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
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
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



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
FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.

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BOOK LI.

THE INVASION.

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leon had just brought back the French to the Rhine in the most deplorable manner. The Guard was reduced from 40,000 to 90 men. Oudinot's corps, (the 12th,) Saxe's, (the 7th,) Augereau's, (the 16th,) and D'Alton's, (the 4th,)—all now collected into one army under General Morand,—did not amount to twelve thousand fighting-men on the day of their entrance into Mayence, which was charged to defend. Marmont's and D'Alton's corps, appointed, under Marmont, to the Rhine from Mannheim to Coblenz, were reduced to 8000 men under arms. The second, D'Alton, had, at the utmost, 5000 men, to the Upper Rhine, from Strasbourg to Coblenz. Macdonald's corps, and Lauriston's, (the 5th,) assembled under Marshal

Macdonald, and destined for the Lower Rhine, had not 9000 efficient men to defend the banks of this noble river from Coblenz to Arnheim. The French cavalry, divided into four bodies, ill mounted, or else actually on foot, could not muster 10,000 cavalry-soldiers fit for service. The Poles, reduced almost to nothing, had been sent to Sedan, where their depôt was, to try to recruit. In short, a mass of stragglers, without arms, without clothes, bearing about them the germs of typhus fever, with which they infected every place through which they passed, recrossed the frontiers in small troops. It was almost a repetition of the retreat from Russia, with this difference,—that there remained about 60,000 men under arms, and that, instead of falling back upon resentful Germany,

we were retiring into France, where we indeed found a home, but a home desolate and laid waste. The disaster of Moscow might have appeared only an accident, but an accident mighty as the destiny that presided over our fortunes; but the campaign of 1813, following upon that of 1812, bore witness to the total desertion of fortune, and the ruin of a system to which was opposed the interest as well as the good sense of the civilized world, and which even the vastest genius was not sufficient to maintain against the current of events.

If such was the condition of things in the locality where Napoleon had commanded in person, it was scarcely more satisfactory elsewhere; and his lieutenants, whether in Italy or in Spain, had not been more fortunate than himself.

Prince Eugene, appointed to defend the Julian Alps, had succeeded in drawing upon the old sources that supplied the army of Italy, and by recruiting in Piedmont, Tuscany, Provence, and Dauphiny, he had succeeded in raising 50,000 soldiers, instead of 80,000, for which he had received orders.

Of these he had formed six divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, the soldiers were young, but the officers were experienced, and with their assistance he had endeavoured to keep the Drave and the Saave from Willach to Laybach, covering the Tyrol with his left wing, and Carniola with his right. After having maintained this extensive line of operations during the months of August, September, and October, constantly expecting the Neapolitans, who never came, he had seen the Austrians present themselves in masses in the passes of Carinthia, he had seen his army dwindle down through the desertion of the Croats and the Italians, and he had successively fallen back, first upon the Isonzo, and afterward on the Tagliamento. The defection of Bavaria, by opening all the passages of the Tyrol upon his left, had rendered his position still more difficult, and, in his anxiety to cover at the same time Verona and Trieste, he had divided his army into two bodies. He had sent General Grenier to Bassano with 15,000 men, while he endeavoured with 20,000, by manœuvring between the Tagliamento and the Piave, to cover Friuli and Venice. It was the studying General Bonaparte's campaigns that inspired him with the idea of sending General Grenier into the valley of Bassano, for in returning through this valley the general might throw himself upon the Austrian flank, while General Giffenga tried with some thousand men to oppose them in front between Trente and Roveredo. But it avails little to borrow the ideas of great captains, if we cannot, at the same time, possess ourselves of their precision and energy in execution. Thus General Grenier lost most precious time wandering uselessly about; and Prince Eugene, who had at disposal not more than 20,000 men to resist the Austrian column coming from Laybach, was afraid of being thrown back upon the Adige,—that is to say, behind the entrance to the valley of Bassano, which would have separated him from General Grenier. He then recalled the latter, in order to retire finally to Verona. He had thus abandoned to the Austrians Carniola, Friuli, the Italian Tyrol, and

only kept the fortresses, that is to say, Osopo, Palma-Nova, and Venice. The necessity of leaving garrisons in these important fortresses, and the desertion of the troops, had reduced his army to 36,000 fighting-men, whilst the adverse generals, Hiller and Bellegarde, had 60,000 at their disposal, independent of the Tyrolean insurgents.

Once established on the Adige, Prince Eugene again took heart, and, attacking the Austrians, sometimes on his left toward Roveredo, sometimes in front toward Caldiero, he killed or captured 7000 or 8000 in various engagements. He had thus succeeded in inspiring his adversaries with a certain amount of respect; but he had in his rear Italy, that had fallen away from us in consequence of the sufferings entailed by the war, and whom the priests and the English were exciting to revolt, and whom Murat did not endeavour to win back to us: all these circumstances presented difficulties which rendered it doubtful whether Prince Eugene could maintain his position. He could only answer for his own fidelity,—simply, alas! for his own. The desolating intelligence from Leipsic had confounded and thoroughly shaken the different courts of Italy, though they were all of French origin. As to Prince Eugene, the husband, as we have seen, of a Bavarian princess, his father-in-law had sent an officer to inform him of the imperative reasons that had detached Bavaria from France, and to offer him an Italian principality if he consented to abandon the cause of Napoleon. Prince Eugene, overwhelmed with grief in thinking of his wife and children, whom he loved, and whom he feared soon to see deprived of every thing, replied that, being indebted to Napoleon for the position he held, he could not think of abandoning him, that he should soon, perhaps, be obliged to seek an asylum at Munich, but he was certain the King of Bavaria would rather receive a son-in-law deprived of a crown than lost to honour. Prince Eugene, after this noble reply, contented himself with communicating to Napoleon an exact account of the interview. ●

The close of the year 1812 had been still more disastrous in Spain than in Italy. We must remember that Napoleon, immediately after the battle of Vittoria, being exceedingly irritated against his brother Joseph and Marshal Jourdan, had despatched Marshal Soult to Spain, to re-establish our affairs there, and, to render his authority more impressive, had conferred on him the rank of imperial lieutenant. Marshal Soult, whose quarrels with King Joseph we have not forgotten, returning armed with power to order the arrest of this prince, if he resisted, had felt a vain-glorious satisfaction, which, unfortunately for our cause, he was doomed soon to expiate. In an order of the day, insulting alike to Joseph and to Marshal Jourdan, he had imputed our misfortune in Spain, not to circumstances, but to the incapacity and cowardice of those who had preceded him in authority,—not foreseeing that he thus deprived himself of every excuse in the circumstances in which he was soon after placed. He had immediately entered on the duties of his office, and turned his attention to the reorganization of the

army. Instead of allowing it to be portioned out into the army of Andalusia, the army of the Centre, the army of Portugal and the Nord, an arrangement that presented serious inconveniences, Marshal Soult distributed the army into simple divisions, commanded by excellent generals, of whom there was a large number in the army of Spain. The organization of this army had been originally so good that it had withstood every reverse. After having distributed the army into ten divisions, of which one was a body of reserve, he confided the command of the right to General Reille; he gave the centre to General Count d'Erlon, and the left to General Clausel. The latter, after the battle of Vittoria, having succeeded by a miracle of courage in reaching Saragossa, had entered France by Jaca, and had just joined Soult with 15,000 men. This movement had certainly the disadvantage of leaving Saragossa unprotected, but it possessed the advantage of concentrating our forces against the English, who were our most formidable enemies in Spain, and it was natural to expect some favourable result from the judicious employment of these troops. The army in Spain, in respect to military qualification, was unrivalled,—especially since the losses we had experienced in Russia and in Germany. They were the bravest soldiers, the most warlike, the most inured to fatigue, that could then be found in Europe. But they were at the same time irritated, disgusted at seeing themselves during six years victimized, not alone to the carrying out of a disastrous enterprise, but to the incapacity and rivalry of their commanders. With immense confidence in themselves, the soldiers had none in their generals, with the exception of Reille and Clausel, and they consequently expected nothing but defeat. This want of confidence in their commanders completely destroyed the spirit of discipline, which had been already considerably weakened by want and privation. Long unaccustomed to having food provided for them, and living solely on what they tore from a population they hated and by whom they were hated, they looked upon themselves as masters of every thing within their reach, and even if they returned to France it was not probable they would change their mode of thinking if they did not alter their manner of living. Covered with rags, embrowned by exposure to the sun, discontented, arrogant, commanded by officers in a still more lamentable plight and who dared not show their ragged garments, they presented the most heart-rending of melancholy spectacles,—that of brave soldiers struggling with vice and want. A great general who could have obtained a mastery over their minds, and led them again to victory, might have rendered them the greatest army in the world.

Napoleon, for fear of disorganizing the only provinces in Spain where the war had not proved disastrous, did not wish to withdraw Marshal Suchet from Aragon, and, for the reasons we have already mentioned, he chose Soult. This marshal, who had acquired great military fame, less, certainly, in Spain, where he had already served, than elsewhere, was not received by the army with unqualified confidence. However, he was capable of repairing much

of the mischief that had been done. He had to do with a formidable enemy,—we mean the Anglo-Portuguese army, reckoning 45,000 English and 15,000 Portuguese, elated with victory,—and in addition to these 30,000 or 40,000 Spaniards, the best soldiers in Spain. It was certainly possible with 70,000 French to make head against this army, numerically greater than ours, but much inferior in quality, with the exception of the English.

Lord Wellington, even after the battle of Vittoria, hesitated to penetrate into France: so he besieged St. Sebastian and Pampeluna, rather to find a pretext for temporizing, than to obtain possession of these two posts, which were scarcely worth the trouble of a siege. To protect this twofold enterprise against the reprisals of the French, he had distributed his army with considerable ability, and surmounted, as much as possible, local difficulties. St. Sebastian, as is well known, is situated on the borders of the sea, nearly at the mouth of the Bidassoa, and at the extremity of the valley of Bastan. Pampeluna, on the contrary, the capital of Navarre, is situated on the opposite side of the valley, and in the basin of the Ebro. Lord Wellington had confided the siege of St. Sebastian to the Spanish army of Freyre, assisted by one Portuguese and two English divisions. These troops were of course posted near the sea, at the extremity of the valley of Bastan. There were in the neighbourhood of St. Estevan, about the centre of the valley of Bastan, three English divisions, ready to make a descent on St. Sebastian, or to march through the valley and throw themselves on Navarre, thus aiding the other three English divisions that were covering the siege of Pampeluna, which was confined to the Spanish troops under General Morillo. With such a distribution of his forces, the English general thought himself tolerably well prepared to meet events whatever turn they might take. Had he, however, been attacked with promptness and secrecy, it is by no means certain that he could have defended himself on every side. Aware of this, he was not without uneasiness, and guarded his position with extreme vigilance.

The French army was distributed in the valley of Saint Jean-Pied-de-Port, which serves as a basin to the Nive, and runs to the sea in a direction almost parallel to the valley of Bastan. Saint Jean-de-Port, which encloses the famous defile of Roncevaux, is the most important place on the upper basin of the Nive, as Bayonne, situate at the confluence of the Nive and the Adour, is the principal point *en route* to the sea. A body of troops might with pretty equal chance of success debouche by this valley, and throw themselves either on the column that was besieging St. Sebastian or on that which was besieging Pampeluna, always bearing in mind that they should act so as to prevent the concentration of the adverse forces. There were some reasons, however, in favour of an attack on St. Sebastian. In the first place, St. Sebastian was more closely pressed; then the road thither was short and good, the journey could be made direct through Yrun, whilst to reach Pampeluna it would be necessary to traverse the entire valley of Saint Jean-Pied-de-Port and pass through the

defile of Roncevaux. Both plans presented pretty much the same amount of facility; but, to succeed in the execution of either, precision and celerity would be needed to drive back from French soil the enemy just ready to plant his foot upon it.

On the 24th of July, Marshal Soult marched forth, at the head of almost his entire army, leaving General Vilatte, with the body of reserve, in advance of Bayonne, and bringing with him about eighty pieces of cannon, taken from the arsenal of Bayonne, and drawn by horses saved from the disaster of Vittoria. On the 25th he had debouched in the upper valley of the Bastan with General d'Erlon's corps, and in the valley of Roncevaux with the corps of Generals Reille and Clausel. The latter had found little difficulty in driving back to Pampeluna the Portuguese and two English divisions that defended the entrance to Navarre. But the Count d'Erlon, to reach the Bastan, had encountered considerable opposition from General Hill, in forcing the *col de Moya*. He had, however, succeeded with a loss of 2000 men, the enemy losing on that occasion 3000. All would have been well if on the following day (the 26th) the Count d'Erlon had been able quickly to rejoin our right, commanded by Generals Reille and Clausel. But the entire of the 26th was lost in rallying the troops, which proves that a grave error had been committed by the commanders in not debouching simultaneously by the valley of Roncevaux, in order to fall suddenly on the English divisions, scattered in front of Navarre. When on the morning of the 27th Count d'Erlon joined Clausel and Reille, the English were already in a strong position in front of Pampeluna. Their forces consisted of four divisions, two English, one Portuguese, and one Spanish: the situation was precisely one of those where we had always attacked at a disadvantage. Moreover, the enemy was about to be strengthened by two divisions hastening by forced marches from the valley of Bastan. In fact, Lord Wellington, having on the night of the 25th learned our approach, turned to profit the entire of the 26th, which we had lost, and brought up his forces from Bastan to Navarre. Even whilst awaiting the expected divisions, the English commander had four perfectly fit for action. General Clausel, whose precision of glance in estimating the strength of a position equalled his energy in action, was averse to attacking the English in front, but recommended that the position should be turned by making an attack on Pampeluna. General Soult not coinciding in his opinion, a strong position was attacked in front, and we had the same fortune there as at Vimero, Talavera, Albuera, and Salamanca. We killed a large number of the enemy, we lost as many ourselves, and we remained at the foot of the position without having carried it. The combat was renewed on the 28th, but without greater success, for the English had been reinforced in the mean time. On the 29th our troops were obliged to return from Navarre into France, after having lost from 11,000 to 12,000 men, and killed or wounded 12,000 of the enemy, in the space of four days. But these losses were much more severe for us than for Lord

Wellington. We had exhausted our resources; whilst his were yet in good condition. Our troops had displayed greater valour than ever, and, if they had not triumphed, they were not disappointed in their hopes, for they had long since ceased to expect any thing either from the ability of their leaders or the kind favours of fortune. The soldiers soon resumed their habits of indiscipline, and sentiments of contempt for their generals; they were in part disbanded, and living at the expense of the French peasants. In this manner, desertion soon equalized the losses on both sides, and each army reckoned from 13,000 to 14,000 men less in the ranks. Unfortunately, the efforts made at the two sieges had produced little result, and Lord Wellington, confining himself to the investiture of Pampeluna, had turned his principal efforts toward St. Sebastian, where the French general Rey supported, with the aid of 2500 men, a memorable siege. Three times had he repulsed the English at the mouth of the breach, after having caused them enormous losses.

Although repulsed, the army, touched by the heroism of the garrison of St. Sebastian, wished to assist them, and Marshal Soult, having returned to Bayonne, made an attempt to aid this brave garrison, which supported so nobly the honour of the French arms. He had passed the Bidassoa and attacked the heights of St. Martial, defended by the Spanish army and two English divisions. The result of this battle was the same as that of all those where we had engaged the English in a defensible position. We caused them great losses, equal or superior to our own, thanks to the valour of our soldiers, but we were obliged to repass the Bidassoa, then swollen with rain, and on the 8th of September we saw the garrison of St. Sebastian surrender, after one of the most noble defences recorded in history. Happily for us, the siege of Pampeluna furnished Lord Wellington sufficient reason for not entering France, at least immediately. Marshal Soult, with an army reduced from 70,000 to only a little more than 50,000 men, had established his left wing on the Nive, round Saint Jean-Pied-de-Port, whilst with his right wing he occupied the banks of the Bidassoa. His left wing being in a valley, his centre and his right in another, there was in his line of operations a lengthened elevation, and here the strength of the position was doubtful. To alter this state of things, he would have been obliged to abandon a portion of the French territory; and it was natural to suppose he would hesitate before making such a sacrifice.

In this manner were passed the summer and the commencement of autumn on the Bidassoa. On his side, Marshal Suchet had resolved, on learning the disaster of Vittoria, to evacuate the kingdom of Valencia, though the sacrifice was a painful one. It certainly would have been better not to imitate the error committed at Dantzic, Stettin, Hamburg, Magdeburg, and Dresden, but rather abandon the possession of the most important places, than that a general should leave in his rear garrisons that he could not assist, and whose absence diminished considerably the efficiency of our armies. But the reiterated instructions of the War Minister, founded on the value that

as attached to keeping possession of the Mediterranean shores, had induced the marshal to save garrisons in a great number of places. He had left 12,000 men at Sagonta, 400 in each of the forts of Denia, Peniscola, and Morella; 4000 at Tortosa, 1000 at Mequinenza, 4000 at Lerida, the same number at Tarragona, with money, provisions, ammunition, good officers,—in a word, every means of defence for a year. After having deprived himself of these detachments, he had returned to Aragon at the head of only 25,000 soldiers, at men in the vigour of health, well dressed, well fed, regretted everywhere by the people through whose territory they passed, and whom they had spared the horrors attendant on war. Marshal Suchet had at first wished to fall back on Saragossa, but, Mina having seized it since the departure of General Clausel, he had been obliged to retire to Barcelona, and to abandon Aragon in order to defend Catalonia against the Anglo-Sicilian army, which did not amount to less than 50,000 men. Judging that the garrison of Tarragona was not in a condition to make an effective defence, Marshal Suchet had for a moment resumed offensive operations, at the enemy to flight, reached Tarragona, saw up the works, and brought the garrison away, so that he now only left in his rear the garrisons of Sagonta, Tortosa, Mequinenza, Lerida, Peniscola, Morella, and Denia. It was quite enough, in the existing state of European affairs, not wishing to allow the enemy to attain a too decisive advantage, he attacked them anew at the *Col d'Ordal*, and after a most brilliant engagement had forced the English to retire to the sea-shore.

The events of the summer and autumn had thus been somewhat less disastrous in this part of the Peninsula than in the other; but if there and elsewhere the fortresses had been evacuated, we might have assembled a noble army of at least 40,000 men, amply provided with every necessary, and led by a chief who possessed the entire confidence of the soldiers: such an army would have contributed to defend our frontiers victoriously. Unfortunately, in the south as in the North, the vain hope of quickly recovering a chimerical grandeur had perverted the judgment of Napoleon, and deprived France of those resources which would have powerfully aided to avert her misfortunes.

Marshal Soult, in quest of French combinations, would willingly have made use of the army of Aragon, to make some important move against Lord Wellington. He at one time wished that Marshal Suchet, traversing Catalonia and Aragon, would join him by passing through Lerida, Saragossa, Tudela, and Pampeluna, with about 25,000 men. At another time Marshal Soult expressed a wish that Suchet, making an immense detour through Perpignan, Toulouse, and Bayonne, should join him to debouch *en masse* against the English. The former of these plans exposed Marshal Suchet to the risk attendant on a march of more than one hundred leagues between the Anglo-Sicilian army, which amounted to 70,000 men, including the Catalonians, and the army of Lord Wellington, which reckoned 100,000 soldiers; that is to say, Marshal Suchet would be exposed to the danger of being overwhelmed by these combined forces, or of being thrust

back into Spain, where he would have been, so to speak, cast into an abyss. The second plan, by condemning him to a journey of one hundred and fifty leagues through France, would abandon all the fortresses in Catalonia and on the frontiers of Rousillon, to the Anglo-Sicilian army, and this risk was to be incurred for a doubtful advantage, for it was by no means certain that Marshal Soult, not having been able to conquer the English with 70,000 men, would succeed in doing so with 90,000; his army not having been deficient on the former occasions in numerical strength. Each of these projects had been pronounced impracticable, and it was only the termination of the war in Spain which, in putting an end to the alliance between the English and the Spaniards, could rid us of both; excepting indeed that the English might, at a later period, appear off our coasts. At length, on the 7th of October, Marshal Soult's right wing having been surprised at Andaye, he had lost 2400 men, and had been obliged to make to the enemy the first concession they had received of French territory. Pampeluna had opened its gates on the 31st, and Lord Wellington, having no motive to pause on the frontiers, had been led, almost in spite of himself, to cross.

The situation of our armies was, then, disheartening on every side. On the Rhine we had 50,000 or 60,000 men worn out from fatigue, followed by an equal number of stragglers and invalids, and having to contend with 300,000 men of the European coalition; in Italy we had 36,000 men in juxtaposition on the Adige with 60,000 Austrians, and burdened with the difficult task of holding Italy in check, that was weary of our rule, and of restraining Murat, who was ready to abandon us; on the frontier of Spain we had 50,000 veterans, disheartened by misfortune, scarcely able to hold the Western Pyrenees against 100,000 victorious soldiers under Lord Wellington; and on this same frontier we had 25,000 more old veterans, in excellent condition certainly, but called upon to defend the Eastern Pyrenees against more than 70,000 English, Sicilians, and Catalonians. Such was the exact position of our affairs, numerically noted down. Napoleon had, it is true, proved a hundred times with what prodigious rapidity he could create resources, but he had never before found himself in such distress. More than 140,000 of our best troops were dispersed in different European fortresses; there remained in France only deserted depots, which even in 1813 had made an effort to drill raw recruits in two or three months, and had sent them forth, officered by the few experienced men they still possessed. Undoubtedly there were still in the regiments that returned to France experienced soldiers and officers, but the authorities were now about to send to them recruits, ill dressed, ill drilled, in order that these old soldiers might do for the recruits what the depots had neither time nor capability to effect; in fact, they were to be constrained to employ in instructing these conscripts the time they would have needed for repose, if the enemy had left them leisure for any. Our fortresses, which would have served as a support to the army, were, as we have said, stripped of all means of defence. Sending an immense amount of war-material beyond the frontiers had de-

prived our home fortresses of indispensable necessities. We had sent to Magdeburg and to Hamburg what was wanted at Strasbourg and Metz, and to Alexandria what would have been needed at Grenoble. Even a part of the Lille artillery was still at the camp of Boulogne. But it was not alone the *matériel* of war in which we were deficient. Our engineer-officers, so numerous, so skilful, so brave, were scattered through more than a hundred foreign cities. We had hardly time to form some cohorts of national guards to hasten to Strasbourg, to Landau, to Metz, to Lille. Thus, in order to conquer the world, which was now escaping from her grasp, France had left herself defenceless. Our finances, formerly so prosperous, managed with admirable regularity, were now as exhausted as our armies, through the chimera of universal domination. The municipal lands seized to liquidate the debt of 1811 and 1812, and to supply the deficiency of 1813, had remained unsold. It was doubtful whether purchasers could be found for ten millions. The paper which represented the anticipated price sunk from 15 to 20 per cent., although nearly the entire of what had been issued was still in the coffers of the bank, and in those of the crown itself, which had taken more than seventy millions. The moral condition of the country was still more wretched, if possible, than the *matériel*. The soldiers, convinced of the folly of the policy for which they were pouring forth their blood, murmured aloud, though they were ever ready, in presence of the enemy, to sustain the national honour. The nation, deeply irritated that the victories of Lutzen and Bautzen had not been profited of to conclude a peace, looked upon themselves as sacrificed to a mad ambition, now that they had experienced the grave inconveniences of an irresponsible government. Disillusioned as to the genius of Napoleon, having never believed in his prudence, but having always had faith in his invincibility, they were at one and the same time disgusted with his government, doubtful of his military capability, and terrified at the approach of enemies who were advancing in masses; the French people, in a word, were morally broken down, at the very moment when to avert the impending danger they would have needed all the patriotic enthusiasm with which they were animated in 1792, or at least the confiding admiration with which the First Consul had inspired them in 1800. Never, in short, was a people in a state of more profound dejection called upon to encounter a more imminent peril.

To a certainty, if the victorious foreigners who suspected a part of these truths had known them in their full extent, they would have paused on the banks of the Rhine only a single day, a sufficient time to provide ammunition and provisions, and would have crossed this river, which since 1795 had been regarded as an inviolable frontier; they would have marched straight to Paris, that city where but a short while before the genius of Victory seemed to have taken up a permanent abode. But the allies, fatigued by their extraordinary efforts, even still astonished at their success, notwithstanding the two campaigns that had terminated to their advantage, felt disposed to pause on the banks of the Rhine. It was the

last respite that Fortune seemed willing to grant ere she abandoned us forever.

More than one cause contributed to the mode of conduct then adopted by the allies, but the glory acquired by the French nation was the determining motive. If the policy of Napoleon had raised the civilized world against him, the glory he had shed over the French people, the unexampled bravery with which we had supported his gigantic enterprise, the recollection of how the French nation had risen to a man in 1792 to repulse the aggression of all Europe, furnished a motive of reflection to the continental Powers who had most at stake in a contest with France. They hated us intensely; but they feared us quite as much. The idea of crossing the Rhine, and of braving within their own realm this people, who had inundated all Europe with their victorious armies, among whom there was not a man who had not borne arms, and where each individual might, indeed, blame the ambition of his chief, but who would, in all probability, support him with might and main if the enemy, having touched the frontiers of France, should attempt to cross,—these considerations disturbed, intimidated, the most experienced of the allied ministers and generals. Besides, after having expelled Napoleon from Germany, what more was there to desire? Would it be wise after an unexpected triumph to tempt fortune again, to fail perhaps in a rash enterprise, to be repulsed beyond the Rhine, and all for want of having had the prudence to pause at that point? This would render Napoleon more exacting than ever, and awaken in him pretensions that were nearly extinct, and would condemn the allies to an endless war, because they had not the good sense to make peace at the proper time, acting in this respect as unwisely as Napoleon had done at Prague. And, then, had not the war already been sufficiently desolating? There was not an army in Europe that did not bear about with them strong testimony of how deeply they had suffered, not alone at Moscow, Lutzen, Bautzen, and Dresden, where they had been conquered, but at Kaisbach, Gross-Beeren, Kulm, Dennewitz, and Leipsie, where they had been victorious. With the exception of the Prussians, among whom there prevailed a sort of national *furor*, excited by the influence of secret societies, the desire of peace was general among the military men of all nations. Though very brave and proud of their success, the Russians had not wished to cross the Oder; they were still more unwilling to cross the Rhine; they thought they had done quite enough in fighting their way from Moscow to Mayence, and that they really had no interest in going farther. The Austrians, who had been fighting two-and-twenty years, and who had ejected from Austria and Germany the conqueror of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Wagram, were desirous of rest. They saw in the prolongation of the war only a means of satisfying the hatred of Prussia, and of increasing the influence of the Russians and English, with, at the same time, the risk of a general defeat. They were, therefore, strongly inclined to peace, which it now seemed probable could be made on a permanent basis. At the head of the military men most anxious for peace was Prince Schwarzenberg. He was

red of the violence of the Prussians, the airs of superiority assumed by the Russians, and the obstinacy of the English, and had spoken strongly in favour of peace, and in the camp of the allies no one opposed the soundness of his arguments. And, what was very extraordinary, a celebrated English commander Lord Wellington, who was the first in Europe that gave check to Napoleon's power, and whose fame is constantly increasing, even he seemed to waver on approaching the formidable frontiers of France. And yet he could not be reached with timidity, for in 1810 and in 1811

he had remained alone in arms on the continent, running at every moment the risk of being pushed into the ocean by the army of France. Even after the decisive battle of Waterloo, which had taken place at our very threshold, Lord Wellington had not advanced a step, and, in reply to the urgent commands of his Government, he said that a general ought to reflect seriously before placing his foot on a burning soil of France. Alas! our enemies, so had so often misunderstood us, and who are doomed to misunderstand us again, flattered us still. They were not aware that a misuse of our national strength had exhausted our resources, and that, disgusted with prolonged despotism and indignant with a seditious ambition, the people of France had become isolated from the Government, and were inclined to look upon the war as a matter interesting to the legislators exclusively, but which the people had no direct interest in. An error into which our enemies had fallen is not fated to be of long duration, but it is very general: they paid us the homage of trembling at the idea of putting a foot on French soil.

This pacific disposition, observable among the military world, with the exception of the Russians, was less prevalent among the statesmen of the coalition, if we except M. de Metternich. This sagacious minister, who in 1813 displayed a rare combination of tact and frankness, of determination and of prudence, sunk from the idea of exposing the fortunes

Austria to fresh risks, and in this respect, in many others, was entirely of the same opinion as his master. M. de Metternich and the Emperor Francis had decided on war, because Germany called loudly for it, because the opportunity of re-establishing the affairs of Austria, and of saving the independence of Germany, was too glorious not to be profited by; but, having attained their object, they did not wish, in attempting to win back all the former glory of Austria, to incur the risk of losing what they had already gained, and at the same time run the chance of increasing the Russian preponderance in Europe, Prussian preponderance in Germany, and English preponderance on the seas. Austria, certain of no longer having the grand army of Warsaw on her northern frontiers, and assured of recovering all she had been deprived of in Poland to constitute this duchy, and of regaining the frontier of the Inn, Tyrol, Dalmatia, and part of Friuli, and of no longer being obliged to maintain the Confederation of the Rhine, ought to consider, and did consider, itself perfectly satisfied. The Emperor Francis, constant in adversity and moderate in

prosperity, was decidedly of this opinion, and M. de Metternich, the faithful interpreter of his thoughts, coincided with him entirely. As to the rest, the marriage of Marie Louise, concocted solely for the interests of the empire, added very little to these excellent reasons. But, if the allies passed the Rhine, a question immediately arose, which had not yet presented itself to the minds of any but a few inconsolable old men, whose regrets had lately been converted into sanguine hopes, and this question was nothing less than the total overthrow of Napoleon himself. To resist his intolerable rule, to restrain, if possible, his excessive ambition, had been at first the desire of all his enemies; to hurl him from the throne of France had never entered into anybody's mind. However, to conquer a man whose title to consideration was based solely on his victories; and after having conquered him in Russia, in Poland, in Germany, to conquer him perhaps in France itself, if the attempt were made; such a series of victories might naturally awaken the idea of attacking his person, and depriving him by the sword of a crown gained by the sword. The bare idea of such a possibility threw the Prussians into ecstasies of joy, and stirred the peaceful and calm-beating heart of Frederick William. As for Alexander, whom Napoleon had personally humiliated, he had never dreamed of so splendid a vengeance, but, presented by circumstances, he did not reject it; on the contrary, his most ardent wish was to enjoy such a revenge in its fullest extent. But supposing the object attained, what was to become of the throne of France, thus rendered vacant? The Prussians cared little about that, provided they could hurl from the pinnacle of his grandeur him who so often had trampled them under foot, and Alexander was equally indifferent to consequences, if he could only be revenged for the contumelious contempt he had experienced from the haughty conqueror. But hatred blinded neither the Emperor Francis nor his minister; they were guided solely by a regard for the interests of Austria, and they asked themselves the question, If the allies crossed the Rhine, what would they do on the other side?

As to Napoleon's being married to Marie Louise, although the Emperor Francis was not a bad father, that circumstance touched him and his minister very slightly. They were influenced by very different feelings. No Power in the world had suffered so much as Austria from the spirit of innovation, or had struggled so vigorously against it during three centuries. In the eighteenth century, she had encountered the great Frederick, and had lost Silesia. During the French Revolution, she had encountered Napoleon, and lost the Low Countries, Suabia, Italy, and the Germanic crown. If we go back even to the time of the Protestant Reformation, we find her, under Charles V., struggling against Luther, that is to say, against the spirit of innovation. An abhorrence of revolutions was a hereditary policy of Austria's, suspended, perhaps, during a short interval under Joseph II., but soon resumed by his successors, and as active as far-sighted under Francis II. and M. de Metternich. They, therefore, asked each other, with an anxiety unshared by any of the allies,

to whom they should confide the government of this stormy France, that held in her hand not alone the terrible sword of war, but the not less destructive torch of revolution. As to the Bourbons, who would have suited them in many respects, they scarcely thought of them, because that France and Europe thought still less of them, and, besides, the capability of the Bourbons was doubtful. It did not appear either to the emperor or his minister easy to replace a soldier of genius, who was willing to repress the spirit of revolution, from which he had himself arisen, not through prejudice, because he entertained none, but through the twofold love of order and of power; thinking, then, less of the interests of Marie Louise than of the dangers of a French Revolution, ready to burst forth again in all its horrors, the Emperor Francis and M. de Metternich were not at all inclined to dethrone Napoleon.

Satisfied with the obtained results, and fearing rather than desiring the vacancy of the French throne, the Emperor Francis and M. de Metternich decided that, once arrived at the banks of the Rhine, it would be better to make Napoleon fresh offers of peace, and, a most unexpected circumstance, England, the persevering enemy of the Bonaparte family, acquiesced in the views entertained by the cabinet of Vienna. The British cabinet having formerly loudly proclaimed their desire of reinstating the Bourbons on the throne of France, having suffered on this account during twenty years the attack of the opposition, by whom they were reproached with carrying on a ruinous war, in which the interests of England were no ways involved, the English ministers at length seemed to fear this reproach, and by dint of defending themselves, in the end, ceased to merit the accusation. Lord Aberdeen, the British representative at the court of the allies, one of the most upright and enlightened ministers that England ever possessed, he, too, was of M. de Metternich's opinion, and did not hesitate to say that if Napoleon made the necessary concessions it would be better to come to terms, and treat him in all respects as a perfectly legitimate sovereign.

Once arrived on the banks of the Rhine, the allies were obliged to come to some resolution on this point. In fact, certain antecedents necessitated them to do so. M. de Metternich, on the very morrow of Austria's coalition with the belligerent Powers, and whilst all were still in Bohemia, even then M. de Metternich had proposed and obtained the general sanction to some important resolutions, all drawn up with the view of obviating the effects of that spirit of discord which usually prevails in coalitions. In the first place, as the sovereigns and their principal ministers were assembled, he proposed that they should not separate until the war should be terminated. Secondly, he had asked and obtained the nomination of a commander-in-chief, who, as we have seen, was the Prince de Schwarzenberg. Thirdly, he had proposed as the object for which the war was to be carried on, not conquest, but the restitution to each sovereign of what he had lost. Now, this proposition might give rise to great uncertainty in the case of Prussia and Austria, both of which had during the past twenty years undergone such numerous transformations;

but to obviate these complications, the Austrian minister had specified that the condition in which Austria and Prussia actually were before the war of 1805 should be regarded as their normal state, and it was moreover decided that the reconquered provinces should be placed as pledges in the hands of the allies. Lastly, M. de Metternich had induced the sovereigns to consent that the war should not be reckoned by campaigns or by years, but by periods measured by the importance of the results obtained. Thus, the progress to the Rhine and the arrival of the army there, was to constitute the first period. The second, if they were constrained to undertake it, should terminate at the heights of the Voges and the Ardennes. The third period, if they were absolutely compelled to carry the war so far, should finish only in Paris itself. The consequence of these profoundly thoughtful resolutions was, that without reverting to the motive, the allies, as each period terminated, paused before commencing the next, to examine deliberately whether peace might not be possible.

Thus, influenced by all the reasons we adduced, Austria, without being at all anxious to take the initiative in fresh negotiations, was still desirous of letting Napoleon know that this was the moment to treat; she wished to advise him to act more wisely than he had done at Prague, and to endeavour, moreover, to conserve a throne, whose security had not hitherto been questioned, but which might soon become doubtful; she wished to counsel him to guard carefully the fair territory of France, and to limit his ambition within the frontier laid down by the treaty of Lunéville. The allied sovereigns and their ministers being at that moment assembled at Frankfort, chance furnished them an opportunity of communicating their opinion to Napoleon, an opinion at that time perfectly sincere, for they had not then crossed the Rhine.

M. de Saint Aignan had been formerly French minister at Weimar. This gentleman combined, with an enlightened intellect, a mild and conciliating temper; he possessed, moreover, the advantages, at that time highly esteemed, of being the brother-in-law of M. de Caulaincourt, and it was well known throughout Europe that M. de Caulaincourt was the only person in the court of France, then so subservient to the will of Napoleon, who had the wisdom to uphold a peace-policy; and this fact, added to the important position he held, rendered him in the eyes of Europe one of the most respectable ministers of the French empire. His brother-in-law had been, by a forced interpretation of the rights of war, looked upon as a prisoner, when the allies entered Weimar. He had been first banished to Toplitz, but afterward recalled to Frankfort, where he was indemnified by every mark of personal respect for a temporary annoyance. He was asked to undertake a mission to Paris, for the purpose of suggesting to Napoleon the idea of a congress, which should assemble immediately on the frontiers, and treat of peace upon the double basis of the natural limits of France, and a complete independence for all nations.

M. de Metternich was the first who made a confidential communication to M. de Saint Aignan touching the nature of this mission.

He assured him that Europe was desirous of peace, that she wished it upon honourable terms and such as every nation in Europe might accept; that she was well aware that, after twenty years of successive victories, France had acquired the right to be respected, and she should enjoy her privilege; that it was not the intention of the allies to try to re-establish the ancient order of things; that Austria did not seek to recover all she had formerly possessed; she would be satisfied to take a suitable and secure position. This was the limit of the pretensions made by the allied princes, and in proof of the sincerity of their intentions, M. de Metternich was commissioned to propose that France should be limited to her natural boundaries, that is to say, the Rhine, the Alps, the Pyrenees, and nothing beyond. He added besides, that it was time for all parties to think of peace, and for France not less than for the rest of Europe; and for Napoleon in particular, more than for any of the belligerent parties, for he had raised up against him a fearful tempest, and the personal irritation he had excited was constantly increasing; that it inspired the combatants with a warlike rage it was difficult to repress; that if he reflected wisely he would see that the sentiments that agitated Europe had penetrated into France itself, and it might happen that he should soon find himself as friendless in his own country as he was in the rest of the world; that the time for entering into an honourable treaty was come, but if the propitious moment were allowed to pass, the war would become intense, implacable, and without hope of cessation until either the one party or the other should be destroyed. Besides, the allied sovereigns would not separate, they would in common make every necessary sacrifice; their offers of peace were sincere, and they wished peace to be universal by land and sea; Russia, Prussia, England herself, wished it. It was now necessary to lay all distrust aside, for the desire to stay the effusion of blood was universal; but it would be well not to fall again into the deplorable error committed at Prague, where in consequence of not believing in Austria, and of not coming to a determination in time, France lost an opportunity of making peace on terms that she could never hope to obtain again. To confirm what he said, M. de Metternich introduced successively M. de Nesselrode and Lord Aberdeen, who repeated in the most succinct but decided terms all that the Austrian minister had said. Lord Aberdeen affirmed, in the name of the British cabinet, that they did not wish either to degrade or humiliate France; that they had no intention of disputing her natural frontiers, for they knew there were certain events to which it was better not to revert; but he repeated that beyond these limits they were decided not to yield to France either territory or actual authority, nor even influence, with the exception of what all the great Powers exercised on one another, when they were content to make use of the advantages of their position without abusing them.

Influenced by all he had seen and heard, M. de Saint Aignan did not entertain the slightest doubt of the sincerity of this language. He replied that taken by surprise, and not having

any positive mission, he could listen to every thing without disobeying instructions that he had never received, but he would report exactly what he had been commissioned to say. He however thought it better for the sake of correctness, that he should be furnished with a written recapitulation of the proposed conditions. M. de Metternich saw no difficulty in the matter, and remitted to M. de Saint Aignan a short but concise note containing the following enunciations.

"The allied sovereigns will not separate, but will remain united, whatever may happen, until peace is concluded. This peace must be general and prevail on the sea as well as on land. It must be founded on the principle of the independence of every nation within its limits, either natural or historical. The Rhine, the Alps, the Pyrenees, will mark the frontiers of France, but she must confine herself within these limits: Holland is to be independent, and her frontiers on the French side shall be afterward determined; Italy also must be independent, and her Austrian frontiers on the Friuli, as well as her French frontiers on the Piedmontese borders, will be a question of future consideration. The Bourbon dynasty must be restored in Spain." (This condition was a *sine qua non*.)

England also was to make restitution beyond the seas, and each nation was to enjoy an entire freedom of trade as should be laid down according to the laws of nations, &c. On this last point alone Lord Aberdeen raised some difficulties, but M. de Metternich, who acted as secretary, satisfied all parties by the use of those vague terms that we have reported. M. de Saint Aignan immediately set out for Mayence, bearing with him the most affectionate messages for M. de Caulaincourt. The purport of these verbal missives was that the allies believed him so honourable and so upright that they were content to accept him as arbiter of the conditions of peace, if Napoleon would invest him with full powers for that purpose.

M. de Saint Aignan arrived on the 11th of November at Mayence, and on the 14th at Paris. He did not delay to communicate his mission to M. de Bassano, who immediately forwarded the communication to Napoleon. This minister was, it must be admitted, considerably changed. Of his former dangerous infatuation, he now only preserved the exterior semblance. His disposition and turn of thought had yielded to the weight of events. He had, consequently, the wisdom to speak favourably to Napoleon of the propositions of Frankfort. They were certainly generous and advantageous. What could we, in fact, desire beyond the Alps and the Rhine? What had we gained by passing these strong and well-defined frontiers? Nothing but the hatred of other nations, the constant effusion of their blood and ours, with thrones for some of the emperor's family, the greater number of which were at that moment overturned, or made instrumental to our injury, because that our government of neighbouring people had assumed the humiliating form of foreign rule; and if, in short, either through pride or fraternal affection, the emperor absolutely demanded some territory beyond the Rhine or the Alps, did not the terms employed

for fixing the limits of Holland and of Italy offer an opportunity of obtaining these family indemnifications?

There was not the slightest ground for refusing the indirect but positive propositions of Frankfort. In fact, Napoleon did not for a moment think of refusing, though his pride suffered severely, but he was now paying the penalty of his errors, for any concession was an admission of weakness. But not to accept instantly the propositions just arrived from Frankfort would be giving the allies an opportunity of withdrawing their offer when they should discover the destitution of France, the dispersion of her resources from Cadiz to Dantzic, her moral dejection, her estrangement from Napoleon; when, especially, the English people, elated by the accounts of the late successes of the allies, should learn these things, they would wish to push their advantage to the last extremity. This danger existed, and it was, in fact, the most serious; but there was another also; it was being obliged to avow himself, what the emperor feared the allies would soon guess, and betraying by too ready concessions the powerlessness to which he was reduced.

Compliance on the part of a person less obstinate than Napoleon, might have appeared dictated by a spirit of conciliation, but for him to yield every point immediately, to fall unhesitatingly into the views of the allies, would be to acknowledge his utter distress. There, side by side with the danger of resisting, was the no less imminent peril of yielding; a not unfrequent consequence of erroneous conduct, which leads us into positions beset with difficulties, and where there is as much to be feared from drawing back as from advancing.

However, the greatest error would be to display a spirit of obstinacy by furnishing those, who reluctantly made the propositions of Frankfort, an excuse to withdraw their offers; it was better to consent to every thing, and that immediately, than run the risk of exposing a secret, which, after all, could not be long concealed. Napoleon wished by replying promptly to evince an eagerness to negotiate, and having only required the afternoon of the 15th for reflection, he sent his answer on the 16th. But the terms of the reply were not happily chosen. There was no allusion to the proposed bases of negotiation, consequently no acceptance of these bases. Mannheim was mentioned as a place for the assembly of the future congress, a city whose locality indicated the intention of entering on business without delay; in short, the reply contained ironical phrases, particularly bitter against England, *opropos* of the independence of nations, which France, it was remarked, demanded both by sea and land. Such was the substance of the reply, a reply which certainly was not delayed, for it was instantly despatched to Marshal Marmont, who commanded at Mayence, with orders to forward it at once to Frankfort. The silence observed by the emperor on the proposed conditions was, without doubt, a part of his policy, and intended to prevent the allies divining his reduced position; for this silence seemed to indicate that he was quite ready to accept every proposition, but it had the disadvantage of discouraging the allies, if they were

sincere, and if they were not so, it furnished them a plausible opportunity for withdrawing their offers.

When Napoleon arrived at Paris, he found the public there plunged in the most profound dejection, in fact almost in despair, but at the same time strongly excited against him. The police, however active they might be, or however arbitrary, could scarcely suppress the manifestation of this general feeling. Although nobody, not even a member of the Government, was in the secret of the negotiations of Prague, although Napoleon had made his ministers and even the chancellor Cambacérès himself believe that the allies had tried to humiliate him, even to the point of depriving him of Venice, which was not true, the public were convinced that, if the negotiations had failed, it was through his fault. The French could not forgive him for having neglected the favourable opportunities for concluding peace which the victories of Lutzen and Bautzen afforded. They regarded his ambition as extravagant, cruel to the mass of mankind, and fatal to France. After the disasters of 1813 added to those of 1812, the French people did not think themselves in a position to resist the formidable coalition, which from the Rhine, the Adige, and the Pyrenees threatened France with the invasion of a million soldiers. The newspaper-writers, either gagged or bribed, and whom no person believed even when they did speak the truth, had received instructions from the Duke of Rovigo upon the manner in which they were to represent the disasters of this campaign. The frost had served as an explanation of the misfortunes of 1812; the defection of the allies was an excuse for the discomfitures of 1813. Besides these excuses, another was found in the unexpected explosion of the bridge of Leipsic. But for the criminal conduct of the Saxons and the Bavarians, exclaimed the apologists,—but for the fault of the officer who blew up the bridge of Leipsic, Napoleon, after conquering the allies, would have returned to the Rhine, bearing with him to France the terms of an honourable peace. Then there was no term of execration that was not lavished on the Bavarians, and still more on the Saxons. They also persisted in declaring that Colonel Montfort was to be tried by court-martial for the catastrophe of the bridge of Leipsic, though, whatever such persons might say, Colonel Montfort was perfectly innocent. Nobody believed these assertions; and like liars, who when they perceive they are not believed raise their voices still higher, these bribed journalists repeated with more bitterness their appointed lesson, without obtaining more credence. "He wants to sacrifice all our children to his wild ambition," was the cry of every family from Paris even to the extremity of the most remote provinces. They did not deny the genius of Napoleon, they did worse, they did not think of it at all, in order to avoid remembering his passion for wars and conquests. The horror with which the guillotine formerly inspired the French people they now felt at the prospect of war. The universal topic of conversation was the battle-fields of Spain and Germany, the millions of dying, of wounded, and of sick, expiring without attendance on the fields of Leipsic and Vitoria. They represented Napoleon as a kind of war demon.

thirsting for blood, and happy only when surrounded by desolation and death. France, formerly disgusted with liberty after ten years of revolution, was now disgusted with despotism, after fifteen years of military rule, and the effusion of human blood from one end of Europe to the other. The violence of the prefects, in carrying off the children of the humbler classes as conscripts, and those of the higher classes to form guards of honour; worrying families whose sons did not respond to the summons by the demand for subsidies; employing movable columns against the malcontents who traversed the country; often treating French provinces as if they were portions of a conquered kingdom, converting into compulsory taxes the pretended voluntary gifts proposed and acceded to by their representatives; the seizure at one and the same time of goods, horses, cattle; a suspicious police, reporting the slightest observations and arbitrarily imprisoning those who were accused of making them, and always suspected of being present even when they were not; a deep misery in the seaports in consequence of the suspension of commerce; equal distress on the frontiers, across which our traffic formerly found a safe passage, but where a million foreign bayonets now intercepted the transport of a single bale of merchandise; in a word, an inexpressible and universal dread of invasion—all these evils, arising at the same time from the uncontrolled will of one individual, furnished a severe lesson, which effaced that of the revolution, and which, without rendering France republican, awakened a desire for a constitutional monarchy. All the old parties, which had almost sunk into oblivion, began to revive. The revolutionists made some efforts, but, it must be avowed, without effect. Some, but certainly not a numerous party, attached themselves to Napoleon through fear of the Bourbons, whom they hated; they wished to make him dictator, on condition that he would have recourse to extraordinary measures, and that he would call the people to a movement similar to that of 1792. But these were maniacs, dreaming of a past that could never be recalled. The movement of 1792 had been only a burst of indignation on the part of France when unjustly assailed by all Europe; but now the cases were reversed, and allied Europe experienced against France as strong a sentiment of indignation as France had formerly entertained against the rest of Europe. The royalists, partisans of the house of Bourbon, revived by hopes excited by the priests, now more daring and more numerous than the revolutionists, began to raise their voices and obtain an audience. France had almost forgotten the Bourbons, from whom she had been separated by events of such magnitude that they seemed to occupy the space of centuries in the public mind; she feared, besides, the Bourbon manner of thinking, their accessories, their resentments; but, terrified at the further prospect of imperial government, and determinately repulsing republican rule, France began to think that the Bourbons, restrained by wise laws, might offer a means of escaping from despotism as well as from anarchy. As to the rest, it was only men of the highest order of mind that carried their views further. The mass of the people hailed the name of the

Bourbons, in order to stop the cry of war, which was devouring their children, increasing taxation, and paralyzing commerce.

When a Government begins to be in danger, an indubitable evidence may be found in the temper of mind displayed by the functionaries. In 1813 and 1814, the functionaries of the empire were low-spirited, dejected, discouraged, and, though a certain number affected a violent zeal, the greater part, without avowing it, entertained as inimical a feeling toward Napoleon as his greatest enemies, because they felt that in compromising himself he had involved them all. But danger had infused somewhat of a spirit of independence into some of the higher functionaries. They told Napoleon at the close of 1812, and they repeated it to him at the end of 1813, that without peace all would be destroyed, they as well as he. Soldiers of the highest rank, that he had loaded with gifts, but to whom he denied leisure to enjoy them, maintained a sullen silence, or said harshly that no resource remained but to carry on the war. Two most sensible men, one a soldier, the other a Government functionary, Berthier and Cambacérès, no longer concealed their consternation. Berthier fell ill; Cambacérès fell into a fit of devotion, which, being utterly unlike any affection he had ever before manifested, was considered a visible consequence of profound dejection. Concealing his real opinion from Napoleon, as from one he deemed incorrigible, he asked permission to retire, in order to finish his days in repose and piety. Some others, less resigned, had manifested their vexation more openly. Ney, it is said, had given vent to violent expressions; Marmont had presumed upon the liberty of an old acquaintance to offer some advice; Macdonald, with a rather uncouth mixture of craft and simplicity, had expressed his opinion; M. de Caulaincourt had given utterance to his with his accustomed courage, and a sort of respectful haughtiness. All were unanimous on one point,—a desire for peace. And there was the empress, who, without giving any advice, for she did not know who was right or wrong, did nothing but weep. She feared for herself, for her son, even for Napoleon, whom she loved at that time, as a young woman loves the man she has married.

This idea of peace, which pursued him like a bitter reproach, annoyed Napoleon so much the more, because, not having desired, when it depended on himself to obtain it, he now felt that, desiring, he could no longer procure it, and that peace so long repulsed at last eluded his pursuit. Strange and fatal vengeance, evolved from our own misdeeds! Europe had certainly just offered with sincerity to resume negotiations, but that sincerity might be doubted by one who was not in the councils of the allies, and it was besides probable they would not persevere in the offer as soon as our weakness, which could not be long concealed, should become publicly known. Napoleon then had very little faith in the possibility of an acceptable peace, and only expected it from a last desperate struggle, kept up on our frontiers or beyond. This was why he addressed the following reply to all his censors, whether open or secret. "It is easy," said he to them, "to speak of peace, but it is not so easy to con-

clude it. Europe seems to offer peace, but she does not wish it sincerely. She has conceived the hope of destroying us, and this hope, once conceived, she will never abandon, unless we can make her feel the impossibility of success. You believe that it is by humiliating ourselves we shall disarm her: you are mistaken. The more yielding you are, the more exacting she will become, and from demand to demand she will lead you on to terms of peace that you could not accept. She offers you the line of the Rhine and the Alps, and even some part of Piedmont. These certainly are favourable conditions; but if you appear willing to accept, she will soon propose the frontiers of 1790. Well, can I accept them?—I, to whom the natural frontiers have been transmitted by the Republic? There has been perhaps a moment when we ought to have shown ourselves more moderate, but, in the actual state of things, too manifest a yielding on our part would be an avowal of our distress that would render the prospect of peace more remote than ever. We must fight once more, fight desperately, and if we conquer, then we ought certainly hasten to conclude peace, and in such a work, believe me, none will be more eager than I."

Unfortunately, each moment added to the correctness of Napoleon's assertions, for Europe, learning gradually the full extent of our weakness, no longer thought of making any concession, and if we wished for peace now, we ought to be able to win it by force. But after having believed Napoleon too easily, when he did not speak sincerely, the allies now refused to believe, when what he said was only too true. They only saw, in the language we have just quoted, his obstinate temper, his insatiable passion for war, (a passion that had once ruled him, but which had passed away forever,) and many persons who cared little whether the peace were honourable or not, whether France conserved or yielded her natural frontiers, provided the imperial throne was saved, and that they preserved their posts,—such people said that *this man*, (it was so they designated Napoleon!) that *this man* was mad, that he was running to his own destruction, and would destroy them all at the same time. Thus the truth that Napoleon would not listen to, when it might have been profitably heard, now reappeared under the most painful forms, evidenced, not alone in the strong cry of the people, but in the affliction of faithful friends, in the sulky ill humour of selfish adherents, and often even in the insolence of the vilest courtiers, from whose breasts despair at the loss of place had banished every feeling of respect.

When an erroneous opinion takes possession of the public mind, and this opinion is sure to be implacable because it is erroneous, it demands a victim. There was one in those days that all the power of Napoleon could not refuse, we will not say, to the public, that was condemned to silence, but to his own indignant courtiers, and this victim was M. de Bassano. It was generally known, though the particulars had not been ascertained, that at Prague France might have obtained a glorious peace, and that the emperor had refused; it was known that now again the emperor had just received a very satisfactory proposition, and an ante-chamber rumour reported that he had

not replied in a suitable manner; and for all these faults M. de Bassano was blamed; his pride and want of foresight having, it was said, caused all our misfortunes. It was said that instead of enlightening Napoleon as to the true state of things, M. de Bassano had done all he could to deceive him,—as if any one could be responsible for the acts of so self-willed a character. M. de Bassano had been undoubtedly a complaisant minister, but more complying than dangerous, for it is doubtful if even by joining M. de Caulaincourt he could have obtained a more favourable result at Prague. He certainly ought to have tried, and if he had not saved France, he would at least have exonerated himself. He was now overwhelmed with the common injustice that springs from passion; and M. de Caulaincourt, who owed him a grudge for not having supported his opinion at Prague, M. de Talleyrand, who amused his leisure by incessantly rallying him, both declared that to obtain peace it was necessary to persuade the world they really desired it, and that the least humiliating mode of proving this disposition was to dismiss M. de Bassano.

Napoleon resigned himself to this sacrifice, the first, but useless, expiation of his errors. He knew very well that M. de Bassano was not the real culprit, that an attack on the minister was a blow directed against himself, and though his sense of justice as well as his pride was wounded by the sacrifice, the emperor consented to withdraw M. de Bassano from the administration of foreign affairs, for the danger was pressing, and he felt that on every side he was obliged to make sacrifices on the altar of public opinion. Thus, under despotism as well as under free governments, the instrument that has been used for the perpetration of a wrong is punished, only under an absolute government, the pride of the monarch is made to suffer, for he is obliged to condemn himself in punishing his tool. Besides, the avowal is at once vexatious and fruitless, because the sacrifice is made when the evil is irreparable.

The two authors of M. de Bassano's disgrace, M. Talleyrand and De Caulaincourt, were alone capable of filling his place. Napoleon first thought of the former, who had more weight in Europe than the latter, though he was less respected. M. de Talleyrand, with his wonderful political sagacity, saw the termination of the empire approaching; however, he was not sufficiently assured of the event to refuse the direction of foreign affairs, a post to which he originally owed his greatness. But distrusting Napoleon's despotism as much as Napoleon distrusted his fidelity, he still set much value on remaining a great dignitary. Now, on this point, Napoleon had laid down for himself a principle, which was never to combine in the same individual the ministerial power with the quality of a grand dignitary. In his empire, such as he had desired it, the great dignitaries, emanating from the royal authority, watching over the different branches of the administration, possessed somewhat of the inviolability of the monarch, as they also partook in some degree of his august character. Now, he did not wish his ministers to be inviolable, and M. de Talleyrand less than another. But M. de Talleyrand ardently wished to hold this posi-

tion, particularly under such a master as Napoleon. Through the operation of these despicable motives, there was a misunderstanding, and M. de Caulaincourt became minister of foreign affairs. There could not be found a minister more estimable, more esteemed, or more welcome to the other Governments of Europe.

Napoleon profited of the opportunity to effect some other changes in the ministry; some of these were the consequence of that which had just been accomplished; others were the result of a more remote design. In withdrawing M. de Bassano from the direction of foreign affairs, Napoleon did not intend to leave this faithful servant without office; he gave him the post of Secretary of State, where his duties brought him into the most intimate communication with the monarch. This was bringing him back to the starting-point of his ambition, but it was necessary to yield to public opinion, at that time stronger than Napoleon himself. M. Daru at that time held the office of Secretary of State. There were still fewer motives for removing from office a person whose absence was not desired either by the public or the monarch. M. Daru, a minister, upright, firm, indefatigable, who had always accompanied Napoleon in his most difficult affairs, and shared his most trying dangers, was besides reputed to have given very useful advice on many occasions, and nobody could see a public advantage in his removal from office. Napoleon, who himself held these opinions, constituted M. Daru one of the two war ministers. General Clarke, Duke of Feltre, had the administration of the *personnel*, M. de Cessac that of the *matériel*. The latter had long done good service, and was capable of doing still more; but Napoleon, forced to make vacancies, allowed him to forestall the time of his retirement from office, and dismissed him with many well-merited marks of distinction. M. Daru succeeded M. de Cessac. And, lastly, Judge Reynier, Duke of Massa, a magistrate, upright and laborious in the discharge of his duties, but advanced in age, and no longer able to support the fatigues of office. Napoleon, though esteeming him highly, had already removed him temporarily in consequence of a long illness, and he profited of the present occasion to replace him permanently by M. le Comte Molé, whose intelligence, name, and manner of thinking pleased him. Napoleon not wishing that this substitution of another in his place should seem a disgrace for the Duke of Massa, resolved to make him president of the legislative body. M. de Massa was not member of the legislative corps, and consequently had no chance of being placed upon the list of candidates for the presidency, which this body had a right to present. But in those days, slight difficulties were not allowed to stand in the way. It was decided that a change should be effected in the constitution by means of a *senatus-consulte*, and that the legislative body should no longer contribute to the nomination of the president by a presentation of candidates. This was not a well-chosen moment to give offence to a body, that following the prevailing example of the times seemed to acquire courage in proportion as Napoleon lost his strength; however, the changes proceeded, and this *senatus-consulte*,

less insignificant than it seemed to be, was prepared with several others more useful and more urgent.

The question now was, on the eve of the last terrible struggle against combined Europe, to raise men and money, to raise them in abundance and quickly. These two means, so essential to the carrying on war, were exhausted. In the preceding month of October, before leaving Dresden for Leipsic, Napoleon had commissioned Marie Louise to repair to the senate to procure the conscription of 1815, which was to furnish 160,000 conscripts, and besides, an extra levy of 120,000 men from the classes of 1812, 1813, and 1814 who were already disbanded. The senate had made no more difficulty of granting these 280,000 men, than it had made in abandoning to Napoleon so many victims of war, then lying buried in the plains of Castile, of Germany, of Poland, and of Russia. Unfortunately, these immense levies, whose prompt enrolment was so desirable, were more easily decreed than put into execution.

Among the 280,000 men, whose enrolment had been decided in October, we must consider as wholly unfit for service in the approaching conscription of 1815, those who, thanks to the system of forestallments, had been sent as soldiers at eighteen and nineteen years of age, that is to say children, brave but weak, and incapable of supporting the hardships of war. Europe had seen thousands of these children perish, who, full of ardour on the battle-field, died of fatigue on the high-roads or in the hospitals. Napoleon did not wish any more of these, and if he asked the conscription of 1815, it was with the intention of forming a body of reserve which would fill the depots and occupy the garrisons. He could then only reckon on the 120,000 men of the former conscriptions. But to raise this levy, the only one that could be useful, would be extremely difficult, because it would be necessary to seek men already discharged, and who, having already on several occasions furnished substitutes, would find themselves drawn as conscripts, a third and even a fourth time. This falling back on the conscripts, who had already served, though it procured soldiers of a better quality, was also attended by the grave disadvantage of exciting the most violent discontent, and requiring the most delicate management, which rendered the levies much less productive. Under these circumstances, married men could not be called out, nor men necessary to the support of their families, and thus, whilst 100,000 men were expected, they were glad to obtain 60,000.

Justifying himself by the pressure of circumstances, Napoleon conceived the idea of falling back on all the classes that had already served, and taking all the unmarried men, whose services were not indispensable to their families. Reckoning at 300,000, the men whom he might raise in this way, he caused a *senatus-consulte* to be drawn up, which authorized him to raise the number from the discharged classes, reascending from 1813 to 1803. These 300,000 men joined to the 280,000 decreed in October, raised to about 600,000 the levies, about to be called out during this winter, and never, it must be said, had such exorbitant demands been made on a population, or any so destructive to

future generations. It was not the opposition of the senate that was feared, but that of private families, and it was very doubtful whether, even threatened with legal compulsion, they could be brought to satisfy such demands. Certainly, if the 600,000 men, originally talked of, could have been assembled, drilled, and embodied in time, there would have been more than a sufficient number of troops to drive back the allies beyond the frontiers. But, what with the public discontent on the subject of the war, and what with the prevailing opinion that it was carried on merely to satisfy Napoleon's personal ambition, how many among these 300,000 men would respond to the call of Government? and above all, how much time would be needed to convert these recruits into disciplined soldiers? Nobody could say. Napoleon, nevertheless, accustomed to the submission of the people, and to the incapacity and tardiness of his adversaries, hoped to obtain a large proportion of the levies, and calculated on having to the approaching April to drill them for the coming campaign.

But whether these 600,000 men arrived a little earlier or later, it would be necessary to pay them, and Napoleon's finances, which had been so well administered during fifteen years, had now, like all the other branches of his power, sunk under protracted abuses. We have seen how his budgets of 750 millions (without reckoning the 120 millions for *les frais de perception*) had successively mounted to 1000 millions, after the annexation of Rome, of Tuscany, of Illyria, of Holland, and the Hanseatic cities. The war, having since 1812 assumed gigantic proportions, the budget of 1813 had mounted to 1191 millions, without the *frais de perception*. The expenses of the last war, those at least that were cleared by the budget, having mounted from 600 to 700 millions, it was supposed that this budget would touch 1300 millions, (1420, including the *frais de perception*.) at that time esteemed an enormous amount. Thus, within two years, the budget had mounted from 1000 to 1400 millions, and if we refer to the market-prices of that period, we shall be able to estimate the actual amount of property this rate of taxation assumes to be in the country. Still it would be all as nothing if we could only make head against our difficulties. But, independent of the 100 millions in excess of our expenses, imputable to war, there was a deficiency of 70 millions in the revenue. It was then 170 millions, which by an excess on one side and a deficiency on the other, represented our real shortcomings for the year. But there was another deficiency still more embarrassing. Not being able to have recourse to a loan, and not wishing to have recourse to taxation, Napoleon had conceived the idea of selling the municipal property, and of realizing the value in advance, by means of bills on the *caisse d'amortissement*. 46 millions of these bills had been applied to the budget of 1811; 77 to that of 1812; and 149 to the budget of 1813. This expedient had completely failed. More than two millions of this municipal property had not been sold, in consequence of the tedious formalities, the public distress, and the general distrust. The bills issued not having come into general circulation, were exposed to an increasing depreciation, and yet, perhaps at the utmost, more

than from 25 to 30 millions had not been offered to the public, the precaution having been taken of distributing the greater part to the contractors. Notwithstanding these precautions, there was already a loss of from 15 to 20 per cent. There was thus at the same time a loss of the 272 millions, which were to have been raised by bills, and the 170 millions deficient in the budget of 1813, which made a total deficit of 442 millions; an overwhelming deficiency at a time when there were no means of raising credit, unless the public and private banks could be induced to receive the bills of the *caisse d'amortissement*. Ten millions had been given to the Bank of France, 62 millions to the *caisse de service*, 52 millions to the *décaisse extraordinaire*, which exhausted, as we have seen, the last disposable means to be drawn from this source.

The privy purse of the crown remained, containing the savings Napoleon had made out of the civil list. Napoleon, as we have already said, thanks to an admirable spirit of order, had saved 135,000,000 from the civil list. He had placed 17,000,000 of this in the Mont-Napoleon at Milan, 8,000,000 in the Banque de France, 4,000,000 in the salt-works. He had lent 13,000,000 to the *caisse de service*, and he had employed 23,000,000 in the purchase of bills of the *caisse d'amortissement*. There remained, besides, three or four millions to meet the current expenses of the crown, and 63,000,000 in gold and silver deposited in the vaults in the Tuileries, a last resource, which he guarded religiously, not as a means of providing for himself in a foreign country, (such forethought was beneath his lofty ambition,) but to sustain his last struggle against the universal rising of the nations.

With the exception of these 63,000,000, Napoleon had exhausted all the public banks to force them to take the bills that represented the value of the municipal property. Having found, in this way, the means of passing 150,000,000 of these bills, there remained of the total deficiency of 442,000,000, of which we have spoken, an actual deficiency of about 300,000,000, which there were no means of meeting, every resource being absolutely exhausted.

In such a state of things, the necessity of recurring to taxation became imperative. But if Napoleon, on the plea of necessity, had made the enormous demand of 600,000 men, he might easily, on the same plea, ask for a few millions in money. Moreover, taxation was the only source of revenue which had hitherto been carefully managed, the only source that remained intact, though indirect contributions, at all times unpopular, were then loudly decried under the name of *droits réunis*. But the direct taxation might still bear a fresh burden, and that, too, pretty heavy. By adding merely thirty centimes to the income tax of 1811, it was easy to raise 80,000,000, available on the instant. It was possible to obtain 30,000,000 more by doubling the *contribution mobilière*. It was therefore decreed in council, that the payment of these sums should be required in the months of November, December, and January. There was an addition of one-fifth made on the salt duty, and of a tenth on the indirect taxes. These extra taxes were expected to produce

ly 120,000,000, without over-pressure, perhaps, pressing a little on the would be required for the year 1814. 120,000,000, with the ordinary taxes, treasure concealed in the Tuilleries, a postponement that state creditors ged to submit to, means were found the more pressing wants.

tion now was to legalize these demoney. Napoleon, by a decree dated banks of the Rhine, had fixed the 2d ber for the assemblage of the legisla- , hoping to be able to make use of to obtain extraordinary resources, raken the patriotism of the nation. certain number of the legislators had e Paris; but they were not found ell disposed as was desired, for, with increase of danger, and the no less y of Napoleon's prestige, the spirit idence had revived in the public mind. ble discussions were therefore to be d besides, however prompt might be ion of the proposed measures, they be effected before the middle of Dec- nd the receipt of the money should deferred to January, whilst it was ranted at the moment. It was then that the levy of the extra centimes made by a decree, by which means a s gained. This manner of proceed- a would be utterly impossible under te and regular régime, was authorized than one precedent. In fact, some- urnish the equipment of cavalry sold by the departments; sometimes in tribute more equally the *réquisitions*, ting them into public contributions, its had not hesitated to levy the ad- entimes, by virtue of their personal ; and whether through a feeling of whether through the habit of sub- obody had complained. The emperor arely, in the presence of absolute enture as far as the prefects, and by a sed on the 11th of November, the next ne after his arrival at Paris, he com- le immediate payment of the sums numerated. The crime was not great pare it with the illegal acts the im- vernment had often committed; and here was the excuse of the imminence ger. But this act, like many others, at value was then set on the laws. ing of the legislative corps becoming sary, since extraordinary levies had ed by a simple decree, the assembly rned from the 2d to the 19th of De- n order to escape importunate discus- he precaution, as we shall soon see, a wise one, for these legislators, all t Paris, and passing their time idly, bing the opinions of the capital, did e more indulgent toward a Govern- ly flattered when all-powerful, freely the moment it began to decline, and d on the eve of its fall by a universal

Another inconvenience attendant on blage of the legislative corps, which nment wished to avoid, was the elec- fourth series, (the legislative body was to five,) whose powers expired at the ment of 1813, and the election had al-

ready been deferred a year. To assemble the electors at this moment being attended with quite as much danger as assembling the deputies, it was decided to defer the election of the fourth series another year. This measure, and that which abolished the list of candidates for the presidency of the legislative body, that also of a fresh call for 300,000 men, raised simply by the authority of the senate, which was supposed to be always sitting and always submissive, as it actually was to the penultimate hour of the empire. The assembly was convoked for the 15th of November, and presented with these three measures.

The meeting of the senate was distinguished by unusual pomp. There was a desire to awaken the spirit of the nation, to speak to the people's heart, to excite their patriotic devotedness. Unfortunately, when nations are spoken to either rarely or too late, the orators are liable to be listened to with distrust, or to be misunderstood. The Government orator related in vain the late reverses of our armies, he declaimed in vain against the perfidy of our allies, against the fatal imprudence committed at the bridge of Leipsic; he pointed out in vain what France had to fear from a victorious coalition; he produced little effect on an impassible and degraded senate, he wrought only one conviction, that indeed the danger was imminent, and that it was necessary to call on the nation to make great efforts without, alas! the hope of seeing such an appeal responded to after fifteen years' reckless and fruitless war. The 300,000 men to be drawn from the discharged conscripts were voted without a single objection. The adjournment of the election of the fourth series was also accorded, the motive alleged being that it was of pressing necessity to assemble the legislative body, rather a singular reason when the meeting of this body had been adjourned from the 2d to the 19th of December, though the majority of the members was in Paris. And the motive adduced for the suppression of the list of candidates for the presidency of the legislative body was not less singular. It was that perhaps the proposed candidates might be ignorant of court etiquette, or be personally unknown to the emperor. The senate did not question the substance nor the motives of the decrees; they voted them without observation, as they were ready to vote every thing, even to the day when they voted the downfall of Napoleon himself at the bidding of foreigners.

These political, military, and financial measures had occupied Napoleon incessantly since his arrival in Paris. One of his first acts, and one which might be deemed fortunate, if it had not occurred somewhat late, was to transfer the foreign correspondence from M. de Bassano to M. de Caulaincourt. M. de Metternich, on receiving M. de Bassano's reply, which was at the same time enigmatical and ironical, had replied, after consulting the allied courts, and his reply was pretty much to this effect:—"The allies have learned with pleasure," he said, "that the emperor has at length recognised in M. de Saint Aignan's mission a sincere desire for peace. They are also glad that he has pointed out Manheim as a place of assembly for the congress, and will accept his choice: but," he added, "the allies do not see with the same

satisfaction the care with which the French Government avoids all explanation as to the fundamental basis proposed at Frankfort, and they feel compelled to demand, as a preliminary to all negotiation, the formal adoption or rejection of the basis."

It ought to have been a source of satisfaction to the French emperor to find the allies still insist on the adoption of the Frankfort basis, though it might now be doubtful whether they were sincere; but the emperor ought to hasten and take them at their word ere they retracted the propositions. The fact of M. de Caulaincourt being now manager of foreign affairs left no doubt as to the character of the reply. He urged upon Napoleon the necessity of sending such an answer as ought to have been sent on the 16th of November, and he succeeded. Without losing an instant he wrote on the 24 of December that, according to the proposition of a congress, and accepting the principle of the independence of all nations established within their natural frontiers, the emperor had, by implication, accepted the primary basis laid down in M. de Saint Aignan's instructions, and that now, to remove all difficulty, these were expressly accepted; that these conditions demanded great sacrifices from France, but she would willingly make these sacrifices in the cause of peace, especially if, England would give up the maritime conquests which France had a right to demand of her, and consent that the same principles of negotiation should obtain on sea as on land.

It is probable that had this reply been despatched eighteen days previously, events might have taken a very different course. But now many pretexts might be made as to a change of opinion on the part of the allied Powers; if better informed of our distress, they wished to retract the offers they had made at Frankfort.

In consenting to treat on the basis of the natural limits of France, Napoleon mentally resolved to retain all he possibly could beyond these limits, and in the instructions to the plenipotentiary whom he had already chosen (it was M. de Caulaincourt) he laid down the following conditions:—In consenting that he should have nothing beyond the Rhine, it was yet to be understood that he was to keep on the right bank of that river, Kehl, opposite Strasbourg, Cassel, opposite Mayence, and the city of Wesel, situated on the right bank—but which had become in some sort a French city. As to Holland, he did not despair of keeping a part of that, by abandoning the Dutch colonies to England. In any case he was resolved to dispute the limits that separated Holland from France, and to propose, first the Yssel, then the Leek, and lastly the Nahal, a frontier from which he was resolved not to retire, and which would secure to him that portion of Holland he had taken from King Louis. He also wished it to be understood that Holland was not to fall again under the authority of the House of Orange, but that it should become a republic.

As to Germany, he was satisfied to renounce the Confederation of the Rhine; but on condition that no federal union should subsist between the German States, and that in restoring Magdeburg to Prussia, and Hanover to England, Hesse and Brunswick should be

consolidated into the kingdom of Westphalia, independent of France, but governed by Prince Jerome.

Napoleon wished that Erfurt should be conceded to Saxony in indemnification for the grand duchy of Warsaw. He desired that Bavaria should preserve the boundary of the Inn, and this he proposed in order that he should not be obliged to give up Wurzburg, which would necessitate an indemnification to the Duke of Wurzburg in Italy.

In Italy, he was willing that Austria should have, besides Illyria, that is to say, Laybach and Trieste, a portion of territory beyond the Isonzo, but on condition that France should advance as far into Piedmont as Austria into Friuli. All that France had possessed in the Milanais, Piedmont, Tuscany, and the Roman States, should form an Italian kingdom, alike independent of Austria and France, and governed by Prince Eugene.

The Pope was to return to Rome, but without temporal sovereignty. Naples should belong to Murat, Sicily to the Neapolitan Bourbons. The ancient King of Piedmont should have Sardinia alone.

The Ionian Isles should be incorporated with an Italian state, if Malta were ceded to Sicily. In any other case the Ionian Isles should belong to France with the isle of Elba.

Spain should be restored to Ferdinand VII., and Portugal to the House of Braganza. But England should not retain any of the Spanish or Portuguese colonies.

Denmark was to keep Norway. Lastly, an article was to be inserted which should describe, in less general terms, the rights of the neutral flag.

Such were the conditions that Napoleon wished to present to the future congress at Manheim. Unfortunately, he erred widely in his reckoning, and notwithstanding his profound sagacity, spite of his clear knowledge of his position, a knowledge so clear as to make him doubt whether the allies could seriously offer him the Frankfort bases, he had still the weakness to think these propositions would be listened to at Manheim. It is true that at this moment he entertained a hope which might justify his flattering dreams, could it be realized: it was that the war would not recommence until April. If, in fact, the allies, fatigued by this terrible campaign, should pause on the banks of the Rhine until April, and thus afford him four months to prepare his resources, he might, with the *débris* of his armies, and the 600,000 men voted by the senate, muster at least 300,000 disciplined soldiers, and with this force combined under his powerful hand, he might thrust back from the banks of the Rhine the enemy that would have dared to cross that river. It is certain that with 300,000 soldiers fighting on friendly soil, and within a circumscribed space, their martial spirit dilated by misfortune, the chances of success were manifold. But would the enemy accord him these four months? Was it reasonable to suppose they would? That was the question, and on this question depended both his throne and our greatness; not our moral greatness, which was indestructible, but our material greatness, which was subject to ordinary laws.

As to the rest, the emperor acted not as if

he had four, but as if he had scarcely two months left for preparation, and he employed his resources put at his disposal with his characteristic activity, now excited beyond the ordinary pitch. The garrisons were the first objects that needed looking after. They were distributed into two divisions; those of the Rhine and those of the Scheldt, covering our natural frontier Huningue, Belfort, Schelestadt, Strasbourg, Landau, Mayence, Cologne, Wesel, Arcum, Antwerp; those of the interior, covering our frontier of 1799, Metz, Thionville, Luxembourg, Mezières, Mons, Valenciennes, Lille, &c., we only name the principal. Whilst Alessandria, Mantua, Venice, Palma-Novo, Anapa, Dantzic, Flissingue, and the Texel were spared by expensive works; places indispensable to our home protection, Huningue, Strasbourg, Landau, Mayence, Metz, Mezières, Valenciennes, Lille, were left utterly defenceless. The scaling-ladders were standing, but useless; the pont-levis unfit for use. The guns were not mounted: there was a want of tools, of wood for blinds, of bridges of communication between the works, of horses for transport, of smiths and carpenters. The artillery and engineer officers, who had remained in the interior of the country, were nearly all old men, unfit to support the fatigues of a siege. Provisions had not yet begun to arrive, and money, which can supply so many wants, was not forthcoming, and it was doubtful whether it could be sent in time and in sufficient quantities. In a word, we wanted garrisons, and it was to be feared that in forming them we might weaken the active army already so much impoverished.

We endeavoured to supply first the most pressing wants. It was of imperative necessity to transport the depots of the several regiments from the first line of fortresses to the second, in order to disembarass those that might be first attacked, and to put beyond the reach of the enemy those depots that were the sources that recruited the regiments. This measure, hastily undertaken, was difficult, for not only was it necessary to transport the men, both healthy and ill, from one place to the other, but also the superintendents and the magazines. The depots that were at Strasbourg, Landau, Mayence, Cologne, and Wesel, were transferred to Nancy, Metz, Thionville, Mezières, Lille, &c. Marshal Kellerman, Duke de Valmy, who had rendered such good service in the organization of troops, and who had commanded *en chef* at Strasbourg, Mayence, and Wesel, was appointed to the superintendence of Nancy, Metz, Mezières. This displacement was immediately commenced, notwithstanding the severity of the season.

Napoleon gave orders to the prefects to provide the garrison with the utmost speed, by buying, or promising to pay shortly, for the seeds and cattle they were authorized to seize. They were to act in the same manner with regard to wood and any materials that might be needed. The marshals commanding the five troops, Marshal Victor at Strasbourg, Marshal Marmont at Nancy, Marshal Macdonald at Cologne and Wesel, received instructions to occupy themselves as much with the training of the different corps as with providing the garrisons. All the detachments

remaining of the 32d military division, that is to say, from the country between Hamburg and Wesel, formed the nucleus of the garrison of Wesel. The 4th corps, unfortunate *débris* of so many corps amalgamated into one, was intrusted with the defence of Mayence, under General Morand, its former *chef*. General Bertrand, who had commanded this corps in its last quarters, had been appointed Grand Marshal of the Palace in recompense for his fidelity. Strasbourg received some skeleton regiments that were to be filled up with conscripts and national guards. The known fidelity of Alsace permitted it to be intrusted to the national guards, a force of which Napoleon did not wish to make use except for garrison defences. Skeleton squadrons of artillery, recruited hurriedly, furnished the *personnel* of this branch. As many good commanders as could be had were appointed, to whom were added some engineer-officers, selected among the least aged of those that remained in France, and all were advised to employ the winter in drilling to the best of their ability. It must be acknowledged that the soldiers were not deficient in zeal.

The measures adopted for the three most important fortresses of the first line, Strasbourg, Mayence, and Wesel, were, with the exception of some local differences, carried out in all the others. In approaching old France, the national guards were called on with more confidence to defend the country. We have just said that Napoleon was not much inclined to employ them. He of course distrusted them, because they might be, in a very disagreeable manner, the reflex of the public mind; however, his motives were not exclusively selfish. At the moment when he demanded from the population nearly 600,000 men, he dreaded urging public discontent too far, by appealing to every class of citizen at the same time, and especially to that of fathers of families, who for the most part composed the national guard. Besides being deficient in the necessary equipments for his soldiers, he preferred giving clothes and guns to the army than to the national guards. It was only in the frontier garrisons, when there was not time to throw in regular troops, that the national guards, being ready drilled, and moreover imbued with a martial spirit, were allowed to enter and complete the garrison. The emperor also made use of them in some large cities of the interior, when the public peace might happen to be disturbed in consequence of the general ferment, and he decided that in these cities the principal inhabitants, formed into battalions of grenadiers and chasseurs, armed and equipped at their own expense, and commanded by trustworthy officers, should be charged to maintain public tranquillity.

Napoleon turned his attention to the active army. To the divers woes that had assailed our troops since their return from Germany, there was now added one, more terrible than all the others—the dreadful typhus. Originating in the over-crowded hospitals on the Elbe, imported thence to the Rhine by the wounded, the sick, the stragglers, it had made terrible ravages, particularly at Mayence. The 4th corps, which had been raised to 15,000 men, by the union of the 4th, 12th, 7th, and 15th

corps, and subsequently increased to 30,000 by other additions, lost in one month half its number, and dwindled down to less than 15,000 men. From the soldiers, the contagion spread to the surrounding population, and death carried off as many of the one as of the other class. This horrible scourge had assumed, under the influence of famine, hideous and heart-rending forms. The constitution of many of our young soldiers had been so weakened by privations and fatigue, that their fingers and toes fell off piece-meal, gnawed by gangrene. The alarm became general at Mayence, and, at the earnest entreaties of the inhabitants, the authorities, in the hope of diminishing the infection, had ordered the immediate removal of numbers of the sick to the interior. This proceeding had involved fresh calamities. The public roads were now seen covered with carts, each bearing thirty of these unhappy creatures, some dead, others expiring beside dead bodies, from which they could not separate. And now, the contagion began to spread from the first to the second line of fortresses, and the city of Metz was thrown into a state of terror, on learning that some soldiers had died in the hospitals of typhus.

Marshal Marmont, deeply touched by this spectacle, had laboured most strenuously to diminish the evil, and had at first prevented the removals which exposed so many unfortunate beings to perish on the high-roads, and threatened with contagion our inland cities. He had seized every ship that could be converted into an hospital, and had translated the sick of one hospital to the other, without allowing them to pass from city to city. A local tax on the adjacent districts had provided for the wants of the sick, and the plague, thanks to the salutary measures adopted, had appeared, if not to diminish very much, at least to pause in its onward course. Notwithstanding these precautions, one of Marshal Marmont's regiments, the 2d marines, had been reduced in a month from 2162 men to 1054.

By the authority of the emperor, Marshal Marmont had removed from Mayence those corps that were not indispensable to the defence of the place. The 2d, commanded by Marshal Viétor, had been already sent forward to Strasbourg; the 5th and 11th combined, under Marshal Macdonald, were sent to Cologne and Wesel. Marshal Marmont sent to Worms the 3d and 6th, which were appointed to serve under him, and only left at Mayence the 4th, to garrison the place. Lastly, by order of Napoleon, he drew off from Mayence the Guard, both young and old, and subdivided them between Kaisers-Lautern, Deux-Ponts, Sareguemines, Sarre-Louis, Thionville, Luxembourg, Treves, &c.

Napoleon afterward gave orders for the reorganization of the different corps. The greater part had become simple divisions, and contributed thus to form new corps. The only exception was the 2d, quartered at Strasbourg, and located near its depots, where the means of supplying its wants with the greatest facility and completeness were near at hand. The first proceeding was to take out of the infantry-depots all the tolerably well-drilled subjects they contained. Napoleon hoped to get an

increase of 500 soldiers for each regiment, and immediately raise the infantry quartered on the Rhine to 80,000 men. The conscripts demanded by the late decrees from the discharged classes were to be sent to the nearest depots to be drilled and equipped as soon as possible, and according as they should have two, three, or four months' instruction, might increase to 100,000, 120,000, or 140,000 men, the Rhinish army. The conscripts of these same classes belonging to the frontier departments, were to be thrown into the fortresses, draughted into some skeleton regiments left behind, and there the conscripts would be drilled into doing garrison duty. These would certainly have abundant leisure to be drilled and equipped provided they had time to arrive before our fortresses should be invested.

After having bestowed these cares on the Rhinish frontier, Napoleon turned his attention to the Belgian, which would be in greater danger, if the enemy contested our natural limits. He also thought of Holland, which covered Belgium. These two countries, ill defended, were profoundly disturbed, and it was of urgent importance to send thither a considerable body of forces. The only resources at the command of General Molitor, who was intrusted with the defence of Holland, were some foreign regiments, of suspicious fidelity, and some weakly-constituted French battalions. These were small means to oppose Bernadotte, who at this moment was advancing on Holland with the greater part of his army, and Marshal Macdonald, at thirty leagues' distance with the *débris* of the 5th and 11th corps, was not likely to be of much assistance to General Molitor. Napoleon made an effort to send him some reinforcements with the utmost expedition. He had long cherished his favourite idea of saving the powerful garrisons of Dresden and Hamburg, which would, undoubtedly, have been sufficient to maintain us in the possession of Holland and Belgium. But we have seen the fate of the garrison of Dresden, made prisoners of war, by a violation of every principle of justice; and as to that of Hamburg, whilst Marshal Davout was thinking of putting himself at the head of the troops, and marching toward the Rhine, the forces of Bernadotte, inundating Westphalia, had obliged him to fall back within his intrenchments. There was therefore nothing to expect on this side, and so the defences of the empire were weakened by the abstraction of 70,000 excellent soldiers. As to the regiments of Marshal Davout, that had furnished the 1st corps, which was made prisoner at Dresden, and the 13th, which was shut up in Hamburg, all had their depots in Belgium. Napoleon poured conscripts into these depots, hoping thus to compose an army of 40,000 infantry, that he intended to put under the command of the brave General Decaen. Throwing, in this manner, conscripts and national guards into the fortresses, especially into Antwerp, he reckoned that this army, called "*Armée du Nord*," increased to 50,000 men, manœuvring between Utrecht, Gorcum, Breda, Berg-op-Zoom, and Antwerp, and protected by the inundations, would suffice to cover Belgium and Holland.

The army of the Rhine was then to com-

since seriously its own particular duties, without feeling any uneasiness to the conservation of the Low Countries, and to make head against the allied troops, that might assume the offensive, either by coming in separate columns through Cologne, Mayence, and Strasbourg, or pouring down en masse by one of these three roads. We have just seen that Napoleon by taking out of the depots the men already killed, and replacing them by conscripts drawn from the discharged classes, who could in case of emergency be dispensed from passing through the depots, and might be sent directly to join the regiments; we have seen that Napoleon hoped, by these means, to raise first to 80 and afterward to 140,000 men, the infantry established on the Rhine. He flattered himself that by reorganizing his cavalry and his artillery, he might increase the number to 200,000 in the spring, and ultimately to 300,000 by uniting them with the Imperial Guard. He intended to give this latter corps an extent that it had never yet possessed. To carry out his idea, he projected the following combinations.

Although attended by some serious inconveniences, the Guard, by its high military spirit, and admirable discipline, had rendered essential service in the last campaign, both by performing prodigies of valour on the battlefield, and by preserving in adversity a firmness that none of the other regiments displayed. The Guard was now reduced to about 12,000 infantry and from 3000 to 4000 cavalry. It consisted of two divisions of the Old Guard, grenadiers and chasseurs, two of the *moyenne* guard, fusiliers and *flanqueurs*, and four of the Young Guard, riflemen and light infantry. As the Guard possessed many soldiers capable of becoming excellent sub-officers, it would be easy to increase its extent, without diminishing its spirit, or detracting from its oneness. Of all the corps of the army, it was that into which thousands of young men might be most easily incorporated, and where they would in the shortest time become soldiers. To facilitate his success in this project, Napoleon had another means, owing entirely to one man, and this man was the illustrious Drouot, a commanding officer of artillery in the Guard, and an accomplished model of every warlike virtue. Drouot, simple in his manners, and even somewhat awkward in his address, had not at first been appreciated by Napoleon. But whilst in these incessant wars, ambition and fatigue increased simultaneously, and the slightest services were obliged to be highly recompensed, Napoleon had been struck by the conduct of Drouot, who knowing thoroughly every branch of his profession, and devoting himself to the discharge of his duties with indefatigable ardour, without seeking like many others to set a higher value on his services as difficulties increased; proportioning thus in silence his energy to danger and his zeal to the embarrassment of the Government; having never flattered his master in prosperity, he did not seek to worry him now by importunate advice, contenting himself with serving to the utmost of his ability the prince and country whom he identified in his affections and devotedness. Napoleon, like all despots of genius, was pleased with flattery, even when he did not believe it,

but he could not help esteeming and seeking the society of honest men when he came in contact with them, and for this reason he had gradually acquired an affection for Drouot which increased with his reverses, and at the moment of which we now speak, he had resolved to confide to him the command of his entire Guard. He had perceived that the minister Clarke succumbed to the pressure of necessity, and even that his fidelity was beginning to be shaken. On this account he had begun to entertain serious distrust of him. He made Drouot an actual minister of the Imperial Guard, without conferring any other title on him than that of his aide-de-camp. All promotions were placed in his gift, and promotion ought to be rapid in a corps destined to increase considerably; he confided to him beside his last resource, his "*poire pour la soif*," as he called it, his 63 millions, the fruits of his personal savings, certain that Drouot would equip the different corps of the Guard, with as much economy as could be hoped from the purest probity and the most watchful vigilance.

According to the instructions of Napoleon, the companies were to be increased from four to six in the battalions of the Guard. The battalions were to be increased to eighteen in the Old Guard, to eight in the *moyenne*, and to fifty-two in the Young Guard. The Old Guard was to be recruited with the picked men of the entire army, the *moyenne* and the Young Guard from the conscripts, taking care to choose the best. These different combinations, if put into execution, would give an increase of at least 80,000 infantry. With the cavalry, the artillery, the engineers, the parks, Napoleon expected that his forces would be little short of 100,000 men. He authorized Drouot to purchase horses, to order carriages for the guns, and to establish at Paris and Metz warehouses for equipping the soldiers. He advised him to do every thing himself, to pay every thing himself, without employing the mediatory services of the war minister. Drouot was to receive from the private treasurer of the emperor whatever funds he might need.

With 200,000 soldiers of the line, and 100,000 of the Imperial Guard, Napoleon did not despair of repulsing from our land the allied armies that had dared to invade it. We shall soon see, by what he accomplished with 80,000, if this hope was presumptuous.

Napoleon next directed his thoughts to Italy and Spain. Prince Eugene was on the Adige with about 40,000 men, making himself respected by the enemy, and having a chance of being able to hold his position, notwithstanding the English attempt at debarkation, if Murat would limit his infidelity to inaction. Napoleon, not wishing to augment the number of Italians in the army of Prince Eugene, nor give Italy fresh pretexts for discontent, forbore to levy a conscription in that country, and determined to send from France a sufficient number of conscripts. He had already raised to 28,000 recruits the portion destined for Prince Eugene in the levies voted in October, and he intended 30,000 for him out of the 300,000 men to be drawn from the discharged classes. He ordered they should be chosen in Franche-Comté, in Dauphiny, and in Provence, in order that they might have

less distance to travel. Prince Eugene was to clothe these new troops from the abundant resources of Italy, then to draught them into the vacancies in his army, by which means he might have 100,000 combatants under his command in the month of April. In Italy, as elsewhere, the question was narrowed to a point,—what time would elapse before the resumption of hostilities?

Lastly, though Napoleon had renounced Spain, he had still an interest in the Pyrenees, now threatened by the Spanish, the Portuguese, and the English, all loudly avowing the hope of avenging the invasion of Spain by reprisals on France. The army of Aragon, under the command of Marshal Suchet, the so-called army of Spain, confided to Marshal Soult, amounted to twenty regiments each, and had their depôts between Nîmes, Montpellier, Perpignan, Carcassonne, Toulouse, Bayonne, and Bordeaux. Napoleon ordered each of these armies to detach a *cadre de bataillon* from each regiment, which could be easily done, considering the diminution they had suffered in the effective force, and to send these skeleton battalions to Montpellier, Nîmes, Toulouse, and Bordeaux, where 60,000 conscripts from the discharged classes would be assembled. Each of these forty battalions receiving 1500 recruits, was to send 500 to the armies of Spain and Aragon, which would recruit these armies to the amount of 20,000 men, and supply through the length of the Pyrenees a reserve of 40,000 to profit of events.

With these various resources assembled on the frontiers of Belgium, the Rhine, of Italy and the Pyrenees, Napoleon still pertinaciously believing he had four months before him, did not despair of overcoming the prodigious difficulties of his position. But the disposition to obey his demand for recruits diminished daily; and it was not the noisy language of venal journals, it was not the silence of the senate, that could transmute this reluctance into ardent patriotism. The emperor, endeavouring to render the sacrifices required of the people less sensibly felt, desired that the levies on the three discharged classes of 1813, 1812, and 1811 should be finished first, and that the anterior classes should not be proceeded with for the moment. This first levy was expected to yield from 140,000 to 150,000 men. It was only after completing this levy that recourse was had to the earlier classes, always omitting the married men, those not likely to be very useful, or those whose services were indispensable to their families. For the same reason he wished these levies to commence in the provinces immediately threatened with invasion,—such as Landes, Languedoc, Franche-Comté, Alsace, Lorraine, Champagne,—provinces where the military spirit was most rife and the danger most pressing. Still influenced by prudential considerations, Napoleon postponed the conscription of 1815, which could only supply soldiers whose extreme youth would add another source of suffering to the many woes to which the army was already exposed. If peace did not put a speedy termination to the war, he would defer the conscription of 1815 to the close of the year.

But levying men was not the sole difficulty:

it would be necessary to clothe and arm them, to provide saddle and draught horses. Napoleon established extra magazines at Paris, at Bordeaux, at Toulouse, at Montpellier, at Lyons, at Nantes, &c. for the more expeditious making up of clothes for the army. Though to provide clothing was not found an easy task, it yet presented fewer obstacles than furnishing horses. However, France was less exhausted of saddle-horses than Germany: she still possessed a considerable number of good ones. The draught-horses for the artillery and carriages were as good as could be wished. Five thousand had just been purchased. Napoleon ordered the purchase of as many more, and gave orders for ten thousand additional, for which ready money was to be paid; and these twenty thousand horses would be sufficient, with the surplus already remaining, for carrying on the war in the interior. Saddle-horses were scarce. Drouot was in want of some for the Guard. Funds were forwarded to all the regiments to purchase in their respective localities as many horses as they could.

There was an abundance of powder, of lead, of iron of all kinds, bayonets and cannon, but there was a want of guns: and this was one of the principal causes of our ruin. In the days of his prosperity, Napoleon had one million muskets in his arsenals. But in the campaign of Russia, 500,000 had been buried in the snows, and in that of Germany we lost 200,000, and in many foreign places great quantities of French arms had been sacrificed. All these losses had exhausted our arsenals. To establish forges for the manufacture of muskets was much more difficult than to fit up stores for furnishing clothes and horses: and yet there was no use in raising men if they could not be equipped. It was a strange feature that characterized this policy: vast preparations were made for invasion, none for defence. France, when threatened by a foreign force, had more difficulty in procuring 300,000 muskets than 300,000 men to carry them.

Artificers were brought from the provinces where working in iron was best understood; and these men were settled either at Paris or Versailles, in order to establish manufactories for the repair or construction of firearms. The same was done in many of the principal towns. Recourse was had to another means of procuring muskets, which was, disarming the foreign regiments, the fidelity of all being suspected, with the exception of the Swiss and Poles. On the same day, and in different parts of the empire, the Dutch, the Hanseatics, the Croats, and the Germans, were disarmed, and the cavalry dismounted. This measure procured a supply of some thousand muskets and some hundred horses. The marine arsenals were afterward emptied, and still Napoleon's passion for conquest was so strong that he did not hesitate to send off 50,000 muskets to Italy at the very moment when he was not sure of having sufficient for the defence of Paris.

Whilst the emperor was thus endeavouring to reorganize his resources by prodigies of administrative activity, the idea occurred to him of obtaining some more, by a policy

which was certainly wise, but adopted too late. He directed General Delort, at Frankfurt, to enter into negotiations with the adverse generals for the surrender of the fortresses on the Vistula and the Oder, on condition of the immediate return into France of the garrisons with arms and baggage. If this condition were accepted, General Delort was forward to make overtures for the more important garrisons of Hamburg, Magdeburg, Bittenburg, Erfurt, &c. The ratification of such a proposal would have procured the accession of 100,000 first-class soldiers, and could have yielded, it is true, an equal number to the allies, by terminating the blockade of the fortresses. But, whilst this arrangement would have given us back excellent soldiers, our enemy would have gained but very inferior ones; and besides, in the state of destitution in which we were, 100,000 men were of more importance to us than 200,000 to the allies. Unfortunately, this reason, which induced the violation of the capitulation of Dresden, left us little hope of succeeding in a negotiation of this kind.

But a still greater resource remained: it was that which could be furnished by the army of Spain, if it could have been transported from the Pyrenees to the Rhine. In that army, in addition to number, every thing was excellent, incomparable; no troops in Europe were equal to the regiments of Marshal Suchet or Marshal Soult. The soldiers of the latter, the remains of armies that had been uniformly unfortunate, were, it is true, disgusted with the service; but the glory of defending the Rhine, and under the command of Napoleon himself, would have certainly converted their disgust into ardent zeal. Nor is it venturesome to say, that had the 80,000 men commanded by the Marshals Suchet and Soult been able to take up a position between the Rhine and Paris, the allies would never have approached the walls of our capital. In order to place our Spanish army in this position, it would have been necessary to conclude a peace with the Spaniards; but this peace, which in appearance ought to have been so easily effected by restoring to the Spaniards their king and their country, was more difficult, perhaps, than that which we hoped to conclude at Mannheim. In fact, it was not sufficient that Napoleon should renounce Spain in order that Spain should renounce him, or that he should recross the Pyrenees in order to induce her not to cross them in company with the Portuguese and English. The punishment of offences would be slight indeed if merely ceasing to persist in them could avert their consequences.

Napoleon, as we have said, had for about two years past resolved to give up Spain without explaining his secret reasons, of which, however, there are sufficient traces in our archives to remove any doubts the historian may entertain. Still, it was not possible that a man of his disposition would unconditionally sacrifice a conquest; and he had flattered himself the preceding year that he would be able to retain the Ebro provinces. This last illusion was at length dissolved, and he had resolved to restore Spain unconditionally to Ferdinand VII., provided this prince

would sign a treaty of peace and persuade his people to consent to the same. It is easy to imagine what the conditions of peace should be. In the first place, Ferdinand VII. and the princes detained with him at Valençay should be set at liberty; the fortresses and prisoners of war should be delivered up. On the other hand, the Spanish armies were to withdraw into Spain and require the English to do the same. It would seem that after these mutual concessions, France and Spain could have nothing more to demand of each other. But adverse circumstances perplexed this position, which appeared at first sight so simple. The Spaniards panted for vengeance, and longed to retaliate on French soil the excesses that had been committed on theirs. The English, after having contributed to the deliverance of Spain, were not people likely to take their dismissal at a beck and repossess the Pyrenees at a notification from Cadiz or Madrid. Besides, an engagement existed between England and Spain that one should not enter into negotiation without the other. In short, the Cortes, exercising at this moment the royal authority, were in no hurry to lay down their power at the feet of Ferdinand VII., and did not participate in the desire for his return, which the country as well as himself felt. In any case, the Cortes did not wish to restore his sceptre, except on condition that he should swear to observe the constitution of Cadiz. Influenced by these different motives, it might happen that neither the English nor the Spanish representatives would consent to the ratification of a treaty, signed at Valençay, for the restoration of Ferdinand, on whom they set little value. Ferdinand himself, once at liberty, might care little about the treaty that had set him free, and say that nothing was due to those who had once proved treacherous, strengthening himself with the reason formerly alleged by Francis I., and never condemned by any juris-consulte, that a promise made during captivity is not binding. The conduct pursued in 1808 toward the royal family of Spain had been such that no person in Europe—not even in France—would have ventured to blame the prisoner of Valençay. Napoleon, the haughty lion, would have appeared, under such circumstances, like a fox caught in his own snare.

If, on the contrary, through a natural sentiment of distrust, Napoleon detained Ferdinand VII. until the treaty concluded with him should be carried to Cadiz and ratified by the regency, it was possible that by the contrivance of the English and the Cortes, this treaty might be rejected and declared void, on the plea that it was concluded in captivity, and that the ratification should be deferred until the return of the King of Spain. Ferdinand VII. would be the longer in prison; but that circumstance would annoy the English quite as little as the liberal Spaniards.

Considering the risk of seeing the treaty ignored either by Ferdinand, or by those who exercised the royal authority in his absence, the safest course might have been to send the Spanish monarch back to his kingdom. But in sending him back the question might arise, would he keep his word? of his fidelity on this

point, his extreme piety might be considered a guarantee, whilst if the treaty were sent without the king, it was certain to be rejected by the English and the Cortes, both parties being most anxious to invade the south of France. M. de Caulaincourt thought it advisable to run the risk of trusting the king. Napoleon, who had no confidence in Ferdinand, and he had his private reasons for entertaining such distrust, wished to take a middle course, and after having concluded a treaty with Ferdinand, to send this treaty into Spain by a trustworthy man, who should endeavour to awaken in the breasts of the old servants of the crown the desire to see the Spanish dynasty re-established. They were to be encouraged still further by a promise that all the Spanish fortresses should be immediately restored. Moreover, the English and Spaniards, as it often happens with allies carrying on a common war, were not on good terms with each other, and it was probable that the Spaniards would not be sorry to be able to say to the English that they had no further need of them, in which case, the latter, deprived of the assistance of the Spanish armies, and having no longer an assured line of retreat across the Pyrenees, dare not remain upon the French frontiers.

It was influenced by these considerations that Napoleon shaped his conduct with regard to Ferdinand VII. He gave orders to M. de Laforest, who had been a long time ambassador at Madrid, to repair under an assumed name to Valençay, to confer in the strictest privacy with the Spanish princes, and to propose to them the following conditions of peace:—The reciprocal evacuation of territory, the return of Ferdinand VII. to Madrid, the liberation of prisoners, the retreat of the English.

Napoleon added to these many private conditions that did him honour, and which were as important to Spain as to us. The first was that Ferdinand VII. should pay to Charles IV. the pension promised by Joseph, and which had been very irregularly paid; the second condition was that he should grant a complete amnesty to those Spaniards who had espoused the cause of France; the third, that Spain should retain not only her restored continental territories, but her colonies, and that none of the latter should be ceded to Great Britain. There was nothing in these conditions which Ferdinand, either as a son, a king, or a Spaniard, could refuse. But another condition remained, not so easy to propose as the others, but to which Ferdinand, in his anxiety to obtain his liberty, might accede; it was that he should espouse the daughter of Joseph Bonaparte. M. de Laforest had orders to reserve this condition for the last, and to propose the alliance only at the moment when the conference should be drawing to a close. This treaty being concluded and signed, a person confided in alike by the Spanish princes and the French ambassador was selected to carry it to the regency, and these precautions were observed in order that neither the English nor the chiefs of the liberal party should have time to prevent the ratification of the treaty. This ratification once obtained, Ferdinand, accompanied by his brother Don Carlos, and his uncle Don Antonio, his fellow-prisoners at Valençay, should quit France to reascend the throne of Spain.

As soon as M. de Laforest had set out, Napoleon, in order that no time should be lost, sent to Lons-le-Saulnier for the Duke of San Carlos, a person of some consideration, and formerly very intimate with Ferdinand VII. Napoleon received the duke in the most friendly manner, and in a long conversation succeeded in bringing him round to his views. He then sent him off to Valençay, in order that he might second the efforts of M. de Laforest, who was doomed to meet with unexpected difficulties. That criminal Spanish business was condemned to punishments both great and small.

The appearance of M. de Laforest at Valençay occasioned great surprise to Ferdinand VII. This prince, a prisoner during six years, with his brother and uncle, had lived in profound ignorance of what was going on in Europe, but through the medium of some French journals that had fallen into his hands, he perceived that the Spanish war was indefinitely prolonged, that, consequently, his subjects were still defending themselves, that neither was Europe cowed since this incessant war was waged against her, and he had sufficient sagacity to perceive that his cause was not entirely lost. It was besides suspected that the parish priest of Valençay, who said mass for him and heard his confession, informed him of all he had an interest in learning, and probably acquainted him with the important events of 1812 and 1813. He might then not have been very much astonished at the communications made by M. de Laforest. But adversity and imprisonment had developed in a high degree the natural characteristics of this prince—distrust and dissimulation. All the powers of his mind, and he was not deficient, he employed in watching those around him, trying to discover if they sought to injure him; he was silent, he did not act, for fear of giving any advantage to the powerful enemy, on whose will he had been dependent during so many years. To dissimulate, to deceive even, seemed to him legitimate defences against the oppression to which he was subjected; and the policy that had conducted him from Madrid to Valençay seemed to justify his conduct. His distrust had reached such a degree, that he was on his guard with his most faithful servants, with those even who were detained in France for his cause, and whom he was always ready to regard as the secret agents of Napoleon. As to the rest, he was not very unhappy. Going to confession, eating and drinking well, walking for exercise, incurring no danger, constituted for him a species of comfort, to which he had become habituated. His mind, devoid of elasticity, had sunk beneath oppression, but in sinking had fallen back upon itself, and when an effort was made to draw him from this reserve, he obstinately resisted, like an animal at once timid and savage, whom the tenderest caresses cannot coax from his den. His brother, Don Carlos, was more lively without being more frank; his uncle was almost stupid.

When M. de Laforest suddenly informed Ferdinand VII. that Napoleon was thinking of restoring his liberty and throne, his first impression was that this proceeding was a cheat, used only as a cover for some hidden perfidy. The motives alleged by M. de Laforest, who wished to avoid the avowal of our misfortunes, and

free, but, he added, it was a subject that could only be discussed at Madrid.

The above-mentioned conditions having been signed on the 11th of December, the next question was who would carry the treaty to Madrid in the name of Ferdinand. The envoy was already present, it was the Duke of San Carlos himself. It was agreed that this personage should repair in the greatest haste and most profound incognito to the army at Catalonia, in order to lull the vigilance of the English, which would be excited if he passed through the head-quarters of Lord Wellington. He was to endeavour to reach Madrid, and press thence to Cadiz, if the regency was still sitting there, present the treaty, and get it ratified. The Duke of San Carlos was to persuade the subjects of Ferdinand VII., who were ruling in his stead, to think above all things of setting him at liberty, and to sacrifice every thing for that object. He was at the same time expressly commissioned not to adhere to the constitution, or if obliged to do so, only with such reservations as would permit the breaking of any engagements he might be induced to make with rebels.

These things being arranged, the Duke of San Carlos set out from Valençay the 13th of December, bearing with him the good wishes of the Spanish princes, who, having laid aside all dissimulation, testified an almost infantine impatience to be set at liberty. Satisfied as to the intentions of Napoleon, they consented to see the faithful followers, whom they at first appeared to distrust, the Canon Escóiquiz, the secretary Macanaz, and the defender of Saragossa, Palafox. Flattering themselves that this latter would have more influence with the Spaniards than the Duke of San Carlos, for he ought to be reverently listened to, if they had not wholly lost the faculty of memory, he was despatched by a different route with a copy of the treaty, and instructions to get it accepted.

Nobody will be surprised to learn that Napoleon had conducted this negotiation without the cognizance of his brother Joseph, who was almost as much a prisoner at Morfontaine as Ferdinand VII. was at Valençay. Joseph, as we must remember, had received orders after the battle of Vittoria, to shut himself up at Morfontaine, not to admit any one, and not to go out, under pain of the severest penalties. Napoleon so strongly distrusted the excitable blood of the Bonapartes, even in the meekest of his brothers, that he did not wish to allow Joseph to go to Paris, lest he might throw difficulties in the way of the regency. He remembered the public commotions excited during royal minorities by the uncles and cousins of kings; he had always before his mind the picture of Marie Louise defending her son against her brothers-in-law. Notwithstanding these orders, Joseph had gone secretly to Paris, but solely for amusement, not for political intrigues. The Duke of Rovigo, interpreting to the letter the imperial orders, had signified to Joseph that if he renewed his clandestine courses he would be obliged to interfere, upon which Joseph, already very much irritated by all he had been made to suffer, appeared very indignant.

Napoleon had not seen his brother since his return to Paris. He did not, however, wish

that the negotiation with Ferdinand VII., which was nearly terminated, should be known to all Europe before Joseph was made acquainted with it. He commissioned M. Roederer, his usual agent, to go to Morfontaine and inform Joseph of all that had been done, and endeavour to persuade him to resume quietly the rank of French prince, with a handsome revenue, and become a member of the regency, serving to the best of his ability France, his last and only asylum. Joseph, on receiving this intelligence, complained bitterly of the treatment he had received, and spoke of his regal rights in a manner that would have excited a smile from a less satirical brother than Napoleon. He admitted that he had committed military errors, but not as great as was said; he declared himself ready to resign the throne of Spain, but in virtue of a treaty and on condition of receiving a territorial indemnity at Naples or Turin; nor did he seem inclined to resume the rank of French prince after having worn one of the greatest crowns in the world. His pretensions provoked an outburst of bitter sarcasms from Napoleon, some unjust and even cruel, the others well founded, but, alas! uttered too late.

"Joseph has committed military errors," cried Napoleon, after hearing M. Roederer's account of the interview, "but he does not think of them. For my part, I commit faults. I am a soldier, I may sometimes err in the exercise of my profession; but he commits faults! He is wrong to accuse himself, he has never committed any. It is true he has lost Spain, and he will never recover it. It is a decided fact, as decided as any thing ever could be. Let him consult the least of my generals, and he will see if it is possible to claim a single village beyond the Pyrenees. Atreasy! Conditions! And with whom? In whose name! Even if I wished to make one with Spain, I would not be listened to. The first of all conditions for obtaining peace with Europe, a condition without which it would be impossible for two negotiators to succeed, is the unconditional restitution of Spain to the Bourbons.—happy if I can at this price get rid of the English, and bring up the armies of Spain to the Rhine. As to indemnifications in Italy, where shall I find them? Can I deprive Marshal of his kingdom? It is doubtful if I shall be able to recall him to the duty he owes France and me. How should I be obeyed if I asked him to descend from his throne for the benefit of Joseph? As to the Roman states, I shall be forced to restore them to the Pope, and I am determined to do so. As to Tuscany, which is Eliza's; as to Piedmont, which belongs to France; as to Lombardy, where Eugene has so much difficulty in maintaining his ground, do I know how much of these I shall be left? Do I even know if any part of them will be left me? To keep France with her natural limits, I should need a series of victories; to obtain any thing beyond the Alps, I should gain still more. And if I were left a kingdom in Italy, could I for Joseph's sake take it from Eugene, that brave, devoted son, who has passed his entire life under fire for me and for France, and who has never given me a single cause of complaint? Where then does Joseph expect me to find an indemnity for him

There is but one part left for him to play: it is to be a faithful brother, a solid support to my wife and my son if I am absent, more solid still if I die, and help to save the throne of France, the sole resource that henceforth remains to the Bonapartes. He shall be a prince of France, treated as my brother, as the uncle of my son, sharing consequently in all the imperial honours. If he act thus, he shall enjoy my favour and the public esteem; he shall still occupy a distinguished position, and contribute to our common welfare. If he pursue an opposite course, and he is very capable of doing so, for he can neither endure labour nor illness; if he cause any commotion during my life, he shall be arrested, and shall finish his reign at Vincennes; if he raise disturbance after my death, let the Almighty judge him. But probably he will contribute to overthrow the throne of my son, the only throne beneath whose shadow he can find dignity, affluence, or a trace of the grandeur he seeks."

These sagacious but coarse expressions, carried backward and forward between Paris and Morfontaine, did not convince Joseph. He was agitated, ill, and suffering from many annoyances at the time; there were the severe anxieties of Napoleon, a lost throne, beggared children, and his sole future prospect obedience to the orders of an imperious brother, not tyrannical, perhaps, but certainly harsh. In this depressed state of mind, he refused to take any part in what was going on at Vaucoussy, and remained at Morfontaine, where Napoleon left him in his loneliness, saying that both he and the Spaniards could very well do without the signature of King Joseph, in restoring Ferdinand VII. the throne of Spain.

This period, when so many of the Bonaparte family were losing their thrones, was one of violent domestic agitation, which, added to the rest of Napoleon's cares, tended to embitter his existence. Jerome, who had retired successively to Coblenz, to Cologne, and to Aix-la-Chapelle, was staying at the last-named place, sad and miserable. He was anxious to return to Paris lest Napoleon might forget him in arranging the approaching peace, and Napoleon, who had more affection for Jerome than for any of his brothers, refused to yield to his wishes, because it was painful to him to have his dethroned brothers constantly before his eyes, particularly as their presence revealed in the most glaring colours the advancing ruin of the French empire. But though he refused Jerome permission to come to Paris, he had much more serious cause of complaint against Murat.

The unfortunate Murat had returned to Naples with an almost broken heart and a distracted mind. Of all the princes doomed at this time to behold the dissolution of their ephemeral royalty, Murat was the most inconceivable. It seemed as if this soldier, born so remote from the throne, and to whom the possession of well-earned military glory ought to have been sufficient compensation for the loss of a crown, it seemed as if he could not now enjoy existence unless as a king. After the events of the last campaign, he could scarcely believe that Napoleon, even if he still held France, could extend his power beyond the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, or that be-

yond these limits he could either afford support or inflict punishment. If then he remained faithful to Napoleon he incurred the risk of not being supported, whilst there was very little chance of being punished if he deserted him. Undoubtedly by joining Prince Eugene, and bringing 30,000 well-disciplined Neapolitans to the support of the 40,000 French that were defending the Adige, there was a possibility of his disputing Italy with the Austrians, but only a possibility, not a certainty. If the two lieutenants of Napoleon were conquered, they would be quickly dethroned; if they conquered, in what position would they be? And Murat especially, what would be his fate? Sacrificed to Prince Eugene, of whom he was jealous, banished to the remotest part of the peninsula, limited to the kingdom of Naples, which would be very little worth without Sicily, and he had no certainty of being able to keep even that, for if Europe offered advantageous terms of peace, which involved the sacrifice of Murat, Napoleon would not be so good a relative and so bad a Frenchman as to refuse the sacrifice. Besides, though Murat was not endowed with a solid understanding, he was possessed of a certain acuteness, and he had often perceived that though Napoleon appreciated his valour, he set no value on his intellectual capacity, and this pointed contempt offended him mortally. Such were the considerations that had agitated, tormented the mind of Murat during his journey from Erfurt to Naples. Whilst he saw so much danger in remaining faithful to Napoleon, and so little in abandoning him, gloomy thoughts contributed to increase his agitation. He had not ceased to keep up a correspondence with the allied Powers, even whilst he was in the camp of Napoleon, and performing feats of valour in his service. At the moment that he quitted Naples for Dresden he had with him agents of Lord William Bentinck, the English governor of Sicily; these he abruptly dismissed when he set out for the French army; a proceeding that surprised and offended Lord William. But he did not act in the same manner toward Austria, and retained at that court Prince Cariat as Neapolitan minister, and kept at Naples the Count de Mire as Austrian minister. M. de Metternich, profiting by this double means of communication, had incessantly sought to shake the fidelity of the Neapolitan court, for he well knew that if Murat, instead of coming to the support of Prince Eugene's right, would attack that prince in the rear, Italy would be immediately lost to France and gained by Austria. Not content with trying to practise on the mind of the king, M. de Metternich had opened secret negotiations with the queen, whom he had formerly known at Paris, when he was ambassador there, and had tried to make her forget her duty as a sister by exciting her feelings as a mother and a wife. Not only had he promised to leave Murat the throne of Naples, without Sicily, which the English made a point of giving to the Bourbons, but he had hinted the possibility of procuring him one of the finest kingdoms of Italy. Prince Eugene and the Princess Eliza being expelled with the French, and Piedmont reconquered, it was possible, still reserving a

large portion for Austria, and re-establishing the Pope at Rome, to constitute a kingdom of Central Italy, whose ruler, according to Metternich, would be the chief prince in Italy, and a second-rank European monarch. These were the arguments M. de Metternich had used, and each day with increasing success.

In short, on one hand Murat encountered the greatest perils with Napoleon without the certainty of being supported by him in case of success; and on the other hand, the allies offered him, besides the certainty of remaining King of Naples, the hope of becoming, in some sort, King of Italy, and this prospect captivated the unfortunate Murat, after having seduced the queen herself. The latter had been in the beginning the faithful representative of the French party at Naples, had resisted all the Austrian suggestions, and had endeavoured to win Murat back to Napoleon. But soon the danger increasing, she was overruled by the desire of preserving the crown for her children, she listened to the insinuations of M. de Metternich, and finished by becoming his chief agent with Murat. Wishing at the same time to give her conduct a colour in the eyes of the French minister, she pretended to have no longer any influence at the court, nor with the king, and to be obliged, as an obedient wife and devoted mother, to follow the policy of the Neapolitan cabinet. Murat, having returned to his kingdom, found his entire court combined to urge him into those devious ways that terminated, not in a throne, but in an ignominious death, and left upon his memory an indelible stain. This prince, born with good and generous sentiments, endowed with some intelligence and heroic bravery, had not sufficient judgment to discern that if with France he ran the double danger of being abandoned by victory and by Napoleon, there was a certainty that the allies, after having made use of and caressed him whilst they had need of him, would soon sacrifice him to the old Italian dynasties, and he should find himself thus at once dethroned and dishonoured. Not endowed with sufficient clear-sightedness to take in so distant a prospect, not possessed of principles lofty enough to prefer honour to interest, he remained some days agitated by a thousand conflicting sentiments, and finished by a deplorable defection.

Scarcely had he returned to his kingdom, than finding the queen come over to his opinion, he had resumed negotiations with the Austrian legation, and the only question he now raised was as to the extent of the advantages he could obtain. Passing suddenly, with the characteristic mobility of his nature, from the depths of despair to a delirium of ambition, he abandoned himself to the wildest fancies, and flattered himself with soon becoming king and hero of the Italian nation. In traversing Italy, he had observed one almost general disposition among the people: that was, a desire to become independent of both France and Austria. Undoubtedly, the nobles, the priests, even the people, desired the return of Austria, because that for the one, it would be a restoration to their former position, and for the others, an exemption from conscription. The middle class, on the contrary, fascinated

with the idea of independence, said it was well to escape from France, but not well to fall back into the hands of Austria. They did not see any reason for passing from one to the other, and becoming the plaything, the victim of foreign masters. Austria ought to be glad that Italy was no longer in the hands of France, and France that she was no longer in the hands of Austria: the independence of the peninsula ought to be, said the bourgeoisie, a desirable object for both Powers, and even more advantageous than the direct possession would be to either, for Italy, subdued by one of the two Powers, would be a dangerous instrument of attack against the other, whilst for the dominant monarch, she would be only a rebellious subject, always ready to become a furious enemy.

These ideas had taken possession of the minds of the most active and enlightened among the bourgeoisie. Murat, located in the most remote part of the peninsula, at equal distance between the French and Austrians, having an interest in securing himself without betraying Napoleon, capable, with his talents and military glory, of creating an Italian army,—Murat had appeared to the independents every way qualified to become their hero. He could in fact say to the Austrians: "I am not France;" to the French: "I am not Austria;" he could say to all: "Do not provoke me, accept me as the least hostile—or rather as the most advantageous—means of securing the end you have in view, if you understand your true interests." The partisans of independence had already surrounded Murat, and lavished upon him promises and flattery, and Murat, in the excitement of his mind, thinking of many projects, and ready to undertake all, had listened favourably to the independents, and accepted them as his agents, so that at Florence, at Boulogne, and Rome, they celebrated his praises as the saviour of Italy, and announced, in prose and verse, his heaven-sent mission.

These ideas were not analogous to the general mode of thinking adopted by the Austrians; however, they did not absolutely discourage them, but allowed Murat, under the pretext of indemnifying him for Sicily, to hope for a large accession of territory in Central Italy. Murat, who in the wild flights of his ambition, put no bounds to his desires, began to fancy that perhaps Napoleon would afford him greater encouragement touching his new Italian kingdom than he had received from the Austrians. Having become, under the excitement of the time, more versatile than ever, he no longer perceived the danger he formerly dreaded from the French alliance, because he fancied it would afford him a greater chance of increased power, flattering himself that all the Italians would rise *en masse* if he promised them independence and unity. He said within himself that if Napoleon would only allow him to proclaim this independence and this unity, and permit him to become the representative of the combined conditions, he would bring to Prince Eugene's assistance, not alone the Neapolitan army, but in addition, 100,000 Italians, who would all rise at his voice, and that thus he would secure his own safety, in increasing his power, in exalting his position, and, in addi-

tion to all these advantages, he would secure another, for, by being the ally of France, he could still keep in his service a large number of French officers, who constituted the principal strength of his army.

Such was the confused succession of ideas that whirled through the brain of this unhappy prince. First, in extreme dejection, he conceived the dreadful idea of abandoning France, and forming an alliance with Austria; from this idea he passed on to the ambitious hope of becoming saviour and king of Italy; and changing his views as his ambitious fancies became stronger, he in spirit abandoned Austria for France, hoping thereby to promote his projected aggrandizement. He formed the wildest schemes, and there was no defection, no alliance, to which he was not ready to give assent, according to the momentary aspect of his plans. Terrible torment that drives downward from ambition to despair; terrible torment that at Paris convulsed the mighty soul of Napoleon with tempests vast as his own genius, whilst at Naples it shook with racking fancies a kind but feeble-minded creature, endowed with no other force than the physical courage of a soldier. It was an afflicting variety of the malady that Napoleon had communicated to nearly all his followers. In fact, after having raised himself to the throne, he had made his brothers and lieutenants kings, princes, and grand-dukes, or flattered them with the hope of becoming so; witness Joseph, Louis, Jerome, Murat, Bernadotte, Berthier, and so many others, who had nearly reached the royal dignity; and if at this moment they were inclined to betray, or at least to serve him laxly, whom could he blame but himself, who had eradicated from their souls the noble love of national glory, and substituted in its stead the mean passion of personal ambition?

At this very time, a personage arrived at Naples whose presence was calculated to increase the perturbation of Murat; it was the Duke of Otranto, M. Fouché, whom Napoleon had sent thither in all haste. Napoleon, in parting from Murat at Erfurt, had received from him evidences of affection that had touched, but not deceived him. When it was a question of penetrating the depths of the human mind, Napoleon possessed a kind of diabolical perspicacity that nothing could escape. He had suspected as he saw danger increasing, that Murat, that his sister even, would need to be strengthened in their duty, and that powerful influences should be opposed to the suggestions of the allies. He had therefore thought of sending to them M. Fouché, who, since the entry of the Austrians into Illyria, had ceased to be a king, and was only a pro-consul without territory, remaining unemployed at Verona. He had judged M. Fouché the most proper confidant for Murat, considering the intrigues they had both plotted in 1809. At that time, Murat and the Duke of Otranto, fearing the result of the Austrian war, had endeavoured to come to an understanding as to what was to become of the supreme power in France, in case Napoleon should be killed. Under such circumstances, the mutual confidence between Murat and M. Fouché must have been very great, and it was

presumable that the same confidence might be re-established under circumstances not less critical. M. Fouché had therefore received orders to repair to Naples, and he arrived there at the very moment when Murat was most exposed to the influence of Austrian intrigues.

Although M. Fouché might receive the confession of a treason without being shocked, and though he was fully capable of understanding all that passed in the King of Naples' mind, still the latter seemed rather annoyed than comforted by his presence. He complained bitterly of Napoleon, spoke at great length of the services he had rendered him, and the bad treatment he had received on several occasions, especially after the retreat from Russia. He spoke, too, of Napoleon's disposition to sacrifice him if the peace of France with Europe depended on the sacrifice. He complained, in a word, as a man complains who seeks an excuse for quarrelling, nor did he open his mind fully to M. Fouché, whom he judged must be in the present case necessarily attached to the French cause. Murat did not affect to conceal that it depended on Napoleon to win him back by treating him better, as if, after having bestowed on him his sister and a throne, Napoleon was still his debtor. In short, M. Fouché did not acquire much influence at the court of Naples, for the voice of duty could not sound effectively from his lips, and Murat was not in a state of mind to listen to political reasons. M. Fouché represented to him, with profound sagacity, that having risen with and by Napoleon, he was doomed to prosper or to perish with him, but Murat, offended at the observation, remarked very flatly that what was true for a revolutionary regicide, such as M. Fouché, would not be true for him, a victorious soldier, indebted for every thing to his sword. As to the rest, however unprofitable the presence of M. Fouché might be in other respects, it contributed at least to the resolution Murat had taken of trying to come to an understanding with Napoleon, and becoming, with his concurrence, the King of independent and united Italy. If he succeeded in winning the attention of Napoleon, his fondest wishes were realized; if he failed, he had an excuse for quarrelling. In consequence of these reflections, he proposed that Napoleon should make two divisions of Italy, giving Prince Eugene all that was on the left bank of the Po, and giving Murat all that was on the right, that is to say, three-fourths of the Peninsula; he was also to permit him to proclaim Italian independence, and on these conditions, Murat promised to arrive on the Adige, not with 30,000 Neapolitans, but with 100,000 Italians. He begged Napoleon to reply immediately, for circumstances were pressing, and there was not an instant to lose if he wished to profit of the times.

Napoleon was not astonished, for he was prepared for any amount of ingratitude from the men whom he had raised to the height of worldly grandeur, but he was deeply indignant at the proposition of Murat, and justly so. Had Murat been a great politician capable of conceiving a vast moral idea such as the regeneration of Italy, his proposal might have been attributed to the warmth of a generous

enthusiasm. But it was evidently only a pretext to colour over a mad ambition, or perhaps disguise an imminent treason. To demand from Napoleon, as the price of his services, the patrimony of the Church which was no longer in his gift; Tuscany, the appanage of his sister; Piedmont, a French province; the Legations, which were a part of Prince Eugene's territory; to make these demands, was to ask him to strip either France or his family, or to deprive himself of these valuable possessions, which in the approaching negotiations might serve to conclude an advantageous peace, by furnishing compensations for the legitimate conquests of France, such as the Alps and the Rhine. This proposal was, in some sort, putting a dagger to the throat of a half-ruined brother-in-law, by trying to deprive him of territory that he ought either leave to his family or sacrifice for his own preservation. Besides, Europe would never have consented to such a partition of Italy; and what Murat ought to have done, if he had had good sense, would be to join Prince Eugene, to defend Italy courageously with him; to conserve to France the pledges of peace, and to secure thus for each a throne, which could only be durable as long as the Imperial dynasty ruled from the Alps to the Rhine. The example of Prince Eugene, who gave so noble an example of fidelity when his father-in-law furnished him a means and an excuse for joining the allies, ought to have inspired Murat with more good sense and gratitude. Napoleon felt the ill conduct of his brother-in-law with intense bitterness. To punish this ungrateful relative appeared to him at this moment one of the sweetest fruits of victory, should he be again victorious. M. de la Besnardière, manager of foreign affairs in the absence of M. de Caulaincourt, who had set out for the future Congress at Manheim, tried vainly to calm the emperor, and to persuade him that, however blamable Murat might be, it was necessary under existing circumstances to temporize. Napoleon burst into a passion, and would not listen to any thing. "This man," cried he, "is at once criminal and mad; he deprives me of Italy, perhaps of more, but at the same time he destroys himself. You will see that he will be one day obliged to beg from me a home and bread, (strange and terrible prophecy,) but I shall live long enough, I hope, to punish his monstrous ingratitude."

Spite of the entreaties of M. de Besnardière, Napoleon would not temporize: the only concession he would make was to pass over the proposals of Murat in silence. To promise any part of what was asked, and thus consent to strip his family or France for the advantage of a madman, or to thunder forth against him the moral condemnation that he deserved, would have been a weakness or an imprudence, and Napoleon took the resolution of being silent. He allowed all the Imperial family to write to Murat to point out to him his folly and his ingratitude, and the emperor wrote to Prince Eugene, recommending him to be on his guard; he sent advices to his sister in Tuscany and to General Miollis at Rome, to close all the garrisons against the Neapolitan troops, if Murat, as there was reason to believe, should invade Italy, under pretext of sustain-

ing the French cause. Murat, in fact, had not yet thrown away the mask, and still declared his intention of coming to the assistance of the French army on the Adige.

Such were the numerous occupations and the severe mental conflicts in which Napoleon passed the end of November and the beginning of December. As to the rest, if from time to time he roared like a lion that receives from afar the arrows of the hunters, held aloof by fear, he exhibited neither his anxiety nor his despair. He still flattered himself that he had four months to prepare, and he hoped in these four months to be able to assemble 300,000 men between Paris and the Rhine; to join to these the entire or part of the old bands of Spain, and with these combined forces to overwhelm the coalition, or crush them in his fall. Alternately animated by hope or meditating vengeance, he was seen active, animated, with flashing eye, walking rapidly to and fro in the presence of his anxious family, of his sorrowful ministers, and his weeping wife. Then he would stop, take his son in his arms, cover him with caresses, restore him to the empress, and, as if he had found fresh strength in the sentiment of paternity, redouble his pace, uttering such phrases as—"Wait, wait, you shall soon see that my soldiers and I have not forgotten our trade. We have been conquered between the Elbe and the Rhine—conquered by being betrayed—but there will be no traitors between the Rhine and Paris, and you shall again behold the soldiers and the general of Italy. Those who will have dared to profane our frontier shall soon repent of having put a foot on French soil."

Still there was another means left, that of negotiation, and Napoleon was at length content to treat, with the natural limits of France as a basis and the conditions we have already mentioned. Unfortunately, the moment when the allies were disposed to accord the natural limits of France had passed like a flash of lightning, in the same manner as the fortunate moment had slipped by at Prague, when France might have preserved all her glory of 1813. The equivocal reply to the propositions of M. de Metternich having drawn from him a formal demand as to the acceptance or rejection of the bases of Frankfort, the reply to this demand not being forwarded until the 2d of December, and not received until the 5th, a month was thus lost, and in this month every thing had changed. The allies had attained a full knowledge of their strength, their transient fit of moderation had passed, and was replaced by all the vehemence of excited passion. From every quarter of Europe, the spirit of a counter-revolution was rising with tempest-like fury.

M. de Metternich, supported by the opinions of the military chiefs, who were weary of the long war, and apprehensive of the risks to which they would be exposed at the other side of the Rhine, had overcome the pride of Alexander, the rage of the Prussians, the obstinacy of the English, and had induced the allies assembled at Frankfort to accede to the propositions of which M. de Saint Aignan had been the bearer to Paris. But the propositions had scarcely been despatched by the sovereigns and diplomatists than there arose a general expression of disapprobation. The

suite of Alexander, composed of eminent Germans; the staff of Blücher, consisting of clubbists of the Tugend-Bund; the English representatives, in short, attached to headquarters and holding various appointments: all would have preferred any other to the course that had been adopted, and cried out for an exterminating war against France and against Napoleon; against France, to reduce her to the limits of 1790—and against Napoleon, to dethrone him and bring back the Bourbons, not alone for the advantage of these princes, but as a tribute to the principle they represented.

To accord Napoleon a respite, of which he would profit to strengthen his army and afterwards re-establish his domination, seemed to them a most impolitic course. To leave still existing in Italy, in Germany, and other places, numerous establishments founded by Napoleon—to continue in power, princes, either parvenus like himself, or members of old dynasties, who had become his accomplices,—seemed a weakness, a want of foresight, in short, a renunciation of victory at the very moment when it might have been rendered most brilliant and complete. According to these politicians, neither Prince Eugene nor Murat ought to be allowed to remain in Italy, spite of the services that were expected from the latter—nor any member of the Bonaparte family. The Bourbons ought to be re-established at Naples, the Pope at Rome, the Austrian archdukes at Florence and Modena, the house of Savoy at Turin, the Austrians at Milan and even at Venice. In Germany, not only ought the Confederation of the Rhine, that detestable work of Napoleon's, to be destroyed, but his allies in Bavaria and Wurtemberg ought to be punished, and dispossessed without compensation of all they had acquired through France. There were some even who deserved to be punished in an exemplary manner, and among them was the King of Saxony, who ought to be dethroned, and replaced by the Duke of Saxe-Weimar; doing thus exactly the reverse of what had been done by Charles V. The King of Denmark deserved no better treatment, because he had persevered in opposing the designs of the coalition by refusing Norway to Bernadotte. As to the King of Westphalia, Jerome Bonaparte, his fall was already accomplished, and about that there was no more to be said. The allies ought not to remain on the right bank, they ought to cross over to the left, and seize the ancient ecclesiastical electorates, Treves, Mayence, Cologne, in short, the Austrian Low Countries, independently of Holland, which nobody could think of leaving to France. With these vast territories reconquered on both banks of the Rhine, a kingdom might be formed for Prussia, so as to render her more powerful than she had been under the great Frederick; states should be reconstituted for the princes deposed by Napoleon, such as the Princes of Hesse, Orange, Brunswick, Hanover; these friends should be loaded with goods, and with them should be formed a Germanic confederation stronger than the ancient, more firmly united against France, headed not by the Emperor of Austria, who was considered too moderate to be made

Emperor of Germany, but by a Diet that should keep alive the strongest and most anti-French feeling that could be enkindled. Such were the views of the most ardent spirits, whether among the allied chiefs, or among the secondary agents that surrounded the numerous and ambulatory court of the allied monarchs.

The English, especially, having become more moderate under the influence of parliament, that did not cease to reproach the ministers with their blind hatred against France, and besides, being represented at Frankfort by one of the sagest spirits, Lord Aberdeen, the English would have rejected so many projected subversions, if, in the number, there did not happen to be one that coincided with their own views, which was depriving France of the Low Countries, that is to say, of Antwerp and Flushing. Still they scarcely dared hope for such a result, and restrained their pretensions within the limits of their hopes. It was strange that the Prussians, entertaining within their own hearts all the sentiments of the French revolution, had become, through hatred of the French, the most zealous promoters of the European counter-revolution. Loving liberty to a degree that alarmed their rulers, they wished, through a spirit of vengeance, to eradicate every trace of what the French revolution had effected in Europe. They were not content with winning over their own king, they enticed the Emperor Alexander, by flattery, calling him the king of kings, the supreme chief of the coalition, by attributing to him the great resolves of the war, by promising to conduct him to Paris; all of which excited the vanity of this prince to a delirious height. Alexander, complaisant by nature and by calculation, adding to his natural amiability a continual care to flatter the passions of all, cajoled the Prussians, whose courage and patriotism he did not cease to praise, in order to have them on his side against the Austrians, of whom he was jealous; he flattered the Austrians, by insinuating that the safety of Europe was secured at Prague; nor did he neglect the English, whom he styled models of perseverance, the first authors of the resistance that had been offered to Napoleon, the first conquerors of this conqueror, once believed invincible. Speaking so, whilst at Frankfort, he affected to support the more moderate in their opinions, he privately encouraged the most violent, and allowed them to give free vent to their feelings, in order to attach them more closely to himself. By these means he had succeeded in keeping together the coalition, which was threatened with disintegration, and acquired among the allies a preponderating influence. There was then with Alexander, Count de Stein, a celebrated Prussian, who found an asylum at the court of Russia from the anger of Napoleon. He possessed considerable influence both with Alexander and the allies. He had been placed at the head of a committee for the direction of German affairs, and administered for the profit of the allied armies, the territories reconquered from France, and whose restitution to the former possessors was not accomplished or even decided. These territories were those of Saxony, Hesse, Westphalia, Brunswick, Hanover, Berg, Erfurt, &c. As to the confede-

rates of the Rhine, those allies that had betrayed us, this committee, not taking their defection into account, had taxed them in men and money double the amount they had formerly furnished to France. Hanover, Saxony, Hesse, Cassel, Berg, Wurtemberg, Baden, Bavaria, had been obliged to furnish a contingent of 145,000 men, and a subsidy of 84 million florins, the latter of which had been sent to Prussia, Russia, and Austria, in bonds bearing interest. The committee of German affairs was thus a kind of revolutionary committee, acting in the name of the public safety, and putting no bounds to its desires. Under pretext of giving up the direction of their affairs to the Germans, to whom it was due, Alexander abandoned them to themselves, on condition that they should side with him in case of need.

An extraordinary personage, a Corsican, a stranger by temperament as well as through superiority of mind to all passions, excepting one, which was hatred, the celebrated Count Pozzo di Borgo, had taken refuge with Alexander, over whom he gradually assumed a marked ascendancy. And who was the object of this hatred which concentrated all the energies of his mind? will naturally be asked. It was that extraordinary man, like himself, a native of Corsica, and whose glory in dazzling the world had agonized the heart of Count Pozzo di Borgo. It certainly argued a rare degree of self-conceit to be jealous of such a genius as Napoleon, for it is only the great Frederick, Cæsar, Hannibal, or Alexander, if their hearts still feel the throbs of mortal emotion, who could have any pretension to be jealous of Napoleon. But how could an obscure individual, hitherto unknown, having never distinguished himself either in the field or at the bar, having been mixed up only in the insignificant squabbles of his native island, how could he possibly conceive a jealousy of the conqueror of Rivoli, of Egypt, and Austerlitz? Still, it was so, for human passions spring up without waiting the permission of either God or man; they are enkindled like those fires that ravage cities and plains, and whose origin is unknown. When a man of genius leaves the country of his birth, he leaves behind either fondly devoted friends, or enemies intensely jealous of his fame. The Count Pozzo was of the latter number with regard to Napoleon, but it must be admitted that on this occasion, he who felt was not unworthy of him who inspired the jealousy. In fact, heaven had accorded to Count Pozzo a genius as admirable as that of war, of eloquence, or the fine arts; he was endowed with the genius of politics, that is to say, he was gifted with that sagacity which traces human events to their causes, unravels their complications, and foresees their consequence; which discovers the best mode of avoidance or interference: a rare gift, which great minds exercise for the benefit of their country, and little ones for their personal advantage; an endowment that loses in greatness what it gains in egotism, but which must rank among the highest intellectual gifts, and which never allows its possessor to remain unknown, idle, or useless. Count Pozzo was, unfortunately for us, a proof of the truth of these assertions, for this man, who up to that

period had enjoyed neither renown nor influence, a man who might be almost said to have no country, he it was who contributed in an extraordinary manner to the ruin of Napoleon, and consequently to ours.

He had traversed many countries for the sole purpose of injuring the man he hated: he had gone first to England, then to Austria, then to Russia and Sweden, always quitting the courts that entertained a friendly feeling toward France, to repair to those that were inimical to her, and returning to the former when they had suspended relations with us, but still breathing forth wherever he went the intensity of the passion by which he was inspired. He undertook every kind of mission. Sometimes he was sent to London to obtain necessary funds; at another time he was despatched to Bernadotte, whom he despised and ruled, to bring him at once to the battle-field of Leipsic. Now, holding the post of aide-de-camp to Alexander, he exercised, with his Italian accent, his lively gesticulation, his proud flashing eye, a powerful influence, justified certainly by his unequalled perspicacity and precision of judgment. This man had revealed to Alexander the sad truth touching the real condition of France; and this he had told as correctly as though he traversed the country in its length and breadth, and yet he had not set foot there for years. "Do not be alarmed," he repeated continually, "at the idea of braving on his own hearth the colossus who has so long oppressed you: you have already done the most difficult part,—you have brought him from the Vistula to the banks of the Rhine. From Frankfort to Paris the distance is only a step, the difficulty nothing. The prodigious forces of France have been squandered in foreign lands; at home she has nothing; the people of France, too, are disgusted, tired of the yoke they have so long borne. March forward, then, without delay,—march quickly; do not allow the giant breathing-time; go to these Tuilleries that he has made his den, and worn-out France will give him up to you without resistance. You will be astonished at the ease with which you will accomplish this work: but you must reach Paris. Your sword will have scarcely broken the chain that binds oppressed France, when she will herself deliver up to you her tyrant and yours."

It was these formidable truths, ever present to the mind of the far-seeing Count Pozzo, that obtained him the decisive influence which he wielded in the fatal 1814. Alexander took pleasure in listening to him, for he felt all his passions rise beneath the influence of the count's words; after having heard him, he forgot the moderation of M. de Metternich, and wished, like the Prussians, to march forward, to cross the Rhine, and engage Napoleon in a last and deadly struggle.

When the propositions of Frankfort became known to the principal agents of the coalition, they were thrown into a violent state of agitation, and expressed the strongest disapprobation of the proceedings. To pause was in their opinion a disastrous weakness; for it would give the common enemy time to reconstitute his forces. To leave him France, with the Rhine, the Alps, the Pyrenees, was to

secure him the means of constantly disturbing the peace of Europe. He ought to be deprived not only of the Rhine and the Alps, but of France, where no rulers ought to be admitted but the Bourbons. Besides, it was necessary to re-establish the dynasties that had been unjustly despoiled, to re-establish the rule of right; in a word, to restore the ancient order of things in Europe. To succeed in all these objects, it was only needed to take one step; but that step should be taken instantly, without pausing to take breath, without delaying a single day.

Unfortunately, letters from France, the reports of secret agents, and information furnished by the friends of the house of Bourbon confirmed these rumours, and unveiled each succeeding hour the true state of things in this same month of November, which Napoleon had lost in equivocal parleying, instead of employing it in positive replies which would have been binding on the authors of the Frankfurt propositions. A graver event, and one certainly more easy to foresee, now occurred. It served to give a new colour to affairs, and induced England, that had lately appeared less violent, to join the most ardent of Napoleon's opponents. The event to which we allude occurred in Holland.

Holland had submitted to Napoleon in 1810, when he had decreed the union of this country with France. She had submitted, in the first place, because at that period Napoleon was irresistible, and, besides, many different interests had found momentary advantages in the union. The Dutch revolutionists, the Catholics, the merchants, had submitted to a revolution which to one party represented the expulsion of the house of Orange, to another the depression of Protestantism, and to a third, commercial annexation with the greatest empire in the world. Perhaps under a better system of politics and with the blessing of peace, these diverse interests might have ultimately found beneath the imperial sceptre a contentedness that would have silenced the voice of national independence; but it was far different. The chief-treasurer, Lebrun, continued, like King Louis, to prefer the Orange party, who were rich and noble, to the patriots, who were neither. The quarrel with the Pope alienated the Catholics in Holland as well as in France. The maritime war reduced the merchants to deep distress, which soon spread to the other classes of society, and affected the humbler classes most. Smuggling being tolerated under King Louis, afforded some amelioration to the scourges of war; but the French custom-house officers having, since the union, deprived the Dutch commerce of this advantage, the evil had reached its height. The maritime inscription with the conscription being introduced into the country, added new afflictions to the universal distress, and then the spirit of patriotism burst forth with renewed violence. In 1813, Hamburg and the Hanseatic provinces having thrown off the imperial yoke, the commotion extended to Holland, and called forth rigorous measures to stay its effects. A certain number of unhappy creatures were condemned to the gallies or to death: six were executed at Saardam, four at Leyden, one at the Hague, and

two at Rotterdam. These measures, instead of calming the public excitement, tended to increase it. The battles of Lutzen and Bautzen restrained for a moment without appeasing the discontent which the battles of Leipsic had called forth in all its original strength. The chief-treasurer, Lebrun, personally opposed to rigorous measures, had tried to keep well with everybody, but had only succeeded in getting credit for good but powerless intentions. General Molitor, commander of the troops, had won universal respect as a strict and upright soldier, who never profited of the force at his disposal for his private advantage. Notwithstanding the tact of the civil and military chiefs, the Dutch were determined, at the first opportunity, to send off both the one and the other, without, however, offering them any violence. But the custom-house officers and the police, whom they detested, they were determined to massacre. Whilst things were in this state, numerous English emissaries in the interests of the house of Orange were traversing Holland, promising the support of England to the people if they rose. The latter replied, that at the first appearance of an armed force they would proclaim the house of Orange,—a family so long unpopular, but on which the hopes and wishes of the country were now centred. But an armed force was necessary. The English had certainly some thousand men ready to embark; but access to the roads was intercepted by formidable batteries or by fleets riding at anchor. Admiral Missiessy, with the Antwerp squadron, defended the mouths of the Scheld and the Meuse; Admiral Verhuel, with the Texel squadron, defended the entrance to the Zuyder Zee. It was then only by land that any assistance could be rendered to the Dutch. Bernadotte had been commissioned, on leaving Leipsic, to deliver Hamburg, Bremen, and Amsterdam by the aid of the army du Nord; but he had done nothing. He had led his entire force toward Holstein, for the purpose of reducing Denmark and forcing the king to give up Norway. With this intention, and trying to get rid of Marshal Davout, who was the chief stay of the Danes, he concluded a treaty with him for the free evacuation of Hamburg, which left the marshal at liberty to return to Holland with 40,000 men. On the reception of this intelligence, the English and Austrian agents uttered loud exclamations,—the former because they did not wish that 40,000 French should be sent into Holland, and the latter because the cabinet of Vienna, at a time when they were labouring to propagate the system of mediation, had formed an alliance with Denmark and taken it under their protection: both parties demanded that Bernadotte should be deprived of the command of those 80,000 men, whom he turned to his own private advantage; but Alexander, who had become strongly attached to Bernadotte, since they had jointly arranged the Finland affair, had moderated the general irritation, and the Swedish prince was only commanded to send a Russian and Prussian corps to Holland, which was done about the beginning of November.

At the approach of this auxiliary force, the Dutch had ceased to dissimulate. The entire

force at General Molitor's command only consisted of some skeleton battalions, containing at most 3000 men,—500 or 600 French gendarmes, a handful of custom-house officers, universally detested, though very honest men, 500 faithful Swiss, who had not a little contributed to excite the public indignation, and lastly, a foreign regiment well disciplined, but in which there were 800 Russians, 600 Austrians, and 600 Prussians. This force was not competent, either by numerical strength or the organization of the troops, to hold the country. Admiral Verhuel commanded at Texel 1500 Spaniards, who at the first signal might revolt and force him to retire on board his ships.

The corps of Bulow, despatched by Bernadotte, having appeared on the Yssel, General Molitor issued from Amsterdam with all his disposable forces, and took up a position at Utrecht to guard the line from Naarden to Gorcum. This was the signal for insurrection. The Orangists, having assaulted the fishermen, the sailors, and the peasants, entered Amsterdam on the evening of the 15th of November, preceded by women and children, and bearing the flag of the house of Orange. At this sight all the populace rose, and during the night burned the barracks situate on the quays, where the custom-house officers and the agents of the French police lived. The populace committed no offence against the high functionaries nor against the chief-treasurer: they contented themselves with merely parading the insurrectionary flag beneath his windows. The only force that remained to the chief-treasurer was about fifty gendarmes, faithful indeed, but powerless against so general a movement. He summoned during the night the principal members of the rich commercial aristocracy, upon whom he had depended for support; he found them polite but cold, and perceived that if through prudence they had submitted to a powerful government that humoured them, they returned at the first opportunity to a government that corresponded with their tastes and aristocratic habits. Seeing there was nothing to hope from these, the chief-treasurer stepped into his carriage and repaired to Utrecht, where he met General Molitor, then threatened in front by a force of 20,000 Russians and Prussians, attacked right, left, and rear by insurrections of all kinds, and having at the utmost not more than 4000 men under his command. General Molitor, in order not to be cut off from Belgium, soon retired to the Wahal, accompanied by the chief-treasurer, who had experienced no worse treatment than a few popular hisses. Dating from this time, there was not a city in Holland that was not revolutionized. Leyden, the Hague, Rotterdam, Utrecht, established regencies almost entirely composed of Orangists, and soon the Prince of Orange, after having disembarked in Holland, entered Amsterdam amidst acclamations. It was announced that Holland, without defining the form of government, would again place herself under the protection of that ancient house beneath whose rule she had passed through the most important crises of her history. As to the rest, few excesses were committed, and those were directed

against the custom-house officers, or the receivers of the *droits réunis*, who certainly ought not to have been made to expiate the faults of their Government. The populace of the great cities, violent and fickle as usual, applauded the restoration of the Princes of Orange as warmly as they had applauded their fall, and the enlightened patriots celebrated their return as the termination of a foreign despotism. With the exception of Admiral Missiessy with the Scheldt fleet, and Admiral Verhuel with the Texel fleet, all Holland recognised the House of Orange. The English landed General Graham at the head of 6000 men.

Any reflecting person could easily have foreseen in these events a dark prognostic for France herself. It was a ray of light to the English. This spontaneous revolution, which, at the first appearance of the so-called emancipating bayonets, burst forth, and almost without violence, by an irresistible impulse, overturned the recent creations of the French empire, to re-establish the ancient order of things, showed the English that the same changes might be wrought elsewhere. On all sides, secret agents—merchants who went frequently from Holland to Belgium, Belgians pursued by the French police—all gave the same accounts, and said that if the allied troops would advance rapidly on Antwerp, Brussels, Ghent, Bruges, they would find the people everywhere disposed to revolt against a Government which during the past fifteen years had oppressed them by the conscription, the *droits réunis*, and a maritime war; that, besides, they would find the fortresses without arms, without men, and without provisions; that the magnificent Antwerp fleet would belong to whoever would seize it; and, in fine, that, to secure success, the allies had only to advance. So much was not needed to rouse the British passions and induce the English Government to adopt new and decisive resolutions. The reinforcements destined for Holland were immediately prepared; General Graham, and the Russian and Prussian generals, received orders to march at once on Antwerp; earnest remonstrances were addressed to Bernadotte requesting that he would cease to occupy himself with Denmark, and march with all his forces into the Low Countries, trusting to the allies to secure him Norway as they had promised. Lastly, Lord Aberdeen received fresh instructions relative to the basis of a future peace.

The Frankfort propositions detailed in the note given to M. de St. Aignan, and in the subsequent letters of M. de Metternich, had caused great dissatisfaction in London. The people there could not understand like those at Frankfort the danger involved in the passage of the Rhine. The Londoners were astonished that the campaign finished at Leipsic, and they could not understand why the armies should stop short on a road that seemed so promising and whose termination presented such great advantages. England found the proposition very indigestible of leaving France her natural limits, that is to say, the Scheldt and Antwerp, and she regarded it as a duty on the part of the allies to deliver her from the disagreeable and constantly threatening presence of a French fleet at Flushing. Russia had found the existence

grand duchy of Warsaw obnoxious; all who had desired the removal of the French from Hamburg, Bremen, and Magdeburg, Austria did not wish their presence at Antwerp and Trieste. All these desires had been satisfied. Should England be the only Power whose wishes were to remain ungratified? Had she not a right to demand that the war should be continued, if a few additional troops could deliver her from the presence of the French at Antwerp? The English politicians did not, certainly, approve all the sub-projects of the more excited members of the coalition, such as the dethronement of the Kings of Saxony and Denmark, but they did not among those projects those which England and those which would oblige her to retire from Gorcum to Lille, or from Gorcum to Brussels and Ghent. Leaving Antwerp and Flushing, a compromise was presented highly agreeable to England, which was to render Holland sufficiently powerful to oppose France, and the Emperor ardently wished that the house of Austria could join the ancient United Provinces of the Austrian Low Countries. This combination was become an object of the most ardent desires of the English, since the successful insurrection of Holland, which, if aided, would be soon imitated in Belgium, revealed the possibility of pushing still further the advantages gained over Napoleon. Instructions Lord Aberdeen had received from the British Government were a little out of date. The British had modified these instructions, and recommended their minister not to consider himself bound by the propositions of Frankfort. Described to him, as the formal condition of England, the continuation of the war, and the maintenance of France within the limits of an absolute silence in all treaties touching maritime rights. It was not that England would carry the war to such an extent as to dethrone Napoleon, though it would be the most agreeable to the wishes of the English people, but this was not expressed, because England had not yet resolved to treat with the head of the empire, and it would have been a great inconsistency to retract this engagement. It was declared in a general manner that the war should be continued until France was restored within the limits of 1790. Lord Aberdeen was commissioned, in order to bring the continental Powers by the bait of peace, of which they stood greatly in need, to leave the Antwerp fleet should the peace be effected; the purchase-money was represented as a half-year's subsidies. To flatter Austria in particular,—Austria, jealousy of Russia was already perceived. Lord Aberdeen was commissioned to say to Metternich that if in some details he humoured Russia, on the whole she was at peace with Austria, because that on almost all points they agreed, and that England always preferred sensible advice to the wild notions of certain enthusiasts, but in return he expected that Austria would vote for the consolidation of a powerful kingdom in the Low Countries, which should extend from Antwerp.

Such were the instructions sent to the British legation precisely at the moment when Napoleon decided, but too late, to accept, purely and simply, the Frankfort propositions. Thus the month we had lost from November to December had left all the Powers time to reflect, especially England, that, enlightened by the insurrection in Holland, had conceived the hope and the desire of depriving France not only of Texel but of Antwerp. It is evident that a prompt and categorical adhesion given on the 16th of November might have placed the allies at Frankfort in an embarrassment from which they could not have easily extricated themselves.

It is scarcely necessary to say that when these fresh instructions arrived at Frankfort, all there were prepared to receive them. All those who were desirous of advancing until Napoleon should be overcome, had spoken out and demanded that no account should be taken of the overtures made to M. de St. Aignan. The Emperor Alexander was only too well disposed to coincide in these views, through resentment against Napoleon as well as through the exuberance of his pride. To make a triumphant entry into Paris would be a revenge for the destruction of Moscow, that transported him with joy. Count Pozzo excited him by repeating that what had taken place in Holland would be reproduced in Belgium and in France, if the allies hastened,—if they boldly crossed the Rhine,—if, in a word, they did not allow the common enemy time to breathe. The Prussians, ever spurred on by hate, ardently desired to advance. Blücher said, that for his part, were he free to act, he would advance to Paris. The Austrians even, though highly sensitive to the dangers to which they would be exposed beyond the Rhine, did not deny that vast advantages might be reaped there. Whilst England was endeavouring to gain Antwerp for the house of Orange, they could gain Italy for themselves and their arch-dukes. There was no lack of motives for continuing the war, although in the case of the Austrians the danger of fresh risks was united to the vexation of seeing the ill-disguised preponderance of the Russians, and the brutal violence of the Prussians. But there was in this question a decisive reason for them as for every one else, which was the wish of England; England, that paid the allies, and who, by her victories in Spain, had acquired a continental importance that she had never before possessed; and there was, besides, her all-powerful fleet. In short, she held the balance between the contending Powers, and could make it turn on which side she pleased. It was consequently decided that the war should be pursued without relaxation. Prussia was moved to this resolution by a motive of vengeance; Russia through vanity; Austria through a selfish compliance with England; and England through the various motives that gave her an interest in the Scheldt; all were urged by the impulsion of events which were hurrying to the close a struggle so old, so embittered, so implacable. On the 10th of December, M. de Metternich replied to the note in which M. de Caulaincourt had adhered purely and simply to the message of M. de St. Aignan. The purport of the reply was that France was rather late in her acceptance of the Frankfort

propositions, but that nevertheless he would communicate this tardy acceptance to the allies. He did not say whether in consequence of these communications military operations would be suspended, and as it had never been agreed since the rupture at Prague, that negotiations, in case they were resumed, should cause a suspension of the war, the allies might, without violating any engagement, continue to advance, provided they continued their pacific policy. Therefore the pretended despatch of the French reply to the allied courts left sufficient time for action without exhibiting extraordinary inconsistency.

However, as England wished to carry on the war for the attainment of an object which was solely to her own advantage, it was but reasonable she should pay the expenses of the late campaign, and as all the belligerents were deficient in the money needed for these immense armaments, it was decided that England should be asked for new subsidies; and in order to point out the largeness of the amount needed, and the necessity of an immediate supply, there was sent to London a man who had already played an important part in the councils of the allies,—Count Pozzo. He set out for the purpose of laying before the British minister the budget of the winter campaign.

But in the hypothesis of an immediate resumption of hostilities, the question of what would be the best plan to adopt awakened serious consideration, and might give rise to grave dissensions in a coalition where the interests and the vanity of the different parties were in direct opposition, and where even the imperative need of conservation only kept up a harmony more apparent than real. Besides that, the allied forces were considerably reduced by the intensity of the struggle; they were also divided by the diversity of the objects that each had in view. The corps of Kleist, Klennau, Tannenberg, Benningsen, that had all taken part in the formidable affair of Leipsic, were left behind to blockade the Elbe fortresses. Bernadotte with the Swedes, with the Prussians of Bulow, with the Russians of Wintzingerode, under pretext of opposing Marshal Davout, had deviated from the principal object of the war, in order to snatch Norway from the Danes. This proceeding had deeply exasperated the Austrians, under whose protection the Danes were, and excited a general distrust of Alexander's sincerity, who was accused of encouraging Bernadotte underhand, whilst he publicly blamed him. It was with difficulty that the new Swedish prince could be induced to give a detachment for the re-establishment of the house of Orange. There remained then on the Rhine only the army of the Prince Schwarzenberg, quartered between Frankfurt and Bâle, and that of Marshal Blücher, stationed between Frankfurt and Coblenz, having in their ranks Bavarians, Badenians, and Wurtembergers. After the adjunction of the latter, and the losses of the campaign, the two armies were estimated at from 220,000 to 230,000 disposable men. It is true that the new German contingents having replaced the troops that were blockading the fortresses, and Bernadotte being recalled to add his forces to the main body, the allies could now number on the Rhine 220,000 men; they hoped to raise numerous

recruits in Poland, Prussia, and Austria; they had about 70,000 men in Italy, 100,000 on the Spanish frontiers, so that they would be able to attack France in March and April with 600,000 men. But for the moment, they could only collect 220,000 men, of whom 160,000 were Austrians, Russians, Prussians, and Bavarians, under the Prince of Schwarzenberg, and 60,000 Prussians, Russians, Wurtembergers, Hessians, and Badenians, under Marshal Blücher. It was a daring enterprise, that of crossing the Rhine in front of Napoleon with such forces; but according to the accounts received, he had not more than 80,000 men, and it was therefore not believed imprudent to encounter him with 220,000. The allies would have been still more determined had they known that he had not a force of more than 60,000 men to oppose a sudden invasion.

Still, the most enlightened personages at Frankfurt looked with suspicion on the reports furnished by the agents of the coalition; they could not believe that Napoleon had not at least 100,000 men under arms. They insisted therefore on the necessity of acting with the greatest prudence in the attempt to enter France. On this occasion each had a plan of his own; the Prussians and the Russians had one, the Austrians another, all inspired by the desire, so common in war, of drawing round themselves the main body of the forces, and so becoming the centre of operations. The Prussians wished, with 180,000 men out of the 220,000, to cross the Rhine between Coblenz and Mayence, whilst another body should cross between Mayence and Strasbourg; that they should advance boldly in the midst of the fortresses that defended this part of France, such as Coblenz, Mayence, Landau, Strasbourg, in the first line; Mézières, Montmédy, Luxembourg, Thionville, Metz, in the second line; they asserted that these fortresses could be quickly captured from the French, if they had only left small garrisons there, but if, on the contrary, in order to guard the fortresses, they had weakened the main body of the army, this weakness should be profited of; the invaders should attack the main body, which they would be certain to defeat, and drive the remnant back to Paris, passing over the fortresses, which they could at a later period attack with the different corps called from the banks of the Elbe. The Prussian staff considered this plan of operation as both the most scientific and the most daring, for in one case they would secure the fortresses, and so establish strongholds for themselves as they advanced; in the other they would perhaps reach Paris in a few days' march.

The Austrians had another plan, dictated also by their private views, but perfectly rational, at least to judge by the results. They thought it would be imprudent to get entangled in this labyrinth of fortresses, extending from Strasbourg to Coblenz, from Metz to Mézières. They said this would be to *take the bull by the horns*. They maintained that without exhausting his resources, Napoleon would content himself with putting the fortresses in a position to resist a *coup de main*, and that he would himself be found manœuvring between them with his concentrated forces, ready to fall upon the allied army; they also asserted that the allies would

be more weakened by blockading these fortresses than Napoleon would be by defending them. The Austrians proposed a plan of operations radically different. The weak side of France was not, in their opinion, the northeast, from Strasbourg to Coblenz, from Metz to Mezières, where she was protected by several rivers and immense fortifications; her weak point was due east, along the Jura, where, reckoning on the neutrality of the Swiss, she had never thought of erecting defences. The best plan then would be to take the road to Bâle, and cross the Rhine at that point, where it never freezes, to traverse Switzerland, that was crying aloud for deliverance, and thus take France in the rear, a proceeding that would be productive of many advantages. It would cut off France from Italy, and deprive her of the assistance she might receive if Napoleon recalled Prince Eugene, and at the same time it would so isolate this prince that he must succumb by the mere fact of his isolation.

It is easy to divine the motives which, independent of the real excellence of this plan, induced Austria to forfeit it. She wished to penetrate into Switzerland, to re-establish her influence there, and not alone deprive France of the assistance of Italy, but Italy of the succours of France. Switzerland was, in fact, in a state of extraordinary fermentation, and disposed to imitate the example of Holland, with this difference, that there was in Switzerland a very strong French party, with well-founded and legitimate pretensions. The cantons formerly dominant—and among these were to be found some of the democratic as well as the aristocratic, for ambition is not inherent to one principle more than another; these cantons, in short, flattered themselves they could recover the territory they formerly ruled. The little cantons aspired to possess, as formerly, the Italian bailiwicks Valteline and Valais; Berne was anxious to possess the Pays de Vaud; Argovie had the same designs with regard to Porentruy; the aristocratic families remembered with regret the authority they once exercised over the middle classes. On the contrary, the territory formerly subject, the classes anciently oppressed, did not wish, on any terms, to submit again to their former masters; deplorable divisions, to which Napoleon had put a termination by the act of mediation. Unfortunately, this noble act, worthy of the time when he concluded the Concordat, the peace of Amiens, and the peace of Lunéville, had been soon disfigured, like all the others, by his infractive genius. He had filled Switzerland with his custom-house officers, and even with his soldiers; he occupied the Tessin with a detachment of the Italian army, which was a strong argument against Swiss neutrality. Moreover, in closely blockading Switzerland to prevent smuggling, he had, in certain manufacturing cantons, caused the labourers' wages to fall from fifteen to five sous per day, and had rendered Switzerland as wretched as Holland. However, these evils had not made the liberated territories forget their independence, and if there were some of the ancient régime who cried out for the invaders, there was a party of the new school who opposed them with all their might. Switzerland was, at this epoch, the only country that Napoleon

had not entirely disgusted with French influence and the principles of our revolution. The struggle was therefore obstinate and intense between the two parties. The partisans of the old régime pressed Austria to advance into their country, and she desired nothing more earnestly than to gratify them, and to adopt a procedure that would restore her influence in Switzerland by re-establishing there the aristocratic power, and would secure her rule in Italy by cutting it off at the present moment from French aid.

The Prussians and Russians found fault with this plan, in the first place because it was dictated by the private interests of Austria, and would turn the allied army from the most direct route to Paris, and necessitate a wide détour, besides separating the main body of the army into many divisions, for it was absolutely necessary to keep an army in the Low Countries, and an intermediary army in the direction of Coblenz and Mayence, which, with the proposed army for entering by the Jura, would cause three divisions, and give Napoleon an opportunity of exercising his favourite tactics, and engaging his enemies in succession.

The English, who were generally disposed to take part with the Austrians against the Prussians and Russians, and who were besides offended at the authority assumed by Alexander, showed themselves favourably inclined to the plan of Prince Schwarzenberg. In addition to these reasons, they had especial need of the Austrians to establish the kingdom of the Low Countries, and were extremely desirous of withdrawing Switzerland from the influence of France. The Emperor Alexander, on the contrary, rejected the Austrian project from a variety of motives. Although at Frankfurt the allies overwhelmed each other with protestations of fidelity and devotedness, through fear of seeing the coalition dissolved; although Alexander added to his protestations a certain coquetry of manner, which, however innocent in his youth, had become tinged with craft as he advanced in life; in short, notwithstanding all these flattering externals, the allies were frequently on the point of coming to a rupture, and especially in a recent affair touching Bernadotte, whom the English accused of having totally neglected Holland, whilst the Austrians accused him of having outraged Denmark, and the Russians, though outwardly disavowing his acts, were suspected of encouraging him in secret. Alexander, openly convicted of duplicity, had exhibited considerable ill humour, and was especially disposed to quarrel with the Austrians, who had on this occasion unveiled his secret plottings. Moreover, though flattering, in presence of the allies, the violent party that advocated the extirpation of every trace of the French revolution, he flattered at the same time the Poles, and the German and Swiss liberals. He was thus a counter-revolutionist with some, and a liberal with the others, as much through sagacious foresight as through mobility of disposition: still his real inclinations were toward liberal principles, through opposition to the despotism of Napoleon, and as a consequence of his education. Brought up, in fact, by a Swiss colonel, Laharpe, having had at his court, for the education of his sis-

ters, governesses of the same nation, he had listened to their supplications, had appeared touched by them, and had protested that he would never allow a counter-revolution to be effected in Switzerland.

This question had finished by rendering the allies uneasy as to the continuance of the coalition. However, Austria being determined on the plan of turning the fortresses, and marching at least as far as Bâle, and having obtained, thanks to the English, a majority of voices, she had promised not to violate the Swiss neutrality, and to be content with approaching the frontiers, adding that if the Swiss rose spontaneously and appealed to the allies, they could not refuse to pass through gates that opened of their own accord. Alexander had not positively disputed this reasoning; he had contented himself with denying that the Swiss demanded the violation of their frontier, and had consented to a general movement toward Bâle, on the conditions we have stated.

Consequently, from the 10th to the 20th of December, all the details of the march beyond the Rhine were regulated. It was agreed that the military operations should be continued without pausing to negotiate; that Blücher, with the corps of York, Sacken, and Langeron, with the Wurtembergers and the Badeners, comprising about 60,000 men, should prepare the passage of the Rhine between Coblenz and Mayence, and should advance afterward among the French fortresses; that, at the same time, the grand army of Prince Schwarzenberg, composed of Austrians, Bavarians, Russians, and Prussian and Russian guards, comprising nearly 160,000 men, should advance to Bâle, and cross the Rhine in the vicinity of this city, or at Bâle itself, if the Swiss should put an end to all scruples by opening the gates themselves; the allies would thus turn the French defences, by penetrating through Huningue, Belfort, and Langres. These principles of action having been acceded to, the army marched forward. Blücher concentrated his forces between Mayence and Coblenz; the Prince of Schwarzenberg directed his course toward Switzerland, advancing to Bâle by Strasbourg. The sovereigns and the diplomatists quitted Frankfurt for Freyburg.

The Swiss Diet, of whom the majority were sagacious men, who, though they regretted the excesses Napoleon had committed in the days of his power, still retained a grateful recollection of his benefits, and did not desire either a counter-revolution or a foreign invasion,—the Diet had sent agents to Paris, requiring that France should recognise the Swiss neutrality, and efface every trace of the acts that had rendered the neutrality illusory. Napoleon, obliged by circumstances to receive these demands, had at first withdrawn his troops from Tessin, and then declared that he looked upon Swiss neutrality as an essential principle of European law, which he had pledged himself solemnly to respect, and that he saw in his title of "Mediator of the Swiss Confederation" only a title commemorative of the services rendered by France to Switzerland, but not in any sense a title conferring any real power.

The Diet, armed with this declaration, had immediately despatched two deputies to the

allied sovereigns, to ask that they, in their turn, should recognise a neutrality that France admitted in so explicit a manner. To this proceeding, the Diet joined another, which would have been very wise if it had been seriously meant, and which consisted in assembling a federal army of 12,000 men, stationed between Bâle and Schaffhausen, under the command of M. de Watterville. Whilst they acted thus, the principal families in the Grisons, in the little cantons, and Bern, had sent secret emissaries to each of the sovereigns, saying that the Diet was a fallacious, a usurping authority, on which they set no value; and that the allies ought immediately to cross the Helvetic frontier to aid the true and only legitimate authority, that of past times, and re-establish it for the benefit of the allies.

And as the Swiss uttered speeches of a twofold character, so also did the allied Powers. In public, they said to the representatives of the Diet that they regarded Swiss neutrality as an important principle of European law, and that they would endeavour for the future to render it inviolate; that for the present, without meditating any infraction of this neutrality, they could not pledge themselves to respect in every case a principle so often violated by France, and feebly defended by Switzerland herself. They cited, in support of this reasoning, the occupation of Tessin, the title of Mediator assumed by Napoleon, the regiments in the service of France that had lately been recruited, and, in short, an event little noted, the borrowing of the Swiss territory, made by the Boudet division, in 1813, in order to pass into Germany. They did not speak more explicitly, as to how far these precedents would influence the conduct of the allies; they limited themselves to establishing their titles without saying they would use them. Under-hand, they insinuated to the Grisons, to the little cantons, to the people of Bern, that they ought to rise and overturn the Diet, that in this case the allied armies would enter into Switzerland, and, *en passant*, restore to the Swiss Vatteline, the Italian bellivicks, Valais, the Pays de Vaud, Porentruy, &c.

The reasons alleged by the diplomatists of the coalition had not great weight, for Tessin was evacuated, and its occupation had been, after all, only an insignificant punishment for flagrant acts of smuggling; the title of Mediator was only an act of gratitude on the part of the Swiss, entailing no dependence whatsoever on France; in short, the admission of the capitulated regiments into the service of the different Powers had not been regarded at any period as a violation of neutrality. But in this great European conflict, law was only a vain word, and on the 19th of December, spite of repeated assurances to the Emperor Alexander that the allies would not enter Switzerland without being invited thither, Prince Schwarzenberg approached the bridge of Bâle, and took up a position in front of the Swiss troops under General Watterville. The Austrian generalissimo expected every moment an insurrection at Bern, which having overturned the Diet and set up a new government, he might then say he was summoned by the Swiss themselves. Nevertheless, weary of wait-

ing, the Prince of Schwarzenberg proceeded on the 21st of December to cross the bridge of Bâle, and the commander of the Swiss troops, looking upon it as impossible to resist all Europe in arms, and excusing his want of courage by his powerlessness, made a feint of protesting, and then ceded the passage without striking a blow. On the arrival of this intelligence, the movement so impatiently expected at Berne broke forth, and the Diet, which had been legally established in virtue of an excellent constitution, and had the recommendation of twelve years' successful and tranquil legislation, was declared void. Similar movements took place in divers cantons, and the allies took advantage of these commotions, which they had excited, instead of awaiting, to commit a flagrant violation of the law of nations. As to the rest, the allies issued a proclamation, in which they declared they would henceforth invariably respect Swiss neutrality—that is to say, when they would no longer need to violate it, and when it would be their interest that it should be respected.

Alexander had been deceived, and having earned some days later that the commotions upon which the allies justified their conduct, instead of preceding, had followed the invasion, he was both offended and irritated to the highest degree. But he could scarcely complain, for Austria had done to him on this occasion what he had himself done frequently, especially in the affair of the Swedes against the Danes. Moreover, it would have been still more vexatious to break with the allies than to be deceived by them, and he contented himself with complaining bitterly, and advising the *Faudois* and all the subject countries to remain quiet, and that he would not permit them to be placed under the old régime. The allied armies advanced and soon inundated Switzerland and Franche-Comté. The Bavarians took their way toward Belfort, the Austrians advanced on Berne and Geneva, in order to reach Besançon and Dole by crossing the Jura. Blücher, near Mayence, waited until the Austrians should have accomplished the wide détour they had undertaken, to cross the Rhine himself. Thus, on the fatal day of the 21st of December, 1813, the empire, after more than twenty years of unexampled triumphs, was, by a terrible revulsion of fortune, invaded in her turn: and France, which, far from being the criminal, had been the sufferer; France, after having severely suffered for the fault, was about to suffer severely in expiation, destined thus to be twice a victim,—once of the wonderful man who had governed her gloriously but harshly, and next, victim to the monarchs who came to take vengeance on him.

Fearing above all things an insurrection of the populace, the allies, on entering into France, made every effort to tranquillize the public mind. By a declaration published at Frankfurt on the 1st of December, the allies endeavoured to show that they did not wish to detract from the greatness of France. Prince Schwarzenberg ordered that the following proclamation should everywhere precede the allied troops:—

“Frenchmen!

“Victory has led the allied armies to your frontier: they wish to cross.

“We do not make war on France; but we repulse the yoke that your Government wishes to impose on our countries, which have the same claims to independence and happiness as yours.

“Magistrates, landed proprietors, labourers, remain in your houses; an enforcement of public order, a respect for private property, the most strict discipline, shall mark the passage of the allied armies. They are not animated by a spirit of vengeance; they do not wish to visit on France the numberless evils with which, during twenty years, she has overwhelmed her neighbours and the most remote countries.

“Their glory shall be to have brought to a rapid conclusion the woes of Europe. The only conquest they desire is that of peace for France, and for all Europe an assured tranquillity. We had hoped to find peace before touching French soil; we are now going to seek it there.”

On learning what had occurred in Holland, and the first movement of the allies toward the Low Countries, Napoleon had felt immediately the danger of allowing himself to be attacked on this side, for it was that part of the ancient conquests of France which his enemies were most disposed to contest, and to maintain the legal it was necessary to secure the actual possession of the country. He had, therefore, hastened to send thither quickly all the disposable succours at his command.

In the beginning of the negotiations, Napoleon was desirous, as we have seen, of keeping Holland, not so much in the hope of retaining it definitely, as with the intention of using it as an object of compensation. But Holland having suddenly escaped from his hands, he had sent off, with the utmost expedition, some forces to the Wahal. He had despatched General Rampon to Gorcum, with the National Guards, raised in French Flanders, to garrison the place. He had sent the Duke of Plaisance, son of the chief-treasurer, to Antwerp, with orders to enclose the Scheldt squadron in the basins, to withdraw the sailors, and give them occupation, some on board the flotilla, others in the city fortifications; he was also to assemble at Antwerp the neighbouring dépôts, the conscripts, the custom-house officers, and the gendarmes returning from Holland. Napoleon had also sent General Decaen, whose services were no longer required at Catalonia, to Belgium, in order to organize there, as quickly as possible, the 1st corps, which was to be drawn, as we have seen, from the dépôts of Marshal Davout. Perceiving clearly that this corps could not be reconstituted promptly enough to avert the first approach of danger, and wishing at any price to save the line of the Wahal, Napoleon had selected in his guard all the disposable men, to march without delay into Northern Brabant. He sent, first, General Lefebvre-Desnoettes with two thousand light cavalry, then Generals Roguet and Barrois, each with an infantry division of the Young Guard; lastly, he had sent Marshal Mortier himself to Namur, at the head of the Old Guard. If the enemy only meditated a winter campaign in the Low Countries, Napoleon flattered himself that he could thus mar their

measures, and have time afterward to transport his Guard where the danger should be most serious during the campaign. If, on the contrary, the chief efforts of the allies should be concentrated on Belgium, the Guard would be already present on the principal scene of operations. The public mind being greatly agitated in Belgium, and the people much disposed to imitate the example of the Dutch, Napoleon had sent thither an excellent officer of gendarmerie, Colonel Henry, (now raised to the rank of General, and already distinguished by his services in Vendée.) He advanced into Belgium at the head of some hundred gendarmes, chosen from the *élite* of that body.

Such had been the first orders given immediately after the insurrection in Holland, toward the end of November. The intelligence of the passage of the Rhine, near Bâle, on the 21st of December, without confounding had still strongly stirred Napoleon's feelings, for he immediately discovered the designs of his enemies; he perceived they no longer wished to negotiate with him, that the Frankfort propositions had soon become, what at first they were not, a decoy, thanks to the fault he had committed of not taking the allies at the first word; he now saw they were determined to carry hostilities to the last extremity, even during winter, and that they were determined to finish the war with the remnants of those battalions that had contested the gigantic battle-fields of Dresden, Leipsic, and Hanau. There was no other course remaining than to defend himself with what remained of the troops that had fought these same battles, adding thereto whatever he could assemble in one or two months.

It was no longer a question of employing the winter and spring in raising 600,000 men, it was now necessary to make use quickly of those that the prefects had been able to tear from our desolated fields in the months of November and December, and unfortunately, the number was not considerable. The appeal to the classes of 1811, 1812, 1813, which was expected to yield 140,000 men, had only produced 80,000; good soldiers, it is true, and an appeal to the earlier classes had yielded at the utmost 30,000. Napoleon ordered that these conscripts should be distributed immediately, according to the localities in which they were placed, some in the dépôts of the old corps of Davout, situate in Belgium, others in the corps of Macdonald, Marmont, and Victor, dispersed along the Rhine. He ordered Marshal Marmont not to suffer himself to be shut up in Mayence, but to issue forth, march to this side of the Vosges and collect on the way the conscripts originally destined to join him at Mayence. He ordered Marshal Victor to quit Strasbourg, and leave there, besides the national guards already stationed in the place, some skeleton battalions, with a portion of his conscripts, and to distribute the others in the ranks of the 2d corps, which he commanded. The conscripts destined for Italy were stopped at Grenoble and Chambéry and ordered to Lyons, where Napoleon wished to form of the dépôts of Dauphiny, Provence, and Auvergne, an army to oppose the enemy in the passes of Switzerland and Savoy. The conscripts of

Burgundy, Auvergne, Bourbonnais, Berry, Normandy, and Orleanais were ordered to Paris, to be employed there, some in the Guard, the others in the dépôts that were to fall back on the capital at the approach of the invading armies. The conscripts of the south were still to journey on to Bordeaux, Toulouse, Montpellier, Nîmes, where the reserves of the two Spanish armies were being organized.

This first direction given to 110,000 men, showed the use Napoleon intended to make of the short time that remained to him. The corps of Macdonald, of Marmont, of Victor were to collect as many conscripts as they could, arm, equip, and drill them, advancing slowly to Paris. Here was a sufficient force to retard, at least for some days, the progress of the invasion. Napoleon busied himself in creating an army of reserve, the detachments of which were to join him as they were formed. It was to be composed of the new battalions of guard, of which a portion was to be organized at Paris, and of the dépôts that were falling back on the capital, and which were to be filled with conscripts from the central provinces. It was not alone the dépôts from the Rhine that were assembled at Paris, all those that were not necessary to the defence of the eastern and southern frontiers were called thither, in order that they should be increased by as large a number as could be added. It was the old Duke of Valmy, so long superintendent of the dépôts of the Rhine, who was to discharge the same functions between the Rhine and the Seine. It was hoped that two divisions of reserve should thus be formed, and which were to be put under the command of the illustrious General Gerard, who had distinguished himself in the late campaigns. As soon as the conscripts should have arrived, be drafted into the different battalions, armed, and half equipped, these two divisions were to set out to join the army, and be organized and drilled on the way. Napoleon had established in the capital clothing-magazines, where he accelerated the activity of the workmen by high pay, in order that two or three thousand suits should be finished daily.

He acted in the same manner with regard to the cavalry, who were very much needed to resist the innumerable bands of Cossacks that the enemy were about to pour into France. He made the dépôts of cavalry that were between the frontiers and Paris, fall back on Versailles; those of Normandy and Picardy were also brought there, with the horse soldiers who had returned on foot through Wesel, and the necessary orders were given to equip and mount them. All the working saddlers and coachmakers of the capital were employed to make saddles and harness, and paid ready money. The prefects of the neighbouring departments were authorized to seize all the disposable horses, with the legitimate excuse that France must be defended from a Cossack invasion. It was announced that every horse fit for service should be paid for in ready money by the general commanding the cavalry depôt. The expenses that the treasurer could not immediately discharge, were supplied from the private reserve of the Tuilleries.

In short, Napoleon, foreseeing that he would

be obliged to supply his deficiency in infantry by additional force in cavalry, was making formidable preparations at Vincennes. The companies of artillery that were not needed in the fortresses, the field matériel that was not indispensable, were brought to Vincennes, where, as we have already mentioned, conscripts, horses, and harness were to be collected, and where from four to five hundred cannon were to be mounted.

These arrangements, notwithstanding the activity with which they were carried out, were far from corresponding to the extent and proximity of the danger. Twelve or fifteen thousand conscripts thrown precipitately into the skeleton battalions of the Guards, twenty or twenty-five thousand drafted into the depôts concentrated at Paris, offered only a feeble resource to the marshals who were to fall back on Champagne and Burgundy, with the débris of Leipsic and Hanau. Napoleon decided, however repugnant to his feelings, to make use of the National Guards. These offered ready-made soldiers, to whom in so imminent a danger it was very natural to have recourse. Napoleon ordered the prefects of Burgundy, Picardy, Normandy, Lorraine, and Brittany, to appeal to those municipalities where discontent had not extinguished patriotism, and ask them to furnish select companies of National Guards. The levy of 300,000 men from the more remote classes, and of 160,000 men from the class of 1815, not having been, through want of time, raised in these provinces, the inhabitants had no cause to complain of too frequent appeals, nor could they refuse, whatever their political opinions might be, to make a last effort to repulse the common enemy from their native land. Napoleon appointed Paris, Meaux, Montereau, Troyes, as places for the rendezvous of these National Guards. Alsace and Franche-Comté were also to furnish some to occupy the defiles of the Vosges.

Unfortunately, there was a want of muskets to arm these troops, for spite of the manufactories established at Paris and Versailles, firearms did not arrive in sufficient quantities, and there was, as we have already said, more hands than muskets, though there had been so great an expenditure of human life from the walls of Moscow to the banks of the Tagus.

One resource remained, to which Napoleon was ready to appeal without considering the sacrifices it would entail; it was that which the two armies of Spain offered, which, assembled before Paris, would have numbered 80,000 or 100,000 admirable soldiers. With this resource alone, he would have the means of overpowering the allies, and forcing them back into the Rhine. But it was doubtful whether he could get them up in time. The Duke of San Carlos, who had set out for the Catalan frontier, had crossed and gone into Spain, and nothing more had been heard of him. The unhappy Ferdinand, as anxious to quit Valençay for the Escorial as Napoleon was to bring his soldiers from the Adour, was dying of impatience; but nothing came of it. Joseph, profiting opportunely of circumstances to escape from a false position, wrote to Napoleon to say that when France was on the eve

of invasion, he could not think of making conditions or demanding compensation, and he only asked to serve France, no matter in what rank or in what place. Napoleon received him at Paris, restored his rank of French prince, as well as his place in the Council of Regency, and decided that without giving him, as formerly, the title of "King of Spain," he should be called "King Joseph," and his wife "Queen Julia."

This arrangement, which had the advantage of re-establishing concord in the bosom of the Imperial family, was, up to this time, the sole result of the negotiations of Valençay. As all the troops could not be immediately withdrawn from the Spanish frontier, Napoleon wished that a part, at least, should come at once. He ordered the Marshals Suchet and Soult to hold themselves ready to march with their entire armies toward the north of France; and, meanwhile, Marshal Suchet was to send off 12,000 of his best troops to Lyons, and Marshal Soult 14,000 or 15,000 of his best to Paris. Relays were prepared along the roads to transport the infantry by post, as had been done in former times. Undoubtedly, the withdrawal of these two detachments weakened considerably the forces of the Marshals Suchet and Soult; but as these generals were only required to retard the advance of the enemy into the south of France, Napoleon hoped that with the remaining forces they would be able to effect this object. Besides, in accordance with prior orders, they had sent to Bordeaux, Toulouse, Montpellier, and Nîmes, skeleton battalions, into which the conscripts of these departments, as they were hastily raised, equipped, and armed, were drafted. It is true that hostilities having taken us by surprise there as on other points, before the anticipated month of April, there were, instead of 60,000 men, scarcely 20,000 in the four depôts. Such as they were, however, in our extreme danger they were not to be despised.

After having given sufficient care to the creation of these forces, Napoleon turned his thoughts to the best way of employing them. Although at the first demonstration of the enemy toward Belgium, he might have supposed that their principal efforts would be directed to that quarter, still, since the passage of the Rhine at Bâle, he had no longer a doubt as to the intended course of the invasion. He saw that though the corps of Blücher was advancing from Mayence on Metz, in a northeasterly direction, still that the allies intended to bear down on the east of France with the main body of their army, turn the defences, and march through Bédort, Langres, and Troyes on Paris. Napoleon made his preparations accordingly.

He ordered Marshals Marmont and Victor, who had just left the fortresses, to march along the range of the Vosges, and contest, as long as possible, with the enemy, the passage of these mountains, as he wished to force their ranks, or out-flank them at Bédort, in order to come down on Epinal afterward, to oppose the column that was advancing to the eastern frontier. All those who were being drilled for the Young Guard at Metz, were to be concentrated at Epinal, under the command of Marshal Ney. The Old Guard, that had

at first been sent on toward Belgium, now received orders to retrace their steps in the direction of Châlons-sur-Maine, and take up a position at Langres. Napoleon only left in Belgium the Roguet division, and even that was to remain only until General Decaen could combine the elements of a *corps d'armée*. The greatest efforts of the allies being directed to this side, Napoleon did not wish to leave there more than the forces indispensably necessary to oppose and retard the progress of the enemy that was advancing from the north.

In consequence of these orders, the corps of Marshals Marmont, Victor, Ney, Mortier, comprising at most 60,000 men, occupying the space between Epinal and Langres, along the heights that separate Franche-Comté from Burgundy, were to dispute with the invading masses, on the east, the entrance of the valleys of the Maine, the Aube, and the Seine; whilst Napoleon, with the troops that were being equipped at Paris, and those that were arriving from Spain, was to come to their assistance and give them the support of his presence. If Blücher, whose mission was to anticipate events, should arrive from the northeast, and advance from Metz to Paris, whilst Schwarzenberg should arrive at the same point by Langres and Troyes, Napoleon was not without resources against this new peril. Macdonald with the 11th and 5th corps, fused into one, and with the 2d cavalry, amounting in all to 15,000 men, was to abandon the Low Countries, to keep close to Blücher, who had entered Metz, then to fall back on Châlons-sur-Maine, and join Napoleon, who, after having thrown himself on Schwarzenberg, would fall back on Blücher, supplying numerical weakness by activity, daring, and energy; in a word, doing as well as he could, carrying the same spirit into the battle-field that presided in his government—despair. Fortune pours so many favours not alone upon the brave, but on the obstinate who persevere, and who force her to be kind at any price! Thus the conqueror who had led 650,000 men into Russia, after having left 100,000 in Italy, and 300,000 in Spain, had now at his command, to resist a European combination, about 60,000 soldiers, stationed between Epinal and Langres, 15,000 falling back from Cologne to Namur, 20,000 or 30,000 ready for duty in front of Paris, and perhaps 20,000 coming from the Pyrenees! This was all that remained of his immense armies, and independent of number, what shall we say of quality? Some untrained boys, unarmed, unclothed, drafted into the ranks with some old soldiers, worn out with fatigue; but all, both young and old, having French blood in their veins; and these, led by the genius of Napoleon, were going to fight for their native land against a world in arms, and, as we shall soon see, they performed prodigies of valour.

We must enumerate among the means of defence, the army assembled on the Rhone. The enemy having shown an intention of advancing to Geneva, and as, in that case, should Prince Eugene be conquered in Italy, they would be able to debouche by Savoy, it was absolutely necessary to provide for the defence of Lyons. Within the great arc of a circle, which Napoleon was about to describe

round Paris, manœuvring between the two invading columns, he could certainly run from Metz to Dijon, but he could not extend his arm to Lyons without leaving the capital exposed to an attack either through Autun and Auxerre, or through Moulins and Nevers. Consequently Napoleon ordered Augereau, already no doubt very much fatigued, but conserving some remains of energy and talent, to address the people, to assemble at Lyons the skeleton regiments, the conscripts, the national guards, and to unite these with the 10,000 that Suchet would send him from Roussillon. If this old soldier of the Revolution understood his mission, he was to throw back upon Geneva and Chambéry that portion of the allies who should have made an attempt on Lyons; then, freed from these assailants, he was to remount the Saône by Maçon, Châlons, Gray, and attack in the rear the main body of the army, invading Burgundy. Many circumstances might arise that would furnish him an opportunity of rendering immense services to France.

Thus, in a position apparently desperate, Napoleon did not despair, and his great mind never appeared less dejected or richer in resources. Whilst he hurried on with so much activity the completion of his preparations, he had besides political measures to take, in order to combine the moral with the material means at his command. After having left the members of the Legislative Corps so long idle at Paris, he had at length resolved to assemble them. He wished to make use of this body to awaken public opinion, to turn it again in his favour, and if they could not do this, at least to stir up a general feeling about the danger of France, now threatened with a fearful disaster.

There happened, on this occasion, what had happened frequently before, and which will happen frequently again, that opinion, restricted for a time in its expression, becomes afterward more intense and more tempestuous in its manifestations. Authorities that would not permit the expression of public opinion, when this expression was harmless, and might even have been useful, have been obliged to suffer it inopportunely, and at a moment when, instead of criticisms, they stood in need of unconditional devotedness. Another inconvenience attendant on these tardy manifestations is, that the one party is incapable of uttering the truth, the other of hearing it; and that instead of being an assistance, this truth becomes a source of danger, and assumes, instead of a counsel, the form of a threat.

The members of the Legislative Corps having come up to Paris with hearts imbued with the sentiments prevailing in their provinces, that lay desolated by the effects of conscription, requisitions, and the arbitrary measures of the prefects, who sometimes imposed taxes of their own free will, sometimes drove into exile the rich father who refused to allow his son to join the guards, or seized the granary which the poor labourer had hidden in the wood. To these real afflictions, which were neither an invention, nor a party cry, were added exaggerated notions, if such could be exaggerated, of what was passing in our

armies, and these ideas were prevalent on every side, and even among members of the Government. Recitals, in which no circumstance was softened, were heard in all directions, of the misfortunes of the last campaign, the sufferings of our soldiers who were left dying on the roads of Saxony and Franconia, the frightful ravages made by typhus on the Rhine, and the not less horrible calamities of the Spanish war. Sympathy for these woes was heightened when it was known how easily they might have been averted. Although the public did not know that there had been a day at Prague, when a glorious peace might have been concluded, and that through a culpable obstinacy the propitious moment had been allowed to pass, (this was the secret of Napoleon and M. de Bassano, who were interested in not proclaiming it, and of M. de Caulaincourt, who was too faithful a subject to reveal it,) everybody was persuaded that if peace was not concluded it was the fault of Napoleon, that the allies had always been willing to make peace with him, that it was he who had never wished to make it with them. And now the inverse was true; now Europe, emboldened by success, after having vainly wished for peace, no longer desired it, and Napoleon now wishing for peace could not obtain it. The public made no distinction between one period and another. They accused Napoleon of a past fault which he would never have repeated; they accused when they ought to have sustained him. Sad and fatal example of too long concealed truth! It would be better, we repeat, to acquaint a people with facts at the time they happen, for they then experience at the proper time the impressions which such information is naturally destined to produce, but by delaying the intelligence we call up sentiments inopportune at a moment that ought to be occupied with different feelings. And so, the French people ought to have been indignant six months before the period of which we speak, and at this moment they ought to have held their peace and afforded Napoleon their support. They did exactly the contrary. And such is the baseness of the human heart, that those who had appeared most humble and most dazzled by the glory of the empire, now, that its prestige was passing away, were the least reserved in their condemnation.

A month passed at Paris in the midst of idleness, injurious reports, and vexatious excitement was not calculated to shed a calming influence over the members of the Legislative Corps. Every member of the Government had perceived their temper of mind and were troubled in consequence. It would be no easy task to change them. This Government, so accustomed to dealing with soldiers, displayed, when it became necessary to deal with men, all the awkwardness and barbarity of despotism. To the Duke of Rovigo, as among his police duties, had always been confided the task of influencing the clergy or the members of the Legislative Corps as happened at the time of the council. To guess what might be the family necessities of one, or the desires of the *protégé* of another, and to satisfy these wishes by the presentation of places, or by other less allowable means, was a duty that

the Duke de Rovigo discharged with an unscrupulous facility and a soldier-like frankness, which in those days supplied the place of independence of character. But if this mode of proceeding succeeded with some individuals, happily, with the greater number more noble means were needed, especially when the public mind was unusually disturbed. Thus, the enlightened servants of the Government seeing clearly that in the present circumstances a few personal favours would have no weight, had said that the Duke of Rovigo ought to be prevented from interfering in the affairs of the Legislative Corps. M. de Sémonville especially, the enemy of the Duke of Rovigo, whose place he was anxious to obtain, succeeded, through his friend M. de Bassano, in having this advice given to Napoleon, and Napoleon, whom the frankness of the Duke of Rovigo offended, told him very quickly that he was not to meddle again in the affairs of the great legislative bodies.

It was true that superficial means would no longer suffice when placed in juxtaposition with the long-suppressed sentiments of afflicted France. Still, in the absence of these means, where was the person who could employ honest persuasion? The clever people who thought the skill of the Duke of Rovigo savoured of vulgarity, what resource had they to offer? Alas! none, for there is no skill that can prevail against mournful truths, universally and profoundly felt. It is true that a president, possessed of good manners and accustomed to act on the feelings of men, enjoying at the same time the confidence of his colleagues, might have obtained some influence over them, and shown them that, though justified in being angry at the past, they ought at the actual time to aid the Government with all their might, and by a decisive and patriotic effort repulse the foreign invaders. But, in order to indemnify the Duke of Massa, who had been deprived of his portfolio for the advantage of M. Molé, the Legislative Corps had been deprived of all participation in the choice of its president, and the Duke of Massa had been forced upon them. He was, no doubt, a worthy and upright magistrate, worthy of all respect, but grown infirm, not acquainted with any of the members of the Legislative Corps, not known by any of them, and displeasing to them because his mere presence was one of the last examples of the capricious whims of a despotism to which the ruin of France was attributed.

This president then could do nothing to overcome the difficulties of the position, and make his colleagues feel that far above the right of complaining of their own Government, ought to be the duty of combining against the enemies of France. If honest and conscientious ministers could have appeared before the assembly, and in a dignified manner made the necessary avowals, beseeching all to silence their resentment and listen only to the dictates of patriotism, it would have been possible to dispense with these suspicious means that deal only with individuals; but in the Legislative Corps all remained silent, the ministers as well as the representatives. A Government orator, a secondary and irresponsible person, pronounced a prepared harangue before the legislators, who replied by a harangue of the same kind, both fulfilling a

vain formality void of interest. These proceedings presented no means of allaying public feeling, of speaking to the people, of pointing out their duty, and winning their attention and credence. It will, perhaps, be said that a free assembly instead of yielding assistance would have entailed embarrassments; we shall see by what happened whether a free assembly could have been more injurious than this enslaved and degraded Legislative Corps.

The members of the Legislative Corps assembled at Paris, their hearts filled with vexation, with alarm, with bitter sentiments of every kind, which would have needed vent, but which must be suppressed, when Napoleon opened the Legislative Assembly in person on the 19th of December. Amid a glacial silence, he read the following address, simply, nobly dictated, as every thing was that emanated directly from himself.

"SENATORS, PRIVY COUNCILLORS, DEPUTIES—

"Splendid victories have shed glory over the French arms in this campaign; unexampled defections have rendered these victories useless; every thing has turned against us. France itself would be in danger were it not for the energy and union of Frenchmen.

"In these perilous circumstances, my first thought was to summon you around me. My heart has need of the presence and affection of my subjects.

"I have never been elated by prosperity. Adversity would find me beyond its reach.

"I have often accorded peace to nations that had lost every thing. From one portion of my conquests, I have created thrones for kings, who have betrayed me.

"I have conceived and executed great designs for the prosperity and happiness of the human race.

"A monarch and a father, I understand how much peace adds to the security of thrones and the happiness of families. Negotiations have been commenced with the allied Powers. I have adhered to the preliminary basis that they presented. I had hoped that before the opening of this session the Congress of Manheim would have assembled; but fresh delays, no ways attributable to France, have deferred this movement so ardently desired by all.

"I have ordered that all the original documents in the portfolios at my office of foreign affairs, shall be laid before you. You will appoint a commission to take cognizance of them. The speeches of my Council will let you know my wishes on this subject.

"Nothing, on my part, opposes the re-establishment of peace. I know and I participate in the sentiments of the French, I say emphatically the French, for there is no Frenchman who would desire peace at the expense of honour.

"It is with regret that I demand from this generous people new sacrifices, but they are commanded by the noblest and dearest interests. I have been obliged to reinforce my armies by numerous levies; nations can only negotiate with security when they deploy all their military strength. An increase in the revenue becomes indispensable. What my Minister of Finance will propose to you is conformable to the system of finance I have

established. We will meet every difficulty without having recourse to a loan, which gnaws into the future, and without paper money, the great enemy of social order.

"I am satisfied with the sentiments which under these circumstances my Italian subjects have manifested.

"Denmark and Naples have alone remained faithful to my alliance.

"The Republic of the United States of America continues with success the war against England.

"I have recognised the neutrality of the nineteen Swiss cantons.

"SENATORS, PRIVY COUNCILLORS, DEPUTIES FROM THE DEPARTMENTS TO THE LEGISLATIVE CORPS—

"You are the natural organs of this throne: it belongs to you to give an example of energy that will render our generation glorious in the eyes of those yet to come. Let them not say of us, 'They have sacrificed the primary interests of the country; they have recognised the laws that England tried in vain, during four centuries, to impose on France.'

"My people cannot apprehend that the policy of their emperor would ever betray the national glory. For my part, I feel confident that Frenchmen will ever be worthy of themselves and of me."

In this speech, Napoleon announced that the documents relative to the Frankfort negotiations should be laid before the Assembly, these negotiations which seemed, no one knew why, completely broken off.

He hoped this communication would produce a useful result, the only one that could be hoped from the meeting of the Legislative Corps—it would be proof that he wished for peace, that he had frankly accepted the conditions as they had been laid down at Frankfort, and if this peace was not already signed, the fault was not attributable to him, but to the allied Powers. A declaration from the Legislative Corps to this effect might remedy, if not the exhaustion of the country, at least the general feeling of mistrust, and infuse into the minds of the people a certain amount of zeal, by persuading them that it was not to the ambition of the emperor they were about to sacrifice themselves once again, but to the necessity of defending and saving themselves. However, before dissipating the distrust of the country, it would have been necessary to dissipate that of the Legislative Corps, which could only be done by very great frankness. M. de Caulaincourt, who had nothing to fear from this frankness, advised it strongly. But Napoleon, anxious to conceal many truths, could not follow this counsel. If the single report of M. de St. Aignan were laid before the House, every one would have seen there that M. de Metternich had expressly recommended *not to act as at Prague*, that is to say, to allow the only moment in which peace could be concluded, to pass unprofitably of, which proved that at Prague they might have made peace and did not. If, moreover, they had produced the letter of M. de Bassano of the 16th of November, it would be evident that at the very time the Frankfort propositions were made, that the French Cabinet, instead of taking the allies at their word, had replied in an equivocal

and ironical manner, and that it was not until the 2d of December that a formal acceptance had been given; and though the public were not aware how fatal the loss of this month had been, they would certainly have suspected that in losing it, precious time had been lost, for M. de Metternich was as cold and evasive in his despatch of the 10th of December as he had been confiding and pressing in the first. Frankness might then entail serious revelations; but in addressing the representatives of the country, for the purpose of obtaining their support, it would be necessary at least to speak to them frankly, acknowledging past faults, and claiming credit for present sincerity, which the letter of the 2d of December put beyond doubt, and this in order to obtain from the Legislative Corps a formal declaration that the Government wished for peace, wished it on honourable terms, but did wish it.

Napoleon was willing that the communications made to the Senate should be more extensive than those made to the Legislative Corps, which were of a very restricted nature. The report of M. de St. Aignan, for example, was to be presented, with alterations, that would efface all allusion to what had taken place at Prague. The letters of the 16th of November, and of the 2d of December, were both produced, for it would be impossible in producing the document of the 2d of December, to repress that of the 16th of November, as the one referred to the other. As to the mode of proceeding, it was agreed that the Senate and the Legislative Corps should each nominate a commission of five members, and that this commission should repair to the High-Chancellor Cambacérès, who would lay before them the appointed documents. Meanwhile, the Senate and the Legislative Corps were busy choosing commissioners to receive the communications of the Government.

The Senate appointed high personages, who, without being partisans, were incapable at this moment of committing the slightest imprudence. The Senate appointed Messrs. de Fontanes, de Talleyrand, de Saint Marsan, de Barbé-Marbois, de Beurnonville. These names revealed neither hostility nor complaisance. It was quite different with the Legislative Corps. The Government had indirectly insinuated certain preferences, but the Assembly took no notice of these intimations. This body had hitherto been too little engaged in politics to be divided into parties, which would have served to declare each member's political opinions distinctly, and was now groping for commissioners, as it were, in the dark, and were obliged to recur to repeated scrutinies to find out what it was they exactly wished. In the first place, they rejected the candidates favoured by Government, then, after mature reflection, they appointed distinguished, independent men, who enjoyed, without having caballed for it, the esteem of their colleagues. These were M. Lainé, a celebrated Bordeaux lawyer, who was formerly an ardent revolutionist, but had afterward adopted more moderate opinions. He was honest but impassioned; he was possessed of eloquence, studied, but brilliant and dignified. M. Raynouard, a literary man of considerable reputation, author of the tragedy of *The Templars*. He was warm-hearted, in-

tellectual, and sincere. M. Maine de Biran, a man of contemplative mind, devoted to philosophic studies, one of the *savants* that Napoleon accused of ideology. And lastly, Messrs. de Flaugergues and Gallois; these were less known than the others, but they were men of considerable intellect and decided partisans of political liberty. All, on the eve of a struggle with the Government, were placed, without perceiving it, on the road to *royalism*, (we mean by this denomination a decided inclination for the Bourbons, with laws more or less liberal,) but they had not yet arrived at the term, at least the three first named, who, among the five commissioners, alone at that time enjoyed a certain reputation.

These selections having been made, each commission, headed by its president, sought an interview with the high-chancellor. The commissioners deputed by the Senate were admitted first,—that is to say, on the 23d of December. The communications were made to them by M. de Caulaincourt himself. They listened to every thing, said nothing, and, after having heard the letters of the 16th of November and the 2d of December read, they did not entertain the slightest doubt as to the error that had been committed in not accepting purely and simply and instantaneously the Frankfort propositions. In fact, such men as MM. de Talleyrand and de Fontanes perceived at once that it was the letter of the 2d of December which ought to have been written on the 2d of November. M. de Fontanes was deputed to present to the Senate the report of the proceedings of the senatorial commission. It seems a strange contradiction that the communications prepared for the most experienced diplomatists were far from partaking of a serious character; but the reason was simply because they were a mere matter of form. The deputies of the Legislative Corps received the communications intended for them on the 24th; and this communication, intended for persons far less important than those for whom the first was drawn up, was destined to produce far more serious results.

As if those who had devised these communications wished as much as possible to detract from the importance of the second, it was not the minister himself, but one of his subordinates, (M. d'Hauterive,—certainly a man of considerable merit,) who was deputed to receive the members of the Legislative Corps and to lay before them a report of the negotiations. These commissioners, like those from the Senate, were received at the high-chancellor's. Instead of public personages of high rank, and coldly attentive, there now appeared men whose faces were unknown among the great,—men anxious for information, impassioned, listening to what was told them, but desiring and demanding more. The report being read, they asked a fresh reading, and it was not refused. Their first impression was a species of astonishment. Some minutes before, they were all convinced that if war still prevailed it was owing to the obstinacy of Napoleon; and yet, not having before them the documents relative to the negotiations at Prague,—having only the Frankfort acts, the propositions intrusted to M. de Saint Aignan, the reply of M. de Bassano of the 16th of No-

vember, that of M. de Caulaincourt of the 2d of December,—they were forced to admit that on the last-named occasion Napoleon had desired peace. Had these gentlemen been a little more accustomed to diplomatic transactions, and had they known what had taken place in European cabinets from the 16th of November to the 2d of December, and how the time lost by us had been actively employed by our enemies, they would have perceived the error that had been committed in not binding the allied Powers by the immediate acceptance of their propositions. However, perceiving between the letter of the 16th of November and that of the 2d of December a positive advance in the way to peace, they were desirous of seeing a still further progress. They wished the emperor to bind himself solemnly to make every necessary sacrifice to obtain peace. Besides, they thought the proposed bases of the natural frontiers very vague; for in Holland, on the Rhine, in Italy even, there might be many points of contest; therefore the commissioners wished the emperor should positively state to them what he would yield; and this they required in order that they might afterward repeat the statement to the Legislative Corps,—that is to say, to Europe,—and that then all parties should be bound,—Napoleon as well as the allies. This was, in their opinion, the only means of acting on the public mind and inducing the people to think favourably of the emperor's designs, by proving to them that the efforts required of the French people were not to be expended in the attainment of unwise conquests, but in conserving the natural limits of France. M. Raynouard, with all the ardour of a Southern temperament, proposed the following form of address:—

"SIR:—You swore at your coronation to maintain the natural and necessary limits of France,—which are the Rhine, the Alps, the Pyrenees: we call upon you to be faithful to your oath, and we are willing to shed the last drop of our blood to aid you in fulfilling your obligations. But, having observed your oath and secured our frontiers, neither France nor you will be longer bound by any motive either of honour or of glory, and you will then be able to sacrifice every thing to obtain the blessings of peace and to secure the interests of humanity."

This truly original document—which was a demand for peace under the appearance of a demand for war—met the approbation of all the commissioners; but for the moment they retired in order to have time for a little reflection, and to devise at their leisure the best mode of addressing the Legislative Corps, France,—in short, all Europe.

M. d'Hauterive—who beneath a grave and rather pedantic exterior concealed an infinity of tact—made every effort to win the good graces of the different members of the commission and to induce them to act with reserve. But when a Government has recourse to publicity, it is better to submit unreservedly and trust to the national good sense. But this cannot be done with safety excepting where this national good sense has been trained by a long participation in public affairs; and it must be admitted that to make

an appeal for the first time to such a tribunal, in delicate and dangerous circumstances, is running a great risk. It is plain that the Government did not wish to tell every thing nor allow every thing to be told to the commissioners; but then it would have been better not to have assembled them; and yet how was it possible to demand such great sacrifices from the people without addressing to them one single word? It is not whilst maintaining such a silence that a Government has a right to demand from a people their last crown and their last man. Those who fall into the habit of making half revelations to a people concerning their affairs, ought to ask themselves the question whether a day will not arrive when every thing must be made public, and whether this day of reckoning will not be precisely that when it would be desirable that the revelations should be of the least painful character.

M. d'Hauterive took especial trouble in endeavouring to persuade M. Lainé, who appeared the most influential man of the commission. He found in him not a secret and zealous partisan of the house of Bourbon, as one would have been inclined to expect from the previous conduct of this illustrious personage,—seeking to embarrass the actual Government in the hope of serving the future dynasty,—but an honest man deeply affected by the misfortunes of France and the tyrannical yoke under which she was bowed down. With regard to external policy, M. d'Hauterive found M. Lainé disposed, like his colleagues, to demand an explicit declaration of what sacrifices the emperor was resolved to make for peace, as this was, in his opinion, the only means of obtaining from France a last effort, if even at this price she was still capable of one, so exhausted were her resources. M. d'Hauterive, profiting of the advantages that a *titre-à-titre* with a man of intelligence and sincerity always affords, endeavoured to persuade M. Lainé that it was impossible to lay before the commissioners a plan of negotiation, because the Government could not publicly declare what they would yield or what they would not yield, for that would be telling their secret to an enemy who did not reveal his; neither could they present an *ultimatum*, that being a proceeding employed only at the termination of a negotiation when it became important to put an end to designedly-prolonged parleying, and when those who used it were in a position to enforce the imperative language in which it was couched.

Enlightened by these practical observations, M. Lainé promised to satisfy his colleagues at this point, and kept his word. In fact, after very warm discussions, the commissioners abandoned the demand of having laid before them a detailed enumeration of the sacrifices the emperor was willing to make for peace; but they expressly declared that France would not recede from her natural frontiers, but she claimed nothing beyond; and these sentiments being sincerely declared, it became the duty of the allies to explain themselves definitely on the Frankfort bases, which they had proposed, and which had been formally accepted by M. de Caulaincourt in his letter of the 2d of December. This point being settled, they

turned their attention to the subject of the home policy, and then the most violent expressions were launched against the despotism under which the empire groaned. Upon this subject each individual had serious grievances to allege: taxes levied without lawful authority, horrible vexations in the administration of the laws touching conscription, insupportable abuses in collecting contributions in kind, illegal arrests, arbitrary detentions, &c. As regarded these complaints, the facts were as numerous as varied; and at the very moment when the Government stood in need of the utmost devotedness from the nation, the people were in a position to tell the governing authorities that for the patriot citizen there were two things equally sacred,—his native land and the laws of his country: his native land, that portion of the earth where he was called into life and which he is bound to defend against every invader; the laws beneath whose shelter he lives, through which he is made conscious of a public authority, and whose rigorous observance he has a right to demand. His native land and the laws of his country are two sacred objects in the estimation of the true patriot. Every citizen, in devoting himself to the one, establishes for himself the right to inquire into the administration of the others; every citizen has a right to say to a Government that demands from him great sacrifices, "I will not help you to drive a foreign foe from my country if the reward of my exertions is to be oppression from a home despotism."

All the commissioners were unanimous on these points, and came to the resolution of drawing up a moderate but decisive declaration of their opinions. When the communications made by the Government were concluded, it became the duty of the commission to make out a report for the Legislative Corps, after which they were to propose an address to the emperor. To M. Lainé was confided the task of drawing up this report, and he did so in a spirit conformable to the opinions entertained by the commissioners. The report stated that at Frankfort overtures of peace had been made to France, having for bases her natural frontiers; that on the 16th of November France had favourably received this overture and proposed a congress at Manheim; that upon a second communication from M. Metternich,—who did not think the acceptance of the natural frontiers had been sufficiently explicit,—France formally accepted them on the 2d of December, and that these became thenceforth the bases on which negotiations were carried on. The report said further that it was a duty the allies owed to France and to themselves to adhere to what they had proposed, and that France, on her part, ought to shed the last drop of her blood for the maintenance of conditions so accepted. The report added that two objects of the highest consideration to every people ought to be the integrity of the country and the maintenance of the laws; and on this subject the report laid before the emperor, in respectful terms and with entire confidence in his justice, an exposé of some acts of the public authorities of which the people had reason to complain.

The tone of the report throughout was sincere, but grave and dignified.

The commissioners assembled on the 28th to submit the projected report—for as yet it was only a project—to the high-chancellor and M. d'Hauterive.

The high-chancellor, though believing the observations of the commissioners to be very just, was, however, alarmed at the effect this report might produce on all Europe, and still more on Napoleon himself. In the eyes of Europe it would pass for an act of indirect hostility to the Government, at a moment when the most perfect union was needed between the executive and the people; with regard to Napoleon, it would offend him and provoke acts of violence, the consequences of which, at such a time, might be very disagreeable. The prudent high-chancellor might have been right on these two points; but why had the representatives of the country been granted only this day—this day so long deferred—to give utterance to truths that must have found expression? Still, though the commissioners uttered complaints of the gravest nature, it might have been wiser to defer them. The high-chancellor endeavoured to persuade them of this; and his fine and impressive countenance—well calculated to give weight to his prudent counsels—produced some impression on his auditors. Many changes were agreed to. M. d'Hauterive obtained one especially of great importance, taking good care not to avow the motive that prompted him to solicit the concession. The letters of the 16th of November and the 2d of December had been inserted in the report, and M. d'Hauterive feared that the public, better informed than the commissioners, might ultimately discover the real error,—the too late acceptance of the Frankfort bases. He assigned as a reason for the proposed alteration that it might involve disagreeable consequences to publish documents touching a negotiation that had scarcely commenced. The copies of the letters in the report were consequently suppressed. Lastly, the high-chancellor succeeded in having the complaints against the home Government reduced to a few moderate phrases. In short, after having spoken of the declaration to be made to the allied Powers, and of the defensive measures to be taken if this declaration were not attended to, the report added, "It is, according to the spirit of our institutions, the duty of the Government to propose the means it believes most prompt and most sure to repulse the enemy and establish peace on a durable basis. These means will be efficacious if the French are convinced that the Government no longer aspires to any glory but that of peace; these means will be sufficient if the French are convinced that their blood will be shed only to defend their native land and well-administered laws."

"It appears then indispensable to your commissioners that, at the same time that the Government shall propose the most prompt measures for the safety of the state, his majesty should be petitioned to maintain the entire and steady execution of the laws that secure to individual Frenchmen the rights of liberty, of

personal safety, of property, and to the nation at large the free exercise of political rights. This guarantee has appeared to your commissioners the most efficacious means of restoring to Frenchmen the energy necessary for the defence of their country," &c. &c.

Notwithstanding the extreme moderation of these phrases, the chancellor made fresh efforts to get them suppressed. M. de Caulaincourt lent his exertions, but neither could induce men indignant against the home administration to abstain from so moderate a manifestation of their feelings, particularly as they might not have another opportunity of doing so, for it was not probable that the Government, which now in the hour of its defeat appealed to them, would be likely to do so should the day of distress be succeeded by one of triumph. This was their excuse for a manifestation which, if it were ill timed, was the fault of those who had afforded only this opportunity for the expression of their feelings, and who gave them little hope of another. The commissioners were certainly told they would be listened to another time on this subject, but they did not believe it, and had good reasons for their mistrust.

On the 20th of December, the Legislative Corps being resolved into a private committee, M. Lainé read his report, which was listened to with religious attention and unanimously approved. M. Lainé, at the conclusion of the report, recommended the drawing up of an address to the emperor in the same spirit. It was decided by a majority of 223 votes out of 254, that the report of the commission should be printed solely for the members of the Legislative Corps, in order that they may reflect on it, and vote for the proposed address after mature deliberation. From this moment, publicity was assured to the words of M. Lainé, especially among foreign nations, by whom they ought never to have been heard.

When the report was laid before Napoleon, he burst into violent anger on reading it, and exclaimed that he was insulted at the very moment when he stood most in need of support. He immediately summoned the privy council, and asked the ministers, with the air and tone of a man who had already taken his resolution, whether the sittings of the Legislative Corps ought to be any longer allowed. He pointed out not only the danger of allowing such a report as that of M. Lainé's to be published, but the still greater danger of having within the walls of the capital an assembly that, at a dangerous crisis, at the approach of the enemy for example, might be guilty of some factious or imprudent manifestation, which would infallibly be attended with fatal effects. Sad and wide-seeing foresight, by which it would seem that Napoleon, piercing the future, already read his own history on the page of destiny; but this foresight came too late, and was incapable of supplying a remedy. How could Napoleon now prevent that this report had come into existence, and had been read before an audience of hundreds? How prevent that the Legislative Corps, either dissolved or adjourned, should remain at Paris, ready to combine spontaneously for the prosecution of the most dangerous schemes? How many legislative bodies have been dissolved, and

have been found at a dangerous crisis more formidable than if they had continued their legitimate sittings! Be this as it may, Napoleon asked his ministers whether it would not be better immediately to adjourn the Legislative Corps; in the first place, to prevent the members putting into execution the sentiments embodied in M. Lainé's report, and, secondly, to suspend the sittings of this body during a war that might only be terminated beneath the walls of Paris itself.

The chancellor, Cambacérès, combated this proposition with his ordinary sagacity. The report, he said, was undoubtedly warm, and even factious, but it was done, and nothing could prevent its publication. Even should the emperor succeed in preventing the publication in France, he could not forbid it in foreign countries. The adjournment of the Legislative Corps would be a more serious circumstance than the report itself, for the public would infallibly attribute to this body sentiments much more hostile than those they really entertained. As to the annoyance that its sitting during the approaching campaign might cause, nobody could of course affirm that the members might not commit some imprudence, but that was an annoyance that could be provided for when the time came, without anticipating it by an ill-judged outburst. In fact, to dissolve the Legislative Corps would be to proclaim to the world a disunion between the legislative bodies; it would be to declare that a rupture existed between France and the emperor.

Each of the ministers adopted the sentiments of the chancellor, each thought the adjournment would work more mischief than the report itself. But touching the annoyances that might arise from the assembling of the Legislative Corps during the campaign, everybody hesitated to give an opinion, and yet that was the point on which Napoleon's foresight rendered him most solicitous; for admitting the past evil to be irremediable, he wished to provide against the future, and he pressed each of the ministers to enlighten him on this subject. Perceiving that each when he came to this part of his discourse hesitated, Napoleon interrupted the discussion and put an end to it, by a few sharp, decisive words:—"You see it clearly," he said: "you all agree in recommending me moderation, but no one ventures to assure me that the deputies will not take advantage of some disastrous day, of which there are so many in war, to make spontaneously, or at the instigation of some factious leader, an insurrectionary movement; and I cannot endure such a doubt. Any thing is less dangerous than such a possibility." Without listening to further remonstrance, he signed the decree which adjourned on the following day—the 31st of December—the Legislative Corps, and he ordered the Duke of Rovigo to seize at the printing-office and elsewhere every copy of M. Lainé's report, a report which has since become so famous.

The decree for adjournment being presented to the Legislative Corps produced among the members a profound sensation. In a moment it converted into enemies two hundred and fifty persons, who before that were profoundly submissive to the Government, and only meant to give utterance to a positive fact, useful to reveal,

which was that the local Government, imitating the conduct of the head of the empire, committed the most arbitrary acts, acts which constituted an actual tyranny. To the eyes of the general public, matters were a still worse aspect. They believed that very serious things had been said in the Legislative Corps, and that most important revelations had taken place. The enemies who were anxious for the overthrow of the Imperial Government were not slow to circulate a report that the emperor had had an open rupture with the public bodies, that they had wished to induce him to make peace, that he had refused, and that consequently the torrents of blood that were doomed to flow were attributable to him alone. All this was true of past times, but was false at the actual moment, and was the idea most injurious to the emperor's popularity that could take possession of the public mind.

This outburst, which, with a ruler of a different temperament to Napoleon, would have finished with an article in the *Moniteur*, had, thanks to his constitutional irritability, far more deplorable consequences. On the following day (the 1st of January) he was to receive the Legislative Corps with the other public bodies. He seemed anxious to meet them, as if he feared to lose the opportunity of giving vent to the vexation with which he was oppressed. After having received the customary compliments, he stepped forward abruptly, stood in the midst of the members of the Legislative Corps, and with a loud voice and sparkling eyes, spoke to them in language familiar even to vulgarity, but expressive, proud, original, sometimes true, but more often imprudent; bearing, in short, all the characteristics of the anger of a great man. He told them he had called on them to do good, and they had done evil; to proclaim the unity of sentiment that subsisted between France and her monarch, and they had hastened to declare a disunion; that two battles lost in Champagne would not have been so injurious as what they had just done. Then apostrophizing them vehemently, he said, "What do you wish for? You wish to seize on power; but what would you do with it? Which of you could wield it? Have you forgotten the Constituante, the Legislative Assembly, the Convention? Would you be more successful than they? Would you not all finish your career on the scaffold, like Guadet, Vergniaud, Danton? And besides, what does France need at this moment? It is not an assembly of deputies, it is not orators;—it is a general. Is there one among you? And then, where are your credentials? France knows me—does she know you? She has twice chosen me for her chief by several million votes; and you, in the restricted space of the departments, she has elected you by some hundred voices, to come and vote for the laws that I, and not you, make. I look for your titles, and I do not find them. *The throne in itself is only a frame-work of wood, covered over with velvet.* The actual throne is a man, and I am that man, with my indomitable will, my inflexible temper, and my wide-spread fame. It is I who can save France, and it is not you. You complain of abuses in the administration; in what you say there is some truth, and a great deal of falsehood. M. Raynouard has

asserted that Marshal Massena seized the house of a private individual for the use of his staff. (This circumstance had occurred at Marseilles, where Marshal Massena had been Envoy Extraordinary.) M. Raynouard has lied. The marshal took possession for a short time of a vacant house, and afterward indemnified the owner for the use. It is not so that a marshal bowed down with years and covered with glory ought to be spoken of. If you had complaints to make, you ought to have waited another opportunity, which I would myself have procured you, and then with some of my privy councillors, perhaps with myself personally, you could have discussed your grievances, and I would have applied remedies where there was any reasonable ground for complaint. But the explanations ought to have taken place in private, *for it is in the retirement of home and not in presence of the public that we wash our dirty linen.* But instead of that, you have bespattered me with mire. I am, I would have you to know, a man whom you may kill, but whom you shall not insult with impunity. M. Lainé is a wicked man, in correspondence with the Bourbons, through the agency of the advocate Desèze. I shall keep my eye on him, and on those whom I believe capable of criminal conspiracies. As to the rest, I distrust you all together. The eleven-twelfths of you are well-meaning, but you allow yourselves to be led by designing men. Return into your departments; tell France that, no matter what might be said to the contrary, the war is made against her not less than against me, and that she is now called on to defend, not my person, but her own national existence. I shall place myself at the head of the army, I shall repulse the enemy, I shall conclude peace, no matter what sacrifice it may cost what you call my ambition. I shall again summon you around me, I shall order your report to be printed, and you will be astonished yourselves that you had ever addressed me in such language and under such circumstances."

This ill-timed speech, which, if it contained some truth, contained still more falsehood, (for if it was true that Napoleon alone could save France, it was equally true that he was the cause of her calamities, and if one alleged grievance was incorrect or exaggerated, a multitude of others could be proved that were unjust and insupportable,) confounded all who heard it, and soon obtained a deplorable publicity. In fact, every one related it after his own fashion; and the consequence was that Napoleon appeared to be opposed by the heretofore submissive representatives of France, that is to say, by France herself. The report of the Legislative Corps published *in extenso* could never have produced so unfortunate a result. It would have been seen in that, that there had been abuses in the home administration, and that the Legislative Corps wished to suppress them; it would have been also perceptible that Napoleon's despotism began to be oppressive to the mass of the citizens; but it would have been also seen that the Legislative Corps wished for peace, wished it on the bases of our natural frontiers,—that the Legislative Corps advised the Government not to yield these boundaries, and invited France to rise *en masse*. Such a declaration might well have induced

the Government to endure a few censures, very light indeed, compared to what they might have been.

Still, it was necessary to appeal to France, to endeavour to stir up her zeal, and Napoleon, for want of the public bodies who were little inclined to fall in with his views, conceived the idea of selecting commissioners-extraordinary among the senators. He intended to choose the most distinguished personages, either military or civil, and send them into their respective provinces, where they were supposed to have most influence, in order that they might facilitate the levy of the conscription, the payment of the taxes, the bringing in of the contributions in kind, the instruction and organization of the military bodies, the departure of the national guards: in fact, their mission was to accelerate the activity of the Government in every department. In order to carry out these views, they would need to be endowed with extraordinary and unlimited powers.

Before their departure, Napoleon wished to see and speak with them. He was touched, it is true, and his emotion communicated to his language an overmastering eloquence.

"I do not fear to acknowledge," he said, "that I have made war too long; I had conceived vast projects, I wished to secure to France the empire of the world. I was mistaken; these projects were not proportioned to the numerical force of our population. I should have been obliged to put them all under arms; and I now perceive that the advancement of society, and the moral and social well-being of a state, is not compatible with the converting an entire people into a nation of soldiers. I ought to expiate the fault I have committed in reckoning too much on my good fortune, and I will expiate it. I will make peace. I will make it on such terms as circumstances command, and this peace shall be mortifying to myself alone. It is I who have deceived myself; it is I who ought to suffer, it is not France. She has not committed any error: she has poured forth her blood for me, she has not refused me any sacrifice. Let her then enjoy the glory of my enterprises, let her enjoy it unreservedly: I yield it to her.

"As to me, I only reserve to myself the honour of displaying a courage difficult to attain, that of renouncing the highest ambition man ever entertained, and of sacrificing for the happiness of my people, projects of greatness that could only be accomplished by efforts that I no longer wish to demand. Go, then, gentlemen, announce to your departments that I am about to conclude a peace, that I shall no longer require the blood of Frenchmen for my enterprises, for myself, as some people have been pleased to say, but for France, and to maintain the integrity of her frontiers. Tell them I only ask the means of expelling a foreign foe from our native land. Tell them that Alsace, Franche-Comté, Navarre, Bearn, are invaded. Tell them that I call on Frenchmen to come to the aid of Frenchmen; that I am willing to negotiate, but will only do so on the frontiers, not in the heart of our provinces, laid waste by a horde of barbarians. I shall accompany my army both as a general and a soldier. Go, gentlemen, and repeat to all France the sentiments by which I am animated."

In listening to these generous excuses of genius acknowledging its errors, a kind of enthusiasm seized these venerable personages who were about setting out for the provinces to endeavour to awaken the zeal of a dejected people. They crowded round Napoleon, pressed his hands in theirs, giving expression to the profound emotion with which they were seized. The greater part took leave to set off immediately for their destination. Alas! why did he not address these noble expressions to the Legislative Corps? He would have then seen that truth is the most powerful means of acting on the minds of men, and perhaps, far from being obliged to dissolve that assembly, he would have seen the members rise to a man to applaud his sentiments and call on every Frenchman to follow him to the field of battle.

The aspect of affairs became every moment more threatening, and it became of urgent importance to send as quickly as possible the remaining national forces to meet the enemy. The allied armies were crossing our frontiers on every side. General Bubna, who had set out first after having skirted the opposite side of the Jura, had borne down on Geneva, where there were only a few conscripts to resist the Austrians and restrain a disaffected population. General Jordy, who commanded at Geneva, having died suddenly, the preparations for defence became disorganized, and the Austrians entered the city without striking a blow. The Generals Colloredo and Maurice Liechtenstein, with the light troops and Austrian reserves, after having passed by Berne, had taken their way toward Pontarlier, with the intention of marching through Dôle on Auxonne. The corps d'Aloys de Liechtenstein, passing in like manner through Pontarlier, waste to come down on Besançon to mask that place, whilst General Giulay, traversing Porentruy, was to advance through Montbéliard on Vesoul. Marshal Wrede, with the Bavarians and the Wurtembergers, had thrown bombs into Huningue, attacked Belfort, and sent out cavalry to reconnoitre Colmar. The Prince of Wittgenstein blockaded Strasbourg and Kehl; the Russian and Prussian guards had remained at Bâle with the allied sovereigns. Such was the distribution of the army of Prince Schwarzenberg after the passage of the Rhine. His project, after he should have crossed the Jura and turned our defences, was to advance with 160,000 men of the old Bohemian army through Franche-Comté, and take up his position on the high grounds of Burgundy and Champagne, whence the Seine, the Aube, and the Marne flow toward Paris, whilst the old army of Silesia, commanded by Blücher, and 60,000 strong, crossing the Rhine at the same time at Mayence, should advance among our fortresses without attacking them, leaving the task of blockading them to the troops in the rear. The two invading armies were to unite at the Upper Marne, between Chaumont and Langres, in order to advance *en masse* toward the angle formed by the Marne and the Seine. Blücher, in fact, had, on the 1st of January, 1814, crossed the Rhine at three points—Manheim, Mayence, and Coblenz—without meeting any greater resistance than the great army of Prince Schwarzenberg had encountered along the Jura range. Thus the prestige of the inviolability of our

frontiers was doomed to be destroyed in many places at the same time.

In fact, it would have been difficult, in the actual state of our forces, to oppose any resistance to this mass of invaders. Along the Jura frontier, where the attack was unexpected, there were no troops stationed; but General Mortier, who had at first been ordered to Belgium with the Old Guard, returned by forced marches from the north to the east, through Rheims, Châlons, Chaumont, and Langres. On the Alsatian frontier, Marshal Victor, with the 2d infantry and the 5th cavalry corps, was at Strasbourg, where he had scarcely time to give his troops a little rest and incorporate a few conscripts. This corps, which in drawing upon all the dépôts in Alsace ought to have furnished thirty-six battalions, and three divisions, did not reckon, after having hastily embodied all the disposable conscripts, more than from eight to nine thousand infantry, ill armed and badly clothed. The displacement of our dépôts, which had been put in the rear, had added very considerably to the difficulty of recruiting. However, Marshal Victor had in the 5th cavalry corps nearly four thousand old dragoons of Spain, incomparable soldiers, and moreover deeply irritated against the enemy. At the appearance of the masses that debouched by Bâle, Bâfort, and Besançon, the marshal had avoided encountering them on the way from Colmar to Bâle; he had, on the contrary, fallen back on Saverne, and taken up a position on the Vosges, after having left in Strasbourg about eight thousand conscripts and national guards, under General Broussier, with sufficient supplies. This brave marshal was visibly disconcerted. However, his noble cavalry had fallen on the Russian and Bavarian squadrons that had advanced against them, had defeated, and put them to the sword.

On the Mayence side, the Duke of Ragusa, on receiving intelligence of the passage of the Rhine, effected on the 1st of January, retreated with the 6th infantry and the 1st cavalry corps, leaving in Mayence the 4th corps, commanded by General Morand, and reduced by typhus fever from 24,000 to 11,000 men. He had been joined on the way by the Durutte division, that had been sent on to Coblenz, and which was cut off from Mayence, where it could not gain admission. The duke's first impulse was to hasten to Alsace to the assistance of Marshal Victor, but seeing Alsace invaded by the enemy, and almost abandoned by our troops, who had already gained the summit of the Vosges, he had taken up a position on the other side of these mountains, that is to say, on the Sarre and the Moselle, in order to effect a junction with Marshal Victor in the direction of Metz, Nancy, or Lunéville. He too had encountered great difficulties in recruiting his corps, owing to want of time and the displacement of the dépôts. He had about 10,000 foot-soldiers, and 3000 cavalry composing the 1st cavalry corps, and these he was obliged to weaken by leaving some detachments at Metz and Thionville.

Marshal Ney had two divisions of the Young Guard that he concentrated at Epinal. We were then about to have on the opposite side of the Vosges the Marshals Victor, Marmont,

and Ney, between Metz, Nancy, and Epinal, and on the high ground that separates Franche-Comté from Burgundy, that is to say, at Langres, we had Marshal Mortier with the Old Guard, both falling back, but at the same time confronting, on one side, Blücher, who was advancing from Mayence to Metz, amidst our fortresses, and on the other side Schwarzenberg, who had flanked them by violating the Swiss neutrality, and who was advancing from Bâle and Besançon on Langres.

Thus Lorraine, Alsace, Franche-Comté, were invaded. The enemy promised everywhere to the people the greatest forbearance, and in the commencement kept their word, through fear of provoking a general rising. Terror had seized our rural populations. The peasants of Lorraine, of Alsace, of Franche-Comté, bellicose by temperament and through the influence of tradition, would have willingly risen against the enemy if they had had arms to fight with or troops to sustain them in the conflict. But they, as well as all the inhabitants of France, wanted money, and the quick retreat of the marshals discouraged them. Overwhelmed by despair, they submitted to the enemy.

The retreat of the armies was accompanied by the less regretted retreat of the principal functionaries. The Imperial Government, after mature deliberation, had ordered the prefects, sub-prefects, &c. &c., to retire with the troops, in order to create an additional embarrassment for the enemy—that of being obliged to appoint an administration in the invaded provinces. It was the recollection of the annoyances we had experienced in conquered countries, especially where the governing authorities had withdrawn, that caused the adoption of this measure by the Government, a measure strongly opposed by the Duke de Rovigo. It would, perhaps, have been wise to have acted thus in a country where there existed no party hostile to the Government and ready to rise at the approach of the allies. Unfortunately, in France, twenty-five years of revolution had left numerous parties that Napoleon, if conquered, could no longer restrain, and among these there was one, that of the ancient régime, the similarity of whose opinions with those of the allies induced them to hope every thing from the invaders. The absence of the governing authorities in France was, therefore, attended with very disagreeable results. In fact, the disaffected, no longer under the surveillance of the prefects, sub-prefects, and police, gave vent to their hostile feelings at the approach of the enemy, and rose when they had advanced some way to aid them in forming administrations favourable to their views: they were even preparing to proclaim the Bourbons. These sentiments did not prevail in the rural districts, where the people were deeply irritated by the long train of ills entailed by the invasion. But in the cities, where the ferment of opinion is generally strongest, the hatred of the Imperial Government was general, and as the ills entailed by the invasion were little felt by the citizens, the most dangerous manifestations burst forth, not alone on the part of the royalists, but from all those who were weary of despotism and of war. Thus France was invaded at the very moment

when suffering, exhausted, and torn by faction, she was no longer able to renew the noble example of patriotism she had exhibited in 1792; and it was not the least of the errors committed by the Imperial Government that France was obliged to show herself in this state to the European coalition.

On the approach of the soldiers of Prince Schwarzenberg toward Langres some of the chief inhabitants of the city, aided by a populace tired of conscription and the *droits réunis*, threatened to rise against the troops of Marshal Mortier. At Nancy the municipal authorities and some influential persons of the country had received Marshal Blücher with great honours, and even offered him a banquet. The Prussian general had spoken to them of the good intentions of the allies, of their desire to deliver France from her tyrant, and he was eagerly listened to by people whose hearts were torn by the miseries attendant on a protracted war.

Our armies retreated, leaving behind them defenceless peasants, whose last supplies they were often obliged to seize, and cities exasperated against the Imperial Government, willingly giving ear to the promises of the allies, who presented themselves not as conquerors but as liberators. One additional circumstance completed the misery of this picture. The few survivors of our glorious armies, disheartened by suffering, humiliated by continued retreats, gave utterance to their discontent, and often re-echoed the remarks of the urban populations. The old soldiers did not desert their standards, but the conscripts, especially those who belonged to the departments through which the armies were passing, made no scruple of quitting the ranks, and the Marshals Victor and Marmont had already, in this way, lost some thousands.

An ocular witness of this distressing position of affairs, a faithful aide-de-camp of the emperor, General Dejean, had made him an exact portraiture of these things, and assured him that all was lost, if he did not hasten by his presence to apply a remedy. In the Low Countries, affairs did not wear a better aspect. Marshal Macdonald seeing himself outflanked on the right by Blücher's column, which had crossed the Rhine between Mayence and Coblenz, had summoned to his aid the 11th and 5th infantry and the 3d cavalry corps, besides what remained of the troops returned from Holland, and had retired to Mexières with about 12,000 men, leaving only very small garrisons at Wesel and at Maestricht. General Decaen, being sent to Antwerp, had assembled there a garrison of from 7 to 8000 men, composed of sailors and conscripts, and had, moreover, thrown 3000 men into Flushing and 2000 into Berg-op-Zoom, but had abandoned Breda, which could not be defended, and Willemstadt, which could have been defended and which was an important point on the Wahal. The desertion of this latter place was much to be regretted, for after having lost Holland, it would have been a great advantage to preserve, between Holland and Belgium, the water-line which offered the most defensible frontier. But General Decaen, being able to perform only a part of his task, had preferred Antwerp and Flushing to all the other places. He had

taken up a position, with the guards, in advance of Antwerp, resolved to defend energetically this great arsenal, which had so long excited the violent hatred of England, and kept alive an incessant solicitude on the part of Napoleon.

The public danger could not be more alarming, particularly if we consider that since the letter of the 10th of December, in which M. de Metternich, acknowledging the receipt of the note of the 2d of December, had declared that he was about to submit it to the allied courts, the French Cabinet had received no further communication. This silence, joined to the offensive movement of the armies, seemed to indicate that the allies no longer thought of negotiating, and that henceforth their sole thought would be to accomplish our destruction.

Whatever might be the activity of Napoleon, he could not be ready to face the enemy before a considerable portion of France should be invaded, and meanwhile he was obliged to submit to the annoyance of seeing the best provinces—the best, both materially and morally—occupied by the enemy. To these difficulties was added the danger of permitting seditious manifestations in the great cities, and of allowing the name of Bourbon to be there publicly proclaimed. In such a state of things, it would have been happiness to obtain an armistice even on severe conditions, for the progress of the invasion would have been by this means suspended, and if the emperor did not succeed in coming to terms with the allied Powers, he would at least gain the two months, still indispensable to the completion of our means of defence. Napoleon had too much sagacity to believe that his enemies, whose advance a severe winter had not interrupted, would suspend their march to listen to mere parleying. He was even convinced that they had abandoned the idea of negotiating, and no longer wished to conclude a peace except within the walls of Paris. Nevertheless, a trial would cost nothing, and, in case of failure, the worst that could happen would be to remain as he was. Besides, according to what M. de St. Aignan had seen, and according to reports received from the invaded provinces, there existed between the allies serious dissensions. Austria, so rumour said, was offended at the pretensions of Russia and inclined to peace. In fact, the Emperor Francis, independent of the love he bore his daughter, was not inclined to augment the importance of Russia, or to satisfy the maritime jealousies of England; and if he got what he desired in Italy, it was possible that he might pause in his course. Then, if Austria abandoned hostilities, all the allies would be obliged to do the same. To these suppositions, which were not devoid of probability, there was but one to oppose, but that one was very plausible: it was, that through fear of a rupture, all the allies, including the Austrians, would refuse every personal advantage, however great. If among these opposite chances the fortunate one turned up, France was saved, and therefore Napoleon did not hesitate to make a last attempt to negotiate, however small might be the hope of success.

He at first thought of sending to the camp of the allies M. de Champagny, (the Duke de

Cadore,) who had been Minister of Foreign Affairs, prior to which he had been ambassador at Vienna, where he had won the esteem of the Emperor Francis. However, the very natural reflection afterward suggested itself that to negotiate with the allied monarchs, too important and influential a personage could not be chosen; and acting on this consideration, Napoleon determined to send M. de Caulaincourt himself. He confided to him the double mission of treating for peace, and, if it could be done without testifying too much alarm, to try to obtain an armistice. As to peace, the conditions were still the same that we have already mentioned, that is to say, the line of the Rhine, but the great line, that which, following the course of the Wahal, cuts off North Brabant from Holland. The idea of excluding the House of Orange was abandoned, as well as the hope of creating in Westphalia a State for King Jerome. In Italy, France, yielding part of the territory to Austria, without requiring any thing for herself, persisted, however, in demanding an appanage for the Princess Eliza, and if possible for the brothers of Napoleon, Jerome and Joseph. The difference between these terms and the project of peace drawn up by Napoleon, on the morrow of the Frankfort propositions, was not great. With regard to the armistice, M. de Caulaincourt, in order to win over Austria, was to offer her underhand the fortresses of Venice and Palma-Nova, which implied the concession of the line of the Adige. Those of Hamburg and Magdeburg were also to be immediately delivered up to Prussia, still with the object of obtaining a suspension of arms. The natural consequence of the evacuation of these four fortresses in Italy and in Germany would have been the speedy return of the garrisons, which would have given an addition of 10,000 men at least to the army of Italy, and 40,000 to the army of the Rhine.

The only objection that could be made to the sending M. de Caulaincourt, was the difficulty of presenting himself to the ministers of the coalition, when no place had been appointed for negotiation, and the mention of Mannheim in M. de Bassano's letter of the 16th of November had led to no result. However, the emperor was in a position where the whispers of self-love must be hushed, and, as the danger was every moment increasing, it was ultimately agreed that M. de Caulaincourt should repair without delay to the French outposts, that he should then write to M. de Metternich, saying that in consequence of the assurances brought in his name by M. de St. Aignan, and his formal invitation to renew negotiations, the emperor did not wish that any delay on the part of France should prolong for one hour the ills entailed by war; that M. de Caulaincourt had therefore repaired to the outposts, ready to set out for Mannheim, or any other city the allied monarchs might please to appoint.

If when M. de Caulaincourt arrived at the outposts he should be left there in a humiliating position, which was possible, there would be at least some compensation for this humiliation, for it would prove that Napoleon desired peace, that no difficulty was now offered by his obstinacy, and the knowledge of the ill

treatment received by his envoy might win him back the good opinion of the French.

Matters having been thus arranged, M. de Caulaincourt set out on the 5th of January for the French outposts, leaving M. de la Besnardière, the most skilful clerk in the department, to replace him in the administration of foreign affairs. Napoleon was preparing to set out soon himself to support with his sword the negotiations that M. de Caulaincourt was exercising his influence to resume.

M. de Caulaincourt repaired to Lunéville, a place rendered famous by a treaty concluded in happier times, and on arriving at the foot of the Vosges, he met our armies retreating precipitately, and preceded in their retreat by the flight of all the public functionaries. He heard the remarks of the troops and the people, he saw the wretchedness of the officers, the desertion of the young soldiers, and the newly-awakened audacity of the royalist party, who, without being popular, obtained a hearing when they spoke of peace, legal rights, even of liberty. A worthy citizen and a brave soldier, M. de Caulaincourt was overwhelmed with grief when he saw our provinces invaded, and our armies put, as it were, to rout. To his grief as a citizen was added his sorrow as a father, for his private fortune, that is to say the property of his children, was involved in the destiny of Napoleon, and he was deeply afflicted at the danger that threatened the imperial throne. He hastened to describe to Napoleon things as they were, and point out the dejection of certain military chiefs who were not faithless, but discouraged, and he begged him, after reflecting deliberately on his position, to send him more acceptable conditions of peace. At the same time he wrote to M. de Metternich, saying that, astonished at his silence, which seemed inexplicable when he referred to the communications of M. de St. Aignan, he had come expressly to obtain a reply, which he awaited at the outposts, ready to repair to any place that the allies might appoint for entering into negotiations.

This demand for an explanation having reached M. de Metternich through M. de Wrede, the former was not a little embarrassed, for after the pacific demonstrations the allies had made, to refuse to treat would have been a gross, even a dangerous inconsistency, both parties being equally anxious to gain the good opinion of the public, whether in allied Europe or in France. M. de Metternich and the Emperor Francis were still disposed to negotiate, with increased ambition, it is true, touching Italy, but the imagination of the other allies was too strongly inflamed, since that, in compliance with the wishes of England, and in obedience to the strong impulse of German passions, hostilities had been again renewed. The unexpected facility with which they had penetrated into Switzerland and France had persuaded them that they had nothing more to do but to march forward in order to put an end to the war in a manner conformable to their most extravagant desires, and to hear them speak one would have said they had no other enemy to fear than their own dissensions. These, it is true, were very great. Alexander, still discontented at the entrance into Switzer-

land, did not wish that the popular party should be oppressed for the advantage of the aristocratic, whilst Austria acted in a manner directly opposite. Austria did not wish the Danes to be sacrificed to the Prince of Sweden, or the King of Saxony to Prussia, and Alexander wished directly the contrary. The Tyrolese begged to be placed immediately under the Government of Austria, and Bavaria demanded that she should be first indemnified for the loss. England thought only of establishing the dynasty of the House of Orange, in order to shut out France from the Scheldt, and Austria, before consenting to this measure, wished that England should promise to support her against Russia. In such a chaos of contending interests, it would be difficult to come to a resolution on any subject, more particularly on that of suspending hostilities, a subject more likely than any other to excite differences of opinion and awaken angry feeling.

Intelligence now arrived of good augury for the allies. This was the approaching arrival of Lord Castlereagh himself, who did not fear to quit the Foreign Office, in order to represent England among the allied sovereigns. Up to this time England had had as agents, Lord Cathcart, a brave soldier, but little skilled in diplomacy, and Lord Aberdeen, a man of enlightened mind, but accused of being too pacifically inclined. It was not sufficient in this assemblage of sovereigns, where each Power was represented by emperors, by kings, or by prime ministers, to have merely ambassadors, whatever might be their merit. The British Cabinet decided then to send the most eminent of its members, Lord Castlereagh, to the ambulatory congress of the coalition, to moderate the passions that prevailed there, to maintain union, and to obtain the fulfilment of England's desires, and these desires being satisfied, to take part on every other question with the moderate against the extreme party. In short, Lord Castlereagh's mission, which seems natural enough, was to preach moderation to the allies, but to baffle nothing of England's pretensions. He was, besides, to enter into explanations touching the war-budget of Count Pozzo, and to make free use of English money for the accomplishment of his views, throwing from time to time, not his sword, but his gold, into the balance. No man was better suited than Lord Castlereagh to fulfil such a mission. His name was Robert Stewart; his brother, Charles Stewart, afterward Lord Londonderry, accredited to the court of Bernadotte, was one of England's most active and most zealous agents. Lord Castlereagh, descended from an Irish family, inherited an ardent and energetic temperament, but tempered in him by lofty reason. His intellect strong and far-seeing, his temper cautious and firm, he was capable of acting at the same time with vigour and with prudence; exhibiting in his manners the proud simplicity of an Englishman, he was called to exercise, and he did exercise, a great influence on the allies. He was, on almost every question, furnished with absolute powers. With his temperament, with his instructions, it might be almost said that it was England herself that was transplanted from her sea-girt home, and appeared in the camp of the allies. Having left London about

the end of December, and having abode some time in Holland, to give advice to the Prince of Orange, he was not expected at Freylburg until the latter end of January. None of the coalition thought of taking a decided resolution before his arrival, or of giving a reply to any diplomatic communications. A strong rivalry already existed between the allies, to know who should see, who should converse with him, first, in order to gain him as a partisan. Alexander had let Lord Castlereagh know, through Lord Cathcart, that he hoped to be the first to have an interview with him.

The expected arrival of Lord Castlereagh furnished M. de Metternich a means of replying to the French envoy. He let M. de Caulaincourt know that, England having come to the determination of sending her Minister of Foreign Affairs to the camp of the allies, they were obliged to wait his arrival before fixing the place, the object, and the direction of fresh negotiations. Besides this official reply, M. de Metternich wrote a private letter to M. de Caulaincourt, polite and flattering as regarded himself personally, but very obscure as regarded matters of business. The purport was that the allies still wished for peace, that they hoped it, that there was no cause to despair of it, but that they must still wait patiently. As to the rest, there was not a word in allusion to the possibility of a suspension of hostilities. This letter was accompanied by one from the Emperor Francis to Maria Louisa. This prince had believed his daughter to be ill; he inquired after her and received a letter, to which he replied. He expressed much affection for Maria Louisa, a great desire for peace, but not so ardent a hope of attaining it; he also expressed a resolution of labouring sincerely for that end; and lastly he gave utterance to the vexation of encountering serious difficulties in the general confusion of ideas, the result of the confusion of things that had prevailed during the past twenty years.*

M. de Caulaincourt transmitted these several

* I give here this instructive and interesting letter, which shows plainly the personal feelings of the Emperor of Austria toward his daughter, his son-in-law, and France:—

26th December, 1813.

DEAR LOUISA:—I received yesterday your letter of the 12th of December, and it gave me much pleasure to learn that you are in good health. I thank you for the kind wishes you offer me for the new year; they are welcome, for I know your sincerity. I offer you mine with all my heart.

As to peace, be persuaded that I do not desire it less than you, than all France, and, as I hope, your husband. It is only in peace that happiness and safety can be found. My views are moderate. I wish every thing that can secure the duration of peace, but in this world it is not sufficient merely to wish. I have important duties to fulfil toward my allies, and unfortunately the question of the future peace, which I still hope is near, is very complicated. Your country has overturned long-established ideas. When we come to debate these questions, we have to contend with well-founded complaints or with prejudices. But peace is not on that account less ardently desired by me, and I hope we shall soon be able to reconcile our peoples. In England there is no manifestation of ill will, but great preparations are being made. This necessarily occasions delays, until things are put on train; then all will go on prosperously, please God.

I am delighted with the account you give of your son; your brothers and sisters are well according to the last accounts I received, so is my wife. I too am in good health.

Believe me ever your affectionate father,

FRANCIS.

replies to Napoleon, and not wishing to draw upon himself public attention, which would add to the humiliation of his position, he waited at the outposts, until the arrival of Lord Castlereagh, which was daily expected, should lead to more serious communications.

Napoleon was too well aware of the real state of things to be surprised at the reception M. de Caulaincourt got. Each day was marked by a fresh retrograde movement of his armies, and he could no longer defer placing himself at their head. Marshal Victor, more and more frightened at the number of the enemy, had finished by recrossing the Vosges, after having abandoned all the defiles. The heroic cavalry of Spain, not sharing the marshal's panic, always rushed upon the enemy's squadrons and cut them down when they came in contact. Marshal Victor had fallen back successively on Epinal and Chaumont, and had taken up his position on the Upper Marne, near Saint-Dizier, having lost through fatigue and desertion between 2000 and 3000 men. In this state, he had remaining, at the utmost, 7000 foot-soldiers and 3500 horse. Marshal Marmont, after having tried to oppose Blücher on the Sarre, had fallen back on Metz, had paused there a short time, to leave the Durtut division which had been cut off from Mayence, and which he had picked up on the way, in garrison. He then retired to Vitry. He had remaining about 6000 foot-soldiers and 2500 horse. These two marshals had been joined on the Upper Marne by Marshal Ney with the two divisions of the Young Guard, reorganized between Metz and Luxembourg, whilst Marshal Mortier, after having advanced to Langres with the Old Guard, fell back toward Bar-sur-Aube, followed closely by General Gûluy and the Prince of Wurtemberg.

Napoleon had flattered himself that the corps of Marmont, Victor, Macdonald, whilst retreating might recruit and raise their number to 15,000 each. They certainly had received some reinforcements, but desertion, and the necessity of providing for the defence of the fortresses, had reduced them to the small number we have cited. The Guard that Napoleon had hoped to raise to 80,000 infantry did not amount to more than 30,000, of whom from 7000 to 8000 were in Belgium under Generals Roguet and Barrois, 6000 under Marshal Ney near Saint-Dizier, 12,000 under Marshal Mortier at Bar-sur-Aube. It is true that 10,000 had just been drilled at Paris. The horse-guards, out of 10,000 fit for service, had 6000 mounted, of whom half were with Mortier, and half with Lefebvre-Desnoettes. The latter had returned in all haste from the Scheldt to the Marne. Of the divisions of reserve that were formed at Paris by drafting conscripts into the dépôts, one, scarcely amounting to 6000 men, had set out before being completed, under the command of General Gérard, to reinforce Marshal Mortier on the Aube; the other had repaired to Troyes, under General Hamelinaye, and reckoned scarcely 4000 conscripts, wholly undrilled. The horse reserve, formed at Versailles by the combination of all the cavalry dépôts, had already furnished 3000 horse-soldiers, whom General Pajol, covered with still-gaping wounds, had led to Auxerre. Such were the

resources that the rapid succession of events had permitted Napoleon to assemble in January. We must add to these, the national guards that came from Picardy to Soissons, from Normandy to Meaux, from Bretagne and from Orleanais to Montereau, and from Burgundy to Troyes.

Napoleon did not despair with these feeble means of making head against the storm. He ordered that the two divisions of the Young Guard should be completed as quickly as possible, and that the organization of the divisions of reserve should be continued by means of the dépôts and conscripts. He ordered that the men should not remain a single day in Paris; as soon as they were provided with a vest, a shako, shoes, and a musket, they were to set out for the army, no matter how little drilling they might have gone through. He infused new vigour into the clothing-magazines established at Paris, but he encountered more difficulty in providing fire-arms than any other necessary. There were at Vincennes only 9000 new muskets and 30,000 old; workmen were every day employed at the latter, to render them fit for service. There was scarcely enough to arm the men that were drafted into the dépôts as they arrived. The artillery, that had been crowded into Vincennes, drawn by horses picked up anywhere and everywhere, was to be sent off immediately to Châlons, where our forces were about to assemble. The private treasure of Napoleon supplied the funds, which the public treasury was inadequate to. M. Molliu, an excellent administrator of the public money in times of peace, but taken by surprise in these extraordinary circumstances, had not been able, notwithstanding the additional centimes, to supply the expenses of the army. Napoleon, out of the 63,000,000f. that remained of his personal savings, had given 17,000,000 to General Drouot for the Guards, about ten to the treasurer for the different other services, eight for fresh horses, clothing, and the manufacture of fire-arms, and one to his brothers, now crownless and penniless kings. He intended to bring 4,000,000 with him, and 23 or 24,000,000 were to be left at the Tuileries to provide for urgent or unforeseen wants.

If the troops of Spain could have been brought up, they would have been at this moment a most valuable aid. But no intelligence had yet been received of the reception given to the Duke de San Carlos, nor any thing further relative to the treaty of Valençay. Ferdinand VII., waiting with continually increasing impatience the opening of his prison doors, was in as great ignorance as the French Cabinet.* This silence was a bad omen, and in any case the emperor could not withdraw the troops from the frontier before knowing whether the French or English would cross the Pyrenees. Nevertheless, as we have seen, Napoleon ordered Suchet to send 12,000 men to Lyons, and General Soult to send 15,000 men to Paris as quickly as possible.

* The work of M. Fain, which on this point contains more than one error, although founded principally on the documents of the Duke of Bassano, describes Ferdinand VII. as arriving at Madrid on the 6th of January. This prince did not leave Valençay until the 19th of March.

To these he joined two of the four divisions of reserve formed at Bordeaux, Toulouse, Montpellier, and Nîmes. The four did not amount to more than 18,000 conscripts, instead of the 60,000 he had flattered himself with being able to raise: but they were composed of skeleton regiments borrowed from the army of Spain, and all good soldiers. Napoleon sent the Bordeaux division to Paris. It amounted to about 4000 men; that of Nîmes, which amounted to about 3000 men, was sent to Lyons. Such was his distress, that even these resources were become of actual importance. The division sent to Lyons was to serve as an addition to Augereau's army; the division sent on to Paris was to augment this assemblage of troops of all kinds, the Young Guard, battalions drawn from the dépôts, national guards, old bands of Spain; and from these he hoped to draw, as soon as they were ready, sufficient men to sustain the terrible struggle that was about to take place between the Seine and the Marne. Lastly, he made preparations for the defence of the capital.

More than once, even in the hey-day of his prosperity, had Napoleon, by a kind of prescience which revealed to him the consequence of his errors without teaching him to avoid them, more than once we say, even then, had he, in fancy, seen the armies of Europe at the foot of Montmartre, and after each dark-boding vision had he resolved to fortify Paris. But again, carried away by the torrent of his thoughts and his passions, he had lavished millions on Alessandria, Mantua, Venice, Palma-Nova, Flushing, Texel, Hamburg, and Dantzic, and had neglected the capital of France. If he had commenced to fortify Paris in the days of his prosperity, the Parisians might have smiled, and there would have been no harm done. In January, 1814, such a proceeding would have made them tremble, and would have augmented the disaffection of some, and the consternation of others. However, in Napoleon's opinion, were Paris beyond the possibility of danger, the success of the approaching campaign would be secure; for, if in manoeuvring between the Aisne, the Marne, the Aube, and the Seine, which flow concentrically toward Paris, he had been certain of a common focus where they all unite, he would have acquired a liberty of action which would have given him, with his genius, with his perfect knowledge of the locality, and holding possession of all the passages, an immense advantage over enemies embarrassed in their progress, always ready to repent of having advanced too far, and whom he might probably have surprised in some false position, where he would have overpowered them. On this account he was continually thinking of fortifying Paris, but he feared the moral effect of such a precaution. He had ordered a committee of engineer officers, appointed especially for the inspection of fortresses, to draw up a plan for the defence of Paris, with instructions to keep the matter a profound secret. As the plans they proposed required immediate and conspicuous labours, he had abandoned them, and had contented himself with selecting, quietly and unostentatiously, sites where redoubts could be erected. He prepared great palisades, which were to serve either to

strengthen the enclosure, or as *tambours* before the gates. In short, he wished to collect within the walls of Paris a supply of artillery and munitions of war, deferring, until the last moment, to organize with the aid of the inhabitants and the dépôts an obstinate defence for the great city that contained his last resources and his family, which was the seat of his government, and the key to the entire theatre of war.

He commanded some other measures relative to Belgium, to Italy, to Murat, and to the Pope. Discontented with General Decaen on account of the evacuation of Willemstadt, he replaced him by General Maison, who had distinguished himself so much in the late campaigns. The instructions he gave the latter were to establish himself in an intrenched camp in front of Antwerp, with three brigades of the Young Guard and whatever battalions of the 1st corps should be formed. He was to endeavour to keep the enemy on the Scheldt by the threat of falling on their rear if they marched toward Brussels. The emperor ordered Macdonald to fall back on the Argonne, and from thence on the Marne, with the 5th and 11th corps and the 3d cavalry. He ordered Prince Eugene to send him, if he could, without compromising the line of the Adige, a strong division, which, passing through Turin and Chambery, should strengthen Augereau. The emperor still persevered in the same silence with regard to Murat, who became every day more pressing, and threatened to join the allies if Italy, on the right of the Po, were not ceded to him. In short, not knowing what to do with the Pope at Fontainebleau,—whence he might be carried off by the enemy,—and not wishing to restore his liberty for fear of complicating the affairs of Italy, he made him set out for Savona, under the conduct of Colonel Lagorsee, who, in discharging the duty of a jailer, had combined respect with vigilance. The Austrians not having been able hitherto either to force the Adige or to approach Geneva, Savona was still a safe place.*

These arrangements having been made, Napoleon resolved to set out. The empress was to act as regent during his absence, as she had done during the preceding campaign, the high-chancellor, Cambacérès, acting as privy-councillor. Joseph was to assist and even take the place of the empress if she left Paris; for, though determined to defend Paris *à outrance*, Napoleon had not resolved to leave his wife and son exposed to bombs and balls—perhaps even to captivity—if the allies succeeded in forcing the hastily-got-up defences of the capital. In case the empress retreated to the interior of the empire, Joseph and the other brothers of Napoleon who might happen to be at Paris were expected to give an example of

* M. Fain, and other writers, have asserted that Napoleon sent the Pope to Rome this very day. This is an error demonstrated by authentic documents. The departure from Fontainebleau was certainly the commencement of the journey that brought the Pope to Rome; but it was not commanded with the intention of actually sending him there. It was at a later period that Napoleon gave orders that he should return to Rome; and this from motives that we shall explain in their proper place. The state-papers contain instructions from Napoleon, and letters from Colonel Lagorsee, that leave no doubt on these points.

age to the national guard, and die, if necessary, to defend a throne more important than those of Spain, of Holland, of Westphalia; for it was not only the best, but the only one that remained to family.

Besides these precautions taken against the real foe, Napoleon had thought also of doing some against the internal enemy,—that is, against the plotter whose object was to restore France either to the republicans or Bourbons. The chancellor, Cambacérès, the Duke de Rovigo, had received orders to extend their *surveillance* even to the princes of the imperial family, and, in particular, to the dignitaries—such as M. de Talleyrand, for example—who constantly inspired Napoleon with the most extraordinary apprehensions. Though deprived of the most active associates,—the Duke of Otranto, who sent on a mission to Murat,—M. de Talleyrand was still much to be feared. Napoleon saw distinctly in him the man around whom his enemies of all kinds would throng, to erect a new government on the wreck of the thrown empire. After having felt a decided liking for M. de Talleyrand, and having rewarded him with similar sentiments, now again himself deprived of the surest means of peace,—prosperity,—remembering, besides, how often, on many occasions, he had aided this great personage,—he thought he had done enough to earn his hatred: he reasoned on it, he made sure of it. He feared, especially since the name of the Bourbons had been revived; for, though his past actions and opinions ranked him as a supporter of the Revolution, still, the ancient Bishop of Lun, now a prince and a married man, was such high birth and endowed with such nobility of mind—he possessed so many means of being useful—that his peace might be easily made with the Bourbons. Napoleon saw in him a formidable instrument of counter-revolution. With such presentiments, he ought never to have rendered him powerless to do so, or attached him to the imperial interests; but, notwithstanding his strength of mind and energy of character, Napoleon—as often happens with persons slumbering on the brink of a precipice—pursued, with regard to M. de Talleyrand, an unsteady line of conduct. He left him full possession of his dignity; he was still a great dignitary and member of the council of regency, and, instead of conciliating whilst leaving him so powerful, Napoleon, on the contrary, made him the most bitter reproaches on the eve of departure, so strongly did the bare sight of M. de Talleyrand excite torment and irritate him. He told him that he knew him thoroughly, that he was not ignorant of what he was capable of doing, that he would keep a strict eye on him, and that at the first doubt-step he took he should make him feel the weight of his authority. Then, after the most violent invectives, he went no further than these words, and contented himself with ordering the Duke de Rovigo to keep the strictest watch over M. de Talleyrand as over all other high functionaries then out of power. The Duke de Rovigo was not a man to hesitate in the execution of his orders,

whatever they might be; but what could he do against a skilful adversary who conducted himself too cautiously to give a hold to his enemies, and who, besides, was haloed with a mighty fame? It would be dangerous to strike him incautiously; and M. de Talleyrand knew well how to profit of the moment when he might dare any thing against an enemy almost entirely deprived of the means of defence.

Napoleon, on the eve of his departure, wished to see and harangue the officers of the national guard, to whom he was about to confide the interior and exterior safety of Paris. The national guard of the capital was composed not of this popular class,—courageous and strong, as capable of bravely defending what is confided to them as of, through their clumsiness, destroying it. The Parisian national guard was composed of men in easy circumstances, adverse to revolutions, who did not forget that Napoleon had saved France from anarchy, though they condemned him for having precipitated her into a dreadful war. These men detested the republic and had no sympathy for the Bourbons. Napoleon having resolved to fight at the head of his soldiers for the French territory, determined to confide to the national guard the care of defending his wife and son against any republican or royalist movement that might be attempted within the walls of the capital. He received the officers of this guard at the Tuileries, with his wife on one side of him and his son on the other; then, advancing into the midst of the guards and pointing to this child, lately the heir of such high fortune, now, perhaps, doomed to exile, even to death, he told them he was going forth to defend them and their families, and drive back from their land the enemies that had dared to cross the frontiers; but, in going forth, he left as a deposit in their hands all that was dearest to him next to France. He left his wife and his son, and set out with a tranquil mind, confiding such pledges to their honour. The sight of this great man, reduced, after having performed so many prodigies, to such extremities, holding his son in his arms, confiding him to their devotedness, awakened in the guard the most profound emotion, and they promised, in all sincerity, never to consent that any other than he should mount the throne of France. Alas! they believed what they said. Which of them, in fact,—though there was a wide field then open to conjecture,—which of them could foresee at that moment the far different scenes that should soon take place in these same Tuileries, and should confound not alone the sagacity of those who then occupied them, but that of their successors and the successors of their successors?

Napoleon set out next day for Châlons, and, in taking leave of his wife and son, without knowing that he had embraced them for the last time, pressed them warmly in his arms. His wife wept, apprehensive of never beholding him again. She was indeed destined never to behold him again; but it was not the bullets of the enemy that deprived her of the sight of her husband. She would have been much surprised had any one told her then

that this husband, at that moment the object of all her anxiety, should die in a remote isle of the ocean, the prisoner of all Europe, and forgotten by her. As for him, he would not have been astonished had he heard the pre-

diction; for he was prepared alike for miser abandonment or extreme devotedness from men whom he knew thoroughly, and toward whom, nevertheless, he acted as if he did not know them.

BOOK LII.

BRIENNE AND MONTMIRAIL.

ARRIVAL of Napoleon at Châlons-sur-Marne on the 25th of January—Dejection of the marshals and confidence of Napoleon—His plan of campaign—His project of manœuvring between the Seine and the Marne, in the conviction that the Allied Armies would divide to follow the course of these two rivers—Suspecting that Marshal Blücher had advanced to the Aube for the purpose of joining Prince Schwarzenberg, he determines to attack the Prussian General first—Brilliant conflict at Brienne on the 29th of January—Blücher is thrown back on Rothière with considerable loss—At this moment the Allied Sovereigns assembled round Prince Schwarzenberg deliberate whether it would not be better to pause at Langres to negotiate before carrying the war further—Arrival of Lord Castlereagh at the camp of the Allies—Character and influence of this nobleman—The Prussians through a spirit of vengeance, Alexander through a feeling of wounded pride, wish to carry on the war *d'outrance*—The Austrians wish to treat with Napoleon as soon as they can do so honourably—Lord Castlereagh supports the latter on condition that they will oblige Napoleon to retire within the limits of 1790, and that, depriving him of Belgium and Holland, a large kingdom should be formed of these for the House of Orange—Eagerness of all parties to satisfy England—Lord Castlereagh, having obtained what he wished, influences the Allied Courts to consent to opening a congress at Châtillon, whither M. de Caulaincourt is summoned to propose to him that France should retire within her ancient limits—The political question having been decided in this way, the military question was resolved by the engagement that took place between Blücher and Napoleon—Prince Schwarzenberg comes to the aid of the Prussian General with the entire Bohemian army—Position of Napoleon, having his right on the Aube, his centre at Rothière, his left at the wood of Anjou—Bloody battle of Rothière, on the 1st of February, 1814, in which Napoleon with 32,000 men resists for an entire day 100,000 combatants—Retreats in good order on Troyes the 2d of February—The almost desperate position of Napoleon—Having fallen back on Troyes, he has not 50,000 men to oppose to the Allied Armies, that night number 220,000—Filled with the most mournful sentiments, he still does not lose courage, and makes his arrangements on the supposition of the enemy committing a serious error—His measures for the evacuation of Italy, recalling to Paris part of the armies that defend the Pyrenees—Order to cont-act the possession of Paris to the last extremity, and to send thence his wife and son—Meeting of the Congress of Châtillon—Insulting proposals made to M. de Caulaincourt, which consist in restricting France to the limits of 1790, and debarring her all interference in European arrangements—Grief and despair of M. de Caulaincourt—During this time the military error that Napoleon has foreseen is made—The Allies divide into two bodies: one under Blücher is to follow the Marne and outflank Napoleon's left in order to make him fall back on Paris, whilst the other descending the Seine should also force him back on Paris, to overwhelm him there under the combined allied forces—Napoleon, setting out on the evening of the 2d of February from Nogent, with the Guard and Marmont's corps, advances on Champ-Aubert—He finds there the army of Silesia, divided into four corps—Battle of Champ-Aubert, Montmirail, of Chateau-Thierry, of Vauchamp, which took place on the 10th, 11th, 12th, and 14th of February—Napoleon captures 20,000 of the Silesian army, and kills 10,000 with scarcely any loss to himself—Hardly disengaged from Blücher, he falls, passing through Guines, on Schwarzenberg, who had crossed the Seine, and obliges him to re-cross in disorder—Battle of Nangis and of Montereau, the 18th and 19th of February—Considerable loss of the Russians, the Bavarians and the Wurtembergers—A delay that occurred at Montereau permits Colliero's corps, which was on the point of being taken, to escape—Great results obtained in a few days by Napoleon—Situation completely changed—Military events in Belgium, at Lyons, in Italy, and on the frontier of Spain—Devotion of the orders sent to Prince Eugene for the evacuation of Italy—Return of Ferdinand VII. to Spain, and of the Pope to Italy—The Allies, startled by these checks, determine to demand an armistice—Prince Wenceslas de Liechtenstein is sent to Napoleon—Napoleon signs to give him a good reception, but is resolved to pursue the Allies without relaxation; he makes a verbal convention for the pacific occupation of the city of Troyes—Unexpected result of the first period of the campaign.

Having left Paris on the morning of the 25th, Napoleon arrived the same evening at Châlons-sur-Marne. The road was already thronged with fugitives, soldiers, and peasants. The inhabitants of Châlons, to whom the presence of the emperor gave confidence, cried out repeatedly, *Vive l'Empereur!* but they always added, *A bas les droit réunis!* so general was the disaffection against the established régime become. It was, to say the truth, the cry of local egotism against the most necessary taxes, which the flatterers of the people, to whatever class they belong, have always promised to abolish, without having ever been able to find a substitute; but at this moment the cry signified, *Down with the Imperial Government!* But the opinion of the Challonnais touching the Imperial régime was tinctured by annoyances they experienced as vine-dressers of Champagne. Napoleon took no notice of this, and appeared gentle, calm, friendly, and won every heart by the tranquillity of his demeanour.

Berthier had reached Châlons before the

emperor. The old Duke of Valmy, still charged with the administration of the dépôts, had repaired there from another quarter. Marmont and Ney arrived at Châlons. They were greatly troubled in mind, though generally little disturbed by the appearance of danger; but now, having only the *débris* of their armies, they earnestly demanded reinforcements, and flattered themselves, on seeing Napoleon arrive, that reinforcements would quickly follow. Unfortunately he only brought himself: it was a great deal certainly, as events soon proved, but not sufficient to resist the mass of enemies now pouring down on France. His lieutenants said that of course troops were coming up after the emperor. "No," he replied, coolly, and after having confounded them by this reply, he revived them soon by the boldness and profundity of the views that he exposed to them. It seemed as if, escaped from the gnawing cares that consumed him at Paris, and again become a soldier, he recovered, on resuming his professional duties, his serenity of mind,

and discovered resources where no other person could have thought of finding any. He spoke at considerable length with his marshals, and showed the position of affairs to be nearly as follows.

His forces were reduced, so to speak, to what the marshals brought with them:—Victor had nearly 7000 foot-soldiers, and 3500 horse; Marmont had 6000 foot, and 2500 horse; Ney had 6000 foot. These three marshals could, besides, bring into the field 120 pieces of artillery, pretty well mounted. At a distance of twelve leagues, that is to say, at Arcis-sur-Aube, General Gérard had a reserve of 6000 men; at Troyes, a distance of eighteen leagues, Marshal Mortier had 15,000 soldiers of the Old Guard, infantry and cavalry; these different troops amounting in all from 46 to 47,000 men. Lefebvre-Desnoëttes arrived with the light cavalry of the Guard, amounting to 3000 horse, with some thousand infantry, either of the Young Guard, or battalions drawn from the dépôts, which made a total of more than 50,000 men, in the quarter most threatened by the enemy. These troops did not comprise, it is true, the second division of reserve, which was being formed under General Hamelinaye at Troyes, the cavalry that was being drilled on the Seine, under Pajol, and the national guards. The number was certainly small, opposed to 220,000 or 230,000 tried soldiers that were marching against the capital, without mentioning those that were daily expected. At Paris, two divisions of the Young Guard were being formed, and some new infantry battalions; several divisions of the army of Spain were advancing by the Bordeaux Road, and Macdonald was coming at last, through the Ardennes, with 12,000 men. But these reinforcements would be greatly outnumbered by those the enemy expected, and for the first shock France had only 50,000 men to oppose to 230,000. Napoleon did not tell the entire truth to his lieutenants, for fear of discouraging them, but he did not withhold much. Still, according to his view of things, there was nothing to be frightened at. The enemy's forces were numerous, but divided, and it was impossible for the allies to avoid great errors, of which the emperor would profit. The allies were advancing by two routes, that of the east, from Bâle to Paris, that of the northeast, from Mayence to Paris, and it was difficult for them to do otherwise, having to combine operations with those of the army in the Low Countries. Independently of this forced separation between the army of Blücher—the ancient army of Silesia—and that of Schwarzenberg—the ancient army of Bohemia,—the enemy was divided still farther, from minor motives. Blücher had left troops to blockade Mayence and Metz; the columns of Schwarzenberg were far distant from one another; that of Bubna had taken the route through Geneva; that of Colloredo came by Auxonne and Burgundy; the columns of Giulay and of the Prince of Wurtemberg through Langres and Champagne; that of Wrede through Alsace. Lastly, the column of Wittgenstein, which was in the environs of Strasbourg. There were still some detachments around Besançon, Belfort, Huningue, &c. It was not possible that so many scattered troops could be directed with such skill as to

concentrate their operations at the same moment on the point where they were to fight. Besides, the physical structure of the locality must necessarily involve them in errors, of which the emperor hoped to profit.

In advancing toward the capital of France, either by the northeast, or by the east, we arrive, after having passed the Meuse or the Saône, on the border of a basin of which Paris is the centre, and toward which the Marne and the Seine flow, forming an angle whose sides unite at a common apex, which is Paris. Blücher was advancing at this time along one side of the angle, taking his course toward St. Dizier on the Marne; Schwarzenberg advanced along the other side, pursuing Mortier along the Seine. Napoleon might come down rapidly either on the one or the other, no matter which, with what forces he could assemble. To the 25,000 men of Ney, Victor, and Marmont, Napoleon was about to add the detachment of Lefebvre-Desnoëttes, with an immense quantity of artillery. He could, after reascending the Marne as far as St. Dizier, turn quickly to the right, combine his forces with those of Gérard and Mortier, and come down with 50,000 men on Schwarzenberg's column. The probable result would be a glorious success.

This first advantage would stop the too confident march of the allies. Should the war be prolonged, the French might, by manœuvring skilfully in this angle formed by the Seine and the Marne, obtain other and perhaps considerable advantages. On one side, the Duke de Valmy was to occupy the different passages of the Marne by raising the national guards and barricading all the bridges; on the other side, Pajol, with the cavalry and the national guards, was to take the same precaution on the Seine, and carry up his operations to the Yonne, which is, so to speak, a detached arm of the Seine.

Between these two lines of the Marne and the Seine there is an intermediate line, that of the Aube, which increases the difficulties for the invaders, and the means of resistance for the invaded. The enemy, induced, sometimes by choice, sometimes by necessity, to divide their forces between these different rivers, and not having possession of the passages, which we exclusively occupied, would furnish a thousand opportunities of fighting, which should be quickly seized; and Napoleon was not the man to neglect such opportunities. During this time the troops from Spain and the interior would arrive, the people, animated by success, would again take courage, Augereau should return from Lyons to Besançon, and attack the enemy in the rear; the commanders of the fortresses were to make frequent sorties against the feeble forces that were blocking them, and, if fortune were not absolutely adverse, bright prospects might yet dawn for France; and Caulaincourt, so strengthened, might finish by signing an honourable peace. "All is not lost," exclaimed Napoleon. War offered so many chances if one would only persevere. No one was conquered but he who was willing to be so. Without doubt, there would be adverse days; they would sometimes be obliged to fight with odds of three to one, even of four to one; but Napoleon had done so in his youth: how much better could he perform the same

feat in his ripened manhood! Besides, of all the *débris* of the ancient army an excellent and numerous artillery had been preserved, so that there were five or six pieces of cannon to every thousand men. Bullets were quite as good as balls. The emperor and his soldiers had partaken of every species of glory; there was yet one to acquire that would crown all the others and surpass them,—that of resisting and conquering adverse fortune; after which the emperor and his soldiers should retire to the bosom of their families and grow old together in this France, which, thanks to her heroic soldiers, after so many different phases of fortune, should have preserved her true grandeur—her natural frontiers—and acquired, moreover, an imperishable glory.

In uttering these noble sentiments, Napoleon looked calm and smiling; he looked as if his youth had returned, he appeared to believe all he said, and, in fact, he did believe a great part of it, so clearly did his genius-lighted mind foresee chances hidden from others. And so he ended by bestowing part of his confidence on his lieutenants, and left them less dejected than he had found them. The most animated on this occasion, he who displayed the best disposition, was Marmont. Ney was dejected. The hero of Moskowa seemed to have never recovered his spirits since the day of Dennewitz.

During the night even, Napoleon, who did not retire to rest, ordered the Duke de Valmy to assemble at Châlons the detachments that were falling back—the depôts were to continue their route to Paris—to raise the national guards in every direction, and to barricade the boroughs and cities that had bridges across the Marne. He also enjoined Macdonald, who had completed his retrograde movement, to stop at Châlons to guard the course of the Marne. He ordered Mortier to quit Troyes and join Gérard on the Aube, an intermediary line, as we have said, between the Seine and the Marne, and to hold himself in readiness either to receive him or to come to him. He ordered Pajol to keep a strict watch over the bridges of the Seine and the Yonne, such as Nogent, Montereau, Sens, Joigny, Auxerre, and to manoeuvre his cavalry far enough on the right to intercept any parties that might endeavour to advance as far as the Loire.

On the morning of the next day, the 26th, Napoleon advanced toward Vitry. Lefebvre-Desnoettes had joined him. With Lefebvre, Marmont, Ney, and Victor, he had in all from 33,000 to 34,000 men. The enemy occupied St. Dizier. Napoleon ordered Victor to drive them from their position, a command that was obeyed with extraordinary vigour. The presence of Napoleon had restored the courage of all. The French entered St. Dizier, after having made some prisoners from the Russian corps of Landakoi. We shall now relate what meanwhile occurred among the allies.

Wearied of waiting for Lord Castlereagh, and spite of his desire to be the first to speak with him, Alexander, who assumed that his presence was necessary everywhere, and who was often useful in many places, thought proper to take up his abode at head-quarters, saying that without him the allies would do nothing but quarrel and take faulty proceedings. He

had repaired to Langres, whither the allied sovereigns and ministers had accompanied him. A considerable portion of the army of Prince Schwarzenberg was disposed between the Upper Marne and the Upper Aube, between Chaumont and Bar-sur-Aube, awaiting Blücher, who was coming up by Saint Dizier. Now serious consultations were held, conformable to the divisions laid down by M. de Metternich touching the various periods of the war. The first term had been reached when the allies touched the banks of the Rhine, the second was accomplished when they crossed the Vosges and the Ardennes, and now the third and most difficult remained,—to march on Paris. Opinions were divided on the question of this last period of the war, and all reckoned on Lord Castlereagh, who had at length arrived, to settle the difficulty. Meanwhile, not to prolong an unbecoming silence, M. de Caulaincourt was informed that Châillon-sur-Seine would be the spot for future negotiations. It was with difficulty Alexander was induced to make this concession, for he was already disposed to treat only within the walls of Paris. But he was now induced to yield because he had selected the locality for the new congress in France, in order to inflict on Napoleon the humiliation of negotiating in the centre of his invaded provinces. Meanwhile the different divisions of the allied armies were tending to a common centre. Whilst the army of Prince Schwarzenberg was disposed around Langres, Blücher, after having quitted Nancy, had traversed St. Dizier, had left the Russian detachment of Landakoi there, in order to spread a belief that he was about to make a descent on Châlons, following the course of the Marne, whilst, on the contrary, he quitted the Marne to follow the course of the Aube, in order to join Schwarzenberg, to animate the main body of the army by his presence, to put an end to all indecision, and induce the allies to march boldly on Paris. Having left the corps of Count de Saint Priest in the neighbourhood of Coblenz, a part of the Langeron in advance of Mayence, and the York corps in advance of Metz, he arrived with the Sacken corps and what remained of the Langeron. He had, on the way, fallen in with the advanced guard of Wittgenstein, commanded by Pahlen, and so arrived at the head of more than 30,000 men. He had crossed transversely from the Marne to the Aube, at the very time that Napoleon reached Saint Dizier. The Marne in the upper part of its course, that is to say at Saint Dizier, is only about ten or twelve leagues distant from the Aube.

Such was the situation of the allies on the evening of the 27th of December, when Napoleon entered Saint Dizier. He learned there, from the prisoners, and from the inhabitants of the district, whom he interrogated with a tact peculiar to himself, that Blücher, at the head of 30,000 men, had passed in advance of him, with the intention probably of joining the column that was in pursuit of Mortier on the Aube. He did not hesitate a moment, and immediately resolved to pursue the Prussian general until he should have overtaken and beaten him. Being able to cut off his means of communication, and intercept the supplies

that might arrive from the corps left in the rear, with, moreover, the possibility of overtaking him, before he should have joined Schwarzenberg, the emperor had every chance of finding Blücher in an unfortunate position, of which he would not fail to profit.

Napoleon might, in re-ascending the Marne as far as Joinville, have reached an excellent chaussée, which by the way of Doulevant and Soullaines abutted on the Aube in the direction of Brienne, but it would cost a day to gain this advantage. He preferred, therefore, turning directly to the right, and advancing directly by a cross-road which abutted on the Aube at the heights of Brienne. The country here was destituted with woods and valleys, and might be traversed in two marches. He ordered Marshal Mortier and General Gérard to remain upon the Aube, and to keep their position, whilst he should take measures to join them. He directed what had arrived of Marmont's corps with the Duhesme division of Victor's corps, to pass by the Joinville chaussée at Doulevant, which he did not like to take himself; he added to these the dragoons of Briche, to scour the country, and occupy the Nancy road, by which the troops that Blücher had left behind might arrive. With Victor, Ney, all the cavalry, and about 17,000 or 18,000 men, he marched on Brienne by the cross-road leading from Eclaron to Montierender. There had been frost on the preceding days; on the 28th, the first day of the march, it rained. It was extremely difficult to traverse these roads, which were only used by woodcutters. Fortunately, the artillery-horses were excellent; besides, with the assistance of the peasants, who willingly gave the aid of their hands as well as the assistance of their horses, the emperor and his troops arrived, though at a late hour, at Montierender. In traversing Eclaron they found the inhabitants overwhelmed with grief at the ravages committed by the enemy. Notwithstanding the moderation which the allies had promised to exercise on their first entrance into France, they had soon relapsed into the ordinary habits of invaders, which barbarity on the part of the Russians, and a blind hatred on the part of the Prussians, rendered in the present case more cruel than usual. They pillaged and ravaged through inclination, even when they were not prompted by necessity. The afflicted peasants had addressed their complaints to Napoleon, who afforded them some relief out of his private treasure. He promised, moreover, that their church, which had been destroyed, should be rebuilt.

On the following day, the 29th, Napoleon left Montierender for Brienne. The soldiers found now, as on the evening before, much difficulty in marching on roads broken up by the rains. At length, about three or four in the afternoon, Grouchy, who commanded the cavalry of the army, and Lefebvre-Desnoettes that of the Guard, having debouched by the wood of Anjou, discovered, in a slightly undulated plain, the cavalry of Count Pahlen, supported by some light battalions of Scherbatow. A little farther on was seen the small town of Brienne, with its chateau built on an eminence, and embosomed in trees, and farther still, the Aube. Numerous troops were

seen along the banks of the Aube; they appeared to be retracing their steps. We shall explain the cause of these various movements.

Blücher having arrived at Bar-sur-Aube, a small town situate on the Aube, much higher up than Brienne, had fancied that Mortier was endeavouring to pass this river to join Napoleon near the Marne, and he resolved to prevent him. He had, consequently, advanced on Brienne, Lesmont, and Arcis, intending to cut down the bridges of the Aube. But having learned the sudden appearance of Napoleon, he hastened to retrace his steps, and at this moment he was crossing, at the head of the Sacken corps, the town of Brienne, intending to return to Bar-sur-Aube. In order to cover this movement, Count Pahlen, with his cavalry and some light battalions of Prince Scherbatow, closely watched the plain and the border of the wood by which the French army was expected to debouche. General Olsouvieff guarded the approaches of Brienne, which the grand park of Prussian artillery was crossing, in falling back on Bar.

No sooner did Lefebvre-Desnoettes recognise the squadrons of Count Pahlen than he rushed upon them with his light cavalry, and forced them to fall back on the battalions of Scherbatow, that were formed in squares. The Russian cavalry had taken shelter behind these battalions, and placed themselves on the right of the enemy's line, consequently facing our left. During this time, Olsouvieff had deployed his forces in front of the town, and the Sacken corps, arrested in its retrograde movement, had taken up a position beside Olsouvieff, in order to protect Brienne, which it was most important to occupy, that the Prussian park of artillery might defile in safety.

The French infantry being still entangled in the wood, Napoleon was obliged to cannonade the Russian line, which his horsemen could not touch, and during more than two hours hostilities were limited to an exchange of bullets, which could not be other than destructive. At length, Ney and Victor began to debouche, and Napoleon ordered an instant attack. Victor had left the Duhesme division with Marmont, and Ney had only two weak divisions of the Guards; we had on our side at the utmost from 10,000 to 11,000 infantry, and 6000 cavalry. Blücher had at least 30,000 men. Still, Napoleon did not hesitate, for it was no longer a question of numbers, but of time. He sent Ney straight forward on Brienne with two columns; he ordered a brigade of Victor's corps to advance on the right toward the chateau of Brienne, and disposed the remainder of this corps on his left, so as to threaten the road from Brienne to Bar, a movement which must render the retreat of Blücher certain.

These arrangements secured from the commencement the desired success. We had very few of the old troops; the Young Guard consisted of conscripts, scarcely clothed, and who had never fired a musket. They were called the "Maria Louisa," in compliment to the Regent, under whose rule they had been raised and organized. But they were drafted into the skeletons of the old regiments, and led on by Marshal Ney. These young lads

supported a violent fire, without yielding an inch, and forced the Russian infantry, though three times their number, to fall back on Brienne. Unfortunately an accident that befell our left wing detracted from this success. Near this wing, the feeble column of Victor that Napoleon had sent forward on the road to Bar, in order to threaten Blücher's line of retreat, was confronted by the entire Russian cavalry, which had been brought up on this side, whilst ours was on the opposite. Suddenly attacked by several thousand cavalry, Victor's infantry were, so to speak, taken by surprise and forced to fall back. Napoleon, who was in the midst of them, ran the most imminent danger, and saw some pieces of artillery captured before his eyes. This retrograde movement of our left cooled the ardour of Ney. But at this very moment, Victor's brigade, that had been despatched toward the right, succeeded in turning Brienne, forced their way through the chateau park, attacked and carried the castle itself. Blücher and his staff narrowly escaped being made prisoners, but the son of Chancellor Hardenberg was captured. On our side we lost the brave Rear-Admiral Baste and some of the marines of the Guard, who on this day terminated a heroic life by a glorious death. The capture of this important position produced a serious impression on the Russians. Ney now attacked them briskly, entered Brienne close on their rear, and carried the town at the very instant that the enemy's artillery passed through. Blücher, annoyed at the result of this encounter, and fearing for the rear of his park of artillery, wished to make a last effort to retake Brienne and occupy it at least for some hours. He made, in fact, about ten in the evening, a furious attack on the town and chateau at the head of the Sacken infantry. The attack on the town was, under favour of night, at first successful, for our young troops were taken by surprise. But a brave officer, commander of the Ender battalion, and who was guarding the chateau with a battalion of the 66th, forced back the assailants into the town, and our soldiers, now recovered from their surprise, either captured or killed them all. This success revived the courage of our troops: they drove the Sacken infantry out of the town, and our artillery, which was numerous, firing as correctly as the darkness would permit, covered the Russians with grape-shot.

It was eleven at night when this combat finished. The confusion was so great that Napoleon did not think he could get a lodging in the chateau. He lay in a neighbouring village, and found himself for a short time, on regaining his bivouac, surrounded by Cossacks: he was on the point of being carried off. Berthier, thrown down in the mud, was drawn out all bruised.

On the morning of the next day the French were able to see their position more clearly. They then discovered that they had been fighting against 80,000 men, and that Blücher was retiring through the vast plain that extends beyond Brienne on the road of Bar-sur-Aube. The French pursued him with a hundred pieces of artillery, and kept up an incessant and de-

structive fire as far as the village of Rothière, where Blücher stopped.

This battle was highly honourable to our young soldiers, who, fighting with two to one against them, had conquered the most experienced of the allied troops, led by their bravest general. Unfortunately it was not against odds of two to one, but of five to one, they would soon be obliged to fight, to make an effort to save France! The enemy had left in our hands about 4000 men, either killed or wounded. On our side, about 3000 were put *hors de combat*. But as we remained masters of the battle-field, our wounded could not be reckoned as lost. The moral effect of this battle was more important than any material advantage that resulted from it. Our soldiers, utterly dispirited when Napoleon joined them at Châlons, began to recover their courage on seeing him, in fighting again by his side, and resuming, under the mighty momentum of his genius, the habit of conquest.

Though Napoleon had not obtained all the advantages he hoped from a sudden irruption among the dispersed corps of the allies, still he had made them feel his presence; he had shown them that they could not reach Paris without firing a shot, as they had flattered themselves from the facility of their first movements, and he had placed himself between them and the capital, so as to block the way. With regard to the object in view, no position could be more happily chosen than Brienne.

The river Aube, on which Napoleon had just paused after the occupation of Brienne, divides into two parts, as we have said, the space lying between the Marne and the Seine. Having taken up his position on the Aube, Napoleon was at almost equal distances from the Marne and the Seine, being able, in two short marches, to reach either the one or the other in order to stop the enemy, who would wish to advance on Paris either by Châlons or by Troyes. Having at Brienne the main body of his forces, having besides a body of troops at Châlons, and another at Troyes, with the power of reinforcing alternately either the one or the other, and satisfied, in any case, to fight with troops infinitely superior in number, he was certain of arriving in time on whichever of the two routes should be most threatened. It was not very probable that the enemy would overstep this angle to carry the war beyond the Marne or the Seine. Blücher, in fact, was obliged to keep up a communication with the troops that were operating in the direction of Belgium, as Schwarzenberg was obliged to keep up a communication with those that were acting in the direction of Switzerland, so that each was somewhat restricted, Blücher in a northerly and Schwarzenberg in an easterly direction. Being obliged, besides, under penalty of the most imminent peril, not to remove at too great a distance from one another, they were unavoidably obliged to follow—Blücher the Marne, Schwarzenberg the Seine, unless they combined to march in a single column on Paris.

It was after having profoundly studied this state of things that Napoleon made his arrangements.

At this moment the two columns of the

enemy seemed to constitute but one, of which Troyes and the banks of the Seine would be the natural direction. Napoleon, therefore, determined to concentrate the largest body of troops in the direction of Troyes. For this reason he sent Marshal Mortier, with the Old Guard of Arcis, toward Troyes. He placed General Gérard, with the Dufour division and the first division of reserve, at Piney, half-way between Brienne and Troyes. We must remember that at Troyes the second division of reserve had commenced to be formed, under General Hamelinaye, and that it yet amounted only to 4000 men. Napoleon ordered that it should be raised to 8000 as quickly as possible, and should be meanwhile reinforced by all the national guards of Burgundy. With Hamelinaye and Gérard, who reckoned 12,000 men, with the Old Guard, which comprised 15,000, Marshal Mortier had at his command 27,000 men. Napoleon hoped to add to these, within a few days, the 15,000 that were coming from Spain, which would form a total of 40,000 men, of whom 30,000 were the best troops in the world. By joining Mortier with the 25,000 under his own command, and this he could do in one long march, he would have 65,000 men to oppose to the grand army of Schwarzenberg, and this, in his position, was a considerable force, and, considering his mode of tactics, almost sufficient to dispute the country. He bestowed, at the same time, fresh cares on the defence of the Seine and the Yonne, and he repeated his orders to send to Pajol, besides the small Bordeaux reserve, all the disposable cavalry at Versailles. Pajol was, with these means at his disposal, to guard Montereau, Sens, Joigny, Auxerre, and scour the banks of the Loing canal with his cavalry as far as the Loire, in order to observe any attempt that Schwarzenberg might make beyond the presumable circle of his operations.

Toward the opposite side, that is to say, toward the Marne, Napoleon renewed his orders to General Macdonald, to advance on Châlons with all the troops he could bring from the Rhenish provinces; and he reiterated his commands to the Duke of Valmy to assemble at Ferté-sous-Jouarre, at Meaux, and at Chateau-Thierry, as many of the national guards as he should have time to assemble; he was to barricade the bridges of these different cities, and to collect as much provision as he could from the surrounding country. In this direction the force was not so strong as in other quarters, but it was only Blücher who could show himself here, and that by separating from Schwarzenberg, in which case, Napoleon, having his eye on him as a hunter on his prey, was ready to pursue and attack him either in rear or flank. At the same time he renewed his solicitations for the organization of fresh battalions at Paris, and for fresh squadrons at Versailles, in order to add quickly 15,000 to the 25,000 then under his command. If he succeeded in getting these reinforcements, he would be very nearly in a position to make head against all his enemies, for by joining Mortier near Troyes with 40,000 men, his numbers would amount to 80,000; if he joined Macdonald near Châlons, he could increase his troops to 55,000, and this would be nearly sufficient either against Schwarzenberg or

against Blücher. Napoleon gave particular attention to tracing the military route of the army from Paris to the banks of the Aube, and he decided that the troops should pass through Ferté-sous-Jouarre, Sézanne, Arcis, and Brienne, which was the most central direction, and whither he ordered munitions of every kind to be brought. Foreseeing that he should frequently have to manoeuvre from the Aube to the Marne, he ordered Sézanne to be surrounded with palisades, and large supplies of provisions and arms to be lodged there. At Brienne, where he was encamped, he fixed his position so as to profit to the utmost of the physical structure of the locality. At Dienville, on the Aube, he established his right wing, which was composed of Ricard's division, detached from Marmont, and of Gérard's, which in case of attack had orders to hasten from Piney to Dienville. He fixed his centre, consisting of Victor's troops, at the village of Rothière, in the midst of a plain intersected by the high-road, and with these was the Guard as a reserve. Lastly, he placed his left wing, consisting of Marmont's corps, at Morvilliers, upon the high ground in front of the wood of Anjou. He ordered each chief of division, and especially Marmont, to surround himself with earthworks, in order to compensate for our numerical inferiority in the very probable event of an approaching attack. Thus encamped on the Aube, at almost equal distances from the two routes that the allies would be likely to take, he awaited two events;—first, that his resources, which were in process of preparation, should be completed; and secondly, that his enemies should commit some gross error. Of this last chance he did not despair, for he knew his adversaries well, and he considered his situation much improved since the battle of Brienne. He wrote in this tone to his wife, to Joseph, to the Chancellor Cambacérès, to the Dukes of Feltre and Rovigo, in order that at Paris they might repeat what he said, that so the inhabitants might be tranquillized and become more zealous in providing the supplies he had ordered.*

During this time grave questions were being discussed in the camp of the allies, questions both political and military. The political question was whether the allies should treat with Napoleon; the military, whether they

* Historians and writers of memoirs not having read the correspondence of Napoleon, and not understanding the motives of his actions, pronounced him mad for having stayed at Brienne after the battle of the 29th, and after having shown himself desirous to fight a second battle with such disproportionate forces. It is easy to see, from the explanation we have just given, whether he was mad, and whether it is wise to judge such a man without having studied his motives of action in authentic documents. Marshal Marmont, in his Memoirs, cries out against the orders Napoleon gave him to intrench himself at Morvilliers. General Ksch., an excellent military writer, and of much sounder judgment than Marshal Marmont, asks how any one could think, with 30,000 men, of fighting a second battle against all the allied armies. It is clear, from what we have stated, what were Napoleon's real intentions. The enemy being able to operate both in the direction of Troyes and Châlons, Napoleon's object was to take up a position that would enable him to advance on whichever of the two routes should be threatened, not intending, as has been laid to his charge, to seek a general battle, but endeavouring to provide against eventualities with the small forces at his command, that is to say, with almost nothing. Nothing is left us but to admire the vastness of his genius and his stern determination of character in a situation so extraordinary, one to which history scarcely offers a parallel.

should pause at Langres, or whether they should immediately commence the third period of the war, without having ascertained, by an exchange of verbal communications, that peace was impossible. As might naturally be expected, the more ardent spirits, at whose head were the Prussians and Alexander, influenced by the motives we have already noticed, wished neither to negotiate nor to pause. The moderate party, at whose head were the Austrians and some prudent men of the different allied nations, desired the contrary. The task of deciding between these two parties devolved on Lord Castlereagh, who had at length arrived at head-quarters.

Each party, in order to win the good graces of the English nobleman, had accorded him beforehand the chief object of his mission, that is to say, the creation of a kingdom of the Low Countries, which would procure England the advantage of depriving France of Antwerp, and of placing the estuaries of the rivers under a Power capable of defending them, and would place her in a position to demand from Holland, as a recompense for such noble gifts, the Cape of Good Hope, which is the Gibraltar of the Indian Ocean, as the Mauritius is its Malta. Lord Castlereagh had moreover to confide to the allies another project, which he felt some embarrassment in speaking of; this was the projected marriage of the Princess Charlotte, heiress to the throne of England, with the heir of the House of Orange, a project which at any other time would have excited strong opposition. But Alexander listened to the revelation of Britain's various ambitions with the smile he accorded to all whose passions he wished to enlist in his favour, and testified his readiness to consent to every desire, without exception, expressed by England. This English project involved on the part of Austria a personal sacrifice, that of the Austrian Low Countries, for in this universal falling back on the past, the Low Countries would naturally have reverted to her. But as for Low Countries, she preferred the lands of Italy, and she assented to the views of England after she had been assured that she should receive in Italy an indemnification for her sacrifice. There was a last point, on which Lord Castlereagh laid considerable stress: it was that no question should be raised about maritime rights. Will it be believed? Here, where those Powers were assembled that were desirous of forming a navy, the question of maritime rights was scarcely glanced at; it was looked upon as a private affair, concerning at most France and England, and which ought, as a matter of course, to be regulated according to the wishes of the latter. Thus, every thing had been conceded to Lord Castlereagh,—the kingdom of the Low Countries, the union by marriage between this kingdom and England, and, lastly, the silence of civilized Europe upon the legislation of the seas.

These concessions having been made, the next question was, with whom would Lord Castlereagh side,—with those who wished for peace, or with those who demanded an uncompromising war. His own desires once gratified, the powerful Englishman was again become perfectly rational, and, for example, on the question of negotiating or not nego-

tiating with Napoleon, exhibited both good sense and diplomatic ability.

Radically, this question meant that the allies did not wish to have any thing more to do with Napoleon, and that they were resolved to dethrone him and replace his dynasty by another. This question presented great difficulties to Lord Castlereagh, whether with regard to England or to Austria. The English ministers, disciples and successors of Mr. Pitt, had long been reproached, as we have said, with keeping up against France a dynastic war; and they were so much in the habit of defending themselves before Parliament against this charge that they continued to make the defence even when the English people themselves, encouraged by success, were no longer supposed to look upon the conduct of the ministers as blamable. As to Austria, it would be very embarrassing to the Emperor Francis to be told that the allies wished to bring him to Paris that he might deprive his own daughter of a throne. Moreover, if the expected vacancy of the throne of France inspired Lord Castlereagh with the hope of seeing it filled by the Bourbons, whose restoration he ardently desired, it also awakened his fear of Bernadotte, for whom the Emperor Alexander had conceived an extraordinary liking since the interview at Abo, and the discussion of the Norwegian question had caused an intimacy to spring up between the courts of Russia and Sweden.

Having given profound attention to all these considerations, Lord Castlereagh came to the sage conclusion that it was better not to be precipitate, but allow the restoration of the Bourbons to arise from the position of affairs, without seeking, by interference, to alter the course of events. He said to both parties that they had publicly offered to enter into negotiations with Napoleon; that to refuse now to send plenipotentiaries not only to Mannheim,—the place pointed out by France,—but to Châtillon,—the place indicated by the allies,—would be to exhibit to the eyes of Europe an inconsistency that would be really embarrassing, and would be strongly condemned in England; it would be, he contended, necessary to negotiate with Napoleon,—absolutely necessary,—in order to maintain the dignity of the allied Powers. To Alexander, who was so anxious to get to Paris, and to the Prussians, who were thirsting for vengeance, he said, in private, that by adopting this line of conduct they did not bind themselves in any way; for, in offering Napoleon, purely and simply, the frontiers of 1790, they might be sure of a refusal; and even if he did accept the offer, he would be so humiliated, so weakened, that the one party ought to feel themselves revenged and the other tranquilized; but if, on the contrary, he did not accept, then the allies would be free, and Austria, having herself pronounced for the frontiers of 1790, would be obliged to yield and abandon an intractable son-in-law, with whom it was impossible to come to any treaty; and then, by not hastening events, they would gradually bring things to the point they wished, without incurring the charge of inconsistency, and without offending the court of Vienna, whose concurrence in the present war was indis-

pensable. To Austria, Lord Castlereagh gave entire satisfaction by supporting the opinion of those who wished the negotiations should be carried on at Châtillon. He told the Emperor Francis and M. de Metternich, that though he believed it difficult to establish a permanent peace with Napoleon, he considered it advisable to try to negotiate with him; that touching the question of what dynasty should occupy the throne of France, England had taken no resolution: she had even tried to dissuade the Bourbons from repairing to the continent. He added that England would sincerely endeavour to conclude a peace; but, if Napoleon refused the offer now made, all further treaty should be broken off, and that in this case, the throne of France becoming vacant, Austria, guided by her conservative spirit, and understanding thoroughly Bernadotte's character, would naturally prefer the Bourbons to this adventurer, who demanded so high a price for trifling services. To all these propositions, Lord Castlereagh received a full assent from the Emperor Francis and his minister, who immediately replied that they were bound in honour to assent to the proposal of treating with Napoleon; that a sense of self-respect compelled them to take the same course,—for, after all, the Emperor Francis could not forget he was a father; but, if Napoleon would not on any terms listen to reason, they were determined to break with him forever, however painful such a course might be to the father of Maria-Louisa. They did not regard the regency of the latter in the name of the King of Rome as anything serious. Bernadotte was only a momentary whim of Alexander's, of which it would be folly to think seriously; and, should Napoleon be dethroned, Austria would prefer the Bourbons as his successors to all others. Every thing was thus satisfactorily arranged between Lord Castlereagh and Austria, whom he took care to satisfy touching her material interests.

Austria, in fact, feared that the coalition, after having made use of her services, might trick her: for example, that Russia, in order to get a better portion of Poland, might give up Saxony to Prussia, which would necessitate an indemnification for the house of Saxony in Italy,—a combination which was already spoken of at this period. She also entertained other subjects of fear, upon all of which Lord Castlereagh tranquillized her, pledging the word of England for the accomplishment of all Austria wished.

By a mixture of good sense, tact, and firmness, and a certain simplicity of manner, peculiarly English, Lord Castlereagh acquired thus rapidly a considerable influence among the allies,—an influence to which his position certainly contributed very much; for, arriving the last, with abundant resources at his command, among people whose interests and opinions were utterly opposed to each other, he possessed all the means of turning the balance in which side he would, and therefore found all willing to subscribe to his wishes in order to secure his aid in the fulfilment of theirs. Lord Castlereagh carried out his views with very little intrigue, and, acting in a simple, straightforward manner, exercised a decisive influence on the destinies of Europe.

Things having been arranged as we have just related, the allies resolved, on the 29th of January,—the very day of the battle of Brienne,—to send plenipotentiaries to Châtillon. These plenipotentiaries were,—on the part of Austria, M. de Stadion; for Russia, M. de Rasoumoffski; for Prussia, M. de Humboldt; for England, Lord Aberdeen. With the latter were joined Lord Cathcart, the English ambassador at the court of Russia, and Sir Charles Stewart, English minister in Prussia. It was also arranged that Lord Castlereagh should go to Châtillon, to observe personally the progress of the negotiations, to direct them if necessary, and to ascertain by observation whether a beneficial result could be hoped from these negotiations. England was known to be so deeply interested in yielding nothing beyond the ancient limits of France, and in getting rid of Napoleon if she could find a favourable opportunity for doing so, that none of the allies distrusted her, or thought of restricting her influence at the future congress. M. de Metternich might also have gone to Châtillon; but, besides that, he wished to remain near the allied sovereigns; he felt embarrassed at the idea of meeting the French negotiator, and preferred leaving this disagreeable office to M. de Stadion, who, being an old enemy of France, would experience no other embarrassment at seeing her ill treated than what might arise from the effort to repress any ill-timed manifestation of delight.

The conditions the allies were about to propose to France were—we may now say so, after the lapse of half a century—indecent. Not only was France required to retire within the limits of 1790,—though none of the allies were willing to submit to a similar restitution,—but she was required to give an immediate answer to the proposition, and to reply with a “yes” or “no.” Moreover, she was to be debarred all interference in the fate of the countries she was called on to give up. What was to be done with Poland, with Saxony, with Westphalia, with Belgium, with Italy; how Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Switzerland were to be treated,—in all these questions France was to have no voice. France—without whose interference the fate of a European village had never been decided—France was to have no opinion on the spoils of an entire world, of which she was at this moment herself despoiled. It is true that Napoleon had often abused the rights of a victor; but, amidst the intoxicating smoke of Rivoli, of Austerlitz, of Jena, of Friedland, he had never treated the conquered thus,—above all, the conquered who were crushed. But at this moment France was not crushed: her enemies advanced upon her soil—so to speak—in trembling, and promising to treat her well. Without doubt, she—or rather her Government—had committed faults, but in one day they had been all effaced; and if we only call to mind that two months prior to this time the allies had offered France her natural frontiers, with earnest importunities to accept them; that, after a moment's hesitation, she had replied by a formal acceptance, which, in justice, was binding on those who made the offer;—if all these circumstances

are taken into consideration, we will be pardoned for saying that the conditions proposed at Châtillon were indecent. And, though the triumph of Napoleon might be that of an insupportable despotism, still, that he might triumph was the wish of every honest man whose judgment was not perverted by the influence of party spirit. It was he, certainly, who had exposed us to these humiliations; but a criminal who defends his native land becomes identical with the soil for which he fights.

Whilst the plenipotentiaries were preparing to set out for Châtillon, M. de Metternich took the precaution of sending M. de Floret in advance, under pretext of securing accommodation for the numerous diplomatists of the congress, but in reality to give M. de Caulaincourt, who had just arrived at Châtillon, the frankest, and, we must say, the wisest, advice, if adopting it had been compatible with Napoleon's glory. M. de Metternich had not yet replied to the request for an armistice that M. de Caulaincourt had been directed to make him. He explained himself now on this subject by saying that if he had not spoken of it it was because such a proposition had no chance of being favourably received; that he had preserved silence on the subject, and would continue to do so, lest an unfair advantage might be drawn from the circumstance. The allies, he said, wished for peace or nothing; they wished it quickly, and on the terms that were about to be proposed. France need not distrust the English: they were among the most moderate of the allies, and to place confidence in them—especially in Lord Aberdeen—would be wise; she ought to seize, as on the wing, the present opportunity of negotiating, of which if she did not profit, it would never again return; that in case of refusal on the part of France, the allies would adopt ideas of subversion, to which Austria—though with regret—could offer no resistance; that the Emperor Francis would be afflicted for the fate of his daughter, but should not be the less faithful to his allies, to whom he was bound by the interests of the Austrian monarchy and by great obligations contracted during the last war; he implored his son-in-law to think seriously of these things, and to consent to sacrifices necessitated by circumstances. As for himself, as Emperor of Austria, he had been obliged to make many sacrifices: he had made them, but, at a later period, had been able to re-establish Austria in her proper position. It was then necessary to submit to necessity in order to avoid greater and irreparable misfortunes.

M. de Floret was forbidden to take any steps relative to the conditions of peace, or to make the slightest revelation respecting them. But the advice he was commissioned to communicate was enough to indicate that peace was not to be offered on the Frankfort bases.

The political question having been settled, the military question remained to be solved. The Prince de Schwarzenberg, who held in the military world a position similar to that which M. de Metternich held in the political, found himself naturally at the head of those who wished to pause at Langres, either to see the effect of the negotiations, or to escape the

dangers of a march on Paris. The allied armies would have to encounter Napoleon, who would be as much strengthened in approaching the focus of his resources as the allies would be weakened in withdrawing from theirs; they should prepare for a decisive battle, and this, with a general such as he, with soldiers exasperated as his were, was always hazardous, and this battle, if they did not gain it, would deprive them in one day of the fruits of two years' unhopèd-for success. To these considerations were added others, arising from the difficulty of obtaining subsistence. In fact, they were obliged to incline toward the Marne rather than toward the Seine, on account of the troops left to blockade the fortress, and in advancing they would find themselves in the midst of barren Champagne, where they would have wine and not bread, whilst they should abandon to Napoleon fertile Burgundy. This was an additional motive for awaiting the result of the negotiations, and the arrival of reinforcements, before involving themselves irremediably. There were, besides, some hidden thoughts, peculiarly Austrian, to which Prince Schwarzenberg did not give utterance, but which influenced his conduct. He said within himself, that the entrance of the allies into Paris, so much desired by Alexander, would be, undoubtedly, a triumph for this prince, but could not be one for the father-in-law of Napoleon; that besides, to disturb still more the balance of power in Europe by pushing the success of the coalition to its extreme term, would be to disturb that balance for the advantage of Russia, without procuring any profit to Austria.

These reasons, some of which were found in the sequel to be faulty, were nevertheless of great weight. But whilst these points were being discussed, the intelligence suddenly arrived that Blücher, though obliged to leave half his troops behind at Mayence and Metz, had taken up his position in advance of the great army of Schwarzenberg, and was going to encounter Napoleon with the small remaining portion of his forces. After such an event there was no longer time for deliberation, and it became indispensable to go at once to the assistance of the rash Prussian general. An ultimate line of proceeding could be afterward determined on. In fact, on the 30th of January, the morrow of the battle of Brienne, Prince Schwarzenberg put all his corps in motion on both banks of the Aube. Blücher had retired a little behind Rothière, on the woody heights of Trannes. Prince Schwarzenberg placed behind him the corps of General Giulay and of the Prince of Wurtemberg, who, whilst pursuing General Mortier, had passed at Bar-sur-Aube. He ordered his left, composed of all the Austrian reserves under Prince Colloredo, to advance on Vandœuvre, on the left bank of the Aube, in order to threaten the right flank of Napoleon, and hold Marshal Mortier in check. He placed his right, composed of Bavarians, at Eclance, a little beyond Trannes, and sent orders to Wittgenstein, who had already reached Saint-Dizier, to advance as quickly as possible to Soulaing. The D'York corps, that had been left before Metz, also received orders to repair to Saint-Dizier. Lastly, in the centre, where the Prince of

Württemberg and General Giulay had already come to the support of Blücher, he placed as a last reinforcement the Russian and Prussian guards.

This was an immense accumulation of forces, for Blücher, after the battle of Brienne, had kept full 28,000 men, reckoning those of Sacken, Olsouvieff, and Pahlen. General Giulay and the Prince of Schwarzenberg did not bring less than 25,000 men. Marshal de Wrede got credit for a like number, as did the Prince of Colloredo. The Russian and Prussian guards were estimated at 30,000, Wittgenstein's corps at 18,000, and that of D'York 15,000 men. The whole comprised, consequently, 170,000 men, of whom 100,000 were concentrated round Rothière. Opposed to these troops was Napoleon, with one wing on the Aube, the other on the woody heights of Anjou, and the village of Rothière as sole defence for his centre. What troops had he in this position? Thirty thousand men, if we may judge by the combat of the 29th of January, and perhaps 40,000 or 55,000 if Mortier, who was known to be at Troyes, could have joined him. Now or never was the moment to pounce upon him, before he could receive reinforcements, and overwhelm him with the 170,000 men who were already concentrated within the space of a few leagues, and of whom 100,000 were already assembled in the plain of Rothière. These decisive reasons put an end to the discussions of the preceding days, and it was resolved that a general engagement should take place. Besides, between Chaumont and Bar-sur-Aube there were no means of procuring provisions, so that it was necessary to advance or retire. To retire did not suit anybody's views, so that a battle, the result of any forward movement, was inevitable. Calculating on the temerity of Napoleon, on his headlong impulses, the allies thought it possible that he might take the initiative, and they were willing to allow him to do so, for they were placed on the wooded plains of Trannes and Éclance, and it would be their advantage to await him there.

The entire 31st of January was passed in this expectation. Napoleon having remained motionless, it was decided that the allies should go to seek him in the plain of Rothière. There was a certain space to be crossed, the different corps were already pretty far removed from each other, the roads were clayey and difficult to traverse, though the weather was cold; and in consequence of these various reasons the battle could not commence at an early hour. Marshal Blücher, to prevent delay, doubled the number of horses to each piece of artillery; but this precaution obliged him to leave half his artillery behind. He employed the morning in passing from Trannes to Rothière. The plan of operation agreed on was as follows:—

Marshal Blücher was with Sacken, Olsouvieff, Scherbatow, and Pahlen, to attack and take Rothière, which appeared to him easy, for there was no obstacle but a village, situate in the midst of a wide plain, rising in an almost insensible acclivity. During this time, General Giulay was to advance on Dienville, to carry the bridge of the Aube, that supported Napoleon's right wing, whilst the Prince of Württemberg, acting on the opposite side through the woods of Éclance, was to carry Giberie and

Chaumeuil, small villages connected with the wood of Anjou, where Napoleon had placed his left wing. Lastly, Marshal de Wrede was to attack this left wing, formed by Marmont's troops. In order to accomplish this, he would be obliged to ford a muddy and wooded stream that runs at the foot of the village Morvilliers, and having crossed it, he should carry Morvilliers, and afterward cross an unprotected and concave-shaped plain, bordered by the wood of Anjou. Behind the 70,000 men who were to be engaged in this manner, the Russian and Prussian guards were to march as a reserve, which would increase the number of combatants to 100,000. Lastly, at the two extremities of this line of battle, Colloredo, who was at the left of the Aube, Wittgenstein and D'York, who were crossing the forest of Soulaines, were, by executing a double circular movement, to surround Napoleon with 70,000 men, distributed along the two wings. What chance that he could extricate himself, even if he had thirty, forty, or even fifty thousand soldiers under his command?

Such was the opinion the allies formed of the situation of the French army. This situation was, at the least, quite as disadvantageous as they believed. It was not 50,000, it was not even 40,000 soldiers that Napoleon could oppose to the 170,000 that the allies led against him: he had at the utmost 32,000 men. He had besides, it is true, a well-selected position, the resources of his own genius, and the devotedness of his soldiers! We shall see what use he made of the means at his command.

From early morning he had remarked an extraordinary movement among Blücher's troops, and knowing that the Prince of Colloredo had appeared at the other side of the Aube, in the direction of Vandœuvre, he was inclined to quit the banks of this river and fall back on Troyes, with the intention of joining Mortier, and making head against the mass of the allies that seemed to be taking this route; but about the middle of the day, he learned from some fugitives, and from the manifest dispositions of the enemy, that he was about to be attacked in front, at Rothière. Once convinced of this fact, it would not have been consistent with his temperament, nor would it have been good tactics, to retire. He resolved to make head against the storm, and warmly receive the expected attack, and to retire afterward, when he should have shown that he was neither discouraged nor conquered.

Napoleon, as we have said, had placed his right wing at Dienville on the Aube, where the Dufour division was posted under General Gérard, and the Ricard division, detached from Marmont's corps. His centre, formed of Victor's troops, was posted at Rothière, intersecting the high-road, and extending as far as Giberie; his left was drawn up in front of the wood of Anjou, protected by the stream and village of Morvilliers. This last, composed of Marmont's corps, which at this moment was reduced to the Grange division, did not number more than 4000 men. There were, certainly, several pieces of cannon, that Marshal Marmont disposed skilfully, so as to check the Bavarians, should they attack the stream and village of Morvilliers. Lastly,

with two divisions of the Young Guard, with all the cavalry, and a numerous artillery, Napoleon held himself in reserve behind Rothière, a little toward the left, so as to aid either Marmont or Victor. It is certain, from the rolls called over that morning, that he had not more than 32,000 men under his command.

The firing did not commence until about two in the afternoon. Blücher, after having traversed with some difficulty the space that separated him from our positions, advanced on Rothière in two strong columns, one composed of the troops of Sacken, the other of those of Olsouvieff and Scherbatow. A brisk cannonade commenced on both sides, but as we were well supplied with artillery, it was no advantage to the Russians that Blücher commanded on that day. The latter soon wished to operate more seriously, and directed masses of infantry to advance against the principal houses of Rothière. It was the Duhesme division of Victor's corps that occupied this village. Our young soldiers, well sheltered in the houses and gardens with barricades at all the outlets, replied by a determined fire to the attempts of Blücher's soldiers, and succeeded in arresting their progress. Marshal Victor, who appeared dejected on leaving Strasbourg, had recovered all the energy of youth at this important moment, and he was in the thickest of the fight, giving an example to his soldiers, who nobly imitated him.

Whilst that at the centre Blücher was struggling with these difficulties, General Giulay, having defiled behind him, in order to reach Dienville, encountered there our right wing, drawn up in front of this town, on the banks of the Aube. General Gérard had dispersed a part of his troops within the town, and the remainder in the plain in connection with Rothière, and under the protection of a great many pieces of artillery. General Giulay, received at first, like Blücher, by a strong cannonade, was not more successful, and endeavoured, in vain, to enter the town himself. He lost a great number of soldiers in these vain attempts. To obtain a better chance of success by attacking Dienville on both sides of the Aube, he transported the Fresnel brigade to the left bank of this river, by the Unienville bridge, situate a little higher up. This brigade, after having crossed the Aube and arrived before Dienville, found the bridge barricaded, and themselves exposed to a brisk musketry-fire from a multitude of sharpshooters, that lay ambushed along the bank of the river. The brigade, under these circumstances, took up a position on the summit of a hillock opposite Dienville, and directed a brisk cannonade across the Aube. The Dufour division drawn up on the opposite bank, supported this discharge with extraordinary firmness, and replied by a not less destructive fire.

Thus, on our right as well as on our centre, the allies had encountered a most obstinate resistance. On our left, the Prince Royal of Wurtemberg, after having cleared the wood of Eclance, had tried to carry the little hamlet of Giberie, that flanked Rothière, and establish a line of communication with the wood of Anjou, occupied by Marmont. There was here a detachment of Marshal Victor's, that over-

powered by numbers, was obliged to abandon the hamlet. But Marshal Victor, putting himself at the head of one of his brigades, retook Giberie and repulsed the Wurtembergers to a considerable distance. Lastly, at the extremity of this battle-field, where the allies' line was sweeping round our left flank, the Bavarians, after having debouched by the forest of Soulaines, and deployed along the brook of Morvilliers, were stopped by Marshal Marmont, who had chosen an admirable position for his artillery, of which he made a most formidable use.

Thus, after two hours of violent cannonade and fusillade, the enemy had not gained on any side an inch. But they could not brook to be held in check by an army that did not appear to number more than 40,000, whilst they had about 100,000 men, without reckoning the two extreme wings.

The allied troops tried to make a decisive effort about four in the afternoon. Blücher, behind whom the Russian and Prussian guards were drawn up, marched sword in hand on Rothière, whilst, at the pressing solicitation of the Prince of Wurtemberg, the Emperor Alexander sent a brigade of his guards to second this prince in the attack on Giberie. The conflict then became terrible. The Sacken column entered Rothière and were driven back; they again forced their way in, having only to contend with the Duhesme division, which did not, at most, amount to more than 5000 men. This division, led on by Marshal Victor in person, did not abandon the post until half their number was cut to pieces. During this time, in order to occupy the space between Rothière and Giberie, the cavalry of the Guard, followed by their artillery, threw themselves on the cavalry of Pahlen and Wasilsikoff, and threw them back on the infantry of Scherbatow. But arrested by the Russian infantry, and charged in flank by a corps of dragoons, they lost in this affair some of their cannon that they had not time to bring away. The Prince of Wurtemberg, supported by the Russian guards, entered Giberie: and the Bavarians, on their side, ashamed of seeing their progress arrested by Marmont's few soldiers, at length crossed the stream that stood in their way, carried the village of Morvilliers, and debouched in the plain that lies at the foot of the wood of Anjou. This movement was made for the purpose of getting out of range of our artillery, which was doing great execution.

The moment was critical, and Napoleon, who had not ceased to direct every movement, himself exposed to a hail of projectiles, now resolved, though night was already closing in, not to leave his adversaries in possession of so many advantages. Feeling that it was only after intimidating the enemy that he could make a retreat either with honour or in safety, he ordered the two divisions of the Young Guards, his last resource, to advance rapidly on the enemy's two principal points. He ordered the Rothemburg division, under Marshal Oudinot, to advance on Rothière, and overturn every obstacle in the way, whilst he took himself the command of the Meunier division, and advanced to the left, between Marmont, who had fallen back on the village of Chaumeuil, and Victor, who had lost Giberie.

These young troops, led on by Napoleon and Oudinot, advanced with the resolution of despair. The Meunier division, stationed between Chaumeuil and Giberie, stopped short the progress of the Bavarians and the Wurtembergers. Oudinot, at the head of the Rothemburg infantry, deployed his troops without flinching beneath a terrific fire, drove back the enemy's opposing masses, and even succeeded in taking possession of the village of Rothière. Night was already far advanced; the men fought desperately hand to hand in the village, and it was ten at night, when the enemy could no longer molest our retreat, that the heroic Oudinot fell back from Rothière on Brienne. Our retrograde movement was executed in good order, covered by the divisions of the Young Guard and Milhaud's dragoons, who, alternately charging and charged, kept their ground, but with loss of the artillery, which it was impossible to bring away. The quantity of artillery was too great, in proportion to the infantry, to be protected, and therefore after using the cannon we abandoned them, but saved the gunners and horses. As to the rest, whilst the centre, composed of the guard of the cavalry and the *débris* of Victor's troops, retired without molestation, the left, under Marmont, escaped fortunately through the wood of Anjou, and the right, under Gérard, that had behaved so gallantly at Dienville, fell back without check along the Aube, after having killed or wounded a considerable number of the enemy.

Thus finished this terrible day, where the resistance of 32,000 men against 170,000, of whom 100,000 were engaged, was, it may be said, a phenomenon in military warfare. This resistance was owing to the skill and energy of General Gérard, to the good use Marshal Marmont made of his artillery, to the heroic devotedness of the Marshals Oudinot and Victor, and above all, to Napoleon's indomitable tenacity of purpose. But for his iron will he would have been driven into the Aube. His mode of action naturally made the enemy pause, and so, for the moment, saved his fortune. We lost about 6000 men killed or wounded, and put *hors de combat* 8000 or 9000 of the enemy, thanks to the advantage of our position and the extensive use of our artillery. This difference, though a satisfaction in one sense, was no great military success, for the smallest losses were much more seriously felt by us than very large ones would be by the coalition. We sacrificed fifty pieces of artillery, but saved our artillerymen and horses, which proves that we abandoned these cannon, and that they were not captured by the enemy. Napoleon fought this battle with such disproportionate numbers only to cover his retreat; during the night he crossed the bridge of Lesmont without confusion, and reached Troyes in good order. As the entire night would be occupied in defiling, and as he might be attacked by the enemy at the break of day, he left Marmont's corps, which was only composed of the Lagrange division, on the right of the Aube and on the heights of Perthes, so as to make Blücher believe that the entire French army was there ready to renew the combat. This corps did not run any serious risk, for it was protected by the narrow but deep Voire,

and held all the bridges, behind which the men were sure to find refuge, should they be too briskly attacked.

In fact, the next day, the enemy, fatigued with the combat of the previous evening, and not waking very early, advanced on one side toward the bridge of Lesmont, and on the other toward the heights of Perthes, and paused in a kind of doubt on seeing Marmont's corps drawn up in battle-array. Whilst the enemy were inquiring of one another where the French army was, we had defiled quite close to them by the bridge of Lesmont, and Marmont himself, after having played his part in keeping up the illusion, withdrew, by passing the Voire at Rosnay.

However, Marmont was pursued along the Aube by Marshal de Wrede. After having occupied the heights of Perthes for a considerable time, and in a threatening attitude, he had crossed the bridge of Rosnay before the eyes of the Bavarians, and then hastened to destroy it. But closely pressed, he had only been able to tear off the *tablier*, and had left the piles standing, whose tops rose some feet above the water. Whilst he was drawing up his few remaining troops in order of battle on the other side of the Voire, he perceived some detachments of the enemy attempting a passage below Rosnay. He first sent some cavalry to oppose them, but finding these not sufficient, and that from two to three thousand men had already crossed the river, he hastened to the spot with a few hundred men, for if this passage were not effectually opposed, his corps might be cut off from the Aube, and Napoleon then thrown back into the midst of Wittgenstein and D'York's troops, which means, in other words, he would be surrounded and taken. Marmont immediately rushed sword in hand on the detachment that had crossed the Voire by the aid of some piles and planks, attacked them briskly, and forced them back into the river. At this sight, the cavalry made a desperate charge, and in the twinkling of an eye, cut down or made prisoners a thousand men. This exploit having been accomplished below Rosnay, Marmont was recalled to Rosnay itself by a like attempt. Foreseeing that a passage might be attempted at this half-destroyed bridge, he left a very intelligent captain of artillery in ambush there, with his company. This captain had allowed a certain number of the enemy to pass one by one over the dismantled piles of the bridge, and had then shot them when within musket-range. Marmont's arrival finished them. Thus a body of about 3000 French had, during an entire day, stopped the progress of 25,000 Bavarians, and had killed or captured more than 2000 men. This double battle was a real advantage, for by exciting to the highest degree the confidence of our soldiers in themselves, and by rendering the allies infinitely more circumspect, it contributed to retard their movements, which permitted us to accelerate ours, the only resource that remained in the reduced state of our forces.

Napoleon having crossed the Aube without accident, passed the 2d of February at Piney, and the next day, the 3d, fixed himself at Troyes. This last battle, so energetically sustained against forces so superior in number,

though a great military achievement, exposed us to great danger. The allies had assembled all their forces between Bar-sur-Aube and Troyes, and if they persevered in marching, thus combined, on Paris, it was doubtful whether the French, even in resisting to the last man, could arrest their progress. After the battle of the 29th of January, and the combat of the 1st of February, the utmost amount of troops that remained to Napoleon, was from 25,000 to 26,000. Mortier, whom he had just joined at Troyes, had perhaps 15,000 men, General Hamelinaye, 4000, which raised the entire number of our disposable forces to 45,000 men. Prince Schwarzenberg, with Wittgenstein and Blücher, commanded full 160,000 men, deducting the losses of the two last battles; and this was not all for Blücher was about to be reinforced, not only by D'York, who was coming from Metz, but by Langeron, who was ready to come from Mayence, and Kleist, who was withdrawing from the blockade of Erfurt, all three of whom were to be replaced by troops hastily raised in Germany. It was impossible for the French to say to what number the allied armies might amount within a few days. It was possible that they might find themselves with 40,000 or 50,000 men opposed to 200,000, and then what defence could they make? The soldiers still reposed an unshaken confidence in Napoleon, though some among the younger deserted; but the commanding officers, who on the field of battle gave an example of the utmost devotedness, and who had sufficient experience to perceive the danger of an almost desperate situation, but not sufficient genius to discern the real extent of our resources, abandoned themselves, when no longer under fire, to utter dejection. They were plunged in profound sadness, which they made no effort to conceal. This dejection spread gradually to the inferior ranks, and winter, with its sufferings and its privations, was not calculated to dispel the gloom. In Franche-Comté, in Alsace, in Lorraine, the inhabitants had displayed excellent dispositions, and a true spirit of fraternity with regard to the army. At Troyes and its environs, where the disposition of the people was less friendly, where the burdens of war were already severely felt, and where the people were strongly irritated against the Government, the reception given to the army was not very cordial, and vexatious conflicts between the soldiers and the peasants added still darker shades to the gloomy picture.

Napoleon, though deeply affected, was not, however, utterly cast down. He still discovered resources where nobody suspected any, endeavoured to make others perceive them, and displayed, not serenity or gayety, which would have been an unbecoming affectation under such circumstances, but a tenacity of purpose, and an indomitable firmness, quite sufficient to plunge into despair those who might have wished to see him more disposed to submit to the pressure of events. Neither disturbed nor disconcerted, above all not exhibiting the slightest weakness, supporting bodily fatigue and trouble of mind with a firmness superior to his physical strength, ever in the thickest of the fight, with steady eye and clear-toned voice, he bore the penalty of his

faults with a degree of resoluteness that might have effaced them, could great qualities be a sufficient excuse for the ills they have often caused mankind.

Still, the confidence that Napoleon displayed, though in part simulated, was not without foundation. If he had only 45,000 men, including those he brought back from Brienne, and Mortier's Old Guard and Hamelinaye's small division, he expected 15,000 old soldiers who were coming *en poste* from Spain, and who had already arrived at Orleans. This reinforcement would increase his army physically to 60,000 men, and morally to still more. The brave Pajol, who with 1200 horse and 5000 or 6000 national guards defended the bridges of the Seine and the Yonne that he had barricaded, as, for example, Nogent-sur-Seine, Bray, Montereau, Sens, Joigny, Auxerre, expected 4000 of the Bordeaux reserve. There would be within a few days at Paris two divisions of the Young Guard completely fit for service. There were besides twenty-four regimental depôts that had been transported to Paris, and which would furnish, by the help of conscripts, twenty-four battalions of from 5000 to 6000 men each, which would afford, reckoning the two divisions of the Young Guard, four divisions of infantry of more than 20,000 men. Here were, besides, accoutrements for some thousand horsemen at Versailles, and wherewith to mount eighty cannon at Vincennes. Here were 30,000 additional soldiers that would, within eight or ten days, raise the total of Napoleon's forces to 90,000 men. Lastly, at Montereau, at Meaux, at Soissons, brave fellows thronged to be drafted into the skeleton regiments of the national guards where they could utilise their patriotism. All was not lost if we could only preserve our *sang-froid* a few days longer. Unfortunately there was a deficiency of two things at Paris, not of men, we repeat the assertion, but of money and muskets. As to money, when M. Mollien, quite at bay, did not know where to find 100,000 francs, an order on the treasurer of the civil list realized the sum at the Tuileries. It was not so easy to procure arms. There were, as we have said, 6000 new muskets, besides 30,000 old that wanted repairs. The workmen laboured to render the latter fit for service, but the daily repairs scarcely supplied the daily demand, and the reserve of arms fit for service diminished visibly. Clothes were made tolerably fast; horses began to arrive. Napoleon was writing incessantly to Joseph and to Clarke, endeavouring to stimulate the idleness of the one and the incapacity of the other; he traced for them from point to point what they were to do; sent every day intelligence of his personal affairs to the empress and Prince Cambrécis; begged them to keep up their spirits and preserve their tranquillity of mind, assured them that nothing had yet been lost, that the enemy had not gained any decisive advantage, and that by constancy and energy all would be saved.

Whilst he was endeavouring to prepare his resources and inspire confidence in them, there remained one happy and fast-approaching chance, which was in reality his sustaining mental force, and of whose realisation he had a presentiment. At the actual moment he was

threatened with a great and fatal battle, fought beneath the walls of Paris against forces that quadrupled his. This was the sad probability if the enemy persisted in advancing *en masse*. But might not the enemy's forces divide? Among the different routes of the Yonne, the Seine, the Aube, the Marne, might they not be tempted to divide, to extend themselves, either to seek provisions, or to keep up a communication with the troops in the north and east, or, in short, from a thousand different motives? Would not Blücher, who had forces on the Marne and farther off, (for he left General Priest on the frontiers of Belgium,) would he not go to meet them? Schwarzenberg, who had forces on the Geneva route and even as far as Lyons, would he not extend an arm to Dijon? To these chances might there not be added moral causes of separation,—such as jealousies, dislikes, the desire of acting independently of each other? For example, would not Blücher advance along the Marne, leaving Schwarzenberg on the Seine, in order to be more free to follow his own plans? Napoleon suspected strongly these possibilities, and on the second day of his retreat from Troyes his suspicions became almost certain.* If things were really so, his plans were fixed: he would leave a corps in front of Schwarzenberg, then, making a covert and rapid movement, he would pursue and overwhelm Blücher, after which he would return and attack Schwarzenberg. But he did not speak of this project, lest his secret might be divulged and come to the ears of the enemy, through an indiscretion on the part of the staff. The presence of a compact mass, four times superior in number to the French army, was a cloud that dimmed every eye and terrified every heart. The French saw themselves obliged to fight a pitched battle beneath the walls of Paris, with forces so disproportioned that victory would be impossible; they wished at any price to dispel this danger, and to dissipate it by establishing peace on any terms. Having arrived on the 3d of February at Troyes, Napoleon was, in fact, assailed by the remonstrances of M. de Berthier, who had always been prudent, and by M. de Bassano, who had become so since our late misfortunes. That we ought to make a treaty on any terms at Châtillon was their fixed opinion, expressed in the most urgent manner.

And we could certainly make a treaty, for the plenipotentiaries of the different allied Powers had just arrived at Châtillon, all willing to subscribe to peace, but on the double bases of the frontiers of 1790, and of our exclusion from all future European arrangements. Received with frigid politeness, M. de Caulaincourt had easily divined that severe propositions were prepared for him, very different from the Frankfort bases. M. de Floret, secretary to the Austrian Legation, commissioned to give in secret friendly advice to the French negotiator, without explaining himself categorically, had said, "Make a treaty on any terms, for this opportunity is like that of Prague, like that of Frankfort: once neglected, it will never return."

M. de Caulaincourt, alarmed at this advice,

and wishing to know what were the sacrifices about to be demanded from France, had not been able to obtain any explanation from M. de Floret, but he ascertained very clearly that the emperor would be obliged to submit to much greater sacrifices than those demanded at Frankfort, if he wished to save Paris, and with Paris the imperial throne. He had therefore written to Napoleon, to beg additional powers to negotiate, for the instructions that enjoined him to demand not only the Scheldt, but the Wahal; not only the Alps, but a part of Italy; not only a legitimate influence over the fate of the provinces given up, but the possession of a portion of them for Napoleon's brothers; these instructions presented a terrible contradiction to the actual state of things. M. de Caulaincourt had asked for additional powers without saying to what extent: he had made the request on his knees, not like a man who stoops to power to save his fortune and his life, but like a worthy citizen who submits to humiliation for the love of his country. Distrusting M. de Bassano, whom he did not like, and by whom he was not liked, whom he erroneously looked on as the cause of Napoleon's obstinacy, he had written to Berthier, to pray him, in the first instance, to send him exact information as to the situation of military affairs; and in the next place, to beg him—the noble and faithful companion of the emperor's dangers—to use all his influence to induce him to yield to the pressure of circumstances.

Thus Napoleon had to endure not only the letter of M. de Caulaincourt, but the most earnest entreaties of Berthier, and of M. de Bassano himself, who now was far from urging his master to resistance. Fresh intelligence, arriving on every side, quickened still more the zeal of those who surrounded Napoleon. In fact, the Austrian corps seemed to have extended along our right beyond the Yonne. From four to five thousand Cossacks had advanced beyond Sens, and were threatening Fontainebleau. On our left, toward the Marne, the aspect of things was not less threatening. Marshal Macdonald, who had received orders to fall back on Châlons, and take up a position there, had been driven out by the enemy and forced to retreat to Chateau-Thierry. It was even said that he was thrown back on Meaux. The 11th and 5th infantry corps, the 2d and 3d cavalry that he brought with him, and that Napoleon estimated at 12,000 men at least, were reduced to 6000 or 7000. Bands of fugitives, after having quitted the army, had wandered between Meaux and Paris, spreading everywhere bad news. The Parisians fancied they saw the enemy pouring down on them by three routes, that of Auxerre, that of Troyes, that of Châlons, and only on one of these three did they discern a force capable of protecting them,—that which Napoleon commanded in person, and which had, so report went, the advantage in the combat of the 29th of January, but the disadvantage in that of the 1st of February. Movements in Vendée were spoken of, and this country, lately so tranquil and grateful to Napoleon, appeared ready to revolt. In short, to add to the general dismay, it was announced that Murat, even he, the brother-in-law of the emperor, to whom he owed his throne, had just then burst every bond of

* Napoleon made some obscure but positive observations on this subject to the War Minister.

political alliance, of love of country, and of family ties, by making a hostile movement in the rear of Prince Eugene. This influx of bad news had completely uprooted public tranquillity. The empress, dreadfully alarmed, was incessantly sending either for Joseph or the chancellor, to confide to them her vexations, for at sight of the approaching danger she was dying of fear for her husband, her son, and herself. There was a report current in Paris that the court was about to retire to the Loire, and every day an anxious crowd assembled round the Tuileries to make sure that the carriages in which the empress and the King of Rome every day took a drive in the wood of Boulogne, were not travelling-carriages intended to set out for Tours.*

These circumstances irritated Napoleon without shaking his resolution. Where everybody saw subjects of fear, he rather perceived causes of hope. He suspected, indeed, that an Austrian corps was advancing toward him, and he was thinking of throwing himself on these troops and overwhelming them. The danger of Macdonald, the manner in which he was pursued, induced him to believe that the main army of the allies had divided and thrown one wing on the Marne. It was what he had all along wished for and hoped. On this account he had sent Marmont forward to Arcis-sur-Aube, and had enjoined him to reconnoitre even as far as Sézanne and Fère-Champenoise, that so he may become acquainted with all the enemy's movements, and be ready to take advantage of the first error.

But the emperor felt called on to reply to the entreaties of M. de Berthier, of M. de Bassano, and of M. de Caulaincourt, and, above all, he felt the necessity of allaying the alarm that prevailed at Paris. "Further powers to treat," he said: "what did they mean by these expressions? Did they mean sacrifices in Holland, in Germany, in Italy, he was ready to make them. The Wahal: he was ready to abandon it, and fall back on the Meuse and Scheldt, provided that he might keep Antwerp. He would sacrifice Cassel and Kehl, though these points were the real suburbs of Mayence and Strasbourg. He would even dismantle Mayence to tranquillize Germany; but on condition of keeping the Rhine. In Italy he would give up every thing, even Genoa, provided he might conserve the Alps, and, if possible, something for the faithful Prince Eugene. But to consent to retain less than France—the veritable France, whose limits had been fixed by the Revolution of 1789—would be hopelessly to dishonour himself. But the allies, he said, did not in reality wish to treat with him: they wished to destroy him, his dynasty, and, above all, the re-

sults of the French Revolution. In fact, the proposal to treat was only a lure. If there were any sincerity in the late proposals to negotiate, it was probably because the allies were concocting conditions so humiliating that he would be dishonoured by accepting them, and this dishonour would serve as a counterpoise in public opinion to the influence of his character and the force of his genius. But it was impossible for him to consent to such things. To descend from the throne, to meet death itself, would be for him, who was only a soldier, a trifle contrasted with dishonour. The Bourbons might accept the France of 1790: they had never known any other, and it was that which they had the glory of creating; but he who had received from the republic France, with the Rhine and the Alps, what could he reply to the republicans of the Directory if they flung back on him the fulminating apostrophe he had addressed to them on the 18th Brumaire? Nothing: he should stand confounded. He was asked to do what was impossible, for he was asked to consent to his own dishonour."

Shall we dare avow it?—we who during this long recital have not ceased to blame Napoleon's policy, we who condemned, as useless, irrational, and even fatal, every project of ambition that extended beyond the Rhine and the Alps? It seems to us that on this occasion Napoleon's view of matters was more correct than that of his advisers: but, as it always happens when a man has been long acting erroneously, he was neither listened to nor believed when he was in the right. His diplomatic agents, disillusioned too late, his generals, worn out from fatigue, conjured him to remain emperor of no-matter-what empire, because whilst he remained emperor they would retain the position they then held. France might be circumscribed in her limits: but she would still be great, because she would still be France, and they would lose nothing of their individual greatness. In their eyes, the Rhine, the Alps, constituted perhaps the grandeur of Napoleon and of France, but in no way touched their personal importance. Sad process of reasoning, which fatigue rendered excusable in worn-out soldiers, and fear made pardonable in justly-alarmed diplomatists. Undoubtedly, the conquests that Napoleon had made from the Rhine to the Vistula, from the Alps to the Straits of Messina, from the Pyrenees to Gibraltar, were not worth the blood they had cost, and, indeed, would not have been worth the life of one man. But, on the other hand, Frenchmen might have been legitimately called upon to shed the last drop of their blood to defend the natural frontiers of France; Napoleon might have been lawfully required to risk his throne and his life for the same object; and, in our opinion, after so many errors, after so many follies, so many extravagances of every kind, he alone was right when he said that his honour was demanded when he was asked to yield an inch of the natural frontiers of France,—those frontiers conquered by the republic, and which had been transmitted to him as a deposit. But the one party, through affection, the others through exhaustion, all influenced by the desire of self-conservation, said to him,

* According to my established habit of never making imaginary descriptions, I wish to mention that I have borrowed these particulars, not alone from the correspondence of King Joseph, part of which has been published, but also from those of Prince Cambrésis, of the Duke of Rovigo, and the Duke of Feltre, which are unpublished, and remarkable for minuteness of detail. The circumstances recorded in my pages are painted in warmer colours in the letters from which I have drawn the facts. I rather soften than brighten the account, knowing that we must always make allowance for the exaggeration of the time in which the events occurred,—though this very exaggeration is a distinctive mark of the epoch, and which must be preserved by the historian, in some degree.

"Sire, save your throne, and in saving that you will save every thing."

The entreaties addressed to the emperor were becoming more candid and more frequent. In short, the alarm increased from hour to hour. Napoleon, not wishing to individualize the sacrifices he was willing to make, and counting on the pride of M. de Caulaincourt and on his patriotism, sent him a *carte blanche*. This was the term used. He had well-founded hopes, from his knowledge of M. de Caulaincourt's character, that the latter would not see in the *carte blanche* authority to consent to great sacrifices; but if, however, great sacrifices were needed to snatch Paris from the hands of the enemy, he was free to do so, and might save the capital. Strange deception, practised with regard to himself, with regard to M. de Caulaincourt, with regard to his honour, as he understood it! for, in the actual state of things, he either yielded nothing, or he abandoned the natural frontiers. Strange deception!—and, we must add, sole weakness of this great man!—which was sprung from him by the importunities of his attendants and his ministers, and which, however, as we shall soon see, was but of short duration.

Having forwarded these additional powers to M. de Caulaincourt, the emperor gave some orders suited to the extreme circumstances in which he was placed. The obstinate silence he had observed toward Murat had at length determined the latter to enter into negotiations with Austria. It was a defection as damnable as that of Bernadotte, but induced by less vicious motives. Inconstancy of character, the insatiable desire to reign, fear, an intense jealousy of Prince Eugene, had at first disturbed and at last corrupted the heart of Murat. His wife, it must be said, was much more guilty than he; for, bound to Napoleon by the closest bonds of duty, she had, when in converse with the French minister, affected the greatest grief and a total loss of influence with her husband, and was at the same time carrying on negotiations with the allies through the intervention of M. de Metternich.* The conditions of Murat's treason were as follows:—Murat was to keep Naples and give up Sicily, for which he would be indemnified by an Italian province. He promised in return to march with 80,000 men against Prince Eugene. He had kept his word, he had advanced toward Rome, had sent forward a division against Florence, another against Boulogne, without saying precisely what he was about to do; for he still retained sufficient good feeling to blush for his conduct, and he had sufficient craft to side from the French officers, whose services he greatly needed, that he was going to employ them against France. He had asked General Miollis to give him up the castle of Saint Angelo, and had requested the Princess Eliza to let him take possession of the citadel of Leghorn, pretending that the occupation of these places was necessary to carrying out

the emperor's designs. General Miollis and the Princess Eliza had refused.

This intelligence, as may be easily conceived, had irritated Napoleon exceedingly; but he had dissembled his feelings through consideration for the numbers of French living in Italy. He had ordered the Duke of Otranto to visit Murat's headquarters again, and agree to the surrender of the fortified posts that the King of Naples demanded; but he had sworn in his heart to be revenged for this black ingratitude, and he, on the spot, devised a means of embarrassing Murat in a most serious manner. Murat, in his treaty with Austria, had, under the vague term of a province in the peninsula, hoped to get possession of all Central Italy. To send back the Pope to Rome at this moment would be to put an almost insurmountable obstacle in the way of Murat's ambition. Napoleon had, as we have already seen, sent Pius VII. to Savona, and the Pontiff had been along the way received by the people with the warmest expressions of respect and affection. Napoleon ordered that the Pope should be conducted to the outposts, with the respect with which he had always been treated, announcing to him that he was free to return to Rome. Thus finished this other drama, so similar to that of Spain, by the sending back of the prince whose states the emperor had designed to seize in taking possession of his person, and whom he was only too happy to set at liberty now, in the hope of drawing some advantage from a recantation dictated by the embarrassment of his own circumstances.

But what was more important than either Murat or the Pope, was to profit of the opportunity of abandoning Italy to herself,—another tardy retraction, but very useful if it had been made in time. As long as Murat continued inactive, Prince Eugene could, by defending himself on the Adige, keep his position in Lombardy, spite of some attacks made by the English on his right and his rear; but, should Murat take him in the rear, on the right bank of the Po, he would have no further means of resistance: therefore Napoleon ordered him to fall back as speedily as possible on Turin, Suza, Grenoble, and Lyon, to come to the assistance of France, whose preservation was far more important than that of Italy.

Thus occupied in undoing what he had done, Napoleon gave his last orders with regard to Ferdinand VII., who was burning with impatience to recover his liberty. Intelligence had at length been received from the Duke of San Carlos. He had, *en route*, met the Spanish regency, that, after long hesitations, had quitted Cadiz and determined to come to Madrid and hold their sittings in the city, where, during three centuries, the Government of Spain had resided. The Duke of San Carlos had seen at Aranjuez the members of the regency and the principal personages of the Cortes. Their reply had been given without either doubt or hesitation. At first, none of them wished to separate from the English, with whom they hoped soon to invade the south of France; neither were they anxious to bring back Ferdinand VII. and restore him authority which they had conserved for him,

* This and Sect. in the midst of so many others, can no longer be doubted, since the publication of Lord Castlereagh's papers. It is there quite evident that the queen was the principal agent in the negotiations.

and of which, it was very easy to foresee, he would soon make a bad use. Influenced by these combined motives, they refused to subscribe to a treaty made by a captive; and, with many protestations of regret, obedience, and devotedness, they declared they could not consider themselves bound to recognise the signature of the king until he stood on Spanish soil, in the full enjoyment of his liberty. They cited, in justification of their conduct, a very plausible reason, which was an article of the Constitution of Cadiz, which said expressly that any stipulation signed by the king in a state of captivity should be deemed void. The Duke of San Carlos had been sent back to Valençay with this article of the Constitution; upon which, the unfortunate Ferdinand seemed plunged into despair.

There was no longer time for hesitation; it was better run the risk of being deceived, but take, at the same time, the chance of finding Ferdinand VII. faithful to his word, than to detain him prisoner; a fact which was the radical cause of the war with the Spaniards, and obliged us to leave on the Adour troops of which we had the most urgent need on the Marne and the Seine. Consequently, Napoleon commanded the liberation of Ferdinand VII. and the other Spanish princes detained at Valençay; he ordered that they should immediately join Marshal Suchet, requiring that they should pledge their word of honour for the faithful execution of the Valençay treaty. Napoleon was thus making an effort to recover the troops that garrisoned Sagonta, Mequinenza, Lerida, Tortosa, and Barcelona, who would immediately recross the Pyrenees. If Marshal Soult, who was detained at Bayonne by the presence of the English, could not be brought up to Paris, Marshal Suchet, who was not placed in similar circumstances, and who was opposed by an army infinitely less formidable, might be brought back to Lyons. Napoleon reiterated his orders, to send thither all the troops that were not indispensably necessary at Roussillon, and to prepare to follow himself with the rest of his army. Should Marshal Suchet arrive at Lyons with 20,000 men, and join Eugene with 30,000, the fate of the war would be evidently changed, for the allies would not remain between Troyes and Paris when 50,000 old soldiers were advancing from Lyons to Besançon.

These orders being expedited during the days of the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th of February, days that Napoleon employed in observing the movements of the enemy, he also gave some others relative to the defence of Paris. The feeling of alarm went on increasing in this capital at every retrograde step made by Marshal Macdonald on the Marne, for the fugitives from the army and the surrounding country spread terror as they fled. Joseph had asked for instructions touching the empress, the King of Rome, and the princesses of the imperial family; he asked whether in case of danger he should keep them in Paris. There was certainly no question of evacuating Paris; Napoleon had, on the contrary, given orders that it should be defended to the last extremity, but, if the enemy appeared, should one of the princes remain with extraordinary powers and orders to resist to the last, and

send beyond the Loire the imperial family, the empress, the King of Rome, the ministers, and chief dignitaries? This question was openly discussed in the streets of the capital, and proved how strongly the public mind was agitated. Louis, ex-King of Holland, who had returned to France since the misfortunes of his brother, proposed, that should the court and members of the Government leave, he would close the gates and make a determined defence, which he was very capable of doing. Many sensible people thought it would be better not to send away the empress and the King of Rome, for their departure would be looked on as an abandonment of the capital, which would offend and alarm the Parisians, and would seem to prepare a void that would quickly be filled by the Bourbons. M. de Talleyrand, who clearly saw the reign of these princes approaching, and had received many secret assurances of their kindly feeling toward himself, and though he neither liked them nor felt any confidence in their abilities, still he was revolving in his mind the means of recovering under their dynasty the influence he had lost with Napoleon; but as he did not wish to compromise himself too soon or irrevocably with the latter, he seconded Joseph and the empress with great apparent zeal, giving them what he believed to be the best advice. In his opinion, to send away the empress from Paris would be most imprudently to give up the place to the Bourbons, who would have in their favour the *prestige* of twenty-four years of misfortune, and the still greater *prestige* of the peace they would be instrumental in procuring France. Joseph, not wishing to take any thing on himself in such a matter, had earnestly begged Napoleon to express his wishes positively on the subject. As to the empress, she had neither opinion nor will, and in concert with Cambacérès, who, as we have seen, was become very pious, she ordered prayers to be said, which in the Catholic liturgy are called the forty hours.

Napoleon, whom all the adversities of the war had not been able to shake, exhibited strong marks of impatience on receiving the courier from Paris, who brought him several times a day sad accounts of the uneasiness manifested by the members of his Government. "You are afraid," he said to those to whom he had intrusted the administration, "and you infect those about you with the same fears. The position of affairs is serious, *but the danger does not lie where you think*. You do well to pray, but you pray like terrified people, and if I followed your example, my soldiers would believe themselves lost. Throw up round Paris the works I have ordered; arm and clothe my conscripts, make them practice target-shooting, send them to me as fast as they shall have acquired the primary notions of a soldier's duties, seize the fugitives and draft them into the regiments, collect provisions and arms, keep yourselves cool, and do not change your opinion with every new idea thrown off in the heat of public excitement, keep my directions always before your eyes, obey them, and leave the rest to me. I know that some Cossacks have appeared near Sens, that Macdonald has allowed himself to be driven back on the Marne, but keep your-

diet: the enemy shall pay dearly for ed temerity. Once more I say, keep es quiet; do not listen to every one s advice, do not talk with the first ert yourselves, keep your mind to and leave the rest to me."

were the wise and energetic counsels oleon addressed to Cambacérès, to the ister, and to his brother Joseph. As mpress, he only gave her an account alth, some succinct and tranquillizing ouching the army, all expressed in an ate and firm tone; but his resolution n as to what he should do with her King of Rome if the enemy appeared Paris. He wished that the capital e defended, for he knew very well e it left open to the enemy, a govern- ould be immediately established there ich he would have no control; but determined to dispute energetically ession of the capital with the enemy, no intention of leaving his wife and

By keeping them in his possession ed that he kept a bond with Austria an respect would preserve intact. If, ntrary, these precious pledges escaped e hands, he said within himself that ould not fail to seize upon Maria and take advantage of her weakness se a regency that would exclude him throne, or the Austrians might bring the King of Rome to Vienna, and ery care on them, as people do to a girl who has had the misfortune to ad marriage. They would treat him venturer who was not worthy of the y had given him, and he would per- banished to some distant prison; and ould be brought up at Vienna as an prince.

pective, as it rose before his mental ook him to the very depths of his l made him forget another not less prospect, that of Paris left vacant e Bourbons, who were approaching. ndoubtedly right, for it was true that and his wife would be taken from t his son would be educated as a prince, and that his wife would be another husband; but it was not the that, were Paris deserted, his enemies ke advantage of the circumstance to the Bourbons there. It was not such hat was to be apprehended, it was a on of every species of evil, which, in ent of his faults, was by the decree dence about to descend on his devoted

ind ever occupied with the danger of his wife and son to fall into the hands austrians, Napoleon ordered Joseph, in ated the 8th of February, to carry out ations as he had expressed them at to leave Louis at Paris with extended y, to remain there himself if necessary, the capital to the last extremity; but up the Loire the empress and the Rome, with the princesses, the minis- grand dignitaries, the treasure of the ind not to give credence to secret such as M. de Talleyrand, with whom mporized too long. In short, to follow

his instructions, and not any others. "The fate of Astyanax," he added, "prisoner to the Greeks, has always appeared to me the most unhappy of all human destinies. I would rather see my son's throat cut, and his body flung into the Seine, than to see him in the hands of the Austrians to be led to Vienna."

Napoleon afterward pointed out in what manner Paris was to be defended. As no defence in masonry had been erected, for fear of alarming the inhabitants, he contented himself with ordering palisades and artillery to be got ready. Now that the alarm was at the height, and that there was nothing left to conceal, he ordered the enclosure called "l'octroi" to be strengthened with palisades, and, together with the palisades, he ordered *tambours* to be constructed before the gates, and redoubts to be erected on the sites already indicated; these were to be protected by artillery, and behind these improvisatized works the national guards were to be placed, armed with fowling-pieces, should there be a deficiency of muskets. What confidence would he not have felt, what liberty of action would he not have acquired, had he had those magnificent walls which, thanks to a patriot king, now enclose the capital of France!

Napoleon had sojourned from the 3d to the 8th of February, first at Troyes, then at Nogent, foreseeing the commission of a fault by the enemy, from which he expected his safety. He soon thought he saw the first symptoms of what he expected. In fact, the morrow of the battle of Rothière, the allies had held at Brienne a grand council, to consider what advantage they could draw from Napoleon's position, which seemed to them desperate. It was not to a force of 30,000 men they had supposed him reduced after the battle of Rothière, but from 40,000 to 50,000, amounting with those of Mortier to perhaps 70,000, and with these numbers, so far above the reality, they thought him lost, provided, as they said, they did not commit any gross faults. After many discussions, the following plan of operations was resolved on.

Whatever might be the numerical superiority the allies possessed over Napoleon, they always feared to encounter him face to face and risk the fate of the war on a decisive battle. They wished to manœuvre and force him back on Paris, bringing up successively, all the allied armies to overwhelm him beneath a crushing mass of enemies, as they had done at Leipsic. There were on the right of the allies, forces left to blockade the fortresses. There were, as we have said, the D'York corps left before Metz, the Langeron before Mayence, that of Kleist before Erfurt. These corps replaced by others, and ready to advance to the Marne, comprised that of D'York, which numbered 18,000 men; that of Langeron 8000, (only the half of this corps was disposable;) that of Kleist 10,000, that is to say, about 36,000 men, without reckoning Saint Priest's corps, and divers detachments of Bernadotte's which were all at this moment falling back toward Belgium. It was not possible to leave the corps of D'York, Langeron, and Kleist isolated on the Marne, within range of Napoleon, instead of directing their services to the common object. It was agreed that Blücher

should join these with more than 20,000 men still under his command, which would raise to about 60,000 the ancient army of Silesia, and give it an independent position. Blücher was to manœuvre at the head of this army on the Marne, and, driving back Macdonald on Châlons, Meaux, and Paris, he would find himself in the rear of Napoleon, who would be consequently obliged to fall back. Then Prince Schwarzenberg, who would have at least 180,000 men after the departure of Blücher, should follow Napoleon step by step in his retreat. If Napoleon turned on Prince de Schwarzenberg, Blücher would take advantage of the movement, to make a fresh step forward, and thus advancing, the one along the Seine, the other along the Marne, they would finish as these rivers did, by meeting at Paris, where they would overwhelm Napoleon under the mass of the European armies assembled round the capital of France. In the mean while, they were so strong, even apart, that if Napoleon wished to fall on one of the two allied armies, either was sufficiently strong to make head against him. Blücher with 60,000 men thought he had nothing to fear. Prince Schwarzenberg, much less presumptuous, thought he could resist him with 130,000 men. Besides, at the distance they then were from Paris, the Seine and the Marne were sufficiently close to allow them to help one another, particularly as they had a large number of cavalry. It was agreed, in fact, that Prince Wittgenstein should take up a position on the Aube, where he would form a line of connection by means of the 6000 Cossacks of General Sesiavin, on one side with Blücher, who was to march along the Marne, and on the other with Prince Schwarzenberg, who was to march along the Seine. With such precautions, they did not apprehend any misfortune, nor especially any of the accidents which might be expected when they had to do with the inventive genius of Napoleon. The allies were perfectly contented with the apparent advantages of their position, and Blücher, who saw in the adopted combination his own independence, with the chance of arriving first at Paris, willingly consented to the arrangement, as did Schwarzenberg, who expected to gain thereby a deliverance from the most troublesome and the most imperious of his collaborators.

In consequence of these arrangements Blücher advanced on the 3d from Roinay to Saint-Ouen, on the 4th from Saint-Ouen to Fère-Champenoise, and finding D'York's corps already engaged with Marshal Macdonald near Châlons, he made every effort to get in advance of the marshal, and by this means force him to retire on Epervain and Château-Thierry. Macdonald after his long retreat from Cologne to Châlons had only 5000 foot and 2000 horse. He was at Château-Thierry the 8th of February, followed by D'York's corps along the Marne, and threatened in flank by Blücher, who, following the route of Fère-Champenoise and of Montmirail, hoped to get in advance of him at Meaux. Paris was thus left exposed to the enemy, and it was this evident danger that threw the inhabitants into the most intense alarm. Prince Schwarzenberg, on his side, after having carefully felt his way before Napoleon, whose slightest movement he feared,

was advancing slowly on Troyes, having with his formidable adversary rear-guard engagements, that were becoming every day more sharp. Suddenly, he conceived doubts and uneasiness. He had just learned that French troops had appeared at a distance on his left, that is to say, on the Yonne, at Sens, at Joigny and at Auxerre,—they were the troops of Pajol. Rumours had also reached him from more distant points. He had learned that a French army was being formed at Lyons under Marshal Augereau, that this army had assumed the offensive against Bubna, that the troops from Spain were seen coming *en poste*, that the heads of the columns were already near Orleans. He immediately asked himself whether Napoleon did not meditate some movement on his left flank beyond the Seine and the Yonne, and whether the Lyons army, the troops that were seen on the Yonne, and those that were coming from Spain, were not troops prepared for this dangerous movement. A prey to anxiety, he advanced a little toward the left, whilst Blücher advanced a little to the right, a movement that sensibly increased the space that separated them. Lastly, Prince Schwarzenberg brought Wittgenstein from the right bank of the Aube to the left, that is to say, from Arcis to Troyes: he left De Wrede before Troyes, with a reserve in the rear, he sent Giulay to Villeneuve-l'Archevêque, and Colloredo to Sens, flattering himself that by these precautions he protected his left flank. Some Cossacks had been left with the object of forming a connection between the two armies, but the intervening space was now much increased. This experienced general thinking that he was defending himself from one danger, was exposing himself, as we shall soon see, to another much more serious, for in war it is not one danger we must keep in view, but every; it is not one side of our position, it is the entire we ought to embrace with a wide-seeing, prompt, and steady glance.

On the 6th and 7th of February, Napoleon, on the watch, like a tiger ready to spring upon his prey, kept an eye on his opponents with an ever-increasing joy, the last he was destined to experience. He had long hesitated between two courses. One moment he wished to throw himself on Colloredo and Giulay who had imprudently ventured between the Seine and the Yonne, then he thought of advancing along the Marne and attacking Blücher, but on the 7th he hesitated no longer. The importance of the results to be obtained by placing himself between Schwarzenberg and Blücher, and the necessity of aiding Macdonald and Paris as quickly as possible, decided him to advance along the Marne, and he commenced his movement against Blücher with unspeakable satisfaction. He had, by extraordinary exertion, from the 4th to the 7th of February, obtained some battalions from the dépôts in Paris. He had with these resources somewhat recruited Marmont and Victor's corps as well as the divisions of Generals Gérard and Hamelinaye, and by the aid of detachments arrived from Versailles he had somewhat reinforced his cavalry. Lastly, he ordered the first division that had arrived from Spain to march on Provins. On the 8th he had ordered Marmont to advance from Arcis

on Nogent, and had repaired thither himself from Troyes, covering his movements with strong rear-guards, in order to hide his march from the enemy. Arrived at Nogent, he commenced to execute his design. Marmont, whose mind was active enough, had also conceived this same design, but in a confused manner, for he had already regarded the execution as impossible, when Napoleon, without troubling himself about what was passing in his giddy head, ordered him on the 7th to set out from Nogent with a rear-guard of cavalry and infantry and to advance on Sézanne, a place provided by the emperor's orders with abundant resources. As soon as Marmont should have seen his way clearly, he was to be followed by his entire corps. On the 8th Napoleon despatched Ney with a division of the Young Guard and the cavalry of Lefebvre-Desnoettes along this same route of Sézanne. He prepared to set out himself on the 8th with Mortier and the Old Guard. These three corps amounted to about 30,000 men.

However, whilst the troops were advancing along the Marne, Paris ought not to be left undefended on the Seine side. Napoleon left on the Seine Marshal Victor, with the 2d corps; the Generals Gérard and Hamelinaye, with their divisions of reserve; and behind them, at Provins, Marshal Oudinot, with the division of the Young Rothemburg Guard and troops drawn from the army of Spain. Victor was charged to defend the Seine from Nogent to Bray, and Oudinot was to come to his assistance at the first sound of his cannon. Pajol, with the battalions that had arrived from Bordeaux, with the national guards and his cavalry, were to keep watch over Montereau and the bridges of the Yonne as far as Auxerre. Lastly, the two divisions of the Young Guard, whose organization was now completed at Paris, had orders to take up a position between Provins and Fontainebleau. The total of these troops did not amount to less than 50,000 men, and those drawn up behind the Seine in the bend which this river forms from Nogent to Fontainebleau, would give Napoleon time to return and do against Schwarzenberg what he should have accomplished against Blücher. These plans were at the least as plausible as those of the adverse generals. It remains to be seen which corresponded best with the distances, time, and actual circumstances of the war. Napoleon set out on the 9th with his Old Guard to pass from the Seine to the Marne, ordering that his absence should be kept a profound secret. Full of hope, he wrote a few words to M. de Caulaincourt to raise his courage, and to induce him to use less freely the *carte blanche* that he had given him, without, however, lessening his powers. In fact, if the emperor succeeded, the conditions of the peace would be very different. Consequently, in setting off on this expedition, he carried with him the fortunes of France and his own!

Whilst the emperor was marching toward Nogent, our unfortunate plenipotentiary suffered at Châtillon the greatest vexations that a honest man and a good citizen can experience, and was, at the same time, subjected to the most humiliating treatment.

The diplomatists of the coalition had arrived

at Châtillon on the 3d and 4th of February. They did not delay to visit M. de Caulaincourt, testifying the highest respect, which, they wished to be understood, was accorded to his personal character. It was agreed that the five should show their credentials, and that the negotiations should commence within a few days. Meanwhile, M. de Caulaincourt endeavoured at the dinners and soirées where they met, to obtain some information, but though polite, he found the members of the congress impenetrable. The only one among them to whom he could have opened his mind, in virtue of the secret communications of M. de Metternich, was M. de Stadion, the Austrian minister, but he was a personal enemy of Francis; the malevolent representative of a friendly court. Next to him, there was M. de Floret, lower in rank, but more friendly; but he spoke little, sighed often, and let it be understood that the battle of Rothière was a great error, for it deeply affected the position of affairs. As to the conditions of peace, though they could not be much longer concealed from us, M. de Floret said no more on the subject than the others. M. de Rasoumofski, formerly the interpreter of Russian passions at Vienna, was almost impertinent about every thing that did not personally touch M. de Caulaincourt. M. de Humboldt made no manifestation of his sentiments: still it was easy to see the Prussian in him, but, it must be admitted, in a mollified form. The most friendly of all the ministers were the English, especially Lord Aberdeen, a perfect model of the representative of a free state, by the simplicity of his manners and the mild gravity of his demeanour. Lord Castlereagh, who was not to take any part in the conferences, but was come to direct them, like a master who gives orders without making his appearance, had astonished M. de Caulaincourt by his pacific assurances and protestations of sincerity. He insisted so strongly and frequently on the fixed resolution of treating with Napoleon, that it was impossible to avoid perceiving the general policy of the English, which professes to make war for interests purely national, and not in support of any dynasty. And so, Lord Castlereagh incessantly repeated that the plenipotentiaries could come to terms immediately, and, if they wished, an interview of one hour would be sufficient for the purpose. But on what bases were they to come to terms? On this point not one would consent to anticipate by a single day, the solemn declaration of the conditions of peace. "They must be very harsh," thought M. de Caulaincourt, "since they dare not produce them, and they no doubt wish to promulgate them as a European law, to which no contradiction is to be offered." Every time the French plenipotentiary endeavoured to gain any confidential information from a plenipotentiary, if by a chance that seldom occurred, he found himself alone with one, the latter broke off the conversation. If, in the society of several, he addressed one, the person addressed raised his voice, that no one might suspect him of having any secret intelligence with France. It was evident that all feared this ideal and formidable being called "the coalition," and that none would,

at any price, offend it. To say to the representative of France, or hear from him, any thing that was not common to all, would have appeared an infidelity of which no person would dare to render himself guilty. Lord Castlereagh alone acting like a man, who was above all suspicion, saw and heard a few words in private from M. de Caulaincourt in their various interviews, but it was only to repeat this fastidious declaration, that the allies wished for peace, that it might be concluded in an hour, if the plenipotentiaries could only agree. Agree on what? Here was the everlasting question, to which no reply was given.

M. de Caulaincourt waited thus four mortal days without obtaining any explanation; he spent his time divining what was not expressed, and the result was repeated solicitations to the emperor for fresh instructions. On the 5th of February, the plenipotentiaries produced their credentials, declaring that the representatives of the four principal Powers, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and England, would negotiate for the different courts of Europe, great and small, with which France was at war. This was a convenient mode of proceeding, but one that revealed the common yoke that weighed so heavily on all the members of the coalition. The representative of England announced, at the same time, that the question of maritime rights was not to be made a subject of negotiation, as it was a question that Great Britain would not submit to the discussion of any one, not even of her allies, because it was a question that did not depend on the fleeting resolution of man. The British representative would have willingly added that it was a dogma, about which no compromise could be made.

We were not in a position to offer any opposition, for we had at that moment things more important than maritime rights to defend. However, M. de Caulaincourt, for the honour of truth, made some observations, which were listened to in glacial silence, and obtained no reply. M. de Caulaincourt did not insist, and other business was proceeded with. It was agreed that during the sitting of this congress, every proposition should be made in writing, and replied to in the same manner, and if these propositions suggested any verbal observations, a protocol, kept with the greatest exactness, should conserve these observations. This was a new precaution to prevent distrust among the allies. M. de Caulaincourt, offering no opposition to these formalities, begged that the plenipotentiaries would proceed to essentials, and declare the conditions of peace. But they would not, either that day or the following, open this grave subject, under pretext that they were not yet ready. At length, on the 7th, after causing M. de Caulaincourt these long delays, one of the plenipotentiaries, acting in the name of all, read, in a solemn and peremptory tone, the following declaration:—

France was, as a first and most important condition, to retire within the limits of 1790, and never pretend to any authority over territories situate beyond these limits, and, moreover, she was not to interfere in the allotment that should be made of these countries, so that not only would she be deprived of Holland, Westphalia, and Italy, which was natural

enough, but she should forego her privilege as a first-rate Power, to give an opinion on what was to become of these vast countries, and the allies wished to act in this manner touching the kingdoms beyond the Rhine and the Alps, as well as for those that were on this side, so that in giving up Belgium and the Rhenish provinces, she was not to be consulted on what was to be done with them. Lastly, the French plenipotentiary was required to say "yes," or "no," before the negotiations were carried further. Never had a conquered nation been treated with such insolence, and conquered we were not yet, for at Brienne we had been conquerors, at Rothière 32,000 French had, during an entire day, kept in check 170,000 of the enemy, and the enemy had not been able to surround these 32,000 French, nor overwhelm them, nor cut off their retreat.

All present were so impressed with the enormity of these propositions that no person seemed willing to make a comment on them, those most hostile to France fearing to weaken them by any commentary, the more moderate not wishing to undertake the task of justifying them. A profound silence succeeded this communication. M. de Caulaincourt, who could with difficulty control his emotion, declared that he had many observations to make, and demanded a hearing. After some hesitation, the sitting was adjourned to the evening of the same day, in order to hear M. de Caulaincourt.

Observations on this extraordinary communication came thronging to his mind. In the first place, how could these propositions be reconciled with those of Frankfurt, propositions that could not be denied, since to the recognised conversation of M. de St. Aignan there had been added a written note, which recapitulated them; since M. de Metternich, on receipt of M. de Bassano's evasive reply, had insisted on obtaining an explicit acceptance of the propositions? This acceptance having been sent, the authors of the Frankfurt propositions were bound by their own act, and how was it possible that they could now make propositions so diametrically opposite? And still further, in considering these things with reference to the balance of power in Europe, how could the allies, after having declared when they set foot on the soil of France, that they did not seek to contest her justly acquired greatness, how could they think of restricting her to the frontiers of the time of Louis XV., when since that period three of the Continental Powers had dismembered Poland, when since 1790 all the Continental Powers had made considerable acquisitions, which completely changed the proportions of the different States? If, in order to secure the peace of Europe, there had been a general return to the limits of 1790, was it not just that each State should restore what it had since acquired? that Austria should not think of retaining Venice; that Prussia and Austria should not keep what they had filched from the small German States, and especially from the ecclesiastical princes; that Prussia, Austria, and Russia should restore the portions of Poland they had possessed themselves of at the last partition? Was it not, in fact, just that England should restore the Ionian Isles, Malta, the Cape the Mauri-

tins, &c. &c.? To make France alone shrink back within her ancient limits, would be to destroy in Europe, to the general detriment, the necessary balance of power, and if, as experience has since proved, France might remain great, and very great, even after the loss of some provinces, she would owe it to the energy and intellectual power of her people, that is to say, to her moral grandeur, of which her enemies could not deprive her, though they might of her material greatness. Certainly there was nothing which conquerors might not assume the right to do, and this argument would cut short all discussion, but in such a case it would have been better not to utter those insidious words of which the enemy made use on crossing the Rhine, and to avow that force and not justice was to serve as a rule of conduct to the allied Powers. France would, in that case, have known what she had to expect from her invaders. But this was not all. How could the allies demand immense sacrifices *en bloc* without entering into details, without determining the more or the less which was an important point in the case? for in the Low Countries, in the Rhenish provinces, along the Swiss and Alpine frontiers, there remained many questions, that according to the sense in which they were solved, would afford various results. And these portions of territory about to be given up, was it possible to abandon them without knowing to whom they would be ceded? To give them up, for example, to a great or a little Power, to yield a territory on the left of the Rhine to a little State like Hesse, or to a large State like Prussia, would constitute an important difference. To refuse an explanation on any of these points was an unjustifiable proceeding, scarcely permissible with an enemy on whose throat the adversary's foot was already planted, and France, if unfortunately she was one day to find herself at the feet of her enemies, was not yet in that position. And if her representative submitted to all or part of these sacrifices, it could only be from a desire to put an immediate termination to a cruel war, to avoid a battle whose result would be perhaps decisive of the safety or total defeat of France; in short, to save Paris; but would it be possible to make these mournful sacrifices, unless M. de Caulaincourt was first assured that the moment he gave his consent, the allies would instantly desist from their adverse proceedings?

These considerations, so natural, so indisputable, M. de Caulaincourt essayed to unfold on the evening of the 7th, and did so, under a feeling of bristled indignation. He was a soldier, and he would have preferred to die fighting side by side with the last soldier of France, against these insulting enemies, than vainly wrestle in a negotiation with men who would neither listen nor reply to him. But he was willing to suffer every thing to profit of an opportunity of making peace, if it occurred, and with the greatest calmness of manner, through which, however, his vexation of spirit was perceptible, he referred to the Frankfort propositions, which had been formally proposed and formally accepted; he objected to the acquisitions that the different Powers had already made or intended to make in Poland, in Germany, in Italy, and, above all, on the seas;

he wished to know especially what was to become of the provinces of which France was to be deprived, and lastly what would be the recompense of the sacrifices to which France might consent; whether, for example, a suspension of hostilities would be the immediate consequence?

The first observations, those that referred to the Frankfort propositions, visibly embarrassed the ministers of the allied Powers. In fact, no reply could be made, and if nations acknowledged any other empire than force, the negotiators would be instantly condemned. M. de Rasoumofski, the haughty Russian that represented the Emperor Alexander, replied that he did not know what was meant. M. de Stadion, who represented the Austrian cabinet, and was the principal and direct author of the Frankfort propositions, asserted that they were not mentioned in his instructions. But Lord Aberdeen, the most sincere and upright person present, who had witnessed the overtures made to M. de St. Aignan, who had discussed the terms of the Frankfort note, how could he deny these facts? So he limited himself to stammering forth some words that proved his embarrassment as an honest man, and then all these diplomatists, opposing to the reasoning of the French minister a sort of general clamour, exclaimed with one voice that these questions were not under discussion, that the Frankfort propositions were not the subject before them, but those of Châtillon, that it was upon these and not upon the others they were called to pronounce in the present sitting, that they were commissioned not to discuss but to present them, and to learn whether they would be accepted or rejected, and in a very decided manner they let it be understood that it was to be either peace or war, war to the death which should follow, that an immediate decision should be come to by replying on the spot either "yes" or "no." M. de Caulaincourt seeing there were no means of forcing an explanation from men who wanted a yes or no, demanded an adjournment of the conference, which was accepted, and then the assembly broke up.

M. de Caulaincourt was alternately plunged in grief, or excited by indignation, for in the propositions that the plenipotentiaries had dared to present to him, the form was as insulting as the substance was disheartening. Certes, Napoleon had abused the rights of a victor, but never to this degree. He had often required a great deal from his enemies, but he had never humiliated them, and when on the morrow of the battle of Austerlitz, Alexander, who was on the point of being taken prisoner with his army, begged forbearance in a note written with pencil, Napoleon replied with a courtesy in which he was not now imitated. In any case, Napoleon was not France, the faults of the one were not the faults of the other, and people who laid such stress on regarding Napoleon as distinct from France ought not to have made the latter suffer for the faults of the former. However this may be, M. de Caulaincourt saw very clearly that to stop the onward march of the allies he would be obliged to pronounce these terrible words of a pure and simple acceptance of the proposed terms; but to bar the entrance of the

enemy into Paris he was ready to use the unlimited powers with which he was furnished. This excellent citizen, devoted to France and the imperial dynasty, committed now the error (perhaps the first with which he could be charged) of thinking more of Napoleon's throne than of his glory. He totally forgot that it would be more glorious for Napoleon to perish than to cede the natural frontiers; that the question involved his honour as well as the true greatness of France, and that however unfortunate she might afterward become, no greater sacrifice could be demanded of her than that actually required; that even under the Bourbons she would be allowed the frontiers of 1790, and that consequently, for Napoleon as for France, it would have been as well to risk every thing; and the noble-minded M. de Caulaincourt, who had been so often in the right when his master was in the wrong, happened on this occasion not to perceive so clearly as the emperor the true position of things. He was, therefore, ready to yield, one condition always understood—an assurance that the enemy would immediately cease hostilities. But to yield every thing demanded, without a certainty of saving Paris and the imperial throne, was, in his eyes, an afflicting humiliation without any compensation. In his despair he had recourse to the only one among the plenipotentiaries in whom the feelings of a man were discernible beneath the frigid reserve of the diplomatist; he tried to learn from him whether the terrible sacrifice demanded by the allies would at least procure a suspension of hostilities. Lord Aberdeen, to whom he applied, taking all possible care, according to agreement, to avoid any private communication with the French representative, gave him to understand, however, that a suspension of hostilities could only be obtained by an immediate and unreserved acceptance of the proposed terms, and that hostilities should cease only on the ratification of the acceptance of these terms. This was almost asking an unconditional surrender, and that too without being sure of life being spared, because in the interval between the acceptance and ratification, a decisive battle might take place, and the fate of France be decided by arms. It was therefore not worth while to have recourse to political precautions, since they would form no defence against the intervention of force. Thus, though M. de Caulaincourt had a *carte blanche*, he dared not give a formal consent to the acceptance that the allies wished to force from him, and he wrote to head-quarters to communicate his anxieties to Napoleon; but the very next day he received from the Russian plenipotentiary the extraordinary declaration that the sittings of the congress were suspended. The Emperor Alexander, it was said, wished to have some fresh communications with his allies before any further conferences were held. This last intelligence threw M. de Caulaincourt completely into despair. He fancied he now saw the downfall of Napoleon irrevocably determined, and in his profound grief he wrote to M. de Metternich in the strictest confidence, to ask whether in case he made use of his powers and accepted the imposed conditions, he would obtain a suspension of hostilities. This was

perhaps making too open an exhibition of his despair; this despair, it was true, was that of an honest man and an excellent citizen, and the avowal was made to the only one among the diplomatists who was not anxious to abuse the privileges of victory; but there are positions in which men must hide beneath a stern exterior the noblest sentiments of their souls. M. de Caulaincourt had nothing more to do than await a reply from M. de Metternich on one side, from Napoleon on the other.

In the state in which things then were, it was only the cannon placed between the Seine and the Marne, and the silence at Châtillon, which could operate any change in this horrible position of affairs. Napoleon was *en marche*, and in setting out he had sent word to M. de Caulaincourt not to be in a hurry. He was on the eve of playing his last stake, and he did it with the confidence of an experienced gambler, who does not doubt the success of his last calculations.

We have seen in the preceding pages the position of the armies when Blücher quitted Prince Schwarzenberg, whilst Napoleon, keeping an eye upon him, was lying in wait at Nogent-sur-Seine. The Prussian general D'York descended the Marne in pursuit of Marshal Macdonald, who, threatened in the rear by D'York and on the flank by Blücher, had no other resource than to retire rapidly on Meaux. Blücher, marching at equal distance from the Marne and the Aube, through Fère-Champenoise and Montmirail, had sent Sacken forward, and followed with Olsouvieff, Kleist, and Langeron. On the 9th of February Macdonald had retired to Meaux, the position of the enemy being as follows: General D'York with 18,000 men was at Château-Thierry on the Marne; Sacken with 20,000 Russians was on the Montmirail Road; Olsouvieff with 6000 Russians at Champaubert, and lastly, in the rear, at Etoges, Blücher with 10,000 men of Kleist and 8000 of Capsewitz, these latter constituting the remains of Langeron. Here were at least 60,000 men dispersed between Châtillon and Ferté-sous-Jouarre, a part on the Marne and part on the road that separates the Aube from the Marne. If Napoleon, whose clear-visioned glance had foreseen this state of things, could only fall opportunely on forces so dispersed, he might obtain the most unforeseen and important results.

By a most fortunate chance—fortune's last favour—Champaubert, through which Napoleon was to reach the Montmirail Road, was only guarded by 6000 of Olsouvieff's Russians. He found the point nearly unprotected by which he could advance into the midst of his enemies, and found himself in a position to say that he had hit Achilles in the heel. On the 7th of February he ordered Marmont to advance with a portion of his cavalry and his infantry, and march from Nogent on Sézanne, informing him that he was about to follow in person. On the 8th he sent forward in the same direction a division of the Young Guard and a part of the cavalry of the Guard under Marshal Ney. On the 9th he set out himself with the Old Guard under Mortier, and passed the night at Sézanne. The way from Nogent to Champaubert was a cross-road, badly kept, as at that time all the second-rate roads in

France were, and beyond Sézanne it was almost impracticable for heavy wagons. At two leagues from Sézanne, at Saint-Prix, we find the extremity of the Saint-Gond marshes, and in the midst of these marshes we see the little river called Petit-Morin, which runs at the foot of the high grounds crossed by the chaussée that passes from Montmirail to Meaux. The artillery found great difficulty on the 9th in reaching Sézanne. They, moreover, met Marshal Marmont, who had at first exulted in the idea of throwing himself into the midst of Blücher's scattered corps, and who, after having advanced on the 7th as far as Chaptou, had suddenly turned back, declaring the marshes of Saint-Gond impassable, the high grounds covered with enemies, the plan a failure, &c. &c. Napoleon troubled himself little about the marshal's change of opinion,* and ordered the troops to march *en masse* on the little village of Saint-Prix, crossed by the Petit-Morin, and to surmount, at any cost, the local difficulties. He had received reports from various quarters which proved that there were Russians at Montmirail, that there were some in the rear at Etoges, and that there were Prussians on the Marne. Knowing with what enemies he had to do, he was convinced that they would not march so as to present on every side an impenetrable mass. Having, with Marmont, Ney, and Mortier, 30,000 of his best troops, he was certain that by choosing judiciously the point of attack and bringing all his forces to bear upon it, he would soon find himself in the midst of the enemy. But there was one dangerous step to make: it was to cross the marshy lands that lie between Sézanne and Saint-Prix. The local authorities, when called on, promised to assemble all the horses of the country. The peasants, animated by the best sentiments, and, above all, exasperated by the presence of the enemy, thronged in crowds, and at ten in the morning were ready between Sézanne and the Petit-Morin to aid with their hands and horses.

On the 10th of February at the break of day,

the troops set forward. Marmont marched at the head with the cavalry of the 1st corps, and the Ricard and Lagrange divisions, comprising the 6th infantry corps. In approaching the Petit-Morin, the marshy surface yielded considerably, but the peasants, by the aid of hands and horses, extricated the cannon, and all arrived safely at the bridge of Saint-Prix. Some of Olsouvieff's sharpshooters were posted along the borders of the Petit-Morin; the French dispersed them and crossed the bridge. The cavalry of the 1st corps advanced in full trot. Having passed the Petit-Morin, they entered a valley at the bottom of which lies the village of Baye. On ascending the opposite side of this valley, we find a kind of plateau, in the midst of which stands Champaubert. Olsouvieff, provided with abundant artillery, had placed on the border of the plateau twenty-four pieces of cannon that commanded the valley through which the French were making their way. The cavalry of the 1st corps dashed forward, in spite of Olsouvieff's cannonade, rushed on the village of Baye, followed by Ricard's cavalry. Horse and foot entered the village *pêle-mêle*, and ascended the heights close in the rear of the Russians. There was, a little to the left, another village, called Bannai, and here the Russians were posted in great strength. The Guard marched thither and expelled them. The French commander could now deploy his forces on the plateau, whose surface is tolerably even, sprinkled here and there with clusters of trees; and now the Montmirail road was discernible; of this it was needful we should take possession. The road ran from our right to our left, from Châlons to Meaux, crossing the village of Champaubert that lay before us. We were nearly a league distance from this important point.

At this moment the French discovered a corps of Russian infantry about 6000 strong, accompanied by a great deal of artillery, but very little cavalry, retiring precipitately, but in tolerable order. General Olsouvieff, who

* We think it our duty to enter here into some details on a historical question, suggested by Marshal Marmont's Memoirs, relative to the affairs of Champaubert, Montmirail, Vanhamps, &c. The marshal, whose intellect was more brilliant than solid, died with the conviction on his mind that he was the author of the brilliant tactics displayed at Montmirail, tactics that procured Napoleon, on the eve of his downfall, five or six of the most glorious days of his existence. We shall see on what the marshal founded his opinion, and on what grounds he relates the circumstance in his Memoirs. He had been staying at Arcis-sur-Aube and at Nogent-sur-Seine from the 2d to the 6th of February, and whilst in these places he perceived the movement of Blücher, and, with natural instinct, he wrote to Napoleon, proposing to attack the Prussian general. On the 7th he received orders to advance on Sézanne, and even with less encouragement than he possessed, he might have believed himself the instigator of this brilliant manoeuvre. This is what he relates in his Memoirs, quoting his own letters and those he has had in reply, and in these details he is perfectly correct. But he does not add two circumstances, one of which he was ignorant of, and the other he had perhaps forgotten, but both of which totally alter the aspect of the case. In the first place, it was not until the 6th that he wrote to Napoleon, whilst the emperor had on the 2d recommended his project to the War Minister, a project that was at the same time his last remaining hope, and depended on an error of the enemy, which Napoleon, with his eagle glance, foresaw before it was committed. From the 2d to the 6th he had arranged every thing according to his own views, without saying any thing on the subject to Marshal Marmont, who, knowing nothing of what Napoleon was thinking and writing, believed himself the sole author of the projected combination. Besides, Marshal Marmont

does not relate how, having arrived at Chaptou, he lost courage, fancied the movement impossible, turned back, and on the 9th wrote Napoleon a letter of four pages, advising him to abandon the project of which, during his remaining life, he believed himself the author. Napoleon, as we have seen, laid little stress on what had alarmed Marmont, because he viewed things as a whole, certain that if there were some thousand men at Champaubert it was not possible that Blücher's 60,000, of whom he had received intelligence at the same time from Vertus, Etoges, Montmirail, and Château-Thierry, could be all at Champaubert: he therefore advanced, convinced that he would reach his destination, and urged besides by the powerful motive that in his situation it was necessary to risk every thing for the success of this grand movement. We shall now see who was right, he or his lieutenant, and who was really the author of the admirable operation in question. We have already furnished many proofs of the difficulty of arriving at historical truth, and the fact we are now discussing is a fresh example. Yet Marshal Marmont was an intelligent man, an eye-witness, and in a position to say, "I was there." This is why Napoleon in one of his letters says with as much wit as penetration, that his officers knew what he did on the field of battle as correctly as the strollers in the Tuileries knew what he wrote in his cabinet, which implies that he alone, embracing in his glance the entirety of the operations, knew the motive of each. And for this reason, it is in his orders and his correspondence that we must seek this secret, and not in the thousand recitals of eye-witnesses, which have undoubtedly a legendary value, but restricted, touching only the material fact operated before their eyes, and rarely extending to the true significance of the fact.

commanded this corps, had just learned that Napoleon was advancing at the head of considerable forces; he perceived his danger to be extreme and became alarmed.

Napoleon had hastened to Marmont, whose infantry was advancing flanked by the 1st cavalry corps. The important point was to reach the Montmirail road as soon as possible, and expel the enemy, who occupied it. In any case, the movement was of great importance, for if Blücher had already got in advance of our left, in the direction of Meaux, we could cut him off from Châlons and his line of retreat; if he had remained in the rear of our right we should cut him off from any of his lieutenants who might have got in advance of him; and we should thus advance into the midst of the army of Silesia, with an almost certainty of destroying it piecemeal. When Napoleon arrived, Marmont had just sent forward the 1st corps of infantry on the right; Napoleon despatched in the same direction, General Girardin, with the two squadrons he had brought with him, to disperse some groups that were retiring along the Châlons road. The alarm of the enemy redoubled at this aspect, and they retired precipitately. Marmont, with his infantry, pushed them briskly on Champaubert, and General Doumerc with the cuirassiers charged them in the plain on the right. The Russians, completely routed, threw themselves in disorder into Champaubert. Marmont entered the village at the head of Ricard's infantry, with fixed bayonets, whilst the cuirassiers of Doumerc, turning to the right, cut off all communication with Châlons. Olsouvieff, driven out of Champaubert by our infantry, and flung on our left by the cuirassiers, was at the same time separated from Blücher, who had remained behind at Etoges, and thrown back on Montmirail, where there was no other resource than to take refuge with Sacken, who was at a great distance, and might already have sought shelter behind the Marne. In this embarrassment, Olsouvieff had retired near a lake, surrounded with trees: this place was called "the Desert." Ricard debouching direct from Champaubert, and Doumerc advancing from the right to the left, fell upon him. In an instant his infantry gave way and were partly cut in pieces by the cuirassiers, partly made prisoners. 1500 killed or wounded, nearly 8000 prisoners, among whom were General Olsouvieff and his staff, together with twenty pieces of cannon, were the trophies of this glorious day. This was fortune's first favour since the commencement of the campaign, and it was a great one, less from the immediate result obtained than from the ulterior results that might be hoped. In fact, according to the report of prisoners interrogated by Napoleon himself, it was ascertained that Blücher was in the rear, that is to say, at Etoges; that Sacken was in front, in the direction of Montmirail, that D'York was higher up toward the Marne; and that consequently the French were now in the midst of the army of Silesia, that in the succeeding days a great quantity of booty would be obtained, and perhaps the aspect of affairs totally changed.

And now Napoleon experienced an emotion of deep-seated joy. He had felt nothing like

it for a long time. After having doubted of every thing, he who during so many years had never doubted any thing, Napoleon's faith in his good fortune revived, and he began to think himself nearly re-established on the pinnacle of his greatness. Supping at Champaubert in a village inn, with his marshals, he spoke of the vicissitudes of fortune with that cheerful philosophy we all experience when evil days give place to good, and in a rare outburst of confidence he exclaimed, "If tomorrow I should be as fortunate as I have been to-day, within fifteen days I shall drive the enemy back upon the Rhine, and from the Rhine to the Vistula there is but a step." This was his last transport of joy, which we must not grudge him, and we would share it with him were the dénouement of this great drama not so well known to the present generation.

The mode of proceeding on the following day, which might have suggested some doubts to another, was quite clear to Napoleon. Fallen like a thunderbolt in the midst of the enemy's columns, he might have hesitated as to which he should first attack, that of Blücher on the right, or that of Sacken on the left. If he advanced immediately toward the right, Blücher had the means of escape by falling back on Châlons, whilst that by marching to his left he was certain of reaching Sacken, who would be caught between Champaubert and Paris, and moreover, in overwhelming Sacken, he would draw Blücher toward him, for the Prussian general would not certainly allow his lieutenants to be overpowered without hastening to their assistance. Taking in, with his ordinary quickness of perception, every aspect of his position, Napoleon, on the morning of the 11th, advanced without any hesitation to the left, followed the Montmirail road, and left on his right, in front of Champaubert, Marshal Marmont, with the Lagrange division and 1st cavalry, to restrain Blücher, whilst he should engage Sacken and D'York, whom he might meet apart or combined.

Napoleon arrived about ten in the morning at Montmirail, at the head of his column, amounting to nearly 24,000 men, with Ney, Mortier, the cavalry of the Guard, and the Ricard division. He crossed Montmirail, and debouched on the high-road, where he took up his position opposite the Russian troops, who were hurrying forward. It was Sacken turning on us with his accustomed impetuosity. What had taken place among the allies is fully descriptive of the confusion and worthlessness of their counsels.

Blücher, as we have seen, had advanced along the Marne to surround Maedonald, whom the Generals D'York and Sacken were briskly pursuing, the one on the right bank of this river, the other along the left, after which, the army of Silesia, Maedonald being defeated, was to advance on Paris, the object of the ardent longings of the allies. Meanwhile, Schwarzenberg was to advance toward the capital, along the course of the Seine, and as we have already said, he had inclined a little toward the Yonne, and so increased the space that separated him from Blücher. Fearing that Blücher might reach Paris before him, he had begged him, at the earnest entreaty of the

Emperor Alexander, to stop outside the walls of Paris, and await the allied sovereigns there. Surely such presumption and inconsistency deserved chastisement.

Blücher had received these orders at the same moment that he learned the arrival of Napoleon at Sézanne, and he did not know what to do, for impetuosity is not clearness of perception, especially when one is called on to choose between two courses equally perilous. General Gneisenau was of one opinion, General Muffling of another. They had tried to induce Sacken to come up, passing through the French columns; an order which offered no special means of safety, was, to fall back on Montmirail, or to take refuge behind the Marne with General D'York, should the danger be so great as was said. If, on the contrary, they had been alarmed without cause, Sacken was authorized to set out in pursuit, passing through Ferté-sous-Jouarre, toward Paris. On receiving intelligence of the sudden appearance of Napoleon, Sacken, instead of retiring behind the Marne, retraced his steps, in order to have the honour of fighting the Emperor of the French, and had invited General D'York to cross the Marne at Château-Thierry, and advance along the Montmirail route to witness or assist at his triumph. General D'York had only accepted this invitation in part, and had advanced a short way toward Montmirail, but always supporting his rear on Château-Thierry.

Napoleon having debouched by the Montmirail route, saw Sacken, who was returning from Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and perceived at a distance on his right, troops that were coming from the banks of the Marne by the Château-Thierry route, but who did not appear in a hurry to take part in this grave business. These were General D'York's troops. The first operation to be executed was to bar Sacken's way and get rid of him, and afterward attack the other comer, who was discernible in the direction of Château-Thierry. The French were still on the plateau they had ascended the previous evening in taking possession of Champaubert, and in advancing on Montmirail they had on their left the declivity of this plateau, whose foot was bathed by the Petit-Morin. About half-way down this declivity the little village of Marchais is situate. Napoleon placed Ricard's division here to oppose Sacken on this side, whilst that on the high-road he had deployed his artillery and posted his cavalry *en masse*. In this attitude, the Ricard infantry defending at Marchais the extremity of the plateau, the cavalry and artillery intercepting the high-road, Napoleon could wait the junction of Ney and Mortier, who had remained behind.

Sacken having arrived with his 20,000 men, and seeing the high-road occupied, perceived that it would not be so easy as he had at first thought to overthrow Napoleon in order to join Blücher. He now only thought of cutting his way through the enemy. The high-road appeared to be blocked up by a compact mass of cavalry. On his right and on our left, he saw along the woody declivities that slope toward Petit-Morin, a possible outlet, of which he could make himself master, by seizing the little village of Marchais. He directed a

strong column of infantry toward this village, whilst he was endeavouring to take possession of small clusters of houses and farms also situate on the side of the high-road, and called "l'Épine-aux-Bois," and "Haute-Épine." A brisk engagement took place at the village of Marchais, between the column of infantry sent by Sacken and the Ricard division. The latter made a vigorous resistance, lost and retook the village, and finished by keeping possession, whilst the mass of our cavalry posted on the high-road, protected our numerous artillery, and was in return protected by them.

It was now two o'clock in the afternoon. The roads were frightfully bad, and the Guard had found great difficulty in traversing them. The first division of the Old Guard, under Friant, having at length reached the plateau, Napoleon prepared to deal the enemy a mortal blow. Sacken had strongly occupied l'Épine-aux-Bois, situate like the village of Marchais on the flank of the high-road, but a little more forward in relation to us. This position seemed difficult to carry without great loss of life, but once carried, every thing was decided, for the enemy's troops that had advanced on our left, between Marchais and the Petit-Morin, would inevitably be made prisoners, and Sacken had no other resource than to sacrifice them, and take refuge with the *débris* of his corps, near General D'York on the Marne. Napoleon, in order to render the attack on l'Épine-aux-Bois less bloody, made a feint of yielding the position near Marchais, in the intention of drawing Sacken thither, and thus inducing him to withdraw some of his troops from l'Épine-aux-Bois. At the same time he put his cavalry in movement, which had hitherto remained motionless on the high-road. These orders, given with vigorous precision, were executed in the same manner.

At a signal from Napoleon, Ricard made a feint of falling back and abandoning Marchais, whilst Nansouty advanced with the cavalry of the Guard. At this sight Sacken hastened to profit of the advantage he fancied he had obtained, and with a portion of his centre, quitted l'Épine-aux-Bois, to seize Marchais, leaving on the high-road only a detachment, for the purpose of keeping up a communication with General D'York. Seizing the opportunity, Napoleon despatched Friant with the Old Guard to l'Épine-aux-Bois. These old soldiers, who combined the fire with the self-possession of tried courage, advanced without firing a shot, crossed a little ravine that separated them from l'Épine-aux-Bois, and then advanced with fixed bayonets. In the twinkling of an eye they made themselves masters of the position, and cut down all who opposed them. During the performance of this vigorous act, Nansouty, after having advanced along the high-road, turned suddenly to the left to oppose the troops of Sacken, who had overpassed l'Épine-aux-Bois, made a desperate charge upon them, and scattered some in the direction of the Petit-Morin, and obliged the others to fall back. The latter, obliged to retreat, still fighting, left in serious danger the troops that were engaged on our left, between Marchais and the Petit-Morin. Napoleon then

ordered Bertrand, with two battalions of the Young Guard, to advance on the village of Marchais to assist Ricard to retake the place. These battalions, rallying Ricard's infantry, entered Marchais with fixed bayonets, whilst the cavalry of the Guard, under General Guyot, pursued and sabred the fugitives. In consequence of these combined movements, all who had ventured between the high-road and the Petit-Morin, were either made prisoners or killed, even on the flank of the plateau. In the space of a few minutes, from four to five thousand prisoners were made, thirty pieces of cannon were taken, and our cavalry left between two and three thousand men dead on the plain. Sacken had no other means of safety than a hasty retreat, and, under favour of night, to repass from the left to the right of the high-road (left and right with regard to us) and rejoin General D'York, who had advanced cautiously, but whom Napoleon had held in check near the village of Fontenelle, by sending thither the second division of the Old Guard, under General Mortier.

This day,—the 11th,—named from Montmirail, was still more brilliant than the preceding. Out of 20,000 men, Sacken had lost 8000, either killed, or wounded, or made prisoners, and this glorious triumph had cost us at the utmost only 700 or 800 men; for the old soldiers Napoleon had employed on this occasion knew how to manage so as to inflict much injury on the enemy without sustaining great loss themselves. The succeeding days promised still greater results; for the entire army of Blücher, taken in detail, was about to receive the chastisement due to presumption.

Every thing indicated that Sacken, flying toward the Marne, was about to rejoin the Prussian General D'York, near Château-Thierry, and that consequently it was in that direction the French ought to march. Thus the third part of the army of Silesia was now in its turn isolated, and forced in this state to confront Napoleon. The next day, in fact, the 12th of February, Napoleon set out with the second division of the Old Guard, under Mortier, one division of the Young Guard, under Ney, and all the cavalry, thinking these forces sufficient to overthrow an enemy already in disorder. He left behind, in the direction of Montmirail, the first division of the Old Guard under Friant, another of the Young Guard under Curial, in order, if needful, to succour Marmont, who was left in front of Blücher, and to have forces within reach of the Seine should the necessity arise of hastening thither to stop Schwarzenberg's progress. The excellence of Napoleon's tactics consisted in only doing what was indispensable, in doing it at a proper time, quickly and with energy.

He set out on the 12th of February, and quitted the Montmirail road, which runs parallel to the Marne, to advance in a perpendicular direction on that river. He there found General D'York with about 18,000 Prussians and 12,000 Russians—the remains of Sacken's corps—formed in column on the Château-Thierry route. The greater part of the enemy's infantry was massed behind a stream near the village of Caquerets. A company of the Guard, acting *en tirailleurs* a little below the village, dispersed the enemy's sharp-

shooters, crossed the stream, and forced the Prussians to retreat. The French passed through the village and advanced into the plain, the two infantry divisions and the Guard deployed. Napoleon, who had brought up the cavalry on his right, ordered them to advance in full gallop on the flank of the enemy's infantry and reach Château-Thierry before them. This order was immediately executed. At sight of this, General D'York sent his cavalry to resist ours; but General Nansouty, with the squadrons of the Guards of Honour, and those of the Guard, rushed on the Prussian cavalry, threw them back on Château-Thierry, sabred a part, and captured all the light artillery. Nothing could equal the ardour of our brave horsemen, whose courage was raised to the highest point by a sense of the danger that threatened France and their devotedness to the emperor himself.

During this rapid movement, made by our cavalry in order to reach Château-Thierry before General D'York, we had succeeded in separating from the main body of the enemy a rear-guard of three Prussian and four Russian battalions. General Letort, commanding the Dragoons of the Guard, anxious to surpass, if possible, all that the cavalry had performed for some days past, charged the seven battalions with five or six hundred horses, broke their lines, killed a great number, and took 3000 prisoners, with a great quantity of artillery. Infantry and cavalry then threw themselves, *en masse*, on Châlons. Prince William of Prussia had advanced with his division, to prevent us continuing the pursuit. He was in his turn overthrown, after a loss of 500 men. The French entered Château-Thierry *à la suite* with the enemy, and made many prisoners. The inhabitants, irritated at the conduct of the Prussians, intoxicated at the same time with joy and anger, gave no quarter to D'York's soldiers, now surprised in an isolated position: they killed or led them prisoners to Napoleon. Unfortunately, the enemy had destroyed the bridge of Château-Thierry, which stopped short our pursuit. Napoleon had still one hope. In setting out to execute this succession of movements, he had informed Marshal MacDonald what he was about to do, had ordered him to pause at Meaux, and, in whatever condition his troops might be, to return by the right bank of the Marne, promising that he would find there the finest booty imaginable.

Arrived at Château-Thierry, Napoleon waited with confidence, employing the time in reconstructing the bridge of the Marne, and reckoning that MacDonald, who ought to appear on the other side, would capture thousands of prisoners and a vast quantity of artillery. But the day passed and MacDonald did not appear. This marshal, who was accustomed to regular warfare, in which he excelled, felt irritated against Napoleon, his generals, and his soldiers, because that he had been brought from the banks of the Rhine to the gates of Paris with 6000 men in a state of disorder, and instead of attributing these mischances to circumstances, he found fault with everybody, and, wholly occupied with the state of his troops, instead of making use of them as they were, he had employed his time in reorganising them with the resources he had received from

eaux. He consequently did not appear on the right bank of the Marne at the decisive moment that Napoleon wished to see him.

This disappointment, which somewhat curbed the consequences of Napoleon's grand manoeuvre, could not, however, prevent the great results it had already produced. He had conquered, without losing more than 1000 men, three of Blücher's corps, and there only remained one more to strike—that of Blücher himself—in order to have overthrown in detail the army of Silesia, one of the two that threatened the empire, and this, too, the most formidable, if not in number, at least in energy. He had already captured from 11,000 to 12,000 men, and killed or wounded from 6000 to 7000. Would Blücher, too, take a place among the conquered, Napoleon would have nothing left to desire touching the army of Silesia.

Napoleon, as indefatigable now as in the stormy days of his youth, resolved not to lose a moment in deriving from this series of operations all the advantages that he might still hope. He employed the remainder of the 12th and the greater part of the 13th in repairing the bridge of the Marne, in order to send Marmont, in the absence of MacDonald, toward Soissons in pursuit of D'York and Sacken's corps, and whilst he watched over these arrangements, he kept his eye fixed on Montmirail, where Marmont was placed in advance of Blücher to observe his movements, nor did he forget the Marshals Victor and Oudinot, who were stationed on the Seine, with orders to keep Schwarzenberg in check. On the Montmirail side Blücher had given no signs of life, and Marmont had remained at Etoges without tempting an attack. On the Seine side the situation of things was less peaceful. Prince Schwarzenberg, after having allowed his troops to repose for a short time at Troyes, marched down along the Seine, where he occupied the camp between Méry and Montereau, and tried to force a passage at Nogent-sur-Seine, at Bray, and even at Montereau. Marshals Victor and Oudinot resisted to the utmost of their power with the resources Napoleon had left them, but earnestly requested his return. He very day gave them intelligence of his proceedings, and each succeeding day brought better news; he encouraged them to hold their ground, promising to return to their assistance as soon as he should have finished with Blücher.

Napoleon had thus passed thirty-six hours at Château-Thierry, when, on the night between the 13th and 14th, he received from Marmont a serious but gratifying intelligence that Blücher, who during the three days of the 10th, 11th, and 12th had remained motionless, had at length resumed the offensive, and was marching on Montmirail, probably at the head of considerable forces. Napoleon immediately set out. He had, as we have seen, left at Montmirail, Friant, with the strongest of the 1st Guard, Curial, with a division of the Young Guard, and had ordered the Laval division that was coming from Spain to advance to the same point. A cavalry division, drawn from all the posts, combined at Versailles, had also arrived at Montmirail. Napoleon ordered all these troops to advance from Montmirail to Champ-

aubert, to support Marshal Marmont. He sent thither from Château-Thierry Musnier's infantry division of the Young Guard, and all the cavalry of the Guard under the command of Ney. At the same time he despatched toward Soissons, Mortier with the second division of the Guard, with Colbert's lancers, and the guards of honour of General DeFrance, ordering him to pursue & *outrance* the conquered troops of Generals D'York and Sacken; he then set off on full gallop, in order to reach the place of destination before the troops that he was bringing. He arrived about nine in the morning at Montmirail, and found every thing just as he could have wished, for it seemed that in these latter days fortune could refuse him nothing that could tend to render his triumphs more glorious.

Blücher, after having waited intelligence from D'York and Sacken during the 11th and 12th, flattering himself that they had fallen back safe and sound on the Marne, had at length thought of coming to their assistance, by advancing to Montmirail, with the troops of Capzewitz, the Prussian corps of Kleist, and the remains of Olsouvieff's corps. These troops amounted in all to 18,000 or 20,000 men. Blücher had, besides, sent to Prince Schwarzenberg, begging him to send the Wittgenstein detachment across through Sézanne, confident that with this detachment, and with the troops under his command, he could effect on Napoleon's rear a diversion strong enough to free D'York and Sacken, who would thus be put in a position to remount the Marne, and join him through Epervain and Châlons. This was an irrational mode of reasoning, for in advancing in this way, he might encounter Napoleon, just victorious over Olsouvieff, Sacken, and D'York, and returning with his combined forces to throw himself on the general of the army of Silesia, and conquer the chief after having conquered his lieutenants.

On the morning of the 13th, Blücher had quitted Vertus, ascended the plateau on which Champaubert and Montmirail are situate, and forced Marmont to retreat, who having only 6000 or 6000 men to oppose to the forces of the Prussian general, had retired successively on Champaubert, Fromentières, and Vauchamps. It was from the latter place that Marmont had, on the evening of the 13th, written to Napoleon. On the 14th, expecting the emperor's arrival, he evacuated Vauchamps, and took up a position a little in the rear, on the Montmirail route.

Napoleon having joined Marmont on the 14th, about nine in the morning, offensive operations were instantly resumed. Marshal Marmont, in abandoning Vauchamps, had taken up a position on a woody height, on whose summit he had placed his artillery. Blücher marching with his accustomed confidence, sent the Prussian Ziethen division forward to Montmirail before him. This division had scarcely got outside Vauchamps, when it was received with a terrible discharge of artillery, that caused great loss, and forced the division to return to the village. Immediately after, Marmont ordered the Ricard division to advance on Vauchamps, in order to carry this village, and under favour of the surrounding woods, try to

turn the enemy, on the left, by help of General Grouchy's cavalry, and on the right by Lagrange's infantry division.

Though these movements were executed with extraordinary vigour, they were opposed by great difficulties. The Ricard division having penetrated into Vauchamp, found there the Ziethen division, determined to make a vigorous defence, and was obliged to fall back. The Ricard division returned to the charge, entered Vauchamps a second time, and would have had great difficulty in keeping the place, but for the movements on the two flanks of the village. Grouchy, after having made a *détour* through the woods, poured his troops into Vauchamps on the left, whilst the Lagrange division effected a similar movement on the right, by traversing the wood of Beaumont. Blücher, suspecting from the vigour and simultaneousness of the movements that were being operated around him, that Napoleon himself was present, resolved to fall back. But it was no longer time to do so with impunity. On one hand, Ricard's infantry, making a last effort on Vauchamps, drove out the Ziethen division, and on the other hand, Grouchy, debouching abruptly from the woods, threatened to cut off his retreat. This division, formed into squares, tried at first to make head against our cavalry, but vigorously charged by Grouchy's squadrons, the lines were broken, and part of the men laid down their arms. The rest sought refuge with the main body of the Prussian troops. Our horsemen made about 2000 prisoners, took a dozen pieces of cannon, and several standards. A thousand men, either killed or wounded, were left at Vauchamps and the environs.

But Napoleon hoped to gain still greater advantages over Blücher's troops. He ordered that the Prussian general should be pursued without relaxation, and himself directed the pursuit during half the day. Marmont at the head of the Ricard and Lagrange infantry, supported besides by the Leval Spanish division, marched forward on the high-road that leads from Montmirail to Châlons, through Vauchamps and Champaubert. He had in front the artillery of the Guard, commanded by Drouot, and on his wings, Grouchy's cavalry on one side, and the cavalry of the Guard and of General Saint Germain on the other. It was in this order he pursued Blücher, who was retreating in two compact masses, that of Kleist on the left of the route, that of Capzewitz on the right, with his artillery and baggage on the route itself. The Prussian general had very little cavalry to protect his infantry.

From eleven in the forenoon to three in the afternoon the French kept up the pursuit, pouring bullets and often grape-shot on the enemy. In this way they reached Janvilliers, Fromentières, and Champaubert. The pursuers perceived that two of the enemy's battalions, posted in a wood, had remained behind. They were surrounded and obliged to surrender. At the same time, Grouchy seeing that in order to obtain the mastery over all or part of the two masses of enemies that were advancing along both sides of the route, it would be necessary to forestall their arrival at the entrance of the woods that surround Etoges, conceived the design of dashing through the

woods as fast as his horses could go, in order to precede Blücher. For this purpose he ordered the light artillery to join him as quickly as possible. Whilst he was executing this movement the artillery cannonaded at every pause Blücher's two columns. This kind of warfare continued to the close of the day, when the Prussians were seen suddenly to stop, and their lines immediately bristled with bayonets. Grouchy had, in fact, got in advance of them with a portion of his squadrons, and attacked them on the left, whilst General Saint Germain did the same on the right with the cavalry lately arrived from Versailles. Blücher, placed in the midst of his infantry, did all in his power to infuse his spirit into his troops, and succeeded in bringing them in pretty good order, as far as the entrance of Etoges, but not without experiencing considerable loss. General Grouchy, though deprived of his artillery, which had not been able to follow him, charged Blücher's infantry several times, and penetrated their ranks sword in hand, while General Saint Germain did as much on his side. And here, by the instrumentality of cold steel alone, the French killed some hundred men, and took more than 2000 prisoners, besides several flags and pieces of artillery. On arriving at the border of the woods that lay between them and Etoges, they were obliged to pause.

The French had already taken, killed or wounded, about 7000 of Marshal Blücher's men. But Marmont ambitious still more spoils. He suspected that the Prussian general would pass the night at Etoges, and that his harassed troops would scatter themselves confusedly through the village, or in the neighbouring forest, and he thought that by appearing suddenly in the midst of them during the night, he would throw them into great disorder, and above all, drive them beyond Etoges to the foot of the plateau, which, during so many days, had been the theatre of war. Destined, in all probability, to again defend this position, whilst Napoleon carried his arms elsewhere, Marmont fixed his mind on taking up a position at Etoges itself, whence he could command the route of Vertus. He therefore resolved to make a night-attack on Blücher.

But Marshal Marmont had only a small body of forces at his disposal: for his soldiers were already dispersed in the environs, looking for provisions. Marmont was followed by the Leval division, which Ney asserted was under his command. After a pretty warm discussion between the two marshals, Marmont took a detachment of this division, and, with one of his regiments of marines, dashed into the wood under favour of the darkness, and came suddenly down on Etoges at the moment when the enemy, worn out by fatigue, began to enjoy a few minutes' repose. This unexpected attack was crowned with success. Prussians and Russians, attacked before they could resume the defensive, were thrust out of Etoges, and obliged, in the middle of the night, to fly to Bergeres and Vertus. The French made a large number of prisoners, among whom were the Russian General Orsoff himself, with his staff. The latter part of this day Blücher lost more than 2000 men and a large quantity of artillery.

This day,—the 14th,—named after Vauchamps, cost Blücher from 9000 to 10,000 men, either killed, wounded, or made prisoners. It would not be possible to put a more glorious termination to this admirable train of operations. Napoleon had set out on the 9th of February from Nogent-sur-Seine; he arrived on the 10th at Champaubert, where, on that day, he took or destroyed Olsouievff's corps, and, on the 11th, conquered, at Montmirail, Sacken's troops. On the 12th he beat and drove back on Château-Thierry D'York's troops, employed the 13th in rebuilding the bridge of the Marne, for the purpose of sending Mortier in pursuit of the enemy, and on the 14th returned to Montmirail and attacked Blücher, who had maladroitly thrown himself in his way, as if to furnish him an opportunity of overwhelming the last of the four detachments of the army of Silesia. Thus, almost without fighting a regular battle, Napoleon had, in four quickly-succeeding combats, entirely disorganized the army of Silesia, captured or killed 28,000 out of 60,000 men, carried off an immense quantity of artillery and flags, and severely punished the most presumptuous, the bravest and the most embittered of his adversaries. Surely Napoleon had now reason to be proud of his army and of himself, and of the last scintillations of his wondrous star,—wondrous even amidst calamity.

Napoleon sent on immediately to Paris the 18,000 prisoners he had made, in order that the Parisians might see them with their own eyes, and that, in beholding these trophies,—worthy of the wars of Italy,—their faith in the genius and good fortune of their emperor might again revive.

The Parisians had learned in succession the unlooked-for triumphs of Napoleon, and, excepting some, carried away by party spirit or hatred of the imperial dynasty, had rejoiced at his success. The announcement of columns of prisoners had excited to the highest degree the expectation of the Parisians, who hoped to see them defile on the boulevards within two or three days. But they scarcely dared indulge a sentiment of joy; for, at the same time that they learned the defeat of Blücher and his lieutenants at Champaubert, at Montmirail, at Château-Thierry, and at Vauchamps, they also learned that Schwarzenberg was ready to force the passage of the Seine from Nogent to Montereau, and that Platow's Cossacks had appeared in the forest of Fontainebleau. Unhappy Paris, from whose bosom, during twenty years, fulminating terrors had been launched upon many European capitals: she was now, in her turn, a prey to the most terrible anguish. Victory even was no guarantee against these alarms; for one enemy was no sooner beaten on the Marne than another appeared on the Seine, and, tranquilized as to the state of things at Meaux, she was alarmed by the apprehension of what might occur in the direction of Melun and Fontainebleau. Earnest entreaties had reached Napoleon from Paris, imploring him to return to the Seine. On this account he had abandoned Marmont before the close of the battle-day at Vauchamps, and returned to Montmirail to give new orders and prepare for new combats.

We shall now relate what had taken place in the great army of Prince Schwarzenberg. When Napoleon had quitted the Aube and the Seine for the Marne, the allied sovereigns had repaired to Troyes, and their army going in advance had occupied the course of the Seine from Nogent to Montereau, and had even endeavoured to extend the line to the Yonne, in order to avert the danger of being outflanked on the left. The declared object of the grand army of Bohemia was to march on Paris along the two banks of the Seine, by Fontainebleau and Melun, whilst the army of Silesia, following the course of the Marne, should arrive at Paris by Meaux. The expectation of entering the capital of France, inflamed, at this moment, the imagination of Alexander. Whilst the Emperor Francis lived in a retired manner at Troyes, receiving little society and visiting only M. de Metternich, the Emperor Alexander, ever in a state of feverish activity, passed from one detachment of the army to the other, affecting to direct every thing, and incessantly advising Blücher to await his arrival before entering Paris. The King of Prussia, to please the patriots of his staff, yielded to all the whims of his ally, but with the awkwardness of a sage ill fitted to play this empty and restless part. It is in this state the allies were found by a trustworthy eye-witness, the brave and learned General Reynier, who had been exchanged for General Count de Merveldt, (both had been taken prisoners at Leipsic,) and who, when this change was effected, had passed through Troyes, on his return to Paris. General Reynier was presented to the allied sovereigns, and listened to their observations with extreme attention.* The Emperor Francis conjured him to repeat to his son-in-law the advice he had so often given him,—to yield to the pressure of circumstances, and give up what was demanded of him since he could not retain it. He bade him also reflect on the position of Austria at the actual time, in order to learn that submitting to the harsh necessities of the present was often only a means to secure future advantages. The King of Prussia had, according to his wont, said scarcely any thing; but Alexander had spoken with extraordinary vivacity. He had, in the first place, asked General Reynier when he expected to reach Paris; and the general having replied that he hoped to be there on the 14th or 15th of February, Alexander said, "Very well: Blücher will be there before you. Napoleon has humiliated me, and I will humiliate him; and I am so far from making war on France that, were he killed, I would desist immediately." "It is, then, for the Bourbons that your majesty makes war," said General Reynier. "The Bourbons," rejoined Alexander, "I care not for them. Choose a leader among yourselves, among the illustrious generals

* No sooner had General Reynier arrived at Paris, than he made a faithful report of these conversations, which was immediately sent to Napoleon. This report—one of the most curious of the secret documents of the time—is worthy of entire credit, for General Reynier was incapable of disfiguring the truth; and, besides, his report accords with all that the diplomatic despatches, French and foreign, tell us touching the headquarters of the allied sovereigns.

who have contributed so much to the glory of France, and we are ready to accept him." Alexander, then, entering into the most extraordinary and confidential communications, hinted to General Reynier the project of putting Bernadotte on the throne of France, as Catharine, forty years previously, had placed Poniatowski on the throne of Poland. On hearing this disclosure, General Reynier had greatly disconcerted the czar by expressing the contempt which the military men of France had conceived for the conduct and talents of the new Swedish prince. Alexander, surprised and displeased, dismissed General Reynier, who immediately set out for Paris to offer his services to Napoleon,—an offer highly meritorious in his circumstances; for he had rejected the most flattering offers of Alexander, to remain faithful to France in her misfortunes. General Reynier was Swiss by birth, but French in heart and act.

Wounded pride and the desire of vengeance dictated at this moment every act of the Emperor Alexander. It was under these influences he had suspended the sittings of congress, assuming as a reason for not resuming them that M. de Caulaincourt had not immediately accepted the Châtillon propositions. He displayed in this matter a dogged determination, and wished to prevent all further negotiation. M. de Metternich, aided by Lord Castlereagh, combated this wish of the czar. The Austrian minister persevered in his policy of not carrying too far a struggle which, beyond a certain point, would only tend to give a preponderance to Russia. The English minister, ready to abandon warfare, if Antwerp and Genoa were given up to him, had, in opposing the Emperor Alexander, made use of the letter that M. de Caulaincourt had secretly addressed to M. de Metternich, and in which he asked if, in accepting the proposed bases, he would at least obtain a suspension of arms. Supporting their arguments on this letter, the Austrian and English ministers said that France being ready to yield to the wishes of the allies, there was no motive for carrying hostilities further; that such a course would be only to incur useless risks for a purpose which could not be the avowed object of any of the allied Powers. In fact, the Emperor Francis could not declare to Europe that he was going to make war for the purpose of de-throning his daughter, and the British Cabinet, though public opinion was become greatly modified in England, could not avow to Parliament that the war was being carried on for the purpose of re-establishing the Bourbons. Lord Castlereagh was now in a position to deprive France of Antwerp and Genoa, and should he expose himself to a reverse by outstepping the object of his mission, it would be impossible for him to appear either before the House of Lords or Commons in England. In short, in prolonging hostilities, there was a risk that France, as a nation, might rise against them, for already, in some parts, the peasants were arming, the convoys of the allies were intercepted, stragglers from their army were killed, and this danger seemed likely to increase, and must necessarily add considerably to the difficulties of this envenomed struggle. As neither Austria's troops

nor England's gold could be dispensed with, and as M. de Metternich as well as Lord Castlereagh had displayed remarkable firmness on this occasion, the other allies had consented to the resumption of conference. Accordingly, the plenipotentiaries, who were still at Châtillon, received a copy of preliminaries, whose acceptance would put an instant stop to hostilities; but the form was so humiliating, that an acceptance would be considered equivalent to entering Paris. This was a consolation expressly prepared for the Emperor Alexander. He was satisfied, hoping that Napoleon would not accept these new offers, and, meanwhile, he urged Prince Schwarzenberg to march on Paris, to spare himself the mortification of arriving there after Marshal Blücher, or being stopped by the signing of peace at the moment he should be about to enter the capital.

As a consequence of these considerations, Prince Schwarzenberg had advanced in a direction parallel to the Seine, from Nogent to Montereau. He ordered the Wittgenstein corps and the troops of Marshal de Wrede to advance on Nogent and Bray; the Wurtembergers were to advance on Montereau, and those of Colloredo and Giulay on the Yonne, these latter having orders to cross the river and advance on Fontainebleau. The Russian and Prussian reserves were to remain under Barclay de Tolly, between Troyes and Nogent. Wittgenstein and de Wrede, having presented themselves at Nogent and Bray, were received at Nogent by General Bourmont, whom Marshal Victor had left there with only 1200 men. This general, after a heroic combat, repulsed the enemy with a loss of 1500 men. But at Bray the allies found only the national guard, and forced the passage. Marshal Victor seeing the passage of the Seine forced at Bray, did not dare remain behind at Nogent, and retired on Provins and Nangis. Marshal Oudinot, borne along in this retrograde movement, and having only the Rothenburg division to bring in aid, had followed the retreat of Marshal Victor, and both had taken up a position on the little river Yeres, which crosses the Brie and falls into the Seine near Villeneuve-Saint-Georges. The two marshals, drawn up behind this narrow river, awaited the coming of Napoleon. The brave General Pajol, always on horseback, spite of his gaping wounds, could not keep his position at Montereau, when Bray and Nogent were abandoned; he had joined General Alix, who had just defended Sens with the greatest vigour, and had fallen back from the Yonne on the Loing canal and from the Loing canal on Fontainebleau.

Thus, on the 14th of February, the day that Napoleon completed at Vauchamps the defeat of the army of Silesia, the troops of the army of Bohemia were posted in this manner: the Prince of Wittgenstein was at Provins, the Marshal de Wrede at Nangis, the Wurtembergers at Montereau, the Prince of Colloredo in the forest of Fontainebleau, General Ginkh at Pont-sur-Yonne, the Cossacks in the neighbourhood of Orleans, Maurice de Liechtenstein with the Austrian reserves at Sens, and Barclay de Tolly, with the Russian and Prussian Guards, between Nogent and Bray. Some intelligence of Blücher's defeat had reached

the head-quarters of the allies, but they were not yet aware of the extent of his reverses, and they flattered themselves they could reach Paris by Fontainebleau or Melun.

On learning this melancholy state of things, Napoleon, with his wondrous activity, which knew no limits but the physical strength of his soldiers, immediately left Vauchamps for Montmirail, followed by the Young and Old Guard, and all the cavalry. He left Marshal Marmont the task he had already confided to him, that of holding a position between the Seine and the Marne, from Etoges to Montmirail, to keep a close watch on the *débris* of Blücher's army, and to aid Mortier, who had been sent in pursuit of Sacken and D'York in the direction of Soissons. Then Napoleon made arrangements to advance to the Seine and encounter Prince Schwarzenberg.

A grave question now presented itself to the mind of Napoleon. Would it be well to go straight from Montmirail to Nogent by Sézanne, (the route he had taken before,) reach the Seine by the shortest way, and so fall unexpectedly on Prince Schwarzenberg's flank; or, whether, would it be better, to follow the retrograde movement of the Marshals Victor and Oudinot, who it was supposed had been forced to retire still further since the last intelligence; would it be better to fall back to the banks of the Yères, join the two marshals, and, combined with them, attack Prince Schwarzenberg in front, and drive him back on the Seine that he had crossed? Were it always possible during war, to have timely information of the designs of the enemy, Napoleon might have known that the different corps of the army of Bohemia were dispersed between Provins, Nangis, Montereau, Fontainebleau, and Sens, and then throwing himself into the midst of them with 25,000 men by the road that leads from Sézanne to Nogent, which was the shortest, he would have taken in flank the scattered corps of the enemy, joined with his right, Victor and Oudinot, thrown back in succession, Wittgenstein and de Wrede on the Prince of Wurtemberg, and all three on Colloredo, and destroyed or made prisoners a portion of those that had crossed the Seine.* But Napoleon having employed five days in fighting the army of Silesia, was ignorant of what had occurred in that of Bohemia, and in this ignorance of the actual state of things, was obliged to shape his conduct according to probabilities. Now, the great probability was that the marshals, after having fallen back a considerable distance, would have fallen back still further, that they would have paused behind the little river of Yères, that Schwarzenberg would be close upon them, attacking them with at least

80,000 men, having perhaps already conquered them, and in this case, by advancing directly on Nogent or Provins with only 25,000 men, Napoleon would incur the risk of meeting Schwarzenberg returning with 80,000, which would be a serious matter, before he should be joined by the two marshals. Besides, all the cross-roads from Montmirail to Nogent and from Montmirail to Provins were detestable, and might be impassable for his troops. For this reason, which was sufficiently strong, and from prudential motives, the safest course, instead of advancing direct to the Seine, was to fall back on Yères, as the marshals themselves had done, and join them by the paved route from Montmirail to Meaux, from Meaux to Fontenay and Guignes, and this combination would raise his army to 60,000 men, which would be sufficient to drive back Prince Schwarzenberg on the Seine. Instead of taking the Austrian general in flank, Napoleon would attack him in front, but it might be that instead of finding his army in one solid mass, the French would find them dispersed in different corps, and it would not then be impossible to treat them as they had treated Blücher.

This was the only plan concordant with good sense, and Napoleon, who in his military projects always combined prudence with boldness, did not hesitate to adopt it. He, the same evening, ordered his Guard, both Young and Old, infantry and cavalry, the Leval Spanish division, and the cavalry of General Saint-Germain, to make the next day—the 15th—a forced march as far as Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and he set out himself for Meaux, in order to superintend the movements of his troops.

Having arrived on the afternoon of the 15th, at Meaux, he there resolved upon his final arrangements. It was on Meaux that General Macdonald had fallen back after the retreat that had so much afflicted him, and it was at Meaux that he had tried to reorganize his *corps d'armée*. This corps, with the *débris* he had brought back, with some battalions, drawn from the dépôts in Paris, and with all the national guards that could be collected, were distributed into three divisions, amounting in all to about 12,000 men. Napoleon despatched them immediately by the route that leads from Meaux to Fontenay, to the Yères, this little stream of water, behind which all our forces were concentrated. He ordered Marshals Victor and Oudinot, who had retired to this spot, to keep their position, and informed them that he would join them next day,—the 16th. The noble cavalry brought from Spain had already marched beyond Paris, to the number of 4000. They were the finest troops in the world. Napoleon posted them at Guignes, where he

* I must here reply to the ill-founded reproach that General Koch, in his excellent and conscientious work on the campaign of 1814, addresses to Napoleon, for not having marched directly from Montmirail to Provins, instead of falling back on Meaux. General Koch, always clear-sighted and impartial, is the only writer of the period that deserves entire confidence: however, even he is sometimes mistaken, especially as he had not access to the emperor's correspondence, by which reason he could not know or appreciate the motives that dictated the acts he criticizes. It is, as we have already frequently repeated, with extreme reserve that any one should pronounce on Napoleon's conduct, and we may safely say, that when he errs, which seldom happens, in his military combinations, he

has been excited by his political feelings, or has been left in a forced ignorance of the enemy's movements. But in any other case, we may affirm with confidence, that his movements are calculated with incomparable depth and foresight. It is necessary then, before giving an opinion, that we should read all that remains of his written intentions, and be convinced that when we cannot discover his motives in the two causes we have just named, that they can be found in the facts themselves, if studied with greater attention. In short, it rarely happens that in re-perusing these facts we do not find fresh cause to admire his genius, even whilst we deplore the unlicensed ambition that led to his ruin.

supposed the principal battle of the campaign would take place. The two divisions of the Young Guard, organized at Paris, had just left, under Generals Charpentier and Boyer, to advance along the left bank of the Seine, and occupy the Fontainebleau route. Napoleon might certainly have brought them up on the right bank of the Seine, and combined all his resources in the neighbourhood of Guignes, but it would be risking too much to leave Paris unprotected along the left bank, as the allies had sent a considerable number of their forces in that direction. He had consequently sent these two divisions forward on the Essonne, recommending them to fight to the last extremity, and so endeavour to protect Paris on the left bank of the Seine, whilst he would endeavour to free the capital on the right bank by a decisive battle. Lastly he gave directions necessary to make him sole master of the passages of the rivers, along which he was manoeuvring; he gave orders for preparing provisions along the routes, and also to collect the field-labourers' carts, in order that the soldiers of the Guard, transported on these carts, might be able to make double or treble stages. The next day he set out from Meaux, and arrived by Fontenay at Guignes, at the very moment when the Marshals Victor and Oudinot, flung back on the Yères, were disputing possession of the banks of that river with the van of Prince de Wittgenstein and the Marshal De Wrede. This state of things justified the resolution Napoleon had taken, for once united to the two marshals, he need no longer fear Wittgenstein and De Wrede, as he should find himself at the head of 60,000 men, wherewith to oppose 50,000, and the result would undoubtedly be a signal success.

Napoleon considering that though a great mass of the enemy's forces lay before him, still Schwarzenberg's entire army could not be there, for he received intelligence of the enemy's presence at the same time, at Montereau, at Fontainebleau, and Sens, and even in the environs of Orleans. He consequently concluded that more than half the grand army of Bohemia did not lie before him, and he resolved to immediately assume the offensive. Though his Guard and the Leval division had not arrived, he had under his command, including the troops of the three marshals, Oudinot, Victor, Macdonald, and the Spanish cavalry, about 35,000 or 36,000 men, and these he thought sufficient, when he was present, to attack 50,000. Besides the 25,000 men, who were coming up, would join in a few hours, and he made arrangements to commence fighting at the break of day.

Effectively on the 17th, he was on horseback from early morning directing in person the movements of his troops. Marshal Victor's troops having formed the rear-guard in the retreat from the Seine to the Yères, now naturally constituted the van-guard. This marshal advanced, having in the centre the Dufour and Hamelinaye divisions of reserve, and these troops he did not hesitate to expose, because they belonged to General Gérard; the wings were formed of the Duhesme and Chateaux divisions of the 2d corps, Marshal Victor's own troops, which he spared as much as possible. On the right the cavalry of the 5th

corps, under General Milhaud; on the left, the cavalry of Spain, under General Treillard, marched deployed, ready to charge *à outrance*. Marshal Victor was followed by the Marshals Oudinot and Macdonald. In the rear, but at a distance of several leagues, the Guard, travelling on carts, covered the route from Meaux to Guignes.

Hardly had Marshal Victor set out from Guignes for Mormant, than he perceived Count Pahlen with 2500 foot, and about 1400 horse-soldiers; these formed the vanguard of the Prince de Wittgenstein. Here was noble prey that presented itself at the commencement of the operations against the army of Bohemia. General Gérard, who showed himself superior to others, and even seemed to outdo all his former deeds during this severe campaign, advanced at the head of a battalion of the 33d; young soldiers, draughted into an old skeleton regiment, renowned in the Italian campaigns. He entered Mormant sword in hand, and drove out Count Pahlen's infantry, who had taken refuge there in the hope of being assisted by the Bavarians, who were posted at Nangis. Deprived of this shelter, the Russian infantry was obliged to cross the open space that separates Mormant from Nangis. Drouot, debouching from Mormant with his artillery, covered the Russians with grape-shot, whilst that on the left, the Count de Valmy, with the squadrons lately arrived from Spain, and on the right, Count Milhaud with the dragoons that came the preceding year, attacked the enemy with drawn swords. The squares of Russian infantry, spite their solidity, were broken and all captured with their artillery. Their cavalry was overtaken before they could save themselves by flight, and a great part made prisoners or destroyed. This affair cost the Russians 4000 men, reckoning prisoners with the killed and wounded, and eleven pieces of cannon.

This commencement promised Prince de Schwarzenberg's army treatment pretty similar to what Blücher's army had experienced. However, it was necessary that the French should keep up an incessant pursuit, if they wished to obtain the result they had a right to hope, and Napoleon consequently accelerated the forward movement of the different corps. The French advanced rapidly on Nangis, throwing back at the same time the Russian troops of Wittgenstein, whose vanguard they had already annihilated, and the Bavarian troops, that retired to their *corps de bataille*. The success of this new series of operations depended essentially on the immediate passage of the Seine, for if Napoleon succeeded in crossing that river, before all the enemy's corps had repossessed, and especially those that had ventured as far as Fontainebleau, he was almost sure of encountering in detail those that should be latest in returning. He therefore advanced rapidly toward the bridges of Nogent, Bray, and Montereau that lay before him. He sent Marshal Oudinot forward through Provins to Nogent, with part of the cavalry of Spain, under Count de Valmy; and sent Marshal Macdonald to Bray, by the way of Donnemarie. As to himself, he turned to the right, followed by Marshal Victor's troops, and advanced on Montereau, passing through

Not knowing which of these three would be easiest to retake, Napoleon ordered to attack the three at the same time, marching boldly forward the French on one or two of the three bridges, it would be possible to cross the river and cut off the retreat of those of the enemy that had advanced too

far on Villeneuve, Marshal Victor, aided by the Dufour and the Hamelions, headed by General Gérard, beyond Valjouan, the Bavarian division, that was seeking to escape, and very little cavalry to oppose to the Lamotte division occupied the high ground; the left wing was strongly supported by the village of Villeneuve, the right in a little plain, surrounded by General Gérard, who was actively engaged in every encounter with the enemy, aided Villeneuve with a battalion of the 1st of the place at the point of the day thus deprived the Lamotte division of support of this village. The division was obliged to retire across the little stream behind, and seek refuge in the distance was a favourable moment for the French to charge. General Lheritier, ordered a portion of Milhaud's division on the spot, and if he had proper opportunity, the fate of the battle was decided. Our soldiers, confident, called loudly on the cavalry, General Lheritier awaited orders from Marshal Victor, that did not arrive, or was that he did not perceive the opportunity, certain it is he was fearless, and the Bavarian infantry opened plain unmolested. Happily, Gérard, guided by a peasant, had crossed the border of the wood, and now succeeded with his infantry on the left of the Lamotte division that was retiring.

He attacked these squares at the bayonet; broke several, and now received timely help from General Bordesoulle, observing the immobility of the rest of the French, rushed upon the enemy with three regiments of cuirassiers, just arrived from the battle of Versailles. These brave began with an ardour and ferocity not unfrequently displayed by young soldiers, charged in broken lines with impetuosity, and a great number of the enemy were lost on this occasion 1000 men, which might have taken or destroyed.

Our troops now advanced to St. Amand. Marshal Victor stopped to pass the night, though he had orders to march to the north.

He wished General Gérard to go to the left, whose troops were halting on their march and two engagements, fatal to the task, and it was the duty of Marshal Victor, whose two divisions had during the day, to form the head of the army by night. The marshal did not like the kind; he was fatigued, ill, discontented with Napoleon, who had left him with having badly defended the place. In a word, he was suffering, physically, though still ready to re-enter the battle-field and prove himself

an officer as intelligent as brave. He passed the night at Salins, at a league from the bridge of Montereau, where great advantages awaited us, had our activity corresponded to the urgency of circumstances.

Napoleon, overwhelmed with fatigue, had taken a moment's repose at Nangis, intending to rise in the middle of the night, according to his custom, to issue orders, which it was necessary to give at night, that they might reach their destination by break of day. He rose at one, and learned that Marshal Victor had remained at Salins. His irritation was extreme, for all the reports received the evening before announced that the enemy, in retreating, had taken precautions to dispute with us the possession of the bridges of Nogent and Bray, which was but too easy to accomplish. In fact, the high grounds, which at Montereau border and command the Seine, are at Bray and Nogent far in the background, and consequently afford no prominent position from which the bridges could be fired on. On the contrary, villages extending along both banks and well barricaded, offered posts, which the army of Bohemia, concentrated on account of its retreat, could long dispute with us. There now only remained the bridge of Montereau, and this bridge was so much the more important, as, if the French crossed it, it would be possible to cut off Colloredo's corps, that had ventured as far as Fontainebleau, and so deprive the enemy at one blow of about 15,000 or 20,000 men, which would be a signal triumph. Napoleon ordered Marshal Victor to quit his bed instantly, summon the troops from their bivouac, and march to Montereau. He also prepared to go there himself. Before setting out he ordered Marshals Oudinot and Macdonald to carry, if possible, the one Nogent, the other Bray, but if they failed, to fall back on him, that all may debouch on Montereau. The Guard having made a day's journey on carts, had arrived at Nangis; Napoleon ordered them to follow Victor to Montereau.

A resolution was taken on this day, which attested the importance of our recent success. When Napoleon arrived that evening at Nangis, he met the Count de Paar, an aide-de-camp of Prince Schwarzenberg, who had come *à l'improviste*, to demand a suspension of arms, a suspension that M. de Caulaincourt had vainly offered, a few days before, to purchase by the most bitter sacrifices. How came it that so much self-confidence, haughtiness, and severity on the part of the allies, had suddenly given way to so much prudence and moderation? The sovereigns assembled at Nogent around the Prince de Schwarzenberg, after having first heard vague reports of Blücher, had soon learned in detail the extent of the reverses experienced by this fiery-spirited general, and conscious of Napoleon's presence by the severe attacks they had just experienced themselves, they suddenly conceived opinions more modest than those they had entertained up to the preceding evening. The army of Bohemia was, in fact, in a very serious position, for this army was advancing abreast in a battle-line of more than twenty leagues in extent, from Nogent to Fontainebleau, and in four columns, of which one or two ran imminent risk of being sur-

rounded and destroyed, should Napoleon get in advance of them at the passage of the Seine. To put an instant stop to his further progress was of the highest importance, and spite of the customary remarks of the party that advocated war à outrance, Prince Schwarzenberg, despising them on this occasion, took the resolution of immediately sending an aide-de-camp to Napoleon, proposing that both parties should pause where they were, saying that certainly it was owing to his ignorance of what was going on at Châtillon, that the emperor had carried hostilities so far, that the conferences, temporarily suspended, had been resumed, on bases admitted by M. de Caulaincourt himself, and that within a few hours they should probably learn that the preliminaries of peace were signed. Such an assertion must be regarded either as a fraud or an evidence of extraordinary simplicity. M. de Caulaincourt had not accepted the insulting propositions made by the allies; he had limited himself to demanding confidentially of M. de Metternich whether the summary acceptance of their propositions would be at least productive of a suspension of arms, and this inquiry he had made in a moment of despair on the morrow of the battle of La Rothière. But to suppose that after the battles of Champaubert, Montmirail, Château-Thierry, Vau-champs, Mormant, and Villeneuve, to suppose, we say, that after such combats Napoleon would consent that France should be circumscribed within her ancient limits, and what was still worse, renounce the privilege of having an opinion on the fate that was prepared for Italy, Germany, Holland, and Poland, this was truly a strange presumption, and equal at least to that of which we have more than once accused Napoleon.

Be this as it may, it was the substance of what the aide-de-camp of the Prince de Schwarzenberg was commissioned to propose at the French head-quarters. So Napoleon was expected to pause in the midst of victory, and consent to his own and France's degradation.

He listened with an ironical smile to the intelligence that a messenger had arrived from the allies; he would not admit him to his presence, but he consented to receive Prince Schwarzenberg's letter, saying that he would reply at a later period. In fact, he did not know what was the nature of the propositions to which the message he received referred. Having but rarely held communications with M. de Caulaincourt, from whom he was separated by the entire army of Bohemia, Napoleon was quite ignorant of what had taken place at Châtillon; he did not know that after the most abhorrent propositions had been made to M. de Caulaincourt, the latter had written confidentially to M. de Metternich: he did not know that the Austrian minister had regarded the letter of M. de Caulaincourt as an official document, and as such, had transmitted it to the allies, and that in order to induce Napoleon to pause in his successful career, it was not only required that France should shrink back within the limits of 1790, but she was also required to renounce her position as a European Power. Napoleon was ignorant of all these details, or he would have given the Austrian envoy a very different reception. In the proposal the allies made to him, he only saw a de-

sire of arresting his victorious progress, without suspecting the nature of the conditions of peace to which allusion was made. And it certainly was not probable that he would consent to sheathe his sword at the moment when by a last successful effort he might hope to change the entire aspect of affairs. He therefore deferred his reply, and continued his march. But feeling that M. de Caulaincourt, whose mind was a prey to the most horrible torments, and whose society at Châtillon was composed of enemies who would hide from him our success, fearing that under such circumstances he might yield under the difficulties by which he was beset, and make too extensive a use of the powers intrusted to him, Napoleon, before mounting his horse to set out for Montereau, wrote him the following letter:—

"Nangis, 18th February.

"I gave you a *carte blanche*, in order to save Paris, and avoid a battle, which was the last hope of the nation. The battle has been fought; Providence has blessed our arms. I have taken between 30,000 and 40,000 prisoners; I have captured 200 pieces of cannon, a great number of generals, and destroyed several armies, almost without striking a blow. I yesterday came up with Prince Schwarzenberg's army, which I hope to destroy before it repasses our frontiers. You ought to assume the same attitude; you ought to do every thing to obtain peace; but my desire is that you should not sign any thing without my orders, because I alone understand my position. As a general principle, I only desire a solid and honourable peace, and it can only be such on the bases proposed at Frankfurt. If the allies had accepted your propositions of the 9th, there would have been no battle; I would not have incurred any risk at a moment when the least reverse might have brought ruin on France, but, on the other hand, I should not have learned the secret of my adversary's weakness. It is but fair that I should enjoy the advantages of fortune that are offered to me. I desire peace, but it shall not be one that will impose on France conditions more humiliating than those of Frankfurt. My position is now certainly much better than when the allies were at Frankfurt; they might then defy me. I had obtained no advantage over them, and they were far from my territory. But new things are very different. I have gained immense advantages over them, advantages that find no parallel in my military career of twenty years, a career, too, not wholly devoid of glory. I am ready to put an end to hostilities, and allow the enemy to return quietly to their own homes, if they sign preliminaries based on the Frankfurt propositions."

If the allies conjured up illusions for themselves, Napoleon, it was plain, did the same for himself, and instead of contenting himself with rejecting what was unpleasant, he demanded what, under the circumstances, he could not obtain.

Whilst Napoleon employed the first hours of the morning of the 18th in this manner, Marshal Victor had at length marched on Montereau, and arrived there at a very early hour. General Pajol, after having rallied his troops in the wood of Valence, had advanced

with his cavalry and some battalions of the national guards. He reached the borders of the wood of Valence at the very moment that Marshal Victor debouched opposite the little hillock of Surville, which commands the Seine and the little town of Montereau. This hillock, which descends in a tolerably gentle slope on the Valence and Salins sides, breaks on the Seine side in an abrupt declivity. From the top of this eminence, we perceive the little town of Montereau lying at the foot, and the two rivers that mingle their waters at this spot, as well as the bridge of the Seine, are objects of great importance, for which the two armies were about to contend desperately. If the French succeeded in quickly getting possession of the hillock, it was possible, by dashing up to the bridge, which was of stone, and less liable to be destroyed than one of wood, to get possession of that too, before the enemy could cut it down. But to attack the hillock was not a slight undertaking, the Wurtembergers being stationed there in great force. It was the Prince Royal of Wurtemberg that occupied the position. This prince, whom Napoleon had formerly treated very ill, and whom the Emperor Alexander, on the contrary, loaded with favours, intending even to give him in marriage his sister, the Archduchess Catharine; this intellectual and brave prince sought to distinguish himself, and efface by his services to the allies his father's long devotedness to the French empire. On the possession of the bridge of Montereau depended the safety of the Austrian corps of Colloredo, that had ventured as far as Fontainebleau, and whose retreat was impossible, should the French cross the Seine before this corps had fallen back at least as far as Moret or Nemours. But, notwithstanding the danger of the position, the Prince of Wurtemberg was resolved to resist, at the risk of being driven from the hillock of Surville into the Seine.

The Prince de Wurtemberg had ranged his infantry from Villaron to Saint-Martins, facing the route by which the French were advancing. His rear was covered by the hillock of Surville. He was, besides, protected by a large quantity of artillery.

General Pajol, ever brave and intelligent, had endeavoured to advance with his cavalry on the rear of the Wurtembergers' position, in order to take possession of the high-road that runs behind the hillock of Surville, and make a rapid descent on the town of Montereau. But, stopped by a destructive fire from the artillery, he was obliged to wait the execution of his project until Marshal Victor's infantry should have made their attack on the hillock.

One of the marshal's divisions, commanded by his son-in-law, General Chataux, a distinguished officer, arrived first, and exhibited great impatience to repair the fault that Napoleon had just blamed so severely. This division advanced with impetuosity on the hillock of Surville, with their right toward Villaron, their left toward Saint-Martin. The soldiers, led on with spirit, tried to escalate the position, which was protected by *clotures*. They succeeded at first, were afterward repulsed, and made repeated attempts

without attaining their object, notwithstanding prodigious efforts of courage.

General Chataux did not spare himself; but his very impetuosity involved a danger, that of exhausting this brave division before it could be supported, and thus uselessly shedding most precious blood. Soon the Duhesme division arrived, with the marshal himself, and this division replaced that of Chataux, which advanced more to the right, to attack the hillock on the least precipitous side. The brave General Chataux, marching at the head of his soldiers, was struck by a ball before his father-in-law's eyes, and fell dying into his arms. This fatal accident damped the ardour of the attack on the right, and the Duhesme division on the left, attacking the position on the least accessible side, was not likely to succeed, when General Gérard arrived with the Dufour and Hamelinaye divisions.

Napoleon, informed of the difficulties of the attack and displeased with Marshal Victor, had sent General Gérard orders to take the chief command; which General Gérard did immediately. Seeing that the artillery of the Wurtembergers caused us serious annoyance, the general combined all his batteries, as well as those of the 2d corps, and directed sixty pieces of cannon against the Wurtembergers, in order to break their ranks by this violent fire before attacking them hand to hand. He caused them so much damage, that, wishing to free themselves from this murderous fire, they attempted to fall on our cannon and carry them off. General Gérard allowed them to advance, then rushed on them at the head of a battalion, and forced them back on their position at the point of the bayonet. At this moment Napoleon arrived with the Old Guard, and Pajol, after having driven back the enemy's cavalry, threatened to turn the hillock of Surville. At this aspect, the firmness of the Wurtembergers was shaken, and they thought of retreating across the bridge of Montereau. But time was not allowed them for this movement: the French attacked them *en masse*, ascended the hillock, and dislodged them by main force. Pajol, setting off in full gallop at the head of a regiment of chasseurs, dashed into the high-road which runs behind the hillock of Surville, forming at this point a rapid descent, and attacked the Wurtembergers, who were accumulated on the declivity, whilst the artillery of the Guard, with their cannon directed against the hillock itself, riddled them with balls. On their side, the brave inhabitants of Montereau, who only awaited the moment to rush upon the enemy, began to fire on them from the windows. The scene was soon one of complete butchery. The Prince of Wurtemberg narrowly escaped being taken, and, in escaping, left behind 3000 of his men either killed or wounded, and 4000 prisoners, with the greater part of his cannon. The most important object—the bridge—remained in possession of Pajol's chasseurs, who crossed it in full gallop, whilst a mine exploded beneath without carrying away the keystone. Napoleon, stationed on the hillock of Surville, whence he directed himself the operations of his artillery, experienced at this sight an exceeding great joy, which he made no effort to conceal. In fact, he ex-

pected the most brilliant result from this glorious feat of arms.

Once master of Montereau, Napoleon's first care was to send his cavalry beyond, in order to learn the position of the Austrian corps, commanded by Colloredo. But this corps had already had time to return to the Yonne, and at this moment formed the rear-guard of Prince Schwarzenberg. It was therefore no longer possible to overtake them with troops already fatigued, of whom some—as the 2d corps of the Paris reserve—had fought all day, and others—as the Imperial Guard—had marched incessantly during seventy-two hours, making double stages during the day, and passing the night on carts. It was necessary then to pause, and take time to let the army pass by the lately conquered bridge of Montereau, and afterward advance *en masse* on Prince Schwarzenberg, to surprise and destroy his various detachments if they found them dispersed, and give battle if they found them concentrated,—a battle which the French would fight with the prestige of victory in their favour, and the consciousness that Napoleon had then actually under his command 60,000 men.

Though the bridge of Montereau had been carried twelve hours too late, Napoleon still had reason to be content with the last eight days. In fact, it was but a week since and he was falling back from Brienne to Troyes, not knowing whether he would be able to defend Paris; and yet, within this short space of time, he had cut Blücher's army in pieces and put to flight that of Schwarzenberg. Here was a change of position sufficient to satisfy the pride even of the conqueror of Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland. Napoleon could now, if he did not exaggerate the political bearings of his success, terminate this war, in obtaining, if not all the Frankfort conditions, at least some of the most essential, and, above all, with stipulations bearing no resemblance to the insulting propositions of Châtillon. However, Napoleon was not satisfied because he had not collected all the fruit he had a right to expect from his admirable tactics; and he quarrelled with several of his lieutenants, who had not on this occasion done all he expected from them. Right or wrong, he complained of Digeon, general of artillery, who had badly supplied the artillery on the eve and even the day of the combat of Montereau; he complained of General Lheritier, who had not charged the Bavarians at the battle of Villeneuve; of General Montbrun, who had not sufficiently defended the bridge of Moret on the Loing. (this was not the celebrated Montbrun, who died, as we must remember, at the Moskowa;) of Marshal Victor, whom he accused of having made an ill-conducted retreat from Strasbourg to Châlons, of having feebly defended the Seine, of having held back the troops at the battle of Villeneuve, of having slept at Salins instead of marching on to Montereau,—in short, of exhibiting on all occasions a dejection mingled with ill humour, which gave bad example. Many replies might have been made to the reproaches addressed to these different officers. As to Marshal Victor, though he did not merit the anger of which he was the object, still it

must be acknowledged that he exhibited too much dejection, and seemed to recover his spirits only in presence of the enemy or under the immediate orders of Napoleon. It must also be admitted that his family were among those who exhibited the least zeal for the empress. Napoleon knew it; and it was under feelings arising from these different circumstances that he had deprived the marshal of his command to confer it on General Gérard. This blow, joined to the death of General Chataux, had plunged the unhappy Victor into the profoundest grief. He had remained all day in the thickest of the fight, even when he had no right to issue orders, repressing the tears which welled up through grief at the death of his son-in-law and vexation at the censure passed on him. He repaired the same evening to the castle of Surville, where he found Napoleon, his mind divided between joy at the glorious triumph he had obtained and vexation at the drawbacks with which it was accompanied. Napoleon, on seeing Marshal Victor, could not restrain his anger, and, totally forgetting the day of Rothière, reproached him with his conduct during the past two months; and to those reproaches on military topics he added those of a political character, and finished by telling the marshal that if he were fatigued or ill it would be better to seek repose and leave the army. The marshal—to whom the order to withdraw at this crisis appeared a disgrace—replied that he was about to shoulder a musket and take his place in the ranks of the Old Guard, where he should find a soldier's death beside his old companions in arms. Napoleon, deeply moved by the marshal's emotion, extended his hand and consented to keep him near his person. He could not deprive General Gérard of the command of the 2d corps, which he had that morning conferred on him and which that general deserved so well; but he indemnified the marshal in another manner. Two divisions of the Young Guard—Charpentier and Boyer—had just left Paris: these had been posted along the Esnonne, to cover the capital on the left of the Seine. Napoleon formed of these a corps of the Guard, and gave the command to Marshal Victor. To place this marshal about the emperor's person and thus relieve him of all responsibility, was a measure that at the same time soothed his feelings and restored his military importance; for, freed from the anxieties of a higher command, he again became one of the most efficient officers in the army.

On the next day—the 19th—Napoleon wished to march immediately on Nogent, continue his pursuit of Prince Schwarzenberg, and fight a pitched battle, if he could force him to accept it; but the necessity of making all the troops then under his command pass over the single bridge of Montereau involved the loss of the entire day. These troops consisted of the two Paris divisions of reserve, the 2d corps, the Imperial Guard, the Spanish division, and, lastly, Marshal MacDonald's corps, which had not been able to cross the Seine at Bray. Whilst these troops employed the time in defiling by the bridge of Montereau, Napoleon was taking measures to overtake the enemy as soon as he could, and

If possible, to execute a flank movement for this purpose. The bridges of Bray and Nogent having been destroyed, he ordered preparations to be made for the passage of Marshal Oudinot's corps near Nogent. As to that of Marshal Macdonald, we have seen that he had brought his corps up to Montereau. Napoleon's project was, after having cleared Montereau, to turn to the left and follow the course of the Seine as far as Méry, which is not far from the confluence of the Seine and Aube. Having arrived at this point, he intended, instead of following Prince Schwarzenberg along the Troyes route, to leave a single corps to observe his movements, and, with the main body of his own forces, to cross the Seine at Méry and advance along the right bank, whilst Prince Schwarzenberg advanced along the left; and now, having no longer an enemy in front, Napoleon's troops could march quicker and eventually repossess the Seine above Troyes, and give Prince Schwarzenberg battle in a position which was not alone his line of retreat, but his line of communication with Blücher. These were two considerable advantages and of the greatest consequence. Here was an instance of the inexhaustible inventiveness of Napoleon's genius. No sooner was one plan frustrated than he devised another equally practicable and beneficial in result.

Napoleon advanced with the main body of his forces to the left toward Nogent; however, not to break off all communication with the Yonne, and not to overcrowd the high-road of Troyes, he ordered Marshal Macdonald to advance a little to the right, through Saint-Martin-Bosny and Pavillon, whilst General Gérard was to advance a little still more to the right, through Trainel and Avon. He ordered General Alix, the brave defender of Sens, to reoccupy the banks of the Yonne, with the national guards and General Pajol's cavalry. The wounds of this latter general, in consequence of unheard-of fatigues, had again opened. Napoleon, after loading him with rewards, had sent him to Paris and gave his post to General Alix. He made some additions to the Old Guard; he added two noble battalions, composed of the Old Gendarmes of Spain, which raised to eighteen battalions the division of the Old Guard that he had with him, (the other was in the direction of Soissons, with Marshal Mortier;) and he added

besides, several companies of young soldiers, whose duty would be to issue from the ranks and act as sharpshooters, whilst the old veterans remained in line, immovable as walls. Napoleon reiterated his orders that at Paris, fresh battalions of infantry, and at Versailles, fresh squadrons of cavalry, should be incessantly formed. He also ordered portable bridges to be constructed, with boats collected on the Seine; for, on account of the want of this appurtenance of war, the passage of French rivers had become as difficult for us as the passage of foreign ones, and was a continual obstacle to the success of our military combinations.

Napoleon employed, in making these arrangements, the 19th and 20th of February, which his troops passed in crossing the Seine at Montereau and advancing toward Nogent. He had momentarily taken up his residence* at the château of Surville, and had great need of the time thus afforded him; for it was not alone the troops immediately under his command that engaged his attention: he had during these two days to arrange for all those that defended the various frontiers of France, and who needed his surveillance no less than the others, and who wanted, above all, the momentum that his spirit alone could impress. General Maison, who had been sent into Belgium to replace General Decaen,—with whom Napoleon found fault for having abandoned Willemstadt and Breda,—had endeavoured to make head against the various perils with which he was surrounded. Profiting of the moment when he had at his disposal the Roguet and Barrois divisions of the Young Guard, he made a descent on the English under General Graham, and to the Prussians under General Bulow, and had obliged them to evacuate Antwerp; but, being soon after deprived of the Roguet division,—having only that of Barrois at his command, with some battalions hastily organized in the dépôts of the ancient 1st corps, the whole not amounting to more than 7000 or 8000 men fit for active service,—he had been reduced to the alternative either of shutting himself in Antwerp, or of leaving this place to try and protect Belgium. He chose the latter part, which was the wisest, and left in Antwerp 12,000 men with the illustrious Carnot, whose services Napoleon had accepted when they were so nobly offered at this trying moment. General Maison then ad-

* We have already made the observation that from want of acquaintance with Napoleon's correspondence, persons often reproach him with faults that he has not committed, or with intentions that he never entertained. The two days passed at Surville furnish a fresh example of this. Various critics, French as well as foreign, after having asked why, on quitting Blücher, Napoleon did not march direct from Montmirail to Provins, and fall upon Prince Schwarzenberg's flank, instead of making a detour in the rear, through Meaux and Guignes, now ask why he did not cross the Seine at Nogent or Bray, instead of crossing at Montereau alone; and why, after having selected Montereau, he lost two entire days at the castle of Surville. A perusal of Napoleon's letters will furnish a reply to all these questions. At Nogent and Bray, the nature of the locality—flat and beset with villages on both banks—offered the enemy such chances of resistance that there was no hope of forcing the passage; and besides, the bridges being of wood, it was scarcely possible to preserve them from destruction. At Montereau, on the contrary, it was possible—thanks to the hillock of Surville that commanded the opposite bank—to seize the passage more easily; moreover, the bridge being of stone, there would be more time to save it. The event proves that Napoleon was

right. Lastly, the hope of seizing the corps that had advanced as far as Fontainebleau was a last great motive for preferring the passage at Montereau. And Napoleon did try to pass the three bridges at the same time, hoping most from Montereau, which was the only point where he succeeded. It is, then, evident that he did all he could do. As to the time lost on the 19th and 20th of February, his correspondence proves that he was burning with impatience during the hours employed in traversing the bridge and little town of Montereau. This defile being passed, the entire day of the 20th was needed to concentrate the troops on Nogent to the left. Consequently, not a moment was lost; and Napoleon, who traversed on horseback, in three hours, the distance that his army could only accomplish in twenty-four, might very well stop at Surville and devote the 20th to his general affairs, which did not less urgently demand his attention than those immediately before his eyes. It is quite clear that now, as ever, he is right and his critics wrong, when the question touches military operations exclusively. But, to be thoroughly convinced of this truth, it would be necessary to read his orders and correspondence, to which historians have not hitherto had access.

vanced to Brussels, afterward to Mons and Lille, throwing here and there into the fortresses of the North what provisions he could collect, with half-clothed, half-armed conscripts that he managed to get from the depôts. Whilst Carnot supported with invincible firmness a fierce bombardment, which, however, did not damage the fleet,—the great object of England's anger,—General Maison manoeuvring with a handful of soldiers between the three fortresses in the north of France, had, as far as circumstances would permit, saved our frontier and kept up an active force ready to fall on any detachments of the enemy that came within their reach.

Napoleon, who, in his perilous position, was exceedingly difficult to please, incessantly urged General Maison not to occupy himself exclusively with the fortresses, but to attack in the rear the troops that had marched through Cologne on Champagne, and tormented with unmerited reproaches this general, who had no need of stimulation, for he had shown himself skilful, vigorous, and indefatigable in the defence of this frontier.

Napoleon was more just when he reproached Augereau, but in this instance too, from the habit of demanding more in order to obtain less, he was too exacting. Augereau, old, wearied, even disgusted, had however recovered his ardour at sight of the danger that threatened France, and which was peculiarly menacing to men whom, like him, the revolution had compromised. It is true he had at Lyons three thousand conscripts, drafted into old regiments, but there were no magazines, no victuals, no artillery, no horses. Unfortunately, Augereau was not endowed with that creative activity that enables a man to draw from a large population all the resources it can afford. He had nevertheless endeavoured to feed and clothe his conscripts through the instrumentality of the Lyonnaise municipality; he brought from Valence some artillery, he recalled from Grenoble the feeble Marchand division, and sent aides-de-camp to Nîmes to seek there the division of reserve, which, like that of Bordeaux, had been intended to pass from the south to the north. By these means he had succeeded, in the beginning of February, in assembling, besides the thousands already at Lyons, 3000 men that had come from Nîmes, and what was still better, 10,000 old soldiers, detached from the army of Catalonia, and with these forces he prepared to commence the campaign. But he wished to give his troops some days' repose before encountering the enemy. It was undoubtedly a matter of vast importance that he should take the field, for his appearance alone in the direction of Châlons and Besançon would cause extreme alarm in the rear of the allied armies, and perhaps determine the retreat of Prince Schwarzenberg, which had not yet commenced. Napoleon, burning with impatience, wrote Augereau the following letter, which merits a place in history:—

"Nogent-sur-Seine, 21st February, 1814.

"The Minister of War has just laid before me the letter you wrote him on the 16th. That letter annoyed me very much. What! six hours after receiving the first detachments that came from Spain, you were not in the field.

Six hours' rest was sufficient for the men. I won the battle of Nangis with the brigade of dragoons that arrived from Spain, and who had not drawn breath from the time they left Bayonne. You say the six Nîmes battalions want clothes and arms, and are undrilled. What miserable reasons to offer to me, Augereau! I have destroyed 80,000 enemies with battalions composed of conscripts, that had not cartouche-boxes, and were scarcely clothed. The national guards, you say, are contemptible. I have 4000 here, from Angers and Brittany, in round hats, no cartouche-boxes, but that have good muskets; I have turned them to good account. There is no money, you say. And whence did you expect to draw money? You can only expect money when we shall have torn a receipt in full from the hands of the enemy. You want horses; take them wherever you can find them. You have no stores; this is too ridiculous. I command you to set out within twelve hours after the receipt of this letter to take the field. If you are still the Augereau of Castiglione, keep the command; if your sixty winters oppress you too heavily, resign the command to the oldest of your general officers. France is threatened and in danger; she can only be saved by daring courage and willing service, not by vain temporizing. You must have more than six thousand picked men with you; I have not so many, and yet I have destroyed three armies, taken forty thousand prisoners, two hundred pieces of cannon, and three times saved the capital of France. The enemy is flying in every direction. Be the first on the battle-field. This is not a time to act as we have done in these latter days; we must resume the arms and call up the spirit of '93. When the French soldiers see your plume waving in the van of the battle, and your breast exposed to the fire of the muskets, you may lead them whither you please."

The army of Italy was not far distant from Augereau. Napoleon had sent orders to Prince Eugene to repossess the Alps and come down to Lyons, but these orders had arrived late, and not until Prince Eugene was already engaged in sharp combats with the Austrian army. Finding his right turned by the Austrian detachments, that English ships had landed on this side of the Adige, Prince Eugene had been obliged to abandon this river, which the army quitted with extreme regret. He had taken up a position behind the Mincio, his left at Goito, his right at Mantua, with a determination to make himself respected. In fact, seeing the Austrians occupied in passing the Mincio, on his left, in the direction of Valleggio, he had left a third of his army under the command of General Verdi, and crossed the river himself, passing over the bridges of Goito and Mantua, then, making a rapid flank movement, he had brought the entire mass of his soldiers to bear upon the Austrians as they were marching to the point where they intended to cross the river. He killed, wounded, or made prisoners between six and seven thousand men in the plains of Roverbella. He captured besides, a considerable quantity of artillery. The affair cost us about 3000 men. Our loss was, relatively, very considerable, but our troops had displayed the greatest vigour, and

their young general exhibited military talents that were beginning to ripen. The Austrians in confusion regained the Adige, deferring their project of conquest until Murat should have fulfilled his promises.

Such was the intelligence that M. de Fâscher, an aide-de-camp of Prince Eugene, brought Napoleon, at the very time that the battle of Montereau was fought. It was a delicate subject, and one requiring profound deliberation, that of persisting in the determination to evacuate Italy, after a splendid victory on the Mincio, and still more splendid victories between the Marne and the Seine. When Napoleon had commanded this evacuation, he had done so, not alone on account of the necessity he was under of concentrating his forces, but in the hope that the troops he should draw from Italy would arrive on the Rhone in time to be useful there. The present position of affairs called for fresh consideration. Certainly, if Prince Eugene had been able to bring to Lyons, in time, the 30,000 soldiers that had just gained the battle of Roverbella, if he had been able to join these to General Suchet's 50,000 veteran troops, and that with such a force he had fallen, passing through Dijon, on the rear of Prince Schwarzenberg, it is probable that none of the allies would have repassed the Rhine; and such a result would undoubtedly have repaid every imaginable sacrifice. But Napoleon, who learned too late that the allies intended to make a winter campaign, had not sent orders to Prince Eugene, until the end of January, to return to France, and the prince was then engaged in the most difficult operations, from which he could not withdraw until victory should have crowned his arms. In fact, were the order for his recall persevered in, it would be impossible for him to be at Lyons before the end of March, and by that time Napoleon should either have yielded to his enemies, or been victorious over them. Moreover this retreat would be the voluntary abandonment of Italy, that is to say, the loss of a pledge which would be of such vast importance at Châtillon. Though at the actual time, Napoleon was only fighting for the line of the Rhine, still to hold firm possession of the Mincio and the Po, would be a means of facilitating the concession of the Rhine, by way of compensation. Having then little chance of bringing back the troops of Prince Eugene in time, and many chances of preserving Italy, which was of very great importance with regard to the negotiations, he took the resolution—which experience has since shown to be a deplorable one—not to abandon Lombardy. Though his reasons for this line of conduct were of incontestable value, he was evidently influenced by the confidence inspired by his late successes; and this is to be regretted, for the safest course would have been to recall Eugene with his thirty thousand men. In war, the chain of events is so easily prolonged, that we ought never to neglect a prudent precaution through fear of its being too late.

Napoleon had also to consider the position of the armies that were defending the Pyrenees, and whose assistance would have been so useful to him. Marshal Suchet was incessantly asking permission to evacuate Barcelona, and some of the fortresses in Catalonia. As

to those of Lower Catalonia and the kingdom of Valentia, such as Sagonta, Peniscola, Tortosa, Mequinenza, and Lerida, the time was past when they could have been opportunely evacuated. By withdrawing 7000 or 8000 men from Barcelona, and as many from some other small garrisons, and joining these 15,000 to the 15,000 that remained under his command after the division had been sent to Lyons, Marshal Suchet would have at his disposal 30,000 soldiers. With such a force, he might still decide the fate of France, were he summoned to Lyons in person. He awaited the reply of the war minister until the 11th of February, when not having received any intelligence he returned to the frontier, leaving 8000 men in the fortress of Barcelona, which he did not dare to abandon without a formal order. Napoleon endeavoured to repair this fault, which was exclusively imputable to the war minister, by giving Marshal Suchet orders to evacuate, not alone Barcelona, but all the posts he still occupied, and thus to create for himself a *corps d'armée*, with which he was to march on Lyons, leaving in Perpignan and the fortresses of Roussillon, only the garrisons, indispensably necessary.

Marshal Soult, thanks to Lord Wellington's temporizing system, had kept his position, not on the Bidassoa, nor the Niva, which he had lost, one after the other, but on the Adour and the *gave d'Oleron*. He had placed four divisions in Bayonne, under General Reille, two on the Adour under General Foy, and four behind the *gave d'Oleron*, which he commanded himself. General Harispe formed his extreme left at Navarreins, he formed the centre himself at Peyrehorade at the confluence of the *gave d'Oleron* with the Adour; General Reille formed his right at Bayonne. Master of the navigation of the Adour, he could provision Bayonne and supply with victuals and munitions of war every portion of his army. Thus posted behind the angle of two rivers, with about 40,000 veteran troops, (deducting the 15,000 sent to Napoleon,) he held his adversary in check, who dared neither to advance without the Spaniards, for fear of not being sufficiently strong, nor penetrate into France with them, lest they might excite an insurrection among the French peasants by pillaging. The English general delayed to assume the offensive until, in the first place, the rains, which were very abundant, should cease, and secondly, until his Government should send money to pay the Spaniards, which was the only means of preserving discipline among them.

Napoleon, still flattering himself to be able to draw some resources from this brave army, sent fresh orders to Marshal Soult to fill up the vacant places in his regiments with conscripts, and to be ready to send him at the shortest notice 10,000 men. Not wishing to leave Bordeaux unprotected, on account both of the moral and political importance of this city, Napoleon determined not to borrow these troops from Marshal Soult excepting he found himself at the last extremity. His late successes gave him reason to hope that he would not be forced to take this step.

The two days passed at Montereau, during which the troops were employed in crossing to the other side of the river, had been, as we have seen, very usefully employed. Before

leaving Montereau, Napoleon thought he ought to reply to the letter that Prince de Schwarzenberg's aide-de-camp had brought him.

He had just learned what had taken place at Châtillon since the resumption of the conferences. On the 16th of February, M. de Caulaincourt received a private letter from M. de Metternich, in which this minister had informed him of the efforts he had made to surmount the ill feeling that prevailed in the allied courts, acknowledging that to attain his object, he had made use of M. de Caulaincourt's confidential letter. He also informed the French plenipotentiary that by formally accepting the Châtillon bases, hostilities might be immediately stopped. M. de Metternich, in conclusion, earnestly begged M. de Caulaincourt to profit of this opportunity to conclude peace, "for," he said, "it will be the last."

The next day—the 17th—the plenipotentiaries assembled, and declared they would resume the conferences only on receiving a positive affirmation from the French plenipotentiary, that he was ready to submit to the conditions proposed in the last sitting. They afterward presented a series of preliminary articles, more insulting if possible than the protocol of the 9th of February. The import of these articles was that France should retire within her ancient limits, with some slight alterations of the frontier-line, which did not alter in any way the general principle: she was not to interfere, in any way, in the fate of the ceded territories, nor in the general regulation of the European States; she was merely to be told that Germany should compose a federal State, that Holland, united to Belgium, should constitute one kingdom, that Italy should be independent of France, and that Austria should hold possessions there, the extent of which the allied Powers would determine at a later period; that continental Spain should be restored to Ferdinand VII.; that in return for these sacrifices, England should give up Martinique, and Guadaloupe besides, if Sweden required it, but she was to keep the Isle of France and the Isle of Bourbon. As to the Cape, Malta, and the Ionian Isles, there was no more said of them than of all the possessions given up by France in Italy, Germany, and Poland.

Such were these articles, that were already laid down in the protocol of the 9th of February, but in a less explicit and less offensive manner; they were now offered as conditions for an armistice, which France had not officially demanded, and for which, above all, she had not promised to pay such a price.

M. de Caulaincourt listened calmly to these propositions, and said that probably the allies did not wish for peace, since to offer radically so vexatious, they added forms so insulting. He added, that he would receive a copy of these articles, in order to submit them to his sovereign, and that at a proper time he would communicate with the plenipotentiaries on the subject. They asked whether he had a counter-project to propose; he replied that he would present one at a later period; and we must say, notwithstanding our respect for a man, who through pure patriotism had undertaken a most painful task, that the fear of compromising the interests of peace, hindered him perhaps from giving vent to his indignation.

The diplomatists, in fact, who were opposed to him, believed, that though he might consider the propositions oppressive he would still accept them, and if they should have difficulties to encounter, they would arise from Napoleon's inflexible temper. It would have been better had M. de Caulaincourt exhibited as much indignation as Napoleon himself would have done. Such conduct might have compromised, not peace, which could always be obtained on the proffered conditions, but the imperial throne, and M. de Caulaincourt ought, like Napoleon, to have preferred honour to the throne. We must, however, admit, that though Napoleon might have reasoned in this way, M. de Caulaincourt, his minister, was not equally free to do so, for next to France the throne of his master ought to be the chief object of his solicitude. Be this as it may, M. de Caulaincourt gave the most prudent advice to Napoleon. He said he was well aware that the proposed conditions of peace were not acceptable, but there were no means of ameliorating them; that, in fact, the emperor could never obtain peace on the Frankfort bases, except by driving the allies into the Rhine, but that, profiting of his late victories to effect a compromise, he might be able by satisfying England, to obtain better conditions than the limits of 1790, still he could never get what he understood by the natural limits. It was indeed possible by giving up Spain, Italy, all that he held of Germany, Holland and Belgium, to retain Mayence, Coblenz, and Cologne,—in a word, to secure the Rhine by abandoning the Scheldt. And certainly, peace, on such conditions, would be very satisfactory, if not to Napoleon, at least to France. With one more victory the emperor might be sure of it, and it was wise to give him this advice. M. de Caulaincourt, without entering into details as to how much of the natural limits ought to be sacrificed, implored Napoleon not to be obstinate, and told him, very justly, that he was mistaken if he believed that his recent victories had replaced him in the position he held at the time the Frankfort bases were proposed, but that he might still obtain peace on terms approaching those of Frankfort, by presenting a moderate counter-project.

When Napoleon received these communications at Montereau, the blood rushed to his brow, and he immediately wrote the following letter to M. de Caulaincourt:—

"I look upon you as a man under compulsory confinement, who knows nothing of my affairs, and whose opinions are formed on the reports of impostors. As soon as I arrive at Troyes, I shall send you a counter-project. I thank heaven for receiving your despatch, for there is not a Frenchman whose blood it will not make boil with indignation. This is why I wish to draw up my ultimatum myself.

"I am very much displeased that you did not explain formally, that France, in order to be as strong as she was in 1790, must have her natural limits as a compensation for the partition of Poland, the destruction of the Republic of Venice, the secularization of the German clergy, and the great acquisitions made by the English in Asia.

"Say that you are waiting orders from your

Government, and that it is very natural you should be obliged to wait, since your couriers are obliged to make journeys of seventy-two hours, and of three you have yet received no tidings. In retaliation, I have ordered the arrest of the English couriers.

"I am so excited by the infamous proposals you have sent me, that I feel myself already dishonoured by having placed myself in a position where such proposals could be made to you. I shall let you know, from Troyes or Châtillon, my intentions, and I believe I would rather lose Paris than see such propositions made to the French people. You are always talking of the Bourbons: I would rather see the Bourbons in France, on reasonable terms, than submit to the infamous propositions you have sent me.

"Surville, near Montereau, 19th Feb., 1814."

His first emotions having subsided, Napoleon, appreciating the good advice of M. de Caulaincourt, consented to continue the negotiations, but no longer on the bases he had commissioned his plenipotentiary to bear to Mannheim, and which comprehended the Rhine as far as the Wahal, a kingdom for Prince Jerome in Germany, one for Prince Eugene in Italy, and a part of Piedmont for France. These demands were no longer urged; the new bases only asked the *limita pura et simplex*, that is to say, the Rhine as far as Dusseldorf; beyond Dusseldorf, the Meuse; nothing in Italy but an indemnity for Prince Eugene, and lastly, France's right to take part in regulating the fate of European States. Napoleon did not limit himself to this official communication; knowing that there existed more than one cause of misunderstanding between the allies, that the Austrians were notoriously tired of the war and offended at the affected supremacy of the Russians, he conceived the idea of replying to the proposals made him by addressing a letter himself to the Emperor Francis, and by having Major-General Berthier write one to Prince de Schwarzenberg. In these two letters, drawn up with extraordinary care, he endeavoured to speak the language, as he understood it, of sound policy and good sense. He said an appeal had been made to victory, and victory had decided; that his soldiers were still as great as ever, and would soon be as numerous; that he had full confidence in the result of this struggle, should it be prolonged; that notwithstanding he was marching at that moment on Troyes, and the approaching engagement would take place between a French and an Austrian army, that he believed he would conquer, and that his confidence on this point ought not to astonish any one; but that having experienced the chances of war, he was willing to consider this supposition as doubtful, and would therefore reason on a double hypothesis. Should he conquer, the coalition would be annihilated, and the allies would find him as exacting as ever, a line of conduct that would be authorized by his dangers and his triumphs. But if, on the contrary, he were conquered, the balance of power in Europe would be disturbed a little more than it already was, and that to the advantage of Russia, and at the expense of Austria; that the latter would be a little more constrained, a little more dictated to, by

a haughty rival; that consequently Austria would gain nothing by a battle, which on one hand would deprive her of all the fruits of the battle of Leipsic, and on the other would render her more dependent than she was on Russia; that whatever Austria might desire, in Italy, for example, France would immediately concede to her, as soon as she consented to repass the Alps; that thus, without reckoning the ties of blood, which ought to have some influence, the true interest of Austria was to conclude peace, on the conditions she had herself offered at Frankfort.

To these reasons, mingled with many sweet and flattering words addressed to the Emperor Francis, Napoleon added others not less specious in a letter, intended for Prince de Schwarzenberg, and well calculated to touch the memory of this prince, to awaken his military prudence, and stir up his pride, which the Russians and Prussians were incessantly offending. Both these letters were sent as a reply to the last proceedings of Prince de Schwarzenberg. Unfortunately, though very cleverly reasoned and written, they did not quite accord with the moral position of the allied Powers, which Napoleon, in the midst of his camp, could not fully appreciate. Undoubtedly, had Austria been less strongly linked to the coalition, if she had not feared to break up this coalition, which, once broken, left her within the iron grasp of Napoleon, if she had not so deeply distrusted the character of the latter, she might have listened to considerations which in many respects accorded with the policy of the Emperor Francis, with the wisdom of his prime minister, and with the wounded self-love of the commander-in-chief. But it was natural to suppose that Austria, instead of keeping these letters private, would show them to her allies, in order to place her good faith above all suspicion, and that then there would be fresh protestations of fidelity, and that the bonds of the alliance would be more closely serried in order to resist an enemy who alternately played the part of the lion and the fox. There was therefore more risked than gained by these communications with the court of Austria.

Be this as it may, Napoleon, after having attended to all his various concerns, and finding his troops amount to the number he desired, left the château of Surville on the morning of the 21st, crossed the Seine at Montereau, and reascended the river as far as Nogent; he found the country everywhere so ravaged, that despairing of victualling his troops, he earnestly implored that provisions should be sent from Paris. Even at Nogent, every thing was in a frightful state, in consequence of the late engagement. He granted out of his private purse assistance to the Sisters of Charity, who had ventured under the fire of the enemy in order to attend the wounded soldiers. He also gave relief to those of the inhabitants who had suffered most.

The next day,—the 22d,—continuing to remount the Seine, he advanced in the direction of Méry, a point where the course of the Seine turns, and instead of continuing from west to east, describes a line from northwest to southeast, running from Méry to Troyes, Napoleon followed the high-road to Troyes,

bringing with him the troops of Marshal Oudinot, (division of the young Rothenburg Guard and the Boyer d'Espagne division,) the Old Guard, Ney and Victor's division of the Young Guard, the cavalry reserve, and lastly, the artillery reserve. On the right, through the cross-roads, Marshal Macdonald advanced with the 11th corps; a little more to the right General Gérard advanced with the 2d corps and the Paris reserve. On the other bank of the Seine, in the neighbourhood of Sézanne, Grouchy was preparing with his cavalry and the Leval division to join Napoleon, by the way of Nogent, and Marmont, with the 6th corps, occupied the country between the Seine and the Marne, for the purpose of observing Blücher's movements, and combining his forces with those of Marshal Mortier, who had orders to advance on Soissons. Napoleon's forces, including the troops of Grouchy and Leval, but not those of Marmont, amounted to about 70,000.

Napoleon was still expecting and most anxious for a battle; since the commencement of the campaign until now, he had not had 70,000 men under his command, without reckoning Marmont's troops, that one day's march sufficed to join with his. Thus, as we have already said, seeking a combination that might render this battle decisive, Napoleon had abandoned the design of pursuing Prince de Schwarzenberg along the high-road of Troyes, and had conceived the project of crossing the Seine at Méry, and remounting the river rapidly along the right bank, leaving Prince de Schwarzenberg on the left; he would thus reach the high ground of Troyes before his opponent, and then recrossing the river, offer him battle between Troyes and Vandœuvre, after having mastered his line of retreat. Should this plan be executed, the most important results would undoubtedly ensue.

On the morning of the 22d, orders having been given for the carrying out of these designs, our vanguard drove back Prince de Wittgenstein's rear-guard toward Châtres, and threw themselves afterward on the bridge of Méry, which is very long, because it spans several arms of the river and a great deal of marshy ground. This bridge, built on piles, had been half burned; nevertheless, our sharpshooters, running on the tops of the piles, kept up a keen combat with the enemy's sharpshooters, and succeeded in getting possession of Méry. But soon a violent conflagration bursting out in the city stopped our progress. The Russians had set fire to Méry. The heat became so intense that we were obliged to cede the place, not to the enemy, but to the flames, and regain the banks of the Seine. At the same moment numerous troops appeared outside Méry, and there was no passing beyond. These troops that made their appearance were neither the Russians of Prince de Wittgenstein, nor the Bavarians of Marshal Wrede, who might have been naturally expected in that direction, but the Prussians themselves, whom the 15th Mortier were pursuing from the Marne, and who, for some time past, had seemed to take no part in the warfare. Within seven days they had rallied and returned, with whom? under what leader? Here are questions

that might naturally be asked, and which Napoleon asked himself with well-founded astonishment.

His inquiries were soon satisfied by prisoners and reports that arrived from the banks of the Marne. Since the emperor had beaten in detail the four corps of the army of Silesia, these corps had endeavoured to recover their defeat, and had partly succeeded. Finding themselves briskly pursued along the Soissons route, the Generals D'York and Sacken had turned to the right, and marching through Oulchy, Fismes, and Rheims, had regained Châlons, where Blücher had appointed to meet them. Combined with the *débris* of Kleist and Langeron, they formed a force of 32,000 men. The pride of this army had been deeply humiliated. Composed of the most ardent spirits among the Russians and the Prussians, having at their head the daring Blücher, and all the confederates of the Tugend-Bund, they were inconsolable at having experienced such terrible reverses, especially as they had mocked the timidity of the army of Bohemia. For this reason, the desire of again appearing in the battle-field was intense among Blücher's soldiers, and they possessed the merit of wishing to repair their disaster at any risk. An opportunity had seemed to offer, of which they had eagerly profited.

Marmont, after the terrible day of Vau-champs, had stopped at Etoges. This break in the pursuit, on the part of the French, indicated clearly that Napoleon, repeating against the army of Bohemia the manœuvre that had succeeded so well against the army of Silesia, had fallen upon Prince de Schwarzenberg. This conjecture amounted to certainty, when it was remembered that Prince de Schwarzenberg having advanced as far as Fontainebleau and Provins, Napoleon could not allow him to come nearer Paris without making an attempt to stop his progress. Nothing now remained for the army of Silesia but to advance immediately from the Marne to the Seine, where they would probably find the Marmont detachment that had been left to observe Blücher's army, and on which they would revenge themselves for the four terrible days of defeat they had experienced.

These resolutions being taken, Blücher had given his troops only two days' repose, and had sent courier after courier to Prince de Schwarzenberg to inform him of his new enterprise. The arrival of considerable reinforcements had confirmed him in his projects. He had had hitherto only about half of the Kleist and Langeron corps. The remainder of these two corps, which had been replaced by others in the blockade of the fortresses, had now joined. The corps of Saint-Priest, at first sent in the direction of Coblenz, arrived also; and on the 18th, Marshal Blücher, marching from Châlons to Arcis, had received a reinforcement of from 15,000 to 16,000 men; so that his army, which Napoleon had reduced from more than 60,000 to 32,000, was already suddenly increased to 48,000 combatants, and was consequently in a position to make a formidable move,—so true is it that in war passion often supplies the place of genius, substituting the power of the will for that of the intellect.

Blücher had therefore set out for Arcis, and having learned on the way that Prince de Schwarzenberg, fallen back on Troyes, was waiting his arrival there, in order to engage the enemy, he advanced in a straight line on Méry, to arrive sooner at the meeting-place, and be able to fall on the flank of the French army, which he believed to be still pursuing the army of Bohemia.

Napoleon, finding Blücher on the right bank of the Seine, could not any longer think of throwing his troops into that quarter. Though he did not for a moment imagine that the Prussian general could have so soon assembled an army of 50,000 men, he cared little for his appearance, and did not despair of meeting Prince de Schwarzenberg hand to hand on the morrow or next day, and overthrowing him. His soldiers again believed in their own superiority, he in his good fortune, and they all marched forward joyfully to the great battle that was about to take place. Napoleon resolved to march the next day, the 23d of February, on Troyes.

But, whilst he was seeking this battle, his principal adversary avoided the encounter. Prince de Schwarzenberg was justly alarmed at finding himself in the presence of Napoleon, whom he believed at the head of considerable forces; and he dreaded to risk the fate of the coalition on a battle. He had received exaggerated reports as to the number of troops arrived from Spain; and as to their valour, he had experience of that at the battle of Nangis. He did not estimate Napoleon's forces at less than 80,000 or 90,000 men, their spirits flushed with victory and the consciousness of being in a remarkable position. Separated from Blücher, of whose near approach he was not aware, he was reduced to 100,000 men, in consequence of the battle he had fought and the detachments he had been obliged to send off. These 100,000 men were not so concentrated as the 80,000 attributed to Napoleon, and it did not appear wise to Prince de Schwarzenberg to venture a hundred against eighty, when with 170,000 he had been held in check at La Rothière by 50,000, (this was the number erroneously attributed to Napoleon on that day.) And then, should the allies be beaten, they would be at one blow flung back upon the Rhine, and so lose in one day the fruits of the two campaigns of 1812 and 1813, which would render the common oppressor more exacting, more tyrannical, than ever. As for the Russians and the Prussians, ruled by passion, and who had much to gain by victory if they had much to lose by defeat, there might be, on their side, cogent reasons for incurring great risks; but for the Austrians, who ran the chance of losing in one day what they had gained in a year, and the possession of which Napoleon offered to secure to them without fighting—they, to whom victory only promised an augmentation of Russian preponderance—truly, the prolongation of the warfare would not be worth the trouble to the Austrians. Napoleon's double letter, though involving the disadvantage of too openly revealing his intention of creating dissensions among his enemies, had not, however, failed to excite some discontent, by awakening in the Austrian mind very natural reflections. One disquieting circumstance was, moreover, added to those that

already existed in favour of an armistice. Whilst the allies had received positive intelligence of the arrival of a powerful detachment at Paris by the Orleans route, a report was circulated that a still stronger detachment, commanded by Marshal Suchet in person, had arrived at Lyons from Perpignan; but in the stirring times of war the public mind becomes impressionable, and facts are exaggerated to a stature that renders them falsehoods. The Count de Bubna, posted between Geneva and Lyons, fearing to be attacked by 50,000 or 60,000 men, begged immediate assistance, and prognosticated dreadful calamities if his entreaties did not meet proper attention. What, in fact, would become of the allies were a battle fought and lost in Franche-Comté in their rear? To prevent so calamitous an event, it would be necessary to send immediately 20,000 men to the assistance of Count de Bubna, which would be, in fact, to reduce the main army to 80,000, and so stand before Napoleon with forces of nearly the same numerical strength as his; this would be a serious indiscretion. There was certainly Blücher, whose actual force Prince de Schwarzenberg was ignorant of, but he knew the obstinacy of his temper to be such that he could not flatter himself with having at his disposal the 40,000 or 50,000 men that the Prussian general might bring with him.

Influenced by these reasons, which were of some weight, the prudent Prince de Schwarzenberg thought it better to avoid a pitched battle, and to fall back on Brienne, Bar-sur-Aube, and Langres, and to wait there the coming reinforcements, sending at the same time 20,000 men to the Count de Bubna; and meanwhile, in order to avert an attack from Napoleon, Prince de Schwarzenberg thought it advisable to reply to his double letter, and to propose an armistice,—an armistice which might perhaps lead to peace, or, if it did not lead to peace, might afford time to make sure of victory.

These considerations were debated the same day,—the 22d,—in a council held at headquarters, in presence of the three sovereigns, the generals, and ministers of the coalition. Alexander, lately so hot-headed, dared not become suddenly the apostle of temporization, but both his sentiments and language were less haughty than before. The violent party, though deprived of Blücher and his staff, who were at Méry, found, however, some speakers who declared that to fall back would be a weakness of which the moral effect would certainly be fatal; that in the position in which the allies then were, they should either conquer or perish; that by a junction with the army of Silesia their forces would be nearly double those of Napoleon, and that consequently they must conquer, for it would be degrading to suppose they could be vanquished when they fought with the advantage of two to one on their side; that in any case they had no other resource, for a retrograde movement would totally ruin the affairs of the coalition; that to return to Langres would be to go back to a country poor in itself, and impoverished still more by the recent visit of the armies,—they could not find provisions there, and the retreat on Langres would soon involve a retreat

on Besançon; that falling back in that manner would restore Napoleon all his prestige as well as all his partisans, and induce the French peasants, who had already killed several of the allied soldiers that wandered from their ranks, to rise *en masse* and slaughter all who would not be formed into *corps d'armée*; that, in short, to hesitate, to fall back, was to perish.

No person could at this moment say whether the advocates of the prudent or the impetuous policy were right. If the latter estimated correctly the respective forces of the two armies, the former yielded to well-founded fears when they refused to stake all for all against Napoleon, for if he gained the battle—and in the actual disposition of his troops he had many chances of gaining it—the allies would be thrown into the Rhine. We are, therefore, justified in saying that Prince de Schwarzenberg, though his calculations exhibited a certain timidity, was more in the right than his adversaries.

Be this as it may, the moderate party insisted, and as late events had added to their influence what Blücher and his partisans had lost, and as the Emperor Alexander supported Blücher's party less warmly, Prince de Schwarzenberg's opinion prevailed, and the proposition of an armistice was resolved on. This proposition did not pledge the allies to any thing, neither as to the conditions of the peace nor the conditions of the armistice. Should the proposition not be accepted, it would at least occupy Napoleon's attention some hours, and perhaps delay his march a day, which would be a matter of importance. If, on the contrary, the propositions were accepted, the allies would find time to concentrate their forces, the one party at Langres, the other at Châlons, and reinforce their number considerably; and an acceptance would also afford a chance—which was the secret wish of Austria—of resuming pacific negotiations with greater hopes of success, for, hostilities once suspended, they would not be lightly resumed. The advocates of war à outrance consented to this proceeding, in the hope that it would lead to no result, and might perhaps procure a respite for a few hours, which all parties admitted would be an incontestable advantage. Prince de Schwarzenberg made choice of Prince Wenceslas de Liechtenstein to send to the French head-quarters, with the proposal of appointing commissioners, who, at the outposts of the two armies, should arrange the conditions of the armistice.

On the 23d, Napoleon was marching from Chartres on Troyes, when, within sight of the latter city, Prince Wenceslas de Liechtenstein presented himself and delivered Prince de Schwarzenberg's message. Napoleon, seeing the persistence of the allies in demanding an armistice, concluded much too quickly that they were in a difficult position, and resolved to appear to listen to them, but without pausing in his progress, as it was not his part to extricate them from their embarrassment. He was elated by success, by the consciousness of the great deeds he had just accomplished, by the hope of those he would yet achieve, and felt no prudential promptings that might induce him to seem modest or circumspect: on the contrary, to boast might be his best policy.

He adopted it, therefore, as much because it suited his feelings at the moment as because it accorded with the calculations he had made.

Prince Wenceslas having largely complimented him on the great deeds he had lately performed, Napoleon listened with visible satisfaction, talked a great deal of what he intended to do, exaggerated in an extraordinary manner the extent of his forces, complained of the insulting propositions that had been made him, and, passing from one subject to another, asked if it were true that several of the Bourbon princes had already arrived at the head-quarters of the allies. In fact, the Duke d'Angoulême had tried to get a reception at Lord Wellington's head-quarters; the Duke de Berry was on board a frigate at Belle-Ile, endeavouring by his presence to excite the people of Vendée; and lastly, the father of these two princes, the Count d'Artois himself, acting as representative of Louis XVIII., who had retired to Hartwell, had gone to Switzerland, then to Franche-Comté, to obtain admission to the head-quarters of the allied sovereigns. However, none of these princes had yet succeeded in his enterprise.

The envoy of Prince de Schwarzenberg hastened to disavow, on the part of Austria, any participation in plots against the Imperial dynasty, and affirmed, which was true, that the Count d'Artois had been dismissed from head-quarters. This declaration gave Napoleon more pleasure than he cared to testify: he said he was about to consider the propositions that had been made him, and that he would send a reply from the city of Troyes, into which he intended to enter immediately.

This confidence, which it was very well to display to the Prussians and the Russians, was not so well timed with regard to the Austrians, who were desirous of peace, and to whom hopes of attaining it ought to have been held out, in order to induce them to moderation in their views, or at least to hesitation in their counsels.

Having arrived at the gates of Troyes, Napoleon found there the rear-guard of the allies, determined to make a defence: they even threatened to burn the city if the French persisted in forcing an immediate entrance. Such a threat coming from the Russians was something too serious not to command attention. A verbal agreement was made, by which the one party was to leave Troyes the next day—the 24th—and the other was to enter the city, neither striking a blow, or at least committing any act of aggression or resistance that might endanger the city. Accordingly, on the next day the last of the allied troops departed peacefully from Troyes, and our soldiers entered the town in the same manner. And Napoleon—who twenty days before had passed through this city almost a defeated man, his mind filled with dark presentiments, not knowing whether he should be able to defend Paris, and even necessitated to order that his wife and son, the members of his Government, and his treasury, should be removed from the capital—Napoleon, we say, now reappeared at Troyes, after having, with a handful of men, put to flight all the armies of Europe; and he beheld the allies, late as insolent, now praying him, if not to lay aside his sword, at least to allow it to rest for a few days in the scabbard. Wondrous change of fortune!

roves that a man of determination and by persevering in warfare, can somewhat unexpected and fortunate opportunity circumstances apparently desperate. this last change of fortune sufficiently to serve as a permanent basis for the

Painful doubt, which it became the prudence united to genius to convert tainty. With regard to the allies, it e necessary to combine the most skill-macy with victory, in order to reduce ting of one party without depressing eration of the other, and seize, so to n the wing, the favourable opportunity ng a very difficult task, that of ne- propositions intermediate between Frankfort and Châtillon. That was

the problem that remained to be solved. Napoleon, unfortunately, trusted too much to his wonderful change of fortune to be prudent, and it is true that at this moment he was justified in indulging the strongest hopes, if he only looked at external appearances. Ah that we, too, could indulge the same hopes, and conjure up, even for an instant, a flattering illusion during this sad recital of past events! for in 1814 the question at issue was not the fate of a man, no, nor of that which, next to our native land, is perhaps the most interesting consideration in the world, the destiny of a great man: no, it was the destiny of France that was at stake,—France, half whose greatness might still be preserved, and for whom Mayence might be saved by the sacrifice of Antwerp.

BOOK LIIL.

FIRST ABDICATION.

state of Paris during Napoleon's late military operations—Secret party intrigues—Position of M. de Talley- is views; mission of M. de Vitrolles to the allied camp—Conference of Lusigny; instructions given to M. de relative to the conditions of the armistice—Efforts on our part to prejudice the question of the frontiers, by the line of separation of the armies—Retreat of the Prince de Schwarzenberg to Langres—Grand council of e—The war party wishes that Wintzingerode and Bulow's corps should be united to Blücher's army, in order e latter in a position to march on Paris—The difficulty of withdrawing these corps from Bernadotte removed extraordinary manner by Lord Castlereagh—The latter profits of this opportunity to propose the treaty of nt, which binds the coalition for twenty years, and thus becomes the basis of the Holy Alliance—Joy of and his party; his march to join Bulow and Wintzingerode—Peril of Marshal Mortier, who was sent beyond ae; and of Marmont, who was left between the Aube and the Marne—These two marshals succeed in com- their forces, and giving a check to Blücher, whilst Napoleon hastens to their aid—Rapid march of Napoleon on -Difficulty of crossing the Marne—Blücher, protected by the Marne, tries to overpower the two marshals, who en up a position behind the Ourcq—Napoleon crosses the Marne, joins the two marshals, and sets out in pur- Blücher, who is obliged to retire on the Aisne—The almost desperate position of Blücher, now threatened to be to the Aisne by Napoleon—The reduction of Soissons, which gives the Allies the command of the bridge of e, saves Blücher from certain destruction, and procures him a reinforcement of 50,000 men, by the union of erode and Blücher—Critical situation of Napoleon, and his impassable firmness on this sudden change of -His first impulse, to march upon the fortresses, collect the garrisons, and fall, with 100,000 men, on the rear—It is necessary first to face Blücher and give him battle—Napoleon captures the bridge of Berry-au-Bac, see the Aisne with 50,000 men, in sight of Blücher's 100,000—Perils of a battle to be fought with 50,000 men 100,000—Reasons that decide Napoleon to capture the plateau of Craonne, in order to advance to Laon, by the route—Bloody battle of Craonne, fought on the 7th of March, in which Napoleon carries the formidable of the enemy—After having seized the Soissons route, Napoleon wishes to penetrate into the plain of Laon, to the defeat of Blücher—New and more sanguinary battle of Laon, fought on the 9th and 10th of March, eue undecided, through Marmont's fault, who allowed himself to be surprised—Napoleon is obliged to n Soissons—His indomitable energies in an almost desperate position—Saint-Priest's corps having approached, es, cuts the corps in pieces, in the neighbourhood of Rheims, after having killed the General—Napoleon, finding in danger of being enclosed between the armies of Schwarzenberg and Blücher, resolves to execute his great of marching on the fortresses, rally the garrisons, and fall on the rear of the Allies—His directions for the of Paris during his absence—Consternation of the capital—The Council of Regency being consulted, wishes propositions of the Congress of Châtillon should be accepted—Indignation of Napoleon, who threatens to shut ecuses Joseph and all those who speak of submitting to the conditions of the enemy—Events that have ace in the South—The battle of Orthez, after which Marshal Soult advanced on Toulouse, leaving Bordeaux ed—Entrance of the English into Bordeaux, and the Bonapartes proclaimed in that city, on the 12th of March ous effect produced by these events at Paris—Napoleon, seeing the alarm of the capital, toward which chwarszenberg has advanced considerably, determines, before marching on the fortresses, to present hima-d e in the rear of Schwarzenberg, and divert his course from Paris to attack him—Movement from the Marne ine, and passage of the Seine at Méry—Napoleon finds himself unexpectedly facing the army of Bohemia— e Arcleux-Aube, fought on the 22d of March, on which occasion, 20,000 French opposed, during an entire 00 Russians and Austrians—Napoleon at length resolves to recross the Aube, and protect himself by this e advances on Saint-Dizier, in the hope of drawing the army of Bohemia after him—His project for advancing Nancy, to rally there 40,000 or 50,000 men from the different garrisons—*En route*, he is joined by M. Caulain- has been obliged to leave the congress of Châtillon, in consequence of his refusal to accept the propositions lles—Termination of the congress of Châtillon and the conference of Lusigny—Napoleon does not regret has done, and does not yet despair of success—During this time, the armies of Silesia and Bohemia, between had ceased to manoeuvre, have combined their forces in the plains of Châlons, and deliberate on what course -Grand council of the Allies—Military reasons show the importance of pursuing Napoleon, whilst political and to an opposite course, that of marching on Paris, and trying to effect a revolution in the capital—Inter- of the empress and the ministers determine the Allies to march on Paris—Influence of Count Pozzo di producing this determination—Movement of the Allies toward the capital—Marmont and Mortier, being cut Napoleon, encounter the entire allied army—Disastrous day of Fère Champenoise—Retreat of the two -Sudden appearance of the allied army before the walls of Paris—Incapacity of the war minister, and e Joseph, who have made no preparation for the defence of the capital—Council of Regency, where it is hat the government and court should retreat to Blois—Instead of organizing a popular defence of Paris, they he foolish idea of fighting a battle outside the walls—Battle of Paris, fought on the 30th of March, by 25,000 gainst 70,000 of the allied soldiers—Bravery of Mortier and Marmont—Forced capitulation of Paris—M. de wishes to remain at Paris, and obtain a mastery over the mind of Marmont—Entrance of the Allies into

the capital; their precautions; their conduct with regard to the different classes of the population—Félicitations of the crowned heads to M. de Talleyrand, whom they make, in some sense, arbiter of the destinies of France—Events that take place in the army during the march of the Allies on Paris—Brilliant combat of Saint-Dizier; fortuitous circumstance that undecides Napoleon, and shows him, at last, that he is not followed by the Allies—The evident danger of the capital and the voice of the army, make him determine to retrace his steps—His hasty return—Napoleon, in order to arrive sooner, separates from his troops and arrives at Fontainebleau between eleven o'clock and midnight, at the very moment when the capitulation of Paris was signed—His despair, his irritation; he quickly recovers himself—He suddenly conceives the project of throwing himself on the Allies dispersed in the capital, and scattered on the two banks of the Seine; but as his army has not yet joined him, he hopes to gain, by opening negotiations, the three or four days that must elapse before they can join him—He commissions M. de Caulaincourt to go to Paris to engage Alexander in negotiations, and he retires to Fontainebleau with the intention of concentrating his army there—M. de Caulaincourt accepts the mission confided to him, but with the secret resolve to sign a peace on any conditions—Reception given by the Emperor Alexander to M. de Caulaincourt—This prince, disarmed by success, becomes the most generous of conquerors—However, he promises nothing, except a becoming personal treatment for Napoleon—The allied sovereigns, with the exception of the Emperor Francis, retire to Dijon, and hold a council at M. de Talleyrand's, to decide on the form of government suitable to France—Legitimate principles happily expressed and strongly supported by M. de Talleyrand—Declaration of the crowned heads that they will not enter into further negotiations with Napoleon—Convocation of the Senate—Formation of a provisional government, at the head of which is M. de Talleyrand—Joy of the royalists; their efforts to get the Bourbons immediately proclaimed—Journey of M. de Vitrolles in search of the Count d'Artois—M. de Talleyrand, and some enlightened men by whom he is surrounded, moderate the movement of the royalists, and wish that a form of constitution should be drawn up which should be the express condition of the return of the Bourbons—Eagerness with which Alexander enters into these views—Napoleon's threatened pronouncement on the 3d of April, and a form of constitution drawn up by the senate, at once monarchical and liberal—Fruitless efforts of M. de Caulaincourt in favour of Napoleon, both with Alexander and Prince Schwarzenberg—He is sent to Fontainebleau to persuade Napoleon to abdicate; meanwhile the Allies endeavour to subvert the basis of the army—In compliance with the advice of M. de Talleyrand, the principal attempts at seduction are practised on Marshal Marmont, who, at Essonne, forms the head of the colonne de l'armée—What takes place at Fontainebleau during the proceedings at Paris—Great projects of Napoleon—His conviction that, if seconded, he can overwhelm the Allies in Paris—His military arrangements, and his extreme confidence in Marmont, whom he has stationed on the Esnonne—Evasive replies that he makes to M. de Caulaincourt, and his secret resolves for the morrow—Next day, the 4th of April, he assembles the army and announces his determination to march on Paris—Enthusiasm of the soldiers and officers, lately so dejected—Consternation of the Marshals—The latter, assuming the representation of the wretched ones, remonstrate with Napoleon—Napoleon asks them if they wish to live under the Bourbons; on their unanimous reply that they wish to live under the King of Rome, he conceives the idea of sending them to Paris with M. de Caulaincourt, to obtain the transmission of the crown to his son—Whilst he feigns to carry on this transaction, he is still resolved on a great battle in Paris, and makes every preparation for that object—Departure of the Marshals Ney and MacDonald, with M. de Caulaincourt, to negotiate the regency of Maria Louisa, and the abdication of Napoleon—Their meeting with Marmont at Essonne—Embarrassment of the latter, who acknowledges to them that he has secretly negotiated with Prince Schwarzenberg, and promised to join the Provisional Government with his corps d'armée—On their remarks he withdraws the promise made to Prince Schwarzenberg, and orders his generals, whom he has taken into his confidence, to suspend their movements—He accompanies to Paris the deposition commission to negotiate for the King of Rome—Interview of the Marshals with the Emperor Alexander—This prince, staggered for a moment, defers his decision to the following day—During this time, Napoleon having sent Marmont to Fontainebleau to prepare his great military operation, the generals of the 6th corps think they are deceived, quit the Esnonne, and execute Marmont's suspended project—This intelligence decides the allied sovereigns, and the cause of the King of Rome is indefinitely abandoned—M. de Caulaincourt is sent to Napoleon to obtain his abdication *pure et simple*—Napoleon, deprived of Marmont's corps, and no longer able to attempt any serious movement, resolves upon abdicating—Return of M. de Caulaincourt to Paris, and his efforts to obtain a suitable treatment for Napoleon and the Imperial family—Generosity of Alexander—M. de Caulaincourt obtains the Isle of Elba for Napoleon, the Grand Duchy of Parma for Maria Louisa, and the King of Rome, and pensions for all the priors of the Imperial family—His return to Fontainebleau—Napoleon attempts to commit suicide—His resignation—Effusion of his sentiments and his language—Constitution of the senate, and entrance of the Count d'Artois into Paris on the 12th of April—Enthusiasm and hopes of the Parisians—Departure of Napoleon for the Isle of Elba—General view of the greatness and errors of the Imperial reign.

NAPOLEON wished to afford some comfort to the Parisians, who had of late been so terribly alarmed; he wished to make them enjoy his triumphs, and he wished above all to raise their spirits, which would be a serious advantage with regard to the organization of his forces, for little public aid can be obtained from a dispirited people. Influenced by these considerations, he had commanded a military and religious ceremony for the reception of the standards, and the entrance into Paris of the twenty-five thousand prisoners captured from the enemy. He wished that these prisoners, crossing Paris from east to west, should traverse the entire extent of the boulevards, in order that the Parisians might be visually assured of the reality of the wonders performed by their emperor. The difficulties of Napoleon's position must serve as an excuse for this ostentatious display.

When the approach of these prisoners was announced, all the population of Paris thronged to the boulevards, to see defile before them Prussians, Austrians, and Russians, marching disarmed, headed by their officers and generals. The prisoners, indeed, displayed no arrogance in their demeanour, neither did they seem utterly dejected; it was easy to discern in their faces a very different expression from that formerly manifested by the captives taken at Austerlitz and Jena. There was a certain look of

confidence and real pride at having been captured so close to our capital.

Though the people of Paris were tired of the Imperial rule, and perfectly well aware of the bad effects of a despotism which, after having formerly carried war even to the gates of the Kremlin, now brought it back to the foot of Montmartre, still the mass of the people, yielding to the impression of the moment, could not help applauding Napoleon's late successes, and experienced an intense satisfaction in beholding defile before them these foreign soldiers conquered and captured, whom they had feared to see enter Paris as conquerors and destroyers. As to the rest, with a delicacy natural to the French people, they offered no offence to the prisoners. Their thoughtlessness, alas! had been too great. After the first emotion of triumph, the French lookers-on experienced a movement of pity, and more than one kind and compassionate creature offered an alms, that was received with sincere gratitude.

At court, affairs assumed a calmer aspect. Numerous visitors flocked round the empress and the King of Rome, and among them were conspicuous those high functionaries who, having believed the Imperial throne to be in danger, had, by removing to a distance, hoped to escape being crushed in the ruins. They reappeared in high spirits, though some seemed rather anxious about the reception they should receive.

all lauding the glorious campaign whose success they had condemned some days before; they who within the forty-eight hours declared that the emperor was mad not to open the frontiers of 1790, now exclaimed just so dishonouring a peace, and protested that the Frankfort bases ought to be the plute condition of the future peace. Maria was too little acquainted with our country to understand and judge these men, besides; was now almost as much agitated by joy he had before been by fear; but she gave her visitors a kindly reception, and began latter herself that she should soon see a return of those glorious days that inaugurated arrival in France.*

his joy, the thoughtlessness it induces and uses, was by no means discernible among adverse parties. Though these parties were distinct,—the old revolutionists and the royalists,—still, both agreed in regretting the loss of Napoleon, though the revolutionists experienced an emotion something like joy, so they did they dread the foreign Powers and not the Bourbons. The royalists, after long for a moment hoped the return of their loved princes, asked themselves now, with caution, whether they must suddenly abandon hope. They sought an excuse for their reticence in the misfortunes that Napoleon brought on France, and said within themselves that any hand, even that of a foreigner, might be welcome, if it delivered them from odious a despotism. Still, they contented themselves with forming wishes, and remained completely inactive. Whispered conversations between members of the ancient nobility and clergy, malevolent reports, in which our errors were exaggerated and our triumphs disputed, with an inert resistance to the measures of the administration,—these constituted their entire efforts against the Imperial Government. The emigrants, who since the revolution had lived abroad with the Bourbon princes, had almost lost the habit of corresponding with their friends in the interior of France. They made an effort to resume their connections now, but met no encouragement; and indeed in the provinces threatened with invasion no one would have dared to aid them in proclaiming the Bourbons. A few royalists scarcely dared venture a manifestation in the cities already entirely occupied by the allied armies. At Lyons, two old Chevaliers of St. Louis had presented a petition to Alexander, praying the re-establishment of the Bourbons. This was an act of imprudence, for which these unfortunate men paid dearly. At Paris, two members of the old nobility were talked of—the comte de Polignac—who, having been transferred from the jail to a mad-house, had expired, and gone at every risk to offer to the duc d'Artois their faithful services. It was evident that nothing serious could be expected by these men, who during twenty-

five years had been too much estranged from French affairs to possess any influence in the country. It would be necessary that members of the actual Government, some of whom were discontented with Napoleon, who had ill treated them, and others who were desirous of securing a position for themselves under the new régime, should stretch forth a hand to the royalists if a plot of any importance were to be framed, every precaution being taken to conceal the movement. Something of the kind was actually attempted, but with profound secrecy and fear.

Of all the malcontents whom the imperial régime had created, the most conspicuous—he who most occupied the minds of the friends of the Bourbons as well as the friends of the Bonapartes—was M. de Talleyrand. He was the object of the hopes of the one party and of the fear of the other, and though he was in a position to play a great part, and on the eve of doing so, both parties greatly exaggerated what he could or what he would dare to do. Were the decisive moment come, Napoleon completely conquered, and the enemy in possession of Paris, it was incontestable that M. de Talleyrand was the only man capable of constructing a new Government on the ruins of the overthrown dynasty; but to believe that he had either the ability or the will to take the initiative in a revolution, whilst the *drapeau tricolor* still floated on the Tuileries, was a groundless terror on the part of the imperial police, and a pleasing illusion cherished in the royalist coteries. M. de Talleyrand's ill will toward the emperor was undoubtedly as strong as it could be, but neither the means at his disposal nor his personal courage were commensurate with his inclination. By refusing the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, two months previously, because he would not be allowed at the same time to keep his rank of grand dignitary, he had almost broken off his connection with the imperial house, and, as we have seen, Napoleon had, on the very eve of his departure for the army, treated him in a manner calculated to awaken his most lively fears. He had learned from hints thrown out by persons connected with the Bourbons—what, indeed, he knew before—that the aid of a married bishop would be favourably received by these pious princes, for there is no difficulty that cannot be overcome when there is a question of services,—not services already rendered, but which are to be rendered. Some persons have a very pliant memory: they forget or remember according to the interests of the hour. M. de Talleyrand, with his profound knowledge of men and things, had nothing to learn in his quality of politician; having finished with the Bonapartes, it was easy to recommence with the Bourbons. But he well knew the Duke of Rovigo,—easy-mannered, familiar, even friendly, with the persons upon whom he was acting as a spy, but capable, upon any serious suspicion, or at the first order from Napoleon, of laying his coarse soldier hand on the flowing mantle of a grand dignitary. Influenced by these considerations, M. de Talleyrand was extremely circumspect.

At his mansion in the *Rue Saint-Florin*, which has since become celebrated, M. de

I do not fancy say thing. I quote these details from correspondence of the Minister of Police, and from that the High Chancellor, who informed Napoleon of the minute details. I inform the reader of this for the interest, and happily the last, time; for I am near the end of my task. But I do not weary of defending my rectitude as a historian, and this is a scrupulousity that readers will pardon me, for it will prove to him, I hope, a love of truth.

Talleyrand received, among other persons, the Duke de Dalberg, the Abbé de Pradt, and the Baron Louis.

M. de Dalberg was descended from the illustrious Dalbergs of Germany, and nephew to the Prince Primate. He was first an enemy, afterward a friend, to the Imperial dynasty. During the time when Church property was being secularized, he came in for a large share, but he afterward quarreled with Napoleon, because the latter had transferred the lands of the Prince Primate to Prince Eugene. The Duke de Dalberg was short of stature; in manner, a mixture of the French and German; his countenance was animated, his temper lively; his opinions were frankly liberal, and his intellect strong and subtle. He had often given vent to his discontent at M. de Talleyrand's with a freedom that had brought his young wife into disgrace at court. He was annoyed at this, and did not conceal his vexation. The Abbé de Pradt had been banished to his diocese since his unfortunate embassy to Warsaw, an affair difficult in itself, and rendered still more so by the defects of the abbé's temper. He had returned to Paris since our late reverses, and mingled his observations with those of the Duke de Dalberg in a tone that could not fail to attract the attention of the police even had they been far less observant than they really were. Baron Louis had formerly taken minor orders, but afterward abandoned the idea of entering the Church, and devoted himself to the study of political economy. He was endowed with a true genius for finance, and a spirit at once active and persevering. He was an advocate of that legitimate liberty which sound policy sanctions; he detested the Imperial *régime* from motives dictated by an enlightened reason, and was always happy to associate with men of high intellect whose opinions corresponded with his own.

These personages and some others met frequently at M. de Talleyrand's, and there gave utterance to their sentiments. The petulant Abbé de Pradt declared with his characteristic vivacity, and without circumlocution, that the Bourbons ought to be put in the place of the Bonapartes; the Duke de Dalberg spoke less openly, though he was equally desirous of effecting the same object, and capable of working more systematically for the attainment of his ends. Baron Louis wished that a termination should be put to a despotism which during the last two years had exceeded all bounds. M. de Talleyrand heard all this with his ordinary air of languid indifference. He listened with attention sufficient to encourage the speakers without compromising himself personally. Sometimes, however, he gave utterance to his sentiments with one of his visitors, rarely with two; but he always selected the Duke de Dalberg, of whose hardihood, dexterity, and numerous connections he was well aware, and from whom he might expect efficacious aid. He looked upon the Abbé de Pradt as a giddy-brain, and considered the Baron Louis as a profound financier, both useful on certain occasions, but he gave neither his confidence, for at that moment he did not need either the brilliant talents of the one, or the solid qualities of the other. He listened to their observations with a smile at once ap-

proving and evasive, and after having heard their opinions, he issued from his house and went to pay a visit to the Duke de Rovigo, under pretext of asking the news of the day. To the duke he testified the most lively interest in the success of the French army, affected to regret the inability of the greater number of Napoleon's agents, and said it was very unfortunate that so great a man should be so ill served. In all this the Duke de Rovigo coincided, for this minister, discontented with the greater number of his colleagues, complaining of being no longer listened to by Napoleon, regretting that he was separated from M. de Talleyrand, was one of those who would listen to any reasonable criticism of the existing state of things, provided the censure sprang from a spirit of devotedness to the Imperial Government, and not from a desire to overthrow it. With the Duke de Rovigo, M. de Talleyrand affected to be of the number of those who blame because they love: still he only half deceived his clear-sighted interlocutor, but he deceived him sufficiently to weaken the effect of the remarks uttered at the mansion, Rue Saint-Florentin. Having returned to his own house, M. de Talleyrand again listened to those daring conversations, but acknowledged only to the Duke de Dalberg his desire to withdraw from an insupportable yoke; with him he talked over the means, but was yet far from discovering them. To attempt any thing whilst the allies were still so distant from Paris, seemed to him impracticable. One idea had great weight both with the Duke de Dalberg and M. de Talleyrand; it was, that by manœuvring between the Seine and the Marne, and prolonging the negotiations at Châtillon, the allies were preserving for Napoleon his only chances of safety. To break off all negotiation with him, and then point him out to France as the only obstacle to peace; to take advantage of an interval between the rejection of one set of propositions and the framing of others, and seize upon the capital; these were, in their opinion, the only means of putting an end to the war. The allies should have so soon reached the gates of Paris, than their friends inside would rise in their favour, and declare Napoleon dethroned. By these means they would break in his grasp the sword which it was impossible to wrench from him.

These were the ideas which M. de Talleyrand and the Duke de Dalberg wished to communicate to the allied sovereigns, but it is a singular proof of the little intercourse that existed between those in the city and those outside, that they had not been able to find any one who might act as intermediary. Thus, though the Messrs. Polignac had succeeded in escaping, they had brought no communication from M. de Talleyrand nor from the Duke de Dalberg, the only men, at that moment, able to serve the Bourbon cause.

There was, however, at Paris, a gentleman of Dauphiny, possessed of high intelligence and courage. He had served formerly in the army of Condé, and, though still a royalist in feeling, had kept up a connection with his compatriot, M. de Montalivet, who had obtained for him the title of Baron and that of Inspector of the Imperial Sheepwalks. Notwithstanding the slender tie with which these demi-favours

had attached him to the empire, he felt his heart bound at the slightest hope of again seeing the Bourbons in France. This Dauphinois gentleman was M. de Vitrolles. Fond of coming into contact with men in place, both through curiosity and ambition, he had made the acquaintance of the Duke de Dalberg, who knew all the restless spirits of the time and was known by them. The duke introduced him to M. de Talleyrand, whom he sometimes visited. M. de Dalberg, looking for a bold-spirited deputy, who would venture to repair to the head-quarters of the allies and make known there his opinions and those of M. de Talleyrand, thought of M. de Vitrolles, and found him quite ready to undertake the journey. The difficulty was in accrediting M. de Vitrolles to these great personages—sovereigns and ministers—who held their sittings at Langres, at Brienne, and at Troyes, as the exigencies of the war required. One man alone could give credentials that would secure a reception to the person that should come in his name, and this man was M. de Talleyrand. But he would never confide to any one whomsoever a positive proof of his having acted against the established Government, and he had refused to send any thing but very sensible advice, which could be transmitted verbally to the allied sovereigns and ministers. M. de Dalberg, who never hesitated when he could advance a step toward his object, did what M. de Talleyrand would not venture to do. A German by birth, he had frequently met M. de Stadion at Vienna; he furnished M. de Vitrolles some tokens, sufficient to prove incontestably that the bearer came from him, and sent him forth charged to relate what we have already explained, and what the Count Pozzo di Borgo repeated every day to the Emperor Alexander, that is to say, that the allies ought to break off all communication with Napoleon and march without delay on Paris. The armistice, which appeared to be in process of negotiation at the outposts, and intelligence of which had already reached Paris, was, in the eyes of the Duke de Dalberg, an additional reason for informing the allies immediately, that to negotiate with Napoleon was to stretch out to him a supporting hand at the very moment that he was about to fall. After having seen the sovereigns and the foreign ministers, M. de Vitrolles was to visit the Count d'Artois, who was reported to be at that time in Franche-Comté, and give him good advice, of which this prince stood more in need than the ministers of the coalition. M. de Vitrolles set out by the Sens route, with fictitious passports, and this he effected without the knowledge of the Duke de Rovigo. The secret of his mission was confined to himself, M. de Talleyrand, and the Duke de Dalberg. Being obliged to traverse the French and allied armies, he had numerous difficulties to overcome, and could not arrive very speedily at the head-quarters whither he was bound.

Whilst these secret plots were being prepared, which, however, contributed much less than his own errors to the fall of Napoleon, the latter had entered Troyes, and turned his attention to the conditions of the proposed armistice. The armistice, considered as a means of allowing the allies to gain time whilst he lost it, presented no great advantages, for

he wished, on the contrary, to meet them as soon as possible and fight a decisive battle. But the armistice would be useful to him as a means of negotiating more directly, more immediately under his own eye, and whilst the impression of his late successes was still vivid. He had, therefore, consented to send one of his aides-de-camp to the outposts, and had confided this mission to the Count de Flahaut.* His instructions were to refuse a suspension of hostilities during the negotiation, for Napoleon was unwilling, for the sake of exchanging a few remarks that might never produce any result, to allow Prince Schwarzenberg to escape. He was further instructed to require a preamble, declaring that the treaty for peace should be on the Frankfort bases, and, lastly, to draw the line of separation between the belligerent armies in such a way as to imply that Mayence and Antwerp were to belong to France. Should these conditions be accepted, Napoleon could, in fact, lay down his arms, for he would probably have no further occasion to resume them, as he was resolved not to continue the struggle if the allies allowed him to retain the line of the Rhine and the Alps. But to lay down his arms without a guarantee of the Frankfort bases, would be, in his eyes, to lose all the advantages he had lately acquired, fortune having now, as he believed, declared in his favour.

M. de Flahaut left Troyes on the 24th, the very day that Napoleon entered the city; he repaired to the village of Lusigny, about three leagues distant, and found there M. de Schouvaloff on the part of Russia, M. de Rauch to represent the interests of Prussia, and M. de Langenau for Austria. At this moment, Marshal Oudinot, pressing the enemy's rear-guard on Vandœuvre, was riddling with balls the very place where the negotiators were about to assemble. At M. de Flahaut's request, the marshal turned his arms elsewhere, and the village of Lusigny was declared neutral ground.

The envoys of the allied Powers appeared to desire a prompt solution of the impending difficulties. M. de Flahaut announced without delay the conditions of which he was the bearer, and he proposed two things—first, the continuation of hostilities during the negotiations, and, secondly, the insertion of a preamble ratifying the Frankfort bases. These two points were not of a nature to please the other envoys, for the first proposal deprived the armistice of its principal interest, and the second gave it a signification contrary to the designs of the coalition. Evidently discontented, the three commissioners replied that they had not the authority to treat diplomatic questions. To procure a short suspension of hostilities, and to fix temporarily the boundaries on which the belligerent armies should pause, constituted, they said, their sole mission. They wished to leave immediately, but M. de Flahaut detained them, and begged them to ask for fresh instructions, promising to do the same himself. They consented to remain at Lusigny, on condition that all the commissioners should write

* These instructions are still at the office of the Secretary of State. They were not, as has been said, purely verbal. Their purport has, therefore, been very clearly ascertained.

to their respective head-quarters for fresh instructions.

Napoleon, though he was firmly resolved not to yield on the question of the natural frontiers, and that for this reason he did not wish to interrupt the course of his successes excepting to be assured of the Frankfort bases, still he was not wholly indifferent to the advantage of concluding an armistice, which would be equivalent to signing the preliminaries of peace, and which would induce a momentary tranquillization of the intense animosity excited against him. He therefore abandoned the preamble, which it was difficult to insert in a mere armistice, and consented to the continuation of the negotiations, hoping by some happy circumvention to return to his original object. If, for example, in fixing the limits that were to separate the armies, he could persuade the allies to leave him Antwerp as a boundary in the Low Countries, and Chambéry in the direction of Savoy, he would induce, from this concession, the strongest presumption for the definite regulation of the frontiers. He consequently authorized M. de Flahaut to continue the negotiations commenced at Lusigny, even though the preamble touching the Frankfort bases should not be accorded; but he was to propose that the allied armies should retire beyond Antwerp in the Low Countries, and that in Savoy they should not advance to Chambéry, to which they were then very near. If the allied commissioners accepted this line of demarkation, it would be a presumption in favour of the natural frontiers, which, without being equivalent to the mention of the Frankfort bases, would be, in point of fact, an acceptance of the natural frontiers.

It was according to these instructions that M. de Flahaut was to continue the negotiations at Lusigny. General Langenau, who had fallen ill, had been replaced by General Ducca, who was bearer of the most pacific assurances and advice from the Emperor Francis. The new Austrian envoy was charged earnestly to advise Napoleon, through M. de Flahaut, not to persevere in continuing the war, for the present opportunity was the last when he could, under the influence of his recent successes, treat advantageously. The advice was excellent, if by making certain sacrifices Napoleon could obtain better terms than the frontiers of 1790,—if, for example, by giving up Antwerp and Brussels he could retain Mayence and Cologne. But if this advice meant that, in order to save the dynasty, it would be necessary to abandon all the acquisitions made by France since 1790, the advice, which it was natural to a father-in-law to give, would be unbecoming in Napoleon to follow, and his determination to perish, though his ruin should involve that of thousands of men, was more consonant with his real glory and the true interests of France.

In the official conferences, Messrs. de Schouvaloff, de Rauch, and Ducca declared—as might have been foreseen—that they had met merely to consider some military arrangements; that all consideration touching other subjects was entirely foreign to their mission; that they had received formal instructions to abstain from such matters; and that, consequently, the required preamble was inadmissible.

This declaration not having produced on M. de Flahaut's part a rupture of the conference, the commissioners proceeded to the discussion of the line of demarkation. The French commissioner proposed his, conformable to the views we have explained; the allied commissioners proposed theirs, conformable to the political resolutions of their courts. They wished to advance northward as far as Lille; they consented to retrograde a little in Champagne and Burgundy, leaving the possession of Vitry, Chaumont, and Langres an open question; but they obstinately refused any concession touching Chambéry; and thus, like Napoleon, they reproduced indirectly in the conditions of the armistice the fundamental pretensions of their respective courts. The discussions continued, and the deputies again applied for fresh instructions, which would necessarily prolong the negotiation for some days.

The conferences might have been broken up now; for it was easy to see that the deputies would not come to an agreement unless some important military events occurred immediately. But it did not suit either party to break off just then; for these negotiations, not causing a suspension of hostilities, did no injury to either side; and Prince Schwarzenberg hoped that, during the negotiations, Napoleon's military operations might in some degree be relaxed. Napoleon, on his side, though firmly determined to continue the struggle, still feeling the necessity of peace, did not wish to close this way of obtaining his object by negotiation which now opened to his view. He could at any moment shut it up by a single word, and, by leaving it open, he had a resource in case of necessity, and the means of arresting the up-raised arm of the combatants. He therefore allowed his commissioner to discuss with those of the allies the innumerable sinuosities of a line of demarkation which, commencing at Antwerp, was to terminate at Chambéry.

During the two days that the negotiations lasted,—the 24th and 25th of February,—Napoleon was unfortunately guilty of an act of vengeance, the combined result of premeditation and anger.

On entering into Troyes, he was assailed by cries from a portion of the population, denouncing certain individuals guilty, as they said, of having treated with the enemy during their stay in the capital of Champagne. Though everybody was tired of the imperial régime, still at the sight of foreigners and at the name of the Bourbons, this unanimity of opinion disappeared, to give place to the old party divisions. The partisans of royalty, on making their appearance, awakened in the hearts of the revolutionists a very natural anger, especially when they saw the royalists appeal to the enemies of France to secure the triumph of their cause. At Troyes, two Chevaliers of Saint Louis—Messrs. de Vidrange and de Gonault—displayed the white cockade, and presented an address to Alexander, praying the restoration of the Bourbons. It was the first manifestation of this kind that the allied sovereigns had met since their entrance into France; and Alexander, with a sentiment of humanity that does him honour, did not

omit remarking to those who had indulged in this exhibition of royalty, that nothing was more variable than the movements of armies, alternately exposed to advance or retire; and, above all, that nothing being more uncertain than a change of dynasty in France, he feared they had committed an imprudence which might be fatal to them. Spite of this observation, the imprudence was committed, and the royalists of Troyes had done nothing to extenuate it: they had, on the contrary, displayed a kind of ostentation, indicative, certainly, of courage, in decking themselves with the white cockade.

The people of Troyes, though many royalists were to be found among them, were very much irritated against those who had appeared to sympathize with the enemy. On this account, denunciations smote the ears of Napoleon on every side when he entered the city. On hearing what had taken place, his anger blazed forth, and he ordered the arrest of those who had been pointed out to him as criminals. Reflection, instead of calming his passion, rather served to excite it. At this moment the news arrived of the sudden appearance of the Count d'Artois in Franche-Comté, whilst the Duke d'Angoulême appeared in Gayenne, and the Duke de Berry off the coast of Brittany. It might happen that the royalist movements would serve the allied armies, and even produce a bad effect at Paris. Napoleon, therefore, resolved to stop these party movements by a severe measure, which, falling on one or two rash men, would have the effect of restraining others. The crime committed at Troyes could easily be proved, the law was unquestionably clear on the matter, and the process of military law which the condition of the country warranted was rapid and certain in execution.

Napoleon gave orders to arrest the accused and bring them before this exceptional tribunal. M. de Vidranges, one of the two accused, had taken flight. M. de Gonault, an old white-headed man, who had been drawn into this affair by others, had not thought of escaping. He was arrested, judged, condemned, and delivered over to the power of the military law.

An excellent man, equerry to the emperor and devoted to his person,—M. de Mesgrigny, —a native of Champagne, anxious to save his compatriots, threw himself, with the family of the criminal, at the feet of Napoleon. The latter, whose anger was quick but transient, was touched at the sight of the suppliants, and said, "Well, let him be pardoned if there is still time." The friends of the accused hastened to announce the pardon; but the unfortunate old man was already shot.

Napoleon sincerely regretted this event; but, when thousands of human beings were falling every instant around him, he was not the man likely to dwell long on such incidents. He again turned his attention to that theatre where he was called on to direct the most important events and which succeeded each other with wondrous rapidity. At this moment, in fact, new movements were discernible on the part of the enemy, which had the effect of exciting his genius to the creation of new and formidable combinations.

Prince Schwarzenberg had fallen back on Chaumont, having left at Bar-sur-Aube the Bavarians of the Marshal de Wrede, the Russians of Prince Wittgenstein, and, along the Aube, the Wurtembergers of the Prince Royal, with the Austrian corps of Giulay. He had at Chaumont even the Russian and Prussian guards, and a corps of grenadiers and cuirassiers, that constituted a part of the Austrian reserve. He had detached a portion of Colloredo's corps through Dijon on Lyons, to go to the relief of Bubna. His forces were consequently greatly diminished: he had not more than 90,000 men under his command.

Blucher had remained between the Seine and the Aube, manœuvring from Méry to Arcis with 48,000 men, awaiting impatiently a signal for the pitched battle, in which he flattered himself to be able, not alone to avenge his recent humiliations, but to seize the keys of Paris. When his staff learned that the commander-in-chief had abandoned the idea of fighting this battle, and had even fallen back on Langres, there was, as may be easily supposed, a violent outcry raised against the Austrians,—against their weakness, their duplicity, and intrigues. The temporizing Austrian, Prince Schwarzenberg, was treated as men of his stamp have always been by their irritable *confrères*. The Prussians said that if the troops of Maria-Louisa's father abandoned the cause of the allies, that should not prevent them from marching on Paris: they would be able to make their way to that city spite of Napoleon and spite of his boasting soldiers, that now thought themselves all-victorious. The Prussians certainly had reason to feel proud and self-confident when they thought of Montmirail and Vau-champs.

And yet in this fiery-spirited Prussian staff there was no authority for action but what was assumed in disobeying the King of Prussia; and, though they were quite willing to make use of this species of authority, they were not daring enough to venture a march on Paris with 48,000 men. They had recourse to the usual means. They applied to the Emperor Alexander, whom they were sure of bringing over to their opinions by flattery, and accordingly sent emissaries to ask him two things,—liberty of action for the army of Silesia, and a considerable augmentation of troops, which could be easily procured. This augmentation might consist of the addition of Bulow and Wintzingerode's corps, the one Prussian, the other Russian, that, after leaving detachments in the Low Countries to blockade the fortresses, were advancing through the Ardennes. These troops should, indeed, be withdrawn from Bernadotte, under whose command they then were; but there were many causes of complaint then existing against the Swedish prince. The Prussians questioned his capacity, his courage, and his honesty. They pronounced him to be a soldier without energy, and a traitor to the interests of Europe, occupying more than 100,000 men in his own affair of Norway, and thus endangering the safety of the coalition, through want of sufficient forces to concentrate on a defensive point. Bernadotte had, it is true, at last marched to the Rhine, whither he had

been preceded by Bulow and Wintzingerode's corps. "But," the Prussians said, "he would always make use of these troops for the advancement of his personal views, trying to become, for example, Emperor of the French, if from the throne of Sweden he could spring upon that of France." By withdrawing Bulow and Wintzingerode's 50,000 men from Bernadotte, and putting them under the command of Blücher, the latter would have 100,000 men under his command, and might, by advancing on Napoleon's rear, dissipate the phantom that kept Prince Schwarzenberg motionless, through terror, at Chaumont.

Such were the sentiments that Blücher's envoys were commissioned to express to the Emperor Alexander; and these sentiments were likely to be well received, with the exception of what was directed against his protégé Bernadotte.

Alexander listened to what was said with much satisfaction and good will. Some days had elapsed since the mischances of Nangis and Montereau; and his lively imagination having recovered the shocks then experienced, was again inflamed in contemplating the prospect of entering Paris which was now laid open before him. He listened favourably to Blücher's propositions, and convoked a council of the allies to take them into consideration. The discussion was very warm. Besides the three sovereigns, there were present at this council Messrs. de Metternich, de Nesselrode, de Hardenberg, Lord Castlereagh, Prince Schwarzenberg, and the principal generals of the coalition. Alexander condemned the armistice and the temporizing system, insisted on the necessity of carrying on the war with vigour, and declared that, for his part, he was willing to carry it on with his faithful ally the King of Prussia, should the others abandon him; upon which the Emperor Francis demanded whether he was no longer numbered among those of the coalition that could be reckoned on. Thereupon the allied sovereigns shook hands and agreed upon the necessity of acting promptly and vigorously, so as to leave no respite to the common enemy. After some explanations, more unanimity of opinion was found to exist among them than was at first expected. Both sides admitted that the armistice compromised no principle, for it did not even suspend hostilities, and the only proposition that could either directly or indirectly derogate from the propositions of Châtillon had been carefully removed. There was consequently no change in the actual position of the allied Powers. They had certainly paused at Chaumont; but it was the result of a very natural prudence that they should remain at a distance from Napoleon, whilst they were obliged to lessen their own strength by sending to Count de Bubna, at Dijon, succours that were declared indispensable. As to the rest, the formation of a powerful army that might act on Napoleon's flanks and force him to fall back was an excellent project, to which no objection could be made if the means existed of carrying it into effect. To grant Marshal Blücher perfect liberty of action and increase his army to double the present number was not objected to by any one. The great difficulty consisted of depriving the jealous and susceptible Berna-

dotte of two corps that constituted the chief part of the forces under his command. He had already complained, and even threatened, because it seemed to him that his services were not rated as highly as they deserved; and he hinted that he might possibly retire to his tent and withdraw his aid. Different causes had concurred to ruffle his temper. Austria continued to protect Denmark against Sweden, and had refused to admit a Swedish plenipotentiary to the Châtillon congress. As to this second point, it must not be forgotten that England, Prussia, Russia, and Austria were empowered to treat for the allied estates, great and small; and certainly Prince Bernadotte's personal worth did not confer so much importance on Sweden as to entitle her to be classed as a sixth great Power. To these two causes of discontent was added a third, more intense in its action, though not so openly avowed. The English minister, often indirectly questioned as to the projects of the coalition with regard to the throne of France, had told the inquisitive Bernadotte, flatly, that the allied Powers were not making war for the purpose of substituting one dynasty for another, that questions of home government did not concern them, that they would allow France to choose for herself should another revolution break out, but that as far as the English were concerned they considered the Bourbon alone fit to replace the Bonaparte dynasty. The new-made Swede, who would willingly have again become French to obtain the throne of France, displayed, from the time of this explanation, extreme ill humour at the slightest contradiction. The allies certainly did not fear him; still, a disturbance of any kind in the affairs of the coalition, whilst all their forces were engaged against Napoleon, would be of some importance, and they feared to get into difficulties by depriving Bernadotte of the most considerable portion of his army.

The allies were only stopped by this apprehension, and Alexander, notwithstanding his desire to satisfy the hot-tempered Blücher, hesitated, as well as the other members of the council, when Lord Castlereagh, rising suddenly and acting as a Providence that determines every thing, asked the military men whether they really considered the addition of Bulow and Wintzingerode's corps necessary to the army of Silesia. Having received a reply in the affirmative, he declared that he would take upon himself to smooth away all difficulties with the Prince Royal of Sweden. This declaration put an end to all hesitation, and it was decided that Blücher should receive the addition of Bulow and Wintzingerode's corps, with permission to manoeuvre between the Seine and the Marne in whatever way he believed most advantageous to the general interests of the war. Alexander dismissed Blücher's emissaries filled with joy; and it must be said, in relating to them what had taken place, he very much exaggerated what the advocates of active measures owed to him on this occasion.

But what means did Lord Castlereagh possess of arranging every thing by his own authority? We shall explain this in a few words. In the first place, his mind was clear-sighted and firm; he was consequently able to seize at once the essential points of an argument. In the next

place he held in his hands the power that springs from money, and in the present instance this was a very great power, considering that Sweden was not rich enough to pay her army. To have or not to have twenty-five millions, was the same for Bernadotte as having or not having a Swedish army. Besides, Sweden, surrounded on every side by the English navy, durst not venture one false step. And lastly, Lord Castlereagh possessed the means of soothing the Prince of Sweden's pride. A German corps, drawn from the different principalities lately separated from France, had been embodied in Hanover and paid by England. This corps amounted to 25,000 men, commanded by General Walmoden. There were 7000 or 8000 English in Holland, under General Graham. The Prince of Orange was busy recruiting the Dutch army, and had already assembled from 10,000 to 12,000 men, who were also to receive their pay out of British subsidies. Lord Castlereagh need only say a word, and all these troops passed under the command of such or such a general. He decided they should be placed under the orders of the Prince of Sweden, who would then combine under his authority, besides Swedes and Danes, who had been forced to give in their submission, Germans, English, and Dutch, including the Prince of Orange. The command of such a variety of troops would give him in the North the appearance of a king of kings, which ought to satisfy his pride, and indemnify him for the troops of which he was deprived.

Bernadotte was made acquainted with these arrangements, and an order immediately despatched to the corps of Bulow and Winzingerode to place themselves under the command of Marshal Blücher.

Lord Castlereagh profited of what had occurred to render the coalition a fresh service, not less important than the preceding.

The want of union among the allies was deeply felt, and it was feared every moment that the present coalition might dissolve, like all those which during the last twenty years had fallen beneath the sword of Napoleon. The bare thought of such an event was alarming, for if the allies committed the error of breaking up the coalition, the tyrant of Europe, as they called the Emperor of the French, would again become as powerful, and more malignant than ever, and would not fail to trample on his present opponents. This well-founded fear obtained in the highest degree in the allied camp, and yet did not prevent disagreeable remarks, ill offices, and violent private quarrels. The late letters from Napoleon to the Emperor Francis and Prince Schwarzenberg, which the Austrian cabinet had too much tact to conceal, had increased the general feeling of apprehension, and though the fidelity of Austria did not appear to be shaken, still it was desirable that the bonds of the coalition should be drawn closer, in order to convince Napoleon that neither his profound running nor his formidable sword could sever the ties that bound his enemies together.

Lord Castlereagh was now revolving in his mind some striking measure by which the union of the allied Powers might be more firmly cemented. Happily, an opportunity, the natural result of circumstances, soon pre-

sented itself. This was the conclusion of the new financial arrangements, which the three Powers had incessantly solicited since it had been decided that the war should be carried beyond the Rhine, and it was on this account Count Pozzo had been sent to London. These fresh arrangements offered an opportunity of binding the allies more closely together than anything that had yet occurred, for they could now stipulate with what intentions, for what length of time, and in what proportion, each should contribute to the common cause, and they should also consider what kind of alliance should be formed to secure, after the great struggle should be terminated, the results that had been obtained. It was in accordance with these views that Lord Castlereagh projected, and ordered to be drawn up, a new treaty, that he resolved to offer for signature to the allied courts. This treaty, besides the general object of cementing the union of the allied Powers, had a particular object, exclusively English,—that of increasing Great Britain's continental importance, and so securing her the means of carrying out certain views which she had very much at heart.

Lord Castlereagh consequently devised a solemn alliance between England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, by which each of these Powers was pledged to furnish a permanent contingent of 150,000 men until the present war should be terminated in a manner conformable to their wishes. The 600,000 men that this combination would place at the disposal of the coalition did not include the levies to be supplied by the secondary Powers, and which, united to the others, would furnish a total of 800,000 men. England, not being able to contribute 150,000 men from her own troops, undertook to subsidize foreign soldiers. She had 100,000 men in Spain, including English, Portuguese, and Spaniards, and it would be easy for her, with Hanoverians, Germans of different states, and Dutch, to raise a new contingent of 50,000 men.

Great Britain would thus acquire, independent of her maritime importance, a continental influence almost equal to that enjoyed by the three continental Powers. To this she was able to add an influence peculiar to herself, that of money, and Lord Castlereagh took upon himself to offer an annual subsidy of six millions sterling, to be paid during the entire duration of the war; and this money was to be equally divided between Russia, Prussia, and Austria. Thus England contributed a double aid to the common undertaking; a triple aid, indeed, if we take her navy into account; and the assistance she rendered ought naturally to give her a decisive authority over the other Powers, and be a pledge that the conditions of the future peace should be based on her wishes.

It was further stipulated that the allies should promise not to listen to any private proposition, but to treat in common with the common enemy, according to the accepted conditions. Lord Castlereagh, wishing, moreover, to provide for the future, and to bind the allies to the work they should have accomplished, conceived the project of maintaining the coalition for twenty years after the conclusion of the approaching peace. Each of the allies

should be bound, after the close of the war, to keep on foot 60,000 men, making a total of 240,000, for the service of whichever of the allies France might attack, if after the conclusion of the peace she renewed her aggressions against her neighbours. This was a means of guaranteeing the existence of two kingdoms, whose creation England earnestly desired; that of the Low Countries, because it deprived us of Antwerp, and that of Piedmont, because it robbed us of Genoa.

There was an idea that began to find favour among the diplomatists of the coalition; it was, not only to grant possessions on the left of the Rhine to the House of Orange, but also to grant some to Prussia, in order to establish an unceasing source of jealousy between that Power and France. This idea had originated with Mr. Pitt in 1805, and was adopted by Lord Castlereagh, as it seemed an important means of strengthening the new kingdom that was to be created by the union of Belgium and Holland. This projected arrangement, which was advantageous to Prussia, though it compromised her with us, was not likely to meet any opposition; for to overthrow France, and bind her in iron fetters after having overthrown her, was at that time the wish, the hope, the joy, of all Europe. But these events also furnished each of the sovereigns an opportunity of gratifying his private interests. Thus, for example, Russia demanded as a recompense for the arrangements to which she lent her aid, that Holland should give her a full receipt for the loans contracted at Amsterdam. England, as we have already seen, in order to complete her work, wished to marry the Princess Charlotte, heiress to the British crown, to the son of the Prince of Orange, and thus unite, in some sort, under the same sceptre, the three kingdoms of the British Empire and the new monarchy of the Low Countries.

In burdening England with enormous expenses, the new treaty afforded her such great advantages, that the bold-minded minister had not hesitated to propose the conditions, and insisted on their acceptance as a point which he would not yield. Consequently, Lord Castlereagh presented the project to the allied Powers, in conjunction with whom he governed Europe.

The proclamation of a new alliance that was to exist during the entire duration of the war, and be valid for twenty years after the conclusion of peace, in order to maintain the new European edifice about to be created, ought to be agreeable to all the contracting Powers; for, even after the conclusion of peace, they might still fear ulterior enterprises on the part of France. The propositions of Lord Castlereagh were, therefore, accepted and signed at Chaumont, on the 1st of March. This was the famous treaty of Chaumont, which was the basis of the Holy Alliance, and which, during nearly forty years, influenced European policy, until Europe at length perceived it was not by France alone that the balance of power might be disturbed.

This treaty was signed amid the universal joy of the allies, who were all well pleased at being closely united and largely subsidized, with the exception of Austria, who, whilst she saw in the new alliance tranquillizing assu-

rances against the projects of France in Italy, did not find there any guarantee against the enterprises of Russia in Poland and the East. Lord Castlereagh did not stop here in his labours. He proposed and carried the resolution of persevering some time longer, but the period was to be limited, in negotiating at Châtillon. Peace had been offered to Napoleon on condition that France should retire within her ancient limits, and to be consistent with themselves, they ought, if he were willing to treat with him. Besides the stipulations of Chaumont, by giving to the coalition a duration of twenty years, was sufficiently reassuring against any attempts he might make for the recovery of his ancient conquests. But if he prolonged the negotiations with the evident intention of occupying the time of the allies, and trifling with them, they would fix a term, after which the negotiation should be broken off, and a definite resolution taken of treating with him no longer, which would be equivalent to a European declaration of his dethronement. But until that time arrived, no measures opposed to his dynasty could be sanctioned, and the Count d'Artois, in Franche-Comté, and the Duke d'Angoulême, in Guyenne, were not to be received at the head-quarters of the belligerent Powers.

These measures were, with regard to the interests of the allies, so wisely planned, that they received a prompt and universal assent. It was by these measures that Lord Castlereagh established his personal influence, and, above all, the influence of his country, in the European coalition. He wrote to his cabinet, that carrying out these projects would, no doubt, cost England a great deal, but he was sure of their being generally approved, for the question at issue had been either to seize or to lose the first place among the European Powers, and he had not hesitated to secure that position, whatever it might cost the British treasury. He certainly had no cause to fear the rejection of his project, whatever might be the number of promised millions. England has always been made to pay for her greatness, and has rarely erred in the estimate of her worth.

As soon as these matters were determined, an order was despatched to the plenipotentiaries of the four cabinets, directing them to inform M. de Caulaincourt that they awaited a reply on the part of France; that if the proposed preliminaries were not approved, France might send others, which should be discussed in a spirit of conciliation, provided they did not deviate too widely from the principles laid down; but, after a certain period had elapsed, the congress of Châtillon should be dissolved, and all further negotiation abandoned.

No sooner had Blücher and his advisers, Gneisenau, Muffling, and others, learned the resolution adopted by the allies of allowing them freedom of action, and reinforcing them with 50,000 men, than they again indulged the ambition which had already proved so fatal to them, that of being the first to enter Paris. They scarcely paused to examine whether, before they undertook this new offensive movement, it would be better to wait the junction of the 50,000 men destined for their support, and they immediately resolved to advance to the right, though in a slightly oblique direction

—that is to say, toward the Marne—where they could more promptly rejoin Bulow and Wintingerode, who had already set out, the one toward Soissons, the other toward Rheims. In their feverish impatience, they preferred joining these troops on the way, whatever danger might result from their isolated march, than to await their arrival in the vicinity of Prince Schwarzenberg, where the armies of Silesia and Bohemia might afford each other mutual assistance. They said to themselves, and with truth, that by this movement they would draw Napoleon toward them, and free Prince Schwarzenberg; but they did not add, that it was at the risk of involving themselves in imminent danger that they could free him from the enemy. Moreover, having seen some light troops galloping on their flank, they hoped in advancing toward the Marne to encounter Marshals Marmont and Mortier apart from Napoleon, and thus find an opportunity of revenging themselves for their recent defeats. What they did not take into consideration was, that the movements of the French army were very differently calculated from that of the allies, and were not so much exposed to the chances of war.

However this may be, on the 24th of February Blücher, who had advanced as far as Méry, recrossed the Aube at Anglure, and advanced to Sézanne. Perceiving, though not very clearly, the perils of this march, he sent word to Prince Schwarzenberg that in order to free him from his enemies he was about to expose himself to great danger, and begged him earnestly, as soon as he should be freed from the presence of Napoleon, to advance, in order to render to the army of Silesia the same service that the latter was about to render to the army of Bohemia.

We have already seen what was the position of the Marshals Mortier and Marmont, whilst Napoleon was returning from the Marne to the Seine, to fight the battles of Nangis and Montereau. Marshal Mortier, who had been ordered to follow in the rear of D'York and Sacken toward Soissons, had not been able to overtake these two generals, who, by making a movement to the right, had escaped to Châlons; but Mortier retook Soissons, which had momentarily fallen into the enemy's possession. In pursuance of Napoleon's orders, which recalled him to the Marne, he had fallen back on Château-Thierry, and arrived there the very day that Blücher commenced the execution of his new projects. As to Marshal Marmont, placed between Etoges and Montmirail, so as to be in communication, on one side with Marshal Mortier on the Marne, and on the other with Napoleon on the Aube, he had successively occupied Etoges, Montmirail, and Sézanne. Having seen Blücher cross the Aube at Anglure on the 24th, and return to Sézanne on the 25th, he had retired in good order on Esternay, behind the Grand-Morin, after having killed some of the enemy, without losing a man himself. His plan of action was now clearly laid down: it was, on seeing himself separated from Napoleon by Blücher's late movement, to fall back on the Marne, and there join Marshal Mortier, and dispute the country inch by inch with the enemy, until Napoleon should arrive to their assistance. He had sent word to Mortier, who

was then at Château-Thierry, to proceed toward Ferté-sous-Jouarre, whither he would advance from another direction; he also informed Napoleon of what had taken place, praying him to come up as soon as possible.

On the morning of the 26th, Blücher having recommenced his pursuit, Marmont continued his retrograde movement as far as Ferté-Gaucher, then turning toward the Marne, he took the road to Ferté-sous-Jouarre. Blücher continued the pursuit of the previous evening without overtaking Mortier, and, when he saw him take the direction of Ferté-sous-Jouarre, instead of going toward Meaux, strong doubts sprang up in his mind. He did not comprehend that Marmont going to Ferté-sous-Jouarre in preference to Meaux, must have had serious reasons for a movement that removed him still farther from Paris, and that these reasons could be no other than the desire of joining Mortier as soon as possible; neither did he perceive that, allowing the two marshals the advantage of uniting their forces—an advantage which he could not contest with them—he ought to have thought of cutting them off from Paris, and for that purpose hastened himself to Meaux. This very natural thought did not occur to Blücher, and though he arrived at Jouarre at a very early hour, and might have had possession of Meaux before night, he lost the evening in trying to discover what he could not divine, under the pretext so often alleged by generals who do not know the value of time, of granting necessary repose to his troops.

On the next day—the 27th of February—having at length comprehended that the two marshals, having combined their forces at Ferté-sous-Jouarre, must be naturally solicitous to reach Meaux, the direct route to Paris, he ordered Sacken to advance from the left on Meaux, and sent Kleist straight forward on Sammeron, to cross the Marne at that point, by means of a portable bridge that he brought with him. Besides being desirous of intercepting the route to Paris, on both banks of the Marne, he also wished to cross that river with the main body of his forces, and take up a stronger position on the other side, in case Napoleon, as was very probable, should leave the army of Bohemia and come in pursuit of that of Silesia.

But the two French marshals were more alert than Blücher, and whilst on the morning of the 27th he had scarcely fixed his plans, they were at that very moment marching toward Meaux, for the purpose of resuming communications with Paris, which the urgent necessity of effecting a union between their forces had obliged them to suspend for a while. Blücher did not estimate their combined forces, taking into account their labours and losses, at more than 14,000 men, excellent soldiers no doubt, but a small number to cut their way through 50,000 enemies, whom they might encounter on the route to Meaux. Happily they took measures to protect their movements with as much skill as promptitude.

The Marne, between Ferté-sous-Jouarre and Meaux, describes numerous windings, whose edges are bordered by the Paris route, like a tangent touching successively several circles. At Trilport the road touches one of these con-

tours, crosses the Marne and leads to Meaux. The two marshals set out before daybreak, in order to reach the bridge of Trilport, take possession of it, cross the Marne and seize on Meaux. Moreover, wishing also to take possession of the Paris route that runs along the right bank of the Marne, they had ordered General Vincent to cross to this bank by the bridge of Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and take up a position behind the Ourcq, which in the neighbourhood of Lizy approaches the Marne very closely, without, however, uniting with that river, and forms with it an almost continuous line of defence. Thus established behind the Marne and the Ourcq, with their right at Meaux and their left at Lizy, they might keep the enemy in check during three or four days, receive, meanwhile, reinforcements from Paris, and await, without incurring any great risk, the arrival of Napoleon, who would not fail to fly to their assistance as soon as he should have learned their position.

These excellent arrangements were as skillfully executed as conceived. On the morning of the 27th, before Blücher could discern their movements, the two marshals glided, so to speak, between the enemy and the Marne, along the road that runs on the left bank, tangent to the different windings of this river, crossed the bridge at Trilport, leaving the Ricard division to defend the bridge, and advanced to Meaux. Whilst Marshal Marmont, after crossing the Marne, arrived at Meaux by the right bank of the river, General Sacken arrived there by the left. Some Russian detachments had already entered the city at the south side, when the marshal charged them at the head of 200 men, drove them back, and shut the gates. Meanwhile, General Vincent had crossed the Marne at Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and taken up his position at Lizy, behind the Ourcq.

The two marshals had thus succeeded, with 14,000 men, in evading 50,000, and Blücher, who ought to have captured both the one and the other, experienced the confusion of seeing them established safe and sound behind the Marne and the Ourcq: whilst the position of affairs, lately so perilous for them, was now about to become so for him. This movement being completed on the 27th of February, the marshals sent Napoleon an account of what they had done; they also sent to Joseph, demanding all the reinforcements he could possibly spare from Paris. In fact, the question now was, to save the capital; and the resources Paris contained could not be more usefully employed than in being sent immediately to Meaux.

Napoleon, informed on the 25th of Blücher's

movement toward the Marne, and knowing the presumptuous character of this general, was fully prepared for the imprudence he was about to commit, and resolved to make him pay dearly for his rashness.* Without losing a moment, he ordered Marshal Victor, who was stationed between Troyes and Méry, to reconstruct the bridge of Méry on the Seine, and to advance to Plancy and cross the Aube at that point. He ordered Marshal Ney to march to Aubeterre, and cross the Aube at Arcis. His intention was to leave Troyes privately, with 34,000 or 35,000 men, leaving about the same number before that city, throw himself on Blücher's rear, and force him back on the Marne, where the Marshals Marmont and Mortier would receive him at the point of the bayonet.

On the morning of the 26th, the former intelligence being confirmed, he despatched the remainder of the Guard from Troyes, and resolved to set out next day himself, to direct this new movement, which, if it succeeded, might put an end to the war.

In adopting this resolution, it would be necessary to leave before Troyes a force sufficient to awe Prince Schwarzenberg. Napoleon confided to the Marshals Oudinot and MacDonald, and to General Gérard, the task of defending the Aube, concealing, at the same time, his absence as long as possible. Marshal Oudinot had, besides the Rothemburg division of the Young Guard, the Léval division, brought from Spain, half of the Boyer division, also brought from Spain, and Count de Valmy's cavalry; Marshal MacDonald had the 11th corps with Milhaud's cavalry; General Gérard had the 2d corps, recruited with the Paris reserve and the Saint-Germain cuirassiers. The entire amounted to little more than 30,000 men. Napoleon ordered them to over throw all the enemy's posts beyond the Aube, and to occupy the course of this river strongly, both above and below Bar-sur-Aube. He particularly recommended that after his departure the soldiers should frequently shout *Vive l'Empereur*, in order that his absence might not be suspected.

He brought with him Marshal Victor, commanding the Boyer and Charpentier divisions of the Young Guard, Ney with the Meunier and Curial divisions of the Young Guard, and the 2d brigade of the Boyer division, from Spain, Friant with the Old Guard, Drouot with the artillery reserve, and, lastly, from 9000 to 10,000 cavalry, belonging either to the Guards or the dragoons of Spain; the scales amounting, as we have just said, to 35,000 men. By a union with the two marshals the total would be raised to 50,000.

Before leaving Troyes, Napoleon took, ac-

* The Duke de Ragusa, as usual, ignorant of Napoleon's motives, and judging his conduct very superficially, reproaches him for not having set out on the 27th, and makes it appear that he received intelligence of Blücher's movement on the 24th, and asserts that had he made a movement two days earlier, the destruction of the army of Blücher would have been inevitable. The correspondence gives a decisive reply to this reproach. Intelligence of Blücher's movement, which was sent to Sézanne on the 24th, did not reach Napoleon till the 25th, and on that very day he despatched Victor from Méry to Plancy, and Ney from Troyes to Aubeterre. Consequently there was not an hour lost. On the 26th, when Blücher's intention was fully evident, Napoleon continued this movement, but did not set out himself until the 27th, in order to give his

troops time to advance. The news arrived on the 28th, and on the 27th his troops had reached Herties, beyond the Aube. It would, therefore, have been impossible to act with more rapidity, and when we consider what shrewdness of judgment and vigour of character are needed to form instant resolutions during actual warfare, especially in a position so serious as that of Napoleon, a position where the first false movement might have sealed his ruin, we cannot sufficiently admire the precision and vigour of conduct of a captain who, in an hour after having received intelligence, puts his troops on march, and remains behind only to hide his projects longer from the enemy, and to give, whilst his troops are marching forward, orders that embrace all the armies and the government of a vast empire.

cording to his custom, diverse measures, relative to military and political administration. The conscription, instead of the decreed 600,000 men, had only yielded 120,000, and, for some time past, furnished none. The people profited by the shocks the imperial authority had received, to disobey a law that was universally detested. Instead of from four to five thousand conscripts that hitherto had arrived daily at Paris, and that were drafted hastily into the skeleton regiments of the Guard or the line, there did not now arrive a thousand. But it was quite different in the departments traversed by the enemy; there a patriotic fury raged, and numbers of young men were willing to enlist. Napoleon ordered a sort of levy *en masse* in the invaded provinces, under pretext of calling out, in these departments, the national guards for the defence of the country, but not wishing to leave these men in the regiments of the national guards, on which he set no great value, he ordered them to be drafted into the regiments of the line, with a promise of liberation as soon as the enemy should be driven beyond the frontier. He reiterated pressing entreaties that provisions should be sent to Nogent, by the Seine, and, besides, a pontoon-train, without which all his movements would be as difficult as though he were in an enemy's country. To these orders he added an injunction, often addressed to his wife, his brother Joseph, the high-chancellor Cambacérès, and the war minister, not to be afraid, at least not to allow their fear to appear; to execute his instructions promptly and punctually, and then, as he was in the habit of saying, *to leave the rest to him*, promising, if they seconded his efforts, that he would soon drive the allies into the Rhine.

The commissioners appointed to negotiate the armistice, and who had been assembled since the 24th at Lusigny, had not ceased to discuss the limits that should separate the belligerent armies. Napoleon, on setting out, had enjoined M. de Flahaut to continue the negotiations, and even to yield different points, provided the fortress of Antwerp and the city of Chambery were included in the line of demarkation. Though he did not expect any beneficial result from these discussions, yet he did not wish to close any way that led to negotiation. M. de Caulaincourt still advised him to give up a part of the Frankfort bases, and asked him for a counter-proposition, which the plenipotentiaries at Châtillon earnestly demanded, conformably to the orders sent from Chaumont. Napoleon dictated a reply for these plenipotentiaries. M. de Caulaincourt was to say that the desired counter-propositions were being drawn up at headquarters, but that, amidst so many multiplied military movements, it was not astonishing that the Emperor of the French, who was at the same time the head of the Government and the head of the army, had not found time to complete such a work. He was, meanwhile, to declare that the project presented at Châtillon being not a treaty of peace, but a capitulation, it would never be accepted; that France ought, even for the common good, to preserve her ancient position in Europe, and in order to do so, she ought to receive an equivalent for the

extension of territory acquired by Prussia, Russia, and Austria at the expense of Poland, by Germany at the expense of the Ecclesiastical States, by Austria at the expense of Venice, and by England at the expense of the Dutch and of the Indian princes; that, consequently, France ought to expand herself far beyond the limits of 1790; and that, moreover, she would never consent that the fate of the states she gave up should be decided without her sanction. In this way Napoleon hinted upon what bases he intended to negotiate, but without declaring explicitly what frontier-line he wished to keep, which he was not disposed to do until he should have achieved new and decisive victories. He counselled the Duke of Vicenza to propagate the belief that he was still at Troyes, busy in concentrating his resources there, and drawing up a treaty in reply to that of Châtillon. He also wished that the Council of Regency should examine the Châtillon propositions, and give an opinion on them. He flattered himself that all the members of the council would be unanimous in expressing their indignation.

Having despatched these various and serious affairs, Napoleon left Troyes secretly on the morning of the 27th of February, crossed the Aube at Arcis, and, following his columns closely, passed the night at Herbis, at the house of a poor country priest, who could offer no other accommodation than what his humble vicarage afforded, but which he offered cordially, not alone to the emperor, but to his numerous staff. After a frugal and cheerful repast, they passed the night on chairs, tables, or on straw, calculating that the present movement in Blücher's rear would be as profitable as the former. Every thing promised a similar result, and Napoleon might, without presumption, reckon upon it.

The next day, the 28th of February, he continued his march. He could choose between two courses, either to follow Blücher through Sézanne and Ferté-sous-Jouarre to Meaux, or to advance directly through Fère-Champenoise to Château-Thierry. By taking this latter direction he secured the advantage of intercepting Blücher's most important communication, for he could cut him off at the same time from Châlons and Soissons and separate him from Bülow and Wintzingerode. But there was more than one danger involved in this plan of operation; it would leave the Marshals Marmont and Mortier too long contending with Blücher before Meaux, it would abandon to the latter the principal route to Paris, and, in short, furnish him a line of retreat, far better than that of Châlons or Soissons—we mean the route from Meaux to Provins, which would allow him to fall back, in case of danger, on Prince Schwarzenberg. To pursue Blücher by Sézanne, Ferté-Gaucher, and Ferté-sous-Jouarre, was therefore the safest proceeding, whether for the purpose of cutting him off from the high-road to Paris, or coming more quickly to the succour of the two marshals; in short, to inflict on him a punishment similar to that he had received at Montmirail and Champaubert; for if Blücher made an effort to join Prince de Schwarzenberg on the Seine, Napoleon would anticipate him there. If he threw himself behind the Marne, to take a covered

position there, he would be followed and hemmed in between the Marne and the Aisne, without any means of escape, precautions having been taken to defend Soissons. Thus Napoleon, in executing a bold manœuvre, chose at the same time the safest course, for he possessed the rare talent of not overstepping the line that separates daring courage from imprudence,—in a word, he could be at the same time rash and cautious. Unhappily, it was only in war he combined these two antagonistic qualities.

He marched, therefore, on the morning of the 28th, with his 35,000 men, through Sézanne, on Ferté-Gaucher and Ferté-sous-Jourarre. Notwithstanding the rapidity of his movements, he was not able to reach Ferté-Gaucher that day, and passed the night between Sézanne and Ferté-Gaucher. The next day (the 1st of March) he slept at Jourarre, and reached Ferté-sous-Jourarre at an early hour on the 2d. During Napoleon's march on the Marne, Blücher, who at length perceived the danger of his position, had not endeavoured to extricate himself with the celerity that common prudence would have dictated. He had at first wished to place the Marne between him and Napoleon, and crossed the river at Ferté-sous-Jourarre, which place had remained in his hands since the retreat of Marmont and Mortier. He destroyed the bridge of this town, and established himself on the Ourcq, to try and force the position of the two marshals; whilst Napoleon, checked by the Marne, would be obliged to remain a spectator. This was an imprudent calculation, for the Marne could not restrain Napoleon more than thirty-six hours; and if, to carry out these fruitless attempts, Blücher lingered on the banks of the Ourcq, he ran the risk of being attacked in the rear and enclosed between the Marne and the Aisne in a truly perilous position. Things went on in this way; and, whilst Napoleon was rapidly advancing, Blücher was losing his time in vain attempts on the line of the Ourcq. He had attempted to transport Kleist's corps across the Ourcq; but Marmont and Mortier, throwing themselves on Kleist, had forced him to retrace the river with considerable loss. Whilst the two marshals thus held their position, Joseph sent them reinforcements, consisting of 7000 foot-soldiers, and 1500 horse, of the Guards and line. These troops had been incorporated on the 1st of March; and on the 2d, when it was known that Napoleon had arrived on the Marne, they were ready to receive orders.

Blücher, stationed beyond the Marne and along the Ourcq, which he had not been able to force, found himself between the two marshals who defended the Ourcq, and Napoleon, who was preparing to cross the Marne. He had excellent reasons to expedite his movements, for the danger was every moment increasing. Nevertheless, he persevered in his former plan, and lost the entire 2d of March lingering along the line of the Ourcq, to try whether he could not fight the two marshals before the eyes of Napoleon, who could not cross the Marne. Having encountered a valiant resistance on every point of the Ourcq, he resolved to decamp on the morning of the

3d, in order to draw nearer the Aisne, and join either Bulow, who was coming by Soissons, or Wintzingerode, who was coming by Rheims. But he should now find himself between the Marne, that Napoleon was about to cross, and the Aisne, where the only bridge within his reach was that of Soissons, of which we were masters; besides, the country between the Marne and the Aisne, which he was about to traverse, was marshy and became almost impracticable in consequence of a sudden thaw. His position was consequently most alarming, thanks to his own imprudence and the profound calculations of his adversary.

During these proceedings, Napoleon, having arrived at the banks of the Marne, was burning with impatience to cross. To effect this object, he employed the marines of the Guard; and such was their activity that the bridge was reconstructed during the night of the 2d-3d of March. The intelligence that arrived every moment was calculated to excite his impatience to the highest degree. The peasants who came from the other side of the Marne were glowing with patriotism, like all who had caught a sight of the enemy, and drew a dreary picture of the state of the Prussian army. In fact, this army, filled with recollections of Montmirail, of Château-Thierry, of Vauchamps, and knowing that they were pursued by Napoleon, expected a terrible disaster. The state of the broken-up roads added to their alarm, and they foresaw that they should be obliged to abandon at least their cannon and baggage as soon as Napoleon should have crossed the slender barrier that separated him from them. All this was an inducement to the emperor not to lose time; and, according to his wont, he did not lose it. Intelligence from Troyes was also another motive for expediting his movements. He learned that Prince Schwarzenberg, having discovered the secret of his departure, had resumed offensive operations, and was again driving forward on Troyes and Nogent the marshals who had been left to guard the Aube. This circumstance, though it rendered despatch on his part imperative, troubled him little; for he felt confident that, after discomfiting the army of Silesia, he would be able to fall back on the army of Bohemia, and make a retreat faster than it had advanced. Suddenly, at sight of the complicated movements of his adversary, Napoleon conceived a great military idea, whose execution might involve the most important results. To fall immediately on Schwarzenberg, after beating Blücher, appeared to him a fatiguing movement that might not yield any decisive result. He devised another plan of operation. The intelligence he had received that Bulow and Wintzingerode's corps had arrived in line, proved to him that the allies were strangely neglecting the blockade of the fortresses, and left them invested by forces as contemptible in number as in quality; it would therefore be possible to make use of the garrisons against the enemy, as they had made use of the blockading troops against us: he could thus turn to profit what, in his highly expressive language, he called "the dead forces." He consequently resolved to call out all the disposable troops in the fortresses, and form them into an active army,

which important services might be expected. Into the fortresses of Belgium, Luxembourg, Lorraine, and Alsace, conscripts had been thrown, who, drafted into the skeletons of regiments, must have acquired a certain amount of military instruction during the two months and a half that the campaign had lasted. Having lately often led to battle conscripts who had been only fifteen days under arms, Napoleon might consider men who had two months and a half enlisted, discarded soldiers. Admitting these premises, it might be possible to draw from Lille, Antwerp, Ostend, Goreum, and Berg-op-Zoom, 20,000 men, or at least 15,000. Double number might be drawn from the fortresses of Luxembourg, Metz, Verdun, Thionville, Mayence, Strasbourg, &c. If, then, overthrowing Blücher, Napoleon, who had about 50,000 men, could add to these 30,000 more, in advancing by Soissons, Laon, Reims, on Verdun and Nancy, he would find himself at the head of 100,000 men in the face of the Prince Schwarzenberg, and without the latter would not wait that opportunity to return from Paris to Besançon. At the first suspicion of such a project, the commander-in-chief would retrace his steps, pursued by the exasperated peasantry of Burgundy, Champagne, and Lorraine, who, utterly worn down at first by the rapidity of the invasion, had afterward exhibited sentiments of the purest patriotism. Schwarzenberg would arrive half vanquished, to fall hopelessly beneath Napoleon's sword. This daring project was certainly executable; for the men on whom he calculated existed, and the journey itself did not involve an expenditure of much labour or time. In fact, the distance from Soissons to Reims, from Reims to Verdun, from Verdun to Toul, was not greater than the army had already traversed in crossing alternately from Schwarzenberg to Blücher. Besides, two or three days more was of little consequence, when the bare announcement of projected movement would have the effect of drawing the enemy from Paris to the frontiers, and freeing the capital. Thus, the project might be terminated at once if fortune favoured the execution of the plan; for certainly Prince Schwarzenberg,—whose numbers were already reduced to 90,000 men, by the loss of the detachment sent to Laon,—pursued by the peasantry of the provinces, could not maintain an army of 100,000 men, commanded by an emperor in person.

Napoleon, therefore, ordered General Maison to be at Antwerp only a few seamen, the royal guards, and the forces absolutely necessary to resist an enemy, who did not think of making a regular attack; he was to do the same in all the fortresses in Flanders, and was to march on Mézières with whatever he could assemble. He gave similar orders to the governors of Mayence, Metz, and Strasbourg. All were ordered to leave the fortresses only those troops that were indispensably necessary, and supply the deficiency by the national guards; they were to send the garrisons from the least important villages, and advance from Mayence and Strasbourg to Metz, from Metz to Nancy, to form the main body. The small numbers that

blockaded our fortresses could not prevent these combinations, if the commanders of the garrisons acted with vigour. In any case, Napoleon coming to their aid would free those who might have encountered any serious obstacle. Trustworthy men were sent in disguise to carry these orders, which it was not difficult to despatch to their destination; for, with the exception of Mayence, we had intelligence from all our fortresses, so complete was the blockade.

Full of this project, on which he founded most rational hopes, Napoleon, after crossing the Marne on the night of the 2d-3d of March, set out in pursuit of Blücher, whom it was necessary he should put *hors de combat*, or at least remove to a distance, in order to execute the plan he had just conceived. The reports of the morning all agreed in representing Blücher in the deepest embarrassment. In fact, he was driven back on the Aisne, which he could only cross at the bridge of Soissons, that belonged to us. He could certainly escape by a movement to the right that would bring him toward Fère-en-Tardenois and toward Rheims,—a movement that would afford him an opportunity of escape by remounting the Aisne and crossing nearer the source, where there was a sufficiency of bridges, and where he would meet Bulow and Wintzingerode. But Napoleon was not a man to leave this resource to his adversary. For this purpose, after crossing the Marne, he remounted the river toward the source, by the high-road that leads from Ferté-sous-Jouarre to Château-Thierry. He had thus the double advantage of advancing faster, and of reaching the direct road from Château-Thierry to Soissons, by Oulchy. Once on this road, he would outflank Blücher; and he was certain of taking possession of the only road open to the Prussian general,—that of Rheims.

Having arrived at Château-Thierry, Napoleon ceased to advance to the right, and, marching directly on Soissons, he drove Blücher briskly back on Oulchy. At the same moment, the Marshals Mortier and Marmont having recrossed the Ourcq on our left and debouched from Lizy and from May, set out in pursuit of the enemy. A sudden frost that occurred on the morning of the 3d, rendered Blücher's retreat less difficult. His danger, however, was not less great; for the road to Rheims was about being closed against him. At Oulchy the Ourcq again makes its appearance, and Marmont had a sharp engagement at that place with Blücher's rear-guard. He took or killed about three thousand of his rear-guard, and forced the remainder to cross the Ourcq in disorder. The passage was thus assured on the morning of the next day for the Marshals Mortier and Marmont, who were advancing at the head of their combined troops. Another advantage was also obtained,—it was that of occupying Fère-en-Tardenois with our extreme right, and cutting off the route to Rheims. There remained to Blücher no other way of crossing the Aisne than at Soissons, of which we were masters. We had at length laid hold of our irreconcilable enemy, and were about to suffocate him in a brassy embrace.

Napoleon had brought up his van-guard as

far as the village of Rocourt, whilst Marmont's troops were at Oulchy, and he that night slept at Bezu-Saint-Germain, his mind filled with the highest and best-founded hopes he had ever conceived.

In fact, on the next day,—the 4th of March,—he set out, calculating on a decisive engagement during the day. Still fearing that Blücher might escape on the right, the emperor himself took up a position at Fismes, the only route leading to Rheims that was still practicable, whilst Marmont and Mortier pushed forward on Soissons by Oulchy and Hartennes. Whatever course Blücher took, he would be forced to fight, with the Aisne at his back, and with 45,000 against 55,000 men. We had not been accustomed in this campaign to a superiority of numbers on our side, and Blücher would now, inevitably, be thrust into the Aisne. Whether he paused at Soissons and fought there, with the river in his rear, or reascended the Aisne, his position would be just the same. If he halted before Soissons, Napoleon, uniting his left with Marmont and Mortier, would fall on him within three or four hours; if he advanced along the Aisne, to reconstruct a bridge there, or make use of that of Berry-aux-Bac, Napoleon could fall more directly on him from Fismes, and forming a combination with the two marshals, surprise him by a flank movement, and place him in the most critical position. Blücher's destruction was therefore inevitable, and what was to become of Bulow and Wintzingerode, who were hovering about the vicinity, waiting to join him? What would become of Schwarzenberg, left alone on the Paris route? The destiny of France was about to change, for whatever at a later period might become of the Imperial dynasty, (a secondary consideration in the present solemn crisis,) victorious France would have preserved her natural frontiers. Every moment brought us fresh presages of victory. The greatest dejection prevailed among Blücher's troops, whilst ours were burning for battle. At every step the French fell in with wagons that had been abandoned, or with stragglers from the enemy's line. Eleven or twelve hundred of these unhappy creatures had fallen into our hands.

Suddenly Napoleon received the most unexpected and afflicting intelligence. Soissons, that was the key to the Aisne—Soissons, that he had taken especial care to provide with sufficient means of defence—Soissons had opened its gates to Blücher, and given up to him the passage of the Aisne. Who was it that had thus suddenly changed the face of things, and converted into a serious danger for us that which, a few hours before, had been an imminent peril for the enemy? Blücher, in fact, had not only escaped our pursuit, and stood protected by the Aisne, which, from having been an advantage for us, was now changed into an obstacle, but had also joined Bulow and Wintzingerode, and so raised the number of his troops to 100,000 men. Who, then, we repeat, had been able to reverse our position and destroy our hopes? A weak-minded man, who, without being either a traitor or a coward, or even a bad officer, had been terrified by the threats of the adverse generals, and had delivered up Soissons. We

shall now relate how this event had occurred, the most fatal in the annals of our history, next to that which, a year later, occurred between Wavre and Waterloo.

Soissons had once fallen into the hands of the allies, in consequence of the death of General Rusca, and had been wrested from them by Marshal Mortier, when the latter had been sent in pursuit of the Generals Sacken and D'York. In obedience to the orders of Napoleon, who felt all the importance of Soissons in the present circumstances, Marshal Mortier had provided, by every means in his power, for the preservation of this post. The place, which had long been neglected, was not in a state to offer great resistance to the enemy; but, with artillery and provisions, of which there was no deficiency, and certain sacrifices that circumstances authorized, we could have held the place for a few days, and thus remained masters of the passage of the Aisne. According to written instructions, that Napoleon had revised, and which had been sent to Soissons, the buildings in the suburbs were to be burned, because they impeded the defence; then the bridge of Aisne was to be undermined, so that it might be blown up, should circumstances become desperate—a measure that would, at least, deprive the enemy of the bridge, should the French not be able to hold it. The Poles lately withdrawn from Sedan had been sent to garrison the place, Napoleon not being very well pleased with them at the time. It was true that to their despair at seeing their country devastated was added the affliction of profound personal misery, and the noble Polish troops of former times were now reduced to 3000 or 4000 men, ill armed and ill equipped. However, seeing the extreme peril of France, every one among them who could hold a sword or a musket had offered to serve. A thousand cavalry soldiers, under General Pac, had joined the Imperial Guard, and a thousand foot-soldiers had assembled at Soissons. These were to be reinforced by 2000 national guards. The governor of the town was General Moreau, (no relation of the celebrated Moreau,) who had not the reputation of being a bad officer. Unfortunately, to him was confided the worst-defended part of the town.

On the 2d and 3d of March, two masses of the enemy's soldiers appeared in sight, the one advancing along the right, the other along the left bank of the Aisne. It was Bulow, who, coming from Belgium, advanced toward Soissons along the right bank of the river, and Wintzingerode, who coming from Luxemburg, through Rheims, approached by the left bank. Both felt the great importance, both to Blücher and themselves, of the post they were about to attack. In fact, Soissons was the only issue by which Blücher could cross the barrier of the Aisne, and for the others it was the only means of delivery from an isolation that became every moment more perilous. Should they not succeed in seizing this bridge, they would be obliged to fall back, the one along the right bank of the Aisne, the other along the left, to effect a junction higher up, and leave Blücher alone between the Aisne and Napoleon. Thus, after having on the 2d of March cannonaded the

on during the entire day, without any great result, on the 3d they used the strongest efforts to General Moreau, trying to intimidate him by threatening to put the entire garrison to the sword.

The place could not resist more than two or three days; for attacked by 50,000 men, and garrisoned only by 10,000, with the defences in a bad condition, it would be impossible to hold it even for a short time. The 2000 national guards, destined to join the Poles, had not arrived; the houses in the suburbs that defended the defence had not been destroyed; the bridge had not been mined, which was the governor's fault. These circumstances were all adverse; but the Poles, who were tried soldiers, offered to hold out to the last extremity; besides, the report of the cannon was already heard in the direction of the Marne, which indicated the near approach of Napoleon, and proved the importance of the post, a fact which the earnest efforts of the enemy would alone be sufficient to prove. Under ordinary circumstances, to surrender would have been very natural, for the lives of a garrison ought always to be saved when sacrifice them can be of no avail; but under the circumstances we are now considering, it became a sacred duty to await the attack of the assailants, and perish even to the last man rather than yield. An engineer, Lieutenant-Colonel Saint Hillier, pointed out the duty and possibility of resistance at least during twenty-four hours. Nevertheless, General Moreau, shaken by the threats addressed to the garrison, consented to give up the place on the 3d of March, and only employed one day discussing the conditions. He then departed with his artillery. Count Orloff, who was present, said in Russian to one of his generals, "Let him take his artillery if he wishes, and mine too, and allow us to cross the Aisne." Our enemies were very compliant, and in accordance to General Moreau a capitulation in appearance the most honourable, they made him commit an act that nearly cost him his life, at which deprived Napoleon of his empire, and of his glory. On the evening of the 3d, Bulow and Wintzingerode shook hands on the Aisne, and thus on the 4th, Blücher found the gate open which ought to have been closed, and received a reinforcement that raised his army to a hundred thousand men, besides having saved in the twinkling of an eye from the consequences of his own faults and the terrible fate Napoleon had prepared for him. Some historians, apologists of Blücher, have asserted that the danger he incurred was not so great as Napoleon had been pleased to say, that Blücher might have been reinforced at least by Wintzingerode, who, coming from Belgium, was on the left bank of the Aisne, and at the junction would have raised the Prussian army to 70,000 men against 55,000. In the first place, no numerical force could have been sent to Blücher's false position, for arriving on the 4th at Soissons, when Napoleon was on the same day at Fismes, he would have been obliged either to cross the Aisne, that lay before him, by help of temporary bridges, or to march should have reascended the banks of the river, a distance of ten leagues, with the

French army on his flank. The advantage of 70,000 men against 55,000, a numerical difference which, at that time, was not new to us, was nothing in comparison to so false a military position. Besides, it is almost certain that Wintzingerode not being able to effect a junction with Bulow on the 3d, would have retraced his steps on the 4th, to recross the Aisne twelve or fifteen leagues higher up, that is to say, at Berry-au-Bac. Blücher would, therefore, have found himself during an entire day isolated between Napoleon and the fortified post of Soissons.

The disaster was, therefore, as certain as any thing could be in war; and Napoleon, on learning that Soissons had opened its gates to the enemy, was overwhelmed with grief; for the danger that had lately menaced Blücher was now turned against him. Blücher, in fact, was now at the head of 100,000 men, and the Aisne, which lately threatened his destruction, was become his strongest defence. As to us, we should be obliged either to cross the Aisne with 50,000 men in sight of 100,000, which would be an act of great temerity, or return to the Seine, without knowing what to do there; for how could the French army face that of Bohemia without having conquered the army of Silesia? We can easily understand that Napoleon wrote the following letter to the war minister:—

"Fismes, 5th March, 1814.

"The enemy was in the greatest embarrassment, and we were hoping to gather on this very day the fruits of some days' labour, when the treason, or the stupidity, of the commander of Soissons, delivered that place to the enemy.

"On the 3d, at noon, he marched out, with the honours of war, and brought with him four pieces of cannon. Let this wretch be arrested, as well as all the members of his war council; let him be impeached before a military commission, composed of generals, and for God's sake act so that they may be all shot within twenty-four hours on the *Place de Grève*. It is time to make examples. Let the cause of the sentence be fully explained, printed, and distributed in every direction. I am obliged to throw a temporary bridge across the Aisne: this causes me a loss of thirty-six hours and annoys me dreadfully."

And yet Napoleon only knew part of the truth, for he was not aware that Blücher's force now doubled his in number. All he knew was that Blücher had eluded his grasp, and that to overtake he must pursue him beyond the Aisne. The misfortune was already sufficiently great, and of a nature to disconcert any one but himself. If, after such a discomfiture, Napoleon had been embarrassed and had lost a day or two devising new plans, we ought not to be astonished, if we reflect on the conduct of the greater number of commanders.* But it was not so with him.

* General Koch says, chapter xiv., "The emperor, whose plan was disconcerted by so unexpected an event, remained an entire day in uncertainty, and manifested his embarrassment by the divergent and daring nature of the operations he undertook." This is a very excusable error in one who has read neither the orders nor the correspondence of Napoleon. He was certainly very much

Though the Aisne was now to Blucher as great an advantage as it had lately been a disadvantage, though he was reinforced in a proportion of which we had no idea, Napoleon did not renounce pursuing him; he wished to fight him hand to hand, for it would be impossible without having beaten Blucher to fall on Schwarzenberg. In fact he would soon find himself trapped between Blucher, who was in close pursuit, and Schwarzenberg, who would have conquered the marshes left to guard the Aube: this would be a fearful and untenable position. It was incumbent on Napoleon, at any risk—should he even be defeated in the attempt, for he was certain of a still greater defeat by not making the effort—it was incumbent, we say, on Napoleon to pursue Blucher beyond the Aisne, and to set out instantly, before the enemy should have thought of rendering the bridges impracticable. Napoleon gave his orders on the morning of the 5th, immediately after receiving the intelligence that grieved him so deeply.

Napoleon had, during the night, sent General Corbiveau to Rheims, to seize the place—the most important point of communication with the Ardennes—and make himself master of the troops and provisions that Wintzingerode must necessarily have left behind. Wishing to secure the passage of the Aisne, which was the essential object of the moment, Napoleon had ordered General Nansouty, with the cavalry of the Guard, to advance to the bridge of Berry-au-Bac, built in stone, and over which was the high-road from Rheims to Laon. He also ordered a detachment of cavalry to advance on Maiky, situate on our left, and throw a temporary bridge across at that point; he, at the same time, ordered Marshal Mortier to repair without delay to Braine, to prepare other means of crossing the river at Pontarcy. His intention was to have three bridges on the Aisne, that he should not be forced to debouche in sight of Blucher, which might render the operation impossible. Undoubtedly, had the vigilance of the enemy equalled his, the French would have found the 100,000 men of the army of Silesia behind the presumed point of passage, and, opposed by such a force, 50,000 men, however brave they might be, could not have crossed the Aisne. But it may safely be said that by not losing time, however little remains, we shall arrive soon enough to disconcert the precautions of our enemies. Napoleon, who had learned from long experience how great, in general, is the carelessness of commanders, did not despair of finding the Aisne ill guarded, and of being able to effect the passage without striking a blow.

In effect, whilst that on his right General Corbiveau entered Rheims and seized 2000 of Wintzingerode's men, and a quantity of bag-

gage, General Nansouty, with the cavalry of the Guard and the Poles under General Pac, met Wintzingerode's Cossacks in front of the bridge of Berry-au-Bac, charged full gallop, overthrew them, and crossed the bridge close in their rear, spite of some light infantry left to guard it. The rapid conquest of this stone bridge rendered an attempt on the others unnecessary, for the main body of the enemy being still at a distance the French were able to debouche immediately, and Napoleon made every exertion during the nights of the 5th, 6th, as well as during the afternoon of the 6th, to make his troops defile by Berry-au-Bac, in order to take up a position on the right bank of the river, before Blucher could oppose his intention. "It is a slight benefit," said Napoleon, on learning this success, "in compensation for a great ill."

It was not a slight benefit, if transported beyond the Aisne he could gain a victory: but it would be difficult to gain a victory, Blucher having 100,000 of the best of the allied troops, whilst we had only 55,000 men, of which two-thirds were half-clad, undrilled conscripts, but who participated in the heroic despair of our officers, and fought with unexampled devotedness. But Napoleon was no longer in a position to count his enemies, he was obliged at all risks to fight, for to fall back on Schwarzenberg without having conquered Blucher, would be to induce the latter to pursue him, and thus expose himself to destruction, hemmed in between the two allied generals. As to the project of marching on to the fortresses to draw out the garrisons, it was equally impracticable, before having beaten Blucher, for otherwise the French would have him close on their track, following them everywhere, and that so nearly that they could not take a step unobserved by this troublesome adversary. To fight was therefore obligatory, no matter how great the number of enemies, or how vast the local difficulties we might have to encounter.

Blucher was very much displeased at Wintzingerode's negligence in guarding the bridge of Berry-au-Bac, but he ought only to have blamed himself, for nothing is done correctly where the commander-in-chief does not oversee the work in person. He, however, dissimulated his annoyance. Wintzingerode commanded the Russians, and it was necessary to act cautiously with haughty and susceptible allies: besides, he was still master of a very strong position, easily defended, and from which he intended to resist the threatened approaching attacks of Napoleon.

After passing the Aisne at Berry-au-Bac, following the high-road from Rheims to Laon, we have on the right, vast tracts slightly undulated, whilst on the left, we skirt the foot of the Craonne heights, then crossing some wooded hillocks, we descend by Festieux into a humid plain, in the midst of which suddenly appears the city of Laon, built on an isolated peak, and surrounded by high and antique walls. The heights of Craonne, which we see to the left, after crossing the bridge of Berry-au-Bac, are only the extremity of a lengthy plateau that borders the Aisne as far as the environs of Soissons, and forms on one side the bank of the Aisne, on the other the

annoyed, but not disconcerted, as we shall see; and he ordered, without losing an hour, the new arrangements that circumstances required. The cause of General Koch's error is, he supposes, that, the reduction of Soissons having taken place on the 3d, Napoleon must have known it on the 4th, on account of his proximity. But the correspondence proves that he did not know it until the morning of the 5th, because the Generals Mortier and Marmont did not know it till the evening of the 4th. The orders for the passage of the Aisne were given on the morning of the 5th: there was therefore neither hesitation nor loss of time, which, under the circumstances, is certainly a matter of astonishment.

f the Lette, a little river, alternately wooded and marshy, running parallel to the Aisne, and communicating by several valleys with the plain of Laon.

It was on this plateau of Craonne, which is several leagues in length, and which juts out like a species of promontory, after we have crossed the bridge of Berry-au-Bac, that Blücher had taken up a position with his army and the fifty thousand men that had joined him. Each commander had naturally taken his station according to the direction from which he had advanced. Wintzingerode having come by Rheims, had advanced to the heights of Craonne by Berry-au-Bac, whilst Bülow, having journeyed by Fère and Soissons, had marched between Soissons and Laon. Blücher, with Sacken, D'York, Kleist, Langeron, having crossed the Aisne at Soissons, had reascended the banks of the river, and found themselves, not on the plateau of Craonne, but on the orders of the Lette, between the Lette and Laon.

On the morning of the 6th, Napoleon having effected the passage of the Aisne, wished to try the enemy's position, and ordered a brisk attack on the heights of Craonne. The town of Craonne was first carried, but not without great labour and loss of blood. Then Ney and Victor, entering a valley between the abbey of Vauclerc on the left and the chateau of Bône on the right, endeavoured to seize the heights where the Lette rises. They attacked the position with the determination to make themselves masters of it. But after losing several hundred men, they perceived the position could only be carried by a serious attack, that is to say, by a regular engagement. Instead of uselessly shedding precious blood, they thought it better to pause until they should come to a decisive resolution. Ney and Victor encamped at the foot of the heights. The first division of the Old Guard under Morier took up a position at Corbeny, the cavalry of the Old Guard were stationed at Craonne and in the environs. The second division of the Old Guard passed the night in the rear of Berry-au-Bac, a little on this side of the Aisne, at Cormicy. Marmont was *en route* for this point, to form the rearguard of the army, and flank it during the grave operations that were about to be undertaken.

It had become necessary, as we have already said, to fight a battle, however doubtful the result might be, in consequence of the numerical strength and the position of the enemy, for without having conquered Blücher, Napoleon could neither fall back on Schwarzenberg nor seek the garrisons on the frontier. But the plan of battle gave rise to more than one question. To make a direct attack on the plateau of Craonne, which runs to a length of several leagues between the Aisne and the Lette, in order to thrust back the enemy on the Lette, and from the Lette into the plain of Laon, would be to grapple at once with the worst difficulties the case presented: it would be, as the proverb says, *to take the bull by the horns*. There was a means that seemed less difficult; it was, instead of pausing on the left and giving battle there, to defile to the right, follow the high-road from Rheims to Laon, by Corbeny and Festieux, and descend into the

plain of Laon, where probably, descending *en masse*, we might drive the enemy back on the Laon. But besides that, there was more than one obstacle to surmount on this route, the road to Paris would be by this movement left unprotected, and the enemy, being masters of Soissons, would be able, conquered or victors, to return to the Marne and the Seine, join Schwarzenberg, and march on Paris with 200,000 men. Undoubtedly the same thing would happen, did Napoleon, as he intended, advance to the frontiers to call out the garrisons; but he did not think of executing this project, until he should have weakened Blücher by a great defeat, after having seriously shaken the moral strength of the allies and revived in a proportionate degree the courage of the Parisians and of the army. It would therefore be necessary to attack Blücher in such a way as to keep up a communication, on one hand, with Soissons, and on the other, with Laon, (an important consideration that military critics have not taken into account,) and therefore there remained but one means, which was to ascend the plateau of Craonne on our left, and to make this—our first success—our first aggressive act against Blücher. Once arrived on the plateau, a road lay before us that leads to Soissons. We could follow this route, and by an effort of our right wing, throw our enemy on the Lette, then by a second effort force them into the plain of Laon, and if we ultimately succeeded in depriving them of Laon, we should have terminated the series of operations against Blücher in the most decisive and desirable manner. Napoleon could certainly have adopted a middle course, as, for example, not attempting to carry the plateau of Craonne, not advancing along the route from Rheims to Laon, but effecting a passage between both by means of a ravine that opened into the valley of the Lette, and thus advance in close column into this valley, having on the left the heights of Craonne, on the right those of Bône. But to effect this movement, it would be necessary to pass through a narrow gorge, in the midst of woody and marshy villages, where we should run the risk of seeing the enemy rush upon us from the heights that border the Lette on all sides; we should have needed veteran soldiers, coolly intrepid, to venture into this cut-throat pass.

The carrying of the plateau on the left by a sudden effort, was better suited to our young impetuous troops, supported by two divisions of the Old Guard; and besides, if the position was strong, there was the advantage of having to do only with a wing of the allies, separated from the remainder of the army by so many obstacles, that succours could not easily be brought up.

Napoleon decided that his left wing should attack the Craonne plateau. On this plateau was stationed the entire infantry of Wintzingerode, at that moment under the command of Count Woronzoff; the entire Sacken's corps with the Langeron in reserve, making in all 50,000 men, well provided with artillery. Blücher, judging by the attempts of the previous evening and the direction of our movements, which he could easily discern from the heights he occupied, had divined that we intended to attack the Craonne plateau, and by

the advice of M. de Muffling, quartermaster-general of the army of Silesia, he had resolved to form nearly the entire of his cavalry into a single mass, make them advance along the high-road from Laon to Rheims into the open country, and precipitate them, to the number of twelve or fifteen thousand horse, on our right flank and our rear. If he succeeded, he would cut us off from Berry-au-Bac and then throw us into the Aisne. The combination might involve grave consequences for us, but to produce such a result two events must occur; we must fail in our attempt to carry the plateau, and the second division of the Old Guard, as well as Marmont's corps, must be broken by the enemy's cavalry: it was not very probable that either event would take place.

This cavalry-expedition was confined to Wintzingerode, who was looked upon among the allies as the most alert of their van-guard officers; and it was on this account he had left his cavalry and light infantry to Count Woronzoff. Almost the entire of the allied cavalry were to advance on the Lette, through the woody country that forms the two banks of this little river, and, having crossed the Lette, they were, after making a long détour, to remain *en masse* on the high-road from Laon to Rheims. Kleist was to support Wintzingerode with his infantry, the D'York cavalry was to watch the two banks of the Lette, Bulow was ordered to guard the Laon, whilst Woronzoff, Sacken, and Langeron were to defend to the last extremity the Craonne plateau.

On the morning of the 7th of March, Napoleon determined on his plan of attack. We have said that the plateau of Craonne consisted of a succession of flat-topped heights, extending between the Aisne and the Lette, which they separate, and reaching the environs of Soissons. It was the most salient part of this plateau, forming, as we have just seen, a kind of promontory in the midst of the plain of Craonne, that was to be attacked. Had it been necessary to escalate this plateau at one stretch, the task would have been too difficult. There was what might be called a first step; this was the little plateau of Craonne, rising above Craonnelle, a point fortunately occupied by our troops since the previous evening. This first step would serve as a *point de départ*, by which we could ascend more easily to the main plateau. In order to render the operation less destructive, Napoleon resolved to second it by two flank attacks,—a movement favoured by the nature of the ground. Two ravines descended from the plateau: one, that of Oulches, situated on our left, reached the Aisne; the other, that of Vauclerc, situated on our right, opened into the valley of the Lette, in the midst of which stands the celebrated abbey of Vauclerc. The two ravines abut, one on the right, the other on the left, on the flanks of the plateau, at a place called the "*ferme d'Heurtobise*," and offered facilities for attacking in the rear the troops that defended the principal position. Ney, with his two divisions of the Young Guard, supported by a portion of Nansouty's cavalry, was to enter into the valley of Oulches, whilst Victor, with the two divisions of the Young Guard, passing through that of Vauclerc, was to debouche on the plateau in the direction of the *ferme d'Heurtobise*, and in

proximity to Ney. Napoleon, in the centre, with the Old Guard, the artillery reserve, and the bulk of the cavalry, had taken up his position on the little plateau of Craonne, ready to command an attack on the great plateau when the movement of his wings would render it possible. At the same time, Marmont was coming from Berry-au-Bac to protect our rear. All our troops having been obliged to defile in succession by the single bridge of Berry-au-Bac, the greater part of our artillery was left behind,—a circumstance very much to be regretted in sight of an enemy who had assembled in front of his position a considerable number of cannon.

At ten in the morning, Napoleon gave the signal for attack. Victor on the right advanced into the valley of Vauclerc, Ney on the left into that of Oulches. Victor, with a brigade of the Boyer division, advanced into the park of Vauclerc, where he found Woronzoff's infantry, in a strong position, and protected by a numerous artillery, firing from the summit of the plateau. After sustaining considerable losses, Victor made himself master of the park of Vauclerc. Above him, on the side of the hill, rose houses and gardens in tiers. The enemy had placed reserves here that were to fall on the Boyer division; but the movement was executed too late. This division, solidly established in the buildings and gardens of the abbey, did not yield the post they had conquered. The enemy poured on them a murderous fire from their batteries, and set in flames the buildings where they were lodged, but, spite the conflagration, they held their position.

Meanwhile was heard from the other side of the plateau, in the valley of Oulches, the cannon of Ney, who was opposed by Sacken, in his attempt to carry the *ferme d'Heurtobise*. The plateau being narrowed at this point, there was very little space between the extremity of the ravine of Oulches and that of Vauclerc, so that the two marshals were fighting in close proximity to one another. Ney had entered the valley of Oulches with his two divisions and Nansouty's cavalry. He had formed his cavalry into two columns, and had advanced under a fearful discharge of grape, for the Russians stationed large quantities of artillery at every outlet. The soldiers of Ney, young and enthusiastic, supported this fire bravely, and reached the confines of the plateau, but, having arrived there, they were met by Sacken's infantry, who received them with a sharp fire of musketry and drove them back to the bottom of the ravine. However, the fate of the war depended on the result of this battle; and Ney did not wish that the result should be determined by the bad conduct of troops under his command. Undiscouraged, he rallied his soldiers at the bottom of the ravine; with that soul-stirring warmth they never resisted, he spoke to them, revived their drooping courage, and conceived the design of forming them into one column, and leading them to the charge at a running pace, so that the enemy should not have time to use their muskets. The soldiers form in column, with the resolution either to conquer or perish; they advance through the ravine, and, having reached the extremity, dash forward, the marshal at their head.

under a hail of balls; with the rapidity of lightning, they fall on Sacken's infantry, that, taken by surprise, cannot sustain the shock, and are obliged to fall back. The infantry, thus disconcerted, retrogrades to a little hamlet called Paissey, leaving to Ney's two divisions sufficient space to deploy. Whilst Ney's left establish themselves on the plateau, his right fall on the farm of Heurtebise, enter, spite the enemy's resistance, and kill all who occupy the place. After some moments, Sacken's infantry, having recovered their first emotion, endeavour to regain the place they had lost; but Ney's soldiers, now enjoying equal advantages of position, are determined not to yield the border of the plateau so dearly purchased; both sides fire nearly *à bout portant*. Victor, encouraged by Ney's success, has no idea of doing less himself. The Boyer division, after seizing the abbey of Vauclerc, wished to débouche on the plateau, and established themselves with the Charpentier division on the borders of a little wood that extends from the abbey of Vauclerc to the hamlet of Ailles. Having taken up a position there, they supported unflinchingly the fire of sixty pieces of cannon. These two flank attacks having freed the centre, Napoleon, at the head of the Old Guard, ascended the plateau, almost without striking a blow, and took up a position opposite the farm of Heurtebise. He thus formed a line, connecting Ney's attack with that of Victor. The delay of our artillery left us exposed to the fire of the enemy's numerous cannon. To compensate for this disadvantage, Napoleon sent four of Drouot's batteries, that immediately deployed between Ney and Victor. The fire was then less unequal, but still terribly destructive, and, though exposed to a shower of bullets and grape, the Charpentier and Boyer divisions kept their post with unshaken firmness.

On the left, in the centre, on the right, we had made good our footing on the plateau, but this was not enough; it was necessary to keep the place, to extend our lines, and drive off the enemy. The moment had come when the cavalry ought to sustain the infantry, for beyond the farm of Heurtebise the ground opens out. Nansouty's cavalry, having followed Ney through the ravine of Oulches, and having débouché with him on the plateau, pass between the intervals of his battalions, and rush on the enemy,—the Polish lancers and horse chasseurs at the head, the grenadiers in reserve. These brave horsemen, finding here space to deploy, advance in full gallop, cut their way through several Russian squares, force them back on the hamlet of Paissey, whence it is only a step to drive them into a ravine parallel to that of Oulches, and leading to the Aisne; but in falling back the Russian infantry unmask a line of artillery that pours grape on our cavalry and tops their advance. They are obliged to return in order to avoid this destructive fire, and are pursued by twelve Russian squadrons. The latter, in their turn, charge with such impetuosity that they outdye the horse grenadiers of the Guard, who had remained in the second line. At sight of this sudden storm of cavalry, Ney's young soldiers lose their presence of mind, and fly toward the ravine of Oulches, whence they had so bravely advanced to the conquest

of the plateau. It was in vain that Ney, throwing himself into the midst of them, appealed with his strong voice and energetic gestures; they continued to flee, seized with inexplicable terror,—a phenomenon not unfrequent with young troops, whose susceptibility renders them as prompt to retreat as to attack. Napoleon, stationed a little in the rear, watching over the vicissitudes of the battle, sends Grouchy, with the remainder of the cavalry, to fill the void just made in the line of battle, and extend a veil, which, hiding the scene from our fugitives, might allow them to recover their presence of mind. Grouchy arrives, occupies the appointed place, and is about to charge, when he falls wounded from his horse. Deprived of their leader, our cavalry remain motionless. Still, however, they protect Ney's efforts to rally his infantry. Toward our right, Victor, at the head of the Boyer and Charpentier divisions, resolutely maintains his position on the confines of the wood of Ailles; but, being severely wounded, General Charpentier takes his place. Napoleon, fearing that his wings, which could hardly keep their position on the confines of the plateau, might ultimately yield, sent forward a division of the Old Guard to deploy between them. These old soldiers advanced with a determined step between our two wings, whilst, at the same moment, twenty-four pieces of artillery, so long expected, arrive. This remedies our inferiority in artillery, and it is time; for Drouot's cannon are nearly all dismounted. These twenty-four pieces of artillery formed into a battery, between the troops of Ney and Victor, soon commence to pour forth their fiery torrents on the Russians, causing them considerable loss. Sacken's and Woronzoff's infantry, after resisting some time, yield in their turn, under repeated discharges of grape: they retreat, and leave us in possession of the ground. A simultaneous thrill runs from one end of our battle-line to the other; our soldiers wish to pursue the enemy. Victor's troops, making a last effort, seize the village of Ailles, and establish themselves definitely on the right of the army. Ney's troops do not remain behind, and our entire line crosses the plateau, which sometimes widens, sometimes narrows, and drives back Sacken's and Woronzoff's infantry on that of Langeron. The Russian cavalry endeavour in vain to make a charge to cover this retreat, our chasseurs and horse grenadiers dash forward and repulse them. Having taken refuge behind the infantry, they form, and try to return to the charge; our dragoons drive them back again. Our troops thus traverse victoriously the summit of the plateau, their left on the Aisne, their right on the Lette, overtopping by some hundred feet the beds of these two rivers, and driving before them the 50,000 men of Sacken, Woronzoff, and Langeron. The pursuit continues in this fashion during a space of two leagues, that is to say, as far as Filain, and as the enemy appeared at this place desirous of descending into the valley of the Lette, our left, animated by a sudden reactionary emotion, briskly urge their descent. Our artillery, compensating for their tardy arrival, pursue the enemy to the entrance of the valley, and cover them with grape, until they find a shelter in the woody depths of the bed of the Lette.

Night was approaching; and nothing indicated that we need fear an attack on our flanks or our rear. In fact, this irruption of Wintzingerode's 15,000 horse, a project of which Napoleon was not aware, but whose possibility he admitted, and against which he had taken his precautions, by leaving a division of the Old Guard and Marmont's corps at the foot of the Craonne heights, had not yet been executed at the close of the day. Notwithstanding the solicitations of Blücher, who attached much importance to this combination, Wintzingerode's cavalry—having entered the valley of the Lette in the midst of a woody and marshy country, where they embarrassed the infantry of Kleist, and were in turn embarrassed by them—had not reached Festieux until very late in the day, and had not dared at that hour, to attempt an enterprise that presented dangers as well as advantages. Blücher was therefore obliged to content himself, for that day, with the loss of the plateau of Craonne.

Such was this bloody battle of Craonne, consisting of the conquest of an elevated plateau, defended by 50,000 men and a numerous artillery, and attacked by 30,000 with a few cannon. The tenacity on the one side, and the intrepidity on the other, had been admirable; and on our side, the Boyer and Charpentier divisions had displayed, besides intrepidity, extraordinary firmness under fire. Ney had been, as usual, one of the heroes of the day. The Russians had lost from 6000 to 7000 men, and no one will be surprised to learn that, debouching under a terrible fire, we had lost from 7000 to 8000. Our loss would have been greater, had not our artillery—delayed, not by any fault of theirs, but by the distance—come at length, and compensated by its ravages those we had sustained. Could we next day draw any useful consequences from this noble effort made by our army? Had the blood of our brave soldiers flowed for the benefit of France? Such was the question to be resolved within the forty-eight hours, and whose solution, alas! did not depend on the genius of Napoleon, for had it depended on that, it would not have been one moment doubtful.

Napoleon, though satisfied with this first result, and touched by the devotedness of his troops, was deeply absorbed in thought next day, but his determination to fight, resulting from the necessity of conquering Blücher, before falling back on Schwarzenberg, was still the same. He only deliberated on one point: that was to decide, now that he was master of the plateau of Craonne, by which side he should descend into the plain of Laon. But here again a necessity, almost as absolute as that of fighting, obliged him to march by the chaussée of Soissons to Laon, and this was the necessity of placing himself between these two cities, in order to occupy the Paris route. Unfortunately this chaussée presented much greater difficulties than that of Rheims, in advancing to the plain of Laon. Having arrived at that part of the plateau that lies between Aisy and Filain, we should be obliged to turn to the right, descend into the valley of the Lette, between Chavignon and Urcel, and enter a defile bordered on the left by

wooded heights, and on the right by the stream Ardon, that runs from Laon and is bordered by marshy prairies. We meet on the way, successively, the villages of Etouvelles and Chivy, and debouche afterward by the chaussée of Soissons into the plain of Laon. To lead the entire army into this narrow defile, where there was only the breadth of the chaussée to manœuvre, was extremely dangerous. In fact, the enemy occupying strongly the villages of Etouvelles and Chivy, could bring us to a full stop. However, we had no choice of operations, for to proceed to the right and take the high-road from Rheims to Laon, which crosses the Aisne at Berry-au-Bac, would be leaving the high-road to Soissons unprotected, and had Napoleon been from the beginning satisfied to take the route to Rheims, it would not have been worth while to lose 7000 men to conquer the plateau of Craonne. The serious necessity of remaining in the vicinity of Soissons, having outweighed every other consideration in the first battle, ought to be of equal importance in the second. Consequently, Napoleon, who, on the evening of the 7th, had bivouacked on the plateau, took up a position on the 8th between Ange-Gardien and Chavignon, at the entrance to the defile that leads to the plain of Laon. This day he gave his troops, that they might rest, and that Marshal Marmont might have time to fall into line.

Napoleon wished to make use of Marmont's troops to remedy as much as possible the inconvenience of the position in which he was obliged to place himself. Marshal Marmont had just received from Paris a fresh division of reserve, composed, like those commanded by General Gérard, of battalions of the line, hastily formed in the dépôts. This division comprised 4000 conscripts, drilled, like the others, during fifteen or twenty days, but led by officers whose courage was raised to the highest pitch by the danger of France and the threatened honour of our arms. This division, placed under the orders of the Duke of Padua, raised Marmont's troops to 12 or 13,000 men, and increased the total of Napoleon's forces to 48 or 50,000, deducting the losses incurred at the battle of Craonne. Napoleon resolved to send the Duke of Ragusa's corps along the route that he did not wish to take himself,—that leading from Rheims to Laon. This corps passing through Festieux, and having no great difficulties to conquer, would take up a position on our right in the plain of Laon, and by attracting the attention of the enemy, would facilitate to our principal column the passage of the defile between Etouvelles and Chivy. Undoubtedly there was danger, even with this precaution, for Napoleon debouching on the left through a narrow defile, and Marmont debouching unprotected on the right into the plain of Laon, at a distance of three leagues, they might be separately overwhelmed without being able to render each other any assistance. But what was to be done? On what side was there not danger, and even greater danger than that they were braving? It was not possible, in fact, to turn away from Blücher without having beaten him; it was not possible to follow on ~~some~~ the route from Rheims, without leaving that of Soissons unprotected, which was the high-road

to Paris; therefore debouching by the defile from Etouvelles to Chivy, was the result of a concatenation of necessities to which the emperor was obliged to submit, diminishing as best he could the difficulties of the operation. There was evidently a better chance of forcing the defile if we aided the attack on the left by an accessory demonstration on the right. Besides, the obstacle once overcome, Napoleon by advancing rapidly to the right, to aid Marmont, and the latter proceeding cautiously into the plain of Laon, the principal danger of the operation might be avoided. As to the rest, we must repeat, there was only a choice of perils. The greatest of all would have been to hesitate and not to act.

The 8th having been devoted to refresh and rally the troops, Napoleon resolved on the morning of the 9th to advance into the humid plain of Laon. The daring Ney was to lead the van, and force the defile from Etouvelles to Chivy. To facilitate the execution of his task, Napoleon commanded General Gourgard to lead, during the night, some light troops across the wooded hillocks that overlooked our left, and turn the defile by appearing suddenly on the flank of the chaussée between Etouvelles and Chivy. The Roussel division of dragoons had orders, as soon as the defile should be passed, to dash in full gallop on the city of Laon and endeavour to enter pell-mell with the enemy.

Marshal Ney, to insure success, set out on the 9th, before daybreak, whilst the allied troops were still sunk in profound sleep. The second light infantry, under the conduct of his intrepid marshal, rushed in close column in Etouvelles, surprised and put to the sword Bernicheff's vanguard, and, after taking possession of the little village, threw themselves in Chivy, which they also mastered. It even happened that General Gourgard's little column that had been sent to turn the defile, having encountered greater difficulty than the principal column, did not reach Chivy until after Marshal Ney had taken possession of the place. General Gourgard joined Ney at the moment he was entering the plain of Laon. Roussel's division of dragoons then dashed in full gallop on the chaussée, but their progress was arrested by grape poured from a battery of twelve pieces; the leader of a squadron and some men were killed. The cavalry were, therefore, obliged to pause and wait the arrival of the infantry before they could attack Laon. As to the rest, the defile they had believed so formidable was happily cleared, and the entire army could now deploy in the plain. Ney took up a position in advance of Chivy, opposite the Semilly suburb. Charpentier placed himself on the left with Marshal Victor's two divisions of the Young Guard; Mortier was stationed on the right with the second division of the Old Guard, and with the Poret de Morvan division of the Young Guard. Friant, at the head of the principal division of the Old Guard, took his place in the centre toward the rear. Lastly came the cavalry and the artillery reserve, making a total of 38,000 combatants. Marmont, at three leagues to the right, separated from Napoleon by the wooded heights, was stationed on the Rheims

route, waiting the sound of our cannon to venture into the plain.

A thick fog overspread the valley in the middle of which Laon is built; scarcely were the spires of the city discernible rising above this vapour as from a sea. Favoured by the fog, Ney threw himself on the Semilly suburb, situate at the foot of the height on which the town stands; Mortier, on the right, with the Poret de Morvan division, advanced on the Ardon suburb, situate in a similar manner. The vivacity of the attack, the dash of a successful commencement, the fog, all contributed to the success of this twofold attempt. Within an hour we made ourselves masters of the two suburbs.

But we soon perceived through the fog, that began to clear off, the singular site that was to become our battle-field, and the enemy might recover their spirits on seeing distinctly the small number of soldiers that had attacked 100,000 men.

Laon is built on a triangular peak, not unlike a tripod, and about 200 metres in height. This eminence commands on every side the verdant valley by which it is surrounded. The old town, enclosed by embattled walls and towers, occupies the entire summit of the hill. At the foot in the plain there are to the south the two suburbs of Semilly and Ardon, of which we had just taken possession. To the north there was the suburb of Neuville on the left, of Saint-Marcel in the centre, and de Vaux on the right, that we could not see, because the city hid them from us. Blucher, after having ceded the plateau of Craonne to our efforts, was determined to dispute the plain of Laon by taking strong hold of the wall-crowned rock that commanded it, and of the suburbs built around. He possessed too much courage, too much patriotism, too much pride, to abandon to 48,000 men a battle-field where he headed 100,000 men,—a battle-field whose defence was easy, and whose importance was incontestable—and after abandoning which nothing would remain for him but to retreat without knowing where to pause, for the army of Silesia was separated from the army of Bohemia, so that a junction was impossible. The fate of the war then depended on the possession of Laon, and for both parties it became a matter of necessity either to become masters of the city or perish.

Blucher had an additional motive for making a determined resistance. In consequence of the jealousy that prevailed between the Prussians and Russians—though they were the most united among the allies—a false notion prevailed among the latter that at Craonne the Prussians had knowingly allowed them to be worsted by the enemy. This prejudice, unreasonable as the prejudices generally are that spring up between allies making war in conjunction, had caused a serious misunderstanding between them, and a battle, where no person would spare himself, was become, besides the military necessity we have already noted, an absolute moral and political necessity. Influenced by these different reasons, Blucher had resolved to defend Laon *à outrance*, and he had for that purpose made excellent arrangements.

The Prussian troops that had not fought on the previous evening were distributed—part on the hill of Laon, part in the plain, opposite the suburbs of Semilly and Ardon, that we had just carried. They were to defend the principal post—that of Laon itself. On the side toward our left and the enemy's right, Woronzoff was placed between Laon and Clacy, opposite the woody heights through which we had debouched. The corps of Generals Kleist and D'York, combined into one, were stationed at the opposite extremity—that is to say, at our right and the left of the enemy facing the Rheims route, by which Marmont was expected. There remain Sacken and Langeron, that Blucher had placed behind the hill of Laon, hidden from our view as from our fire, and able, as circumstances may require, to advance either on the Soissons chaussée or on that of Rheims. Blucher, ignorant of our plan, did not know on which side the principal attack would be made; he had only learned from his scouts that the French troops were advancing along the two routes, and it was on this account he placed a great body of reserve behind Laon to be sent wherever the danger should be greatest.

As soon as the fog cleared off, Blucher ordered the Semilly suburb, lying at the extremity of the Soissons route, to be attacked. Ney had taken possession of the suburb. Blucher also commanded an attack on the suburb of Ardon, situate a little to the right of the Soissons route. Mortier had made himself master of the suburb, that he might be ready to aid Marmont. Woronzoff's infantry attacked Semilly, and that of Bulow did the same at Ardon. As customary in an offensive attack, the Prussians displayed great vigour, entered the two suburbs, and dislodged our soldiers. Already, even, Woronzoff's column, that had carried Semilly, was advancing *en masse* along the Soissons chaussée, and this movement would cut off the means of retreat from Mortier's troops, who, driven out of Ardon, were scattered in confusion on the right. At this sight, Marshal Ney, putting himself at the head of some squadrons of the Guard, dashes on the Prussian infantry, stops their onward course, gives his own infantry time to rally, and lends them on Semilly, of which he victoriously regains possession. Whilst Ney was performing this exploit in our front, General Belliard, on our right, replacing Grouchy in the command of the cavalry, puts himself at the head of the dragoons of Spain, (Roussel division,) charges in his turn Bulow's infantry, defeats them, and opens to Mortier the road to Ardon.

After having several times taken, lost, and retaken these suburbs of Semilly and Ardon, situate at the foot of the rock of Laon, the two armies remained grouped around these two points and bitterly exasperated against each other. The enemy regained possession of half a suburb, were driven out, and immediately returned again. Napoleon, burning with impatience, despatched aide-de-camp after aide-de-camp to Marshal Marmont, to hasten his approach; for he flattered himself, with reason, that the sudden appearance of this marshal would produce a moral panic among the allies, of which he would profit to force them from

the foot of the hill, to which they were so strongly attached. But three leagues of marsh and wooded hills to traverse, and a cloud of Cossacks, left little hope of communicating with Marmont.

Meanwhile Napoleon, believing that, were there any means of dislodging Blucher from this fatal rock of Laon, it would be by outflanking him, ordered the brave Charpentier, with his two divisions of the Young Guard, who had covered themselves with glory the preceding evening, to file along the wooded heights that surround the plain, and carry the village of Clacy on our left, whence they could advance and turn Laon by the Neuville suburb and the route de la Fère.

This order was bravely executed. The sharpshooters advanced through the woods, to divide the attention of the enemy; whilst General Charpentier, skirting the foot of the heights, traversed successively Vaucelles, Mons-en-Laonnois, and at length reached the village of Clacy, that was occupied by one of Woronzoff's divisions. Friant, with a division of the Old Guard, followed to support him if necessary. Charpentier fell on Clacy with such vigour that he entered, spite of a most determined resistance on the part of the Prussians. Our young soldiers, infuriated by the spirit of carnage, bayoneted some hundreds of the enemy. We made some hundred prisoners. This success on our left was of sufficient importance to influence the fate of the battle, for it gave us some chance of turning Blucher. It was neutralized, however, on our right, by the loss of the Ardon suburb. Bulow threw himself, for the last time, furiously on that point. The Poret de Morvan division had their general killed, and were obliged to fall back. But, in the centre, Ney had remained master of the Semilly suburb, that commanded the chaussée of Soissons. On the right, if we had lost Ardon, we had taken possession of the village of Semilly; on the left, we held Clacy, whence it was possible to turn Laon. There was evidently a positive advantage gained by the main column, commanded by Napoleon in person; and, spite our numerical inferiority, we might still hope to conquer the plain of Laon, so deeply bedewed with blood; but we could only hope to conquer on condition that on our extreme right, that is to say, on the Rheims route, success should crown our efforts.

Effectively, on the Rheims route, Marmont had at length debouched from Festieux into the plain of Laon. His cannon was heard at two in the afternoon, and filled Napoleon with hope, Blucher with anxiety.

He had advanced along the Rheims route, on the village of Athies, in sight of the enemy's cavalry, with the young division of Padua at the head of his column. He had repulsed the attacks of the cavalry, and had drawn near to the village of Athies. The troops of D'York and Kleist had possession of the place. Marmont, who heard the cannon of the emperor, and who felt the necessity of doing something on this day to aid his designs, thought he ought to carry Athies. Wishing to render the attack as easy as possible to his young troops, he placed forty pieces of artillery in his front, and cannonaded the village unceasingly

He afterward commanded the Duke of Padua's infantry to make an assault, and the place was carried. The day drawing to a close, he paused and established himself on the spot that conquest had made his.

Up to that point all went on well, and that day, though we had only accomplished half our work, promised good results on the next, if we could only compensate for our numerical inferiority. This was a serious difficulty, for we were fighting under a disadvantage of two to one, and with young troops against the veteran bands of Europe. However, such extraordinary feats had been performed during this campaign, and especially on the two previous days, that, if on the morrow the French troops dashed vigorously from the point they had already reached, Marmont thus drawing toward him the principal mass of the enemy, Napoleon could bring his troops from Clacy on the rear of Laon, and the victory would be almost certain. But that affairs should assume this aspect, a fortunate combination of circumstances would be needed. In the first place, the French should combine at a great distance, and then advance through woods, through marshy plains and crowds of Cossacks, and afterward pass the night, especially Marmont, in very unsafe positions.

Marmont, unprotected at the village of Athies, in the midst of the plain, awaited Napoleon's instructions, which he had sent Colonel Fabvier, at the head of five hundred men, to learn. Was it well of Marmont to remain stationary, or ought he not rather, after having during the day caught a sight of the immense masses of the enemy's cavalry, to take up a position for the night in the rear, toward Festieux for example, a kind of little hillock by which he had debouched into the plain and where he would have been in perfect safety. But the mistaken fear of abandoning the spot he had conquered in the afternoon restrained him, and deterred him from making the retrograde movement that prudence would have suggested. What was still less excusable, as he did remain amidst hordes of enemies, was the not multiplying precautions against a night attack. With a characteristic thoughtlessness that detracted from his good qualities, Marmont deputed to his lieutenants the duty of providing for the common safety. The latter allowed their young tired soldiers to scatter themselves in the neighbouring farms; they did not even think of protecting the battery of forty pieces that had cannonaded Athies with so much success. It was young marine-gunners, little accustomed to land-service, that tended these cannon, and they had not taken the precaution to place their guns on the avant-train, so that they might be able to remove them at the first appearance of danger. Everybody, commander and officers, trusted to the darkness of night, of which they ought, on the contrary, to have entertained the deepest distrust.

There were, alas! only too many reasons for distrusting this fatal night, for Blücher, as soon as he heard Marmont's cannon, believed that the attack by the Rheims route was the true attack, and that the other, which had occupied the day on the Soissons route, was only a feint. He consequently decided to bring down the mass of his army on the Rheims route. He

immediately put into motion Sacken and Langeron, who had remained *en reserve* behind Laon. They had orders to make a circuitous march round the city, and join Kleist and D'York; Blücher, besides, sent part of his cavalry, which on that side could not fail to be useful. The day was far advanced when this movement was terminated; still the Prussian general was not willing to bind himself to preparatory arrangements, and conceived the design of profiting by the darkness to effect a night surprise, by leading on his cavalry *en masse*.

Toward midnight, in fact, when Marmont's soldiers least expected it, a mass of horsemen dashed upon them, uttering terrific cries. Old soldiers accustomed to the vicissitudes of war would have been less surprised, and sooner rallied; but a sudden panic spread through the ranks of this young infantry, that took flight in every direction. The artillerymen, who had not thought of arranging their pieces so that they might be easily removed, fled without thinking of them. The enemy, amid the darkness, become mixed with us, and make part of the tumult; whilst their horse artillery pursue us, firing grape, at the risk of killing Prussians as well as French. All hurry on in indescribable disorder, not knowing what to do, and Marmont is carried away at the same pace as the rest. Fortunately, the 6th corps, which formed the nucleus of Marmont's troops, recover a little of their *sang-froid*, and stop at the heights of Festieux, where it would have been so easy to find a secure position during the night. The enemy, not daring to advance farther, suspend the pursuit, and our soldiers, delivered from their presence, rally at length from their disorder.

This accident, one of the most vexatious that could befall a general, particularly on account of the consequences it involved, cost us materially only some pieces of cannon, two or three hundred men put *hors de combat*, and about a thousand prisoners, the greater number of whom returned next day; but our enterprise, already so difficult and complicated, was defeated. On learning during the night this deplorable skirmish, Napoleon gave way to the most violent anger against Marshal Marmont; but giving way to anger would not repair the mischief, and he immediately began to think what was best to be done. To give up the attack and retire would be to commence a retreat that must lead to the ruin of France and his own. To attack, when the movement confided to Marmont was no longer possible, and when he would be confronted by masses of the enemy assembled between Laon and the Soissons chaussée,—to attack under such circumstances would have been rash. Either course seemed to lead to destruction. Listening only to the promptings of his own energetic soul, Napoleon determined to make a desperate attempt on Laon, and see whether chance, so fruitful of events in war, might not do for him what the most skilfully-laid plans had not been able to effect.

Napoleon was about to throw himself on Laon when Blücher anticipated him. The latter had first thought of sending half his army against Marmont, believing his to be our principal column. But in his staff nu-

merous voices were raised against this project; and it was proved to him that, above all things, he ought to oppose Napoleon in front of the city of Laon. Blücher, who was ill that day, and more inclined than usual to yield to the advice of his lieutenants, had, therefore, suspended the prescribed movement, and determined to direct his efforts straight before him,—that is to say, on Clacy, whence Napoleon threatened to turn his position.

At the very moment that Napoleon was putting his troops in motion to renew the attack, three divisions of Woronzoff's infantry, advancing on our left, deployed around the village of Clacy, intending to carry the place. General Charpentier, who had replaced Victor, was at Clacy with his own division of the Young Guard and that of General Boyer,—both very much reduced in number by the late engagements. Ney had on his side advanced to the left to support General Charpentier; he placed his artillery a little in the rear and diagonally, so that he could take the Russian masses *en écharpe* that were about to fall on Clacy. At nine in the morning an obstinate engagement commenced around this unfortunate village, whose site, happily for us, was slightly elevated. General Charpentier, who during the past days had displayed as much energy as skill, allowed the Russian infantry to advance within musket-shot, and then received them with a terrible fusillade. The officers and sub-officers exposed themselves incessantly, seeking to compensate for the want of training in their young soldiers, who, in every respect, exhibited an unexampled devotedness. The first Russian division was received with so destructive a fire that they were driven back to the foot of the position, and immediately replaced by another that received like treatment. The assailing troops were exposed not alone to the fire from Clacy, but to that of Marshal Ney's artillery, which, happily posted as we have just related, committed fearful ravages in the enemy's ranks. In truth, some of the projectiles from this artillery knocked off some of our soldiers at Clacy; but, in the enthusiasm that prevailed, we only thought of checking the enemy and destroying them, no matter at what price.

The same attack, renewed five times by the Russians, failed five times through the heroism of General Charpentier and his soldiers. The Russians, repulsed, fell back on Laon. Napoleon, again conceiving some slight hopes, and flattering himself with having perhaps tired out the tenacity of Blücher, ordered Ney's two divisions (Meunier and Curial) to advance straight on Laon, through the Semilly suburb, which we had not evacuated. Our young soldiers, led by Ney to the hillock, overturned every thing before them, ascended one side of the triangular peak of Laon, and, taking advantage of the conformation of the land, which here was hollowed and receding, they succeeded in attaining the walls of the city. But Bülow's infantry stopped them at the foot of the ramparts, then, pouring forth showers of grape, forced them to redescend this fatal height, before which our good fortune deserted us. Napoleon, however, who did not yet abandon the hope of driving

Blücher from his position, sent Drouot at the head of a detachment to a great distance on the left, to try whether it would not be possible to advance along the route of *La Fère* and annoy the enemy sufficiently to make him let go his hold.

Drouot, whose sincerity was never called in question, having, after a daring reconnoissance, pronounced this last attempt impracticable, Napoleon was obliged to admit the belief that Blücher's position was impregnable. The positions of each had been so during the last twenty-four hours: Blücher had been as powerless against Clacy and Semilly as Napoleon against Laon. But Napoleon's position would not continue impregnable twenty-four hours longer should Blücher execute his project of marching *en masse* by the route from Laon to Rheims, to drive Marmont back on Berry-au-Bac and cross the Aisne on our right. It was therefore impossible for Napoleon to remain where he was: he was obliged to retrace his steps and fall back on Soissons. However painful this determination might be, still, as it was indispensable, Napoleon made up his mind without hesitation, and the next morning (the 11th of March) he repassed the defile of Chivy and Etouvelles, to fall back on Soissons; whilst Marmont, posted on the bridge of Berry-au-Bac, defended the Aisne above him. The enemy took especial care not to pursue this angry lion, the thought of whose return made even a victorious enemy tremble. Napoleon could therefore return to Soissons without disquietude.

These three terrible days—the 7th at Craonne, the 9th and 10th at Laon—had cost Napoleon about 12,000 men; and if they cost the enemy 15,000, that was a poor consolation, because our adversaries had still 90,000 soldiers, whilst we had little more than 40,000, including even the small division of the Duke of Padua, who had come to reinforce Marshal Marmont. But the worst of all was, not the numerical but the moral loss, and the military consequences of the last operations.

To neglect Schwarzenberg a moment, in order again to discomfit Blücher, and afterward return to Schwarzenberg, either by falling directly on the latter or by first calling out the garrisons,—such was the last project Napoleon devised, and which ought, if fortune did not prove a traitor, enable him to drive his enemies from France. But, not having beaten Blücher, though he had chastised him severely, he was about to be pursued by this indefatigable adversary in going to attack Schwarzenberg, and he thus ran the risk of seeing them both combine to overwhelm him. The danger was palpable and difficult to avoid.

Napoleon returned deeply dejected to Soissons, but less dejected than his soldiers, who comprehended perfectly well the position of affairs, and began to fear that their efforts would be powerless to save France. But the inflexible spirit of Napoleon, enlightened by his great experience, which had shown him that the chances of war are inexhaustible, and that affairs are never desperate provided a general perseveres,—the inflexible spirit of Napoleon was not cast down. He still reckoned on the erroneous movements of the enemy.

and flattered himself that a fault of the presumptuous Blücher—perhaps of the prudent Schwarzenberg himself—would restore him the good fortune he had lost. As to the rest, he was still placed between his two adversaries, and consequently in a position to prevent their junction; he had still some resources at Paris; and, if he abandoned the capital to itself, to advance toward the fortresses, he would necessarily command still greater reinforcements, with which he might perhaps change the face of things. He preserved a firmness of mind of which few warriors have given an example,—perhaps not one; for no man ever fell from so high an eminence into so fearful an abyss. He had, in fact, excited the anger of the entire world against himself personally, and had completely lost the affections of France. He still possessed, it is true, an admirable corps of officers, formed in his school and filled with a pious despair, which they communicated to the heroic youth of France who joined them as they marched,—all advancing to the slaughter together. Besides, he still retained his inexhaustible genius and a well-founded pride in the great deeds he had accomplished; and he was not disturbed; for, without doubt, even in his fall, he saw visioned before him that indestructible glory which to the latest posterity shall halo his name. Having returned to Soissons, which the enemy had not dared to keep, he watched, with his eye fixed on his enemies, which of them should commit the fault of which he hoped to profit. He had been in the town twenty-four hours busied in distributing bread and shoes to his young soldiers, to whom he also allowed some repose, and whom he also tried to drill a little better, when one of his numerous pursuing enemies chanced to come within his reach. This was General Priest, who brought a new detachment, called off from the blockade of the fortress and replaced by German militia. He had advanced from the Ardennes on Rheims, and had repulsed from this city Corbineau's detachment. This detachment consisted of 16,000 soldiers, Russians and Prussians, commanded by an excellent officer—unfortunately French—whom hatred of the *régime* of 1793 had driven to Russia, and who had not returned when this *régime* had ceased to bedew France with blood. These 16,000 men were not a prey of sufficient importance to indemnify Napoleon for his late losses; but, falling on them, he would at least prove that it was still dangerous to be in his neighbourhood, and might render his enemies more circumspect: whilst waiting a better chance, this was not to be despised.

Whilst Blücher was stopped on the banks of the Aisne by Marshal Marmont's presence at Berry-au-Bac, Napoleon prepared to go from Soissons to Rheims to overthrow Saint-Priest's corp. On the evening of the 12th, he ordered Marmont to leave at Berry-au-Bac whatever forces were indispensably necessary, and to advance to Rheims with the rest, whilst he repaired there by the route of Fismes. They were the following morning—the 13th—to effect a junction within a league of Rheims. The greatest secrecy was commanded and observed.

On the night of the 12th of March, Napoleon, after having ordered thirty pieces of cannon to be formed into a battery at Soissons, behind *sacs à terre et des tonneaux*, after having destroyed every obstacle that impeded the defence, after having left as a garrison some fragments of battalions and a good commander, he set out for Rheims, enjoying the demi-satisfaction that the success he was about to achieve inspired. At the break of day, he met Marmont's corps and the marshal himself, whom he reproached, but yet not so severely as he might have done; he then urged forward to Rheims the 30,000 men he had assembled for this *coup de main*.

On the way, Napoleon fell in, on the right, at the village of Rosney, with two Prussian battalions that were making soup. He disturbed their repast by making them all prisoners, spite of a certain amount of resistance on their part; he soon after found himself opposite Rheims. Napoleon, who wished to cut off the entire of Saint-Priest's corps, conceived the idea of sending his cavalry across the Vesle, and, making them advance beyond Rheims, to cut off the retreat of the imprudent enemy that had fallen into his snares. But the allies had destroyed the bridge it had cost him so much time to rebuild, and he was forced to content himself with driving back on Rheims Saint-Priest's troops, who had issued from the city to defend the heights. The French attacked the enemy with the greatest vigour, and, after a very short combat, drove them from the heights upon the town. Then the emperor ordered the regiments of the Guard of Honour to rush upon them. General Philippe de Ségur, who commanded one of these regiments, turned the extreme left of the enemy, overthrew their cavalry, and captured eleven pieces of cannon. The Russian infantry, taken in the rear by this movement, rushed toward Rheims. They wished to defend the city gates; but the French demolished them with cannon-shot, and then entered the town *pêle-mêle* with the Russians: they made 4000 prisoners. This rapid *coup de main*, which scarcely cost us a few hundred men, deprived Saint-Priest's corps of 6000; the remainder retreated. M. de Saint-Priest lost his life on this occasion.

This success, without restoring to Napoleon the ascendancy he possessed after Montmirail, had, however, the good effect of encouraging his soldiers and restraining the enemy, who now felt the necessity of weighing their least movement in presence of such an enemy. Napoleon paused at Rheims, to profit of any favourable circumstances that might arise.

The situation of affairs, both political and military, had undergone a serious change during the ten or twelve days the emperor had been engaged combating Blücher. On quitting Troyes, he had ordered Marshal Oudinot, General Gérard, and Marshal Macdonald, to continue to pursue Prince Schwarzenberg and drive him beyond the Aube, though he still pretended to negotiate an armistice at Lusigny. He had at the same time ordered his lieutenants, who had under their command more than 30,000 men, to make the soldiers at the outposts cry, "Vive l'Empereur!" in order to persuade the enemy

that he had not left. But this illusion had endured only four-and-twenty hours. The manner in which the Austrian general had been pursued after the emperor's departure was sufficient to prove his absence, and Prince Schwarzenberg, who had promised to resume offensive operations as soon as Napoleon's attention should be directed from him, had fulfilled his promise on the morning of the 27th of February. Wishing to bring back to the Aube the French troops that had crossed the river in pursuit of him, he sent Marshal de Wrede toward Barsur-Aube, and Prince Wittgenstein in the direction of the bridge of Dolancourt. He kept under his own command Giulay and the Austrian reserves.

Marshal Oudinot and General Gérard had taken up a position on the Aube, and Marshal Macdonald on the Seine. The two former, whose peril was greatest, having on the morning of the 27th perceived that the enemy had resumed offensive operations, had changed their position—General Gérard to Barsur-Aube and Marshal Oudinot to Dolancourt, to dispute at these two points the passage of the Aube. Marshal Oudinot, thinking the situation of Dolancourt bad, for it was overlooked on every side by high grounds, and thinking, moreover, that a retrograde movement would reveal too clearly the absence of Napoleon, had determined to take up a position in advance of the Aube, and defend *à outrance* the heights of Arsonval and of Arrentières. Leaving the Pacified division of the national guards to cover the bridge of Dolancourt, he sent to the heights beyond the two brigades of the Leval division and the remaining brigade of the Boyer division. These three divisions brought from Spain, supported by the dragoons, also from Spain, and comprising seven thousand foot-soldiers and two thousand horse, with, at the utmost, thirty pieces of artillery, could with great difficulty hold their ground in sight of the enemy's hundred pieces of artillery. The Montfort and Chassé brigades, first exposed to a shower of grape, and afterward attacked by the Austrian cuirassiers, had not yet yielded an inch, but repulsed every assault, whilst the Count de Valmy, fording the Aube, came to their assistance. These two infantry brigades, completely surrounded by the enemy, without exhibiting the slightest emotion, assisted alternately by the Pinoteau brigade and by the dragoons of Spain,—who charged at full gallop the formidable Austrian artillery and killed the gunners beside the cannon,—kept possession of the battle-field during the entire day. At length, toward night, seeing the remainder of the grand army of Bohemia ready to fall upon them, they quitted the heights, regained the banks of the river, and effected their retreat in good order. This admirable combat, sustained on one side by from eight to nine thousand men, first against thirty and afterwards against forty thousand, had cost the enemy three thousand and us two thousand men. Had Napoleon only had such soldiers, the result of this great struggle would certainly have been different.

Whilst Oudinot with the troops from Spain so well defended the heights before Dolancourt, General Gérard, on his side, had checked the Bavarians before Barsur-Aube, and had killed

several without losing many of his own troops, thanks to the barricades by which he was covered. Macdonald, hearing the cannonade, had hastened from the Seine to the Aube to co-operate in the defence of the attacked posts.

Although this sharp combat, in which Prince Wittgenstein had been seriously and Prince Schwarzenberg slightly wounded, was of a nature to render the army of Bohemia still more prudent than usual, still it was easy to discern, by the number of troops engaged, that this *corps d'armée* only served as a screen, and that Napoleon was elsewhere. Had Prince Schwarzenberg entertained a doubt on this subject, it must have vanished at seeing before him, at the utmost, eight or nine thousand men. Thenceforth his project of retreating on Chaumont was abandoned, and whether that he was goaded by the reproaches of the allies, whether that he was jealous of keeping his word, pledged to the army of Silesia, he resolved to advance, and at least recover his position at Troyes, whilst Blücher continued to run the chances of an isolated march. Consequently, on the 28th he put his troops in motion, and the three French generals, judging with reason that the Aube was not tenable, and that Troyes even might be turned on every side, had fallen back on the Seine, between Nogent and Montereau, the rear-guard engaged all the way in sharp skirmishes. Prince Schwarzenberg had followed them, had again taken possession of Troyes, and occupied the banks of the Seine from Nogent to Montereau. He had made a firm resolution that Blücher, advancing on Paris, should not advance alone.

The situation of affairs, considered in a military point of view, had assumed a very gloomy colouring during the ten or twelve days employed by Napoleon in contending with Blücher. Politically considered, things had become wondrously worse.

The conferences at Lusigny had been definitely abandoned, because Prince Schwarzenberg had no further need of them to free himself from Napoleon's pursuit, and because Napoleon persisted in bringing forward the frontier question under the veil of an armistice. On entering Troyes, the prince had dismissed the commissioners, who had endeavoured for a moment to arrest the effusion of blood by an armistice. As to the rest, he did so with regret, and solely constrained by the spirit that prevailed among the allies.

At Châtillon, in like manner, things were on the eve of a rupture. We have already said that when, on the 1st of March, at Chaumont, Lord Castlereagh had induced the allies to sign a treaty, he had also persuaded them to fix a term, after which they would no longer wait M. de Caulaincourt's counter-project. The term fixed was the 10th of March, and M. de Caulaincourt was informed that after that date the congress would be dissolved, and all further negotiation deferred till either Napoleon or the allies should have succumbed. Prince Esterházy had been sent secretly by M. de Metternich to M. de Caulaincourt, to repeat his former advice, of treating at any price, for should the present opportunity pass unprofitable of, the allies would never renew negotiations with Napoleon, and besides, they contemplated depriving him, not alone of the

Rhine, but of his throne. M. de Caulaincourt had sent this intelligence to head-quarters, imploring the emperor to allow him to cede some points of the Frankfort bases; for if he persisted in his determination, the negotiations would be instantly broken off, and not only his imperial rank, but his very existence, would be at stake.

The information transmitted by M. de Caulaincourt, and which he had gained from the secret but sincere counsels of Prince Esterházy, was strictly true. To the impatience to enter Paris that Alexander experienced, to the furious hatred that influenced the Prussians, were now added the urgent solicitations of the royalist party. M. de Vitrolles, despatched, as we have seen, with a commission accredited by M. de Dalberg, but not by M. de Talleyrand, had succeeded, after many détours, in reaching the head-quarters of the allies, and had obtained admission by using the tokens of recognition he brought from M. de Stadion. Though he was wholly unknown to the allied ministers, they, after some time, accorded him their confidence, as they listened to his sincere and impassioned language, as they listened, above all, to the names of the high personages under whose authority he acted. This was the first important communication the allied sovereigns had received, and it had the effect, not alone of affording them satisfaction, but of redoubling their courage, by holding out the hope of finding within Paris itself a party that would open the gates for them, and, having secured their entrance, would aid them to constitute a Government with whom they could negotiate; this hope, so strong when they had first crossed the Rhine, and which had since become so weak, on witnessing so few manifestations in favour of the Bourbons, now revived, and strengthened considerably their determination to advance. The allies questioned M. de Vitrolles in detail about the state of Paris: they complained of knowing nothing on the subject, and repeated the old story, that, not having made war either for or against any dynasty, they would not think of dethroning Napoleon excepting France manifested a decided wish to that effect, in which case they would be happy to aid in delivering her from the yoke that weighed so heavily on her and on Europe. Upon this, M. de Vitrolles, adducing the names of MM. de Talleyrand and de Dalberg, who had great weight in the allied camp, much more than men of higher rank among the royalists; on this, we say, M. de Vitrolles replied, that France, trembling under the imperial tyranny, dared not manifest her real sentiments; that, besides, knowing that the European courts were negotiating with Napoleon at Châtillon, she was still less disposed to raise the standard of revolt against him, a standard which the sovereigns in arms had not themselves dared to raise; but if they broke off definitely with Napoleon, the allied monarchs would see burst out on every side a unanimous demonstration in favour of the house of Bourbon. It was unfortunately true that the aversion of France to despotism and to war had weakened her horror of foreigners, and though she had completely forgotten the Bourbons, she would willingly accept any Government whatsoever

that would release her from sufferings that had become insupportable. This truth, undoubtedly much exaggerated by the envoy of MM. de Talleyrand and de Dalberg, had naturally made a profound impression on the ministers and sovereigns assembled at Troyes, and they informed M. de Vitrolles that they were obliged to continue the conferences at Châtillon to a certain date; that if Napoleon accepted the frontiers of 1793, they would treat with him; that, in the opposite case, they would break off, and then listen to whatever could be said in favour of another Government, provided that this Government was agreeable to the French people, and seemed likely to be permanent. But the partisans of war à outrance, though they had no reason to be excited, had, on learning the late intelligence, felt a still greater desire to break off the negotiations at Châtillon, and to march on Paris. This was the motive of the repeated and secret advice that Austria sent to M. de Caulaincourt. A few moments more, and the entire aspect of things would be changed.*

At Paris, too, things assumed a most threatening aspect. Napoleon had, as we have seen, sent the treaty proposed by the plenipotentiaries at Châtillon to the Regent, Maria Louisa, flattering himself that these dishonouring propositions would call up the indignation of all in whose veins French blood flowed. The different papers relative to the negotiation had been laid before a council held in presence of Maria Louisa and Joseph, on the 4th of March. Napoleon, who had so much altered the truth with regard to the Prague negotiations, and even to those of Frankfort, had resolved this time to tell the entire truth, because he hoped it would excite an outburst of anger. Alas! the truth now only confounded those who heard it, enervated as they were by a long-continued despotism. There were among the members of this council good citizens and honest men, but they were as much afraid of offending Napoleon by advising an immediate peace, as they were of displeasing the public by recommending a prolongation of the war. They were, in fact, alarmed at being called on to deliberate on so grave a question. There were also present on this occasion, besides the empress and Joseph, the grand dignitaries, the ministers, and some presidents of the *Conseil d'Etat*. After the different papers had been read, all observed a long silence, the combined result of surprise and terror. Then Joseph, who presided, having compelled each by a personal appeal to break silence, the twenty members stammered out their opinions in an embarrassed manner, and with a brevity that indicated, not energy but weakness. The proposed treaty, they all admitted, was most humiliating; indeed, some, who did not hesitate to call things by their right names, declared it to be an actual

* The principal personage employed in these negotiations, M. de Vitrolles, has, in his spirited and yet unedited memoirs, given an account of his mission to the allied camp. I am indebted for a sight of these memoirs to the kindness of the gentleman in whose possession they are. I am therefore sure of the correctness of the recital I have just made, the more so as I have compared M. de Vitrolles's testimony with that of some of the principal personages of the time, and my narration is the result of these compared testimonies.

capitulation. "It was to be hoped," they said, "that the genius of the emperor, which had already accomplished so many prodigies, would effect one more, that of driving back the enemy and forcing the concession of more favourable conditions. However, they did not know the precise state of affairs; the emperor alone knew that; he alone could judge and give an enlightened advice on the subject—which was very true, thanks to the form of government—but if, however, the position of things was as desperate as was said, and as it seemed, judging by appearances, would it not be better to treat on the bases of the ancient frontiers, than to allow foreigners to enter Paris? It was impossible to hide the fact, that if foreigners entered the capital, they would not respect the glorious dynasty under which France then existed; foreigners would attempt a total change in the home Government, and that was a calamity that ought to be averted at any cost. Undoubtedly, to lose Belgium would be a serious loss, but it was better to lose Belgium than France, and, above all, the throne. Besides, after all, France such as she had been under Louis XIV., having her emperor at her head, would be still great, for her greatness did not depend on having one or two provinces more or less. Napoleon had given sufficient proofs of possessing a warlike genius, it was to be desired that he should now find time to exhibit a genius for peace, and procure his country as great an amount of happiness as he had already done of glory. Then France would soon recover the effects of her late drains, and would find an opportunity of regaining what the violence of foreigners might at present deprive her of. But, in any case," said these servile men, who ardently wished for peace, without daring to avow their wishes, "in any case, if his imperial majesty, who alone knew the real state of things, and was alone in a position to judge accurately—if his imperial majesty was inclined to accept the proposal of the ancient frontiers, the council was of opinion that his majesty might do so without detriment to his honour, for his true honour was the interest of France, and the interest of France was immediate peace."

Certainly the interest of France was peace, but it was her interest a year, two years, six years earlier, and that would have been the time to say so. To continue the war now involved danger only to the reigning dynasty: France, under the Bourbons, would be neither smaller nor less influential than the plenipotentiaries at Châtillon wished to render her; it is even certain that the dread of Napoleon influenced the allies very much in their desire to weaken France; were she under the Bourbons they would be much less solicitous to reduce her natural and secular power. Things having arrived at the point at which they were, there was no danger in risking a few battles more, which might lead to a settlement whose conditions would be a compromise between the ancient and modern frontiers, by which we might secure Mayence by sacrificing Antwerp. One man alone, whose name deserves mention,—M. de Cessac,—recorded his vote against accepting the Châtillon propositions. With this single exception, all the

members of the council of regency exhibited an unprecedented subservience. The most daring expressed in a more decided tone the same cowardly feeling. "Peace or war as the emperor pleases." Such was their sole opinion, but it signified that, if by chance the emperor should prefer war, it was what they, too, desired.*

Napoleon had always manifested extreme contempt for those large assemblies where questions of war or politics are debated, because in reality those whom he met in such places were men fashioned by despotism—the greater number having no opinion of their own, very few among them capable of forming one, and these endeavouring to discover the wishes of the ruler as a guide to theirs; others were contradictions either through bad temper or discontent. This council, had Napoleon been present, would have justified his opinion, and revealed the effects of the *régime* under which he had pressed down France, and under which he was about to sink himself. As to the rest, he would be very much disappointed, for he had wished to excite a burst of patriotic indignation, and he received, on the contrary, an humble and trembling supplication for peace, a supplication written under the influence of two sources of fear—fear of him, and fear of the enemy.

But the humility that these advisers testified in the presence of his wife, his brother, and his faithful chancellor Cambacérès, was flung aside when they no longer found themselves confronted by these formidable witnesses: they then gave vent to very different language. Their submission to Napoleon's wishes was suddenly transformed into fury against his obstinacy. "*This man is mad,*" was the expression echoed on every side. "He will get us all killed," said men that had never appeared on a battle-field. Among the men particularly attached to Joseph—and these, generally speaking, were the civil or military *employés* who had sought at Madrid the advancement they could not find at Paris—it was insinuated that it would be better to place in Joseph's hands the power of saving France. These friends of Joseph, very ill treated by Napoleon, who accused them of causing our misfortunes in Spain, now repaid his ill treatment with disparaging remarks, and said it would be better to proclaim a regency of which Joseph should be president, for with him Europe would be more willing to treat than with Napoleon. They asserted this to be an adroit manner of soothing the pride of the allied sovereigns as well as of Napoleon himself, and of delivering France from the rule of a man whose genius was only suited to war, and confiding her destinies to one whose genius was essentially that of peace. This was a plainly-spoken wish that Napoleon should abdicate and Joseph take his place. But it was only the most rash—that is to say, the most discontented—who dared to hold this language. Those who confined themselves to wishing that a speedy termination should be

* The report of this council is still extant with the recorded opinion of each member: and, should it ever be published, it will be seen that I have not exaggerated in any particular.

put to the war, and had no idea of subverting the throne, contented themselves with saying that, in reply to the debate provoked by Napoleon, it would be right to send him an address containing a formal demand for peace.

These sentiments obtained so much, that Joseph, adopting the opinions of those who wished to facilitate peace on Napoleon's part, by making pacific demonstrations, thought proper to consult M. Meneval, whose fidelity was unalterable, and commissioned him to write to head-quarters to know whether a peace-movement would be agreeable to the emperor, and in what form he would wish it to be made. M. Meneval declared that he would inform the emperor correctly of every thing that occurred, and would afterward listen to what it was lawful for him to hear. He therefore wrote immediately to Napoleon, with the delicate reserve which he was capable of, combined with the most perfect frankness.

Napoleon, on arriving at Rheims, found M. Meneval's letter, and several others, that gave him a clear idea of the state of affairs. Thanks to his wondrous sagacity, which distrust heightened but did not confuse, he guessed every thing; perhaps that in the first moment of excitement he exaggerated a little what he divined. He was especially displeased because the Duke de Rovigo, not wishing to compromise any one, and not attaching much importance to the opinions of those who surrounded Joseph, had sent him no report of what had occurred. With the promptitude and utter want of discretion that too often characterized his manner of acting, he wrote the following letter to the Duke de Rovigo. In this document we find only evidences of a dreary despotism, nor would it deserve to be quoted did it not, at the same time, exhibit an inflexibility of character very extraordinary under the circumstances.

"To the Minister of Police.

"Rheims, 14th of March, 1814.

"You do not inform me of any thing that is going on at Paris. People there talk of an address, of a regency, and lay a thousand plots as stupid as absurd, and which could only be conceived by a fool like Miot. These people do not know that I, like Alexander, cut the Gordian knot. Let them know that I am still the same man that I was at Wagram and at Austerlitz; that I do not wish for state intrigues; that there is no authority but mine, and should events become pressing, it is the empress-regent who alone possesses my confidence. The king (Joseph) is weak-minded, and allows himself to be seduced into intrigues that may prove fatal to the State, and above all, to him and his advisers, if he do not quickly return to the right path. I am displeased at learning all this from another source than from you. Be assured that had an address been drawn up, opposed to the governing authority, I would have had the king, my ministers, and all who signed it arrested. These men spoil the national guard; they spoil the Parisians, because they are themselves weak-minded and do not understand the temper of the country. I want no tribunes of the people. Let the people not forget that I am the great tribune; they will then do what is conducive

to their real interests, which are the constant object of my thoughts."

After this vexatious experience of the men that surrounded him, Napoleon took upon himself to reply to the plenipotentiaries at Châtillon. He had already commanded M. de Caulaincourt to use every means to prolong the negotiations and prevent a rupture, without, however, conceding the proposed bases. The question still was of the counter-project, required within a fixed time, and which Napoleon, without actually refusing, felt extreme repugnance to present. He renewed his instructions this time in terms as prudent as honourable.

"Ask," he wrote to M. de Caulaincourt, "whether the proposed preliminaries, to which you are requested to present a counter-project, are the *dernier mot* of the allies. If it is so, you break off immediately, whatever may be the consequence, and we shall tell France to what the allies have tried to subject us. If on the contrary, as is very probable, you are told it is not their *dernier mot*, you will reply that we on our side, referring incessantly to the Frankfort bases, have not uttered our *dernier mot*, but they cannot require that we should offer in a counter-project the sacrifices they wish to force from us; for," he added, "*if they wish to flog us, they will not, at least, oblige us to lay on the whip ourselves.*"

Napoleon wished that M. de Caulaincourt, by entering into a discussion of details, should learn precisely what it would be necessary to sacrifice and what it would be still possible to retain; for the disadvantage of offering a counter-project was, that, in our ignorance of the definite intentions of the allies on each point, we might yield what it was possible for us to keep. He authorized M. de Caulaincourt to abandon in the first instance Dutch Brabant, that is to say, the part of Holland of which, in 1810, he had deprived his brother Louis. This was a very slight concession, for the frontier, extending from the Wahal to the Meuse, was what was called the natural frontier, or the *Frankfort bases*, and secured to us the Scheldt and Antwerp. Napoleon also authorized his plenipotentiary to renounce the different spots of territory we possessed on the right bank of the Rhine, as annexations of the left bank, such as Wesel, Cassel, and Kehl. We thus, though keeping possession of the left, abandoned the bridges that secured us a facility of landing on the right bank. Napoleon also consented to demolish the fortifications of Mayence and reduce the place to a mere commercial town. He was willing to resign all that France possessed beyond the Alps and all the states governed by his brothers, either in Germany or in Italy, without requiring any compensation except for Prince Eugene. The sacrifice of Spain had been long since made; Napoleon again formally renounced that kingdom; and as to our colonies, he authorized M. de Caulaincourt to declare that France would yield some of her factories in India (those that we still possess) without the isles of France and Réunion; she would give up Guadeloupe, but not the Saintes; she would resign Martinique, but not her other possessions in the Antilles

These were all of so little value that Napoleon was willing to abandon them, if he could retain some continental possessions. He ought to have said, "France prefers free trade with the colonies of every other nation that have been independent, or are about to become so, to possessions in the New World, that are at the same time valueless and difficult to defend." Should M. de Caulaincourt not succeed in getting each point discussed, he was to draw up a counter-project on these bases, and await the reply, whatever it might be.

These instructions which had already been despatched from Craonne and renewed at Rheims, with a little additional latitude, but without exceeding what we have just reported, were only a reproduction of the Frankfort bases, and could not prolong the negotiations beyond a few days. M. de Caulaincourt was deeply afflicted on receiving these instructions, for, though he loved his country as a good citizen, he also loved and wished to save the ruling dynasty, even at the expense of Napoleon's personal glory, a diminution of which he looked upon as an inevitable and deserved punishment for his faults. But, bound by absolute orders, having exhausted every pretext he could devise to defer the fatal term some days beyond the 10th of March, he was at length obliged to explain himself. He did so; but when, in an elaborate note, which he attempted to read to the plenipotentiaries, he undertook to discuss the preliminaries presented on the 17th of February, and to prove that they were a violation of a positive treaty, for the Frankfort bases, formally proposed, had been accepted with equal formality; that the frontiers, to which the allies now wished to limit France, deprived her of the relative power which she ought to retain in order to maintain the balance of power in Europe; that the possession of the left bank of the Rhine was scarcely a sufficient compensation to her for the partition of Poland, the secularization of the Ecclesiastical States, the destruction of the Republic of Venice, and the conquests of the English in India; when, we say, he undertook to expatiate on these considerations, seven or eight of the plenipotentiaries present raised a simultaneous outcry, threatened to break up the meeting, and hear nothing further, if the present plenipotentiary persisted to dilate on such a theme. It was, they said, a counter-project that the Duke de Vicenza was to present, and not a critique; it was a counter-project he had promised, and for which they had patiently waited a month—which they were commissioned to demand, with orders to leave off if they did not obtain it.

M. de Caulaincourt did all in his power to calm and induce them to accept his note. He only succeeded, after enduring the most bitter recriminations, and on promising to present a counter-project, and that within twenty-four hours.

Effectively, on the 15th, M. de Caulaincourt presented a counter-project, conformable to the bases we have quoted. After enumerating the sacrifices we were ready to make, in a manner calculated to make the most of our concessions—such, for example, as the surrender of Westphalia, Holland, Illyria, Italy, and Spain—the document further stated that

France consented that Holland should be restored to a prince of the House of Orange, with an increase of territory; (this increase was no other than the restitution of Dutch Brabant;) that Germany should be organized in the manner already proposed by the plenipotentiaries—that is to say, *the states should be rendered independent and united by a federal bond*; Italy, too, was to be free, with the exception that Austria was to hold possessions there, whilst France would retire to the Alps, it being always understood that Prince Eugene and the Princess Eliza were to be allowed an appanage; lastly, that the Pope was to return to Rome, and Ferdinand VII. to Madrid. France was also willing that England should keep Malta and the greater part of her acquisitions. But this detailed enumeration of the concessions made by France naturally implied that she intended to keep the Rhine and the Alps—that is to say, Antwerp, Cologne, Mayence, Chambéry and Nice, as she did not expressly say she was willing to give them up.

On this occasion, M. de Caulaincourt was not interrupted by the plenipotentiaries, for he had fulfilled the condition of presenting a counter-project: he was listened to in frigid silence, but without any expression of astonishment. Scarcely was the reading of the document finished when the plenipotentiaries rose, and, after formally acknowledging the presentation of our counter-project, announced they were about to send it to the headquarters of the allied sovereigns; they also announced that the negotiations might be now looked upon as definitively broken off, and that within forty-eight hours they would leave Châtillon. The English, and especially Lord Aberdeen, who, during the entire proceedings, had always observed the strictest politeness, assured M. de Caulaincourt, that they deeply regretted not being able to conclude peace on the conditions they had proposed, which would have prevented the effusion of blood, to which they could now see no end; that on these conditions they would have treated honestly with Napoleon, that they would even have recognised him as emperor, which England had not yet done. These declarations, which bore the stamp of perfect sincerity, profoundly affected M. de Caulaincourt, who, not having been able to secure the grandeur of the empire, had wished at least to save the empire itself. This illustrious citizen, who had represented France after Jena and Friedland, and had been loaded with the caresses of trembling Europe, was, in his present grief, which he could not conceal, a striking example of the fickleness of fortune, an example which the plenipotentiaries ought to have looked upon with lively fear. But diplomats are not more philosophic than other men: the present intoxicates them, so that they forget the past and the future!

The counter-project, presented on the 15th of March, was to be answered at latest within two days—that is to say, on the 17th—and the congress was to be dissolved on the 18th. M. de Caulaincourt sent the reply immediately to Napoleon at Rheims.

Napoleon had anticipated this, and had taken his resolution. Having arrived at

Rheims, on the evening of the 13th, he resolved to pass the 14th, 15th, 16th, and perhaps the 17th, there, in order to allow his troops some repose, and to fuse some into certain corps organized too hastily at Paris, and to take cognizance of the proceedings of the allies, before definitely determining on his own. Though his second movement against the army of Silesia had not been as successful as the first, though he had been deceived in his hopes by the loss of Soissons, and by the result of the battles of Craonne and Laon, still Blücher had been severely chastised, and Prince Schwarzenberg, though he had come from the Aube to the Seine, had not dared to advance beyond Nogent. This prince seemed to hesitate to take another step until Napoleon should have more fully revealed his designs. At length the battle of Rheims, a small indemnification for the most bitter disappointments, had, however, produced a most strong impression on the allies. Napoleon did not, therefore, consider himself conquered, and he still waited some false move on the part of his adversaries, to rush upon them with the rapidity of lightning.

The plan which he still preferred to any other, was to advance toward the fortresses, collect the garrisons, and intercept the enemy's lines of communication. He was much encouraged to pursue this plan by the arrival at Rheims of General Janssens, with five or six thousand men, drawn from the fortresses of the Ardennes, who, combined into a compact corps, had scathlessly traversed the invaded provinces. Napoleon had already, as we have seen, ordered General Maison to withdraw from Lille, Valenciennes, and Mons, in fact from all the Belgic fortresses, whatever troops were not indispensably necessary to guard the walls during a few days: of these he was to form a small army and join the troops coming from Antwerp. He ordered Carnot, who still held the English in check before Antwerp, to keep with him only the Marines, and the most recently organized battalions, and to send his best men to the number of about six thousand, to General Maison. He had ordered General Merle to leave Maestricht and the fortresses on the Meuse; he commanded Generals Durutte and Morand to leave Metz and Mayence (orders that had been received and were about being executed;) in this manner he reckoned on being able to draw from the fortresses, from Antwerp to Mayence, about fifty thousand men. He had no need to go to Mayence or to Metz to collect these diverse detachments: a simple movement on the Upper Marne, through Châlons, Vitry, and Joinville—a movement that would not draw him far from the circle of his operations—would enable him to collect this reinforcement, and, joined to the troops he already had between the Seine and the Marne, would raise his army to one hundred thousand men, and, besides, place him in the rear of his enemies, which was the most certain way to draw them to a distance from Paris. To this great design there were, however, two important objections—the want of defensive works around Paris, and the moral condition of this great city. Napoleon, as we have said, had through fear of alarming the population, deferred to the last moment the erection of the

necessary works. Around the capital of France, where now rise eleven or twelve leagues of walls and sixteen citadels, there were not even earthen redoubts. Some palisaded batteries in front of the gates were the only works that had been erected. Twelve thousand men of the national guards, selected among the most peaceful and least stirring citizens, and fifteen or twenty thousand men from the dépôts, with a numerous artillery force, composed the garrison. These forces, headed by an energetic commander, would have been sufficient to resist the enemy for some days, especially if the inhabitants of the suburbs could have been supplied with muskets. But the moral state of the capital presented the great difficulties of the defence. The inhabitants, divided between hatred for foreigners and detestation of a despotism which, after twenty years of victory, now brought armed Europe before the gates of the capital, were ready to side with the first occupant, and a party of clever malecontents could, as soon as the enemy appeared, become the active instruments of a revolution, already effected in the minds of the people. This was the weak point of the empire, more dangerous than that created by an almost annihilated military power. Had Napoleon been a legitimate prince, that is to say, the descendant of an ancient dynasty, or a wise prince, who had preserved the confidence of the country, he might have seen the enemy enter Paris, as Frederick the Great had beheld a similar event in Berlin, without being involved in irreparable misfortune. For him, on the contrary, the entrance of foreigners into his capital, facilitated by the want of defensive works, was not a military reverse, but the almost certain cause of a revolution.

These were undoubtedly grave objections against any plan that involved Napoleon's further removal from Paris, but the system of fighting alternately against Blücher and Schwarzenberg, in the angle formed by the Seine and the Marne, having become almost impracticable—firstly, because the enemy was too clearly aware of the design; and, secondly, because Napoleon having retired to the extremity of the angle, the two adverse armies in approaching him would be fused into one—a change of tactics was therefore absolutely necessary, and no plan was better than that which, increasing his army by 50,000 men, placed him in the rear of the enemy. Having no choice, Napoleon tried to persuade himself that the political danger was not so great; that the Parisians would not dare to throw off his authority; and, besides, having his brothers at their head, they would be able to defend themselves. He did not picture to himself then, because he had not experienced it, how great is the irresolution and weakness of the public mind when a Government is morally undermined, and its popularity departed. Whether through necessity, or blinded by self-illusion, he adopted the project, so admirably planned in a military sense, of marching toward the fortresses; to secure the success of this plan, it was only necessary that Paris should hold out five or six days.

However, before commencing this daring manœuvre, Napoleon wished to give a few days' rest to his troops, to make some indis-

pensable arrangements, and see whether he could not, before withdrawing still further from Paris, fall on the rear of one of the invading armies, that of Bohemia, for example, which, having taken up a position at Nogent, already presented a flank toward him. It was thus the four days passed at Rheims, from the 14th to the 17th of March, had been employed. He had left General Charpentier at Soissons, with some *débris*, sufficient to defend the place; he had reorganized, by fusing them together, the four divisions of the Young Guard, composing the corps of Victor and Ney; he had ordered to be sent from Paris, under the conduct of Lefebvre-Desnoettes, about three or four thousand of the Young Guard, two thousand mounted horse soldiers of the same corps, the miserable remnant of the Polish troops, a new reserve division composed of national guards drilled in the dépôts, and lastly an immense park of artillery. This reinforcement would supply him with 12,000 additional men. He had already received nearly 6000 from the fortresses of the Ardennes, under General Janensens, and with these different reinforcements, it would be possible for him to raise his army to 60,000 men. If to these he joined the corps of Macdonald, Oudinot, and Gérard, he would have 85,000 combatants under his command; and the number would be increased to 135,000, should his march toward the fortresses be as successful as he hoped.

The repose accorded to his troops having appeared to him sufficient, and his arrangements being completed, he resolved to leave Rheims on the morning of the 17th, and repair to Eprenay, in order to judge better of what he ought to do under existing circumstances. Paris had two causes of alarm; the renewed approach of Prince Schwarzenberg, whose vanguard had reached Provins, and what had befallen the army of Spain between Bayonne and Bordeaux. Posted on the banks of the Marne at Eprenay, Napoleon would see whether it would be better to fall immediately on Prince Schwarzenberg's rear, and arrest his advance toward the capital, or persevere in the project of marching toward the fortresses. His arrangements were made the evening before with a view to these two objects, for whilst bringing up the mass of his forces on Eprenay, he sent Ney with the infantry of the Young Guard to Châlons. If he wished to advance on the fortresses, he had only to direct his corps to follow Ney in the direction of Châlons, or, on the contrary, to make them fall back toward Fère-Champenoise, if he decided on attacking Prince Schwarzenberg. Ney, who was in the van, would not have a greater distance to march to Fère-Champenoise, whether he went there from Châlons or from Eprenay.

Having left Rheims on the morning of the 17th, Napoleon reached Eprenay the same evening. He left Mortier at Rheims, to second Marmont in the defence of Berry-au-Bac, and gave both an injunction to hold Blucher in check for some days, by successively disputing the passages of the Aisne and the Marne. When Napoleon reached Eprenay, he learned that Prince Schwarzenberg had advanced far beyond the Seine. The latter was now so far advanced in the direction of Paris, that to fall upon his rear seemed a well-directed *coup de*

main, as important as that of Montmirail, and politically necessary on account of the consternation prevailing in the capital. In fact, the Parisians were calling aloud for Napoleon, for they could not behold foreign bayonets approaching their gates without invoking the aid of his arm. The events at Bayonne and Bordeaux had added to the terror of the Parisians. These events, very serious, as we shall soon see, had inspired the enemies of the Government with enthusiastic hopes which ought to be immediately crushed. Napoleon, influenced by these motives, did not hesitate to set out for Fère-Champenoise in order to pass from the Marne to the Seine. On the morning of the 18th, the entire army marched in that direction.

Before following the emperor in this new series of operations, we shall briefly retrace the events that had just occurred on the Spanish frontier, and which had so powerfully disturbed the public mind. Marshal Soult had continued to occupy the Adour with his right wing, and the *Gave d'Oleron* with his centre and left, whilst Lord Wellington had not yet made up his mind to move forward. But the English general having received the means of satisfying the wants of the Spaniards, had commenced offensive operations with eight English, two Portuguese, and four Spanish divisions. He ordered two English and two Spanish divisions to blockade Bayonne, then with the remainder, about sixty thousand men, he marched against Marshal Soult, who had abandoned the *Gave d'Oleron*, and had taken up a position at the *Gave de Pau*, in the neighbourhood of Orthez.

Marshal Soult, after having left an entire division at Bayonne, (independent of the garrison,) after having sent Napoleon two infantry divisions and several cavalry brigades, had still six divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, amounting in all to 40,000 veteran soldiers. If this number was not sufficient to secure a victory, which might be more difficult as the English were present, it was at least sufficient to dispute the country inch by inch, and cover Bordeaux. Bordeaux was at this moment the capital of the south. There prevailed there, besides the discontent peculiar to maritime cities whose commerce had been cut off, during twenty years, a religious and royalist spirit, common to all the southern provinces; so that every sentiment most opposed to the imperial régime obtained at Bordeaux. The Duke d'Angoulême, son of the Count Artois and nephew of Louis XVIII., had hastened to the Spanish frontier, but had not been received by Lord Wellington, thanks to the care taken by the English to deprive this war of all appearance of a dynastic question. But he hovered in the rear of the head-quarters, and his appearance caused an extraordinary agitation in the country, a feeling not exhibited in Franche-Comté and in Lorraine, where the arrival of the Count d'Artois had not produced any sensation. Numerous royalist emissaries had already appeared at Bordeaux, and a single movement of the enemy would suffice to produce an explosion.

These were the causes that had decided Napoleon to leave so large a portion of his troops between Bayonne and Bordeaux, and which

ought to have induced, on the part of his lieutenant, the most energetic efforts to stop the progress of the English army. On this account, Napoleon had frequently recommended Marshal Soult to display the greatest vigour, and do as he was doing—that is to say, to be the first and last under fire; for when he required unlimited devotedness from his troops, the best means of obtaining it was to give the example.

On the 26th of February, Marshal Soult took up his position a little in the rear of Orthez, on the heights that border the Gave de Pau, having on his right General Reille, in the centre Count d'Erlon, and on the left, at Orthez, General Clausel, each with two divisions. The latter covered the route of Sault de Navailles. The cavalry watched the banks of the Gave. Each wing was drawn up in two lines, the second ready to support the first.

On the morning of the 27th of February, Lord Wellington passed the Gave, and attacked with five English divisions the French right wing, commanded by General Reille; whilst at the opposite extremity, General Hill, with an English division; and some Portuguese and Spanish troops, attacked General Clausel at Orthez. The contest was long and violent, and General Reille on the right, as General Clausel on the left wing, worthily sustained the honour of our arms. General Clausel had maintained his position at Orthez without yielding an inch; and General Reille, obliged to fall back upon a second position, was, nevertheless, certain of being able to keep his place if, by a vigorous use of the second lines, the battle was recommenced against an enemy visibly exhausted. The French might, it is true, be conquered after this new effort, as our sole reserve consisted, besides the divisions engaged, of General Paris's brigade, composed of the residue of all the other corps. It might also happen that the French would conquer, and in that case the result would be important. These are questions whose solution depends on temperament, for the mind becomes confused in the consideration. Marshal Soult, considering that this was the only army that remained in the south of the empire, had thought it wiser to retire, and had effected his retreat on Sault de Navailles, after having killed or wounded 6000 of Lord Wellington's troops, and left three or four thousand on the field of battle. The French had retired in admirable order, and inspired the enemy with a feeling of profound respect.

But Soult had abandoned valuable territory, and that, too, at the close of a day which, without being a lost battle, would have all the appearances of one; for the enemy would be authorized to call it so, as it enabled them to advance, and because the ill-disposed populations of the south would give it no other designation. After this battle of Orthez, there was not a point where the French could rest until they reached the Garonne. Bordeaux would be left unprotected, and the great political interests to which Napoleon had sacrificed 40,000 men—who, had they been brought up to the Seine, might have saved the empire—was about to be compromised. There was only one resource: it was that Marshal Soult should make Bordeaux the basis of his operations, and the terminus of his retreat. He

would, in this case, be obliged to fight another battle at the risk of being beaten; and afterward, beaten or not, he would be obliged to fall back on Bordeaux, establish a vast camp around this city, and defend himself as General Carnot was doing at Antwerp. It is true that Bordeaux had not the walls of Antwerp; but it had better: it had a noble army that, making this city the base of operation, ought to be invincible. Should Soult's army only hold its position fifteen or twenty days, it would be sufficient to give Napoleon time to decide the fate of the war between Paris and Langres.

Marshal Soult, fearing encounters with the English, which had always been unfortunate, (thanks, it must be said, to our generals and not to our soldiers,) had thought proper to manœuvre, and, instead of covering Bordeaux directly, to go up toward Toulouse, thinking that the English would not dare to advance on Bordeaux whilst he was on their flanks and rear. Such calculations, very rational on the part of Napoleon, of whom the enemy was afraid, were not so well suited to his lieutenants, who were far from inspiring the same amount of alarm. Events soon proved this. In fact, Lord Wellington, who, by summoning to him a portion of the troops stationed round Bayonne, had under his command more than seventy thousand men, despatched ten or twelve thousand toward Bordeaux, a sufficient number to incite insurrection in that city, and kept sixty thousand men to pursue Marshal Soult in the direction of Toulouse. This he did not fail to do. Whilst Marshal Soult took the road to Tarbes, Lord Wellington despatched Marshal Beresford from Mont-de-Marson, with a column of English and Portuguese troops, and the latter, finding Bordeaux defenceless, on the 12th of March, the general and the prefect, who had at most twelve hundred men under their command, retired to the Dordogne, and the royalists of Bordeaux, seconded by the merchants, who were impatient for the re-establishment of commerce, called aloud for the restoration of the Bourbons. The Duke d'Angoulême hastened to the city, and the restoration of the ancient dynasty was proclaimed in presence of the English, who did nothing, hindered nothing; contenting themselves with repeating that the home Government of France did not touch them, that they had only one mission—to provide the means of subsistence for their troops and guarantee the safety of those among the inhabitants who trusted to their honour. Count Lynch, (the Mayor of Bordeaux,) putting himself at the head of the movement, made a proclamation in which he announced the re-establishment of the Bourbons, and seemed to say it was for the purpose of restoring her legitimate princes to France that the allied Powers had taken arms. Lord Wellington, following his instructions as closely as though they were a military watchword, wrote to the Duke d'Angoulême to protest against the Mayor of Bordeaux's proclamation, and to declare that the overthrow of one dynasty or the re-establishment of another was not, by any means, the object of the allied Powers, a fact which he would himself be obliged to explain before the public, if the Bourbons did not retract the assertions they had ventured to make.

This was carrying a respect for appearances too far, when in reality the allies did desire what the Mayor of Bordeaux had announced. However this may be, it was not less true that the enemy, taking advantage of a false move of Marshal Soult, had entered Bordeaux, which had been left unprotected, and furnished the royalists a favourable opportunity of proclaiming the restoration of the Bourbons in the south of France. The example was one of serious import and might provoke imitation. It seems to us, who can reason calmly fifty years after the event, that this ought to have been enough to determine Napoleon not to quit the vicinity of Paris. But, besides that Napoleon did not know to what point he had alienated the hearts of the people by his system of continual war, he was overruled and rendered powerless by the impossibility of long disputing the possession of Paris outside the walls, and the necessity of going to seek his last resources on the frontiers. But, even before executing this movement, he resolved, as we have just seen, to make a violent attack on Prince Schwarzenberg's flank, in order to draw the Austrian general toward him, or at least retard his march on the capital. This was the cause of Napoleon's sending his troops in the direction of Fère-Champenoise. He arrived there on the evening of the 18th, and on the way, the cavalry of the Guard, falling in with Kaiserow's Cossacks, cut them in pieces and threw them back on the Seine. They bivouacked at Fère-Champenoise and in the neighbourhood.

The next day, the 19th, Napoleon, after deliberating whether he would march on Arcis or Plancy, advanced toward this latter point, because all reports concurred in representing Prince Schwarzenberg as already arrived at Provins, and Napoleon thought that by drawing nearer to Provins he would have a better chance of finding himself in the midst of the scattered columns of the army of Bohemia.

But in reasoning thus, Napoleon was not fully aware of the last movements of the enemy. Encouraged by the results of Craonne and Laon, Prince Schwarzenberg had at first sent on a vanguard as far as Provins, without having determined to attempt any thing decisive, for, besides his customary prudence, he was restrained by a fit of gout. But no sooner was he informed of the battle of Rheims, than he dreaded some fresh enterprise on Napoleon's part, and hastily returned to Nogent. Besides, the Emperor Alexander, uneasy at learning there were fresh troops at Châlons, (Ney's troops had been seen advancing toward this city,) began to fear that Napoleon, turning from Châlons on Arcis, might attack the mass of the allied armies in the rear, and hastened from Troyes to communicate his fears to Prince Schwarzenberg, whose head-quarters were between Nogent and Méry. The Austrian generalissimo, generally less daring in his projects than the Emperor Alexander, was also less easily disturbed, and without being so persuaded as the Russian monarch of the imminence of the danger, recalled his too-sentinel troops to Troyes on the 18th, with the intention of concentrating them at Bar-sur-Aube, in order that he might not remain ex-

posed to a flank movement of his formidable adversary.

Thus on the 19th, whilst Napoleon at the head of his cavalry was advancing in full gallop on Plancy, Marshal de Wrede, who had been left to guard the Aube and the Seine, between Arcis, Plancy, and Anglure, was retreating to Arcis, Wittgenstein's corps, (now called Rajeffsky's,) those of Prince de Wurtemberg and General Giulay, were falling back on Troyes, and the reserves, under Barclay de Tolly, were being concentrated between Brienne and Troyes.

Napoleon, in debouching by Plancy, had gone a little too much to the right, that is to say, a little too much toward Paris, and was soon convinced of his mistake in seeing the retrograde march of the different columns of the army of Bohemia. Nevertheless, knowing by experience that by throwing himself boldly into the midst of the retreating troops there was greater probability of gaining great advantages than of encountering strong resistance, he unhesitatingly crossed the bridge of Plancy, with the cavalry of the Guard, and, after passing the Aube, advanced on the Seine. He left General Sebastiani, with the Colbert and Exelmans divisions, on his left, to observe the enemy in the direction of Arcis, and with Letort's cavalry of the Old Guard he proceeded directly to the bridge of Méry, on the Seine. Méry being occupied by the enemy, Letort crossed the Seine at a ford higher up, and fell on Prince de Wurtemberg's rear-guard. He sabred some hundreds, and effected a capture of great value, that of a pontoon-train belonging to the army of Bohemia. If Napoleon had been in possession of this instrument of war a month earlier, he might possibly have freed himself from all his enemies. A pontoon-train had been sent him from Paris, but so cumbersome as to be useless. He was, therefore, delighted to get possession of a well-constructed portable bridge, light and easy of transportation. After this daring reconnaissance, Napoleon left Letort in the direction of Méry, with orders to pursue the retreating columns of the enemy, recrossed the Seine in person, and slept at Plancy, on the Aube.

This day the relative position of the armies was rendered clear. Prince Schwarzenberg was retiring in great haste, through the mere fear of finding the French army on his right flank: what would his alarm be did he suppose the emperor in his rear? The Paris route was now freed from the presence of the enemy, and Napoleon resolved to profit of this, as well as of the small amount of firmness displayed by Prince Schwarzenberg, to resume the execution of his project of advancing on the fortresses, collecting the garrisons, and, having thus doubled his forces, take a position in the rear of the enemy. It seemed a well-founded hypothesis that Prince Schwarzenberg, already retreating, would accelerate his pace when Napoleon arrived at Vitry, at St. Dizier, at Toul, and at Nancy; and certainly Blücher would not advance when Schwarzenberg would be retreating.*

* I take these details from the correspondence of Napoleon, where we find retraced day by day, and hour by hour, his resolutions and his movements.

Consequently, Napoleon made the following arrangements. He ordered Marshals Oudinot and Macdonald, and General Gérard, who were now freed from the presence of the enemy, to retrace their steps through Provins, Ville-neux, Anglure, and Plancy, and join him at Arcis by the right bank of the Aube. Ney, advancing to Arcis, along the same bank, would arrive there on the same day as the Young Guard, and Friant at the same time as the Old. Napoleon resolved to repair to Arcis himself, on the morning of the 20th, with the cavalry of the Guard, remounting the Aube by the left bank. After having rallied Ney, Friant, Oudinot, Macdonald, Gérard, round Arcis, and gathered *en marche* some spoils of the enemy; after having received the *convois* sent from Paris under Lefebvre-Desnoettes, he intended to advance straight from the Aube to the Marne, and go to Vitry, Saint-Dizier, perhaps even to Bar-le-Duc. Marshals Mortier and Marmont, who had been left at Rheims and at Berry-au-Bac, could easily join him by Châlons, and Napoleon gave them orders to that effect. Every thing was ordered so that Napoleon was to advance on the fortresses with 70,000 men. Having made these arrangements, Napoleon wrote to Paris, saying what he was about to do: he recommended every one to preserve a cool self-possession, and exhibited great confidence himself. This confidence was partly affected and partly sincere, for he fully understood the skilfulness of his plans, and had little doubt of their success.

The next day,—the 20th of March,—a day more than once memorable in the course of his life,—Napoleon left Plancy to retrace his course along the left bank of the Aube, with a portion of his cavalry. Letort had left another portion round Méry, to seize baggage and prisoners. General Sebastiani with the Colbert and Exelmans divisions, had made the first move and advanced on Arcis. In his extreme confidence, Napoleon had not deigned to recross the Aube and advance under cover; he marched on Arcis by the same route he had traced for the different detachments of his cavalry.

Having arrived at Arcis about the middle of the day, (Arcis-sur-Aube,) he found General Sebastiani very thoughtful, in consequence of what he had seen *en route*. Marshal Ney, who had just arrived with his infantry along the right bank of the Aube, appeared quite as anxious as General Sebastiani. Both, after having repulsed the Bavarian vanguards, thought they perceived between the Aube and the Meuse—that is to say, between Arcis and Troyes—the entire army of Bohemia. If it were so, they had no time to lose in quitting Arcis, which is on the left bank of the Aube, and cross to the right, and put this river between them and the enemy. Though, by the union of all the troops ordered to repair to Arcis, the French would number 70,000,—that is to say, when Oudinot, Macdonald, Gérard, and Lefebvre would have arrived, and 84,000 at Vitry when Mortier and Marmont would have joined,—still, at the actual moment they did not amount to more than 20,000. There were 5000 cavalry of the Guard; Ney brought from 9000 to 10,000 infantry of the Young Guard, and Friant 5000 to 6000 of the Old. There were not sufficient to resist Prince

Schwarzenberg's 90,000 soldiers, concentrated between Arcis and Troyes.

Napoleon, who had seen, from Méry, Schwarzenberg's columns in retreat, could not imagine that this prince would think of halting between Troyes and Arcis, to risk a battle there. A slight reconnoissance made on the Troyes route by a young officer confirmed his opinion and induced him to post Ney's infantry in advance of Arcis, a little to the left, at Grand-Torcy; he at the same time sent messengers along the other bank of the Aube, to hasten the arrival of his Old Guard and Lefebvre-Desnoettes, whose approach was announced. The latter was bringing about 6000 men. In this attitude, Napoleon resolved to await events which could not fail to occur within a few hours; and, effectively, affairs shortly assumed an alarming aspect.

Prince Schwarzenberg, though not rash, possessed the firmness of an old soldier; and, after having made his principal corps fall back from Nogent on Troyes, he could not, with 90,000 men, retreat farther before 80,000 or 40,000,—the number he believed Napoleon to command. Besides, he was weary of the insinuations and continual boasting of the Prussians, and he wished to prove that he was as capable as they of encountering the terrible Emperor of the French. He therefore resolved to turn to the right, advance on Arcis, and accept battle if offered, and thus prevent the French, in any case, from falling on Troyes and making fresh captures. With this view, he ordered the Bavarians to advance from his right on Arcis; he sent the Rajeffsky, Wurtemberg, and Giulay corps straight forward on Arcis, and connected these two masses by the guards and reserve corps. About two o'clock he found himself before Arcis.

General Sebastiani, piqued by some expressions of Napoleon, who had not treated his fears seriously, dashed along the Troyes route with a few squadrons, to ascertain more clearly what he thought he had seen the first time. The ground beyond Arcis, in the direction of Troyes, being deeply undulated, is capable of concealing great numbers of troops. General Sebastiani, having crossed the first risings of the ground, perceived the Bavarian and Austrian cavalry advancing *en masse*, and returned in full gallop to communicate the intelligence to Napoleon. The Colbert and Exelmans divisions were immediately ordered to take horse to oppose the enemy. General Kaisarow, at the head of several thousand cavalry, charged the Colbert division, which scarcely amounted to 700 or 800, and flung them back on the Exelmans division, that, overborne by the shock, was obliged to yield. All together, pursuers and pursued, arrived *pêle-mêle* at Arcis. Ney was on the left at Grand-Torcy, with the infantry of the Young Guard. Between Grand-Torcy and Arcis there were at most three or four battalions, among which was one Polish, commanded by Skrzynecki, the same who has since—in 1830—so nobly and bravely defended the interests of expiring Poland. This battalion had only time to form in square to receive Napoleon and protect him from the threatening masses of the enemy. The Poles, proud of the precious deposit defended by their bayonets, re-

mained firm under a shower of shells and the repeated assaults of innumerable squadrons. But Napoleon did not long avail himself of the asylum he had found with the Poles. The first shock of the adverse cavalry being abated, Napoleon issued from the square, hurried toward Arcis, at the risk of being made prisoner, stopped, rallied his flying cavalry, and led them himself against the enemy. Our squadrons, into whom the presence of the emperor infused new life, charged with the greatest vigour, and succeeded in restraining, without being able entirely to repulse, the superior numbers of the Bavarian and Austrian cavalry. During this time, Ney, stationed in the Grand-Torcy, was preparing to make every effort to resist the army of Bohemia. The main object was to hold out till the Old Guard, whose columns were already visible on the other bank of the Aube, should have crossed that river and occupied Arcis. When the six thousand old soldiers composing this select troop should have arrived before Arcis and joined Ney's ten thousand young soldiers that were defending the Grand-Torcy, the French might be reassured. But these troops had not yet arrived.

Meanwhile, Ney sustained furious assaults at Torcy. Marshal de Wrede's corps had fallen into line, and his right, composed of Austrians, attacked Grand-Torcy, whilst he tried to throw his left, composed of Bavarians, between that village and the little city of Arcis. All the Russian, Prussian, and Austrian reserves, comprising the guards, the grenadiers, and the cuirassiers, were engaged in this attack. We were opposed by more than 40,000 infantry, without reckoning hordes of cavalry.

Ney defended Grand-Torcy with his accustomed energy. His troops, stationed in the houses and behind the barricaded streets of the village, arrested, by a determined fire, the masses of Austrian infantry. Overpowered for a moment by numbers, he was driven from Grand-Torcy; but, putting himself at the head of some battalions and making a desperate charge with fixed bayonets, he re-entered the village and succeeded in keeping his position. Meanwhile, Napoleon, traversing incessantly the space between Arcis and Torcy, to encourage the troops by his presence, was, for a moment, in imminent danger of terminating his wondrous career. A bomb fell in front of a battalion of young soldiers, little accustomed to such a spectacle, and the men nearest to the flaming projectile drew back a step. Napoleon drove his horse straight to the bomb, to teach them contempt of danger. At this instant the bomb burst, and he is wrapped in flames and smoke; the next moment he issues from the fiery cloud in perfect safety; but his horse is wounded, and he throws himself on another, amid the enthusiastic cries of his young soldiers.

Thanks to these acts of heroic rashness, we kept our position. At length the Old Guard crosses the bridge of Arcis, under the conduct of the intrepid Friant. Napoleon in person drew them up before the town. The assistance was timely; for at this moment the Russian Guard, having fallen into line, came to the aid of Marshal de Wrede. A last attack,

still more violent than the preceding, is attempted against Grand-Torcy. Ney displayed impenetrable firmness, and repulsed the assailants.

At the same time that this reinforcement of veteran infantry arrived so *apropos*, Lefebvre-Desnoettes, who had left Paris to join the army, debouched by the bridge of Arcis, at the head of 2000 horse, with which he had preceded his infantry. General Sebastiani, now at the head of 4000 cavalry, deploys in the plain of Arcis, which ascends slightly toward the enemy's position. He is preparing to take revenge. His squadrons, charging fiercely, overthrow those of Kaisarow, drive them back on those of Frimont, and avenge the skirmish of the morning. But soon the Bavarian cavalry appears, together with the heavy Russian horse, and prudence counsels a retreat on Arcis. The day is now drawing to a close; Ney still keeps his position at Grand-Torcy, the Old Guard at Arcis, the cavalry placed between. The French have escaped the disaster which, had they displayed less energy, would certainly have befallen them. In fact, we had at first fought with 14,000 men against 40,000, then with 20,000 against 60,000, and, lastly, with 22,000 or 23,000 against 90,000; for, on our right, the corps of Giulay, Wurtemberg, and Rappelsky had debouched from Nozay and began to take part in the combat, when night separated the two armies.

At a distance on our right, an episode occurred which might have had disagreeable consequences but for the rare valour of the cavalry of the Guard. We have said that the horse-chasseurs and grenadiers had been left beyond the bridge of Méry, on the left of the Seine, with the booty captured on the previous evening, comprising the pontoon-train. These troops having left Méry in the morning with this pontoon-train, tried to join the main army by marching directly from Méry to Arcis, through Premier-Fait. They naturally fell into the midst of the cavalry corps of Rappelsky, Giulay, and Wurtemberg, combined under the command of the Prince of Wurtemberg. Attacked by a force five or six times greater than theirs, they only escaped by displaying extraordinary valour, and fighting during several hours sword in hand. Being at length joined by squadrons from the dépôt at Versailles that had advanced by Méry, they fell back on Méry itself, with a loss of not more than a hundred horsemen, and, above all, without having sacrificed their pontoon-train. The next day they reached Plancy, crossed the Aube, and joined the main body by the right bank of the river, with the corps of Oudinot, Macdonald, and Gérard, that were *en marche* from Provins to Arcis.

Such was the battle of Arcis-sur-Aube,—the last that Napoleon fought in person during this campaign, and in which the soldiers as well as himself performed prodigies of valour. Napoleon believed himself victorious, and he believed it sincerely; for it was a miracle that 20,000 men had resisted forces that had successively increased from 40,000 to 90,000. He was proud of himself and his soldiers, and saw, in this possibility of fighting forces so unequal, a guarantee of success to the end of

the war. His confidence was now become so great that he was willing to encounter on the morrow all Prince Schwarzenberg's army. However, during the day, he could only be joined by Oudinot's corps; and, adding to these what Lefebvre-Desnoettes had brought, his forces would at most have numbered only 32,000 men. It would not therefore be prudent to brave the shock of 90,000 soldiers, especially with a river in his rear. He ultimately yielded to the dictates of reason and the advice of his marshals, who insisted that he should put the Aube between him and the enemy. After having kept his troops deployed before Arcis, whilst a second bridge was being constructed, he made them suddenly fall back through the streets of this little city, crossed the two bridges, and left Prince Schwarzenberg very much surprised and disappointed at seeing a prey escape that had almost seemed certain. The bridges of the Aube were broken down, and Marshal Oudinot took possession of the right bank with his corps, supported by a large body of artillery. The enemy, not wishing to allow the French army to escape undisturbed, determined to attempt the passage of the river, and remained during this attempt exposed to a destructive fire. Schwarzenberg lost unprofitably on this day—the 21st—more than 1000 men; for, wherever he tried to cross the Aube, Oudinot's well-posted troops received him with a sustained fire of musketry and grape. It is not too much to say that these two days cost the army of Bohemia from 8000 to 9000 men, whilst our loss did not amount to more than 3000,—thanks to the smallness of our numbers and to the advantage of fighting under cover in a defended position.

Amidst these continual vicissitudes of war, Napoleon, finding his army ever heroic and devoted, though often discontented, still, confiding in his genius and with increased faith in the excellence of his tactics, he was far from despairing of his cause, though he did not deceive himself as to his political position. Though he would not acknowledge, even to himself, to how great a degree he had alienated the affections of the people by his continual wars and his arbitrary government, still he was not blinded to the moral condition of France. Even on the field of Arcis and amid the roar of battle, conversing with General Sebastiani,—a Corsican like himself and endowed with great political talents:—"Well, general," asked the emperor, "what is your opinion of what you see?" "I say," replied the general, "that your majesty has, of course, other resources of which we know nothing." "What you have before your eyes," answered Napoleon, "and nothing more." "But, in that case, why does not your majesty call upon the people to rise?" "Chimeras," replied Napoleon, "borrowed from recollections of Spain and the French Revolution! Call upon the people to rise in a country where the Revolution has destroyed the nobles and the priests, and where I have destroyed the Revolution!"

The general remained astounded, admiring this coolness and profundity of thought, and asking himself how genius so vast had not

prevented the commission of errors so flagrant.

But the moment was now come to form a definite resolution. Between Arcis and Châlons, the Aube and the Marne are only separated by a distance of eleven or twelve leagues. Marmont and Mortier, who had been sent to keep Blücher in check, might delay, but could not arrest, his progress. The armies of Bohemia and Silesia must soon be united, and then the French troops would be stifled in their grasp. Napoleon, not being able with the forces under his command, to beat either of the allied generals separately, unless fortune afforded him favours, which of late she had seldom granted, still less could he defeat them, if combined. To carry out his idea of marching on the garrisons, and so procuring a reinforcement of fifty thousand men and draw the enemy further from Paris, was now his only remaining resource, a resource that, hazardous for him, would have been fatal to another.

He determined to set out on the 21st of March for Vitry-on-the-Marne. Taking the route of Summepins, he could traverse the distance between Arcis and Vitry in two days. From Vitry he could easily reach Bar-le-Duc, and without advancing a step further, he could be joined by the garrisons of Metz, Mayence, Luxemburg, Thionville, Verdun, and Strasbourg, to the number of more than 30,000 men. If Napoleon went as far as Metz—a journey he might accomplish in three days, he could, in manœuvring round that place, raise Lorraine, Alsace, Franche-Comté, and receive from the Low Countries 15,000 additional men. He would, in this case, find himself at Metz, at the head of 120,000 soldiers, in the midst of provinces in arms against the enemy; and if Marshal Suchet, who had replaced Augereau—collecting all the troops he could on his way—returned to Besançon with 40,000 men, the aspect of things would certainly undergo a change.

Napoleon sent to Paris an account of the plan he had adopted, and ordered that all the artillery, battalions of the Young Guard, and battalions drawn from the dépôts, that were not absolutely indispensable to the defence of the capital, should be sent to him. He begged the Parisians not to be disturbed, should the enemy again approach the city, as he said their appearance there could only be for two or three days, for the allies would pursue him when they learned that he was about to cut off their lines of communication. Having renewed his orders to Marmont and Mortier to join him at the Marne by Châlons, he set out for Vitry. He had formerly never quitted the Seine, without stationing considerable forces from Nogent to Montereau. It was not so this time, for he was obliged to execute *en masse* his projected diversion on the rear of the enemy; and it was by this movement alone he hoped to save Paris. 20,000 men, stationed between Nogent and Paris, would not have stopped Prince Schwarzenberg's progress, and their absence might frustrate the success of Napoleon's operations. Still, believing it important to guard the bridges of the Seine, and thinking it possible to check the

enemy at these points for some hours,—a delay which, under certain circumstances, was not to be despised—he left General Souham with a melange of national guards and hastily-organized battalions, to defend Nogent, Bruy, and Montereau. General Alix, who, with forces of the same character, had so well defended Sens, where he still was, was placed under the orders of General Souham.

The journey from Arcis to Summepins was effected without difficulty. The French scarcely came in contact with some bands of Cossacks, that were hovering between the Aube and the Marne, and pillaging the country, desolated as it was. The corps of Oudinot, Macdonald, and Gérard, that had marched from Provins to Arcis, along the Aube, defended that river at the bridge of Arcis, and defied unmolested in sight of the enemy.

Napoleon, on the night of the 21st, slept at Summepins, with a part of the army; next day,—the 22d,—he marched toward Vitry with a vanguard. Vitry had been put in a state of defence by the army of Silesia, and was then occupied by 5000 or 6000 Prussians and Russians protected by earthworks. Napoleon, not wishing to risk a terrible loss of life for a post that was of no great importance, sent to seek a ford between Vitry and Saint-Dizier. One was discovered at Frignicourt, where he crossed with his cavalry, and Ney's division of the Young Guard. He left a detachment to guard this ford, and passed the night at the Château du Plessis, near Orconte. He despatched the light infantry of General Piré to Saint-Dizier, where they forced an entrance, and captured two Prussian battalions.

The next day,—the 23d,—Napoleon thought it advisable to remain at Saint-Dizier, and await there his remaining forces, for Oudinot, Macdonald, and Gérard were *en arrière*, and Marmont and Mortier had orders to join him by Châlons. It was also necessary to await General Pacthod's division of the national guards, that had behaved admirably with Oudinot and Macdonald, and had been left at Sézanne to escort a last convoy of troops and materials of war. Still, having some doubts as to the possibility of receiving this last transport, Napoleon ordered the war minister to watch over its safety, and even bring it back to Paris, if he feared it might not reach Vitry through the opposing mass of enemies.

Without losing a moment, Napoleon directed his light cavalry on Bar-le-Duc, with directions to seize the bridge of Saint-Mihiel, on the Meuse, and that of Pont-à-Mousson, on the Moselle; he sent fresh orders to all the garrisons to join him: he was preparing to spare them half the distance, by making one or two days' march to meet them—he would thus see his troops increase every hour. Independent of the Marshals Mortier and Marmont, independent of the Sézanne convoy, of which he had only received a part, and even deducting the losses at Arcis, and the troops left to guard the bridges of the Seine, he had about 55,000 men. He would have 70,000 when the two marshals joined, 80,000 when the Sézanne dépôt arrived, and his troops would gradually amount to 100,000 and more, if the different garrisons succeeded in joining him. Though

he fully appreciated the difficulty of his position, he was still confident in the success of his tactics, and on the 23d of March, in a letter to the war minister, which breathed an imperturbable coolness, he gave an account of his march, of his motives for not attacking Vitry, and his project of approaching Metz, to draw from that and other garrisons a considerable reinforcement; the certainty of alarming the enemy by cutting off their lines of communication; the dejection of the greater part of the allies, who had never obtained any serious advantage over the French troops, and who had recently experienced enormous losses at Arcis-sur-Aube, and almost regretted having advanced so far; his consequent hope of shortly bringing about new and important events; the utility of watching over the Sézanne transport, and even increasing it, if circumstances permitted; the possibility of recurring to the conscription of 1815, for in Champagne and Lorraine the peasantry was rising *en masse*, and the urgency of making prompt use of this resource; the importance of inducing Marmont and Mortier, who had fallen back on Château-Thierry, to advance and join the main body of the army; and, lastly, his confidence, spite of all the difficulties of his position, of soon saving France and himself in this terrible crisis. Nobody would have suspected in reading this letter, the last addressed to the war minister, that Napoleon was on the verge of an awful catastrophe.

At this very time, M. de Caulaincourt arrived at the emperor's head-quarters; he had just quitted the congress at Châtillon. This devoted servant of his king and his country, had, as we have seen, presented a counter-project, in order to satisfy the reiterated demands of the allied plenipotentiaries, and had endeavoured to render the reading of the document supportable to his auditors, deviating, at the same time, as little as possible from Napoleon's instructions. The plenipotentiaries of the allied Powers, after listening in glacial silence to the French counter-project, and after receiving orders from their sovereigns, had read on the 18th of March, a formal note, in which they declared that France having again proposed all the conditions, already declared unacceptable by Europe, the conferences were finally broken off, and that war would be prosecuted *à outrance*, until France would admit, purely and simply, the preliminaries of the 17th February. To this declaration M. de Metternich added a private letter, for M. de Caulaincourt, in which he begged him once more to think seriously before quitting the place appointed for holding the congress. "For," he said, "the France of Louis XIV., augmented by the conquests of Louis XV., was of some value, and ought not to be longer staked at the dangerous game of battles." However great might be the temptation of the French plenipotentiary to follow this advice, he dared not outstep his instructions to the degree that would have retained the members of the congress at Châtillon. He left the plenipotentiaries the next day,—the 19th,—and on the 20th, the different legations set out for the head-quarters of the belligerent armies.

M. de Caulaincourt found some difficulty in rejoining Napoleon, whom he found at Saint-Dizier. The return of the French plenipotentiary produced a painful impression on the French soldiers, for it annihilated every hope founded on negotiations, and left them no prospect but war unto death with the allies. If the battles of Montmirail, of Champaubert, and Montereau, had raised the hopes of the soldiers to a level with those of Napoleon, the battles of Craonne, of Laon, of Arcis-sur-Aube, had quickly brought them down from this elevation, and the daring system of tactics that the emperor was now attempting at a distance from Paris, a system of tactics which few were capable of appreciating, astonished and troubled minds already deeply disturbed. The noble and stern countenance of M. de Caulaincourt, more sad than usual, was little calculated to smooth the thoughtful brows he met at head-quarters. Napoleon received his minister in a friendly manner, like a man who felt no ill humour because he experienced no emotion. The return of his legate, however, produced a certain impression on his mind, but it was only transient, and he soon overcame it. He was at table, supping with Berthier, when M. de Caulaincourt arrived. "You do well to return," he said, "for I will not deny that, had you accepted the ultimatum of the allies, I would have disowned you. Better for you and me to avoid such a rupture. At bottom these people are not sincere. Had you yielded, they would have soon asked more. They spread a report that their enmity is against me, and not against France. All lies! Their enmity is against me because they know I alone can save France, (which was then true, for he who had brought her to the brink of ruin could alone save her;) but at bottom, it is against France and her glory their enmity is directed. England covets Belgium for the house of Orange; Prussia covets the Meuse for herself; Austria wishes to deprive us of Alsace and Lorraine, to barter them with Bavaria and the German princes. They want to destroy us, or at least to diminish our power, so as to reduce us to nothing. Well, my dear Caulaincourt, it is better to die than be minced up in that way. I am too old a soldier to fear death. They shall not say, now, that it is to satisfy my own ambition I fight, for it would be easy for me to save the throne; but I do not wish for a throne purchased by the humiliation of France. Look at these brave peasants, how they already rise and kill the Cossacks on every side! They give us an example. Let us follow it. Would you believe that these contemptible members of the Council of Regency were willing to accept the infamous treaty proposed to you? Ah, I have ordered them to be silent, and to be quiet. These poor peasants are far better than the Parisians. My dear Caulaincourt, you shall soon see glorious deeds. I am about to march to the fortresses, and within a few days collect thirty or forty thousand men. The enemy evidently pursues me. In no other way can we explain the appearance of the masses of cavalry that hover round us. My sudden appearance on Schwarzenberg's rear has made him fall back; and when he learns that I threaten his line of communi-

cation, he will not dare to advance on Paris. I shall soon have one hundred thousand men under my command; I shall pounce upon the nearest enemy, no matter whether Blücher or Schwarzenberg; I shall crush him, and the Burgundian peasantry will do the rest. The coalition, my dear Caulaincourt, is as near destruction as I am; and if I conquer, we shall tear these abominable treaties. If I miscalculate, then we shall die. We shall only do what our old companions in arms are doing every day, but we shall die after having saved our honour."

M. de Caulaincourt, who was as capable as anybody of comprehending this heroic language, remembered too many deliberate faults, too many ill-timed refusals, that honour had not counselled; his manner expressed discontent and cool disapprobation. Berthier, in whose presence this discourse occurred, was astounded. He, like Napoleon, was impressed by the encompassing presence of the enemy, and, like the emperor, doubted that these troops could be merely a detachment; but, on the other hand, he asked himself how 200,000 allied troops, in whose favour victory had almost declared, could turn away from Paris, that great prey, that was almost within their grasp, to pursue a handful of men that had ventured to appear in their rear. He doubted, and under the circumstances doubt was agony; for, if the enemy were not in pursuit, they might within a few days reach Paris. This was the prevailing opinion. Restrained in presence of Napoleon, these opinions found vent elsewhere in unmeasured language. As to Napoleon himself, though his doubts were not allayed, he still repeated to M. de Caulaincourt, "You did well to return; I would have disowned you. You are come in time to witness great things."

All this energy, admirable, considered as a gift of God, but deplorable when we reflect that, ill employed, it had conducted us to the brink of an abyss, this energy was not infectious, and the entire army expected every moment a terrible *denouement*. This *denouement* was indeed approaching; the fatal hour had at length arrived. Napoleon's military combinations were certainly profound; but if the efforts of genius could readjust his military affairs, no power of genius could retrieve his political position. Paris, filled with terror and disgusted with his *régime*, a *régime* glorious but sanguinary, methodical but despotic; Paris, at the first appearance of enemies who declared themselves liberators, might be lost to Napoleon, and become the theatre of a revolution! Should the allies only suspect this sad truth, it would suffice to make them neglect all prudential considerations, and think of making this the scene, not of a military, but a political operation; and when Napoleon's plans would be frustrated, and his throne, which his powerful hand had two or three times within the last month sustained under terrible shocks, would crumble into dust. We shall now see how near the allies were to guess the terrible truth, that constituted all our weakness with regard to our invaders.

Prince Schwarzenberg had not very clearly understood the movement of the French army on Arcis; and it must be confessed that, to

any one not in the secret, it would have presented some difficulty. His first and most natural supposition was, that Napoleon was going to give him battle, and the Austrian general determined to accept it at Arcis-sur-Aube, as Blücher had at Craonne and Laon. Expecting a sanguinary struggle of some days' continuance, he was far from thinking it finished on the evening of the 21st. Seeing Napoleon withdraw on the 22d, he endeavoured to guess what could be his design, crossed the Aube in his rear, and took up a position between Ramerupt and Dampierre, behind a wide brook called Le Puits; his left was the Aube, his front covered by Le Puits, his right in the direction of Vitry. In this position he awaited fresh attacks on the part of his adversary, who he feared was contemplating some extraordinary movement.

But Napoleon, as we have just seen, had no idea of attacking his foe, and was indeed meditating an extraordinary movement in advancing from the Aube to the Marne, in the direction of Metz. The next day,—the 23d—whilst Napoleon awaited at Saint-Dizier the rear of his army that were to join him by the Frignicourt ford, Prince Schwarzenberg's light cavalry, who followed on his track, perceived the movement of the French army, and saw clearly that they were taking the direction of Vitry. Of Napoleon's intentions there could now be no doubt, for it was evident he purposed to cut off the allies' lines of communication. What was to be done in this state of things? Would it be better to pursue Napoleon in the direction of Lorraine, or join Blücher, who could not be very distant, and, with their combined troops, march on Paris, at the head of 200,000 men? The question was important, one of the most important that the heads of empires and commanders of armies were ever called on to resolve.

According to the strict rule of military tactics, the lines of communication ought not to be abandoned; on the contrary, they ought to be guarded with a care proportionate to the daring and formidable character of the enemy. The lines of communication being threatened by Napoleon, Schwarzenberg ought to pursue him, conjointly with Blücher, and determine the military question before advancing to Paris to receive the prize of victory. There were, undoubtedly, some advantages to be gained by marching directly on Paris, especially that of abridging the struggle: still, should the allies be arrested before the gates of the capital by a resistance, not alone military, but popular, and should the allies be detained some days outside Paris, fighting at the outskirts of the barricaded suburbs, they might be attacked in the rear by Napoleon, returning with an army of 100,000 men, and find themselves in a most perilous position.

These reasons were of great weight, and would have been decisive, had the situation been an ordinary one, and had the allies been likely to encounter before the walls of Paris a resistance such as the importance of the place, and the patriotism and courage of the inhabitants might lead them to fear. But though they had received only one communication from Paris, that of which M. de Vitrolles was bearer, and though hitherto no manifestation had corroborated the truth of this com-

munication, but that, on the contrary, the peasants were arming in the invaded provinces, they had discovered, by more than one symptom, that if M. de Vitrolles exaggerated in describing France as longing ardently for the Bourbons, he was perfectly right when he maintained that she was tired of war, of conscription, of imperial prefects, and that as soon as an opportunity of declaring her real sentiments offered, she would raise her voice against a Government that, after having carried war to the very walls of the Kremlin, had now rolled back the destructive tide to the gates of Paris. There was a personage whose opinions commanded much more attention than those of M. de Vitrolles; this was Count Pozzo di Borgo, who had returned from London, and had acquired among the allies an influence proportionate to his talents, and who never wearied of repeating to them that they ought to march on Paris. "The great object of the war," he said, "is the possession of Paris. As long as you think of fighting battles you run the chance of being beaten, because Napoleon will always fight better than you, and his army, even though discontented, but sustained by a sentiment of honour, will fight beside him to the last man. All ruined as is his military power, it is still great, very great, and, aided by his genius, greater than yours. But his political power is at an end. The times have changed. A military despotism, hailed as a blessing at the close of the Revolution, has been tested by its results, and is now universally condemned. If you give scope for a manifestation it will be prompt, general, irresistible, and Napoleon being at a distance, the Bourbons, whom France has forgotten, and in whose talents she has no confidence, will become suddenly popular, and from popular, necessary. It is by a political, not a military movement, that you ought to try and finish the war, and to achieve that as soon as an opening of any kind occurs between the belligerent armies, through which you can pass, hasten to take advantage of it; if you can lay a finger on Paris, even a single finger, the colossus is overthrown. You will have broken the sword you cannot wrest from him."

Such was the substance of the speeches unceasingly addressed by Count Pozzo to the Emperor Alexander, and he certainly had to do with a very impressionable person. Besides the very remarkable intelligence of Alexander, Count Pozzo had enlisted in his favour all the passions of this prince. To be revenged, not for the burning of Moscow, of which he had ceased to think, but for the personal humiliations that Napoleon had inflicted on him; to enter Paris, enter the capital of the civilized world, and there dethrone a despot and stretch forth a succouring hand to the French people; to receive for these deeds universal applause; this was the intoxicating dream in which he indulged. This dream so occupied his mind, that to realize it he was capable of acts of daring alike foreign to his head and heart.

As to the rest, Count Pozzo di Borgo's opinions had gradually taken possession of the public mind. Owing their origin to the Prussians, among whom they had been engendered by hate, they afterward found acceptance among the Russians, and finally among the

Austrians. The latter very clearly understood that to strike Napoleon politically, was the surest and promptest manner of destroying him. The Emperor Francis and M. de Metternich, though regretting in him, not a son-in-law, but a ruler more capable than any other of governing France, had felt, since the dissolution of the congress at Châtillon, that Austria should take a decisive part against Napoleon personally. They had long shrunk from the necessity of pushing things to an extremity, but having crossed the Rhine, and admitted the principle of the limits of 1790, which rendered the ancient Low Countries monarchless, and for which Austria was to have Italy in exchange; knowing Napoleon too well to believe that he would ever submit to such a reduction of his territories, they had, through ambition, reached the same conclusion to which the Prussians had been led by hatred and the Russians by vanity. To seek at Paris, the political solution of the question, which involved at the same time the military solution, seemed to them now a necessity. Prince Schwarzenberg, timid but steady, had adopted the same opinions as M. de Metternich and the Emperor Francis, for, at this moment, Austria presented the extraordinary phenomenon of an emperor, a prime minister, and a generalissimo, identical in their sentiments, constituting, as it were, but one man, insensible alike to love and hate, and influenced solely by deep-laid calculations. Under these circumstances, Prince Schwarzenberg, seeing the road to Paris open, was inclined, for the first time, to advance, so that the resolution of marching on the capital was almost unanimously adopted, though several experienced officers opposed this rash proceeding, as contrary to the rules of war, which teach that the lines of communication should never be abandoned, nor victory risked by a too great eagerness to attain it. An event calculated to strengthen the opinion of the more daring, occurred during the day. Wintzingerode's cavalry, forming Blücher's vanguard, had fallen in near the Marne, with the cavalry of Count Fahlen, belonging to Prince Schwarzenberg. There were mutual congratulations and rejoicings at this junction, which, to say the truth, ought to have taken place sooner, for the battle of Laon, having been fought on the 9th and 10th of March, it was strange that Blücher had not pursued Napoleon or the marshals who had replaced him on the Aisne, and that on the 23d he was still groping between the Aisne and the Marne. But Blücher had acted like generals who possess more obstinacy of temper than firmness of mind. He had first tried to take Rheims, then Soissons—had long waited the arrival of some thousands of Bülow's corps, that had remained *en arrière*, and had finally decided to drive the Marshals Mortier and Marmont before him, and had reached the Marne by Châlons. However this may be, he brought with him one hundred thousand men, and the allies had now two hundred thousand ready to march on Paris. The presence of such a force easily removed objections, founded on the rules of war, however skilfully propounded.

Whilst things were in this state, Prince Schwarzenberg was passing the night with the Emperor Alexander at the Château de Dam-

pierre, when suddenly despatches were brought, that had been taken from a Paris courier, arrested by the allied light infantry. Prince Wolkonski, the head of Alexander's staff, was at the château, as well as Count Nesselrode, the head of his *chancellerie*. The latter was called, who having long resided at Paris, might be better able to seize the meaning of the intercepted despatches, which were submitted to his perusal. These were extremely important. They consisted of letters from the empress and the Duke de Rovigo to the emperor. Both expressed intense alarm about the internal state of Paris. Those of the empress, breathing a sort of terror, were not, of course, of great significance, for they might be only an expression of feminine weakness. But the letters of the Duke de Rovigo would be estimated differently; for, minister of police and a soldier, long accustomed to difficulties, he could not be suspected of timidity; and he declared that Paris contained within its walls influential accomplices of the foreigners, and that at the appearance of an allied army, it was probable they would follow the example of the Bordaists. This revelation was, at such a moment, of immense importance; it threw new light on the political position of affairs, and put an end to any remaining doubts as to the course to be pursued. After this involuntary avowal on the part of the emperor's Government, of his wife, and his minister of police, there could no longer be a doubt that the imperial throne was tottering to its fall, and that to march on Paris was the most certain means of hastening its destruction. The Emperor Alexander and Prince Schwarzenberg were hastily awoke, and the intercepted despatches laid before them; these papers carried instant conviction to the minds of both. To march directly on Paris seemed the most suitable determination, one that ought to be put into execution at day-break. The three sovereigns were not on the spot. Alexander, the most active of the three, wishing to be everywhere, and particularly with the generals, was, at the actual time, with Prince Schwarzenberg. The most modest, the wisest, he who made least commotion, and who, not being a soldier, did not wish to embarrass the military chiefs by his presence, the Emperor Francis, had taken up his abode at Bar-sur-Aube, a considerable distance from headquarters. The King of Prussia, who was a kind of medium between the two emperors, being more reserved than the one, more active than the other, was staying in the neighbourhood. It was agreed that he should be immediately sought, and that in the morning the army should march toward the Marne, where Blücher was; that all the allied forces being combined, a consultation should be held, whose result the presence of the Prussians rendered certain; and that the army should take the route to Paris. Prince Schwarzenberg undertook to acquaint his master with the plan that had been adopted; and to beg of him, by letter, not to think of joining the invading army, lest he might, in the inter-crossings of the belligerent armies, fall into the hands of his son-in-law, which would be a serious complication in the actual state of things. There was a line of communication through Burgundy that might be called Austrian, as reinforcements

had been sent to Count de Bubna from Troyes to Dijon. Prince Schwarzenberg advised the Emperor Francis and M. de Metternich to go to Dijon; for, independent of the inconvenience of being made prisoner, it would not be suitable that the Emperor Francis should be present at the dethronement of his son-in-law, and especially of his daughter. These arrangements being made, they left Dampierre for Sommeperins on the morning of the 24th.

The journey was not long, the distance being scarcely three leagues. The Emperor Alexander, Prince Schwarzenberg, Wolkonski, the head of the staff, and Count Nesselrode, left the château of Dampierre together, and met at Sommeperins the King of Prussia, Blücher, and his staff. It is asserted that the fatal resolution that was to lead the armies of Europe within the walls of Paris, was taken on a little mound in the neighbourhood of Sommeperins, and that there the consultation was held, whose result was already certain, since to all the sentiments that had obtained in the Château of Dampierre the Prussian passions were now added. The council was almost unanimous. Replies swarmed in answer to the objections founded on military principles, which were the offspring of a servile subservience to the rules of war. Napoleon was about to cut off the allies' lines of communication; but they were also about to cut off his. The mischief he would do in seizing their magazines, their hospitals, their rearguards, their convoys of *matériel*, would be doubly, trebly repaid by capturing what they should find on the Nancy route, between Paris and the French army. He would take much; they would take more. And afterward, whither would both parties go? Napoleon would go to Metz and Strasbourg, where his presence would decide nothing; the allies would go to Paris, where they were certain of effecting a revolution, and snatching from Napoleon the power that rendered him so formidable. To pursue him would be to carry out his own views—for that was evidently what he desired, in executing this extraordinary and unexpected movement toward Lorraine. But it would be turning from the main object, and exposing themselves to a series of military chances; for Napoleon would be reinforced by the junction of his garrisons, and the allies would recommence with exhausted armies against recently-recruited forces, the formidable game of battles, at which, undoubtedly, Napoleon was the stronger; the war would be lengthened out, interminable complications would arise, and very probably the allies would end by falling into some snare that Napoleon would have the art to spread, and which they would not have the skill to avoid, and in which they would be finally ruined. To go to Paris and strike Napoleon a vital blow, was the shortest and surest way, though it appeared the most dangerous; and, in any case, supposing they could not enter the capital of France, there was a line of retreat secured—that from Paris to Lille, the Belgic route—where the allies would meet Bernadotte with 100,000 Dutch, English, Hanoverians, and Swedes.

There was no weighty argument to oppose to this mode of reasoning. Everybody yielded, and this frustrated Napoleon's calculations,

by regarding only political considerations, whilst he, despising politics, to whose suggestions he seldom lent an ear, founded all his proceedings on military considerations. As usual, having reasoned on military premises, he was politically wrong, and thus continually deceiving himself, his destruction became inevitable.

It was immediately resolved that all the allied *corps d'armée* should pause on the spot where they were, and on the following morning march for Paris. But some troops should be left in Napoleon's rear, either to harass or watch him, and obtain intelligence of his movements, in case that, changing his resolve, he should return on Paris. General Wittingenrode was ordered to keep close in his rear, with ten thousand horse, some thousand light infantry, and a large number of artillery. These troops would be sufficient to cause him, now and then, some annoyance, but would be especially useful in gaining intelligence of his resolves, as soon as they were formed. The allies, in advancing on Paris, were desirous of having an emissary who would precede them, and enter into relations with M.M. de Talleyrand and de Dalberg, whom they regarded as the principal instruments of the revolution they contemplated. There was an emissary ready to their wishes—M. de Vitrolles—sent by the malcontent chiefs, and sending him back would only be replying to the overture they had made. But M. de Vitrolles was no longer to be had. Faithful, it must be confessed, to the promises made at Châtillon, the allied sovereigns had not wished to give M. de Vitrolles a hearing before the dissolution of the congress. Considering themselves free after that event, they had consented to receive and hear him, and expressed a wish to send him to Paris. But he, anxious to see the Bourbons, whom he loved, and who were about to become masters of France, preferred going to Lorraine, where it was believed the Count d'Artois had already arrived, than to return to Paris and run the risk of falling into the hands of the Duke de Rovigo. He persevered in requesting permission to seek the Count d'Artois. There were, certainly, many important arrangements to be made with this prince, for it was imperative that the very day on which the allies entered this formidable Paris—formidable whether they appeared as conquerors or as liberators—it was imperative, we say, that a Government should be ready organized, under whose rule the French might immediately place themselves, and though the allies felt no decided preference for the Bourbons, yet the return of these princes resulted so spontaneously from the nature of things, that it would be necessary to act in concert with them. The allied sovereigns therefore consented to the departure of M. de Vitrolles for Lorraine, and it was arranged that after having seen the Count d'Artois, he should return to head-quarters, outside the walls of Paris. He was commissioned to tell the Count d'Artois that in returning to France, he should lay aside many prejudices, forget many persons and circumstances, and be directed by the advice of M.M. de Dalberg, de Talleyrand, and such persons.

M. de Vitrolles having left before the events

at Arcis-sur-Aube occurred, the allies, on marching on Paris, had no means prepared of communicating with those inside the walls, but, the gates of this capital once opened by the instrumentality of cannon, it was presumed that political relations might be easily established. The next day, the 25th of March, a day of mournful memory, the allied forces, henceforth combined, set out, Blucher's army on the right, Schwarzenberg's on the left, both advancing on Fère-Champenoise, the Paris route between the Marne and the Seine.

Advancing in this direction, the allies could not fail to meet several corps, unfortunately scattered, who, in obedience to orders and their own inclinations, were *en route* to join Napoleon. Among these corps, the principal were those of Mortier and Marmont, that had been left as an army of observation in advance of Blucher, and the great convoy of reinforcement and *matériel* sent to Sézanne, to be put under General Pacloud's escort. We shall now relate what had befallen each up to the 25th of March.

Napoleon, in quitting Rheims, had left Mortier there to support Marmont, who was defending the bridge of the Aisne at Berry-au-Bac, whilst General Charpentier, with some *débris*, defended at Soissons the second bridge of the Aisne. When Blucher, having lost six or seven days in vain deliberations at Laon, determined to march to the Aisne, he found the bridge of Berry-au-Bac too well guarded to be carried by a direct attack. He sent a strong detachment, some leagues higher up, to Neuchâtel, where the passage was easy, whilst he made a feint of passing lower down, at Pontavert. As soon as the detachment that had crossed the Aisne at Neuchâtel reached the high grounds at Berry-au-Bac, Blucher advanced on the 18th to attack the bridge. But Marshal Marmont had mined it, and it was blown up with a terrible explosion, before the eyes of the Prussians. Marmont then retired through Roucy on Fismes. This was an error, and the source of great misfortunes.

The most natural movement for Marshal Marmont would have been to fall back on his reserve, that is to say, on Marshal Mortier, who was at Rheims. It is true that Napoleon had given instructions both to cover Paris and to keep up a communication with him. But if Fismes was on the route to Paris, so was Rheims, and, by repairing there, Marmont had the advantage of concentrating his forces and coming in direct communication with Napoleon. It would therefore have been better to go to Rheims than to Fismes, for in marching toward Fismes there was an almost evident risk of being cut off from Napoleon, which was contrary to half his orders, and might induce, as we shall see, fatal consequences.

Marshal Marmont, probably influenced by the sight of the enemy's corps that had passed the Aisne at Neuchâtel, and who were advancing against his right, instinctively drew off to the left, and it was in consequence of this merely mechanical movement that he fell back on Fismes. Having arrived at this place, he felt himself isolated, and summoned Marshal Mortier to his aid. The latter, mo-

dest, and wholly free from jealousy, knowing that Marmont had more talent than himself, and forgetting that he had not as much good sense, thought it his duty to defer to his colleague's opinion, and left Rheims on the 19th; he joined Marmont at Fismes, which proves that the two marshals might in the first instance have repaired to Rheims, without being on that account cut off from the Paris route. Their combined forces amounted to about fifteen thousand men.

They remained in position, on a hillock called Saint Martin, until the evening of the next day, the 20th: this proves that the enemy was not very troublesome, and it also proves how easy it would have been, during these first days, to manœuvre as they pleased between Paris and Napoleon. On the evening of the 20th, despatches arrived from Napoleon, written at Plancy, at the moment when he was leaving for Arcis. These despatches condemned the movement on Fismes, as separating the marshals from him, and ordered them to rejoin him by the route supposed to be the shortest and safest. To return to Rheims was no longer possible, for the enemy had taken advantage of our retreat to occupy the place. From Fismes to Epervain, which would have been the most direct route to join Napoleon, there were no roads practicable for artillery. It would therefore have been necessary to come down to Château-Thierry, and cross the Marne there, then reascend between the Marne and the Seine, by the Montmirail route, thus losing two days, and exposing themselves to vexatious encounters. As there was no choice, the marshals set out on the evening of the 20th, and arrived on the 21st at Château-Thierry; they recrossed the Marne there, and the next day, the 22d, advanced on Champaubert by two different routes, in order not to embarrass each other by following the same road. They arrived at their destination in the evening. On the 23d, they went to Bergères, whence they began to get a glimpse of the enemy, and were obliged to proceed very cautiously. They learned that Napoleon had had a bloody affair at Arcis, that he had recrossed the Aube, and returned to the Marne in the neighbourhood of Vitry. To proceed in this direction, and endeavour to reach the emperor, was the duty of the marshals, however great the risk. They consequently resolved to advance as far as Soudé-Sainte-Croix, half a day's march from Vitry; if they found an opening through the columns of the allied army, they intended to dash through blindly, in order to join Napoleon. If they did not succeed, and if the adverse army remained interposed in a compact mass between them and Napoleon, their intention was to follow their movements cautiously, and fall back and cover Paris, should the allies advance on the capital. In fact, this was the only plan of conduct left them to follow, after committing the error of retiring to Fismes instead of Rheims.

The next day, the 24th of March, the two marshals repaired to Soudé-Sainte-Croix, but Marshal Mortier, wishing to know what was going on at Châlons, conceived the idea of crossing by Vatry, which would necessarily prolong his route. Marmont arrived in the

evening at Soudé-Sainte-Croix, and finding that he alone had kept the appointment, felt very uneasy. A vast line of fires gradually sprang up before him, until the horizon glowed in the reflected blaze. Marmont selected three of his officers who spoke German and Polish, and sent them to reconnoitre; one of these, a Pole, a brave and intelligent man, penetrated into the enemy's bivouacs, and learned all he wished to know; he soon returned to make his report to Marshal Marmont. According to this report, all the allied armies lay before them, amounting to nearly 200,000 men, and they were separated by this enormous mass from Napoleon, who had set out for Saint-Dizier. It would be scarcely possible to reach the imperial army, opposed by such obstacles. Marmont sent an officer to Mortier, begging him to come up as quickly as possible, and recommending him to take a position in the rear, as a protection against the dangerous neighbours whose vicinity they had just discovered.

The following day, the 25th of March, Mortier had an interview with Marmont. He had lost time in crossing by Vaux, and had received on the way the same intelligence that his colleague had learned. In consequence of this information, both thought it advisable to fall back on Fère-Champenoise; besides, the enemy's columns advancing toward them rendered this movement unavoidable. Marmont prepared to retire to Sommesous, earnestly entreating his colleague to take the same direction.

Such had been the operations of the Marshals Marmont and Mortier, up to the morning of the 25th of March, the very hour that the allied armies commenced their march on Paris. Two other corps, those of General Pacthod and General Compans, soon after found themselves in a position similar to that of the two marshals. General Pacthod had been left at Sézanne, with his division of the national guards, to escort the reinforcements destined for the army. He had been successively joined by different battalions, some of the line, others of the Young Guard, who had come from Paris under General Compans, and an immense quantity of artillery, the whole amounting to about 10,000 men. Napoleon had reckoned on these reinforcements, and had several times recommended them to the especial care of the War Minister; the minister bestowed little attention on them, and these battalions wandered about at random, awaiting instructions that never arrived. General Pacthod, having learned by different reconnoissances that he was near Marmont and Mortier, wrote to the latter, who did not know what advice to give, and Pacthod, receiving no answer, advanced from Sézanne to Fère-Champenoise, in the direction from the Aube to the Marne, by which movement he would cross the route of the two marshals, and could easily join them. On the very morning of the 25th, he crossed their line of march, and found himself near a place called Villeseneux. General Compans followed General Pacthod at a great distance.

This was the position of the different French corps when, on the morning of the 25th, the allied army, abandoning to Wintzingerode the pursuit of Napoleon, took the road to Paris.

Blucher advanced to the right, protected by the Marne, Schwarzenberg to the left, protected by the Aube. Nearly 20,000 horse preceded the two columns. The infantry followed within half an hour's march.

When Marshal Marmont saw the storm advancing in his direction, he immediately comprehended that the enemy had abandoned Napoleon and were marching on Paris; he retraced his steps toward Sommesous, along the Fère-Champenoise route. The marshal—an excellent tactician—retreated in good order, sheltering his cavalry, that was not very numerous, behind his infantry squares. He paused at every tenable position, covering the advancing enemy with grape, and then resumed his march, still protecting his artillery and cavalry with his squares, whose solidity was not shaken for a moment.

At Sommesous a new vexation awaited him. Mortier, though hurrying, had not yet reached the rendezvous, and Marmont was obliged to wait his arrival rather than run the risk of a separation. The combined forces of the two marshals would amount, at the utmost, to 15,000 men. What would become of them if separated?

Marmont, therefore, waited resolutely the arrival of his colleague; but, meanwhile, he was exposed to many cavalry charges, and, what was more vexatious, he was forced to lose most precious time, during which the enemy's columns had leisure to advance, and became more threatening. At length Mortier arrived, and the two marshals set out for Fère-Champenoise.

They had scarcely traversed some thousand metres when they were attacked by a terrific mass of cavalry, supported by infantry. The two marshals sheltered themselves in a position that permitted them to resist some time. Two ravines, not very distant from each other, and running parallel, the one toward Vassimont, the other toward Connastray, left between them an open space of small extent and easily defended. The marshals took up a position between the two ravines, fortifying the space that separated them,—their left supported by the ravine of Vassimont, their right by that of Connastray; they thus covered the Fère-Champenoise route. They held their position as well as they could, confronted by the enemy's cavalry and artillery. The French cavalry, posted in the plain, defended themselves valiantly, but were at last driven back by Pahlen's horse and obliged to take shelter behind our infantry.

During the proceedings, the weather, which had been bad, became worse, and violent hail, beaten into the eyes of our artillerymen, obscured their vision; and now, the Russian horse, dashing on the Bordessoulle cuirassiers,—who were on our left, a little in advance of Mortier,—drove them back on our infantry. The Young Guard had hastily formed in squares; but their ammunition being rendered useless by the rain, they could not offer an effectual opposition to the enemy, and two of the squares of the Jamin brigade were broken. At the same moment an alarming spectacle presented itself to the eyes of our troops, who, spite of their youth, had hitherto unflinchingly maintained their ground. It was

not that they were called on to dispute, during an hour or two, the space lying between the ravines of Vassimont and Connantry, they should afterward fall back and defile through the village of Connantry that supported our right, and through which the Fère-Champenoise high-road passed. Whilst the main body of the enemy's cavalry charged us in front, a portion of their cavalry, having crossed the Connantry ravine on our right, came galloping on our rear in the direction of Fère-Champenoise. Threatened in the rear, and exposed in front to reiterated attacks, our soldiers wheeled round a little too quickly, and retired on Fère-Champenoise in considerable confusion. Marmont's corps crossed Connantry with no greater loss than a few pieces of cannon; but Mortier had some difficulty in extricating himself, and would have been overwhelmed had he not suddenly received unexpected aid.

Among the troops of the Generals Pacthod and Compans there were some cavalry regiments, hastily organized in the Versailles dépôt. One of these regiments having followed in General Pacthod's track, suddenly appeared between Vassimont and Connantry, charged the enemy's cavalry, disbarbarred our infantry, and saved Marshal Mortier's corps. The latter escaped, like Marmont, by the sacrifice of part of his artillery, that could not cross the Connantry ravine to reach Fère-Champenoise.

This skirmish, in which the bad weather, adding an enemy ten times more numerous than we, had paralyzed the resistance of our soldiers, cost us about 3000 men and a considerable quantity of artillery. This was a severe loss, whether considered in itself, or relatively to the numerical weakness of the two marshals; and it was not the last they were destined to experience.

It was impossible to take up an abode at Fère-Champenoise: the marshals could only pass the night there. They were obliged to march toward Sézanne. But they were not sure of reaching the place, harassed as they were by hordes of enemies. Happily, in order to reach Sézanne, they skirted the heights over which passes the main road from Châlons to Montmirail, and where, a month before, the French troops had fought so gloriously. On the right was one of the little hillocks belonging to this range: it jutted into the plain, forming a kind of promontory. On this spot the marshals were preparing to take up a position for the night, and shelter themselves from the incessant attacks of the enemy's cavalry. But, as they were marching to their destination, a terrible cannonade was heard on their right and in their rear. The marshals became thoughtful, and Mortier remembered the brave and unfortunate Pacthod, who had asked him for advice that he was not able to give.

General Pacthod, in fact, endeavouring to join the marshals, had gone beyond Fère-Champenoise, and, to overtake them, had advanced as far as Villeseneux. Having there learned their retrograde movement, he retraced his steps, pursued by Wassiltsikoff's cavalry, and directed his march toward Fère-Champenoise at the very moment Mortier left.

General Pacthod abandoned the hope of reaching the place, and resolved to fall back toward Pierre-Morains and Bannes, expecting to find shelter near the Saint-Gond marshes. He marched with 8000 national guards, formed into five squares, and was forced to take refuge in a valley, surrounded on every side by the enemy's troops. These troops did not at first recognise each other, for some belonged to Blücher, others to Schwarzenberg; and they fired at each other. They soon perceived their error, and concentrated their fire on General Pacthod's unfortunate squares. The two last of these squares, that formed the rear-guard from Villeseneux, had made a heroic resistance, though composed of national guards, the greater part of whom had never seen service. Surrounded on every side, exposed to showers of grape, they held their ground, until, beaten down by the artillery and their lines broken by the cavalry, they were cut down to the last man. The three remaining squares, driven toward the marsh of Saint-Gond, were at last forced into a single mass, and, though still exposed to a heavy fire of grape, they refused to lay down their arms. Every fresh discharge of artillery produced frightful ravages among them.

The Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia, who had hastened to the spot, were touched by such heroism. Alexander sent one of his officers to summon them to surrender in his name; and those that remained surrendered to him. This prince could not help feeling some disquietude in seeing the simple national guards defend themselves with such energy; and he testified his astonishment and admiration of their conduct some days after. Noble and saddening episode of these wars, alike unwise and sanguinary!

This disastrous day of Fère-Champenoise— which the allies have decorated with the name of battle, and which was only the fortuitous encounter of 200,000 men with some straggling corps that fought in the proportion of one against ten—cost us about 6000 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners, without reckoning a great quantity of artillery. General Compans' corps, that had early taken the resolution of falling back, had marched on Coulommiers, and in perfect safety outstripped the enemy on the Meaux route.

The next day, —the 26th of March, —the two marshals, whose united forces amounted to nearly 12,000 men, advanced on Ferté-Gaucher, in order to place themselves on the Marne between Lagny and Meaux, and defend Paris; for the Marne, falling into the Seine at Charenton, —that is to say, above Paris, —protects the capital against an enemy coming from the northeast. They traversed Sézanne at an early hour, meeting only some Cossacks, whom they dispersed, and continued their way through Meurs and Esternay. Marshal Marmont formed the head, Marshal Mortier the rear, of the column.

In the afternoon, the advanced posts of our cavalry gave notice of the presence of the enemy at Ferté-Gaucher, which caused extreme surprise and a species of terror. General Compans having passed in this direction a few hours previously, and the enemy that pursued us being in the rear, it was difficult

to understand how an adverse force should appear in front. Still, the thing was very simple, though it did not appear so. Blücher, in advancing on Châlons to join the army of Bohemia, had left Bülow before Soissons, and sent Kleist and D'York in pursuit of the two marshals. Kleist and D'York followed them to Château-Thierry, and from Château-Thierry had thrown themselves directly on Ferté-Gaucher, to cut them off from Paris.

Mortier and Marmont held a consultation on the spot, and it was agreed that the former should force a passage at Ferté-Gaucher, whilst the latter should hold the enraged pursuing enemy in check, by defending Moutils *à outrance*. The Christiani division of the Old Guard vigorously attacked Ferté-Gaucher, but could not dislodge the enemy, who were strongly posted on the banks of the Grand-Morin. Marshal Marmont, on his side, defended himself valiantly in the defile of Moutils. The two marshals passed the day in this manner, their hearts oppressed with care, and not knowing how they should issue from this cut-throat trap, for they had the allied troops both in front and rear. Toward night, however, they conceived the design of turning to the left, and trying to reach Provins through Courtacon. The plan was executed successfully. Profiting of the darkness, they marched through the open country on the left, and reached Provins, after frightful sufferings, but without experiencing any greater loss than that of some wagons. Happily, the men and cannon were saved; and, with the loss of a few carriages, the marshals extricated themselves from this fearful difficulty. But the line of march was now changed, and there remained no other way of reaching Paris than by following the road along the right bank of the Seine, from Melun to Charenton. The enemy were now at liberty to advance to the Marne and cross it where they would, having no other obstacle to fear than General Compans' feeble division that had retired to Meaux. It was therefore incumbent on the marshals to hasten, that they might arrive in time before the walls of Paris and join General Compans, should he be so fortunate as to escape; in short, they wished to unite with the remaining patriotic citizens, and defend with them the capital of our country, against Europe, that was thirsting for vengeance.

The marshals, fully comprehending there was no other line of conduct left them to follow, allowed their troops some rest, of which they stood much in need, for they had been marching three days and nights; they set out on the evening of the 27th, for Paris, Marshal Marmont taking the Melun route, and Mortier that of Mormant, that they might not embarrass each other in pursuing the same road.

The next day—the 28th—they were equally far advanced on their respective routes; the one slept at Melun, the other at Mormant. On the 29th, they combined their forces and crossed the Marne, at the point where it falls into the Seine, that is to say, at the bridge of Charenton. The two marshals went to receive the orders of Joseph and the Regent for the defence of the capital.

General Compans, on his side, was joined *en route* by the retreating troops of General Vin-

cent, that had occupied Château-Thierry, and those of General Charpentier, that had occupied Soissons, and who were falling back before the allied masses; with these he halted at Meaux, destroyed the bridges, sunk the fragments in the waves, and fell back, through Clay and Bondy, on Paris. The two armies of Bohemia and Silesia having arrived at the Marne, it was necessary to make arrangements for appearing before Paris. This great capital, renowned through the entire world, is situate below the confluence of the Marne with the Seine, and it is the largest and most populous part of Paris that lies exposed to an enemy coming from the northeast. In the times of which we speak, this quarter had no other protection than the heights of Romainville, of Saint-Chaumont, and of Montmartre. The allies would be obliged to cross the Marne *en masse* to force our last defences and avenge twenty years' humiliation. They crossed the river above and below Meaux, and distributed their forces in the following manner in advancing on Paris:—

In the first place, the corps of Sacken and De Wrede were posted at Meaux, to cover the allies' rear against a sudden attack, and this precaution was very natural, for they had left Napoleon at Saint-Dizier. Blücher, with the corps of Kleist and D'York combined into one, with Woronzoff's corps, (formerly Wintzingerode's,) with Langeron's, the four comprising 90,000 men, was to move to the right, and take the Soissons route, in order to advance through Bourget on Saint-Denis and Montmartre. Bülow's corps had orders to seize Soissons. Prince Schwarzenberg, with Rajefsky's corps (formerly Wittgenstein's) and the reserves, amounting in all to about 50,000 men, was to come by Meaux, Clay, and Bondy, on Paris, La Villette, and the heights of Romainville. The Prince Royal of Wurtemberg, with his own corps and that of Giulay, amounting to about 30,000 men, was to come through Chelles, Nogent-sur-Marne, and Vincennes, on Montreuil and Charonne. The three columns had orders to appear before the walls of Paris on the evening of the 29th, that they might be ready to commence an attack on the 30th. The allied armies were actually *en marche* to arrive on an appointed day before the walls of that great capital, the object of their long-cherished hatred and ambition.

It is unnecessary to say, for we can all divine, what were the feelings of the Parisians. It was now beyond all doubt that the allied armies had resolved to march on Paris. Napoleon, whether through necessity, or as the result of a plan of operations that his people did not understand, was at this moment at a distance from his capital, and totally unable to protect it. With the exception of some men, blinded by party feeling, the mass of the inhabitants was overwhelmed with grief, and would have hailed a deliverer, no matter whom. The desire to be delivered from Napoleon's government was as nothing compared to the fear of an assault, and the horrors that might ensue. The national guards, drawn exclusively from the middle classes, and reduced to 12,000 men, had not 3000 muskets: some were armed with pikes, which rendered them ridiculous. The people, though dis-

liking the conscription and the *droits réunis*, shuddered at the appearance of foreigners, and would have willingly taken arms, if the Government had any to give, and would place so much confidence in the citizens.

The populace wandered about idle, restless, discontented, in the faubourgs and on the boulevards. At the barriers crowds of peasants were seen driving their cattle before them, and bringing on carts whatever they could save of their humble furniture. The Government had not thought of exempting these poor people from the entrance duty, and some of them were forced to sell, much below the value, a portion of what they brought, to purchase the right of sheltering the remainder within the walls of the capital. These unhappy creatures, as soon as they entered Paris, crowded the boulevards and public squares, and after having made a kind of encampment with their carts and cattle, ran about here and there, asking the news, retailing it, exaggerating it, and groaning at the roar of cannon, that proclaimed the ravage of their desolated farms. Over this people, so diversified, so confused, so distracted, hovered in a sort of distraction the strangest government in the world. The empress-regent, intensely alarmed for herself and her son, fearing at the same time the soldiers of her father, and the people over whom she had come to reign, no longer receiving from Cambacérès, who was stupefied, the advice she was accustomed to, wrongfully distrustful of Joseph, who was kind and affectionate to her, but whom she had been made to regard as jealous of the emperor, and consequently not knowing where to seek advice or support, she had been thrown by the sound of the cannon into a state of extreme alarm. Joseph was not frightened by the roar of the cannon, but beholding the thrones of his family falling one after another, he began to fear for that of France. It is true that, spurred on by the emperor, he for a moment busied himself with the organization of the troops, without at all understanding the business; but he had neither the knowledge, nor the activity, nor the authority necessary to utilize the elements of resistance still existing in Paris. The war minister, Clarke, Duke of Feltre, industrious, but void of capacity, weak-minded, and almost an infidel, opposing in every point the Duke of Rovigo, whom he detested, was scarcely fit to execute half the orders of the emperor, which referred almost exclusively to the active army. The Duke of Rovigo, intelligent and brave, but execrated as the instrument of a nearly-extinct tyranny, had lost all influence. The other ministers, mere officials, did not step beyond the circle of their functions, and in the present circumstances participated in the general consternation. In short, M. de Talleyrand, the only man capable, not of creating resources, for he had never meddled in the administration, but of giving good advice as to the best mode of proceeding, smiled at the embarrassment of all these personages, sneered at them, and repaid with contempt their distrust of him. Such was the confused assemblage of princes and ministers who were at this moment charged with the safety of France. Now were seen on every side the deplorable consequences

of a policy that provided only for foreign conquest; magnificent fortifications, arms, and soldiers at Dantzic, at Hamburg, at Flushing, at Palma-Nova, at Venice, at Alessandria—and at Paris nothing, absolutely nothing! Not a redoubt, not a soldier, not a musket, not even a Government, and the sole resource to direct the bravest people in the world was a weeping wife, and brothers not without courage, but without authority, because the State had been concentrated in the person of one man; and because this man was absent, thought, will, and action seemed paralyzed throughout France.

When, on the 28th of March, the approaching arrival of the two marshals became known, and there being no longer any doubt as to the approach of the enemy, Joseph, who was the depository of Napoleon's instructions, both written and verbal, as to what was to be done with the empress and the King of Rome, in case of an attack on Paris, communicated these instructions to the empress, to the chancellor Cambacérès, and the minister Clarke; it never entered into the minds of either to disobey, though both Joseph and Cambacérès saw some strong objections against the prescribed measure. As to the empress, she was willing to leave or to remain, as her husband pleased. It was agreed that a council of regency should be immediately summoned, to discuss the question, and draw from the members a resolution conformable to Napoleon's intentions, positively and repeatedly expressed.

The council assembled on the evening of the 28th of March, the empress presiding. It consisted of Joseph, of the great functionaries, Cambacérès, Lebrun, Talleyrand, the ministers and presidents of the senate, of the legislative corps and the *Conseil d'Etat*.

No sooner was the council assembled at the Tuileries, than, with the permission of the regent, the war minister addressed the assembly, and laid bare the situation of affairs in mournful and studied phrase. He said their sole remaining resources were the diminished corps of the Marshals Mortier and Marmont, some troops, obtained with difficulty from the dépôts, a national guard of 12,000 men, of whom a part only had muskets, a populace willing to fight, but unarmed, some palisades at the gates of the city, but no defensive works on the heights; in a word, 25,000 men, wholly unaided by art, and called on to oppose 200,000 veteran soldiers furnished with all the *matériel* of war. The minister accompanied this *exposé* with expressions of the most profound devotedness to the imperial family, and concluded by recommending the immediate departure of the empress and the King of Rome for the Loire, where they would be beyond the reach of the enemy.

M. Boulay, (de la Meurthe,) who had listened impatiently to the war minister, protested impetuously against such a proposition, and expatiated warmly on the self-evident disadvantages of such a project. He said it would be at the same time abandoning the capital and reducing the Parisians to despair, who looked on the daughter and grandson of the emperor of Austria as a kind of ægis; but should these seem only to consult their own safety, it

would be inviting every one else to follow the example; that from that moment the defence of Paris would become impossible, that it would be tantamount to opening the gates to the enemy, and the departure of the Government would create a void which a hostile party, supported by foreigners, would quickly fill, by proclaiming the Bourbons, as had happened at Bordeaux. M. Boulay, (de la Meurthe,) after having stated his opinions, proposed that Maria Louisa should imitate the example of her illustrious grandmother, Maria Theresa, that she should go to the Hôtel de Ville, with her son in her arms, and there make an appeal to the people of Paris, who, at need, could raise 100,000 soldiers to defend her.

This advice, to which there could be no objection, had there been a hundred thousand muskets to give the Parisians, and the Government willing to trust them, was approved by the majority, especially by the minister of police, the Duke de Rovigo, and by the old Duke of Massa, who, notwithstanding his age and the impaired state of his health, opposed the departure of the empress, with an eloquence that savoured of the vigour of youth. Even the sage and cool-tempered Duke de Cadore grew warm, as he supported the proposition of staying at Paris and making a vigorous defence. Amid this general expression of opinion, that almost amounted to unanimity, Joseph, though appearing to side with those that opposed the proposition of leaving Paris, remained silent, and seemed as if paralyzed by an invisible power. Prince Cambracès, bowed beneath the weight of his vexations, was also silent. The empress, powerfully agitated, was silent, but her supplicating looks implored advice from all present.

M. de Talleyrand, with the authority inseparable from his name, spoke in turn, and expressed an opinion truly surprising to those who were aware of his secret relations. With that calm, graceful, and at the same time disdainful gravity that characterized his manner of speaking, he gave the soundest political advice, such, in fact, as he might have enunciated had he been exclusively devoted to the Bonapartes. He laid little stress on the enthusiasm that might be awakened by conducting the empress and the King of Rome to the Hôtel de Ville, he was too discriminating to put much faith in such resources, but he laid great stress on the danger of evacuating Paris. To evacuate the capital, was, in his opinion, to abandon it to the attempts that an adverse party would not fail to make at the first appearance of the allied armies. This adverse party, as every one knew, was that of the Bourbons. The allies, their great support, were drawing near. To abandon Paris, and remove Maria Louisa from the capital, would be to free the allies from every difficulty they might encounter in effecting a revolution. Such was the general sense, though not the exact words, of the opinion expressed by M. de Talleyrand; and it was strange to hear a man who was to be the principal actor in the approaching revolution describe it so minutely beforehand.

People devoid of finesse, and who for that

very reason suspect its existence in others, believed at this moment, and gave utterance to their opinion, that M. de Talleyrand had put forth this opinion in order that another might be adopted. This was a puerile error. M. de Talleyrand, called upon unexpectedly, had obeyed the dictates of his good sense, and gave the best possible advice. Moreover, the proposal of leaving annoyed him. To remain at Paris after advising a departure, would put him in a serious difficulty; to leave would be to run the risk of all the vicissitudes that might befall the departing Government, and remove to a distance from that which was approaching. In short, the advice to remain had an appearance of devotedness that might be useful, if Napoleon—whom the French would never believe utterly vanquished, until they heard of his death—should ultimately triumph. Having thus spoken conformably to the dictates of his understanding, and suitably to his particular circumstances, M. de Talleyrand was silent, and not a person present had the courage to offer an opinion after him. The question was put to the vote, and a considerable majority appeared in favour of those who disapproved the departure of the empress and the King of Rome.

The result was scarcely announced when extraordinary anxiety was discoverable in the countenance of the minister Clarke, and not less in the face of Prince Joseph, who, however, had visibly encouraged the opinion in favour of which the majority had decided. Then, as if under the influence of an imperative necessity, the war minister rose, and pronounced a lengthy discourse, again recommending the departure of the empress and the King of Rome. In support of his opinion he adduced reasons which, without being good, were the least bad that could be alleged. Paris was not every thing, and ought not to be; and Paris once taken, it would be necessary to defend *France*, the rest of France, and dispute it obstinately with the enemy. It would be better to repair, with the empress and the King of Rome, to the provinces that had not yet been invaded, rally every patriotic Frenchman, and defend, to the last man, their native land and the emperor's throne. But this prolonged struggle was not possible if, leaving the empress and her son in the capital, they exposed them to the risk of falling into the hands of the allied sovereigns. This would be yielding up to the Emperor of Austria the precious pledge of his which they held; and if the people in any of the provinces were willing to raise the standard of resistance, they could not find any high personage round whom the devoted subjects of the empire could rally. Besides, the probability of seeing the enemy enter Paris was greater than was generally believed; for there was very little chance, with the resources they had, of resisting the 200,000 men that were marching on the capital.

The war minister had taken all this trouble through a simple spirit of obedience. At bottom, he had no opinion on any subject. The arguments he brought forward he had drawn from historic recollections of cases of desperate resistance; these arguments, which were valid at Vienna under Maria Theresa, at Berlin under the great Frederick, but false at Paris, in the

case of a vanquished soldier, did not convince any one; for, without avowing it mentally, and without daring to express it openly, every one felt that with a Government itself the offspring of revolution, and that had ceased to be popular, and for which a substitute was ready prepared, to abandon the capital was to open the way for a revolution. Every one retained his opinion; and the sense of the assembly being again taken, it was found that the members were almost unanimous in declaring that Maria Louisa and the King of Rome ought to remain at Paris.

Then Joseph broke his prolonged silence, and the motive of his hitherto inexplicable conduct was revealed. He read two letters of the emperor's—one dated from Troyes after the battle of La Rothière, the other from Rheims after the battles of Craonne and Laon—in which Napoleon declared that on no account should his wife and son be allowed to fall into the hands of the allies. We have already explained the feelings under which Napoleon wrote these two letters. Independent of the very sincere affection he bore his wife and son, he wished to keep in his hands a precious pledge; he also feared that Maria Louisa might become the docile instrument of all that his enemies would contrive against him, especially by creating a regency that would exclude him from the throne. After the disquieting battle of La Rothière, this was his opinion, and he still held the same after the doubtful battles of Craonne and Laon. The two letters of the emperor now produced were an overwhelming blow to the Council of Regency. Under the impulse of the moment, those whose opinions were negatived by the letters of the emperor exclaimed that it was very wrong to assemble a council when an order had been received from Napoleon, an absolute order, that did not admit of discussion. But reflection succeeding to the first emotion, they examined the letters, and disputed the use that was being made of them. The first had been written under circumstances very different from the present, after the battle of La Rothière, when there appeared to be no chance of resisting the enemy. But since then, glorious triumphs, mingled, it is true, with less agreeable events, had prolonged the war and rendered the result uncertain. The circumstances were, therefore, different, and Napoleon would not probably at the actual time give the same orders.

To this interpretation the second letter replied peremptorily. This letter was written at Rheims the 16th of March, the morrow of the successful battle of Rheims, at the very time the emperor was commencing his march toward the fortresses. The members were obliged to yield, and consent that the empress should depart next day—the 20th. It was, however, resolved that Joseph and the ministers should remain in order to direct the defence of Paris, and not leave until it would be no longer possible to dispute this city with the enemy. The chancellor Cambacérès, little suited to the tumult of arms, and being besides an adviser indispensable to the empress, was to accompany her. The council broke up, and the members went their way confounded, and in a state of agitation unusual under this Government, hitherto so obedient and peaceful.

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They broke out into recriminations, each imputing to the other the approaching ruin of the empire. Some of the more zealous members reproached the Duke of Rovigo with not having had recourse to the means that had saved France in '92—for example, with not having raised the people—to which he replied that he agreed with them; but in order to raise the people, he would have needed two things which he did not possess: in the first place, arms, and in the next, permission to have recourse to such means. In descending the staircase of the Tuileries, M. de Talleyrand, who walked in the same fashion as he wrote, that is to say, slowly, said to the Duke of Rovigo, leaning on the cane on which he habitually supported himself, "Well, what an end to so glorious a reign! To finish his career like an adventurer, instead of terminating it peacefully on the greatest throne in the world, after having stamped the century with his name—what an end! The emperor would be much to be pitied, had he not deserved his fate, by surrounding himself with such stupidities!" The Duke of Rovigo, who had felt his own influence declining, and set no great value on those who had replaced him in the confidence of the emperor, bowed his head and made no reply: he even appeared to approve the observations of M. de Talleyrand. The latter, with a look that solicited a little more confidence, added, "However, it will not suit every one to allow himself to be crushed under these ruins, and we ought to look to it." But, finding the Duke of Rovigo still silent, for though discontented he was faithful, M. de Talleyrand finished the conversation with these simple words,—"We shall see." He then stepped into his carriage, apprehensive that he had said too much.

After this meeting, whose consequences were so serious, Joseph, the Prince Cambacérès, and Clarke, in accompanying the empress to her apartments, communicated to each other their opinions, and acknowledged that the resolution to obey Napoleon presented serious difficulties. "But tell me," said Maria Louisa, "what I ought to do, and I will do it. You are very true counsellors, and you must teach me how to interpret the wishes of my husband." Prince Cambacérès, whose wisdom was now of little avail, and Joseph, who feared incurring any responsibility, dared not advise disobedience to the orders of Napoleon. However, they decided that, before obeying, they would ascertain whether the danger was really so great as was believed, and whether the time was come for putting into execution orders considered so dangerous. It was therefore resolved that Joseph and Clarke should the next morning make a military reconnaissance round Paris, and the empress was not to leave until they should have pronounced a final opinion.

The next day—the 20th—the *Place du Carrousel* was filled with carriages belonging to the Court. These were loaded, besides the baggage of the imperial family, with Napoleon's most valuable papers, the remains of his private treasures, that amounted to about eighteen millions, the greater part in gold, and lastly, the crown diamonds. A restless and discontented crowd had assembled, for Maria

Louisa had appeared to many a protection against the barbarity of foreigners. "These foreigners," said the multitude, "will not pillage, they will not burn, they will not destroy with bombs, the city that contains the daughter and grandson of the Emperor of Austria." The departure of Maria Louisa seemed a desertion, a kind of treason. Still the crowd remained inactive and mute. Some officers of the national guard having succeeded in entering the palace—for in public calamities etiquette yields to strong emotion—endeavoured to persuade Maria Louisa to remain, saying they were ready to defend her and her son to the last extremity. She replied, in tears, that she was only a woman, that she had no authority, that she was obliged to obey the emperor; she thanked them for their offers of service, which she was neither able to refuse nor accept. The unhappy woman (she was at that time really attached to the cause of her son and her husband) walked up and down through her apartments, weeping, expecting Joseph, who did not come, and not knowing what to say or what to do. At length, repeated messages having come from Clarke, announcing that the enemy's light cavalry already inundated the environs of the capital, she set off about midnight, overwhelmed with grief, bringing her son, who stamped with anger, demanding whither he was being carried. Whither he was being carried, unhappy child! To Vienna, where he was destined to die, without father, almost without mother, without country, and kept in ignorance of his glorious origin. Unhappy child, offspring of that strange destiny that united a soldier to the daughter of the Cæsars, and whose fate, next to the woes of France, is the most mournful history recorded in the annals of these extraordinary times!

The *cortège* of this terrified Court—and example of human vicissitudes, calculated to scare the happy ones of the world—advanced slowly toward Rambouillet, amid a discontented but silent crowd, who foresaw at this moment the future, as if it lay unveiled before them. Twelve hundred soldiers of the Old Guard escorted the fugitive court. This dreadful day of the 29th, the eve of one still more terrible, was devoted to making defensive preparations. Joseph had employed the morning, in company with several officers, in making a reconnoissance in the environs of Paris, which had delayed his replies to the empress, and the result of his observations was, that with the actual disposable means the capital could not be defended twenty-four hours. It is certain, that with the forces brought by the two marshals, with the depôts then at Paris, there were scarcely more than 22,000 or 23,000 men to oppose nearly 200,000. The national guard amounted to 12,000, whom a sense of duty and detestation of foreigners would have converted into devoted soldiers, but there were not more than 3000 or 4000 who had muskets. Among the populace sinewy limbs could be found, and in the common danger they would not be wanting in good will, but there were no weapons to give them. As to the defensive works, we have already said they consisted of some ill-armed redoubts, and some *tambours* before the gates, constructed *en palissades*, and without

moats. Napoleon, however, had sent orders, unhappily in general terms, such as it was possible to send from a distance, and amid the multiplied movements of an active army. Besides, as the question was of an irregular resistance, maintained by any means within reach, nothing could be foreseen, nor orders given beforehand. Napoleon's own presence was needed, with his strong will, his activity, his inventive genius, his indomitable energy, to turn to advantage the resources that Paris possessed: the excellent but irresolute Joseph, the incompetent and vacillating Duke de Felice, were ill fitted to supply his place in such circumstances. They were only impressed by the fact that they had 20,000 or 25,000 regular troops and that the enemy had 200,000. Certainly, the idea of a battle under such circumstances could only inspire despair; but nothing could be more stupid than the idea of giving battle outside the walls of Paris, for, the battle lost, and it was impossible it could be otherwise, every thing was lost, the battle, Paris, the Government, and France. Paris ought to be defended as General Bourmont had, a few days before, defended Nogent, as General Alix had defended Sens, as the Spaniards had defended their cities, as the Parisians themselves had too often defended Paris against their Governments, with barricaded suburbs, with the populace drawn up behind the barricades, only reserving the regular army to fall on the points where the enemy might penetrate. For a resistance of this kind, there was no want of resources. The army, with the additions that might be made to the corps of the Marshals Marmont and Mortier, would amount to 24,000 or 25,000 men. There were 12,000 national guards, to whom 5000 or 6000 muskets might be given, a number generally disposable out of the 30,000 or 40,000 under repair, and which Clarke persevered in keeping for the active troops, which would have raised to 6000 or 9000 the number of the national guards, regularly armed. The Parisians could at that time have furnished 50,000 or 60,000 volunteers, who could have found fowling-pieces, of which there was always a great number in the capital, which the zeal of the inhabitants would have induced them to present, and of which, in any case, the executive might have taken possession. Vincennes contained two hundred cannon of every calibre, and an immense supply of ammunition. With these the heights of Paris might be covered, and surely no one would have refused his horses for the service. By barricading the streets of the suburbs and the city; by placing the populace behind these barricades; by protecting, with artillery, certain select positions; by disposing the army on points where the enemy was most to be apprehended; or by throwing the regular forces from the heights on the flank of the invading columns as the configuration of the locality permitted, it was certainly possible to resist the entrance of the enemy into Paris at least for some days. The different localities, properly studied, would have offered resources that might have been turned to profit.

Everybody knows, either as an inhabitant or a visitor, the great capital whose defence was now under discussion. An enemy advancing along the right bank of the Seine met

f necessity encounter the half-circle of heights that surrounds Paris from Vincennes to Passy, and which encloses the most populous and richest part of the city. From the confluence of the Marne and the Seine, near Charenton-le-Passy and Auteuil, Paris is encircled by a chain of heights, sometimes extending *en plateau*, as at Romainville, sometimes saillant, as at Montmartre, and these offered a most valuable means of resistance, even before a patriot ing had covered these positions with impregnable fortifications. To the south and east of his semicircle (keeping still on the right bank of the Seine) are Vincennes, with its forest, its castle, and the encampments of Charonne, of Ménilmontant and Montreuil. Adverse forces on this side would be almost entirely cut off from all communication with any on the northeast, that is to say, in the plain of Saint Denis, unless they had previously taken the precaution of seizing the plateau of Romainville. Should this precaution not be taken, a defensive force, well posted on the plateau of Romainville, could fall on the flank of an enemy coming by Vincennes, or on the flank of an invading column crossing the plain of Saint Denis with the design of attacking the barriers of Villette, Saint Denis, and Montmartre. This latter column, coming from the northeast across the plain of Saint Denis, meets, of necessity, the hillock of Saint Chaumont, the heights of Montmartre, of Etoile, and Passy, and should this column advance so far in the direction of Etoile, it would run the risk of being brought to a stand in the wood of Boulogne and thrown into the Seine, thanks to the retrograde sweep this river makes from Saint Cloud to Saint Denis.

The heights of Etoile, of Montmartre, of Saint Chaumont, of Romainville, being covered with strong redoubts and a great quantity of artillery, the city being barricaded and defended by the populace, part of the army being posted between the barriers most threatened by the enemy, but the bulk reserved to occupy the plateau of Romainville, a resistance, not invincible certainly, but prolonged for some days, might be opposed to the allies, and give Napoleon time to manœuvre in their rear, and he had reckoned on this, not imagining that the defence of Paris would be limited to a single day, or, in other words, to the number of hours that 25,000 men could sustain, in the open country, a combat against 200,000.

But the authorities at Paris had not thought of profiting of local advantages, nor of making use of the citizens: for Napoleon being absent, nobody was capable either of thinking or acting. Those to whom he had delegated his authority scarcely possessed military courage—a quality in which Frenchmen are rarely deficient. Under Joseph, and under Clarke, who ought to have commanded, and who did not command, General Hutin was *chef de la Place* at Paris, and Marshal Moncey *chef* of the national guards. Each of these busied himself, without holding communication with the other, with what specially concerned himself. General Hutin—a brave and patriotic man, but long accustomed to doze away his time at Paris—had immediately sent some pieces of cannon to the heights of Montmartre and the mound of St. Chaumont. Not being authorized to employ

the horses of private persons to transport the artillery from Vincennes, he had scarcely been able to drag to the heights some pieces of ordnance, fixed on badly finished *plates-formes*, ill supplied with munitions, or furnished with what did not suit the calibre of the guns. Marshal Moncey, always disposed to fulfil his duty, after having vainly demanded muskets for the national guard, had at the last moment obtained the disposable 8000, distributed them, and then drawn up the 6000 national guards he had succeeded in arming; some he placed behind the palisades, erected at the barriers; the others he kept as a reserve, in order to send them to the points most threatened by the enemy.

As to the Marshals Marmont and Mortier, the Minister Clarke contented himself with prescribing a circuit outside Paris, as their field of operations, without examining whether it was advisable to fight a battle outside the walls of the capital. The right of this circuit he confided to Marmont, who would consequently have to defend the south and east of the heights—that is to say, the avenue of Vincennes, the barriers of Trône and Charonne, the plateau of Romainville, and a portion northward behind this plateau, as far as Prés Saint Gervais. He confided the left to Mortier, who was to defend the space between the canal of the Ourcq and the Seine—that is to say, the plain of Saint Denis.

These two marshals, after all the combats they had sustained during their retreat, had not more than 12,000 men under their command. They were strengthened by General Compans, who had escaped by a miracle, and who brought with him the Young Guard, recently organized at Paris, and the division Ledru des Essarts drawn from the dépôts. He had about 6000 bayonets. He was placed under the orders of Marshal Marmont. This division was commanded by General Michel, and was placed under the orders of Marshal Mortier. Thanks to this last reinforcement, the active forces of the two marshals amounted to 22,000 men. In their rear, 6000 national guards, some hundred veteran soldiers, and some young men in the artillery service, increased the number of the defenders of the capital to 28,000 or 29,000; and these brave men, as we have just seen, had for their defence, some pieces of cannon planted on the heights of Montmartre, of Saint Chaumont, and Charonne, and some palisades in front of the barriers.

The marshals, who arrived on the evening of the 29th, had only time to see the war minister, and converse a few moments with him, whilst their troops were taking a little indispensable repose. The confusion was so great that, though a sufficient quantity of provisions had been provided, the soldiers could scarcely get any thing to eat. They were supported solely by the kindness of the inhabitants. The two marshals allowed them some repose, preparatory to leading them to the spot where they were to fight.

The allied sovereigns were, on the evening of the 29th, at the château of Bondy, and approaching Paris by the northeast, they resolved to attack it by the right bank of the Seine; for no enemy, unless compelled by extraordi-

nary circumstances, would have joined to the natural difficulties of the attack that of an operation executed beyond the Seine, with the obligation to repass this river in case of failure. Being obliged to operate on the right bank of the Seine, the allied generals combined their efforts in a manner conformable to the nature of the locality. They decided to make three simultaneous attacks—one on the east, to be executed by Barclay de Tolly, with Rajeffsky's corps and all the reserves, about 50,000 men—their especial object being to carry, by Rosny and Pantin, the plateau of Romainville; one to the south, to second the proceeding executed by the Prince Royal of Wurtemberg with his own corps and that of Giulay, (nearly 30,000 men,) and which was to abut through the wood of Vincennes, at the barriers of Charonne and the Trône; lastly, a third, to the north, in the plain of Saint Denis, executed by Blücher at the head of 90,000 men, and especially directed against the heights of Montmartre, Clichy and Etoile. Of these three columns, the most advanced in its march was that of Barclay de Tolly. That of Blücher, having come by the Meaux route, and having reached the Chaussée de Soissons, was on the evening of the 29th, farther from the rendezvous than the two others. The Prince de Wurtemberg, who had skirted the Marne, and had crossed it at an advanced stage of his march, was also *en arrière*. It was agreed that all should enter into action as soon as possible.

On our side, the Marshals Marmont and Mortier, having arrived at a very late hour in the evening, and having passed the night between Charenton, Vincennes, and Charonne, were to advance in a southerly direction to occupy the heights. Marmont, with his troops, scaled the escarpments of Charonne and Montreuil, with the intention of establishing themselves on the plateau of Romainville, and on the north of this plateau as far as Prés Saint Gervais. Mortier had a still greater distance to traverse. Ascending by the exterior boulevard from Charonne to Belleville, having afterward to descend on Pantin, La Villette, and La Chapelle, he was ultimately to reach the plain of St. Denis, establish his right wing on the canal of the Ourcq, his left at Clignancourt, at the foot of the heights of Montmartre. He consequently required much more time to fall into line than Marmont. Happily he was to contend with Blücher, who was also *en retard*, so that he was certain of not being outstripped by the enemy.

Marmont, trusting too easily to the report of an officer, did not believe that the plateau of Romainville was occupied, and on this account had not hastened his march. When he arrived there, Rajeffsky's troops were already in possession. With 1200 men of the Lagrange division, he threw himself on his vanguards, chased them from the plateau, and drove them back on Pantin and Noisy. At the same moment the Ledru des Essarts division took possession of the wood of Romainville, which covers the flank of the heights that border the plain of Saint Denis. Marmont distributed his troops in the following manner. He had at his disposal one of the last divisions drawn from the Paris dépôts, under the Duke of Padua, his ancient divisions Lagrange and Ricard,

the troops that General Compans had brought the evening before, and lastly, some cavalry under Generals Chastel and Bordessoulle. He left his cavalry between Charonne and Vincennes, with orders to defend the foot of the heights on the north side, and to cover the barrier of Trône. He placed the Duke of Padua on his right, on the extreme edge of the plateau of Romainville, in the tallest houses of Bagnolet and Montreuil, that are built *à amphitheatre* on the southern declivity, that their fruit-trees may enjoy the full rays of the sun. He drew up on the centre of the plateau the Lagrange division, backed by the houses of Belleville, the Ricard division on the left in the wood of Romainville, and lastly, on the northern declivity, the Ledru des Essarts division of Compans' corps. He placed at the foot, in the plain, at Prés Saint Gervais, the Boyer de Rebeval division. The Michel division, that awaited Mortier to serve under his orders, guarded in his absence *La Grande* and *La Petite Villette*.

The sound of musketry and the roar of cannon awakened, at an early hour, the Parisians, who, to say the truth, had slept little during the night, and Joseph, accompanied by the war minister, the minister of police, engineer and artillery officers, had established his head-quarters at the summit of Montmartre.

Barclay de Tolly, though convinced that when the Prince Royal of Wurtemberg on the south, and Blücher on the north, would fall into line, the contest would soon turn to the advantage of the allies, still did not wish to leave the defenders of Paris the first success of the day. He consequently resolved to retake the plateau of Romainville, and to employ for that purpose a part of his reserve. This reserve was composed of infantry, cavalry, and grenadiers. General Paskewitch was, with a brigade of the 2d division of grenadiers, to scale the plateau on the Rosny side; he was also to attack it on the south, advancing by Montreuil with the 2d brigade of this 2d division, and with Count Pahlen's cavalry. The 1st division of grenadiers was confided to Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, to attack Pantin and Prés Saint Gervais, in the plain to the north.

This attack, conducted with vigour, was in the commencement successful. General Haxenzoff, who had been repulsed in the morning, now, reinforced by the grenadiers, remounted the plateau, spite of the Lagrange division, and succeeded in taking possession of it. On the right, the 2d brigade of grenadiers, after having turned the plateau by Montreuil and Bagnolet, forced the Duke of Padua's division, by outflanking them, to retrograde. We certainly lost ground, though the resistance of our soldiers was heroic, whether we consider the number or quality of the adverse troops, who were of the allies' best.

However, though we lost ground, we kept the enemy in check. In fact, the Russian cuirassiers, led up on the plateau, tried to charge our infantry, but were covered with grape and stopped by our bayonets. In falling back from Romainville on Belleville, the plateau growing narrower, our troops had the advantage of concentrating. On the right, we

found a support in the houses of Bagnolet, on the left, in the wood of Romainville, and our soldiers, dispersing *en tirailleurs*, inflicted severe losses on the enemy. Our artillery profiting of the local advantages—for the plateau rises in retrograding toward Belleville—poured volumes of grape on the Russian grenadiers, and at each discharge overthrew entire lines. During this time, Ledru des Essarts' young soldiers had reconquered, tree by tree, the wood of Romainville, and thus outflanked the Russian troops that occupied the wider portion of the plateau. At the very foot of the plateau, toward the north side, General Compans had remained master of Pantin, with the aid of the Boyer de Rebeval division, and kept Prés Saint-Gervais by the help of the Michel division. He had even driven beyond the two villages the Prince of Wurtemberg, who had attempted to take possession of them at the head of the first division of grenadiers.

Marshal Mortier having at length taken up a position in the plain of Saint-Denis, had placed the Curial and Charpentier divisions of the Young Guard at La Villette, the Christiani division of the Old Guard at La Chapelle, and his cavalry at the foot of Montmartre itself.

It was ten in the morning, and if we had, independent of the troops that covered the environs of Paris, a column of ten thousand veteran soldiers to take the offensive, we should have been able to give the allies at this moment a severe check. But, far from being in a position to take the offensive, we had scarcely the means to defend our positions. In this state of things, Prince Schwarzenberg waiting his two wings that were *en retard*, and our two marshals being reduced to the defensive, both parties confined themselves to a cannonade and some sharpshooting, the superiority on our side being marked, owing to the zeal of our troops and the advantage of position.

At this hour Joseph was holding a council on the hillock of Montmartre, where he had fixed himself. Several officers who had been sent to the marshals returned, with the assurance that they and their soldiers were determined to die to the last man, but added sad presentiments for the result of the contest, for they almost felt certain that the capital must be surrendered. This intelligence agitated Joseph deeply, who feared not the danger but the humiliation, and who dreaded above all things becoming the prisoner of the allies. From the heights of Montmartre dark and voluminous masses, led on by Blücher, were seen to cross the plain of Saint-Denis, and officers coming from the neighbourhood of Vincennes asserted that they saw on the east and south a fresh army that was turning Paris, and trying to enter by the barriers of Charonne and Tréne. All evidence, both visual and oral, concurred in announcing an imminent catastrophe. Joseph debated the subject with the ministers that had accompanied him, with the engineer and artillery officers, and all were of opinion that within a few hours Paris should be given up. In fact, the defence being reduced to a battle fought in the open plain, with odds of ten to one, of the result there could be no doubt, however brave our soldiers and generals might be. Confronted by such certainty, Joseph determined to withdraw.

Having learned by reconnoissance that Corbassons were already seen advancing along the Revolte route and at the border of the *Bois de Boulogne*, he hastily set off, ordering the ministers to follow, as had been agreed, when the last moment should have arrived. His sole instructions to the two marshals at parting were to continue the defence as long as possible, and then surrender on conditions that would guarantee the safety of Paris and good treatment to the inhabitants.

During these proceedings the attack had made inevitable progress. On the north, that is to say, in the plain of Saint-Denis, Marshal Blücher had traversed the distance that separated him from our positions. General Langeron had driven our weak vanguards from Aubervilliers and Saint-Denis, and sent his cavalry and light infantry by the road of La Revolte, as far as the edge of the Bois de Boulogne. The bulk of his infantry advanced toward the foot of Montmartre, whilst General d'York's corps, turning to the left (the left of the allies) advanced on La Chatelle by the Saint-Denis route, and the corps of Kleist and Woronzoff, turning still more to the left, marched on La Villette. Prince Schwarzenberg, seeing Blücher in line, asked him to send a reinforcement to assist Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg to carry Pantin. Prés Saint-Gervais,—in a word, all the villages situated at the foot of the Romainville plateau. The Kotzler Prussian division, the Prussian and Baden guards, were then sent to the assistance of Rajeffsky's corps, and crossed the canal of the Oureq, near the Rouvray Farm, to join in the first attack.

Whilst these movements were being executed to the north, the Prince Royal of Wurtemberg had, on the south, cleared the distance that separated him from the point of attack, and came to aid the allies. After having crossed the bridge of Neuilly-sur-Marne, and left Giulay's corps to guard his rear, he had marched his forces in two columns, the one skirting the banks of the Marne, the other crossing by the shortest way the forest of Vincennes. The first column had carried the bridge of Saint-Maur, made a circuit of the forest, and attacked Charenton by the right bank. The national guards of the neighbourhood, who, with l'Ecole d'Alfort, defended the bridge of Charenton, finding themselves attacked in the rear, were forced, after a valiant resistance, to abandon the post, and march across the country to the left of the Seine. This adverse column having attained its object, which was to occupy all the bridges of the Marne, to hinder any auxiliary corps from coming to disturb the attack on Paris, began to *tirer*, with the national guard, before the Bercy barrier. The Prince of Wurtemberg's second column had crossed the bridge of Vincennes in a straight line, and assisted Count Pahlen, as well as the troops of Rajeffsky and Paskewitch, who were engaged in attacking Montreuil, Bagnolet, and Charonne.

All the allied forces being now in line, the action recommenced with increased violence. To the north, Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg's division, assisted by the Russian grenadiers and by the Prussian troops recently arrived, fell on Pantin and Prés Saint-Gervais, but

was warmly received by the Boyer de Rebeval and Michel divisions of the Young Guard, commanded by General Compans. For a moment, the allies succeeded in seizing the two villages, but our young soldiers, planting their backs against the foot of the heights, where they were supported by a well-posted artillery, recovered their spirits, and again entered the villages, where the carnage became fearful. The enemy did not succeed on this side, notwithstanding the vigour of their attack.

The defence was not less energetic on the plateau of Romainville, but was less successful. The troops of Generals Helfreich and Mezenzoff, supported by the grenadiers of Paskevitch, though at first repulsed, had ultimately succeeded in taking the position. Having seized Montreuil and Bagnolet, they had established themselves on the southern declivity of the plateau, and being well seconded by the troops of Count Pahlen and the Prince Royal of Wurtemberg, who were operating between Vincennes and Charonne, they had taken possession of the nearest houses of Ménilmontant. The Duke of Padua's division of reserve, which formed Marmont's right, being outflanked, had been obliged to fall back, and leave uncovered the Lagrange and Ricard divisions, that occupied the centre. On Marmont's left the Ledru des Essarts division, briskly pushed from tree to tree in the wood of Romainville, at length lost the wood altogether.

Finding himself thus pressed on both flanks, Marmont conceived the idea of directing his centre against the enemy, that was advancing in a serried mass, their front protected by artillery and the wings supported by strong detachments of heavy cavalry. The marshal put himself at the head of four battalions formed *en colonne d'attaque*, and charged the Russian grenadiers that marched in the front line. Twelve pieces of cannon loaded with grape were discharged against our soldiers, who sustained the fire with heroic firmness and continued to advance. But they were at the same moment attacked in front by the Russian grenadiers, and in flank by the Chevaliers-Gardes, led on by Miloradovitch.

Overpowered by numbers, Marmont's four battalions were obliged to fall back, after a hand-to-hand fight, sustained with positive fury. The marshal fell back with his troops on Belleville, and was near sinking under the mass of assailants, both horse and foot, when a brave officer named Gheseler, ambushed on the right, in a little wood called "Bruyères," of which at present the memory alone remains, dashed at the head of 200 men on the flank of the adverse column, and, by making a diversion in favour of the marshal, succeeded in facilitating his retreat on Belleville. At the same moment the wood of Romainville was definitely abandoned; and the plateau being evacuated on every side, the defence was carried back—at the centre, on Belleville; on the right, toward Ménilmontant, which the Padua division had taken possession of; on the left, to the declivity of Beauregarde, where the Ledru des Essarts division had found shelter. At the foot of the latter the Boyer and Michel divisions struggled perseveringly. They

had lost Pantin, but they defended Pré Saint-Gervais with intense obstinacy.

On every side the combat was furious; men fell by thousands, especially among the allies, who received on all sides a plunging fire. In the plain of Saint-Denis, Kleist and Woronzoff had attacked La Villette, defended by the Curial division; York attacked, before the eyes of Marshal Marmont, La Chapelle, defended by the Christiani division. In front of Clignancourt, Blucher's squadrons were engaged with General Belliard's cavalry, and seldom got the advantage.

Thus, from the plain of Saint-Denis to the barrier of Trône, the combat was prolonged with varying success. Our line had fallen back; but the allies had already lost 10,000 men, whilst our loss amounted to only 6000. Our worn-out soldiers were supported by the thought that Paris was in their rear, and 24,000 men struggled without extraordinary loss against 170,000. Once the arrival of Napoleon was announced—it was the sudden appearance of General Dejean that had occasioned this false report—and the cry of *l'Empereur!* propagated with electric rapidity, echoed from rank to rank. Our troops, reanimated by hope, rushed furiously on the enemy. On both sides the combat raged with a kind of madness; for the one party was striving by a single stroke to attain the great object of the war, and the other was endeavouring to snatch their country from ruin.

At this time an event occurred at Vincennes which must ever redound to the honour of the youth of France. In the advance of the Trône barrier, there was a battery served by veteran soldiers and by pupils of the Polytechnic School, which Marmont, exclusively occupied with what was passing on the Romainville plateau, had left almost without support. This battery, having advanced too far on the avenue of Vincennes in order to play on Pahlen's cavalry, was turned by some squadrons that, passing by Saint-Mandé, made an attack in the rear. The brave pupils of the school, standing unflinchingly by their guns, resisted valiantly, and were fortunately aided by the national guard, posted at the Trône barrier, and by a detachment of dragoons. The latter, rushing on the guns, succeeded in retaking them. The battery was brought back to the heights of Charonne; and there, assisted by a crowd of the populace armed with fowling-pieces, our brave youths continued to pour a destructive fire on the enemy.

Belleville was the key of the position; as long as this point, which crowned the chain of heights, was not carried, the mass of armies fighting on the north, in front of La Villette, La Chapelle, and Montmartre, and those that fought on the south, between Vincennes and Charonne, could make no serious progress. The curved line of the allies was, as it was, stopped near the centre at a fixed point, which was Belleville. Belleville, in fact, commanded the Romainville plateau itself. Numerous obstacles, joined to the advantage of the position, rendered resistance there more easy. Marmont, established on this spot with the allies of the Lagrange, Ricard, Padua, and Ledru des Essarts divisions, having decided on his

command a large quantity of field-artillery, kept his ground against numerous assailants, and sent word to Joseph, who had authorized the marshals to negotiate, that he did not yet feel himself obliged to surrender. The marshal's officer who carried the message found that Joseph had set off before he arrived, and he returned without being able to fulfil his mission.

Meanwhile the fatal hour was drawing nigh. Prince Schwarzenberg, not wishing to terminate the day without having carried the decisive point, ordered two attacking columns to advance: one toward the south, passing between Ménilmontant and the cemetery of Père la Chaise, was to take possession of the exterior boulevard, and so separate Belleville from the enceinte of Paris; the other column, advancing to the north, was ordered to seize, at any expense, Prés Saint-Gervais, La Petite Villette, and the hillock of Saint Chaumont, and finish by joining the other column coming from the south.

To conquer or perish was at this moment the fixed determination of the allies, and it behooved them to overcome every obstacle without loss of time, for there was a possibility of Napoleon's arriving at any moment, and, had he found the allies repulsed from Paris, condign would have been their punishment for having dared to appear before the walls. About three in the afternoon, the action recommenced furiously. Brigadier Paixhan's artillery, who proved on this day what can be done with well-posted heavy artillery, had placed eight guns of heavy calibre beyond Charonne, on the declivity of Ménilmontant, four on the north reverse of Belleville, and eight on the hillock of Saint-Chaumont. He took his place beside his cannon, charged with grape, accompanied by his gunners—some, veteran soldiers, others, youths from the schools,—and waited until the enemy, who were masters of the plain, should essay to ascend the heights. In fact, the Russian grenadiers advanced, some to the south of the plateau, by Charonne, others marched straight to the plateau, in front of Belleville, and others approached the same point by the north, through Prés Saint-Gervais. Suddenly they are covered with grape; entire lines are overthrown. However, they sustain the fire steadily, and ascend on the south the declivities of Ménilmontant, and passing by the exterior boulevard, attack Belleville in the rear,—Belleville, where Marshal Marmont is desperately defending himself. The other division of grenadiers, who, with the Prussians and the Badenese, were attacking Pantin, Prés Saint-Gervais, and Petite Villette, and had snatched them from the Boyer and Michel divisions, now almost destroyed, ascended the hillock of Saint-Chaumont under the plunging fire of Brigadier-General Paixhan's batteries, carried the hillock, which, for want of troops, was not defended by infantry, and joined the column that arrived from the south, by Charonne and Ménilmontant. The enemy, having reached the exterior boulevard by the northern and southern declivities, succeeded in establishing themselves between Belleville and the barrier of that name, which they nearly carried.

On receiving intelligence of these events, Marshal Marmont, who had throughout kept his ground at Belleville, seeing himself cut off from the enceinte of Paris, assembled his remaining forces, and supported by Generals Pelleport and Meynadier and Colonel Fabvier, rushes, sword in hand, on the Russian grenadiers, who begin to enter the high street of the Temple Faubourg. He drives them back, closes the barrier against them, and resumes the defence at the *octroi* wall.

Mortier, on his side, struggled heroically in the plain of Saint-Denis, between La Villette and La Chapelle. La Villette on his right, defended against Kleist and D'York by the Curial and Charpentier divisions, was at length invaded by a host of enemies. At this spectacle, Mortier, who occupied La Chapelle with the Christiani division of the Old Guard, takes a part of this division, and making a movement from left to right, entered Villette at the point of the bayonet, and succeeded in driving out the Prussian Guard, after a fearful carnage. But soon fresh masses of the enemy, attacking Grande Villette in the rear, by the canal of the Ourcq, and entering between La Villette and La Chapelle, Mortier is forced to abandon the plain and fall back on the barriers. At the same instant, Langeron advances toward the foot of Montmartre. Langeron, a Frenchman, leads the enemy against Paris. Advancing toward Montmartre, he expects to be enveloped in clouds of grape, but is surprised to find these heights silent; he ascends and seizes the few pieces of artillery that had been placed there, and which were feebly guarded by some of the sapper brigade. He marches afterward to the Clichy barrier, which the national guards, before Marshal Moncey's eyes, were bravely defending, and with a courage that proves what aids might have been obtained from the Parisian populace.

Such was the termination of two-and-twenty years of unprecedented triumphs, whose scenes of action had been successively Milan, Venice, Rome, Naples, Cairo, Madrid, Lisbon, Vienna, Dresden, Berlin, Warsaw, Moscow, and now closed so disastrously before the walls of Paris.

No preparations having been made for a prolonged defence, by barricaded streets, and the population drawn up behind the barriers, with troops in reserve, the sole defence having consisted in a battle fought outside the walls of Paris with a handful of soldiers, against a formidable army, and that battle being inevitably lost, it was not to be supposed that the wall d'*octroi* could now stop the enemy's progress. It was better to spare Paris an unprofitable misfortune. Marmont, seeing no other resource, thought the time was come for using the powers conferred by Joseph on the two marshals commanding the army outside Paris, and had successively sent two officers to Prince Schwarzenberg to propose a suspension of arms. The battle raged with such fury that one of the delegates had not been able to cross to the enemy's quarters, and the other had been wounded. Marmont then sent a third.

At this moment, General Dejean arrived all breathless, to announce that Napoleon, learning that the allies had marched on the capital,

had changed his course, and was advancing in all haste to Paris, that if the marshals could only hold out two days, they would see him appear at the head of considerable forces; that they ought, therefore, to resist at any cost, and when they could no longer resist, they should endeavour to cajole the enemy by parleying. In fact, Napoleon in this extremity, the congress of Châtillon being dissolved, had written to his father-in-law for the purpose of resuming the negotiations, and authorized him to say so to Prince Schwarzenberg, in order to obtain some hours' suspension of arms. Marshal Mortier received General Dejean amid a hail of projectiles, and pointing out to him the *débâcle* of his divisions, which still disputed the possession of La Villette and La Chapelle, he quickly convinced him of the impossibility of prolonging this species of resistance. It was evident there was nothing left to do but to apply to Prince Schwarzenberg; and the marshal accordingly wrote him a few words on a drum-head pierced with balls. He said that Napoleon resumed negotiations on bases that the allies could not reject, and that, *en attendant*, it was desirable, for the sake of humanity, to stop the effusion of blood.

An officer, bearer of this letter, set off at full gallop, crossed the ranks of both armies, and succeeded in reaching Prince Schwarzenberg. The latter replied that he had received no intelligence of the resumption of negotiations, and could not, in the absence of such information, stop the battle, but he was willing to suspend the butchery on the immediate surrender of Paris. At the same moment, the third officer, sent by Marshal Marmont, having succeeded in obtaining an interview with the generalissimo, and having announced that the marshals, in order to save Paris, were ready to sign a capitulation, the parley assumed a more serious turn, and a meeting with the two marshals was appointed at La Villette. They repaired there, and found M. de Nesselrode, with several plenipotentiaries. Without losing a moment, the question of a suspension of hostilities was entered on. Divers pretensions were at first put forward by the representatives of the allied armies. They demanded that the troops who had defended Paris should lay down their arms. A movement of indignation was the sole reply vouchsafed by the two marshals. Then the adverse delegates reduced their demands to requiring the two marshals to retire into Brittany with those troops, in order that they might not exercise any influence on the sequel of the war. The marshals again answered in the negative, and demanded permission to retire where they pleased. These demands were acceded to, provided they evacuated the city that night. This condition was accepted, and it was agreed that some officers should meet in the evening to regulate the details of the evacuation of the capital.

Such was the celebrated capitulation of Paris, which cannot be reasonably condemned, for it was a matter of necessity on the part of the marshals. They had certainly done all that could be expected of them, since, with 23,000 or 24,000 men, they had, during an entire day, held their ground against 170,000, of whom 100,000 were actually engaged, and

6000 of their troops were put *hors de combat*, they killed or wounded double that number of the enemy. Let us imagine what would have happened if Paris, holding out three or four days longer against the allies, they had been surprised by Napoleon in their rear, as the head of 70,000 soldiers. And that it was not thus, whom shall we blame, if not, in the first place, Napoleon, who, having decided too late, to avow his real position, had not got the necessary defensive works executed under his own inspection round Paris?—he who, scattering his resources from Alexandria to Danzig, had not 50,000 muskets to give the Parisians? And, after the emperor, we must blame those who, delegated to represent him in his absence, had displayed so little activity, intelligence, and energy, and had reduced the defence of the capital to a battle of 24,000 men against 170,000.

In negotiating for their *corps d'armée*, the two marshals had not been able to make any stipulation relative to the city of Paris and the Government that resided within its walls; for they had neither the powers nor the mission to do so. Moreover, all the ministers had retired with Joseph. The Duke of Rovigo, faithful to what had been agreed on,—for it was arranged that the ministers should follow the empress-regent when Paris should be no longer tenable,—had set out, leaving the two prefects—one of whom directed the administration of the capital, and the other the police—the care of maintaining tranquillity in the city. There was consequently no longer a Government; and the void, whose ill effects had been so frequently pointed out by those that opposed the departure of the empress-regent was at length created.

The man destined soon to fill this void,—M. de Talleyrand, whom, by a secret instinct, Napoleon had foreseen as the author of his fall, and whom the public, by an instinct as correct, looked upon as the necessary author of an approaching revolution,—M. de Talleyrand found himself at this moment in a state of extreme perplexity. In virtue of his rank as grand-dignitary, he ought to follow the regent; but, by leaving, he rejected the great part that awaited his acceptance; and, by not leaving, he exposed himself to be taken in an overt act of treason, which might involve serious consequences, if Napoleon, by a sudden stroke of good fortune,—always possible in his case,—should reappear as conqueror before the gates of the capital. To extricate himself from this embarrassment, he sought an interview with the Duke of Rovigo to obtain permission to remain at Paris, saying that, in the absence of the entire Government, he would be able to render important services. The Duke of Rovigo, suspecting that those services would be rendered to some other than to Napoleon, refused the desired permission, which, in fact, he had not power to accord. M. de Talleyrand sought the prefects, but could not obtain what he desired; and, not knowing how to cover with a specious pretext his prolonged stay at Paris, he took the resolution of stepping into his carriage, and affect at least a willingness to follow the regent. Toward the close of the day, as the battle ceased to rage, he presented himself,

without passport and with great travelling-pomp, at the barrier leading to the Orleans route. The barrier was occupied by the national guards, highly irritated against those who, during the past two days, had deserted the city. A kind of tumult was raised about M. de Talleyrand's carriage; some contemporaries regard this as a national outburst, others believe it to have been prearranged. His passport was demanded: he had none; a murmur was raised against this neglect of an essential formality; and then, with an affected deference to the opinion of the brave defenders of Paris, he retraced his steps and returned to his mansion. The greater part of those who contributed to detain him, and who were not desirous of a revolution, little suspected they had detained the man who was about to effect one.

Not being fully satisfied as to the formality of his conduct, M. de Talleyrand repaired to the house of Marshal Marmont, who, the battle now over, had hastened to his dwelling, situate in the Faubourg Poissonnière. People of every class flocked thither, seeking, on some side, a Government, and crowding round the man who, at this moment, seemed to represent one, since he was head of the only force existing in the capital. Marshal Mortier was subordinate to him on all important occasions. The two prefects, a portion of the municipal body, and several distinguished personages, were present. Every one spoke of the late events with emotion and according to his individual sentiments. Seeing the marshal, whose face was blackened with powder and his coat rent by balls, the assembly felicitated him on his courageous defence of Paris, and then proceeded to talk of the situation of affairs. There was a species of unanimity in condemning what they called the cowardly desertion of those that Napoleon had left in the capital to defend it, and against Napoleon himself, whose mad policy had brought the armies of Europe to the foot of Montmartre. The royalists—and there was a considerable number present—did not hesitate to say that the French ought to throw off an insupportable yoke, and boldly named the Bourbons. Two influential bankers—MM. Peregraux and Lafitte, the one connected by the ties of blood, the other by those of friendship, with the Duke of Ragusa—attracted attention by the vivacity of their language. The second especially, whose secular success had just commenced, and whose versatile and brilliant talents had attracted general attention, spoke strongly, and went so far as to exclaim, on hearing the name of the Bourbons pronounced, "Well, be it so: give us the Bourbons, if you wish, but with a constitution that will guarantee us against a fearful despotism, and with peace, of which we have been so long deprived." This unanimity of feeling against the imperial despotism, carried so far as to make the upper bourgeoisie consider the Bourbons, with whom they had never come in contact, very acceptable, produced an extraordinary impression on all present. It was suggested in the assembly that they ought not to think exclusively of the army,—that the capital, too, ought to engage their attention. Marshal Marmont replied

that he was not empowered to treat for the capital: it was therefore thought proper that the prefects, with a deputation from the municipal council and the national guard, should be deputed to wait on the allied sovereigns, and demand from them that treatment to which Paris had a right from civilized princes, who, since the passage of the Rhine, had announced themselves as the liberators, and not the conquerors, of France.

Whilst these discussions were at the height, M. de Talleyrand arrived. He had a private conversation with Marshal Marmont. He wished at first to obtain something resembling an authorization of his stay at Paris, the which no person was less in a position to grant than the marshal; but he began to set a less value on this permission when he saw what was passing around him. He instantly conceived the idea of making this visit facilitate a *denouement* which he now began to regard as inevitable, and which should, of necessity, be accomplished by him. No man was more open to flattery than Marshal Marmont, and none knew better than M. de Talleyrand how to administer the draught. The marshal had, during this campaign, committed serious errors, but discoverable only by military men; whilst he had at the same time displayed heroic bravery. On this very day especially,—the 30th of March,—he had acquired lasting claims on the gratitude of his country. His face, his hands, his dress, bore testimony to what he had done. M. de Talleyrand praised his courage, his talents, and especially his understanding,—very much superior, as he affirmed, to that of the other marshals. The Duke of Ragusa, as usual, became very much elated when told that he was endowed with high intelligence, in which his fellow-commanders were deficient; and it must be acknowledged that, in this respect, he possessed what they could lay no claim to. He listened, consequently, with a sentiment of profound satisfaction to what the arch-tempter, who was preparing his ruin, told him. M. de Talleyrand took some trouble to point out the serious position of affairs, and the necessity of extricating France from the hands that had destroyed her; he gave the marshal to understand that, under existing circumstances, a soldier who had defended Paris so gloriously, and who had still under his command the men at whose head he had fought, possessed the means of saving his country, which had now no master. M. de Talleyrand went no further, for he knew that no person is seduced at a first attempt. He took his departure, and left the unfortunate Marmont intoxicated with vanity; and now, amid the disasters of France, he sketched for himself, in imagination, the most brilliant destiny; whilst the simple-minded and upright soldier, who had been his colleague on this same 30th of March,—Mortier,—whose face, too, was blackened with powder, devoured his grief in the loneliness to which his modesty and uprightness consigned him.

Night was already advanced; the officers chosen by the marshals were about arranging with Prince Schwarzenberg's representatives the details of the evacuation of Paris; the two prefects, with a deputation selected from

the members of the municipal council and officers of the national guards, left the Hôtel de Ville for the Château of Bondy, where they intended to make an appeal to the better feelings of the victorious sovereigns.

At this very moment Napoleon arrived before the gates of Paris. We have already seen that, on the 23d of March, he stopped in the neighbourhood of Saint-Dizier, to give his troops some rest and collect the garrisons that were to reinforce his army. On the 24th and 25th, he operated diverse movements between Saint-Dizier and Vassy, still flattering himself that he had drawn Prince Schwarzenberg after him; and in this belief he was confirmed by the reports of his lieutenants, who, still retaining the impression received on the day of Arcis-sur-Aube, fancied they saw on every side innumerable masses of the enemy. Napoleon had determined to ascertain the exact state of things, by profiting of the first opportunity to reconnoitre closely the numerous troop of cavalry that followed in his track. Meanwhile, M. de Caulaincourt, inconsolable that the negotiations had been broken off, insisted that an effort should be made to resume them, which Napoleon seemed little inclined to do. A favourable circumstance had, however, occurred, and M. de Caulaincourt had done himself a sort of violence to turn it to profit. General Piré, reconnoitring with the light cavalry, had taken prisoners Baron de Wessenberg, and M. de Vitrolles himself, who was returning from his mission to the Count d'Artois, and who, happily for him, was not recognised. M. de Caulaincourt, seconded by Berthier, had succeeded in obtaining the liberation of M. de Wessenberg, and sent him with a letter to Prince Metternich, in which M. de Caulaincourt declared that Napoleon was at length resigned to make great sacrifices, without, however, saying what they were. It was all that M. de Caulaincourt had been able to obtain from his master, though he would have wished to be more precise in these new overtures, in order that they might be better received. M. de Wessenberg, having been set free on condition of fulfilling the mission, undertook it, and, passing M. de Vitrolles for one of his servants, saved him from imminent danger.

An opportunity of making a close reconnoissance having offered on the 26th, Napoleon took care to profit by it. Whilst he was between Saint-Dizier and Vassy, on the left of the Marne, filling the entire country between the Marne and the Aube with his troops, he perceived a vast number of cavalry on the right bank of the Marne, a little above Saint-Dizier, in the direction of Vitry. At the sight of the enemy appearing in force, there was no time for hesitation; it was necessary to advance, in the first place to give battle, and, in the second place, to learn who the enemy might be. Notwithstanding the serious disadvantage of crossing a river in presence of troops drawn up in line of battle, the French marched straight to the Héricourt ford, and crossed the Marne *en masse*, at that point, with the exception of Oudinot's corps, that was sent a little higher up, to cross at Saint-Dizier. The enemy were embarrassed on discovering they had to do with the entire French army. Still, the enemy had ten

thousand horse, and some thousand light infantry, that charged us at the moment we were crossing the Marne. They got the reception they deserved. The cavalry of the Guard, after a sharp contest with the enemy's squadrons, routed them completely. They were obliged to fall back, and Wintzingerode, (for it was he,) seeing that he had imprudently implicated himself, determined to regain the Bar-sur-Aube route, notwithstanding the disadvantage of defiling within range of Saint-Dizier, of which Oudinot had taken possession. We charged *à outrance* the retreating enemy, and whilst they were sharply attacked in the rear, they were at the same time taken in flank by our infantry that debouched by Saint-Dizier. Two battalions of infantry having in vain attempted to form in square, the brave Letort rushed on them at the head of the dragoons of the Guard, and cut them in pieces. The impetuosity of the charge was such that the dragoons continued their course, without regarding the Russian infantry, that they had broken and ridden past. The latter, who had feigned to yield, seeing the dragoons pass, tried to form again into line, and fired on them from the rear. Our horse, retracing their steps, cut them down without mercy. This pursuit lasted till night, and our troops returned to Saint-Dizier, after having killed or made prisoners four thousand of Wintzingerode's rear-guard, that had been sent to follow and deceive us. We captured, besides, thirty pieces of cannon. This victory only cost us three or four hundred men. A brilliant trophy,—the last, alas! of this heroic and fatal campaign.

The next day,—the 27th,—Napoleon, having learned that the enemy still held Vitry, approached to take the place, but an old wall and a moat filled with water were obstacles that presented some difficulty. Macdonald, whom our late misfortunes had irritated, made the remark to Napoleon with some bitterness, and an altercation on the subject ensued between them, when one of the enemy's bulletins, seized by our soldiers, was brought. This bulletin related, after the enemy's fashion, the fatal battle of Fère-Champenoise. This missile, though the date was incorrect, proved beyond all doubt that the allies had marched on Paris. After the sad confirmation of this fact, obtained from some prisoners, Napoleon returned to Saint-Dizier, deeply touched by this intelligence, and still more deeply affected by the impression produced on those about him. Spirits already restless, thinking of what might have happened since they left for Lorraine, no longer restrained themselves when they heard that the allies had marched on Paris; they burst out with a species of fury against the mad obstinacy of Napoleon, to whom, since the return of M. de Caulaincourt, they attributed the breaking off of the negotiations. They did not hesitate to say that, having caused the destruction of part of the army in this campaign, he was now about to cause the destruction of the capital itself, and that, whilst he was fighting uselessly in the rear of the allies, they would perhaps avenge the burning of Moscow by setting Paris in flames. The commotion soon became so great as to call for interference, and the following day, the 28th, Napoleon deliberated in company with Berthier, Ney, and Caulaincourt, what

was to be done. Could they only have known that Paris was beyond help, and that the best course was to persevere in a project, hazardous certainly, but which now offered the only remaining chance of safety—that of allowing the allies to effect a revolution in the capital, and fall upon their rear with the 120,000 men that Napoleon could have assembled. But entertaining the hope that Paris was not utterly lost, it was natural to march thither as quickly as possible; and since Napoleon had not succeeded in turning the allied generals from the capital by his last movement, he might at least endeavour to surprise them at the moment when they should be engaged before the walls of the great city, and fall upon them like a thunder-crash.

Such were the sentiments of Ney and Berthier, and they warmly maintained their opinion. So strong was the general feeling, that to hasten to Paris was become a universal passion.

Napoleon, who was not led by emotion, thought differently. He had marched toward the fortresses to strengthen his army, and return at the head of 100,000 men, a force that, under his command, would make the allies tremble. Paris being taken, or in danger of being taken, was not a sufficient reason for being turned from this great object; for no sooner would the allies know of his being at the head of such a force, than they would hasten to quit Paris, or, if they remained, pay dearly for the satisfaction of having appeared there for a moment. Napoleon attached little importance to the idea of a political revolution, because that, spite of his sagacity, he had never realized to himself the discredit into which his Government had fallen. He saw things only from a military point of view; and under this aspect, he thought it more important to have 100,000 at his command than to save Paris. However, unsupported in his opinion, accused of insane obstinacy, he was obliged to soothe the universal affliction, by giving up his own opinion and resolving to assist the capital. But if he were to go there at all, it would be necessary to march there immediately, as, in order to arrive in time, there was not a moment to lose. Napoleon took his resolution instantly, and set out that very hour, crossing straight from the Marne to the Aube, from the Aube to the Seine, in order to reach Paris by the left bank of the latter river, and so avoid encountering the allied armies.

Having left Saint-Dizier on the 28th, he passed the night with the army at Doulevant, and resumed his march on the 29th, crossed the Aube at Dolancourt, and slept at Troyes, leaving in the rear his army, that could not travel distances as rapidly as he. *En route*, he received a message from M. de Lavallette, informing him of the danger of the capital, the mass of enemies that threatened Paris from without, and the activity of plots that threatened it from within. On receiving this message, Napoleon hastened his march. On the morning of the 30th he reached Villeneuve l'Archevêque, and there, ceasing to march in military fashion, wishing to encourage the Parisians by his presence, he travelled post, sometimes on horseback, sometimes in a miserable chariot, and

thus, accompanied by M. de Caulaincourt and Berthier, he advanced toward Paris. He sent forward, as we have seen, General Dejean, to announce his arrival, and earnestly urge the marshals to prolong their resistance. About midnight, having travelled at full speed the entire day, either on horseback or *en voiture*, he at length reached Fromenteau, all-impatient to know what was going on. A large number of cavalry was seen advancing, preceded by some officers. Without hesitation Napoleon called these officers. "Who goes there?" he asked. "General Belliard," replied the leader. It was, in fact, General Belliard, who, in compliance with the conditions of the capitulation of Paris, was going to Fontainebleau, to find a suitable position for the troops of the two marshals. Napoleon sprang from his carriage, seized General Belliard by the arm, led him to the roadside, and overwhelmed him so with questions that he had scarcely time to reply. "Where is the army?" said he, immediately. "Sire, the army is coming up." "Where is the enemy?" "At the gates of Paris." "And who occupies Paris?" "Nobody: it is evacuated." "What, evacuated? And my son—my wife—my Government—where are they?" "On the Loire." "On the Loire! who counselled such a proceeding?" "But, sire, it was said to be in obedience to your orders." "My orders had no such meaning: but Joseph—Clarke—Marmont—Mortier, what has become of them? what have they done?" "Sire, we have not seen either Joseph or Clarke the entire day. As to Marmont and Mortier, they have behaved like honest men. The troops have acted admirably. Even the national guards, wherever they were exposed to fire, vied with the soldiers. They bravely defended the heights of Belleville as well as the opposite declivity, looking toward Villette. They even defended Montmartre, where there were only a few pieces of cannon, and the enemy, believing the place to be better defended, sent a column along the Revolte route to turn Montmartre, thus running the risk of being driven into the Seine. Ah, sire! had we had a reserve of ten thousand men—had you been there, we would have thrown the allies into the Seine, saved Paris, and avenged the honour of our country!" "Undoubtedly, had I been there; but I cannot be everywhere! And Clarke and Joseph, where were they? And my two hundred Vincennes cannon, what has been done with them? And my brave Parisians, why were not they called into action?" "We do not know, sire. We were alone, and we did our best. The enemy lost at least twelve thousand men." "I ought to have expected it," cried Napoleon. "Joseph lost me Spain, and now he loses me France. I ought to have believed that poor Rovigo, who told me that Clarke was a coward, a traitor, and, moreover, a stupid. But let us have done with complaints: we must repair the evil. Caulaincourt, my carriage."

Having finished these words, Napoleon began to walk in the direction of Paris, ordering everybody to follow him, as if he could thus gain time. But Belliard and the others endeavoured to dissuade him. "It is too late," said Belliard, "to go to Paris: the army has been obliged to leave, the enemy will soon arrive, if they are not already there." "But," re-

plied Napoleon, "I shall lead on the army again, and drive the enemy out of Paris; my brave Parisians will hear my voice, and they will all rise and drive the barbarians beyond their walls." "Ah, sire, it is too late; the infantry is even now following me: besides, we have signed a capitulation that forbids our return." "A capitulation; and who has been so cowardly as to sign one?" "Honest men, sire, who had no alternative."

During this colloquy, Napoleon is still advancing, refusing to listen to any remonstrance, and calling for his carriage, which Caulaincourt does not bring, when an infantry officer is seen advancing. It was Curial. Napoleon calls him, and then learns that the infantry is on the spot—that is to say, three or four leagues distant from Paris, and that the time for returning to the capital is past. Conquered by facts, by the explanations he receives, Napoleon pauses at the two fountains that rise on the Juvisy route, sits beside the waters, covers his face with his hands, and remains some time plunged in profound reflection.

All present are silent; they look at each other; they wait anxiously the result of the emperor's meditations. At length he rises, and asks to be shown some place where he can find a few moments' shelter. He had travelled without cessation thirty leagues *en voiture*, and thirty on horseback; he was worn out with fatigue, but he seemed unconscious of exhaustion. He asked for a table and lights; he wanted to look at his maps, and give orders. A messenger is despatched to the neighbouring post-master, a light is brought, and the emperor's face becomes visible. His features exhibit some traces of his late emotion, but no disturbance of mind: the prevailing expression is invincible energy.

The maps are spread; he examines them; he reflects, and then says, "If I had the army here all would be set right! Alexander is going to show himself to the Parisians. He is not badly inclined; he has no desire to burn Paris; he only wishes to show himself in this great city. To-morrow he will hold a review; he will have one portion of his troops on the right of the Seine, another on the left. Some will be in Paris, some outside, and in that position, if I had my army, I would crush them all. The people would join me. They would fling every available missile on the heads of the allies. The peasants of Burgundy would finish the work. Not one of them should return to the Rhine. The greatness of France would be restored. If I had the army! But my troops will not arrive for three or four days. Ah! why did not Paris hold out some hours longer?" And as he uttered these words Napoleon walked up and down the small room, which was scarcely large enough to hold him and the few witnesses of this strange scene. In order to calm him M. de Caulaincourt said, "But, sire, the army will come, and in four days your majesty can do what you would do to-day." Napoleon who, up to this moment, seemed neither to hear or understand what was said to him, suddenly raised his head and walked straight up to M. de Caulaincourt, and he who had never appeared to admit the possibility of a revolution, exclaimed, "Ah! Caulaincourt, you do not know men. Three days; two days; you do

not know what may be done in that short time. You know not all the intrigues that will be plotted against me. You know not how many there are who will abandon me. I could name them for you if you wish. Listen; the people say that I have ordered the empress and my son to leave Paris. It is true; but I cannot explain every thing. The empress is a child. They would make use of her against me, and God knows what acts they would force her to commit. But let us forget these trifles. Three days, four days; 'tis very long. However, the army will arrive, and if I am properly seconded France may be saved." Napoleon relapsed into silence, sank into thought; he took a few rapid steps, then, in a tone of inspiration he exclaimed, "Caulaincourt, I have our enemies trapped. God will deliver them up to me. I shall annihilate them in Paris, but I must gain time. You must help me to gain it." Then, intimating that he wished to be alone, he remained with M. de Caulaincourt, to whom he explained his plan, which was as follows:—M. de Caulaincourt was to go to Paris to visit Alexander, by whom he would be well received. He should appeal to the recollections of this prince, seek to awaken his old sentiments, point out the dangers that threatened him in this great capital, especially when Napoleon, approaching with 60,000 men, would be joined by the 20,000 that were leaving Paris, all burning for revenge, and wishing at any time to redeem the honour of our arms. These ideas must have already presented themselves to the imagination of Alexander, but would doubtless produce still more effect when placed before his eyes by another. If in this disposition of mind an immediate offer of peace were made to him on conditions nearly the same as those of Châtillon, he would not compromise his triumph, he would lend a willing ear, he would send M. de Caulaincourt to the French head-quarters. M. de Caulaincourt would go and return. Three or four days would soon pass, and then, added Napoleon, I should have the army, and all would be set right. "But, sire," replied M. de Caulaincourt, "would not that be an opportunity of negotiating seriously and submitting to events, if not to men, and to accept the Châtillon bases or at least their principles?" "No," replied Napoleon. "It is sufficient to have hesitated an instant. No, no; the sword must decide every thing. Cease to humiliate me. The dignity of France can still be saved. The chances are great, if you only gain me three or four days." Firm as M. de Caulaincourt was, he could with difficulty resist the torrent of this energy, whose impetuosity so many misfortunes had not abated. He asked that Prince Berthier should accompany him, as he knew the resources that the emperor had still at his disposal, and was himself known and esteemed by the sovereigns, and would be listened to with attention. Napoleon did not allow M. de Caulaincourt to finish. In the first place, he wanted Berthier, who alone knew how the army was distributed through the confused theatre of war; but this was not his strongest reason. "Berthier is excellent," said Napoleon, "he has great qualities, he loves me, I love him, but he is weak. You have no idea of what those intriguers who are going to set to work are capable of doing.

So without him: you are the only one whose temperament would enable you to visit unhurt the focus of those intrigues."

After this animated conversation it was decided that Napoleon should fix himself at Fontainebleau, where he should concentrate the army and collect his remaining resources, and that whilst he was preparing every thing for a last and formidable struggle, M. de Caulaincourt should endeavour, if not to stop, at least to retard the political enterprises which the allies, together with the malcontents, were about to attempt in Paris; that three or four days would thus be gained, and by that time the longed-for moment would have arrived when Napoleon should appear at the gates of the capital,—perhaps, indeed, to be defeated, but even so to involve the coalition in his ruin. M. de Caulaincourt accepted the mission with his usual fidelity, not indeed with the intention of deceiving the allied sovereigns, for he would not wish to deceive any one, not even the enemies of his country, but in the hope of renewing relations between an intractable master and victorious Europe. He left for Paris, whilst Napoleon set out for Fontainebleau, after having ordered the troops which arrived to take up a position on the river Essonne, and establish themselves firmly there. It was behind this line that Napoleon wished to concentrate his forces. He was so animated that one might have believed him on the eve of one of his greatest victories, rather than on the morrow of one of his greatest disasters. His ardent imagination had already conceived a design which could, he thought, change the destinies of all. He was bringing with him 50,000 men, who would be joined by 15,000 or 18,000 that were leaving Paris. With what he could collect from the banks of the Seine and the Yonne he would not have less than 70,000 combatants, whom he wished to concentrate between Fontainebleau and Paris, along the Essonne, his right on the Seine, his left in the direction of Orleans, where were his wife and son. The enemy would be dispersed in Paris, divided on the two banks of the Seine, and with 20,000 soldiers, whose hearts were inflamed with honour and patriotism, Napoleon did not despair of striking terrible blows; blows that would resound through ages to come. Who could tell? perhaps in one bloody day he would restore the greatness of France. These ideas succeeded each other with the rapidity of lightning in his mind, and after sending M. de Caulaincourt to Paris he gave his orders to General Belliard, desiring him to go to the river Essonne, and to summon the two marshals thither and fix them on the banks of the Seine, on the Orleans route; he told him that on the next day he would furnish them with artillery to replace what they had lost in the glorious and fatal battle of Paris. Having made these arrangements, he quitted M. de Caulaincourt and Belliard, and set out for Fontainebleau with Berthier to await and collect his army there.

Whilst Napoleon proceeded thither, M. de Caulaincourt took the road to Paris, and repaired to the Hôtel de Ville, seeking the municipal authorities,—the sole power that still subsisted in our deserted capital. But they had already repaired to Bondy, to make an

appeal to the allied sovereigns in favour of the Parisians. The greater part of the night had passed. The Emperor Alexander had received the two prefects, and the deputation that accompanied them, in his most gracious manner. This monarch, at length master of Paris, was at the height of his wishes. His pride once satisfied, all his good qualities came into play. His most decided inclination was the desire to please, and there were none whose approbation he more desired than that of those French who had conquered him so often, and whom he in his turn had conquered, and whose applause he passionately ambitioned. His most cherished dream was to astonish this generous people by the extent of his generosity, a noble weakness, if it were one.

He therefore received the two prefects and the Parisian deputation with the greatest courtesy, repeated to them what he had so often said before, that he did not war against France, but against the mad ambition of a single man; that he did not mean to impose either a government or a humiliating peace on France; but to deliver her from a despotism from which she had not suffered less than all Europe. He guaranteed the best treatment to the capital, provided the Parisians remained quiet, and he showed himself as friendly toward his guests as they desired to be toward him. He consented, without any difficulty, to confide the care of Paris to the national guard, and not to billet his soldiers on the inhabitants. He only asked for provisions, which they had, and which they promised him.

As soon as the general conversation was finished, he addressed himself individually to each member of the deputation, and again affirmed, that whilst he brought the most honourable peace to France, he would also leave her full liberty in the choice of her government. He was particularly anxious to know what had become of M. de Talleyrand, what this great man was doing, and where he then was. M. de Nesselrode, who was present at this conversation, requested M. de Laborde, one of the deputation with whom he was acquainted, to repair immediately to M. de Talleyrand to detain him at Paris, if he had not left, and to assure him that the allied sovereigns held him in the highest esteem.

Whilst the prefects were with Alexander, the officers of the two armies had arranged the conditions for the evacuation of Paris. It was agreed that at about seven in the morning the soldiers of Marshals Marmont and Mortier should deliver the barriers to the soldiers of the allied armies, after which the sovereigns would make their entrance into Paris.

Meantime M. de Caulaincourt, not having found the Parisian authorities at the Hôtel de Ville, had repaired to the Château de Bondy, met the deputation returning, and after great difficulty succeeded in gaining admittance to Alexander. Alexander received him with the same cordiality as formerly, embraced him in the most affectionate manner, and explained why he had not received him at Prague; then coming to the great events of the day he said that, free from all resentment, and only desirous of peace, he came to seek it at Paris, since he had not been able to find it at

Châtillon; that he wished it to be honourable for France, but also secure for Europe, and for that reason neither he nor his allies would any longer consent to negotiate with Napoleon; that it would not be difficult to find a person with whom they could treat, as they heard on all sides that France was as weary of Napoleon as Europe itself, and that she desired nothing better than to be rid of his despotism; that besides, the allies had no idea of doing violence to this glorious France, but, on the contrary, meant to treat her with all respect, to leave her the choice of her own sovereign, and to conclude a peace with that sovereign as soon as France should have chosen him; that when they had entered Paris they would consult the most eminent persons, to whom they would apply in every difference of opinion, and that what should be decided on by the most respectable persons of the country should be adopted by the allies and consecrated by the adhesion of Europe.

Dismayed by language so firm, and at the same time so calm and mild, M. de Caulaincourt sought to combat the opinions expressed by Alexander. He tried to make him feel the danger the allies would run if they, the representatives of social order and monarchy in Europe, in favouring revolutionary principles, should dethrone a prince so long recognised and flattered by all the Powers, who had been accepted by them as an ally, and by one as a son-in-law; he dwelt on the danger of being influenced by the malcontents, who only consulted their own passions, and being thus deceived as to the true sentiments of France, who, while she condemned the continual wars of Napoleon, was still grateful for the glory and internal order she had enjoyed under his reign, and felt little inclination to exchange his powerful and glorious hand for the weak and forgotten one of the Bourbons; in a word, the danger of driving Napoleon and the army to despair, and exposing to new and fearful risks an unhoped-for triumph, a triumph that might be confirmed that very instant, and rendered definite by an equitable and moderate peace.

These reasons appeared to have little weight with Alexander. He said that, the allies having no party interests nor private views, they would not be guided by the malcontents, but by sensible men; that the allied sovereigns had not, and could not have, any desire to overturn thrones; that they were aware of the danger of reducing Napoleon to despair, but were resolved, after having come so far, and especially as they were now so united, to pursue the struggle to the utmost, that they might not be obliged to recommence it under less favourable circumstances; that, of course, they expected, that as long as Napoleon wielded a sword, he would make extraordinary exertions, but that, even should they be driven back from Paris, they would return again and again, until they should have obtained an assured peace,—a peace that could not be expected from a man who had ravaged Europe from Cadix to Moscow.

Nevertheless, although Alexander affected not to fear any final act of desperation on the part of Napoleon, it was evident that he was interiorly disturbed by the apprehension, and

that it would be an argument of great weight in the negotiations that were to follow. As to those resolutions which appeared so irrevocable on the part of the allies, M. de Caulaincourt asked the czar whether the Emperor of Austria had no regard for family ties, and if he had brought his soldiers so far that he might have the honour of dethroning his daughter; that, if that were the case, he could no longer reproach the French people with putting an archduchess to death, when he was come himself to dethrone another. "The Emperor of Austria," replied Alexander, "has felt much difficulty in coming to a determination, but since you refused the armistice of Luigny, which he had devised to bring about an accommodation, he is as firmly convinced as we, that it would be impossible to treat with his son-in-law, and that a treaty of peace, to be durable, must be signed by some other than he."

To this declaration Alexander joined fresh assurances of friendship for M. de Caulaincourt, asked him to come to see him again in the course of the day, promising to receive him at any hour, but at the same time made him promise to observe a diplomatic silence in Paris: he then left him, for the hour of triumph approached, and his vanity rendered him impatient. His desire was not to burn Paris, but to enter there in triumph.

On Thursday, March 31, 1814—day of sorrow not to be forgotten—the allied sovereigns set out between ten and eleven in the morning to make their triumphal entry into Paris. The Emperor Alexander had assumed, and was allowed by the other sovereigns to play, the chief part. The King of Prussia yielded it to him most willingly, too happy in the success of the allied arms, a success of which his distrust of fate made him doubt until the last moment. The Emperor Francis and M. de Metternich, separated from the head-quarters of the allies by the battle of Arcis-sur-Aube, had retired to Dijon, and were still ignorant of the taking of Paris. Prince Schwarzenberg possessed sufficient authority and knowledge of their intentions to represent them during these important transactions. Lord Castlereagh, minister of a Government where every thing must be explained to the nation, was gone to lay before Parliament the motives of the treaty of Chaumont. There was therefore nobody to dispute with the czar a position which he soon assumed openly as well as filled in reality.

Alexander, having round his arm a white scarf, which he had worn as a distinctive mark on the field of battle, crossed the Faubourg Saint-Martin on horseback, accompanied by the King of Prussia on his right, and Prince Schwarzenberg on his left, followed by a brilliant staff, and escorted by 50,000 chosen soldiers, marching in perfect order. A proclamation of the two prefects, announcing the benevolent intentions of the allied monarchs, had warned the Parisians of the solemn and sad event which was about to cast a gloom over their city. It would be difficult to describe the feelings of the Parisians under the influence of contradictory emotions. The people of Paris, always so sensitive of the honour of the French arms, irritated at not receiving the

muskets they had demanded, and suspecting reason where there was only weakness, bore with an ill-concealed aversion the presence of the foreign soldiers; the *bourgeoisie*, more enlightened though not less patriotic, appreciating the causes and consequences of events, were divided between horror of the invasion, and satisfaction at seeing an end to despotism and war. The ancient French nobility, forgetting the glory of their country, which was once so dear to them, in their hatred of the revolution, were so intoxicated with joy at the fall of Napoleon, that it prevented them from seeing, in its full extent, the disaster that had befallen their native land. Some of them, anxious to effect in Paris a change like that introduced in Bordeaux, traversed the Faubourg Saint-Germain, the Place de la Concorde, and the Boulevards, waving a white flag, and crying, "Vive le Roi!" a cry that found no echo, but often provoked evident disapprobation. Calmly and sadly the national guards performed their duty, ready to maintain order, which indeed nobody seemed inclined to disturb.

Such was the aspect of Paris. As the allied sovereigns pursued their route, through a dense and silent crowd, across the Faubourg Saint-Martin to the Boulevard, they encountered at first only mournful, and sometimes threatening, countenances. Beyond that, not an insult, not an acclamation, signalized their slow and solemn march. As they arrived at the Boulevard, and approached the principal quarters of the capital, the countenances began to change with the sentiments of the people; some exclamations were heard, that seemed to indicate that the generous intentions of Alexander were appreciated; he relied with evident sensibility. His repeated salutations to the people, and the order observed by his soldiers, soon produced more friendly manifestations. At last the group of royalists appeared, who since morning had been traversing Paris, with a white banner, and enthusiastic cries of "Long live Louis the Eighteenth! long live Alexander! long live William!" burst on the ears of the sovereigns, and caused them evident satisfaction. To the violent cries of this group were soon joined those of some elegantly-dressed women, who waved their white handkerchiefs, and saluted the foreign monarchs with the passionate vivacity of their sex; sad spectacle, that we must deplore, but cannot wonder at, for it is the same that in every age and every country a divided people presents. Party triumphs stifle every feeling of patriotic sorrow that the woes of country ought to awaken.

These last manifestations reassured the allied monarchs, whom the cold ill will testified by the populace in the Faubourg Saint-Martin and the Boulevard Saint-Denis had alarmed at first, not indeed for their personal safety, but for the success of their designs. They proceeded without pause to the Champs Elysées to review their soldiers. This great military spectacle filled up the hours of the day, which were passed by their ministers in attending to more serious and pressing cares. It was of urgent necessity to address this city of Paris, so much dreaded even when conquered; to tell the people that the allies were come neither to

conquer, nor to oppress, nor to humble France, that they brought peace, which an intractable chief would not accept; and as to the form of their government, they were free to choose whatever they pleased. But in order to arrange this harangue, and to know to whom it should be addressed, it was necessary to concert with some persons of repute: therefore, during the review in the Champs Elysées, M. de Nesselrode had gone to one whom public opinion seemed unanimously to point out,—in a word, to M. de Talleyrand. He found him in his celebrated hotel in the Rue Saint-Florentin, awaiting the steps which might be so easily foreseen, and asked him, in the name of the allied monarchs, what government they ought to give to France, assuring him, at the same time, that they had more confidence in his judgment than in that of any other man in the empire. M. de Talleyrand, who had long known and appreciated this skilful diplomatist now deputed to wait on him, received him most warmly, and said that it was indeed true that the imperial Government had lost all favour in the minds of the people, that the *régime* of perpetual warfare inspired as much horror in 1814 as the guillotine had in 1800; and that nothing would be easier than to bring about a revolution, provided the allies treated France with the regard due to so great a country, and proved to her, by deeds as well as by words, that they desired rather to be liberators than conquerors: on such generous terms, it was easy to come to an understanding. M. de Nesselrode repeated the assurances which he had been commissioned to lavish, and the two diplomatists were commencing to discuss the grave subjects connected with the affair, when a singular message was brought to M. de Nesselrode from the Emperor Alexander.

Through a refinement of modesty, Alexander did not wish to take up his residence in the Tuileries, but in the Elysée, and during the review a note was given him, saying that the Elysée was undermined. This note he sent to M. de Nesselrode, in order that he might inquire if there were any truth in the information. M. de Nesselrode communicated this message to M. de Talleyrand, who smiled at the childishness of the warning, but, at the same time, courteously offered to place his mansion at the Emperor Alexander's disposal, where he would have no danger to fear, and which had been long conducted in a princely style. M. de Nesselrode eagerly seized the offer, as an opportunity of testifying a high esteem for a person of whom the allies had great need, whilst it would, at the same time, augment M. de Talleyrand's influence, and facilitate, in many ways, the work in hand.

The Duke de Dalberg, the Abbé de Pradt, Baron Louis, and a number of other persons who had been for a long time either the confidants or the visitors of M. de Talleyrand, were assembled at his house to talk over the wonderful events which were about to be accomplished. There his court was prepared to receive the Emperor Alexander, when, having reviewed his troops, he should betake himself to the hotel in the Rue Saint-Florentin. The Emperor Alexander, alighting from his horse on the Place de la Concorde, repaired

on foot to the house of the great imperial dignitary, to whom he presented his hand with that courtesy which seduced those who did not know how much *finesse* was concealed beneath the charm of his manner. He then traversed the apartments which were already filled with an eager crowd, where the new royalists, whose numbers visibly increased, were presented to him, and, having lavished the most flattering attention on everybody, he retired with M. de Talleyrand to consult concerning the resolutions which were to be adopted. The King of Prussia and Prince Schwarzenberg were immediately summoned to his conference, to which M. de Talleyrand asked permission to introduce his true and only accomplice, the Duke de Dalberg, who, more enterprising than he, had ventured to send an emissary to the allied camp. No sooner were these eminent persons met than they commenced to discuss the business for which they had assembled—that of giving a Government to France.

Alexander, who had already acquired the habit, strengthened by daily practice, of opening and closing the deliberations, commenced by repeating what he had said to everybody—that his allies were not come to France to effect a revolution, but to seek peace; that they would have concluded it at Châtillon if Napoleon had agreed, but, that having met with nothing but refusals at Châtillon, and being obliged to come and seek peace within the very walls of Paris, they were willing to conclude it with those who sincerely desired it; that it was not their part to name who should represent France under these circumstances, or to decide as to its form of government; that they did not mean to prescribe any person; that they would not even have taken it upon them to exclude Napoleon himself, if he had not prevented his admission by peremptorily refusing the conditions on which the safety of Europe depended; but, Napoleon being now excluded, they were prepared to admit any person whom the French nation would seem to desire, the Regent Maria Louisa, Prince Bernadotte, the Republic itself, or the Bourbons. They were ready to admit whosoever the French people might desire; but, both for the interest of Europe and of France herself, the French ought to choose a Government strong enough to make themselves respected, particularly when succeeding the powerful hand of Napoleon, as it would be well to avoid a repetition of the work they were now about to accomplish.

Alexander did not deny that though the allied monarchs felt a natural preference for the Bourbons, they feared that those princes, being now strangers in France and unacquainted with the people, might be unequal to governing the country; neither did they hope to form a solid Government with a woman and child, such as Maria Louisa and the King of Rome, and this was the decided opinion of the Emperor of Austria; that, for his part, when considering what would be the best Government to give to France, he had sometimes thought of Prince Bernadotte, but that, not being supported in this opinion, he would not insist on it, and that, in this state of indecision, it would be easy to bend the opinion of the sovereigns

to the desires of France, who alone had a right to be consulted here; that the allies had but one interest and made but one claim, which was to secure a certain peace, and by offering one that was honourable, such as was due to a nation covered with glory—a nation against whom the allies felt no resentment for their own injuries—knowing well that she had been as much oppressed as the rest of Europe by the detested yoke that had just been broken.

It was M. de Talleyrand alone who was expected to reply to this speech, so mild, flattering, and insinuating. These questions were particularly addressed to him, as the most esteemed of those to whom they could be propounded. Generally speaking, M. de Talleyrand was not anxious to express his opinion, and willingly gave precedence to more eager speakers; but he was capable of deciding promptly when necessary. M. de Talleyrand possessed in the highest degree the faculty of discerning the exact state of affairs; he knew well what suited each person, and possessed the art of clothing his opinions in a piquant or sententious guise, which gave them all the value of a *bon mot* or of an aphorism. He saw clearly that as Napoleon owed his throne to his military victories, it was by such victories alone that he could retain it; that to him defeat was equivalent to dethronement; he saw that a republic could not be proposed to a generation that had witnessed the horrors of 1793, and that as monarchy was the only suitable government, the Bourbon was the only acceptable dynasty, for it would not be possible to create at will, and by artificial means, the conditions that qualify a family for the throne. Genius, or chance, born of revolution, might, for a moment, raise a man to the highest position, and of this there was a living proof; but, this phenomenon once passed away, the people would quickly resume opinions consecrated by time and long-formed national habits.

Safe from imperial vengeance, M. de Talleyrand slowly and clearly pronounced the truth upon this subject, and declared that Napoleon was no longer suitable to France. France, to which, indeed, he had rendered great services, though unfortunately at a very high price, saw in him, as did all Europe, the personification of war, whilst she was desirous of peace. Napoleon was consequently the very antithesis of what the present generation desired. It could not be expected that he would sign a treaty of peace. In fact, any peace, even on the most honourable terms—such as France might accept, and Europe, in her wisdom, grant—would be certain to fall short of Napoleon's pretensions; nor could he subscribe it without demeaning himself, and, consequently, with the intention of breaking it. They must now abandon all idea of Napoleon, since he was incompatible with peace, for which the whole world called, and it would be seen, in leaving free scope to public opinion, still repressed, that this was the universal belief. And if Napoleon himself was not fit, neither were his wife and son. Who could seriously believe that he would not be in the moving spring of a Government carried on in the names of Maria Louisa and the King of

nd really rule in their name? Not would still be Napoleon, with all advantages, added to those of dissimulation. It was consequently necessary to reach a combination, and since the aulce, who had given his daughter to , was willing to make a sacrifice for that sacrifice ought to be accepted in the Emperor of Austria for having comprehended the difficulties of the

As to the proposition of choosing Bernadotte, who was become heir to ne of Sweden, it required still less ation. France, after being governed er of genius, would never brook the , mediocre soldier, one, too, who was with the blood of her sons. There, y remained the Bourbons. Certainly hat had once known them well, knew hem now, and even entertained cerpossessions against them. But she knew her acquaintance, and receive lingly, if they brought back, not the s, which had been already the ruin ouse, but the healthy ideas of the age. lleyrand added that it would be ne o bind them by wise laws, and recon- with the army by placing about them , distinguished military men; that , precaution, and assiduity, all this accomplished; in fact, it should be sible, for it was necessary; that after national commotion, the most crying ant was the re-establishment of the ifice on a steady basis, which only ossible when the throne of France : restored to its old possessors. Sum- his opinion in a few words, M. de id said, "The republic is an impos- the regency and Bernadotte are an the Bourbons alone are a principle." nguage was sure to please the allied s, and would have found still warmer s among them if the Emperor Francis, representative of Old Europe, if Lord gh, the head of the tory party, had sent. However, the rare good sense William made him desire that all that een said should be true. Alexander, lesiring it so much, was still willing it, provided that the restoration of ons might be a means of pacifying rithout humbling her,—of pleasing ng conquered her. M. de Talleyrand, expressed his opinion clearly and ut without vehemence, wishing to e support of an eloquence more lively er than his, proposed to the allies and isters, assembled in his drawing-room, uce some Frenchmen who, by their intelligence, or official rank, deserved rd. He called in the Abbé de Pradt, op of Mechlin, who had lately been or at Warsaw; Baron Louis, a skilful and employed by Napoleon on several t occasions; and General Dessoles, head of Moreau's staff, and one of the emed men in the army.

t interview then lost its character of a The conversation became animated, stimes confused from its very anima- e Abbé de Pradt with his petulant , Baron Louis with his firmness, and 7.—12

General Dessoles with his solid reason, affirmed, each in his own manner, that there was an end to Napoleon's rule, that nobody any longer desired a madman who was ready to sacrifice France and Europe to his sanguinary chimeras, that his wife and son would be only he under another name, that Bernadotte would be considered an insult, and that, as a monarchy was desired, the Bourbons alone could be thought of; that it was true they were not thought of yet, but nobody had had time to think, but that if their names were once openly spoken everybody would see that they were the only suitable princes, and that by providing against their prejudices by good laws they would have all the advantages, without the inconveniences, that their name afforded.

Nobody was more influenced than Alexander by the conclusiveness of this advice. "Since this is your unanimous opinion," said he, "it is not for us to oppose it." Then, looking at his allies, who signified their approbation by an inclination of the head, especially Prince Schwarzenberg, who had visibly approved what had been said against the regency of Maria Louisa, he declared himself ready to accept the Bourbons. "For," said he, "it is not the representatives of the old European monarchies that could object to the restoration of this ancient family." This principle once admitted, it was next to be considered how the deposition of Napoleon was to be assured, and what Government should be instituted to reconcile Europe to France, and France to herself. M. de Talleyrand and those who composed his extempore council were of opinion that they ought to make use of the Senate, whom they expected to find ready to overthrow a ruler they had so long flattered, and hated while they flattered. But in order to inspire this body with sufficient courage to come to a decision, it was necessary that Napoleon should appear irrevocably condemned. Without this certainty, the same timidity which had kept the senators silent before Napoleon would still keep them silent in presence of his shadow. To remove this difficulty, the first and simplest way was to declare that the allied sovereigns— assembled at Paris and prepared to grant the most honourable peace to France—had determined not to treat with Napoleon, with whom they believed it impossible to conclude a sincere and durable peace. Although this was a very serious engagement to enter into, they could and they did not hesitate, as it was the only means to induce a burst of public opinion with regard to Napoleon. The declaration was therefore adopted. However, for those who desired the immediate restoration of the Bourbons, it was not sufficient to say that the allies would not treat with Napoleon. It would be necessary to add, nor with any member of his family, for, if any chance were left for his son, timid persons would hold back, and it was those whom it was important to influence at this moment. This necessary addition was made on the proposition of Abbé de Pradt, and the following declaration, signed by Alexander in the name of his allies, was immediately placarded on the walls of Paris:—

"The armies of the allied Powers occupy the capital of France. The allied sovereigns are willing to promote the wishes of the French nation.

"They declare—

"That if the conditions of peace necessarily involved the strongest guarantees when it was a question of restraining the ambition of Bonaparte, they need be less stringent when France herself, by again adopting the rule of a moderate government, will give the best pledge of peace.

"Wherefore the allies proclaim—

"That they will not treat with Napoleon, nor with any member of his family.

"That they respect the integrity of ancient France, such as it existed under her 'legitimate kings; that they even do more, because they still maintain the principle that, for the welfare of Europe, France ought to be great and powerful.'

"The allied sovereigns will recognise and guarantee whatever constitution the French nation will choose. They therefore invite the Senate to appoint a Provisional Government to discharge the functions of the executive, and prepare a suitable constitution for the French people.

"The intentions that I here express are shared with me by all the allied Powers.

"ALEXANDER.

"COUNT DE NESSELRODE, Secretary of State.

"Three o'clock P.M., Paris, March 31, 1814."

It was decided that M. de Talleyrand and his co-operators, authorized by this declaration, should consult with the members of the Senate, and prevail on them to appoint a Provisional Government; they would afterward consider the mode of formally and definitely pronouncing the deposition of Napoleon.

After this first act the sovereigns separated. Alexander remained at M. de Talleyrand's; the King of Prussia went to the hotel of Prince Eugene, which has since become the Prussian Embassy. Orders were given that the allied troops should not be billeted on the inhabitants, but that, furnished with provisions, they should bivouac in the principal places of the capital, especially in the Champs Elysées. General Sacken was appointed Governor of Paris. The editors of the different journals were either changed or required to speak according to the spirit of the new revolution. The telegraph, such as it then was, announced the great events which had been transacted in the capital, together with the reiterated assurances of the generous intentions of the allies. Royalists, old and new, who during the day had besieged the Hôtel Talleyrand, dispersed through the capital, in order to propagate the hope, and almost the certainty, of the restoration of the Bourbons. Those who during the morning had borne a white banner through the streets of Paris, having assembled tumultuously, proposed to address the foreign sovereigns and demand the immediate proclamation of the Bourbons. They considered the declaration that the allies would not treat with Napoleon, was indeed something gained, but yet not sufficient; they should also proclaim that they would treat with none but the Bourbons, the only legitimate sovereigns of France. After a warm and disorderly deliberation, they separated, having agreed on this one point, that a deputation should be sent to Alexander, to announce to him the formal wishes of the royalists. Ef-

fectively, this deputation sought Alexander, first at the Elysée, then at the hotel in the Rue Saint-Florentin, but was not received by that prince, but by M. de Nesselrode, who, confining himself within the bounds of a suitable reserve, said that Europe, through her representatives at Paris, meant to be guided altogether by the wishes of France; and if these wishes were, as every thing seemed to indicate, favourable to the Bourbons, the allied sovereigns would be happy to assist in their restoration and to contribute to it by their full consent.

Thus was the first act of the revolution accomplished. The sovereigns had entered Paris, had been favourably received by the disarmed populace, whom they were anxious to flatter; they had consulted some persons of importance, and by their advice had declared they would no longer treat with Napoleon, but were ready to treat advantageously with any Government agreeable to the French nation. This was sufficient to induce public opinion, weary of the rule of a soldier, who never desired repose for himself, and would never allow it to others, to declare in favour of the only dynasty which now presented itself to the public mind, except, indeed, that which had been raised up by victory, and which victory had just overthrown. A moment's hesitation was necessarily caused by an event so sudden, and after twenty years' absence of the Bourbons; but hours were now about to accomplish what in other times might not have been brought about in months and years.

The same evening and the following morning all those restless spirits who fling themselves into the torrent of revolutions—some to seek gain, others for the sake of the excitement—came and went without ceasing from M. de Talleyrand's to those persons, especially the senators, whose assistance was necessary. No great resistance was to be dreaded on any side, for every one considered Napoleon's defeat equivalent to his dethronement. It is true that the people of Paris felt some regrets for the brilliant warrior who had long dazzled their imaginations, and who but a few days before had still appeared as the defender of their walls; but for all France, with the exception of the inhabitants of a few large towns, and of the peasantry whose huts had been ravaged, peace, the natural consequence of Napoleon's fall, was a great relief. Besides, there was a general desire for change among those who more directly guided events. The old revolutionists, without reflecting that it was the Bourbons that would succeed Napoleon, rejoiced at the prospect of being revenged on the author of the 18th Brumaire. Sensible persons saw in present events only the predicted consequence of unlimited power, and of the mad rashness which they had so often deplored. Men, entirely occupied by their own interests, and anxious to court Fortune, not seeing her beside Napoleon, turned their attention elsewhere. Amid feelings so unanimous, it was not to be feared that the Senate would blush for, or persevere in, its long submission. In general, persons feel indignant against those by whom a long obedience has been imposed, and, far from being a shock to modesty, the sense of imposed subjection serves as a pretext for ingratitude.

Of this the faithful and unfortunate Duke de Vicenza was fully convinced, during this day 31st of March) and the following night, for after leaving Alexander he had called on the many persons who under different titles had served the imperial Government, and who could be of assistance in this extremity. He believed that by claiming their promised faith, or at least their gratitude—for every one of these men owed his fortune to Napoleon—he would succeed in strengthening the fidelity of those who began to waver, and that if the allied sovereigns, who were so desirous not to offend public opinion, should find it still, though ever so little, in favour of Napoleon, they would stop, and, instead of a revolution, content themselves with making peace,—a work for which M. de Caulaincourt was now prepared. He had secretly determined to violate his instructions, even should his acts be disowned at Fontainebleau, and sign the Châtillon bases at Paris. But his unceasing visits during four-and-twenty hours had brought him only surprise, indignation, and profound contempt for men whom he did not know sufficiently to expect what he now experienced. Upright, straightforward, and intellectual, M. de Caulaincourt did not possess that profound knowledge of men which forbids anger by excluding surprise. He passed two days in astonishment and anger. His first visit was to the hotel in the Rue Saint-Florentin, but here he felt no surprise, for, knowing as he did M. de Talleyrand's just causes of complaint, he considered his conduct quite natural. He only hoped to be able to induce him to choose another course. "It is too late," said the great actor in the scene of the day: "all that can be now done for Napoleon is to secure him a distant retreat. He is a madman, who has lost every thing, and deservedly lost, and who should no longer be taken into consideration. Think of yourself, and look to your own interests. Your own honourable reputation and the friendship of the Emperor Alexander will assure you a position under any Government. Consider your own interests, and forget a master who is weary of your sincerity." M. de Caulaincourt, who expected such language from M. de Talleyrand, passing over what concerned himself, and exercising the privilege of an old friend, endeavoured to awaken the favour with which M. de Talleyrand was believed to regard the regency of Maria Louisa, under which he might be the first personage in the state. "It is too late," repeated the Prince de Bénévento: "I wished to save Maria Louisa and her son by keeping them in Paris, but a letter from that man whose destiny is to destroy everybody, obliged them to leave for Blois, and caused the void that we are now seeking to fill up. Cease your regrets: all is at an end for Napoleon and his friends. Think of your children, and let us save France by the only means we can now employ." M. de Caulaincourt, seeing that M. de Talleyrand was irrevocably engaged to the cause of the Bourbons, lost all hope of influencing him. As M. de Caulaincourt left the cabinet of M. de Talleyrand, he passed a group composed of officials of the empire, among whom the Abbé de Pradt, as was his wont, was speaking without the least reserve. M. de Caulaincourt, who recalled to mind the

long flatteries of the Bishop of Mechlin, could not restrain his anger, and, walking directly toward him, left him no resource but the staircase of the Hôtel Saint Florentin. The others surrounded M. de Caulaincourt and tried to calm him, assuring him that his honourable fidelity misled him, and that he ought now to open his eyes to the truth. "But why not open them before?" cried M. de Caulaincourt, addressing himself to these men, who had been once such warm partisans of the empire. "Why not open them before? If you had supported me six months ago, we should have stopped on the brink of the abyss the man that you now call a fool, a madman, and an intractable tyrant." To this they only replied by turning away their heads, and saying that all was at an end for Napoleon. Still in despair, M. de Caulaincourt hastened to visit several of the senators, but he found few doors that were not closed at his name, once so honoured and so well received. Some were from home, others pretended to be; some, however, taken by surprise, received him. Among these a few appeared embarrassed, surprised, and sought to conceal with profound sighs their evident determination to do any thing that should be asked of them. Others, more daring, declared in a loud voice that it was time to think of France, that it had been too long forgotten, too long sacrificed to a man who had seriously compromised the country, and who would cause its destruction if it were not torn from his grasp. "Sacrificed by whom," said M. de Caulaincourt, with passion, "if not by those who now see for the first time that the hero, the god of yesterday, is only a madman and a despot, who must be hurled from the throne for the safety of France?" But these reflections of the honest Duke de Vicenza, however just, could not alter any thing, and he saw clearly that Napoleon's cause was lost, and that the utmost that could be done would be, perhaps, to save the son in abandoning the father; but there was scarcely time even for that, so fearfully rapid was the succession of events. Besides, although indignant at what he saw, he felt that what he heard was the truth, though it ill became the lips that pronounced it, and, as though he were the culprit against whom these just reproaches were directed from every side, he withdrew, silent and dejected. Despairing of the Senate, he determined to appeal to Alexander and Prince Schwarzenberg, that he might save something from this great wreck.

The success denied to M. de Caulaincourt with the senators was easily obtained by M. de Talleyrand; some affecting indignation, others sighing, but all, trying to find favour with the man who held the future in his hands, seemed prepared to yield a full consent to whatever might be proposed to them. More character was shown by those who, disciples of M. de Sieyès, had formed an inactive but severe opposition in the Senate. These were ready to undertake every thing against Napoleon, and their dignity was uncompromised, for they had never flattered him, but they were not as ready as their colleagues to accept whatever conditions might be imposed. They asked whether they were to be led, like prisoners of war, to the feet of the Bourbons; and if, in recalling

this family, there was to be no guarantee for the principles of the French revolution, and the restoration of that liberty which had been so long immolated to the author of the 18th Brumaire. They were assured that the Bishop of Autun, independent of his clear-sightedness, had a particular interest in taking precautions against the Bourbons, and that as soon as Napoleon should be set aside by the votes of the Senate, he would immediately occupy himself in framing a constitution suited to the wants and lights of the age.

This being understood, M. de Talleyrand, as Grand Dignitary and Vice-President of the Senate, took the resolution of convoking this body for the 1st of April, the day following the entrance of the allied armies, in order to supply the want of a governing authority. Although many doors were knocked at and many senators visited, the number of those who had quitted the capital with Maria Louisa, or those whose offices kept them near Napoleon, and above all the number of the intimidated, was so great, that of 440 scarcely 70 could be assembled. At three o'clock they took their seats and waited with resignation to hear what should be proposed to them. M. de Talleyrand told them, in an ill-written speech, the production of the Abbé de Pradt, that they were called on to aid a forsaken people, (an expression expressly chosen, that the resolution about to be taken might be based on the departure of the regent,) and to provide for that indispensable want of every society,—a Government; that they were consequently invited to form a Provisional Government which might assume the rejected reins of authority. All listened in profound silence to this discourse, which was pronounced with M. de Talleyrand's usual *nonchalance*, and none made an objection; but the members of the liberal opposition demanded immediately that the Provisional Government should not alone take upon it the administration of the State, but that it should also frame a constitution which would consecrate the principles of the French revolution; and one suborned to allure his colleagues, hastened to add that the Senate and the Legislative Body should occupy the place of the great political bodies in the future constitution. These propositions were reciprocally accorded, and it was decided that the Government which they were about to appoint, after having assumed the power, should immediately proceed to frame a constitution.

This being decided, they were next to compose this so-called Provisional Government. It is unnecessary to mention that those who were to be chosen, and their number, had been already decided at M. de Talleyrand's. As three would not suffice for the many wants of the time, five were chosen, and those from among the most submissive friends of M. de Talleyrand, and who, at the same time, would be useful from their connections with the different parties. Therefore four other persons were joined with M. de Talleyrand, the appointed head of the new Government. The first was the Duke de Dalberg, a man little known in France, but the oldest, the most active, and the most skilful operator in the deep intrigue which now saw the light: he was, besides, intimately connected with the foreign

princes and ministers, who were the necessary support of the new revolution. This man being chosen for the foreign diplomacy, another was to be selected for the army. The choice fell upon the old Beurnonville, an officer in the early times of the revolution, a man of moderate abilities, good-natured and yielding, who, a short while since, was mourning over the misfortunes of Napoleon with M. de Lavallette, and was now inveighing against his faults in the Hôtel Talleyrand. He was intimately connected with the greater number of the military malcontents. It was necessary to meet, as far as possible, the opinions of the different parties, without, however, going beyond the society of M. de Talleyrand, where all were essentially moderate. M. de Jancourt was selected: an honest man, an old constituent, mild, enlightened, liberal; one who had belonged to the minority of the nobility, and happily represented those who desired to unite the Bourbons and liberty. But that royalty, the ruling influence of the moment, might not be forgotten, the Abbé de Montesquiou was appointed. He had been one of the presidents of the *Assemblée Constituante*, and, under the empire, had been the secret correspondent of Louis XVIII., a churchman, and a man of the world, who no longer officiated as a priest, frequented society, and who, while he retained more than one political prejudice, affected to have no religious prepossession; well-informed, witty, independent, but haughty and irritable, chosen now as an accessory, but destined to become soon the principal person, because, besides to the advantage of representing a power that was hourly gaining importance, he joined that of having the most decided opinions of any member of the new Government.

As we have said, these men had been previously fixed on at M. de Talleyrand's. The Senate, divided into groups, told each other who had been selected, and confirmed the choice by their votes, without dreaming of rejecting a single name of those that had been presented to them. These resolutions being adopted, M. de Talleyrand, leaving the Senate to put them into official form, returned to his hotel, where he found the numerous courtiers of his new grandeur, who were convinced that he would bring back the Bourbons and govern them on their return.

The men thus chosen could constitute a nominal Government, reflecting the various opinions of the day, but not an effective Government, capable of administering public affairs. For this a ministry should be appointed. No sooner had M. de Talleyrand returned from the Luxembourg than he assembled his colleagues, and turned his attention to the choice of ministers. Two were of vital importance—the ministers of war and finance, for money must be got, and the army detached from Napoleon. Baron Louis was chosen minister of finance, a choice for which France had eternal cause of thanksgiving, a man of earnest and vigorous mind, who understood better than any one of his time the power of credit, that power which could alone close the wounds of war and replace the creative genius of Napoleon. In appointing General Dupont (the unfortunate victim of Baylen) Minister of War, they yielded too much to the feelings of the time, and made

an appointment which had all the character of a reaction. Of late attention had been directed to the brilliant victories of General Dupont; in 1805 and 1806, his misfortunes had been pitied, and whilst Napoleon was blamed in secret and flattered in public, it was said privately that General Dupont was the victim chosen to deceive public opinion as to the faults of the Spanish war. They erred in thinking that this choice, which was an accusation against Napoleon, and reparation to the army, would please the latter, whilst, on the contrary, it only irritated the military. M. de Talleyrand, one of General Dupont's judges, summoned him from his prison at Dreux. M. de Beugnot, another who held office under the empire, was appointed minister of the home department; a man of great intelligence, who had distinguished himself lately by piquant epigrams against the empire. The legal department was confided to M. Henrion de Pansey, a liberal and respectable magistrate; the naval to a disgraced councillor of state, the estimable and hard-working M. Malouet; foreign affairs to M. de Maforest, a learned diplomatist, unconnected with any party, and possessing the usual moderation of his profession. The civil department, under the form of general direction, was confided to an employé of this department, M. Inglis, a secret friend of the Bourbons; and the post-office to M. de Bourrienne, an enemy of Napoleon, and formerly his secretary, who had been removed from the cabinet for reasons unconnected with politics.

To these appointments, some of which were excellent and others indifferent or unsatisfactory, one most fortunate addition was made. The national guard, very well constituted, had behaved honourably and firmly, and deserved to be treated with consideration. It received a worthy commander, General Dessoles, formerly head of Moreau's staff, a man of decided character, of clear and cultivated intellect, who had formerly been a republican, but was now a partisan of constitutional monarchy, and united in his person a civil and military character, as became the chief of a troop called "The Citizen Militia."

These persons, like the Government which appointed them, received only provisional titles. They were called "Commissioners delegated for the administration of justice, war, of the interior," &c. They were ordered to repair immediately to their posts, and take possession of their different offices as quickly and as completely as possible. Here was now a Government to refer to, with which the sovereigns could treat, and which they were about to employ to tear from Napoleon whatever civil or military power he still possessed in France.

Instituting this provisional Government was declaring that Napoleon had ceased to exist; and this was an important step. They would not have ventured to take it without the support of 200,000 foreign bayonets in Paris. This, however, was not sufficient for the few but zealous royalists that were at work in the capital, and who, if they were deficient in numbers, had with them all the weight of present circumstances. They would have the Bourbons proclaimed at once; they beset M. de Talleyrand and M. de Montesquieu to induce them to take a decided step, and declare with-

out delay that Louis XVIII. was the only legitimate sovereign of France, and that his reign commenced at the death of the unfortunate Louis XVII. Such expeditious work did not suit either the calculations of M. de Talleyrand, who did not desire the unconditional return of the Bourbons, nor his temperament, which never allowed him to hurry, nor his prudence, which saw the necessity for many intermediate steps. To these impatient spirits he opposed his customary weapons—*nonchalance* and *disdain*; he considered himself justified in saying, what was true for some time at least—that he alone was to regulate public affairs.

Defeated on this side, the ardent royalists betook themselves to the Municipal Council of Paris and the staff of the national guard. Both counted in their numbers large landed proprietors, rich merchants, and distinguished members of the liberal professions. It was to be expected that they would find partisans of royalty among them. Such were found in the municipal council, and M. Bellart, an advocate of talent, whose intellect was more brilliant than profound, drew up an address to the Parisians, in which he enumerated in virulent language what party spirit then designated the crimes of Napoleon, but what history, with greater justice, will call his errors, errors of which some were very culpable and almost all irreparable. At the end of this long enumeration M. de Bellart proposed the deposition of Napoleon, adding resolutely that France could only be saved by throwing herself into the arms of the legitimate dynasty, and that the members of the municipal council, regardless of all danger, considered it a duty to proclaim this truth to their fellow-citizens. This address was unanimously adopted. This deliberation was held in the presence of the prefect, M. de Chabrol, who owed his sudden elevation to Napoleon, having been transferred at once from the prefecture of Montenotte to that of the Seine. He could have opposed this address, but he thought he fulfilled his duty by declaring that his convictions were conformable to the proposed address, but that his gratitude prevented him from signing it. This address, signed by all the members of the council that were present, was posted on the walls of Paris on the evening of the 1st of April, at the very time that the Senate was framing the provisional Government. The royalists hastened the same hour to the Hôtel Saint-Florentin to get permission from the provisional Government to insert the address in the *Moniteur*. M. de Talleyrand was displeased at this impatience, which, in his opinion, would spoil every thing. His colleagues, with the exception of M. de Montesquieu, were of the same opinion, and contented themselves with allowing it to be posted in the streets of the capital, but refused its insertion in the *Moniteur*.

The royalists were not so successful with the staff of the national guard. General Dessoles, the lately-appointed chief, had unhesitatingly taken the side of the Bourbons, wishing, however, that they should be restrained by a wise constitution, and joined in the efforts made to deck the national guard again with the white cockade. But they were stopped by the resistance met with, particularly from M. Allent,

head of the staff, a man known and esteemed during thirty years as the most enlightened member of the *Conseil d'Etat*.

There existed a great deal of patriotism in the guard, united with much intelligence, prudence, love of order, and, above all, great disapproval of the faults of Napoleon. The men of the guard blushed to see the enemy in the bosom of the capital: some of them had fought at the barriers, and so would all, had they been provided with arms, and, if the Regent had not abandoned them, they would have rivalled the populace in defending Paris. Without blaming those who sought to replace an impracticable and insupportable Government, they saw with repugnance that this work was half accomplished by foreigners, and it needed much precaution in leading them step by step to the deposition of Napoleon and the recall of the Bourbons. After a few trials the royalists perceived they should go to work slowly, and that there was danger of wounding honest, sincere, and still warm feelings.

This was a lesson to the impatient, and fresh strength to sensible persons like M. de Talleyrand, who did not wish to move too fast. One of the most ardent, and at this moment one of the most useful, members of the royalist party had just arrived in Paris. We mean M. de Vitrolles, sent, as has been seen, to the camp of the allied sovereigns, and admitted to an audience after the rupture of the congress at Châtillon, and then sent to Lorraine to give some good advice to the Count d'Artois and prepare him for the part for which Providence seemed to destine him. He was not perhaps the best person to counsel prudence to the prince, but he was a man of intelligence, and long acquainted with MM. de Talleyrand and de Dalberg, and was convinced that it would be impossible to succeed except united with them, and equally impossible to govern without them. This was the truth as far as concerned persons, if not with reference to things; but the one would lead to the other. When M. de Vitrolles arrived at Nancy, he had great difficulty in finding the prince, who was still obliged to conceal himself, and whom he filled with joy when he told him of the late resolutions of the allies, and the reasons there were for hoping for an approaching change in the affairs of France. The account of the battle of the 30th of March had changed this hope into certainty. The prince, whom joy had rendered more willing to hear and to grant any thing, made no objection to what was proposed. It appeared to him quite natural to treat the army well, and to surround himself with men who had become illustrious and remained powerful. "Besides," he frequently repeated, "I was very intimate with the Bishop of Autun. We passed some of the happiest years of our youth together, and I am sure he preserves the same feelings of friendship for me that I do for him." In fact, when the Count d'Artois was young and fond of pleasure he had often met M. de Talleyrand thinking and acting the same things in his sacerdotal habit as the Count d'Artois did in the dress of a man of fashion. It is true the Count d'Artois had repented, and that M. de Talleyrand had not, but still the memories of the past formed between them a bond that was rather agreeable than otherwise. M. de

Vitrolles assured the prince that M. de Talleyrand reciprocated his sentiments, but at the same time advised him not to call him "Bishop of Autun," and endeavoured to impress upon his memory that, having renounced holy orders and married, he was become Prince of Bénévento, Grand Dignitary of the Empire, and President of the Senate. Profiting of the warning, the Count of Artois corrected himself, called M. de Talleyrand Prince Bénévento, but the next moment called him bishop again, again corrected himself, and made the same mistake repeatedly, and in these insignificant things gave a proof already of that luckless memory which had forgotten nothing, but could receive no new impression, and which was destined on two future occasions to cause his fall and that of his august race.*

For the present the only point on which it was necessary to decide was, that they should employ those imperialists who consented to hand over the empire to the Bourbons: and on this point M. de Vitrolles and the Count d'Artois naturally agreed. But the prince wished to enter Paris immediately, and that his title of lieutenant-general of the kingdom should be recognised there, as emanating solely from his brother, Louis XVIII., who had not quitted Hartwell, a residence in the neighbourhood of London. In this M. de Vitrolles agreed with the prince, and he set out again for Paris, to negotiate this immediate return, and the unrestricted title of lieutenant-general. He had been exposed on the road, as we have seen, to the strangest accidents: he had been taken prisoner with M. de Wessenberg, set free with him, and arrived at Paris, where he fell suddenly into the midst of the circle at the *Hôtel Saint-Florentin*, at the moment when they were thinking very little about the Count d'Artois. M. de Talleyrand and his friends were endeavouring to free themselves successively from the bonds which still bound men and things to the empire. These bonds, although relaxed and almost broken, needed still to be definitely broken, and this required a little time. The Senate, having instituted a provisional Government, was preparing to pronounce the deposition of Napoleon, but did not mean to accept the Bourbons without the guarantee of a constitution. M. de Talleyrand, who shared this opinion, had twenty-four hours before promised all the senators that it should be as they wished; and, besides, the Emperor Alexander, who at that time sincerely admired liberal opinions, declared, with the sincerity that distinguished his first impressions, that Europe should receive liberty as well as peace, and that the good work should commence with France. There was consequently something else to be done during those three or four days than to receive the Count d'Artois with open arms. Napoleon was to be cast off by declaring his deposition, the form of the new Government was to be determined, and a constitution drawn up which was to be made a condition of the new reign.

* I do not admire caricatures in history, and I do not wish to make one here; but I repeat this anecdote because I consider it characteristic, and because it is so to be found in the interesting, witty, and undoubtedly sincere memoirs of M. de Vitrolles.

The astonishment of the Count d'Artois' messenger was extreme. M. de Vitrolles was naturally of an impetuous temper, anxious to take part in the most important affairs, even such as were beyond his position; he was, besides, vain of the dangers through which he had passed, and proud of his newly-acquired importance. Gifted with remarkable intelligence, he saw clearly that the Bourbons could not rule as formerly; but the presumption of imposing upon them conditions of any kind, written or implied, filled him with surprise and indignation, (sentiments that were shared in by all the royalists of the time,) and he would willingly have given utterance to some very unseasonable observations, if his impetuosity had not been restrained by the vastness of what was passing before his eyes. However, he saw that, before the prince could be received on any conditions, it was necessary that Napoleon should be dethroned, which was not yet done; and that it was also necessary to introduce this idea by degrees to that great body, the Senate, which, though not much esteemed by the public, still contained within it the remains of the French Revolution, and was armed with its great principles, and that all this was to be done in the presence of an army commanded by Napoleon in person. Contemplating these difficulties, M. de Vitrolles became gradually calmer, but he still continued to urge them, repeating constantly that the Count d'Artois was impatient to come, and anxious to testify his gratitude to MM. de Talleyrand and Dalberg, and that they could not decently keep him waiting long.

To this M. de Talleyrand opposed that be numbing influence with which he met all unwelcome importunities, as with mocking indifference he said slowly, first looking round with absent gaze, that it would be well to reflect that a good deal remained to be done before he could have the happiness of embracing the Count d'Artois, but the matter would be looked to as soon as possible. M. de Vitrolles heard from M. de Dalberg, words still better calculated to cool him, if his ardour had not been so great. No person was more decidedly opposed to Napoleon than M. de Dalberg, but, at the same time, none could be more determined against the unconditional return of the Bourbons. He was a sincere liberal, and was never restrained by any consideration from expressing his opinions. "We must move quickly!" he said to M. de Vitrolles. "We must move steadily. Nothing is fixed here. It is with the greatest difficulty that we can succeed in having Napoleon's deposition definitely pronounced. Napoleon still intimidates everybody. We can only make use of the Senate, which, conquered by events, will yield; but it will require, and justly require, conditions. Besides, the Emperor of Russia, who rules every thing here, is of the same opinion as the Senate. It is not from inclination that this prince accepts the Bourbons, and he considers that it is only with great precaution that France should be again delivered into their hands. You must learn to wait, and not pluck the fruit before it is ripe."

Indeed, no time had been lost. On the 31st of March, the foreign sovereigns had arrived,

and decided that they would not treat any longer with Napoleon or any member of his family; on the 1st of April, a provisional Government had been formed, and the address of the municipal body, in favour of the Bourbons, placarded through Paris. It was now only the morning of the 2d of April: so that not a moment had been lost. But the hour was come to pass the decisive and essential act, the deposition of Napoleon. Appointing a provisional Government was indeed declaring that Napoleon's government was no longer recognised, but it was necessary to declare it in a formal manner, and, as the Senate had taken the first step, it could not refuse to take the second. However, if some senators wished to make themselves conspicuous by speaking and acting in the spirit of the day, the majority was stunned, silent, inactive, and although ready to pronounce the deposition of Napoleon, asked by looks, if not by words, that the formula should be drawn up by others, and that they should only be asked to sign it. But there were some members in the Senate, who felt less embarrassment, and were more inclined to come forward: these were the members of the old opposition, who generally assembled at Passy, where, under the inspiration of M. de Sieyès, they expressed their disapprobation—alas! only too well deserved,—of all the acts of the emperor. After twelve years of oppression, their hearts were full and yearned to give vent to their sentiments. M. de Talleyrand, who had himself of late freely criticized the emperor's government, without, however, holding any connection with the opposition at Passy, considered it better to allow a free course to the sentiments of these gentlemen, and let them propose and draw up the act that declared the deposition of Napoleon. This task was committed to M. Lambrechts, an honest, simple, and hard-working man, who only thought of making himself useful, without considering whether he was serving the designs of men more crafty than he. The evening of the 2d of April was spent in preparing the act of deposition, whilst those who drew it up were promised that attention would immediately be directed to the Constitution—the formal and recognised condition of the return of the new dynasty.

The day on which this act was to be accomplished, M. de Talleyrand presented the Senate to the Emperor Alexander. This monarch, whose sole aim was to please the Parisians, had already walked on foot among them, regarding them with flattering smiles, and attracting their salutations by his personal beauty and gracious affability, scattering on every side well-timed phrases, and telling everybody he met, how much he loved and admired the French, that he did not in the least blame them for the misfortunes of Russia, neither would he avenge himself on them, but, on the contrary, do them all the good in his power; that he did not consider himself their conqueror, but their liberator, and that if he had overcome their resistance, he knew well it was because they thought and felt as he, and abhorred the yoke which had just been broken. These ideas repeated in a thousand refined, delicate, and graceful forms, had pro-

duced their effect, and the national pride feeling soothed in presence of a conqueror so anxious to please the vanquished, yielded to his caresses, and returned them, and it is a fact that Alexander was become the most popular man in Paris. He alone looked upon, thought of, or sought by those Parisians, dispensers of glory in modern times, was intoxicated with his success, and disposed to repay it by serving France in every way compatible with Russian ambition.

The Senate was presented to him on the evening of the 2d of April. He received the members with the most perfect courtesy, repeated to them, that he had not taken arms against France, but against a single man, that he had admired how the French had fought even in a cause they disliked, that he was too happy to see the end of this horrible struggle, and that as a proof of the satisfaction he felt, and the hope he experienced, that this struggle would not recommence, he had ordered that all the French prisoners throughout his dominions should be set free. The senators, charmed by every thing that seemed an excuse for their submission, thanked Alexander most warmly for this magnanimous act, and promised on their side, to do all that lay in their power to terminate the misfortunes of France and the world.

On this same day, the Senate definitely pronounced the deposition of Napoleon. This document, embodied in two essential articles, declared, that the hereditary sovereignty established in the persons of Napoleon and his descendants, was abolished, and that all Frenchmen were absolved the oath they had sworn to him. The proposition once made, its unanimous adoption was a necessary consequence. It passed without any opposition, in a sad and solemn silence, like a decree already recorded elsewhere by a Power higher than the Senate, higher than this earth. No party was satisfied, but the old oppositionists, who did not conceal their sentiments. To them therefore, was committed the task of explaining the causes that originated this decisive act. M. de Lambrechts accepted this commission, and speaking as if he were the organ of the Senate, he proposed the following reasons:—"That Napoleon had violated every law, in virtue of which he had been called upon to reign; that he had oppressed public and private liberty; arbitrarily imprisoned the citizens; imposed silence on the press; levied men and taxes, regardless of legal forms; shed the blood of the French in foolish and unnecessary wars; covered Europe with corpses; strewn the roads with wounded Frenchmen; in short, had carried his audacity so far, as to disregard the right of the national representatives of the nation to vote the taxes by increasing contributions in the past January, without the consent of the legislative body, and not even respecting *la chose jugée*, when he annulled the year before, the decision of the jury at Antwerp. That consequently, Napoleon had forfeited the throne, and his descendants in his person."

M. de Lambrechts seemed to have forgotten that if personal freedom, and the liberty of the press had been sacrificed, it was the duty of the Senate to prevent it, since that body

was charged with the examination of all extraordinary acts relating to persons or writings; that if continually renewed conscriptions favoured the carrying on of universal wars, the Senate alone was to blame, for from 1804 to 1814, the conscriptions had been voted without opposition; that if in the levying of men and taxes the usual forms had been violated, it was also the fault of the Senate, for the power of voting troops and money had been transferred from the legislative body to the Senate, with the consent of the latter, and in violation of the Imperial constitution; that, in short, if legal decisions had not been respected, the Senate was also to blame, since it had consented to annul the decision of the jury at Antwerp. Honest M. de Lambrechts, we say, seemed to have so thoroughly forgotten these facts, present to the memory of every one else, that the senators felt almost as much at their ease, as if in presence of a public as forgetful as themselves. As to the rest, M. de Lambrechts's statement received the same silent consent as the act of deposition itself, and so anxious were the royalists to proclaim the result, that in order to save time, they had already placarded copies of the act of deposition through Paris, leaving the old oppositionists the task of explaining the motives on which they acted.

From this moment the essential act was accomplished, and the Senate in passing the act of deposition, had freed the French from their oath to Napoleon and his family. However, it was not sufficient to break the legal bonds that bound France to the imperial dynasty; Napoleon should be deprived of the power of recovering the sceptre, which had been wrested from his grasp; and although protected by two hundred thousand men, the authors of the revolution that was being accomplished, were visited from time to time with a sense of terror, especially when they thought of him who was at Fontainebleau, of what he was doing, and what he could do. He had still the army that had fought under his command, reinforced by all he had collected *en route*, and by those who had fought beneath the walls of Paris; he had still the army, which was excellent, though commanded by Augereau, the incomparable armies of the Marshals Soult and Suchet, which, it is true, were at a distance, but could easily be united to his troops, by going to meet them or bringing them to him; he still had the Italian army! what might he not undertake with such means, exasperated as he was, and his military talents in full activity, as the events of the last two months had only too well proved? And at this moment, could he not, with the troops actually under his command, make a descent upon Paris, and though he should not conquer, he might, at least, signalize his end by some tragic catastrophe, some brilliant vengeance, that would worthily crown his formidable career. The very idea of such possibilities was appalling, and, indeed, very little confidence was felt by the crowds of royalists, old or new, that swarmed the Hôtel Talleyrand: they hawked the gossip of the day, they commented, they affirmed or denied the reports from Fontainebleau and its neighbourhood.

The only means to avert the danger was to

excite some such feeling in the army as had been produced in the Senate. It was not, certainly, the civil servants of the empire that alone were weary of the rule of Napoleon: the same feeling was shared in more or less by very many of the military. Those unfortunate men who, often with wounded limbs and without the slightest prospect of an end to their sufferings, had followed Napoleon from Milan to Rome, from Rome to the Pyramids, from the Pyramids to Vienna, from Vienna to Madrid, from Madrid to Berlin, from Berlin to Moscow, those few survivors of two million warriors were weary and exhausted, though certainly after another fashion than the Senate, that was tired of the fatigue of others. As long as glory and munificent gifts had been the reward of the unceasing dangers that threatened their lives, they had uncomplainingly followed their successful captain. But now that the structure of rewards, which, like the colossal edifice of the empire, had extended from Rome to Lubeck, had crumbled to the earth, and where glory was no longer the brilliant renown that follows victory, but the virtuous and bitter fame that attends heroically-supported defeats, it would not be impossible by skilful intrigues to convert murmurs into complaints, and complaints into military sedition. Besides, there were very good reasons that could be adduced to military men, whom their own sufferings had already half persuaded, to induce them to leave an exacting master. They would not be asked to abandon Napoleon for foreigners or for the Bourbons, which might inspire some with honest scruples, or others with repugnance, but to leave him that they may rally round the provisional Government which had risen from the misfortunes entailed by Napoleon on France; and after all, this Government was neither foreigners nor Bourbons, though the former were its support and the latter its aim, but an assemblage of the most influential men of the imperial régime, who, in the midst of Paris—that was deserted by the wife and brother of Napoleon, left unprotected by an erroneous manœuvre on his part, and invaded by the enemy—had concerted how to save the country, how to reconcile it with Europe, and to put an end to this disastrous and henceforth useless struggle. As long as Napoleon represented and protected France it was their duty to stand by him faithfully, whatever his faults may be, but now, when, after a fatal complication of mistakes and reverses, he was conquered and could no longer do any thing for France, except, perhaps, ruin her by continuing a calamitous war, was it not right to withdraw from a man who, although he still personified the glory of our arms, no longer represented the welfare of the nation, and to rally round a Government which, without being prejudiced in favour of any institution or any dynasty, appealed to all good citizens to aid them in serving their country in this terrible crisis, leaving them free to consider afterward (as their title "Provisional" testified) under what laws and what royal family they would place free and ransomed France?

Such rational ideas were sure to be well received by all sensible men, and still more willingly by those who, like the principal military officers, were disgusted, weary and anxious for

their own interests, and the greater part of whom were suffering under private as well as public wrongs, for Napoleon had notoriously to find fault with more than one of his lieutenants during the last campaign, and he did so with all the abruptness of an impetuous and tyrannical temper. However, it must be told to their honour that none had shrunk before the enemy, and that those most tired of Napoleon's rule and most discontented had often been the bravest. But all things have an end, even devotedness itself, especially when men no longer see any legitimate cause for it, and consider themselves sacrificed to the passions of senseless masters. Now, Napoleon could not appear in any other light to men who were persuaded that it had always been in his power to make peace, and that he had refused to do so. He now experienced what all who do not habitually speak truth must experience—that truth itself is not believed from them. Napoleon had been blamable in not concluding peace at Prague, imprudent in not accepting it at Frankfurt; but it was to his honour to refuse it at Châtillon; and at Fontainebleau it was heroism to desire to prolong the war that he might rescue Paris from the hands of the enemy. But he did not get credit for this, and the sorrow, the dignified sorrow, of M. de Caulaincourt was almost become a calumny of Napoleon. The regret that M. de Caulaincourt expressed because peace had been so often rejected, led persons to imagine that lately, especially at Châtillon, it might have been accepted with honour, and it had been insanely refused. Napoleon was henceforth considered a furious madman, from whom they should at once, and at any cost, rescue both France and themselves.

Sometimes a violent feeling, resulting from physical fatigue, showed itself in the inferior ranks of the army; but a sunny day, a good meal, an hour's repose, or the sight of Napoleon, was sufficient to dispel it. It was among the commanding officers that the most dangerous species of weariness—moral fatigue—was exhibited, and this feeling increased in proportion to the rank, that is to say, to the penetration of those who felt it: strong in the generals, it was extreme in the marshals.

Among these was one man—no other than Marshal Marmont, who, perhaps, would have been least suspected, but whom M. de Talleyrand, with his facility in detecting the weak side of humanity, had pointed out as the man who would soonest yield to the good or bad reasons which could be employed to detach his most intimate lieutenants from Napoleon. This officer, whom Napoleon had created marshal and duke, more through affection for an old fellow-student than admiration for his talents, did not think himself appreciated under the imperial régime, or put in his true position, for it is undeniable that, though Napoleon felt a personal friendship for Marmont, and admiration for his courage, he thought little of his intellectual capacity. This presumptuous and unformed mind, partly candid, partly cunning, believing himself completely master of subjects of which he had only a superficial knowledge, desiring to assume the principal part, whilst at the very utmost he was fit for the second, not possessing sufficient superiority to direct,

nor sufficient modesty to obey, was disagreeable to Napoleon, who preferred the simple and solid understanding of several of his marshals, who, if their intelligence was not very extensive, were at least punctual and energetic in obedience. He had consequently placed many men, whom Marmont believed his inferiors, in a position far superior to his. Besides this, Marmont had committed a serious fault at Craonne, and, instead of being displeased with himself, was angry with Napoleon, though he had reproached him much less than his fault deserved. The wounds inflicted on his vanity were quite evident to M. de Talleyrand in the conversation he had with Marmont on the evening of the 30th of March, and he consequently pointed out this marshal as the term to which all the seductions of the royalists ought to tend. Discontented vanity is in every crisis the object round which intrigue can twine with the greatest possibility of success. Besides, at this moment, Marmont held a position which, as much as his natural disposition, would attract those who sought to seduce him. He had just distinguished himself in the defence of Paris; and though half the honour by right belonged to Mortier, he had no hesitation in attributing it all to himself. He was stationed with his division on the Essonne, and protected Fontainebleau; and if he could be induced to join the provisional Government, it would decide the question which the genius and indomitable spirit of Napoleon still rendered doubtful. The emissary chosen on this occasion, and who was perfectly well suited to the office, was M. de Montessuy, who had formerly been aide-de-camp to Marmont, and who had abandoned a military for a financial career, in which he had achieved an honourable success. M. de Montessuy shared in the healthy sentiments of the higher classes of the citizens respecting the war and the imperial dynasty. He possessed, besides, that influence over Marmont which aides-de-camp sometimes acquire over their generals, and which arises from a knowledge of their weaknesses, and a capability of turning them to profit. M. de Montessuy was sent to Essonne, furnished with letters for Marmont and the other chief officers from the principal members of the new Government. To this was added another project, which promised to be no less efficacious. Since that Napoleon had retired to Fontainebleau, and had appeared to concentrate his forces there, a portion of the allied army had been stationed on the left bank of the Seine. The allied reserves were assembled in Paris and the environs, together with Bulow's division, which had been employed at the blockade of Châlons, and a large portion of the troops of the coalition was stationed between Juvisy, Choisy-le-Roi, Longjumeau, and Monthéry; Prince Schwarzenberg had fixed his head-quarters not far from the Essonne, that he might be ready to profit by the first symptoms of weakness in Marmont. Marmont was not the sole object of these intrigues; a military relative was sent to influence Marshal Oudinot, Beurnonville wrote to his friend Marshal Macdonald, and a number of emissaries, principally military men, were sent to Fontainebleau, and who were expected to be well received by the wavering and the unfaithful, as well as by all who were anx-

ious to hear how things were going on at Paris.

The one theme of all these verbal or written communications was, that men belonged to their country and not to an individual, to whom they might still be faithful, if, after compromising France, he was able to save her, but all that Napoleon could do would be to shed blood unnecessarily, of which too much had been already poured forth; that Europe was resolved not to treat with him, whilst she was ready to grant the most honourable conditions to any other Government than his; it was therefore necessary without delay to join the Provisional Government, with which Europe was now disposed to treat; that in joining this Government they would give it strength, authority, in a word, the capability of making itself respected both by the allies and the Bourbons, against whom, whilst they recalled them, they wished to take all necessary legal precautions. To these sensible and honourable reasons were added others, less elevated, though by no means objectionable, such as that the Bourbons would receive with open arms all officers who would join them, and especially those that would declare themselves first.

Independent of these intrigues, the principal authors of the new revolution took care that M. de Caulaincourt should leave Paris, because, being admitted to the same familiarity by Alexander as when at Petersburg he represented the conqueror of Austerlitz and Friedland, his presence was as offensive to them as the Congress of Châtillon had been. In fact, whilst there was any appearance of negotiations being carried on with the deposed emperor, nothing seemed secure, and the royalists gave the czar to understand that it was neither wise nor generous to induce them to compromise themselves further, if there were any probability of treating with Napoleon. Alexander saw this very clearly, and though from the natural goodness of his heart it would have pained him to tell the full truth to M. de Caulaincourt, he ultimately dissuaded him, in order to force him to leave Paris without being necessitated to give an order to that effect. M. de Caulaincourt repeatedly told Alexander that he was the dupe of intriguers, of partisans, who deceived him as to the true sentiments of France, and that, wishing to complete his triumph, he perhaps exposed himself to some catastrophe that would involve Paris and the allied army in one common ruin. Alexander said he believed neither intriguers nor partisans, but trusted to his own eyes; that nobody desired Napoleon, that France was no less weary of him than Europe herself, that his friends must submit to necessity, and give up all hope of seeing him reign; that the allies knew well what he was capable of, but they were prepared, and in a short time their preparations would be still more complete; that the friends of Napoleon could only render him one service, which was to induce him to resign, as that was the only measure that could ameliorate his fate. In speaking thus of an ameliorated fate for Napoleon, Alexander, always anxious to conciliate M. de Caulaincourt, hinted to him that the question under consideration was a comfortable retreat for Napoleon, and a throne for his son, under

he regency of Maria Louisa. M. de Caulaincourt, although little inclined to idealize, began to conceive hopes, and he now said within himself, that the throne hinted at would be, perhaps, that of France, accorded to the King of Rome, under the guardianship of his mother. Before returning to Fontainebleau, he made a last effort with Prince Schwarzenberg, who, as the representative of Napoleon's father-in-law, and the negotiator of Maria Louisa's marriage, ought to be kindly disposed to the Napoleon dynasty, if not to Napoleon himself. But M. de Caulaincourt found Prince Schwarzenberg still more discouraging than Alexander, and far less reserved in the expression of his sentiments. Wearied by the presence and the importunities of M. de Caulaincourt, he said it was better to tell him frankly that the allies would have nothing more to do with Napoleon or his family; that the Emperor of Austria had struggled for him to the last moment, and had proposed the armistice of Lusigny with the view of giving him an opportunity of coming to an accommodation, but that, instead of corresponding to his paternal intentions, Napoleon had sent his father-in-law a letter which was most insulting to that monarch, as it seemed to imply that he was capable of deceiving his allies, and that that letter would have been dangerous for Europe had Austria been capable of yielding to his views; that from the date of that letter the deeply-insulted Emperor Francis had adopted the resolution of no longer treating with Napoleon, in consequence of which the hazardous enterprise of marching to Paris was resolved on, and which having succeeded, notwithstanding all the attendant dangers, the allies were determined to profit of their success; they would have nothing further to do with Napoleon, on any terms, and, finding public opinion in France coincide with theirs, he did not see why they should stop short in a path that alone was safe, for no repose could be expected but in getting rid of a man who during eighteen years had convulsed the world; that as for his wife and son, it was a mere chimera to think of confiding an empire to them which neither the one nor the other was capable of governing; that in fact Austria could not assume such a responsibility; that it would be either the government of Napoleon continued under a fictitious name, or the weakest, the most impotent of governments, that would neither give rest to France nor security to Europe: it was therefore better to come to a determination, and M. de Caulaincourt, instead of vainly soliciting persons who received him with a deference induced by politeness, but with a deafness imposed by duty, would do better, with politeness, to tell the truth to Napoleon, and, by inducing him to accept his fate, terminate a painful and protracted agony, alike disagreeable to himself, to France, and to Europe.

Irritated by such unmeasured words, M. de Caulaincourt, who liked to speak the undisputed truth, asked Prince Schwarzenberg whether it was not surprising that he, the minister of Napoleon's father-in-law, should be the most decided against him of all the representatives of Europe; that he, once the humble solicitor of Maria Louisa's marriage,

should be now the haughtiest despiser of that union, and of the moral obligations that resulted from it; and that he, the zealous and well-recompensed lieutenant of the Emperor of the French during the Russian campaign, should now view his military enterprises with so much severity, and, in short, that, with such recent opportunities of refreshing his memory, he should have forgotten what were the French army and its chief. "Perhaps you suppose," said M. de Caulaincourt, proudly, "that because I, the constant apostle of peace, am here as a suppliant of that same peace, which I desired as earnestly after the battles of Wagram and of Dresden as I do at present,—perhaps you fancy that my sentiments are those of the master I serve. You mistake: his genius is as indomitable as ever. He is, moreover, exasperated. His soldiers share his sentiments; and if the Austrians were able, with an enemy in their capital, to fight the battle of Essling and Wagram, the French will not do less to wrest their country from the hands of foreigners; and, indeed, there is not much vanity in believing that the French are as good as the Austrians, and Napoleon as valiant a leader as the Archduke Charles."

The bluntness of this address checked Prince Schwarzenberg somewhat, and he replied that he had never forgotten what he personally owed to Napoleon, but that he owed still more to his own sovereign; that he had indeed desired, and even solicited, the marriage of Maria Louisa; that he was not ignorant of the obligations incurred by that contract, but he considered it a tie, not a chain; that, in consideration of this connection, Austria had done all in her power to open Napoleon's eyes and to lead him to moderate measures, but without effect; that all things must come to an end, even family considerations; that as to desperate acts, such might naturally be expected from a man of genius commanding the French army, but the allies were prepared for that, and they too would fight with desperation; that if the French fought to tear their country from the hands of foreigners, the allied sovereigns would combat to wrest their independence from a pitiless tyrant; they had been slaves, but would be so no longer; that if they were forced to quit Paris, it would only be to return; and that the allies would not display less devotedness in fighting for their independence than the French in defending the integrity of their soil.

It was very evident that if Austria, either from motives of friendship or prudence, had wished to favour Napoleon in 1813, and was satisfied in offering him peace at Prague, to restrain his absolute dominion over Europe; that if at Frankfort, she, from the same motives, had offered him France, together with the Rhine and the Alps; and if, in fine, to avoid the risks of the march upon Paris, she had offered at Châtillon to leave him France as it was in 1790, it was evident that now, when all dangers had been surmounted, and all considerations satisfied, the Emperor of Austria would prefer to get rid of an insupportable son-in-law, and, above all, share the fruits of the common victory, of which indeed his share would be large beyond his hopes, for in de-

prising France of the Low Countries and the Rhenish provinces, and renouncing all claim to them herself, Austria would receive in exchange the line of the Inn, the Tyrol, and Italy. The doubtful and, in many ways, very embarrassing pleasure of seeing an archduchess Regent of France, would not compensate for the risk of seeing this terrible son-in-law repossess himself of the sceptre, and Austria would therefore prefer indemnifying this archduchess at her own expense in Italy, than leave her at Paris, which would be virtually keeping the place for Napoleon. This very natural calculation did not prove that Francis II. was a bad father, but it proved that he preferred the interests of his people to that of his daughter, and no one can say that in doing so he neglected his first duty.

This explains the little support that Napoleon's cause met with from Prince Schwarzenberg, who followed only too plainly a policy which M. de Metternich, had he been at Paris, would have pursued with more precaution, but not with less constancy. Although M. de Caulaincourt, from what he had seen during the last three days, was convinced there was not the least chance of gaining a single friend for Napoleon, even among the most eminent servants of the empire, or among the representatives of the allies, he still wished for an interview with the Emperor Alexander, to know whether, if Napoleon were sacrificed, there would be any chance for his dynasty. Alexander received him with his usual cordiality, but repeated almost the same words he had used before, telling him that he ought to go to Fontainebleau and advise a last and great sacrifice. "Go," he said to him, "for I am constantly asked to give an order for your departure, for it is said that your presence intimidates many persons, and makes them fear that we shall take the part of Napoleon. In the end, I shall be obliged to order you to go, for neither my allies nor I wish to favour such suppositions. Believe me, I feel no resentment. Napoleon is now overtaken by misfortune, and I forget the injuries he has inflicted on Russia. Both France and Europe need repose, but with him on the throne they could never hope to obtain it. On this point we are irrevocably decided. Let him ask what he will for himself, there is no retreat that we are not willing to grant him; if he will accept the friendship I offer, and come to my dominions, he shall receive there, not alone a magnificent, but a cordial, hospitality. We shall thus both give a great example to the world; I in offering, he in accepting this asylum; but there is no other base of negotiation than his abdication. Go, and return as quickly as possible, with powers to treat on the sole conditions that we can accept."

M. de Caulaincourt tried to discover whether Napoleon could secure the throne to his son by his own abdication. Alexander refused to give a decided answer, but said that nothing was irrevocably fixed with regard to the Bourbons, though every thing looked favourable for them. He himself appeared to feel very coolly toward them, and again pressed M. de Caulaincourt to turn his attention as quickly as possible to the personal fate of Napoleon. M. de Caulaincourt, wishing to discover the

views of the allies, asked if in case Napoleon were deprived of France would they give him Tuscany as an indemnity. "Tuscany," exclaimed Alexander, "although, indeed, it is very little in comparison with France! Could you expect that the allied Powers would have Napoleon on the continent, or that Austria would suffer him in Italy? It is impossible." "Perhaps Parma, or Lucca," replied M. de Caulaincourt. "No, no: nothing on the continent," said the emperor; "an island; let me see—Corsica, perhaps." "But Corsica belongs to France," replied M. de Caulaincourt, "and Napoleon would not consent to accept that which had been wrested from himself." "Well, the island of Elba," added Alexander; "but go and induce your master to submit to a necessary resignation, and we shall consider the matter. Every thing afterward that is honourable and possible shall be done. I do not forget what is due to so great and so unfortunate a man."

At these words M. de Caulaincourt took his leave, convinced that without a military miracle there was absolutely no hope for Napoleon, and scarcely any for his son, and he felt it his duty to announce this sad truth to his master. He left on the evening of the 21st of April, when the deposition was about to be pronounced, and with the conviction that it would be in a few hours. It was midnight when he arrived at Fontainebleau.

Whilst M. de Caulaincourt was seeking to strengthen the wavering friends of the empire in Paris, and to arrest the extreme resolution of the allies, Napoleon was not losing his time at Fontainebleau. Complaints were no more suited to the loftiness of his character than self-deception to the greatness of his mind. If he sometimes abandoned himself to illusion, it was as a self-exercise or self-encouragement in the execution of some rash design, without being at the same time the dupe of the illusions. In misfortune he did not hesitate to look truth in the face, and met her aspect undismayed. Although at a distance from Paris, he almost divined what was passing there; he saw that the allies would seek to draw as much advantage as possible from their triumph, that the Senate would abandon him, and that arms alone would be his resource in this double danger. When he returned to Fontainebleau he called for his maps and the lists of his troops; he saw at a glance the brilliant but terrible chance that fortune still offered him, and determined that it should not escape.

The allies having lost twelve thousand men either by death or wounds, and having summoned Bulow's corps to Paris, now counted about one hundred and eighty thousand combatants. Napoleon had not less than seventy thousand, counting the corps of Marshals Mortier and Marmont, together with some troops from the banks of the Yonne and Seine. The disproportion was enormous, but the ardour of the army,—we mean of the inferior ranks,—the genius of Napoleon, and many local circumstances, might compensate for this numerical inferiority, and every thing indicated a mighty catastrophe either for the capital or the coalition. If we consider what would have been gained had he succeeded, France restored to greatness by a single blow,—we mean by

this not an insane but desirable greatness,—the boundary of the Rhine, and not of the Elbe—we do not hesitate to say that the possible gain justified the risk, though even all the splendour of Paris had been destroyed in one bloody day. The Rhine frontier would compensate for what might be destroyed in the capital, we should withdraw our admiration from men who accompanied Napoleon to Moscow, if they now refused to follow him to Paris.

However this may be, Napoleon conceived a plan of whose success he had not the least doubt, and which to posterity must appear at least probable. Since Napoleon had fixed his centre of operation at Fontainebleau, the allied forces had been divided into three bodies, one of eighty thousand men on the left of the Seine, between the Essonne and Paris, another within the walls of Paris itself, and the third outside on the right of the Seine. This disposition of the foreign troops Napoleon considered as fatal to themselves, provided he could profit of it. His plan was to cross the Essonne suddenly with his army, and driving back Prince Schwarzenberg's eighty thousand men on the suburbs of Paris, call upon the citizens to join him, and, profiting of the probable confusion of the allies, thus unexpectedly attacked, he could destroy them, either by entering Paris along with them, or immediately crossing, by the bridges of which he was master, to the right bank of the Seine, and cut off their line of retreat. Indeed, it is possible that, with seventy thousand men under his command, he would overthrow the eighty thousand immediately opposed to him, and that those driven back upon Paris would enter the town in confusion, where the slightest assistance from the Parisians would change his disorder into flight, and Napoleon, either following close on their heels or passing to the right bank of the Seine, where he could cut off their line of retreat, would place the allies in a position from which they would have great difficulty in freeing themselves, even were they—which they were not—headed by the greatest of captains. It is also very probable, but after such an event, and aided by the peasants of Burgundy, Champagne, and Lorraine, who would not fail to attack the conquered allies, since they did not hesitate to attack them when conquerors, that Napoleon could soon have forced back the coalition upon the Rhine. If he was mistaken, it would be better, in our opinion, to have erred with him that day, than to have erred with him at Wilna in 1812, or at Dresden in 1813. Besides, he did not consider the risk to Paris: he estimated his capital as the Russians did Moscow, and considered that too high a price could not be paid, to exterminate an enemy that had penetrated to the very heart of France.

Imperturbable in the midst of the most exciting circumstances, and always passing directly from the conception of his plans to the execution, he immediately issued his orders, placed Marshals Marmont and Mortier on the river Essonne, Marmont at Essonne itself, and Mortier at Mennecy. He had strengthened Marmont's corps with the Soult division, comprising at least six thousand men. He replaced Marmont and Mortier's ar-

tillery, part of which had been left outside the walls of Paris; he also furnished them with sixty pieces of cannon fully supplied. He commanded them to surround Corbeil with earth-works, that they might take possession of the bridge independently of that of Melun, of which he was master; he would thus be able to manœuvre according to circumstances on both sides of the river; they were to collect at Corbeil all the supplies of grain abundantly distributed along that side of the river, and to manufacture at the powder-mills at Essonne as much powder as possible. He had stationed his cavalry *en échelon* in the direction of Arpajon, in order to be in communication with Orleans, whither he had summoned his wife and son, together with his brothers and ministers. He had ordered the Young Guard to advance between Chailly and Ponthierry, to keep the position for Oudinot, Macdonald, and Gérard, who were soon to arrive with their corps. Lastly, he sent forward the troops that, under General Alix, had so well defended the Yonne, and thus made his arrangements to have the army concentrated behind the Essonne on the 4th, the earliest possible date, considering the distance from Saint-Dizier to Fontainebleau. He every day reviewed the troops that joined, and, without explaining himself fully, gave them hopes of a brilliant revenge for the defeat they had suffered before the walls of the capital. At sight of Napoleon, the Guards uttered wild cries, horse and foot, brandishing their sabres or their guns, mingling with their usual cry of "Long live the Emperor!" the more significant one of "To Paris, to Paris!" The other divisions of the army, consisting of younger men more sensible of fatigue, arrived sometimes weary and dispirited. But they could not resist the presence of Napoleon, nor the view of his countenance, at once thoughtful and inspired, and after a little repose, these caught the contagion of sentiments whose focus was in the Imperial Guards. On the other hand, the principal officers were seized with astonishment. Napoleon's presence embarrassed them, and even irritated without animating them. They dared not deny that a last and fatal battle was a duty due to their country, if it could thus be saved, but they exclaimed against the idea of that battle being fought in Paris, if it were there he intended to fight, which, indeed, they did not know, but which they reported to be the case, to render the project more odious. Their aides-de-camp and flatterers asserted the same thing. But it was very different with the officers immediately attached to the troops, who only spoke of avenging the honour of their arms, and instilled the same feeling into their men. Thus, the moment that Napoleon appeared, violent transports burst forth on every side, and all manifested a common sentiment, not indeed of devotion to his person, but of exasperation against the enemy, and those traitors who, they said, had betrayed the capital.

There are days, sad days! when it is difficult to see clearly what is our duty, when even hearts the most sincere are perplexed; this was the case now, and an honest man might in all sincerity hold one opinion at Paris and a different one at Fontainebleau. We can

easily understand how, in Paris, one could, without feeling any esteem for the Senate, adhere to its decisions, and prefer peace and liberty under the old dynasty, to a perpetual war under a violent and arbitrary Government, whilst at Fontainebleau, on the contrary, to brave soldiers not obliged to choose between two different systems of policy, but called on to expel foreigners from their native land, the mere hope of crushing the coalition, were it even amidst the ruins of Paris, might be the cause of boundless enthusiasm. Indeed, although truth is independent of local position, and that what is truth in one place, is not falsehood elsewhere, still it seems to us, that a good deal depends on the point from which we view it, and that duty assumes different aspects according to circumstances. In Paris, good citizens were called on to choose between the Charter and the Bourbons; in Fontainebleau, soldiers, in the mere hope of expelling an enemy from their land, were bound to expose their lives once more, and it would be more patriotic to die now before Essonne than formerly at Austerlitz or Jena, for they would now unquestionably die for their country, and sacrifice themselves, not to exalt success, but to aid misfortune.

We repeat that the public mind must necessarily be deeply agitated amidst such great events, and this M. de Caulaincourt found to be the case when, on the night of the 4th of April, he appeared at Napoleon's door, where the unoccupied staff that guarded it besieged him with questions, and implored him to tell the truth to the emperor. This noble-minded man needed no persuasion on that point. He related, in a simple and straightforward manner, without reserve, all that he had seen and heard during his stay at Paris; he did not conceal from Napoleon the furious passions that were excited against him, nor the extreme revolutions of the sovereigns with regard to him; but though he had never hesitated to advise, he dared not do so now, so great would be the difficulty of forming an opinion, and so useless and cruel would it be even to insinuate the slightest counsel. Napoleon received M. de Caulaincourt very mildly, and with visible signs of gratitude, and appeared neither disturbed nor astonished at what he heard. He had already learned from different persons some of the facts related by M. de Caulaincourt, and he had divined the rest. He was aware of the appointment of the Provisional Government, and the passing of the Act of Deposition, but not of the adduced motives; he was also aware of the efforts made to overturn his statue. "It is well done," said he, to M. de Caulaincourt, "and is only what I deserve. I did not desire statues, for I know that it is only those erected by posterity that are safe: to conserve those erected during life, one must be always successful. Denon wished to flatter, I had the weakness to yield, and you see what I have gained. But let us talk of something more important. Nothing in your recital surprises me; Talleyrand wishes to revenge himself on me, and the Bourbons will avenge me on him. But those men of the revolution that fill the Senate, and among whom there is more than one regicide, are very imprudent to throw themselves into the arms of

foreigners, who will hand them over to the Bourbons; but they are frightened, and seek their safety where they may. As to the allied sovereigns, they only wish to humble France: however, they do not act well toward me. I could have dethroned the Emperor Francis and King William, and could have excited the Russian peasants against Alexander, and I did not do it; I acted toward them like a king, and they behave to me like Jacobins—this is giving a bad example. Alexander is the least hostile among them; he has had his revenge, and, moreover, is good-hearted, though cunning. The Austrians are what I have ever found them, humble in adversity, and insolent and heartless in prosperity: the emperor almost forced me to take his daughter, and now he acts as though that daughter were not his. Schwarzenberg is the advocate of emigration, and Metternich of the English: my father-in-law lets them have their way, we shall see whether he will allow them to follow out their views; the empress hopes he will not. As for the English and Prussians, what they want is to annihilate France. All is not finished yet. The allies wish to put me aside, because they feel that I alone can restore our fallen fortunes. Believe me, I do not value a throne; born a soldier, I can become a citizen again. You know my tastes; what is it I need? A little bread should I live: six feet of earth if I die. It is true that I have loved, and still love, glory. . . . But my fame is beyond the reach of man. . . . If I seek to rule a few days longer, it is that I may restore the honour of our arms, and wrest France from her implacable enemies. You have done well in not signing any document, for I could not subscribe to the conditions that would have been imposed on you. The Bourbons may accept such conditions with honour, the French they are offered is only what they have made her themselves; I could not do so. We are soldiers, Caulaincourt, and what is death in such a cause as ours? Besides, do not flatter that our fate is definitely decided; if I had my army, I should have already made an attack, and all would be over in two hours, for the enemy is in a position of imminent danger. What glory, should we succeed in driving them forth! what glory for the Parisians, to expel the Cossacks from their capital, and hand them over to the peasants of Burgundy and Lorraine, who would finish them! But it is only a short delay. After to-morrow I shall have the corps of Macdonald, Oudinot, and Gérard, and if they follow me, I shall soon change the aspect of affairs. The chief men of the army are weary of this work, but the mass will march; my old *mousquetaires of the Guard* will give the example, and not a single man will refuse to follow them. In a few days, my dear Caulaincourt, all may be changed, and then what satisfaction—what glory!"

After pronouncing these words, with calmness, mingled with a warmth of feeling that sought vent in words, Napoleon dismissed M. de Caulaincourt to repose, and soon fell into a profound sleep himself.

He passed the following day—the 2d of April—in reviewing his troops and making preparations, and his countenance, sometimes

shaded by thought, sometimes lighted with animation, and the flame of genius sparkling in his eyes, he seemed filled with some mighty project that he was anxious to put into execution. In this all-important moment the soldiers could not resist the effect of his presence, and, though weary and exhausted, they cried, in almost frenzied accents, "Long live the Emperor!" In the rage excited by the tales of the Old Guards, who related, with the credulity common to camps, that Paris had been lost by treason, they felt no other desire than to tear their capital from the hands of traitors. As we mentioned before, these sentiments, common to the soldiers and officers immediately in command, were not shared by the staff. The emissaries who had come from Paris, mingling among these latter, asserted that Napoleon had been legally deposed, and that those who continued to obey him only obeyed a rebel, and became, by the fact, rebels themselves; that it was now time to abandon a man who had ruined France, and who would ruin them also if they did not abandon him, and rally round the paternal Government of the Bourbons, that awaited them with open arms; that, indeed, with this Government alone was peace to be hoped for, as Europe was resolved to destroy Napoleon and his adherents. They also said that by quitting what was henceforth a rebellious camp, they would preserve their rank, pensions, and dignity, and still enjoy, beneath the shade of a protecting throne, the glory they had acquired, and which none could deny them; whilst pursuing an opposite course they would be surrounded by 400,000 enemies, and cut off to a single man. It was not difficult to make reasons valid in the weary and anxious minds of the commanding officers, and excite them to an extraordinary outburst, not alone against the political errors of Napoleon, which were only too real and disastrous, but also against his pretended military errors. According to them, he was only an adventurer who had had a run of good luck, which he abused until he exhausted it. 1813 had been but a succession of blunders: it was the same in 1814; and quite lately he committed a fresh mistake in seeking an enemy at Dixier who ought to have been sought at Paris. And now, made more desperate by misfortunes, he wanted to fight a last battle, and sacrifice the poor remains of his army. Let there be a last battle, they said, if it will restore the honour of our arms and save France. But Napoleon, in his rage against the Parisians, has resolved to fight this battle in the very heart of Paris, with the intention apparently of killing as many Parisians as Austrians, Prussians, or Russians. Napoleon's enemies industriously spread the report that this battle was to be fought in Paris itself, in order to attach the greater odium to this last great effort, and in admitting that the risk ought to be incurred if there were any chance of thereby saving France, they demanded, with a terror sometimes feigned, sometimes sincere, whether it was not the act of a madman or a barbarian to seek to convert Paris into a battle-field, and thus give the Allied sovereigns a legitimate reason for turning the capital of France into a new Moscow.

Such discourses excited the members of the different staffs to the highest degree, and whilst a truly patriotic fury animated the Guard, and from them passed to the inferior ranks of the army, a very different feeling took possession of the different staffs and commanding officers. This double current of contradictory opinions only increased during the course of the 3d day of April, influenced also by information coming from Paris or the outposts.

On the following morning—the 4th of April—Napoleon seemed, at last, to have decided to act. He explained his plans to M. de Caulaincourt. The troops under Macdonald, Oudinot, and Gérard were expected to arrive that day, and by granting them a day's rest, he expected to be able the next day, the 5th, or at furthest on the 6th, to let them fall into line, and attack the enemy with 70,000 men. He had no doubt of his success. Early in the morning he gave orders that the Guards should leave, and station themselves behind Marmont and Mortier on the Essonne, in order to support the movement, and at the same time to leave room for the troops that were to arrive. Having reviewed the corps that were to leave, he assembled the officers and sub-officers in a circle round him, and in sonorous voice addressed them in the following energetic words:—

"Soldiers! the enemy, in stealing three marches on us, have rendered themselves masters of Paris. They must be expelled. Frenchmen unworthy of the name—emigrants, whom we had the weakness to pardon formerly—have made common cause with the foreigners, and mounted the white cockade. Cowards! they shall receive the reward of this additional crime. . . . Let us swear to conquer or die, to avenge the insult offered to our country and our arms."

"We swear it!" cried these old officers, all on fire with devotion to their standard, and then dispersed to communicate the ardour that consumed them to their men. The troops defiled, uttering wild acclamations.

When this scene was ended, Napoleon mounted the staircase of the palace, followed by a crowd of officers, some still under the influence of the enthusiasm which had just been aroused, but others with very different sentiments. They immediately formed groups around the marshals, and unanimously asserted that the resolution was evidently taken to risk their existence and the fate of France in a last scene of madness, and they must prevent such folly by protesting against it. This was the unanimous opinion; but each wished to avoid being the first to speak. The aides-de-camp surrounded the generals, the generals surrounded the marshals, and, exciting each other mutually, they demanded that their chiefs should refuse to obey. Marshal Macdonald was only just arrived, for he had not quitted his division. As he was alighting from his horse, still covered with mud, he was presented with a letter from Beurnonville, bearing the following erroneous address, "For Marshal Macdonald, Duke of Ragusa." This letter was sent to Marmont, as Duke of Ragusa, and he, having read it, perceived from the contents that it was meant for Marshal Macdonald, and forwarded it to him. This letter conjured Macdonald in the

name of friendship, in the name of his family, to whom he was tenderly attached, and who ran the risk of perishing amidst the flames of the capital, to abandon a tyrant, who was no longer any thing but a rebel, and join the legitimate Government of the Bourbons, who were about to re-enter France, bearing peace in one hand and liberty in the other. Macdonald had preserved in his heart the sentiments of the army of the Rhine; he was irritated by what he had seen and suffered during the two last campaigns, and he was passionately attached to his children. He had just heard from them; they were still in Paris: he was overpowered with sorrow. The officers surrounded him; they said he ought to join his colleagues, and contribute to put an end to this hateful and frantic reign. He consented, and only asked time to change his dress for one more suitable. They had by this time arrived at the door of Napoleon's cabinet, and they resolved not to leave the antechamber, but watch over the marshals and defend them, if, after the scene that was about to take place, Napoleon should put them under arrest. There were some officers in this kind of mutiny who were even mad enough to cry that they ought to get rid of Napoleon.* In a word, it was a repetition of one of those military revolts of which the Roman empire had given such odious examples, and it must be admitted that a reign so deplorably warlike met with a worthy end in the midst of a military sedition.

The marshals entered. They were Lefebvre, Oudinot, and Ney. Macdonald was to join them. They found Napoleon surrounded by Major and General Berthier, the Dukes of Bassano and Vicenza, and several other eminent persons. Napoleon had taken off his hat and sword, and was walking about his cabinet, speaking with more than ordinary vehemence. The marshals were dejected, embarrassed, and afraid to speak. Napoleon, divining the cause of their silence, and wishing to make them break it, asked them if they had any news from Paris, to which they replied that they had, and very disagreeable news. He asked what was their opinion. "All that has happened," said they, "has been very sad, very deplorable; but what was saddest of all was that there was no probable end to this cruel state of affairs." "The end," replied Napoleon, "depends on us. You see those brave soldiers, who have neither rank nor pensions to save, and who only think of marching forward, of dying, that they may tear France from the hands of strangers. We must follow them. The allies are divided on both banks of the Seine, of which we have the principal bridges, and dispersed in an immense city. Vigorously attacked in this position, they are lost. The Parisians are burning for revenge; they will not allow the foreigners to depart without pursuing them, and then the peasants will complete their destruction. Without doubt they may return; but Eugene has returned from Italy with 36,000 men, Augereau has 30,000, Suchet 20,000, Soult 40,000. I can summon to our aid the greater part of these forces. I have 70,000 men here,

and with this mass I shall throw into the Rhine all that shall have left Paris and wish to return there. We shall save France,—we shall avenge our honour,—and then I will accept a moderate peace. What does it need to accomplish all this? One last effort, that will allow you to enjoy in repose the benefits of twenty-five years of labour."

These reasons, though very striking, did not seem to please the listeners. They objected to Napoleon, that though it might be legitimate to risk a last battle, provided it might be of use, and not the cause of irremediable catastrophe, still it would be frightful to fight it in the centre of Paris and to turn the capital into another Moscow. To this Napoleon replied that it was a calumny to say he wished to avenge himself on the Parisians, that he did not mean to turn Paris into a battle-field, but he would attack the enemy wheresoever Providence gave him an opportunity, and that in the actual position of the allies, they would necessarily be destroyed. Then addressing himself to Lefebvre, Oudinot, and Ney, he asked them if they desired to live under the Bourbons. To this they replied by loud exclamations. Lefebvre, with the violence of an old Jacobin, declared he would not, and in this he was sincere. Ney expressed himself with incredible vehemence; he said that his children could never enjoy comfort or safety under the Bourbons, and that the only desirable sovereign for them was the King of Rome. "And do you believe," replied Napoleon, "that in abdicating I shall secure to you and your children the advantage of living under my son? Do you not see that the proposal of a regency during the minority of the King of Rome is only a cunning falsehood, invented for the purpose of separating you from me, and by that means destroying us both? The Government of my wife and son would not stand one hour, and then you would have an anarchy, that, in perhaps a fortnight, would end with the Bourbons. Besides," he said, "there are family secrets that I cannot divulge. . . . A Government directed by my wife is impossible." Napoleon alluded to the reasons that had induced him to order his wife to leave Paris, the chief of which was the weakness of Maria Louisa's character, with which he was well acquainted. When Napoleon spoke to the marshals of living under the Bourbons, they burst forth into violent exclamations of abhorrence, but when he mentioned his abdication and its possible consequences, they did not speak, but their silence showed that it was what they desired. Napoleon understood them, but did not let it appear. At this moment, Macdonald, disturbed and anxious, entered holding Beurnonville's letter in his hand. "What news do you bring?" said Napoleon. "Very bad," replied the marshal. "I am told that there are two hundred thousand of the enemy in Paris, and that we are going to fight them there. It is a frightful idea. . . . Is it not time to put an end to all this?" "The question is not," said Napoleon, "whether we shall fight in Paris, but whether we shall not profit of the mistakes of our enemies." The discussion commenced, and the emperor asked Macdonald what was the letter about that he held. Macdonald replied, "Sire, I keep no

* I have received these sad details from eye-witnesses, respectable men, whom I could name, and who may be ranked among the most honourable men of their time.

hing secret from you: you can read it." "Nor from you," said Napoleon: "let it be read loud." M. de Bassano took the letter and read it with that embarrassment and pain which a subject, who is still respectful and attached to his master, must feel under such circumstances. Napoleon listened with a disainful calmness, and when it was ended, without blaming the frankness of Macdonald, he said that Beurnonville and such men were only intriguers, who, with the assistance of foreigners, were trying to bring about a counter-revolution; that they would end by ruining France, and weakening her forever; that the Bourbons, far from pacifying France, would only throw her into confusion, whilst with a little perseverance the present state of affairs could be changed in two hours. "Yes," replied Macdonald, whose heart was grieved by the thought of a battle in Paris, "yes, that might be, but at the expense of reducing our capital to ashes, and fighting probably over the corpses of our children." The marshal also declared, without venturing to say that he would not obey, that the soldiers were not to be depended on. Ney seemed to confirm his assertion. Having thus reached the limit that separates respect from revolt, the marshals ought to cast the blame of disobedience upon the soldiers, whilst they themselves were alone at fault. Napoleon saw this, and said, proudly, "If your soldiers will not obey you, they will obey me. I need but speak a word to lead them where I will." Then, in a tone of haughtiness that forbade reply, he added, "Retire, gentlemen: I shall consider, and let you know my determination."

They left the room quite astonished at their own daring, little as it had been, and, in admiration of their courage, made themselves appear more guilty than they really were, by declaring to their aides-de-camp that they had cast aside all fear and boldly told the truth.*

They retired, awaiting the result of this very extraordinary scene, for when Napoleon was in full possession of his power they had never ventured to address an observation to him, when perhaps a single word would have arrested his descent into the abyss.

On that day Napoleon had but to step outside his cabinet, and appeal from the marshals to the colonels and soldiers, and he would have found enthusiastic servants ready to follow him where he would, and ready also to avenge him on ungrateful men overloaded with his

benefits. But to expect that he would at that moment turn from the door of his palace an entire staff, composed of generals and marshals who during twenty years had lavished their blood for him, and form another of colonels and brigadiers, and so commence a formidable military operation, would be asking too much even from the most determined and energetic character.

When Napoleon found himself alone with Berthier, Caulaincourt, and Bassano, he gave free course to his suppressed indignation.

"Did you see them?" he said; "did you see how excited they were when I mentioned the restoration of the Bourbons, and how silent when I spoke of my abdication? That is what they want, for they have been persuaded that, by setting me aside, they could enjoy the riches I have lavished on them, under the Government of my son. Short-sighted creatures! they do not perceive that there is no choice but between me and the Bourbons; they cannot see that my wife and son are only a shadow, that would fade away in a few days or months."

He then complained of their daring to read such a letter to him as Beurnonville's, and expatiated on the weakness and ingratitude of men. M. de Caulaincourt tried to calm him, saying that Marshal Macdonald was a noble-minded man, and had only shown the letter in compliance with the emperor's wish; that this repugnance to fighting in Paris, which was only a pretext with some, was with others a deep and honest feeling; he then added that the project of abdicating in favour of his son was very generally received, and that it was, in fact, the only base on which they could still negotiate.

Napoleon soon recovered that equanimity with which great minds rise superior to circumstances, and acknowledged that the popular idea of the hour was his abdicating in favour of the King of Rome, which perhaps afforded some satisfaction to anxious minds, and that he was quite ready to yield to public opinion, if it were only to prove the folly of such a plan.

"I am satisfied," he said to M. de Caulaincourt, "that you should return to Paris, and offer to negotiate on this basis,—and even that you take with you the marshals most enamoured of this project: you will rid me of them, which will be no small advantage, for I have men to fill their places,—and whilst you occupy the allies with this new proposition, I shall advance and finish all, sword in hand. You must hasten your departure, for, twenty-four hours hence, you will not be able to pass the outposts."

Napoleon seized at once the proposition of his abdication, as an opportunity of gaining two or three days more, of setting the vigilance of the enemy to sleep, of satisfying the marshals, and of ridding himself of some of them who were become particularly troublesome. He added, however, that if the regency of his wife during the minority of his son were accepted on conditions that were both honourable and likely to support the new order of things, it was very possible he would consent. Notwithstanding that he spoke thus, there was very little chance that a negotiation

* It has been spoken, written, and repeated in every variety of form, that the scene that took place in Napoleon's cabinet, on the morning of the 4th of April, had been one of violence carried so far as threats,—so far, in fact, as to force him to abdicate. I have before me at this moment the manuscript memoirs of two most respectable witnesses of this scene. I have collected information from several credible ocular witnesses, and I am convinced that the reports spread on this subject are all misrepresentations. In fact, the aim and result of this interview were to wrest a conditional abdication from Napoleon, but as to the mode of execution, it did not exceed what I relate. The exaggerated versions, whose veracity I dispute, drew their origin, their aid origin, in the boasting of some military men, who wishing to make themselves of importance, a few days later, represented themselves as more culpable than they really were, and which they regretted the following year. It was their boastings still further exaggerated by the propagators of false reports, that gave rise to such misrepresentations, and I am convinced that the truth is contained in what I relate.

should succeed which he intended to interrupt so soon with the roar of his cannon.

Having so suddenly given this new aspect to affairs, the next thing was to choose the men who should accompany M. de Caulaincourt to Paris. M. de Caulaincourt wished to have Berthier with him, that he might add weight to military considerations, and Bassano, as he could best represent the feelings of Napoleon; but the emperor would not listen to the proposal. He could not part with Berthier, who transmitted his orders to the army, and he said, that although Bassano was not in any way accountable for the late wars, still he was responsible for them in the eyes of the public and of the allied sovereigns. He would only consent to M. de Caulaincourt's being accompanied by two or three of the marshals. He mentioned Ney first of all. "He is the bravest of men," said he, "but at this moment I have men that will fight as well as he, and you will rid me of him. But you must watch him: he is a mere child: if he fall into the hands of Alexander or Talleyrand, he is lost, and you will not be able to do any thing with him. Take Marmont, also: he is devoted to me, and will assert my son's rights." Then reflecting for a moment, he said, "No, you cannot take Marmont, he is too much needed on the Essonne." Macdonald was then proposed, who would have more influence than Marmont, as he had never been considered a flatterer, and besides, being a perfectly honest man, he would defend the interests confided to him with as much zeal as if they were his own. Napoleon consented to this arrangement, and drew up himself the act of his conditional abdication, with the tact and haughtiness of language that ever distinguished the emanations of his pen. The marshals were then summoned to his presence.

"I have reflected," he said, "on our position, and on the sentiments with which it has inspired you, and I am resolved to test the sincerity of the allied sovereigns. They say that I am the only obstacle to the peace and happiness of the world. Well, then, to remove this prejudice, I am willing to sacrifice myself, and resign the throne, but on condition that it shall be transferred to my son, who shall be placed under the regency of the empress during his minority. Does this arrangement suit you?"

At these words, which freed the marshals from all embarrassment, for it would suit them much better to live under the government of a woman and child of their own party than under that of the Bourbons, who were strangers to them, they seized the hands of Napoleon, clasped them with the deepest emotion, and declared that at no period of his life had he shown himself so truly great.

When they had made an end of these demonstrations, which were by no means agreeable to Napoleon, though he did not show the annoyance he felt, he said to them, "Now that I have yielded to your wishes, it is your duty to defend the rights of my son, which, indeed, are your own; and to do so not alone with your swords, but by your moral influence." He then said that he had appointed two of them to accompany the Duke of Vicenza to Paris, and there negotiate the esta-

blishment of Maria Louisa's regency. He mentioned Ney and Marmont, saying how he had at first thought of Marmont, and why he had changed his mind. Ney was greatly flattered by being chosen, and Macdonald, also, who felt it the more as he had never been one of Napoleon's personal friends. "Marshal," said the emperor to the latter, "you know that I have entertained prejudices against you, but that is past; I have full confidence in your honour, and am convinced that you will be the firmest defender of my son's interests."

Saying these words, he extended his hand, which Macdonald pressed warmly between his, and promised to justify the confidence the emperor reposed in him on this occasion; and this promise he nobly fulfilled. Though Napoleon renounced the idea of sending Marmont to Paris, he left his plenipotentiaries free to take him with them as they passed through Essonne, if they thought he could be useful, in which case he would appoint some one to take his place. When these explanations were over, Napoleon read the following act, which he had just drawn up:—

"The allied Powers having declared that the Emperor Napoleon was the only obstacle to the re-establishment of peace in Europe, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his oath, declares he is ready to descend from the throne, to quit France, or even life, for the welfare of his country, inseparable from the rights of his son, from those of the regency of the empress, and the laws of the empire. Given at our palace of Fontainebleau, 4th of April, 1814."

This act being received with universal approbation, Napoleon took a pen to sign it, but before affixing his signature, conscious of the importance of what he was about to do, notwithstanding the secret projects that he cherished, he felt a poignant regret, not for the throne, but for the chances that might be lost, and, still thinking of the imprudent disposition of the enemy's forces, he cried, "And yet—yet we could beat them if we would." After this exclamation, which made all present droop their heads, he signed the document, handed it to M. de Caulaincourt, and dismissed his three ambassadors, still feeling more inclined to fight than to negotiate, and resolved, provided he did not lose the means that were in his hands, to interrupt by the roar of cannon this new negotiation that was about to be opened at Paris.

The marshals, accompanied by M. de Caulaincourt, immediately quitted Fontainebleau, in order to repair to the allied sovereigns, and by Napoleon's orders they were to pass through Essonne, and stop at Prince Schwarzenberg's head-quarters, to ask permission to pass the outposts. They arrived at Essonne about five in the evening, and immediately called on Marmont to acquaint him with their mission, and that he was authorized to accompany them. To their great surprise, they found him cold, embarrassed, and disinclined to join them. Alas! the unfortunate man had yielded to the snares that had been weaving around him for the last four days!

His old aide-de-camp, M. de Montessuy, who had been sent to him, had arrived the previous evening, and given him letters from the Pre-

visional Government, whose reasoning he supported with his private exhortations. It was not difficult for this envoy to speak warmly on the subject, for, in common with all the more influential commercial men of Paris, he was firmly convinced that it was time to withdraw from an arbitrary Government, which was so disastrously warlike, and which had thrown France into an abyss from which it could not rescue her. The agent of the Provisional Government, knowing all the avenues to the heart with which he had to deal, had provided himself with a variety of arguments to accomplish his purpose. Having first dilated on the patriotism of Marmont, he next attacked his vanity and ambition. He did not forget to say that, in the last campaign, Marmont had covered himself with glory, that the eyes of France, of Europe, were fixed on him; that he alone, of all the marshals, had sufficient political knowledge to understand what present circumstances demanded; that those circumstances imperatively commanded to separate from Napoleon, and join and strengthen the Provisional Government authorized to conclude peace, to recall the Bourbons, and, recalling, impose on them the restriction of a wise constitution; that by assisting in this excellent work, he would play the same part in the military that Talleyrand played in the political world; that under the Bourbons he had only to choose his place, for that no reward could be too great for the services he would have rendered, and he would thus unite the double advantage of serving his country and of being magnificently rewarded.

There was, of course, a great deal of truth in all that was said to the unfortunate Marmont, and the man who said it was perfectly sincere. It is quite true, that for simple citizens free from all personal engagements, and ignorant of the position of military affairs, not knowing whether it was still possible to defeat the allies and to wrest conquered France from their hands, the best thing was to join the Bourbons, and, united with them, obtain a more equitable peace and a less despotic Government. But such considerations should not have had any weight with an officer laden with the gifts of Napoleon, and still less with a soldier charged with such a trust as guarding the Essonne with 20,000 men, a trust not alone important to Napoleon, but to France; for so long as there existed anywhere an imposing body of soldiery, it was not alone the fall of Napoleon, but that of France, that might be ameliorated by negotiation: a trust, in short, which, like that of every soldier, should be sacred until he was relieved from it.

No doubt, a soldier does not cease to be a citizen, because he is a soldier, nor lose the right of interfering in the political interests of his country, because he sheds his blood for her. Marmont might have gone to Napoleon at Fontainebleau, forced an entrance into his palace and into his heart, appealed to him in the name of France, implored him not to injure her further, but to yield the country to the Bourbons, who were more capable than he of reconciling it with Europe and restoring its liberty; he could have said all these things, if he believed them; and if he were not listened to, he could resign his sword, and with

it, his post, to Napoleon, and then betake himself to the Provisional Government, taking with him a thing of great value, and of which he could dispose without ingratitude,—his example. Gratitude may check personal interest, but cannot shackle duty. To deliver, surreptitiously, the possession on the Essonne to the enemy without the preliminaries we have mentioned, was simply treason.

And yet Marmont had not the soul of a traitor: far from it; but he was weak, vain, and ambitious, and, unfortunately, such failings are sufficient, under circumstances of great importance, to lead to acts that posterity stamps with reprobation. Marmont heard, with pleasure, the praises bestowed upon his military and political talents, the personal importance that he might acquire, and the services he could render, and, yielding to the deceitful bait of perhaps holding a position in the state equal to M. de Talleyrand's, he consented to treat with Prince Schwarzenberg, who for that purpose had come to Petit-Bourg. The following conditions were decided on, after many discussions. Marmont, with his *corps d'armée*, was, on the following day, to leave the Essonne, and advance along the Normandy route, where he was to place himself at the disposal of the Provisional Government, and as he could not conceal from himself the consequences of such an act—for he not only deprived Napoleon of a third of his army, but of the important post of the Essonne—he stipulated that, should Napoleon, in consequence of his desertion, fall into the hands of the allied sovereigns, they would respect his life, liberty, and past grandeur, and procure him a retreat at once suitable and safe. This single proviso, dictated by an honourable repentance, condemns the conduct of Marmont, in proving the importance which he himself attached to his treason.

These conditions, reduced to writing, were sent to Prince Schwarzenberg. But it was not sufficient to be seduced himself, it was necessary that Marmont should gain over the generals under him, for, without their concurrence, it would be difficult to complete the stipulated arrangements. It was not a difficult task to win them, for they knew nothing, or almost nothing, of the general position of the army; nor did they know whether it was possible or not, by a last battle, to wrest France from the hands of the coalition; they only thought, what every one thought then, that Napoleon, having already caused the destruction of the greater part of his army, was now, in his obstinacy, about to expose the remainder to be slaughtered. Marmont, profiting of this state of opinion, told them how Napoleon, after committing fault upon fault, and permitting the allies to enter Paris, was now mad enough to think of attacking 200,000 men, with his 50,000, and thus risk the utter annihilation of the remnant of his army, and, by fighting in the capital itself, prepare them a tomb amidst the ruins of Paris and of France. There was, doubtless, a great deal of truth in what he said; and what could the generals reply to the images he conjured up? They said that it would not be right to follow Napoleon in this last extravagant adventure; that it was their duty to put an end to the misfortunes

of France themselves. They promised, therefore, to follow Marmont to Versailles as soon as he should give the order. In their opinion, this determination, which by the sequel has proved to be a defection, was but a necessary and legitimate separation from a madman.

Such was the entanglement in which the marshals found Marmont when they arrived at Essonne. At first he would not enter into any explanation, and only made weak excuses when they pressed him to accompany them to Paris. But as his mind was as incapable of concealing treason as inventing it, he finished by telling Macdonald and Caulaincourt all that had passed, at the same time palliating his conduct as much as possible, by relating all the motives that had influenced him, and which, if the truth must be told, were much the same as the marshals had used to induce Napoleon to abdicate. Macdonald blamed him very much for what he had done, and took great pains to impress on him that the best way to repair his fault would be to revoke his engagement with Prince Schwarzenberg, justifying his conduct on Napoleon's conditional abdication, a sacrifice that made it a point of honour to defend the rights of his son; and after this he should go to Paris to plead the cause of the King of Rome before the allied sovereigns. Marmont, without attempting to controvert this reasoning, appeared, however, unwilling to adopt a line of conduct that would be in direct contradiction to his former act. He was strangely perplexed. At one moment he felt inclined to go to Fontainebleau, tell Napoleon all that he had done, and implore his forgiveness; but, either from shame or fear, this better feeling passed away, and he determined to adopt Macdonald's advice, to retract his engagement with Prince Schwarzenberg, and then go with the others to Paris, to support the King of Rome's cause, taking care to suspend, until his return, all movements in his *corps d'armée*.

Accordingly he summoned his generals, told them of the new state of things, of Napoleon's conditional abdication, and the negotiations that were about to commence in consequence, and arranged with them that nothing was to be done until they should receive fresh orders from him. He then rejoined M. de Caulaincourt and the marshals, and permission to pass the outposts having arrived, he followed them to Petit-Bourg. He would not enter at the same time as they, under pretext of having a private interview with Prince Schwarzenberg before taking part in the general conferences. When M. de Caulaincourt and the marshals had been admitted into the château, they had some very lively altercations, first with Prince Schwarzenberg, who sustained with imperturbable calmness the cool policy of the Austrian Cabinet, and afterward with the Prince Royal of Wurtemberg, who spoke in the harshest manner both of Napoleon and France. This prince had served formerly under Marshal Ney, who had never shown him much favour, and who now told him, with great haughtiness, that, if any court in Europe had lost the right of blaming the ambition of France, it was most certainly that of Wurtemberg. They were engaged in these disagreeable recriminations when the permission to enter Paris, de-

manded by Napoleon's representatives, arrived.

They left immediately, and outside the château met Marmont, who was waiting for them, indebted, as he said, to Prince Schwarzenberg's honour for the revocation of his promise. But, notwithstanding this assertion on his part, there is every reason to believe that the prince only gave him a temporary release from his engagement, merely during negotiations, whose success he felt to be impossible, and on condition of fulfilling his promise should the negotiations fail. The fact that the allies immediately announced the convention signed by Marshal Marmont proves that this was the case.

M. de Caulaincourt and the marshals arrived at the Hotel Talleyrand between one and two in the morning. Great was the excitement among the crowd of interested or curious persons who day and night surrounded the doors of the Provisional Government, when it was known that these men were come to offer that Napoleon should abdicate in favour of the King of Rome and Maria Louisa, and that they were about to support this negotiation with all the authority of the army. Terrific was the idea of Napoleon acting under the names of his wife and son, and dealing forth vengeance on those who had abandoned him. The number of the royalists had increased greatly since the publication of the deposition on the evening of the 2d of April, some gradually feeling emboldened to express openly sentiments they had always cherished in their hearts; whilst others became converts to royalty, when they perceived it to be the road to success. The number of the compromised and the anxious had consequently been considerably augmented, and so great was the alarm excited, that M. de Talleyrand—the most deeply compromised of all—asked himself whether it were not better to pause in a course where he had taken so many steps that might be deemed irrevocable.

In fact, worried by M. de Vitrolles, who insisted, as we have said, on the immediate and conditional admission of the Count d'Artois into Paris, M. de Talleyrand was considering these questions, and actually about to give a letter for the prince to M. de Vitrolles, when the marshals were announced.

Alarmed at this unexpected arrival, he withheld the letter, and requested M. de Vitrolles to wait until every doubt should be removed, to which the latter consented, as he did not wish to rejoin the prince until he should be able to bring him certain and definite information.

The first interview M. de Caulaincourt and the marshals had with the members of the Provisional Government was short and cold, and might have become stormy, but that the question under discussion was to be decided elsewhere.

The night was far advanced, and the King of Prussia had retired to the mansion in which he had taken up his residence; but the Emperor Alexander, being in the Hotel Talleyrand, received the envoys of Napoleon at once. Talleyrand, fearing the mobility of this prince, and the influence that the new arrivals might have on him, endeavoured to fix more firmly in his mind the ideas that he had already instilled into it, representing to him that Napoleon, the

personification of war, could no longer be thought of; that Maria Louisa was only Napoleon under another name; that it would be ridiculous to think of Bernadotte, and that, all things considered, the Bourbons alone were admissible; and, besides, that, during the last five days, every public proceeding had been influenced by this opinion, and that common sense as well as honour required that they should not abandon men who had compromised themselves on the faith of the allied sovereigns, in whose honour and power they were justified in believing. Not satisfied with these precautions, M. de Talleyrand placed near Alexander, as a kind of guardian, M. de Dessoles, a man, as we have said before, of great firmness of mind, who favoured the Bourbons from conviction and not from interest, and who was capable of asserting his opinion against every possible contradiction. Though he did not possess the same right as Marshals Ney and Macdonald to speak in the name of the army, he had some claim to reply to those who, in representing its opinions, did not confine themselves to the exact truth.

Alexander received M. de Caulaincourt and the marshals with that courtesy that was natural to him, and which he never more willingly exercised than toward the military men of France. Having complimented them on the prowess they had shown during the last campaign, and the heroic devotion with which they had fulfilled their military duties, he added that, these duties being now accomplished, it was time to choose between the welfare of their country and that of an individual; and, retracing, as he often did, the origin of the present war, as far back as 1812, he asserted that it was Napoleon alone who had provoked it. He said that, in 1809, 1810, and 1811, Russia had patiently borne all the expenses of the alliance, and, in conformity with Napoleon's political plans against England, had almost totally deprived her subjects of the advantages of commerce, when Napoleon, as inconstant as he was despotic, invented a new commercial legislation, and proposed imposing it on his allies, and that when he (Alexander) had made him the most reasonable and friendly representations on this subject, and was about to yield to these demands, notwithstanding their injustice, Napoleon suddenly invaded his dominions, and forced him to take up arms in his defence; that, aided by the severity of the climate and the courage of his army, he had repelled the invader, and would have stopped short on the Vistula, but that oppressed Europe had implored his assistance; that after the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen, the allied sovereigns wished to come to terms with Napoleon, offering to allow him to retain his immense conquests, and only seeking to lighten the yoke that pressed upon them, but he distinctly refused; that again on the Rhine they stopped, and offered him that beautiful river as a frontier, but he did not reply; that at Châtillon they had offered him France such as it was in the days of Louis XIV. and XV., but that he had again refused, and they were obliged to come to seek in Paris that peace which they could not find elsewhere; that, having entered Paris, they had no idea of humbling France or imposing a Government on her; that they

were seeking in all sincerity to discover who France really desired, who, in assuring her happiness, would secure the peace of Europe; that they had not entered into any compact with the Bourbons, and that if they were inclined to favour them, it was more from necessity than choice; and that so great was their deference for the opinion of the French nation, they were quite ready to adopt the Government that the deputies of the army who were now present should propose, provided that Government was consistent with the tranquillity of Europe. Then, redoubling his flatteries to them, Alexander added,—

“And, gentlemen, arrange the matter between yourselves; adopt what constitution you please, choose the chief that will best suit this constitution, and should it be from among yourselves, who possess so many claims, both from your services and your glory, that this new sovereign will be chosen, we most willingly consent, and shall recognise him with pleasure, provided he neither threatens our peace or independence.”

Marshal Ney, whose natural impetuosity always impelled him to take the lead, hastened to reply to the courteous address of the czar, and, entering rather too much into his views, said that they had suffered more than any one else from the incessant wars of which Europe complained, that they had been the first victims of this despotic ruler, as was testified by the bodies of their companions-in-arms strewn all over the continent, and none could desire his removal from the throne more warmly than they. There may have been much truth, but certainly very little tact, in this reply, which was ill calculated to influence the allies, whose plans could only be modified by exaggerating the devotion of the army to Napoleon. It produced an evident impression on Alexander, which the companions of the too impetuous marshal perceived, to their great regret. Then, continuing his discourse, and replying to Alexander's flattering hint of choosing a candidate from among themselves, a hint which, had it been serious, could only have referred to Bernadotte, he insinuated that among military men only one had attained a position that could entitle him to rule, and that he, forsaken by fortune, had, by his abdication, renounced his claim; after him, no soldier could entertain such pretensions; that the only one who could or would perhaps dare to think of it would be, covered as he was with French blood, abhorrent to the nation; that therefore Napoleon's son, under the regency of his mother, was the only form of Government that could be offered to France and the army.

This proposal once made, Ney and Macdonald successively defended the cause of the King of Rome, with a vehemence and eloquence peculiarly military. They exclaimed against the recall of the Bourbons, and proceeded to demonstrate the difficulty of getting them accepted by this young France, that was not acquainted with them, and the great difficulty of making them accept this France, which they did not understand, and the probable consequence of seeing arise between the throne and the people an opposition of sentiments that would lead to painful consequences

and destroy those hopes of peace which Europe founded on the restoration of the ancient dynasty. They then sought to impress on Alexander the necessity of leaving new generations under a Government of the same nature as themselves, and composed of men who had administered public affairs during the last twenty years, men who detested as much as Europe herself the system of continual warfare, of which they had borne all the burden, and, besides, would have at their head a princess whom the allies could not distrust, since she was the daughter of one of themselves. Then, speaking for the army in particular, the marshals said that something was due to men who during twenty years had been pouring out their blood for France, and were still ready to shed the last drop again if necessary:—men who alone, at this moment, were able to check the desperation of Napoleon, and to whom it was at least due to place them under the authority of the son of their general, to whom they had devoted their lives, and who during twenty years had led them to victory, and not under the Government of princes who would detest while they flattered them.

Considerations expressed with so much warmth did not fail to produce a visible effect on Alexander. He sought, by opposing the opinions of the marshals, rather to induce them to give expression to what they thought, than to contradict them; he cited the recent acts of the Senate, pointed out all that had been done toward the restoration of the ancient dynasty, and observed, the most esteemed men of the Revolution and the empire had unhesitatingly declared in favour of the Restoration.

The mere mention of the Senate roused the anger of Ney. "That despicable Senate," he cried, "that might have spared us so many afflictions, by opposing some resistance to Napoleon's passion for conquest,—that despicable Senate, always ready to obey the wishes of the man they now call a tyrant,—by what right do they raise their voice at this moment? These men were mute when they ought to have spoken; and how dare they presume to speak now, when they ought to observe silence? Most of these gentlemen of the Senate enjoyed their emoluments whilst we were bedewing Europe with our blood. It is not they that have a right to complain of the imperial sway, but we soldiers, who have borne all its rigours; but if, in defiance of all justice, they pretend to claim authority now, bring them face to face with us, and you will see, sire, whether they will dare to speak in our presence."

Alexander was so much influenced by this discourse that he was about to consent to a conference between the marshals and some of the principal senators, when General Dessoles, seeing what ground had been already lost, interfered with vehemence, and, indeed, with a certain rudeness. He was interrupted several times, and the debate became confused and violent, when Dessoles, seeing himself alone and unsupported, appealed to the honour of Alexander, saying that too much had been already done toward the recall of the Bourbons to recede now; and that a number of honest

men, relying on the good faith of the allied sovereigns, had already compromised themselves, whom it would be dishonourable to desert.

This argument, true, though somewhat egotistical, and which had been already adduced by M. de Talleyrand, was ill suited to the noble character of General Dessoles, who was entirely guided by disinterested convictions. It was, besides, not a little offensive to Alexander, who replied with pride that no person should ever have to regret confidence placed in him or his allies, but that here they must be guided by higher considerations than the interests of individuals, when the welfare, not alone of France, but of all Europe, was at stake. Then, putting an end to an interview that had lasted nearly all night, he graciously dismissed the marshals, remarking that he alone of the allied sovereigns was present, and appointing them an interview for the next day, when he would inform them of the decision of the allies.

Although so much had been already done toward the restoration of the Bourbons, there was still some hope for Maria Louisa and the King of Rome; but the marshals, overrating the chances in their favour, left the Hôtel Talleyrand with greater confidence of ultimate success than they had reason to entertain. Alexander had heard them with so much politeness, had treated them with so much attention, nay, respect, that, still excited by the discussion they had had, they left him in the highest spirits, and, finding in the antechamber numbers of persons who had formerly crowded the antechambers of Napoleon, they could not restrain their anger, though they were in a short time to exhibit in their own persons a spectacle which now shocked them so much in others. They immediately renewed their discussion with the members of the Provisional Government, and, in truth, in far less measured terms than with Alexander. General Beaumontville was about to address Macdonald, when the marshal repelled him, saying, "Begone! your conduct has obliterated a friendship of twenty years' duration." Afterward, meeting General Dupont, Macdonald said to him, "It is very possible, general, that you have been treated with injustice and even cruelty; but you have very badly chosen both the time and manner of avenging yourself." Marshal Ney was equally unreserved in the expression of his sentiments, and some disagreeable scenes might have taken place, had not M. de Talleyrand reminded them that it would be disrespectful to the Emperor of Russia to continue such discussions in his apartments, and then invited them to come down to that part of the mansion occupied by him, where they would be in the apartments of the Provisional Government. "We don't acknowledge your Provisional Government, and have nothing to say to it," replied Macdonald, and left the house abruptly with his colleagues.

Napoleon's negotiators went immediately to Marshal Ney's house to pass the rest of the night, and await the reply of the allied sovereigns, which they were to receive in the course of the morning.

Whilst this important question, with all its chances of success or defeat, was under discussion in the Hôtel Rue Saint-Florentin, a

was very quickly decided elsewhere, not by reasons true or false, but by treachery, the worst of all arguments. Napoleon, as we have seen, attached very little importance to the negotiations undertaken by the marshals, and was solely occupied with his project of crossing the Essonne with the 70,000 men he still had, and of either overwhelming the allies or perishing with them amidst the ruins of Paris. He sent for Marmont, who commanded the division on the Essonne, in order to give him his last instructions; and, foreseeing that Marmont might have accompanied the marshals to Paris, he ordered that, in his absence, the general left in command should immediately repair to Fontainebleau.

This commission was confided to Colonel Gourgaud. This officer, brave and devoted, but who did not always transmit the emperor's orders in the spirit in which they were given, appeared surprised not to find Marmont at his post, and asked, in an almost menacing tone, for the officer left in command. From his manner one would suppose that he was the representative of an irritated master, who was aware of what had taken place between Marmont and Prince Schwarzenberg at Petit-Bourg. But it was nothing of the kind. Napoleon and Gourgaud were wholly ignorant of the matter, and the latter, speaking with the harshness habitual to the members of the imperial staff, decided, without intending it, an event of the last importance. Napoleon now experienced in a most painful manner, that there are times when fate, that once seemed to turn our very mistakes to our advantage, suddenly changing her plan, punishes us even for the faults of others.

It was old General Souham that was in command during the absence of Marmont. Colonel Gourgaud spoke to him in the same haughty tone, as well as to the Generals Compans, Bordessoulle, and Meynadier; and, to add to this unfortunate complication, a written order arrived at the same moment, directed to General Souham, commanding him to repair immediately to Fontainebleau. This was the usual practice in the imperial staff, that a verbal order from the emperor should be followed by a written one; but old Souham, struck by Colonel Gourgaud's manner, and made suspicious by a consciousness of guilt, forgot this, and immediately conceived the most alarming apprehensions. He thought that Napoleon had discovered every thing,—not alone the secret convention between Marmont and Prince Schwarzenberg, but also its approval by the generals of division of the sixth corps, and he believed they were summoned to Fontainebleau to be arrested, or perhaps shot. General Souham was a general of the Revolution, an excellent soldier, an old friend of Moreau's, entertaining for Napoleon the same concealed hatred as the other generals of the Rhine army, and complaining, like Vandamme, and with as good reason, of not having been created marshal. He was still a republican in his heart, and sufficiently accustomed to revolutionary proceedings to believe Napoleon capable of the most violent measures. He immediately assembled his colleagues, Generals Compans, Bordessoulle, and Meynadier, and said it was quite evident that Napoleon knew what had

occurred, and that they were now summoned to his presence to be shot, a finale for which, he assured them, he had not the least desire. The other generals declared that they were no more ambitious of such an end than he; and after some objections that were silenced by repeating that Napoleon knew all, they consented to Souham's proposal, which was, not to await the return of Marshal Marmont, but conclude themselves the treaty entered into with Prince Schwarzenberg, and, crossing the Essonne, place themselves under the orders of the Provisional Government. So impressed was Souham with the idea of the emperor's desire to secure his person, that he stationed a cavalry picket on the road to Fontainebleau, with orders to arrest the first officer of Napoleon's staff that should appear, in case Napoleon, in his anxiety to be obeyed, should despatch another messenger.

Colonel Fabvier, of Marmont's staff, was sincerely afflicted by these headlong resolutions, and endeavoured to calm Souham, by showing him that he exaggerated the danger of his situation, and that, besides, the precautions he had just taken, of guarding the Fontainebleau route, ought to tranquillize him; and, in addition to this, he need only cross to the other side of the Essonne to be ready to escape at the first signal of danger, but that by commanding the troops to pass the river he would merit, and perhaps incur, the punishment that he dreaded now without cause. But nothing could calm his excitement; and, persisting in his error, he replied to the excellent reasons of Colonel Fabvier with the vulgar adage to the soldiery, "*It is better to kill the devil than be killed by him.*" He consequently persisted in his error.

Under the influence of this fatal delusion, the generals of division of the sixth corps informed Prince Schwarzenberg, or those who represented him, of the movement they were about to make, and fearing strong opposition from the troops, they ordered that all the regimental officers, from the colonels to the sub-lieutenants, should march with their men to their posts, lest the officers, assembling together, should communicate their suspicions to each other, and, divining the plans of their superiors, should rise against them.

These precautions being taken, the sixth corps, conducted by its generals, crossed the Essonne at four o'clock on the morning of the 5th of April, whilst the marshals were in conference in the Rue Saint-Florentin. The troops advanced in silence toward the outposts of the enemy. The soldiers obeyed, ignorant of the crime they were unconsciously committing; some supposing the movement was a consequence of the abdication, of which they had heard the evening before, whilst others thought it was a concerted movement to surprise the enemy. However, when they perceived that the allied troops remained peaceably on the roadside, and allowed them to pass without firing, they began to conceive some suspicions, which were soon changed into murmurs. Some officers, accomplices in the treason, tried to pacify them by various pretexts and induce them to continue their march. But the murmurs increased at every step, and every thing seemed to announce an outbreak when they

should arrive at Versailles. Thus the sixth corps passed over to the enemy with the exception of the division commanded by General Lucotte, who suspected that something was wrong, and refused to obey the order to march. The line of the Essonne was thus left unprotected, and the sixth corps, so necessary for the execution of his projects, was totally lost to Napoleon.

The brave Colonel Fabvier, not being able to prevent this terrible resolve, had no other resource than to endeavour to anticipate its effects by hastening to visit Marshal Marmont at Paris. But, unfurnished with credentials, he found great difficulty in passing the enemy's outposts, and only succeeded by dint of solicitations and false pretences. He arrived at length at the Talleyrand Hotel, but, not meeting there the chief he sought, he hastened to Marshal Ney's, where he found the three marshals together, and informed Marmont of what we have just related.

On receiving this terrible information, Marmont experienced violent emotion. "I am lost!" he exclaimed, "dishonoured forever!" Unfortunate man, he was not sufficiently convinced of the truth of what he said, or he would have made a last effort to escape all share in the responsibility of this defection. But he contented himself with lamenting, complaining, and asking consolation from his colleagues, (very little disposed to offer him any.) instead of going in person to Versailles and bringing back the troops to their posts at any risk. Whilst he was consuming the time in useless bewailings, a messenger from the Emperor of Russia announced to Napoleon's representatives that they were waited for at *Rue Saint-Florentin*. They set off, followed by Marmont, who still continued his useless lamentations, without proceeding to act: the marshals had lost all hope since learning the late intelligence that had confounded them.

Whilst this scene was taking place on the Versailles route, the authors of the restoration of the Bourbons had been very busy. The Emperor Alexander had appeared so moved by the language of the marshals, and the allies themselves, though naturally inclined to favour the Bourbons, had appeared so sensible to the advantages of immediately finishing the war by coming to terms with Napoleon, that the royalists assembled at M. de Talleyrand's became terribly alarmed. They repeated to the Emperor Alexander all they had so often told him during the past five days: they despatched General Beurnonville to the King of Prussia, to repeat the same things to him; there was no occasion to try fresh persuasions with Prince Schwarzenberg, but they begged him not to waver. In a word, they neglected no means to prevent a change of fortune in Napoleon's favour, a change that depended solely on the versatile will of Alexander. As to the rest, these efforts were nearly superfluous, for there was no occasion for using any argument with the allied Powers to show them that the Bourbons were much better than Napoleon acting under the shelter of his wife's regency; but the allies dreaded to drive Napoleon to despair, and this was the only motive that could make them hesitate. However, after having assembled at the *Hôtel Saint-Florentin*, and

after having deliberated, the representatives of the coalition determined to persevere; in the first place, because they had already gone very far in pronouncing the deposition of Napoleon and his heirs, and secondly, because the Bourbons were much more satisfactory for them than a regency, which would leave Napoleon the temptation and the means of resuming the sceptre, and with the sceptre the sword, and lastly, because the work of throwing off the common oppressor was so far advanced that it was better to finish, even at the risk of another effusion of blood, than to abandon the nearly-completed task. The representatives of the allied Powers, therefore, commissioned Alexander to declare that they still persisted in what they had originally resolved, and this they did without infusing into his mind an energy which they did not themselves possess, or without inspiring him with a zeal for the Bourbons, in which they were deficient.

Alexander, surrounded by the King of Prussia and the allied ministers, received the marshals, presented by M. de Caulaincourt, with the same affability as on the previous evening. He expressed once more the sentiments, repeated to satiety during the last few days, that the allied sovereigns had come to Paris to seek peace, and not by any means to humble France or impose a Government on her; then he repeated in a formal and determined manner, the reasons already quoted against maintaining Napoleon on the throne of France, but he mentioned in a manner much less positive the reasons that might be alleged against the regency of Maria Louisa. He spoke on the latter part of the subject in a manner somewhat vague, and which left an opening to the renewal of the discussion. The question was, in fact, again opened; the marshals repeated with extreme vehemence what they had already said against the recall of the Bourbons, and almost assumed a threatening attitude in speaking of the forces that Napoleon still commanded, and of the devotedness he would find them testify in defending the rights of the King of Rome. Alexander, visibly perplexed, looked now at the speakers, then at his allies, as if he were thinking of a solution different to that he had been commissioned to announce,* when an aide-de-camp suddenly entered, and addressing the emperor in a low voice, says something in Russian. M. de Caulaincourt, who has a slight knowledge of this language, thinks, from what he overhears, that the emperor is informed of the defection of the 6th corps, of which Alexander was evidently ignorant, as his surprise testified. "The entire corps!" said the emperor, inclining his ear; for he was a little deaf. "Yes, the entire corps," replied the aide-de-camp.

Alexander returned to the negotiators, but with an absent air, and scarcely appearing to hear what was said. He afterward withdrew for a moment to converse with his allies. Whilst the three negotiators were alone, (Marmont had not dared to accompany them this time,) M. de Caulaincourt told the two marshals that all was lost, for he had not the

* I speak on the written authority of men the most worthy of belief, and the least hostile to Marshal Marmont and the Bourbons.

slightest doubt that the intelligence just brought to the Emperor Alexander was the defection of the 6th corps, and this information would entirely change the dispositions of the czar. Alexander soon returned; but now, firm in his attitude, decided in his language, he declared that both Napoleon and Maria Louisa should be given up, and that the Bourbons alone suited France as well as Europe; and as to the rest, the army, in whose name they spoke, was at least divided, for he had just learned that an entire corps had passed over to the Provisional Government, that the entire army would undoubtedly follow this good example, and would, by so doing, render France a service at least equal to those her soldiers had already rendered; that her glory and her interests would be carefully respected; that the princes now called to the throne would look to the army as their support and their guide; that, as to what concerned Napoleon, he had only to trust to the honour of the allied sovereigns, and that both he and his family would be treated in a manner conformable to their past greatness. Having spoken thus, Alexander conversed with the marshals in succession; he treated Macdonald with the esteem that was his due; he flattered Ney, in a way to turn the head, unfortunately weak, of this hero; he detained M. de Caulaincourt some minutes. Then, in a short conversation, he signified to the latter that the late vacillations of the allies had been terminated by the occurrence of the past night on the Essonne, for from that moment the allies saw clearly that Napoleon could make no further efforts and that he must submit to his fate. The Emperor Alexander renewed the assurance he had already given, of the most generous treatment for Napoleon: he did not deny that he had, perhaps, gone too far in offering the island of Elba, but he added that he would keep his word, and promised formally to obtain a principality in Italy for Maria Louisa and the King of Rome. He then dismissed M. de Caulaincourt, pressing him to return soon, furnished with powers from his master to conclude this negotiation; for Napoleon's cause was every hour losing what that of the Bourbons was gaining, and the indemnifications that the allies were disposed to make would diminish in the same proportion.

M. de Caulaincourt, left alone with Macdonald, who had not quitted him, prepared to return to Fontainebleau. Ney, surrounded by the members and ministers of the Provisional Government, was overwhelmed with attentions capable of shaking a firmer head than his. Marshal Marmont had gone to M. de Talleyrand's, where he was exposed to fresh seductions. He arrived there, confounded with what had taken place on the Essonne, and expecting to find in the looks of the bystanders a judgment that he feared would be severe, especially when he remembered what the marshals his colleagues had said in the morning; but instead of expressions condemnatory or even equivocal, he met on all sides the most flattering approval, and the most expressive pressures of the hand. He was told, that after having heroically done his duty in the last campaign, he had put the *acme* to his

noble conduct in saving France by the determination he had taken; that there was no price too high for such a service, and that the Bourbons would be eager to acquit the debt, however great the amount. The unfortunate Marmont was at first about to protest against the supposititious merits that were attributed to him, but, assailed by felicitations, he had not strength of mind sufficient to repulse such honours, so many brilliant hopes, and without suspecting, without wishing it, in accepting these compliments he accepted the reprobation which is forever inseparably attached to his memory.

In times of revolution, vicissitudes of fortune are sudden and unforeseen. While the frequenters of the Talleyrand mansion, delighted to learn the defection of the sixth corps, and the definite resolutions of the allies, were overloading Marmont with compliments, and thus endeavouring to associate him with their joys and their hopes, a piece of intelligence suddenly damped their exultation. A report was spread that a military sedition had burst out at Versailles among the soldiers of the sixth corps; that these soldiers declared themselves deceived by their generals, whom they threatened to shoot; and, in short, there was no saying what might be the consequences of this accident. Had the royalists preserved a coolness which indeed is seldom exhibited under such circumstances, they ought to have known that a corps of 15,000 men, separated from the main body of the French army, and completely surrounded by the allied troops, would be annihilated or disarmed had they attempted to undo what they had done. But people do not reason so logically during the tumult of revolution. It was feared that this corps, repenting in a burst of heroic despair, might rekindle the passions of the troops still remaining at Fontainebleau, as well as the warlike ardour of Napoleon, which would excite the Parisians, who, though apparently so tranquil, were impatient of the presence of strangers, and so effect a complete change in the aspect of affairs. The royalists were exceedingly alarmed.

There was only one man who could hinder the fortunate event of the past night becoming so suddenly disastrous: this man was Marshal Marmont. This marshal ought naturally to have great influence over the troops of the sixth corps, and be more capable than any other person of keeping them in the way in which they had entered. The royalists surrounded the marshal, and begged him to finish the work he had begun. They told him, for the hundredth time, that the re-establishment of Napoleon, in opposition to all Europe, was impossible; that the European Powers, even if conquered before the walls of Paris, would not consider themselves defeated, but would renew the war with fresh vigour; that France would be consequently exposed to a frightful prolongation of evils; that peace, with the frontiers of 1790,—that the Bourbons, with legal guarantees,—would be preferable to such risks; that, moreover, he, Marmont, having taken one decided step, having brought away his *corps d'armée*, it was now impossible for him to retrace his steps, his conduct would be

inexplicable, and, being already compromised with Napoleon, he would then be irrevocably compromised with the Bourbons.

Marmont did not wish to be compromised with everybody, and, besides, after having had the weakness to accept unmerited congratulations, he wished to acquire incontestable titles to royal favour: he therefore resolved to set off for Versailles and win back the mutinous troops of the sixth corps. On arriving, he found the soldiers in open insurrection assembled outside the town, and refusing to return to their ranks, notwithstanding the efforts of General Bordesoulle, whom they bitterly reproached for what they had been induced to do. The unexpected arrival of Marshal Marmont caused the soldiers evident satisfaction. As he was absent at the moment when the defection took place, they supposed it was accomplished without his concurrence, and, seeing him now arrive, they were persuaded he had come to extricate them from the consequences of the false step they had made. Besides, Marmont had won their sympathies by his brilliant bravery in the last campaign. He presented himself before them, appealed to their recollections, retraced the perilous circumstances in which he had commanded them and where he was always foremost in the fight. Having thus awakened their acclamations, and proved his claim to their confidence, he said that, having always led them in the path of honour, he would continue to guide them in the same way still, when the road would be clear before them, but disturbed as their spirits now were, they could only be the instruments of disorder, destined to be conquered by the first enemy they should meet; he therefore implored them to return to their duty, and take their places again under their chiefs, promising, when they should have again become a real army, he would return among them, and remain with them until France should have passed through the present fearful crisis.

Marmont said no more, and the soldiers attributed his reserve to the vicinity of the enemy, by whom they were surrounded on all sides: they became calm, fell into rank, and appeared inclined to await patiently the part their marshal should appoint them to take. As to the rest, a few moments' submission was sufficient to prove that there was nothing more to be feared from their mutiny. The allies were naturally anxious to place between the sixth corps and Fontainebleau an impassable barrier.

Marmont returned immediately to Paris, to announce the successful result of his short mission, to receive the flatteries of the Rue Saint-Florentin mansion, that had destroyed him, and of which he was no longer independent. He was again surrounded by royalists, overloaded with flatteries greater than he had yet received, and promises of eternal gratitude, which on the part of peoples and kings is not always assured even to services the purest and most honourable.

Thus was this defection, commonly called Marshal Marmont's treason, accomplished. If the act of this marshal had consisted in preferring the Bourbons to Napoleon, peace to war, the hope of liberty to despotism, nothing could have been more simple, more legitimate, more avowable; but, setting aside all the

duties of gratitude, we cannot forget that Marmont possessed at that time the personal confidence of Napoleon, that he was under arms, and occupied on the Essonne a post of great importance. To abandon this position at such a moment, with his entire *corps d'armée*, in consequence of a secret convention with Prince Schwarzenberg, was not acting like a citizen, free to choose between one Government and another: it was playing the part of a soldier who deserts to the enemy. Marmont has since asserted that this deplorable act had but one part, and it is true, that after having himself planned and accomplished the commencement, his generals, misled by a false terror, resumed the interrupted act, and completed it on their own responsibility; but Marmont, appropriating the termination to himself by his conduct at Versailles, assumed the entire responsibility, and loaded with this heavy burden his memory will descend to posterity.

The commotion at Fontainebleau was quite as great, but of a different nature. The three plenipotentiaries returned thither toward the evening of the 6th, to deliver the definite reply of the allied sovereigns. Marshal Ney, overloaded with caresses by the Provisional Government, had undertaken to obtain and bring back Napoleon's abdication *pure et simple*. He had set off without his two colleagues, either through a wish to be alone, or through eagerness to keep his promise. He found Napoleon aware of the defection of the sixth corps, and appreciating better than any one the military and political consequences of the act, but, as to the rest, calm, exhibiting a haughtiness inversely proportionate to his fortunes, and by no means disposed to reveal his feelings, except to the two or three who exclusively possessed his confidence. Napoleon thanked Marshal Ney politely for having fulfilled his mission, but exhibited no inclination to make him his confidant or take him into his counsels, for Napoleon divined from the marshal's eagerness to arrive first that he was anxious to contribute to the *dénouement*, and perhaps arrogate the merit to himself. The emperor listened, almost without reply, to all the marshal said; and, indeed, the latter expatiated at considerable length on the irrevocable determination of the allied sovereigns, on the impossibility of inducing them to change, on the kind of fascination with which the Parisians spoke of peace and the Bourbons on the dismemberment of the army, and the impossibility of inducing the military to make fresh efforts, and *à propos* of the blood shed by these soldiers, he spoke of existing misfortunes with truth, but without considerations for the feelings of the emperor, for his warrior soul was more strong than tender. However, Ney did not for a moment forget the respect due to a master under whose rule both he and his companions-in-arms had acquired the habit of profound submission.* Napoleon, after

* It is as difficult to know what passed in this interview as in the preceding, of which we have spoken. Marshal Ney has left no written record, and Napoleon, in his St. Helena memoirs, through a feeling of respect for the misfortunes and bravery of the marshal, has observed a profound silence on the subject. But it is easy to perceive, by some of his expressions, that he was deeply sensible of the attitude assumed by the marshal during the last few days

having listened coolly and patiently to the marshal, told him he would think over the matter and let him know, next day, his determination. After this interview, Marshal Ney, eager to fulfil his promise, wrote a letter to the Prince of Bénévento, in which, relating his return to Fontainebleau, after the failure of the morning negotiations, "a failure," he wrote, "which was owing to an unexpected event," (the event of the Essonne,) he added, "that the Emperor Napoleon, convinced of the critical condition in which he had placed France, and recognising the impossibility of saving her himself, he appeared decided to give in his abdication, pure et simple." After this assertion, which was, at best, premature, the marshal said he hoped to be the bearer of an authentic and formal act of abdication. The letter was dated Fontainebleau, half-past eleven in the evening.

M. de Caulaincourt and Marshal Macdonald arrived immediately after Marshal Ney. They found Napoleon already sound asleep, and after waking him, they related as minutely as Marshal Ney, but in different terms, all that had taken place at Paris, since the previous evening, that is to say, their negotiations, at first successful, at least in appearance, but followed by a complete failure, after the defection of the 6th corps. They did not conceal from Napoleon, that their intimate conviction, however painful it might be to declare it, was that there was no other course left for him than to abdicate unconditionally, if he did not wish to render his personal position still worse, and deprive his wife, his son, and his brothers of every chance of a suitable appanage, and entail on France new and irredeemable misfortunes. This advice, repeated so soon again, though now in the most respectful terms, annoyed Napoleon. He replied with a kind of impatience that he had still too many resources to accept such a proposition. "And Eugene," he cried, "Angereau, Suchet, Soult, and the fifty thousand men I have here—do you think these are nothing? As to the rest, we shall see. Farewell till to-morrow." Then, intimating that it was late, he recommended his negotiators to take some repose, showing at the same time how highly he appreciated their generous and delicate-minded mode of action.

Hardly had he dismissed them, than he recalled M. de Caulaincourt, whom he did not esteem more highly than Marshal Macdonald, but in whom he was accustomed to confide.

If the empire. The marshal was wrong to boast, on his return to Paris, of having forced Napoleon to abdicate, that he did so to General Dupont, the war minister, is patent, for the latter has recorded the circumstance in his memoirs. Every thing proves that on this occasion the marshal accuses himself without grounds, and that he had confined himself, in the scene at Fontainebleau, to a want of consideration for fallen greatness, without indulging in violence of language, which would have been scarcely possible. What induces us to adopt this opinion is, that M. de Caulaincourt, on arriving toward midnight, that is to say, some minutes after Ney's departure, found Napoleon perfectly calm, not exhibiting, either in gesture or language, any trace of the emotion which would naturally have remained after a violent scene, nor had he come to any determination. M. de Caulaincourt in a written record says positively, that in comparing what he had seen at Fontainebleau with what he heard a few days later touching Marshal Ney's conduct, he could not understand the reports that had been circulated, nor could he help thinking that

Every trace of ill humour had disappeared. Napoleon told M. de Caulaincourt how much he was pleased with the conduct of Marshal Macdonald, who, though so long antagonistic to him, acted in this trying moment like a devoted friend: he took an indulgent view of Marshal Ney's mobility, and speaking of the conduct of his lieutenants with a slightly-disdainful gentleness, said, to M. de Caulaincourt, "Ah! Caulaincourt, men, men! My marshals would blush to act as Marmont has done, for they express the strongest indignation at his conduct, but they are very sorry that he has so far outstripped them on the road to fortune. They would be very glad, without dishonouring themselves, to do as he has done, to acquire the same rights to the favour of the Bourbons." He afterward spoke of Marmont with vexation, but without bitterness. "I treated him," he said, "as if he were my own child. I have often had to defend him against his colleagues, who did not appreciate his intellectual advantages, and who, judging him only by what he appears on the field of battle, made no account of his military talents. I created him marshal and duke through personal affection and regard for the recollections of childhood, and, I may well say, that I reckoned on his fidelity. He is, perhaps, the only man whose desertion I was not prepared for; but vanity, weakness of mind, and ambition have misled him. The unhappy man does not know what awaits him; his name will be forever dishonoured. Believe me, I have no longer a thought about myself—my career is finished, or very nearly so. Besides, what desire could I now have to reign over hearts that have grown weary of me, and are eager to offer their allegiance to another? I think only of France, which it is frightful to leave in this state—clipped, crippled, after having had frontiers so vast! Oh, Caulaincourt, that is the most poignant of the many humiliations heaped on my head! Oh! if these dolts had not abandoned me, I would have rebuilt the fabric of her greatness; for, be assured, the allies, maintaining their actual position, having Paris behind them and me in front, would have been destroyed. Had they left Paris to escape the danger, they should never have entered it again. The very fact of their leaving the city, at my approach, would be in itself a signal defeat. That unfortunate Marmont has frustrated this glorious result. Ah, Caulaincourt, what joy it would have been to restore the greatness of France

Ney had been guilty of self-calumny. M. de Caulaincourt was certainly not pleased with either Marshal Ney's language or conduct at l'Hotel Saint-Florentin, but he could not believe in the scenes of violence reported at Paris, and which many historians have since quoted. As to Marshal Macdonald, though in his manuscript memoirs he manifests his discontent at Marshal Ney's conduct, yet he relates the scenes in which he took part in a manner that entirely excluded the idea of Napoleon being subjected to violence. We cite these two eminent persons, the only ocular witnesses who have written the scenes of Fontainebleau in 1814, and the most credible among all who might have written them, the persons most likely to tell things exactly as they were. We flatter ourselves that we have in this instance, as in every other, recorded the truth as closely as it could be ascertained, and we do not hesitate to assert that every recital that oversteps the limits within which we have confined ourselves, is either utterly false or strangely exaggerated.

in a few hours! Now, what is to be done? I would have about 150,000 men, with those I have here, and the troops Eugene, Augereau, Suchet, and Soult could bring; but I would be obliged to retire behind the Loire, entice the enemy to follow, and thus extend indefinitely the ravages to which France has been too long exposed, and try the fidelity of many, who, perhaps, would not bear the test better than Marmont,—and I should make all these efforts to prolong a reign, which, I clearly see, is drawing to a close. I do not feel sufficient energy to make such efforts. Undoubtedly, in prolonging the war, we should find means of improving our position. I am informed, on all sides, that the peasants of Lorraine, Champagne, and Burgundy, cut down isolated parties of the enemy. Within a short time the people will conceive a horror of the enemy; the Parisians will tire of Alexander's magnanimity. This prince is gracious in his manner,—he pleases women; but so much graciousness in a conqueror soon becomes revolting to the national pride of the conquered. Moreover, the Bourbons are coming, and who can foresee the consequences. To-day they reconcile France with Europe; but to-morrow in what state will she be in relation to herself? They represent external peace, but internal war. You will see what they will have done with the country in a year. They will not keep Talleyrand six months. There would be many chances of success in a prolonged struggle,—chances both political and military,—but at the price of fearful calamities. Besides, at this moment, something more is needed than myself. My name, my statue, my sword, all cause alarm. I must yield. I am going to recall the marshals, and you will see their delight when I extricate them from their difficulties, and authorize them to do as Marmont has done, without compromising their honour."

This entire detachment from things, this indulgence toward individuals, resulted from the greatness of his mind, and was commensurate with the vastness of his errors. If his hard-working lieutenants were at length fatigued, it was because he had urged them to the verge of human capability, and was not able to estimate the exact measure of ordinary men or things. It was not they only who were fatigued, for so was the world at large, and their defection was a result of the nature of things. But after the commission of great faults, it becomes a mighty genius to acknowledge them, and this sentiment inspires an ennobling sense of justice and that loftiness of language that gives dignity to misfortune.

Napoleon spoke afterward of the fate that awaited himself. He accepted the isle of Elba, and in every thing that concerned himself personally was very easy to please. "You know," he said to M. de Caulaincourt, "that I do not want any thing. I had saved 150 millions out of my civil list, which belongs to me, as justly as the savings a clerk makes out of his salary belong to him. I have given every thing to the army and I do not regret it. Let my family have a proper maintenance, and I shall be content. As to my son, he will be an archduke, which will, perhaps, be better for him than the throne of France. Did he

ascend that, would he be able to keep it? But I would wish Tuscany for him and his mother. They would be thus placed in the neighbourhood of the isle of Elba, and I should have the means of seeing them."

M. de Caulaincourt replied that the King of Rome would never obtain such a dotation, and that, thanks to Alexander, he would at most get Parma. "What," exclaimed Napoleon, "in exchange for the empire of France, not even Tuscany!" He submitted to the repeated affirmations of M. de Caulaincourt. After his son, he spoke of the Empress Josephine, of Prince Eugene, of Queen Hortense, and insisted that a proper provision should be made for them. "But," he said, to M. de Caulaincourt, "these things will be easily arranged; the allies would not be so mean as to dispute them. But the army, but France, it is about them especially I ought to think. Since I give up the throne, and that I do more, that I sheathe my sword, having still so many opportunities of using it, have I not a right to demand some compensation? Would not the allies extend the French frontiers, since this increase of strength to France would not be vested in my hands, but in those of the Bourbons? Could we not stipulate for the army the maintenance of its privileges, such as grades, titles, dotations? Could we not, which would be so gratifying to the soldiers, conserve for them those three colours, which they have carried with so much glory to every part of the civilized world? Since we yield without fighting, when it would be so easy for us to shed more blood, is something not due to us, especially as I, the sole object of the enemy's hate and fear, would not profit by the concession?"

And expatiating on this theme, which lay so near his heart, Napoleon wished to make some stipulations for France and the army. M. de Caulaincourt tried to disabuse his mind on these subjects, pointing out to him that he would no longer be allowed to treat of these great and important interests; that the great principle being accepted, that of his deposition, the privilege of representing France and negotiating for her was transferred to the Provisional Government, and that what he said on the subject would not be listened to. "But," added Napoleon, "what strength has this Provisional Government, except what it receives from me, except what I give it by remaining here at Fontainebleau, with the *débris* of the army? When I shall have yielded, and the army with me, it will be powerless, it will command still less consideration than at present, and will be obliged to surrender at discretion."

Such was, in fact, the situation of affairs: it could not be better described; but he who deplored the public woe was himself the author of these calamities, and ought to submit like the rest of the world. M. de Caulaincourt did all in his power to make the emperor comprehend this, and persisted in bringing him back to what alone could henceforth concern him,—that is to say, his personal interest and that of his family. The former master of the world, becoming impatient, exclaimed, "You wish, then, to bring me down to a discussion of these miserable pecuniary interests! It is

worthy of me. Do you arrange my family affairs, Caulaincourt. As to me, I do not want any thing. Let me have the pension of retired officer: it will be enough."

After these conversations,—which occupied the night and morning of the 6th of April,—after drawing up the definite act of abdication, on which he bestowed considerable care, Napoleon recalled the marshals, to acquaint them with his ultimate resolves. Being admitted to his presence, and not knowing to what determination he had come, they reviewed their complaints; they repeated that the army was exhausted, that there was no more blood left to spill, so much had been already shed. The marshals were so eager to obtain a sanction to their offering their services to the new Government, that, had they met opposition, they might in the end have forgotten, for the first time, the respect due to Napoleon. But after having, through a kind of mischievous enjoyment, left them some moments in doubt, Napoleon said to them, "Gentlemen, make your mind easy: either you nor the army will be called on to shed more blood: I consent to abdicate unconditionally. I would have wished, for your sakes as well as for the sake of my family, to secure the succession of the throne for my son. I believe such an event would have been still more profitable to you than to me; for you would have lived under a Government consonant to your origin, to your opinions, and to your interests. This was possible; but a disgraceful desertion has deprived you of a position that I hoped to secure you: but for the defection of the sixth corps, we might have done that, and more,—we might have stored the fortunes of France. The event has been otherwise. I submit to my fate: do you submit to yours: resign yourselves to live under the Bourbons, and serve them faithfully. You have wished for repose: you shall have it; but, alas!—God grant that my prentiments deceive me!—we are not a generation made for repose: the peace that you so much desire will cut down more of you on your beds of down than war would have done in our bivouacs." After pronouncing these words, in a sad and impressive manner, Napoleon read the act of his abdication, couched in these terms:—

"The allied Powers having proclaimed that the Emperor Napoleon was the only obstacle to the re-establishment of peace in Europe, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his oath, declares that he renounces, for himself and his heirs, the thrones of France and Italy; because there is no sacrifice—even that of life—which he is not ready to make for the interests of France."

After hearing this document read, Napoleon's lieutenants rushed forward, seized his hands, and thanked him for the sacrifice he had made, and repeated what they had already said touching his conditional abdication,—that, in descending after such a fashion from the throne, he showed himself greater than ever. He allowed their secret joy to find vent in these last flatteries, and permitted them to speak on; for he did not wish to demean either them or himself by contemptible recriminations. Besides, who had made them what

they were? He alone, by the despotism that had destroyed their individuality, by the interminable wars that had exhausted their strength: he had therefore no right to complain; and he acted nobly in recognising the inevitable consequences of his errors, and submitting without an outburst of feeling, alike disagreeable to all parties.

It was then agreed that M. de Caulaincourt, accompanied as before by the Marshals MacDonald and Ney, should go to Paris, and lay before Alexander the definite act of abdication,—an act of which he was to be the sole depositary, and which he was to exchange for the treaty that was to secure the imperial family a suitable provision. Napoleon insisted once more that no efforts should be made, if such were needed, to insure success, excepting for what concerned his son and his relatives. He dismissed the marshals, and affectionately pressed the hand of M. de Caulaincourt, who enjoyed the largest share of his confidence.

No sooner was this intelligence circulated at Fontainebleau, than a deep sadness was visible on the faces of the old soldiers. Among the officers of high rank, on the contrary, a feeling of immense relief was the prevailing sentiment. They could now, without qualms of conscience, quit the old master for the new. The greater number of the marshals were already considering the best mode of sending in their adhesion to the Provisional Government. They would willingly have confided the task to M. de Caulaincourt, if his immeasurable superiority had not prohibited the idea of his accepting such a confidence. But their anxiety had nearly reached its term, and within twenty-four hours acts of adhesion were to be seen in abundance, with signatures capable of putting the most scrupulous at their ease.

M. de Caulaincourt and the two marshals set out immediately for Paris, where they arrived at a late hour on the 6th. At midnight they were admitted to the Emperor of Russia, who awaited their coming with extreme impatience,—an impatience shared by the Provisional Government and its numerous adherents. Though the defection of the 6th corps had greatly diminished the fears that Napoleon still inspired, and though the assurances given by Marshal Ney and the greater number of the military personages with whom the royalists were in correspondence left little doubt as to the speedy adhesion of the army, they were still terrified in thinking of what might be attempted by the infernal spirit—as they called him—that had retired to Fontainebleau, and whom they honoured by the fear they felt, even whilst seeking to dishonour him by an accumulation of unheard-of insults. There was a kind of general joy when Marshal Ney said to the most eager among the frequenters of the Hôtel Saint-Florentin, that they might make their minds easy, for the act of unconditional abdication had arrived. When Napoleon's envoys appeared before the Emperor Alexander, this prince, who on former occasions always shook hands with M. de Caulaincourt first, now ran to Marshal Ney, to thank him for what he had done, and tell him that of all

the services he had rendered to his country, the last would not be esteemed the least valuable. The Russian monarch alluded to the letter of the previous evening, in which Marshal Ney boasted of having forced Napoleon to abdicate, and promised to be the bearer of the formal act. M. de Caulaincourt and Marshal Macdonald, ignorant of the existence of this letter, and not having seen any thing that could induce them to consider Marshal Ney as the author of Napoleon's last resolves, were very much surprised, and testified their astonishment to Marshal Ney, who became embarrassed. Alexander did not delay to express to the two other negotiators the thanks he had at first exclusively addressed to Marshal Ney; and, having learned on what conditions they would deliver the important document of which they were the depositaries, he made no objection. As to the isle of Elba, however, he declared he would keep his word, because he considered himself pledged by what he had said to M. de Caulaincourt; but his allies considered the concession imprudent, and blamed it openly; but he was determined it should be so, as he had promised; that, touching the King of Rome and Maria-Louisa, a principality in Italy was the least they could get, and the Emperor of Austria was about to recover so much territory in that country, that he certainly would not higgie with his own daughter; that as to Napoleon's brothers, his first wife, and his adopted children, Prince Eugene and Queen Hortense, they should obtain a suitable provision, for which he would become personally responsible; that his minister, M. de Nesselrode, would, if necessary, advocate the interests of the Bonaparte family; that they could refer to this minister for the details, but might, in case of any difficulty arising, apply to himself, (Alexander.) In dismissing the negotiators, the Emperor of Russia detained M. de Caulaincourt, and explained himself more frankly with this noble-minded man, whom he always treated as a friend, and acknowledged to him that the intelligence he had just received of the insurrection of the French peasants, without alarming, disturbed him; for these peasants had massacred a numerous Russian detachment in the Vosges. He afterward dwelt, with deep commiseration, on the desertions that were so numerous among Napoleon's followers, and recommended that no time should be lost in arranging his personal concerns; for two feelings, he said, were at that time being rapidly developed,—the baseness of those who had served under the Empire, and the extravagant exultation of the royalist party. He spoke of the Bourbons and their friends with extraordinary frankness, exhibiting, at the same time, surprise, disgust, and ill humour at what he witnessed on every side, and said that after having had so much trouble in escaping from the warlike follies of Napoleon, the allies would have considerable difficulty in protecting themselves from the reactionary follies of the royalists. Alexander dismissed M. de Caulaincourt, promising his friendship for himself and his support in aiding Napoleon.

Even after the deposition was pronounced by the Senate, Napoleon at Fontainebleau

still inspired a degree of fear that held the royalists in check, and prevented them giving full vent to their feelings. The defection of the 6th corps, which rendered Napoleon completely powerless, had considerably tranquilized them; but, on learning his unconditional abdication,—that is to say, the sheathing, by his own act, of his terrible sword,—they no longer felt any measure in the expression of their sentiments. That they should be, after so many sufferings, so much bloodshed, and so many disasters, public and private, delighted to see again the princes under whom they had been young, rich, powerful, and happy, was quite natural and legitimate. That to their joy they should add all the fury of triumphant hate, was, alas! perfectly natural, though sadly derogatory to the dignity of France. Never was there witnessed in any country a greater outburst of long-restrained rage than was now displayed; and it must be confessed that the partisans of the ancient dynasty, especially known as royalists, were not the sole execrators of the deposed emperor. Fathers and mothers of families who had hitherto cursed in secret a war that devoured their children, now feeling themselves free to give vent to their sentiments, called Napoleon the most atrocious names. Never had not been more execrated in ancient nor Robespierre in modern times. He was now generally called "The Corsican Ogre." He was represented as a monster occupied in destroying whole generations to glut a devouring passion for war. A document secretly prepared by M. de Chateaubriand, during the last hours of the empire, and published under the protection of foreign bayonets, was the correct expression of this overflow of unparalleled hate. In this production, it would seem that passion had stirred up the dregs of the bad taste too frequently discernible in the writer's style: M. de Chateaubriand attributed to Napoleon every vice, every meanness, every crime. The production was read with incredible avidity at Paris, and from Paris it passed into the provinces, always excepting those into which the enemy had penetrated. Strange contrast! the provinces that had suffered most from Napoleon's errors were less adverse to him than the others; for the former pertinaciously regarded him as the defender of their native land. Everywhere else, the public anger went on increasing: like an angry man who becomes still more angry as he continues to scold, so the public mind appeared to become intoxicated by its own fury. The murder of the Duke of Enghien, that had been so long consigned to silence, the perfidious meeting at Bayonne, where the Spanish princes had been deceived, were made subject-matter of the darkest narratives, as if the truth, which was bad enough, needed the heightening of calumny. The return from Egypt, the retreat from Russia, were talked of as cowardly desertions of the betrayed French army. Napoleon, it was said, had only made one campaign that was really brilliant. There were, in his long military career, only a few successful events obtained by force of arms. The art of war, degraded in his hands, had become a mere butchery. His government, hitherto so admired, was now

as a horrible fiscal system, designed the last crown from the pocket of subject. The immortal campaign of only a succession of desperate acts of despair. An order given by the in the battle of the 30th of March, Napoleon's sanction, who was then gues from Paris, ordering the de- of the munitions at Grenelle, that it not fall into the enemy's hands, led as a design to blow up the cap- officer, willing to flatter the domi- ons of the day, declared that he had o execute this fearful order. The t was said, had wished to destroy a corsair who wishes to blow up , only with this difference, that he on board. As to the rest, it was t he was not a Frenchman,—which e a matter of congratulation for the France. He had changed his name *aparte to Bonaparte*; but he ought d Buonaparte. Even the name Na- not belong to him. Napoleon was nary saint: it was *Nicholas* that e joined to his family name. This t was said, this enemy of mankind, fidel; whilst that at his chapel, or ne, he attended mass, in private with olney, and others, he professed He was hard-hearted, coarse, beat ls, insulted women, and, in his mili- ity, no better than a coward. "And his enemies exclaimed, "France had to this man." Such an aberration t could only be explained by the liness that succeeds revolutions. ouring of words was accompanied f the same character. Napoleon's which a rope had been uselessly or the purpose of pulling it down, e allies entered Paris, was assailed after, with the aid of machinery, down from the Austerlitz column in a Government store; and public g on the monument, had the satis- seeing the summit bare. is the fierce explosion of anger to a terrible reaction in sublimary polcon was exposed; he who during ars had been so servilely flattered, leeds had excited the admiration of shed world. But he was too great ain unmoved by such indignities, was at the same time conscious that ts had produced this revulsion of ing. And the flatteries lavished at time on the allied sovereigns made e of humanity still more pitiable. , undoubtedly, by his own conduct ample he gave his allies, deserved e of the French people. But if in- cannot be sanctioned under any cir- e, gratitude ought to be measured in when addressed to the conquerors ve land. Yet it was not so, and the tent so far as to say that the allied , who had suffered so much from the eplayed great magnanimity in taking vengeance. The flames of Moscow y day recalled, not by Russian, but e writers. They were not content ing Marshal Blucher and General

Sacken, brave men, whose praise was natural and well deserved from Prussian and Russian lips; but these writers sought out a French emigrant, General Langeron, who served in the army of the czar, and related with complacency how he had distinguished himself in the attack on Montmartre, and with what well-merited rewards he had been loaded by the Russian monarch. Thus, among the many changes of our great and terrible revolution, patriotism, like liberty, was doomed to reverses; and just as liberty, the idol of every heart in 1789, became in 1793 the object of universal execration, in like manner patriotism had now fallen into such disrepute, that the act of bearing arms against the natal soil, an act condemned in every age, now met laudation. Weary days of reaction, when the public mind, losing its primary notions of right and wrong, rejects what it had adored, and adores what it had rejected, and esteems the most shameful contradiction a happy reconversion to truth.

It naturally followed that if Napoleon were a monster from whose grasp France ought to be torn, the Bourbons were accomplished princes, to whom it ought to be restored as soon as possible, as their legitimate property. France had not quite forgotten them; for twenty years were not sufficient to consign to oblivion an illustrious family that had reigned with glory during centuries; but the present generation was entirely ignorant how and in what degree they were related to the unfortunate king who died on the scaffold, and the not less unfortunate child that died in custody of a cobbler. The populace asked each other if these were the sons, brothers, or cousins of those unfortunate princes, for, with the exception of a few aged persons, the populace knew nothing of the matter. Flattery, quick to turn from him who was now called the deposed tyrant, to those who were designated saving angels, attributed to the latter every virtue, and they certainly possessed some that deserved to be extolled in language more refined and classical than that in which their praises were sung. It was told that Louis XVI. had left a brother, Louis Stanislaus Xavier, now destined to succeed him, under the name of Louis XVIII.; that he was a savant, a literary man, and a philosopher; that he had left another brother, the Count d'Artois, a model of French goodness and elegance; and nephews, the Dukes of Angoulême and Berry, types of ancient chivalrous honour. Under these princes, gentle and just, having preserved the virtues that a fearful revolution had almost driven from earth, France, beloved and respected by Europe, would find repose and bequeath it to the world. She would find peace, which she had never met amid the orgies of demagogry, and which would be now presented to her by princes formed during twenty years in the English school. There was, incontestably, some truth in this flattery, and all might have turned to an enduring good, had not party spirit perverted these many promising elements of prosperity and peace.

Be this as it may, independent of their merit, the Bourbons had in their favour the law of necessity. In fact, the republic, still all stained with the blood shed in 1793, not being presentable to terrified France, royalty alone

was mentionable; and of the two forms then existing, that of genius and that of tradition, the former was rendered unacceptable by its own wild extravagances, and what remained but the latter, with memories hallowed by time and renovated by misfortune? It was therefore very natural that, some days having been employed in recalling the Bourbons to the public mind, the people rallied round them with an hourly-increasing enthusiasm.

Two things were needed to be done expeditiously; to draw up a constitution that would impose conditions on the Bourbons in recalling them, and meanwhile receive the Count d'Artois at Paris. The Count d'Artois had remained concealed at Nancy, as we have seen, awaiting the return of M. de Vitrolles, who had come to make arrangements with the Provisional Government, and who did not wish to return to the prince until the question of Maria Louisa's regency was settled. This regency having been irrevocably rejected, and the recall of the Bourbons being the only imaginable solution of the political difficulty, it became necessary to send M. de Vitrolles to Nancy to see the prince. M. de Talleyrand and the members of the Provisional Government, spite of M. de Vitrolles's importunities, instructed him to tell the Count d'Artois that he would be received at the gates of Paris with all the honours due to his rank; that he would be conducted to Notre Dame to hear a *Te Deum* chanted, and from Notre Dame to the Tuileries; that he should enter the city dressed in the uniform of the national guards; that it was even desirable that he should wear the tricolour cockade, for this would be a sure means of gaining the affections of the army; that such was the opinion of those enlightened men whose concurrence was indispensably necessary for carrying out his views; that the power attributed to him would be that of the representative of Louis XVIII., of whose letters-patent he was the bearer; that these letters would be submitted to the Senate, who, basing their conduct on them, would bestow on the prince the title of lieutenant-general of the kingdom, implying, of course, an adhesion to the conditions of the new constitution.

M. de Vitrolles, under the inspiration of the sentiments that animated the old royalist party, exclaimed loudly against the tricolour cockade, white being in his opinion the colour of the ancient dynasty, and the emblem of the Bourbons' inalienable right; he was also indignant at the pretension of the Senate to invest the Count d'Artois with royal power; and, above all, at the idea of imposing a constitution on the legitimate sovereign. M. de Talleyrand, not wishing to enter into a discussion, and trusting that time would settle all things, said rather carelessly to M. de Vitrolles, that it was better to set off without delay, and find the prince: that at the moment of his entrance the difficulty of the cockade could be settled; that, touching the constitution, it was indispensable that one should be framed, but it would be rendered as little irksome as possible, and the framers would especially endeavour to avoid the appearance of imposing a law. M. de Talleyrand repeated to M. de Vitrolles, in a word, that it was better to set off, and not impede, by puerile objections, the progress of events. He commissioned him, at the same time, to carry

to the prince the assurance of his absolute personal devotedness.

In order to convince M. de Vitrolles that he could not do better than depart, with these conditions, an audience with the Emperor Alexander was procured him. During this audience, M. de Vitrolles having attempted, with the arrogance of the victorious party, to plead for the ancient colours and unconditional liberty for the King of France, the Emperor Alexander, laying aside his habitual gentleness, told him the allied sovereigns had not crossed the Elbe with four hundred thousand men to make France the slave of emigration; that, without pretending to impose a Government on France, they would be guided by the opinion of the actual and sole acknowledged and admissible authority—the Senate; that having used this body to dethrone Napoleon, they would not repay the service with ingratitude, by dethroning the Senate; that moreover the authority of the Senate was in their eyes the only safe, the only enlightened authority existing in France, and that it was this body alone that could imprint on any public act a character at once legal and national: that, besides, the power that had burst open the gates of Paris was still within its walls, that this power reprecated all Europe, so it was better to submit and not force the allies to regret that they had pledged themselves so deeply in favour of the Bourbons.

M. de Vitrolles would have been tempted to contradict, for he now regarded as detestable the foreign influence that he had himself gone to Troyes to solicit, but which he found intolerable when made the vehicle of good advice. However, there was no reply to be made, and M. de Vitrolles set out, the bearer of conditions imposed by the Provisional Government, resolving with his friends to curtail them as much as possible in the execution.

The most urgent business was to draw up the constitution. It was necessary to use despatch, in the first place, to render Napoleon's deposition definite, by appointing the Bourbons his successors, secondly, to bind the Bourbons themselves in their recall, by imposing on them the principles of 1789. This twofold idea, of recalling the Bourbons and restricting them by wise laws, had been propagated by M. de Talleyrand, and had gradually taken possession of the public mind. According to the original project, it was the Provisional Government that was to draw up the plan of a constitution. To accomplish the task, M. de Talleyrand had wished to obtain the assistance of the most enlightened and influential members of the Senate, and for that purpose had assembled them at his house. At the very first words uttered on this important subject, the most contradictory ideas were enunciated, those ideas that were dominant in 1791, and entailed so much public confusion. In fact, the political education of France, successively interrupted by the Reign of Terror and the Empire, had been, so to speak, suspended, and the prevailing ideas now were those of the *Assemblée Constituante*, moderated, certainly, by existing circumstances. M. de Talleyrand, who hated disputation, resolved to let the senators do as they pleased, recommending three things: to be expeditious, to retract the Bourbons in so

and, to make the restriction effi-
advised that the Senate should be
in the new constitution under the
Upper Chamber of the Restored

He thus sought to please the
which he had need, and render that
tacle to emigration. After giving
M. de Talleyrand abandoned the
here only remained of the members
sional Government the Abbé Mon-
haughty and persevering debater,
emanding what conditions were to
on the Bourbons, of whom he was
id devoted agent.

ssions between the Abbé Montes-
e senators commissioned to draw
stitution were very animated. The
ispute were the following. The
ed, in the first place, that Louis
brother of the unfortunate Louis
his heir, since the death of the
han who was imprisoned in the
uld be recalled by the *free will* of
nd invested with the insignia of
r having sworn to observe the new

. The nation applied to this prince,
bly because of his royal origin,
litary value they recognised, but
ought him *freely*, and accepted him
and in virtue of the right the na-
choose a ruler. The Senate wished
e both claims, that of the ancient
that of the nation, by acknow-
claims, and binding them by a
contract. This point, after a warm
being decided, next came the ques-
form of government, upon which,
ere was no dispute, even among
most opposed upon other matters.

iolable king was immediately ad-
was to be the sole depository of the
ower, exercising it through respon-
ers, sharing the legislative power
hambers, the one aristocratic, the
cratic. There were some differ-
inion as to the details of carrying
stem. Those persons who were
ed with the prejudices of the *con-*
hed that the two chambers should
ivilege of taking the initiative in
laws, the right being secured to
fixing his sanction, a right which
ought of contesting. The French
that epoch, learned by experience
this form of government, the most
oint for the chambers is to obtain,
ional means, ministers of their own
ese ministers, once appointed, pass
ost agreeable to the majority, for,
ministers constrained to pass and
s that do not emanate from them-
d be either the most awkward or
ncere of legislative administrators.
experience, or, to speak more cor-
r the influence of a too recent an-
ce, these debaters spoke of depriv-
of the prerogative of making peace
getting that all these prerogatives
claimed for the chambers are, more
mbined into one, that of deposing
g ministers who, being elected by
y, would make, as the majority
er peace or war. Another subject

that excited lengthened discussions was the
formation of the two chambers. The second,
called the "lower house" by the English, who
are too proud not to attach importance to
things, not to words, provoked no discussion.
Instead of having the members appointed by
the Senate, from the candidates presented by
the electoral bodies, as was done under the
Empire, it was agreed that the Second Cham-
ber should be directly chosen by the electoral
colleges, investing the actual administration
with the duty of organizing these colleges. The
most serious debate arose on the subject of
the upper chamber. M. de Talleyrand and his
collaborateurs were desirous that, under the re-
stored monarchy of the Bourbons, the chief
power should be invested in the Senate, which
was composed of the most illustrious men of
the Revolution and the Empire. It would cer-
tainly have been a most desirable measure, for
the members of the Senate were so long accus-
tomed to submit, that they would not have been
importunate to royalty, and, at the same time,
too deeply imbued with the sentiments of the
French Revolution not to oppose an invincible
obstacle to emigration. In this manner M. de
Talleyrand encouraged the senators to fix them-
selves solidly in the new constitution by declar-
ing themselves hereditary peers. In this the Em-
peror Alexander fully agreed with him, for
this generous-minded and enthusiastic prince,
being accompanied by his former tutor M. de
Laharpe, and brought by him into contact
with the most liberal of the senators, entered
fully into their ideas, and shrank from placing
France under the yoke of emigration, after
having freed her from the yoke of the Empire;
he wished to make use of the Senate alone,
either in dethroning Napoleon, or binding the
Bourbons by constitutional laws in recalling
them.

Encouraged in these tendencies by sincere
conviction, by their own interests, and by the
approval of high personages, the senators were
determined not to stop at half-measures. They
wished that the entire Senate should consti-
tute the Upper Chamber under the Bourbons,
and, in order that this chamber should not be
inundated by numerous promotions of emigrant
peers, they wished to limit the members of the
chamber to the actual number of the senators,
and only grant the king the prerogative of
filling up the vacancies, a very limited preroga-
tive where the principle of a hereditary peer-
age was admitted. To these political advan-
tages the senators intended to add some of a
pecuniary nature, by converting into real prop-
erty the funds out of which their salaries were
paid, the entire to be equally divided between
the actual senators. As to the rest, not wish-
ing to seem exclusively occupied with them-
selves, the senators wished the existing legis-
lative corps should compose the Lower Cham-
ber under the monarchy, until a new election
should take place.

There were many points on which not one
dissentient voice was heard; the vote for sup-
plies and taxation by the chambers, equality
of justice for all ranks, permanency of the
magisterial office, individual liberty, religious
liberty, liberty of the press, under a certain
limited censorship, eligibility of all French-
men to public employments, the continuance

of ranks and pensions in the army, the conservation of the Legion of Honour, a recognition of the new nobility and re-establishment of the old, an inviolable respect for the public debt, an irrevocable sanction of sales of what was called "national property," and, lastly, an act of oblivion, including all persons who by word or deed had taken a part in public affairs since 1789; from this moment, all parties were agreed, with the exception of some slight details as to the form of the monarchy designated as *constitutional*, and which consisted of an inviolable hereditary king, represented by responsible ministers, with two chambers, representing different social classes, and furnished with means of bending the ministers to their will; a monarchy which is neither English nor French nor German, but of all times and countries, for it is the only possible monarchical form that remains after an absolute monarchy is rejected.

Generally speaking, the mass of the royalists, intoxicated with joy at the idea of again beholding the Bourbons, thought little of constitutional questions. Provided they could obtain a king such as they knew in former times, they were satisfied. In fact, they would have preferred to see the king absolute as in former times, than surrounded by revolutionary trammels; but they were satisfied to have their king on any terms, as with him they felt confident of recovering the happiness they enjoyed in olden times. However, some persons, either more thoughtful or more subtle, having systematized their prejudices, wished that the king should return *free*, and declared they would not receive him if he were shackled by conditions. Of the latter the Abbé Montesquieu was one of the most zealous. In his opinion, and the opinion of the rest of his party, the king was sole sovereign, and the pretended sovereignty of the people was only a revolutionary impertinence. Undoubtedly the king, whose eyes were not closed against the light, might from time to time, say every century or half-century, perceive that abuses existed, and reform them, but of his own free authority, by granting reformatory measures, which might even go so far as to modify the forms of government, but never abrogate the principle of an absolute royal authority. Such were the only concessions that these high-class royalists would make; but to impose conditions on the royal authority, an authority of divine origin, emanating from God, not from men, binding the king by an oath, and only restoring the crown on such conditions to its legitimate possessor, would be, in their opinion, so many acts of rebellion and insurrection.

M. de Talleyrand, having little time and less inclination to occupy himself with questions of this kind, besides confiding to the Senate the care of restraining the Bourbons, he left M. de Montesquieu to dispute with the senators commissioned to draw up the new constitution. This abbé, though a philosopher and a politician, could not restrain his anger when the principle of national sovereignty was enunciated in his presence. However, he was not so hesitant as to advocate openly the opposite principle, or suppose it would ever obtain the ascendant; for it would be easier to turn back our planet in its orbit than induce

old revolutionists to recognise the king as sole sovereign and the nation as subject, with no other right than that of being well treated by him in the same way as the lower animals have a right not to be overworked by man. But, whilst getting angry and exclaiming against this and against that, M. de Montesquieu dared not attack the main difficulty and contest the principle of a contract existing between the monarch and the people. But he took advantage of the opportunity afforded by the Senate, who had given themselves so conspicuous a place in the future constitution: on this subject he was violent and almost insulting. "And what are you," he said to the senators, "to assume such authority, both with regard to the nation and the king? And first, with regard to the nation, what title have you but what is derived from a constitution that you have just overturned, or a confidence of which the nation has as yet given no evidence, and which possibly it does not feel in you? As to the king, he does not know you; he is my sovereign and yours; he returns by the instrumentality of providential decrees, of which neither you nor I am the author, and will not submit to any condition imposed by you. To limit the number of peers! To give the king only the prerogative of filling the vacancies! But this is violating the principles of constitutional monarchy, such as they are understood in England, the country where they are best known:—it would be making the peerage an omnipotent oligarchy, against which the king would be powerless for two reasons: because he could not dissolve the Upper as he could the Lower Chamber, nor could he create peers, the number being already limited. The peerage will be, in fact, an absolute monarch, and you would yourselves constitute this peerage. You would recall the king only to make him serve as a veil to your own power."

It must be acknowledged that on this last point the Abbé Montesquieu was right, because limiting the number of peers was, in fact, to render the peerage absolute. But he was offensive, even impertinent, and seemed to tell the senators that they might retain their pensions and some of them their seats, but that was all that could be done for a body of revolutionists, who no longer possessed the popular favour, who would never obtain the royal confidence, and who had thrown away their sole support in breaking Napoleon's power.

The senators might have replied that they represented neither the king nor the nation, who at the actual time had no representatives, but that, with all their faults and weaknesses, they represented something very important—the French Revolution; that they were the faithful depositaries of its principles: that this constituted an immense moral force, in which they united an actual force equally incontestable; that of being the only authority recognised, especially by the all-powerful foreigners then at Paris; that they held the crown in their hands, and would bestow it conditionally, but those who pretended to the crown were expected to refuse it if the conditions did not suit them.

Unfortunately, among the senators, who were so tenacious of their opinions, though the

their character was broken down, at one capable of speaking energetically instead of replying, they contented with acting. Looking on M. de Talleyrand as an insolent spirit, the precursors still worse, they lost no time in writing the plan of the constitution he had conceived it. In this they were aided by the secret approbation of Talleyrand and the undisguised approval of Alexander. We may as well see alterations reached their highest point on the 5th of April, the very day when the marshals were pleading at Paris for the restoration of Maria Louisa, and the representation of royalty were in the greatest straits. It could be evidently an incalculable advantage to obtain, at such a moment, a proposal from the Bourbons by the Senate, on such conditions. "Let us put an end to this," said M. de Talleyrand to M. de Talleyrand; "let us obtain from the only authority the exclusion of the Bourbons, the recall of the Bourbons, and the emperor endeavour either to throw himself on the mercy of the Senate or to submit to it." "I will do it," he said, also, to the emperor, "I will demand the Bourbons, for Bonaparte will pay dearly for your acts of the 18th of April. Proclaim the Bourbons, and on them what conditions you please; these conditions do not suit them, they will refuse the crown; but you need not. They will accept the crown on any terms, and we shall be delivered from the hands of the madman at Fontainebleau." Measures, which rather palliated than removed the difficulty, pointed out, however, a way of extrication from the existing embarrassment. The Senate followed M. de Talleyrand, and the next day—the 6th—the marshals were returning to Fontainebleau to demand the emperor's unconditional abdication, the Senate voted the adoption of the constitution, based on the compromise proposed.

The act declared in the act of constitution recalled to the throne of their own right, under the title of KING of the French, Louis Stanislaus Xavier, brother of the late king, and conferred upon him the hereditary sovereignty, with which the prince was invested until he should have sworn to maintain faithfully the new constitution.

The constitution established an inviolable king, a monarch, two chambers, one hereditary and the other elective; the hereditary chamber was composed of the Senate, whose members were limited to two hundred members, one-third being fifty nominations; the elective chamber was composed of the elective members until new elections; their dotations were added to the members of the Senate, and salaries to those of the legislative chamber. Executive power was invested exclusively in the king, including the prerogative of making peace and war; the legislative power to be exercised conjointly by the two chambers; there was to be no nobility; religious liberty, industry, and the liberty of the press were recognised principles; the Legion of Honour was to be maintained, the two no-

blesse, the privileges enjoyed by the army, the public debt was to be respected, and what was called national sales, and lastly an act of oblivion for all acts and votes prior to, &c. &c.

These conditions, drawn up in terms simple, clear, and sufficiently general to allow many after-alterations, were voted on the evening of the 6th. On the 7th, the constitution was printed, and on the 8th published in the different quarters of the capital. It must be acknowledged that it did not produce a favourable impression. The Senate ought to have been strongly supported in the present instance, for it was that body alone who could transfer the crown from Napoleon to the Bourbons, that body only who in the transfer had any title to represent the nation, and obtain favourable conditions for her, but the Senate, that for so many reasons ought to have been supported, was neither esteemed nor loved by anybody. The Bonapartists reproached the Senate with having lifted a parricidal hand against their founder; the friends of liberty, scarcely awakened from a long sleep, saw in the Senate only the servile instrument of an insupportable despotism; lastly, the systematic royalists, considering that body as the representative of the Revolution and the empire, were indignant that the senators, degraded as they were, should dare to dictate conditions to the legitimate king; and such conditions! conditions borrowed from a detested revolution. This was, in the eyes of the royalists, an act of rebellion, of impudence and unheard-of effrontery. To oppose the Senate, they had recourse to the simplest means—those adopted by M. de Montesquiou; they attacked the Senate in its weak point, and exclaimed, as did the entire public, against the solicitude displayed by the Senate in guarding their own interests, by securing the perpetuity of their own incomes. The press took up the cry, not in the form of newspapers, but of pamphlets, which were the fashion of the day, and endless reprobation and bitter pleasantries were poured out against the *conservative* senators, who, of all they had undertaken to conserve, had only succeeded in taking care of their own incomes. Convicted avarice is one of those vices against which it is most easy to excite public laughter, for men generally condemn most loudly in others the failings to which they are most subject themselves. Consequently, a universal and contemptuous laugh was raised against the Senate. The public fell into the snare, and did not perceive that in mocking the Senate, they became themselves the partisans of emigration, whose evil consequences were at this time much more to be feared than the acts of the Senate. This was a misfortune which temperate and enlightened men—always so rare in times of revolution—could alone appreciate. But the mass of the public, joining their voice to that of the royalists, seemed to say to the senators, “Begone with the master that you knew neither how to restrain nor defend!”

The royalists, who were not very expert in the trade of politics, for they had been long out of practice, endeavoured to play off the legislative corps against the Senate, but without much success. The legislative corps, prorogued by Napoleon, on account of its recent

manifestation, had not been legally convoked. But the question of legality presents little difficulty at a time when sovereigns are being dethroned, and the members of the legislative council assembled in full force, to play their part in the new revolution. Finding the first place already taken by the Senate, who, of their own authority, had pronounced the deposition of Napoleon and the recall of the Bourbons, and whom the foreign sovereigns recognised as the sole existing authority, the members of the legislative corps were obliged to play a secondary part, and follow the others; they were evidently jealous. Though they had not formerly shown more firmness than the Senate, and possessed still less intelligence, they enjoyed a certain amount of popularity in consideration of their mode of acting in the previous December, and the royalists, divining their jealousy, began to flatter for the purpose of making use of them. However, these intrigues could be of very little consequence. The legislative corps, obliged to utter a few words of assent to the important resolutions that had just been adopted, might indeed hold a language somewhat different to that of the Senate, but was incapable of putting forth antagonistic resolutions, and the Bourbons were, consequently, to return, bound by the constitution of the 6th of April, or by one nearly similar: this was the important point.

M. de Caulaincourt, who had been especially charged to advocate the interests of Napoleon and his family, saw with grief the influx of adhesions that poured into Paris since the fact of the unconditional abdication had become known. Marshals Victor, Oudinot, Lefebvre, and a crowd of generals, had hastened to send in their allegiance to the Provisional Government. The ministers of the empire assembled round Maria Louisa at Blois had, for the most part, done the same, and at their head was Prince High-Chancellor Cambacérès. It was only the field-officers who were at a distance, Marshals Soult, Suchet, Augereau, Davout, and General Maison, commanding respectively the armies of Spain, Catalonia, Lyons, Westphalia, and Flanders, who did not speak out, for they had not had time. But the Provisional Government had despatched emissaries to summon them officially, and beg them earnestly to support the new order of things, pointing out, at the same time, the uselessness and danger of resistance; and, with the exception of Marshal Davout, the obstinacy of whose temper was well known, favourable replies were expected from all of these, and it must be said that such expectations were well grounded, for, Napoleon having once abdicated, what interest, public or private, could be alleged in favour of a prolonged resistance?

Each passing day, in giving fresh strength to the new Government, rendered Napoleon weaker, and his representatives more dependent on the negotiators with whom they had to treat. Alexander had, with a high sense of honour, warned M. de Caulaincourt of this, and advised him to hasten: "for," he said, "the most I shall be able to do, in exerting all my authority, will be to secure the fulfilment of what I have promised." In fact, Alex-

ander's weakness in placing Napoleon so near the European continent, by granting him the island of Elba, was loudly condemned in the allied camp, and in the *salons* of the Provisional Government. There was one person in particular, the Duke d'Otranto, who, having had a mission to Murat during the last campaign, was in despair at being absent from Paris whilst a revolution was being effected, and thus allowing M. de Talleyrand to play the most conspicuous part. Less suited than the latter to negotiate with the European cabinets, he was much fitter to conduct intrigues with the different bodies of the State; and had he been at Paris he would have acquired an influence almost equal to that of M. de Talleyrand. But, fated to play only the second part, he went, came, blamed, approved, advised, and exclaimed against the idea of according the isle of Elba to Napoleon, for whom he entertained as much hatred as fear. He called Alexander's generous imprudence folly, and by dint of talking he had excited a strong opposition against the conditions promised to the deposed emperor. On the other hand, Austria was unwilling to grant a principality in Italy to Maria Louisa: it was even doubtful whether she would consent to accord Parma and Plaisance; but she absolutely refused Tuscany. In fact, even the Provisional Government entertained objections. This Government did not wish to concede to Napoleon the honour of stipulating certain advantages for the army, such as the conservation of the tricolor cockade and the Legion of Honour, asserting that he had no longer any interest in such things; the Provisional Government also contested the pecuniary conditions, less on account of the expense to the treasury, than because these concessions implied a recognition of the imperial reign. But Alexander had declared his opinion decidedly, and even with a kind of anger, and gave his allies to understand that they were under sufficient obligations to him not to force him to break his word. He therefore wished for an immediate decision. But M. de Metternich had remained at Dijon with the Emperor of Austria, not caring to appear at Paris whilst Maria Louisa was being dethroned; and Lord Castlereagh, not wishing to become responsible to the two English Houses for the recall of the Bourbons, which, however, he ardently desired, had delayed coming to Paris. The arrival of these two ministers was announced for the 10th, and it was impossible to conclude without them.

A slight incident was very near interrupting the negotiations and giving events an entirely new course. If some of Napoleon's adherents exhibited hourly evidences of moral fear, the greater number became more warm at sight of the general weakness. The latter forgot that a few days before they too had participated in the general feeling of weariness, and had cursed a hundred times the exorbitant ambition which had caused their blood to flow so often on the battle-field; they were now entirely impressed by the sight of the great man deserted and left almost alone at Fontainebleau. Some certainly thought bitterly of their career suddenly broken off, but all were heartily disgusted at his conduct: they

cried out against treason, and were ready to fall upon their chiefs, whom they accused of being the cause of the emperor's forced abdication. In fact, a report was circulated that the marshals had used violence to oblige Napoleon to renounce the throne. To a supposititious fact were added false details; and many hot-headed partisans were not far from proceeding to actual violence, in retaliation for imaginary wrongs, which they took pleasure in recounting. When Napoleon appeared in the court of the Fontainebleau palace, many officers brandished their swords and offered to sacrifice their lives for him. Deeply touched by such demonstrations, and calculating the forces that still remained to his lieutenants, Soult, Suchet, Augereau, Eugene, Maison, and Davout, he could not repress some feelings of regret, nor prevent their manifestation. Sympathizing with this sentiment, young, generous, but thoughtless men, who experienced for him an increased enthusiasm, had, on the night of the 7th and 8th, exhibited more than usual emotion. The old Chasseurs and Grenadiers of the Guard, who had remained at Fontainebleau, distinguished themselves especially on this occasion: they traversed the streets of the little town, crying out, "Long live the emperor! down with the traitors!" They threatened to massacre those whom they qualified as traitors, and wildly demanded to be led on to Paris. However, after yielding a moment, Napoleon, seeing in his cooler reason that no great advantage could be drawn from such a movement, sent his most faithful servants to calm a fruitless ebullition of feeling. This burst of emotion was the last effort of a flame that was about to expire.

One of the officers who did not take part in these imprudent regrets, and feared the consequences, had had the cowardice to inform the allies, adding the falsehood that Napoleon had escaped from Fontainebleau, intending to put himself at the head of the armies of Italy, Catalonia, and Spain.* When this intelligence reached the head-quarters of the sovereigns, great alarm was excited. After the desertion of the sixth corps, which was involuntary on the part of the soldiers, individual desertions became frequent in the army, and there did not now remain to Napoleon more than 40,000 men. The idea of these 40,000, led on by him, and possibly sustained by the Parisians, caused an indescribable terror to the 200,000 allied troops that were at Paris, and who were about to be joined by 200,000 more: they knew no rest whilst they entertained a doubt on the subject. Alexander, with his characteristic mobility, passing suddenly from extreme confidence to extreme distrust, thought he had been deceived by Napoleon's representatives, and even forgetting M. de Caulaincourt's stainless honour, suspected that fidelity to his master had stifled his sincerity and that he and the two marshals had come to Paris to hide a great military manoeuvre. This suspicion might have had some foundation when they first came to Paris a few days before and had not pledged their word, but at the actual time it

was an illusion conjured up by fear. Alexander sent for the three plenipotentiaries, expressed his discontent, and even went so far as to say, that, had he followed his first impulse and the advice of his allies, he would have had them arrested. M. de Caulaincourt haughtily rejected the suspicions cast upon him: he said that after the generous frankness the Russian monarch had displayed in treating with them, they would have scorned to become accomplices even in a *ruse de guerre*: he asserted that the allied sovereigns had been shamefully misled, and offered to become a prisoner until the truth should be ascertained. Alexander did not accept this offer, and, to prove that his suspicions had not been lightly conceived, he told M. de Caulaincourt the name of the informer. The latter was indignant, and it was instantly agreed that officers should be sent to Fontainebleau to make inquiries. Some hours after, these officers returned with an exact report of what had passed. According to their report, the affair had consisted of a kind of military sedition, that had died out of itself, Napoleon not wishing to profit by it.

Here was an additional reason for hastening the *dénouement*. But this was not the sole cause, for every moment, reports were spread of the arrival of the Count d'Artois, and should this prince once enter Paris, received, as he would undoubtedly be, with the loud acclamations that ever welcome new arrivals, it might become impossible to obtain any thing for Napoleon. Alexander had indeed promised not to admit the Count d'Artois into Paris before the conventions relative to the imperial family should be signed, and this was an additional reason for despatch. Matters were accordingly expedited. In the first place, it was thought unwise to live under a tacit armistice, which might at any moment be broken without criminating any one. A formal armistice was therefore drawn up for all the armies, and particularly for that encamped round Fontainebleau. Touching the latter, it was agreed that it should be separated from the allied troops by the Seine, from Fontainebleau to Essonne; from this place, the river of the same name should form a line of demarcation as far as the cantonnements extended. This armistice signed, the arrangements for Napoleon and his family were proceeded with.

The cession of the isle of Elba, though more than once contested at the instigation of M. Fouché and the Austrian ministers, was not questioned, thanks to the decided opinion pronounced by Alexander. It was agreed that Napoleon should be sole sovereign of this island, and retain during his life the title by which he was known to the world,—that of emperor. It was also agreed that he should be accompanied by seven or eight hundred men of the Old Guard, who should serve both as an escort of honour and a means of defence. The next question under consideration was a provision for Maria Louisa and her son. M. de Metternich had arrived the 10th of April, and refused Tuscany, saying that Alexander's willingness to give up that province was only being generous at the expense of others. Parma and Plaisance were assigned to the mother and son. Next came the pecuniary arrangements. Napoleon was to have an an-

* M. de Caulaincourt, who knew the author of this treason, did not wish to entail on him the contempt of posterity, and forbore to record his name in his memoirs.

nual income of two millions, and a like sum was to be divided between his brothers and sisters. These sums were to be partly obtained from the French treasury and partly from the immense revenues of the countries yielded by France. On these conditions, Napoleon pledged himself to give up the entire treasury extraordinary, as well as the crown diamonds. Out of this treasury extraordinary he was allowed to distribute two millions in ready money to officers whose services he wished to recompense. A principality was promised to Prince Eugene when the territorial question should be definitely settled. Lastly, the Empress Josephine was to receive her pension, which was reduced to a million.

It was only after protracted debates that these arrangements were adopted. The Provisional Government opposed them, not on account of the extent of the pecuniary sacrifices involved, but on account of the implied recognition of the imperial reign. Alexander wished that Napoleon's representatives should meet M. de Talleyrand and the allied ministers in a general assembly. The discussion was warm; and Marshal Macdonald, whom the petty details of this discussion rendered indignant, energetically supported the cause of the imperial family. At length the insolence and pride of M. de Caulaincourt, which surpassed even the habitual haughtiness of M. de Talleyrand, put an end to the debate, and the general conditions were agreed on. It was the 10th of April, and the approaching arrival of the Count d'Artois was announced.

On the 11th there was a general assembly of the ministers of the different Powers, of the members of the Provisional Government, and of Napoleon's representatives. The treaty was signed by the ministers of the allied monarchs, in separate copies, and M. de Talleyrand, in the name of the royal Government, without adhering to the treaty himself, guaranteed the execution of the conditions that concerned France. M. de Caulaincourt then, for the first time, produced the act of abdication and presented it to M. de Talleyrand, by whom it was received with undisguised joy.

Such was the end of the greatest power that had reigned in Europe since the days of Charlemagne, and the conqueror who had signed the treaties of Campo-Formio, of Lunéville, of Vienna, of Tilsit, of Bayonne, and of Presbourg, was obliged to accept, through the medium of his noble-minded representative, not the treaty of Châtillon, which he was perfectly right to refuse, but the treaty of the 11th of April, which accorded to him the isle of Elba, with a pension for himself and his family: terrible example of the chastisement that Fortune reserves for those who allow themselves to be intoxicated by her favours!

These signatures being exchanged, M. de Talleyrand, with a mixture of dignity and courtesy, said to the three envoys of Napoleon that, their duty toward their unhappy master being amply fulfilled, the Government now reckoned on their adhesion, and attached importance to it, on account of their personal merit and high reputation. To this speech M. de Caulaincourt replied that his duty to Napoleon would not be fully discharged until all the subscribed conditions should have been

fulfilled. Marshal Ney replied that he had already given in his adhesion to the Bourbon Government, and was ready to repeat the act. "I," said Marshal Macdonald, "shall follow the example of M. de Caulaincourt." After these explanations, the meeting broke up, and M. de Caulaincourt, accompanied by Marshal Macdonald, set off immediately for Fontainebleau.

Shortly before the treaty of the 11th of April was signed, Napoleon demanded from M. de Caulaincourt that he should send back the act of abdication. Though he was in no way deceived as to the sentiments of Austria, and understood perfectly well that Francis II., though loving his daughter, would prefer the interests of his empire to hers, he had still flattered himself that if Maria Louisa had an interview with her father she would obtain something, perhaps Tuscany, to which he attached special importance as being in the neighbourhood of the isle of Elba. He therefore advised her, in the secret correspondence kept up between them, to apply to the Emperor Francis. Maria Louisa, following this advice, sent several emissaries to Dijon, and received from her father protestations of tenderness of a nature to inspire hope. At the same time, erroneous information received by Napoleon made him believe that Francis II. disapproved the haste with which the regency of Maria Louisa had been condemned for the benefit of the Bourbons. It was in consequence of this erroneous information that Napoleon had recalled his act of abdication, but without insisting on it, for he soon discovered the shallowness of the information he had received. M. de Caulaincourt had flatly refused to break off the negotiations. Napoleon, appreciating his motives of action, received M. de Caulaincourt and Marshal Macdonald with much cordiality and many expressions of gratitude. He took the treaty from their hands, read it, and approved of it, with the exception of the refusal of Tuscany, which he regretted. He thanked his two negotiators warmly, especially Marshal Macdonald, from whom he could not have expected such friendly conduct. He afterward dismissed both, as if desirous of taking some repose, and wished to defer until the morrow the renewal of the conversation.

Scarcely had the negotiators left, than the emperor, according to his wont, recalled M. de Caulaincourt, anxious to pour forth his feelings in the confidence of friendship. He was calm, more gentle than ordinary, and there was something solemn in his tone and gesture. During the late extraordinary events, M. de Caulaincourt had profoundly admired the mental strength with which Napoleon had restrained his emotions, and raised himself, as to speak, on the wings of his genius, above ordinary things; but he seemed at the present moment to rise higher than ever, and spoke of passing events with extraordinary disinterestedness. He again thanked M. de Caulaincourt, and this time personally, for his conduct, which had inspired him with the deepest sense of gratitude, but not the slightest surprise. He repeated that the treaty had amply provided for his family, and afforded more than enough for him, who really wanted nothing; but, at the same time, he expressed his regret

about Tuscany. "It is a fine principality," said he, "and would have suited my son. On this throne, where mental power is hereditary, my son might have been happy,—happier, perhaps, than on the throne of France, continually exposed to revolutionary storms, and where my race has only one claim,—victory. Besides, this throne would have been necessary to my wife. I know her: she is good-hearted, but weak-minded and frivolous. My dear Caulaincourt," he added, "Cæsar might again return to the rank of a citizen, but his empress could scarcely surrender the rank of Cæsar's wife. Maria Louisa would have found at Florence something of the splendour with which she was surrounded at Paris. She would only have had to cross the Piombino Canal to pay me a visit; my prison would have been, as it were, enlocked in her states; under these circumstances, I could have hoped to see her, I might even have been able to visit her; and when the European Powers would have been convinced that I had renounced the world, and, like a new Sancho, *I only thought of the welfare of my island*, they would have sanctioned these little trips; I should have enjoyed a happiness of which I knew little amid all the splendour of my glory. But now that my wife would be obliged to come from Parma and traverse so many foreign states to come to me—God only knows! But let us quit this subject. You have done all you could, and I thank you: Austria is utterly heartless."

The emperor again pressed M. de Caulaincourt's hand, and spoke of his entire life with extraordinary impartiality and incomparable greatness of mind.

He acknowledged that he had deceived himself: that, enamoured of France, of the rank she held in the world, and of the higher rank she might attain, he had wished to raise, with her and for her, a sovereign empire, upon which all the other empires of Europe would have been dependent, and he acknowledged that, after having almost realized this glorious dream, he had not had the good sense to pause at the limit traced by the nature of things. He afterward spoke of his generals, recalled Massena to memory, and declared that of all his lieutenants he had performed the highest deeds; he did not speak of the campaign in Portugal, only too well justified, alas! by our misfortune in the Peninsula, but he repeated what he had already said more than once, that there was one thing wanted to the noble defence of Genoa in 1800, and that was twenty-four hours' longer resistance. He spoke of Suchet, of his profound wisdom in war and administration, said something of Marshal Soult and his ambition, did not utter a word about Davout, of whom he had lost sight for the past two years, and who at that very moment was performing at Hamburg prodigies of valour, of which France knew nothing. He afterward spoke of Berthier, of his good sense, his honesty, and his rare talents as head of the staff. "I love him," he said, "and he has just caused me great pain of mind. I begged him to pass some time with me in the isle of Elba, and he did not seem willing to consent. And yet I would not have retained him long. Do you suppose that I would wish to prolong indefinitely an idle and useless life? This

proof of devotedness might not have cost him much. But his heart is broken; he is a father, he thinks of his children; he fancies he might be able to keep the principality of Neuchâtel: he is mistaken, but his error is excusable. I love Berthier, I shall never cease to love him. Ah, Caulaincourt, without being indulgent, it is impossible to judge men correctly, and, above all, to govern them!" Then Napoleon spoke of his other generals; he named Gérard and Clausel as the hope of the French army, and made some reflections, not bitter, but sad, on the eagerness exhibited by certain officers to abandon him. "Why do they not act frankly?" he said. "I see their desire, their embarrassment, I try to put them at their ease, I tell them they have nothing more to do but to enter the service of the Bourbons, and, instead of profiting of the offered opportunity, they make me empty protestations of fidelity, and afterward send their adhesion underhand to Paris, and frame a pretext for leaving me. I detest dissimulation. It is very natural that old soldiers covered with wounds should seek to preserve under the new Government the reward of the services they have rendered to France. Why deny their motives of action? But men never see clearly what they ought to do, and what is due to them; they seldom speak or act consistently. My brave Drouot is very different. He is not satisfied, I see it clearly; but it is not through personal feeling, but on account of our poor France. He is not pleased with me; but he will, however, remain with me, less through personal affection for me, than through respect for himself. Drouot! Drouot! he is virtue itself!"

Napoleon spoke afterward of his ministers. He appeared to feel that not one of them had come from Blois to bid him farewell. He spoke of the Duke de Felire as he had always thought of him, which was not very flattering. He spoke highly of the honesty, knowledge, and attention to business displayed by the Duke de Gaete and Count Mollien. He afterward expatiated on the character of Admiral Decrès. Though he had no personal affection for this minister, he seemed to attach an importance to him proportionate to his abilities. "He is hard-hearted, pitiless in his remarks," said Napoleon, "he takes pleasure in making himself detested; but he is of a high order of mind. The misfortunes that befell the navy are not attributable to him, but to circumstances. He prepared, with very little expense, a magnificent fleet. Caulaincourt, I had one hundred and twenty ships-of-the-line. England, whilst walking over the waters, did not sleep. She has done me much harm, undoubtedly; but I have left a poisoned arrow in her side. It is I who augmented that national debt that will press on future generations, and will become an unceasingly oppressive, if not overwhelming, burden to her." Napoleon also spoke of M. de Bassano, M. de Talleyrand, and the Duke of Otranto. "Bassano is falsely accused," he said; "but in all ages a victim has been sacrificed to public opinion. My most serious resolves have been imputed to him. You know—you, who have seen all, know—how it really is. He is an honest man, well informed, industrious, devoted, and of inviolable fidelity. He has not Talleyrand's *esprit*, but he is far

better. Talleyrand, whatever may be said to the contrary, has not opposed me a whit more than Bassano in the acts with which I am reproached. He has just found a part suited to him, and has invested himself with it. As to the rest, it is to be wished that the Bourbons would govern in his spirit. He will be a valuable adviser for them; but they are no more capable of keeping him six months than he is of remaining six months with them. Fouché is a wretch. He will go about busying himself, and will embroil every thing. He hates me intensely, and fears me as much. That is why he would wish to see me at the extremity of the ocean."

This conversation was interminable, and M. de Caulaincourt admired Napoleon's judgment, impartial, but generally indulgent, in which there appeared scarcely a trace of human passion. At this moment Count Orloff was announced; he brought the ratification of the treaty of the 11th of April, which the Emperor Alexander had had the courtesy to forward immediately. Napoleon appeared annoyed at this, and did not wish to part with M. de Caulaincourt, nor was he very anxious to place his signature to such an act. He continued the conversation, and, after having spoken of others, he spoke of himself, of his position, and said, with an accent of profound grief, "Undoubtedly I suffer; but amid my many causes of grief there is one which exceeds all the rest: it is the idea of finishing my career by signing a treaty in which I have not been able to stipulate one general interest, not even one moral interest, such as the preservation of our colours, or the maintenance of the Legion of Honour: to sign a treaty by which I receive money. Ah, Caulaincourt, but for my son, my wife, my sisters, my brothers, Josephine, Eugene, Hortense, I would tear the treaty in a thousand pieces! Ah, if my generals, who so long displayed such great courage, had only been courageous two hours longer, I would have changed our destinies. If even this contemptible Senate, which apart from me has no power to negotiate, had not taken my place, if I had been allowed to stipulate conditions for France, with the force I still retain, with the fear I still inspire, I would have turned our defeat to a very different purpose. I would have obtained something for France, and afterward sunk into oblivion myself. But to leave France so little, after having received her so great! What misery!"

And Napoleon seemed overwhelmed by the weight of this reflection. In contemplating the faults of others he beheld his own; for, in fact, if his generals had at last refused to follow him, it was because he had exhausted them; if the Senate had not allowed him to act, it was because they felt the necessity of snatching the power from his hands in order to terminate a fearful crisis. He perceived all these truths, without giving them utterance; and in judging, he punished himself; for it is so that Providence chastises the man of genius,—deputing to him the task of self-condemnation, of self-torture, by the clearness with which he views the past and future. Then, with still greater grief, Napoleon added, "And these humiliations are not the last. I am about to traverse those southern provinces, where men's passions are so violent.

Let the Bourbons get me assassinated; I can pardon that; but I shall be perhaps abandoned to the insults of this abominable populace of the south. To die on the field of battle is nothing; but amid filth, and by such hands."

Napoleon seemed at this moment to foresee with horror, not death, which he was accustomed to brave, but degrading punishment. Observing that the conversation had lasted very long, he apologized for having detained M. de Caulaincourt, and dismissed him with the most affectionate expressions, saying he should send, did he need him again. M. de Caulaincourt left, profoundly impressed by what he had heard, and seeing, as he thought, in these long recapitulations, and in the emperor's decisive judgment on himself and others, an adieu to worldly pomp but not to life. He was mistaken. Napoleon himself believed that he was bidding farewell to life, when he poured forth his feelings in that manner. He had, in fact, taken the strange resolution—one wholly unworthy of him—of committing suicide. Persons of an active temperament rarely conceive a disgust of life: they make too much occupation for themselves to wish to renounce existence. Napoleon, who was one of the most active of the human race, had, therefore, no suicidal tendencies; he, on the contrary, despised self-destruction, as a reckless renunciation of the chances the future may present,—chances that are as numerous as unexpected for him who knows how to bear up under the temporary burden of evil days. Nevertheless, in adversity, even when most courageously supported, there are moments of dejection, when the mind and the heart bow beneath the weight of misfortune.

Napoleon experienced on this day one of those moments of insurmountable depression. The treaty relative to his family being signed, the honour of the sovereigns pledged for its fulfilment, he believed that his son, his wife and relations were provided for, and he thought he had fulfilled his last duties. It seemed to him that for honest people his death would impress on the engagement he had signed a sacred character, and that, ceasing to fear, they would also cease to hate him. Therefore, believing his career at an end, and feeling it impossible to realize the idea of existence in a small Mediterranean island, where he would only breathe the hot air of Italy, not even reckoning on the sweet ties of home affections—for in this moment of sinister clairvoyance he foresaw that he would be deprived of his son, of his wife,—humiliated at being obliged to sign a treaty exclusively personal and, in point of fact, pecuniary, wearied of hearing every day the murmurs of public maledictions, beholding with horror the prospect of being abandoned to the insults of a despicable populace, he for a moment detested life, and resolved to have recourse to poison, which he had long kept in his possession to be used in extremity. In Russia, on the morning of the sanguinary battle of Malo-Jaroslawetz, after the sudden irruption of the Cossacks, which had involved him in personal danger, he foresaw the possibility of becoming a prisoner to the Russians, and requested Doctor Yvan to supply him a strong draught of opium, as a means of escaping the intolerable torture of adorning the conqueror's

ar. Doctor Yvan, understanding the necessity of such a precaution, prepared the required dose, and took the precaution of enclosing it in a little bag, so that the emperor could always carry it about with him. On his return to France, Napoleon did not wish to destroy it, and had placed the poison among his travelling-equipments, where it still remained.

At the close of the day, occupied by these overwhelming reflections, seeing his family provided for, and, as he believed, doing them no injury by his death, he selected this night of the 11th of April to escape the labour of life, which he could no longer support, after having drawn it so heavily upon him; taking from his travelling-apparatus the formidable dose, he diluted it with a little water, swallowed it, and then lay back in his bed, where he believed he was about to take his last sleep.

Awaiting thus the effects of the poison, he wished to bid a last adieu to M. de Caulaincourt, and, above all, express his last wishes with regard to his wife and son. He had M. de Caulaincourt called about three in the morning, and, apologizing for disturbing his sleep, said he had some important instructions to add to those he had already given. His features were scarcely distinguishable in the fading light; his voice was weak and changed in tone. Without mentioning what he had done, he took from under his pillow a letter and a portfolio, and presenting them to M. de Caulaincourt he said, "This portfolio and this letter are intended for my wife and son, and I pray you to deliver them with your own hand. My wife and son will both stand in need of your prudent and honest advice, for their position will soon be perilous, and I beg you not to abandon them. In this case," pointing to his travelling-case, "is to be given to Eugene. Tell Josephine I thought of her before quitting the world. Keep this memoire in remembrance of me. You are an honest man: you have always told me the truth. Embrace me." At these last words, which could leave no doubt as to the resolution adopted by Napoleon M. de Caulaincourt, though not easily moved, seized the hands of his master, and bathed them with tears. He suddenly perceived a glass near the emperor, in which there were still some traces of the deadly draught. He questioned the emperor, whose sole reply was to beg him to restrain his feelings, not to quit him, but allow him to finish his agony in peace. M. de Caulaincourt endeavoured to escape and call for assistance. Napoleon first entreated, then commanded, him to do nothing of the kind: he did not desire any commotion, he did not wish that a stranger eye should gaze upon his death-stamped features.

M. de Caulaincourt seemed paralyzed, and remained standing near the bed where that prodigious life was about to be terminated, when Napoleon's face became suddenly convulsed. He was suffering intensely, but endeavoured to resist the pain. Violent spasms soon came on, indicative of approaching discharges of the stomach. After resisting for some time his natural movement, Napoleon was obliged to yield. A part of the dose he had taken was thrown up in a silver basin held by M. de Caulaincourt. The latter profited of this op-

portunity to withdraw for a moment and call assistance. Doctor Yvan came quickly. In his presence every thing was explained. Napoleon begged a last service from the physician: it was to renew the dose of opium, as he feared that which remained in his stomach might not be sufficient to effect his object. Doctor Yvan appeared horrified at the proposal. He had in Russia supplied his master with poison, to furnish him with the means of escaping from a fearful position; but he bitterly regretted having done so, and now, when Napoleon insisted on the renewal of the dose, he fled from the chamber and did not return. At this moment General Bertram and M. de Bassano arrived. Napoleon begged they would not divulge this sad episode of his life, which he still hoped would be the last. In fact, there was every reason to believe so; for he seemed very much sunken and almost exhausted. He fell into a lethargy which lasted several hours.

His faithful servants stood round, motionless and dismayed. From time to time the emperor experienced dreadful pains of the stomach, and said, several times, "How difficult death is here, and how easy on the field of battle! Ah, why did I not die at Arcis-sur-Aube?"

Night closed without bringing fresh misfortunes. Napoleon began to believe that he had not reached the term of his life, and the devoted friends that surrounded him hoped so too: they were happy that he had escaped death, though believing that life could possess little attraction for him now. During these proceedings, Marshal Macdonald was announced. He was desirous, before quitting Fontainebleau, to pay his respects to the deposed emperor. "I would willingly receive this worthy man," said Napoleon; "but he must wait a little. I would not wish him to see me in my present condition." Count Orloff awaited the ratifications, for which he had come. It was the morning of the 12th; at this hour the Count d'Artois was about to enter Paris, and many persons were eager to quit Fontainebleau. Napoleon wished to recover a little before admitting any one into his presence.

After a lethargy of considerable length, M. de Caulaincourt and one of the three personages initiated in the secret of the poisoning, took Napoleon in their arms and placed him near an open window. The air sensibly revived him. "Fate has decided it," he said to M. de Caulaincourt: "I must live and await what Providence has appointed me." He then consented to receive Marshal Macdonald. The latter was introduced without being informed of the carefully-guarded secret. He found Napoleon lying on a *chaise-longue* and was horrified at the state of exhaustion in which he was. He respectfully expressed his concern.* Napoleon affected to attribute his illness to an affection of the stomach, to which he was subject, and which already announced the malady of which he died. He affectionately pressed the marshal's hand. "You are," he said, "an honest man, whose generous conduct toward me I appreciate, and I would I could testify my gratitude toward you otherwise than by words."

* This is the marshal's own recital in his still manuscript memoirs.

But honours are no longer at my disposal; money I have not; and, besides, it would not be worthy of your acceptance. But I can offer you a token of remembrance, which will, I hope, be acceptable." He then asked for a sword that was lying near his pillow, and, presenting it to the marshal, said, "This is the sword of Mourad Bey: it was one of the trophies of the battle of Aboukir; I have often worn it. You will keep it in remembrance of our late transactions, and you will transmit it to your children." The marshal accepted this generous gift with profound emotion; he embraced the emperor with intense feeling. They separated never to meet again, though neither had finished his career. The marshal set off immediately for Paris. Berthier had also left, promising to return, but in a manner that had not convinced his old master. "You will see that he will not come back," said Napoleon, sadly, but without bitterness.

During this interval, M. de Caulaincourt had at length found time to remit to Count Orloff the ratification of the 11th of April, with the imperial signature attached. He returned to Napoleon, who had just received an extremely affectionate letter from Maria Louisa. This letter gave him the most gratifying intelligence of his son, and expressed boundless devotedness on the part of the empress, who declared her determination of joining him as soon as possible. This letter produced an extraordinary effect on Napoleon. It in some sort recalled him to life. It was as though a new existence had been presented to his powerful imagination. "Providence has decreed it," he said to M. de Caulaincourt. "I will live: who can penetrate the future? Besides, my wife, my son, will be all-sufficient for me. I shall see them, I hope I shall see them often. When the allied Powers will be convinced that I have no thought of quitting my retreat, they will allow me to see my family, perhaps to visit them; and then I shall write the history of what we have done. Caulaincourt," he cried, "I shall immortalize your names." He afterward added, "Even that is a reason for living."

Then, with extraordinary mobility of feeling, filled with sudden affection for this new existence, whose image was presented to his imagination, he busied himself in the details of his establishment at the isle of Elba, and wished that M. de Caulaincourt should go in person either to Maria Louisa or the sovereigns, to arrange the mode in which his wife should join him. He had not thought of keeping any money for himself; the military chest had been exhausted in paying the soldiers. Some millions remained in the possession of Maria Louisa. Napoleon intended to leave her this sum, that she might not be forced to ask pecuniary aid from any one, and especially from her father. But when the necessity of drawing on this last remaining fund was proved to Napoleon, he consented to participate in these millions. He deputed M. de Caulaincourt to visit the empress, and again advise her to ask an interview with the Emperor Francis, who perhaps, touched by her presence, would accord her Tuscany. She was afterward to join her husband by Orleans on the Bourbonnais route. Napoleon reiterated

his injunctions to M. de Caulaincourt not to press Maria Louisa to join him, but allow her sentiments on this subject to rise spontaneously from her heart; "for," he repeated several times, "I understand women well, and particularly Maria Louisa. To offer her a prison instead of the court of France, such as I made it, would be a terrible trial. If she came, looking sad and dejected, I should be miserable. I prefer solitude to the sight of sadness or despondency. If my wife's feelings impel her to come to me, I shall receive her with open arms; if not, let her remain at Parma, or Florence, where she will ultimately reign. I shall only ask her to let me have my son."

After giving utterance to these scruples, Napoleon applied himself to the details of his journey. It was agreed that he should be accompanied to the isle of Elba by the commissioners of the allied Powers, and he appeared to set especial importance on the presence of the English commissioner. "The English," he said, "are a free people, and respect themselves." Having arranged all these details, he took leave of M. de Caulaincourt, repeating his assurance of absolute confidence and eternal gratitude. M. de Caulaincourt set out to fulfil his mission to Maria Louisa and the sovereigns.

Whilst this mournful scene took place at Fontainebleau, a very different one was being enacted at Paris; for, amid the unceasing vicissitudes of this life, joy, in her perpetual rounds, sometimes lights up, suddenly, faces long shaded by woe, withdrawing her radiance from features on which she had long shone, and which now lapse into midnight gloom. In fact, the Count d'Artois, who was then making his solemn entry into Paris, was surrounded by excited, eager, welcoming crowds.

M. de Vitrolles joined the Prince on the 7th. He found him at Nancy, assisting at a *Te Deum*, sung to celebrate what was called the deliverance of France. The Count d'Artois was seized with a very natural emotion, when he learned that he was about to enter Paris, from which he had fled in 1790, and absent from which he had lived proscribed about a quarter of a century. He was surrounded by some faithful friends, MM. François d'Escars, Jules de Polignac, Roger de Damas, de Bruges, L'Abbé de Latil, all of whom sympathized in his joy, and prepared to accompany him to the capital. The Prince left Count Roger de Damas at Nancy, where, under the title of Governor, he was to assume the administration of Lorraine, and, after having provided a uniform of the National Guard, he set out, that he might be in the neighbourhood of Paris on the day appointed for his entry.

The provinces through which the Prince and his suite journeyed, were horribly devastated. Putrid bodies of men and horses filled the air with pestilence; farm-houses were reduced to ashes; bridges were barricaded or cut down; the population had taken flight or were hidden, and some ran to the roadside, on hearing the noise of wheels different from those of cannon. They were entranced with joy on hearing intelligence of peace, and astonished when they learned the return of the Bourbons. The people evinced no pleasure on hearing the name of these princes, for in the eastern

provinces Napoleon was still regarded by the inhabitants as the defender of their native land, though his policy had drawn foreigners thither. When the royal suite arrived at Châlons, the place was empty. At Meaux, the bishop, the prefect, the public functionaries, and the principal inhabitants quitted the city, that they might not be present at the arrival of the Prince. However, when the Count d'Artois succeeded in making himself seen or heard, he never failed to make an agreeable impression. Possessing little learning, but endowed with a remarkable facility of expression, perfect gracefulness of demeanour, and a noble face, to which an aquiline nose and hanging lip gave the distinctive characteristics of his family; a marked expression of goodness and a great desire to please, rendered him universally attractive. At Châlons and Meaux, he eventually dissipated the coldness of those with whom he succeeded in obtaining an interview, and left them much better disposed than he had found them.

As he drew near Paris, M. de Vitrolles received a letter from M. de Talleyrand, informing him of what had taken place, that is to say, the adoption and publication of the Constitution of the Senate, the obligation imposed on the King of swearing to this Constitution before being invested with the royal power, and the consequent obligation on the part of the Count d'Artois to take some pledge before being recognised as lieutenant-general of the kingdom, and, lastly, the universal desire of sensible people, and especially of the allied sovereigns, to see the tricolour cockade assumed by the Bourbon princes. No sooner had M. de Vitrolles received this letter, than he ran to the Count d'Artois, exclaiming loudly against what he called the indifference, the frivolity of M. de Talleyrand, who, he said, was not able to resist any request, and for want of firmness in his view, promised sometimes to one, sometimes to another, and did not keep his word with any. The Count d'Artois was at this moment so elated with joy, that it would be difficult to mingle a feeling of sadness with his exultation. Both he and his friends entertained an instinctive repugnance to the tricolour cockade, but the constitutional subtleties troubled them less, and the Count d'Artois, astonished at the indignation of M. de Vitrolles, asked him whether what he heard was really sufficiently bad to make him take fire as he did, and above all to make such an outcry. The Prince undertook personally to calm M. de Vitrolles, and it was agreed that the latter should go secretly to Paris, to remove or elude the principal difficulties. Meanwhile the Prince continued his journey and passed the night at the Château de Livry.

M. de Vitrolles having, on the evening of the 11th, reached M. de Talleyrand's *Rue Saint-Florentin*, he found every thing as he had left it—that is to say, in extreme confusion. In the court, there were Cossacks stretched on straw; on the first floor, the Emperor Alexander, surrounded by his staff; on the entre-sol, the provisional governor; in one apartment, the members of the Government—in another, some copyists; and M. de Talleyrand, sometimes in one chamber, sometimes in another, receiving petitioners with a bland smile, and advisers with a shake of the head that involved no pledge,

being as little conclusive as possible, leaving things to time, which certainly does much, but does not do every thing. M. de Vitrolles, always very active, but less yielding in proportion as his prince drew nearer Paris, flew into a violent passion against the tricolour cockade and against the oath required of King Louis XVIII. before being invested with royal power. He seemed to say that the crown would be refused on such conditions. The colourless and ironical countenance of M. de Talleyrand presented a great stumbling-block to headlong talkers; he smiled at the threats uttered by M. de Vitrolles, and then proceeded to explanations.

Touching the cockade, a singular accident, whether fortuitous or concerted, had occurred, which had very much simplified the difficulty. Scarcely had the Constitution been proclaimed, when many royalists, intoxicated with joy, hastened to the provinces, announcing the return of the Bourbons, and wearing the white cockade in their hats, as if this emblem was to be henceforth universally adopted. Two or three of these went to Rouen, where Marshal Jourdan commanded a military division. This marshal, whose aversion to the empire and whose liberal and monarchical opinions disposed him to look favourably on the return of the Bourbons, if restricted by good laws, had shown himself willing to subscribe to the acts of the Senate; he was, moreover, told that the white cockade had been adopted at Paris, and Marshal Jourdan, attaching importance only to the essential act—the recall of the Bourbons, with a liberal constitution—made an address to his troops, announcing to them the new revolution, inviting them to give in their adhesion and assume the white cockade. He gave them the example by displaying one himself. Having only to do with scattered detachments and thinly-supplied dépôts, the marshal met no resistance. The white cockade had been accepted by the troops, and the information was circulated in Paris as a conclusive fact; so that the people of Rouen assumed the white cockade, believing they were following the example of the Parisians, and the Parisians did the same, fancying they were sanctioned by the example of the inhabitants of Rouen. Thus, the question being looked on as decided, an order was issued on the 9th, commanding the Parisian national guard to assume the white cockade, though that body had at first abhorred the idea. On this point the difficulty was nearly surmounted—at least, as far as the Parisian Guard was concerned; and, as the Count d'Artois was to wear the uniform of this guard, which was tricolour, it was hoped that a kind of compromise had been effected between the two cockades. It was, therefore, arranged that the Count d'Artois should enter the city, wearing the white cockade in his hat, and dressed in the tricolour uniform of the national guard.

As to the Constitution, the arrangement was more difficult. M. de Talleyrand, de Jaucourt, and de Dalberg, members of the Provisional Government, discussed the question with M. de Vitrolles, and did not know in what way to resolve the difficulty. During these proceedings, some of the many frequenters of the

house, having called at M. de Talleyrand's, they were admitted to the consultation, where the great difficulty was to make the Count d'Artois lieutenant-general of the kingdom, without violating the decision of the Senate, and without pledging him to an engagement opposed to his wishes, and which he was not authorized to take, not having had time to consult Louis XVIII. An expedient presented itself: this was, that M. de Talleyrand should give in his resignation as President of the Provisional Government, and transfer this presidency to the Count d'Artois. But even in this case the intervention of the Senate would be needed, and to obtain it some connection should be formed with that body. Wearied by the recurrence of so many difficulties, M. de Talleyrand said to M. de Vitrolles, "Enter Paris first, and we shall consider the rest afterward." Thus, according to his custom, he allowed things to take their own course, when he was not able to arrange them himself.

M. de Vitrolles returned on the evening of the 11th to the Castle of Livry, after having arranged that on the next day, the 12th of April, the Count d'Artois should make his entry into Paris. M. de Talleyrand had then at his command M. Ouvrard, who had just issued from the imperial prisons, and who had always been renowned for his luxurious habits. This gentleman M. de Talleyrand deputed to make arrangements for the reception of the Prince at Livry. The cavalry national guard, with six hundred infantry of the same corps, were sent to Livry, to serve as an escort of honour to the prince. The latter, radiant with joy, received them with a cordiality that touched them deeply; and, as if he wished to correct the effect of the white cockade displayed in his hat, he told them he had procured at Nancy a uniform similar to theirs, and that he would next day enter Paris dressed like them and his heart imbued with corresponding sentiments. Cheers replied to these gracious words, and for a moment the representatives of ancient and modern opinions seemed to agree.

On the following day, the 12th, a considerable influx of people had concentrated from early morning on the route and in the streets leading to the Bondy Barriere. Men born royalists, and those that the Revolution had made such—and these were not a few—were foremost to assist at the spectacle which they never could have anticipated: for, after the scaffold of Louis XVI., and the victories of Napoleon, who would have ever believed that Paris would open its gates to receive the Bourbons in triumph? And yet, with a little reflection, it might have been predicted, for we may naturally reckon on abrupt and violent reactionary movements when the rational and legitimate object of revolutions is overstepped. But who reflects, especially among the masses? At this period, so many persons had lost their fathers, their brothers, and their children on the scaffold or the field of battle, so many persons had seen their families dispersed and their property devastated, that their emotion was profound at the bare idea of again beholding a prince who was for them a living representative of a time when they were young and

believed themselves happy. Under such circumstances, the prince's defects were easily forgotten. In the expectation of beholding the prince, thousands of faces exhibited strong emotion, and many were bathed in tears. The prudent bourgeoisie of Paris—always the best representative of public feeling—had been long attached to Napoleon, who had procured them rest, combined with glory, and they had become detached from him solely on account of his faults; but they now clearly perceived that, Napoleon once overthrown, the Bourbons became his necessary and desirable successors, that the respect which surrounded their title to the throne, that the peace of whose continuance they were a pledge, that the liberty which could be so well combined with their hereditary authority, the bourgeoisie, we say, perceived that all these accompaniments were the pledges of a peaceful and enduring happiness for France. The bourgeoisie, therefore, were animated by the best sentiments toward the Bourbons, and ready to throw themselves into their arms, if they exhibited somewhat of good will and good sense. The pleasing personal appearance of the Count d'Artois was well calculated to ripen these dispositions and convert them into a universal burst of enthusiasm.

About eleven in the forenoon, the Count d'Artois, surrounded by a vast cavalcade, composed of persons of every class, but especially of the ancient nobility, took his way toward the Bondy Barriere. Every moment newcomers, high functionaries, French and foreign officers, joined the cortège, and when they became recognised the ranks opened, that they might reach the prince. The royalists, by whom he was surrounded, were highly elated. If among the persons who arrived there were any of the old nobility whose fidelity had for a moment wavered, loud cries of *Vive le roi!* burst out at their approach, and proved that forgetfulness was not a royalist quality, even with regard to one another. M. de Montmorency, who had joined the empire when everybody in France did so, and now held the rank of assistant-major-general in the national guard, arrived with his *chef*, General Desnoles, and was assailed with affected cries of *Vive le roi!* as if it were needful to teach a Montmorency affection for the Bourbons. As the cortège approached the barrier, a group of horsemen was seen in full uniform, and wearing the tricolour panache; this group consisted of the Marshals Ney, Marmont, Moncey, Kellerman, Sérurier, who had not laid aside the colours which were still those of the army. Shouts were again raised, but without violence, for an infallible instinct taught even the most impassioned friends of the prince that in the presence of these formidable men it was better to restrain their feelings. Marshal Ney headed the group. His strongly-marked features, violently contracted, revealed a feeling of discomfort, but without the slightest admixture of fear, for no person had dared to fail in respect toward him. At the cry of the "marshals," the ranks of the royal cortège instantly opened, and a passage was formed. The Count d'Artois, quickening his horse's pace, advanced toward the marshals, and pressed the hand of each. "Gentlemen," he

id, "you are very welcome; you, who have read in every quarter the glory of France. believe me, my brother and I have not been the last to applaud your high deeds." Marshal Ney, being placed near the prince, at whose reception he was much gratified, was soon more at his ease. The Provisional Government, headed by the president, waited at the barrier to conduct the prince to the streets of the capital. M. de Talleyrand pronounced some courteous phrases, respectful and sententious, to which the prince replied by highly appropriate expressions, inspired by the circumstances of the moment. The cortege then wended its way toward Notre Dame, passing through the finest streets of Paris. In the suburbs the spectacle was not very cheerful, but it was otherwise on the boulevards. The citizens, filled with hope of peace and rest, powerfully touched by the thousand memories that came thronging to their minds, and fascinated by the graceful demeanour of the prince, gave him a most cordial reception. The emotion increased as the cavalcade drew near the cathedral. At the gate, the prince was received by the Chapter. They had been taken to remove Cardinal Maury, Archbishop of Paris, *non institut*, by overhauling him with insults during eight days in the Parisian journals. Thus the intrepid defender of the royal cause in the Constituent assembly was so severely visited for some acts of weakness toward the empire that he was not included in the act of oblivion promised to all. The prince, being conducted to the royal *fauteuil* beneath the dais, became, even in the church, the object of noisy demonstrations. All the grand functionaries of the State, all the staffs, were assembled in the asilica: the Senate alone was absent. The senators, at length resuming the dignity which they ought never to have left aside, did not wish to take part in any ceremony that might imply, on their part, a recognition of the authority of the Bourbons, until the latter should have pledged themselves to maintain the constitution. Fresh exclamations broke forth when the clergy pronounced the solemn words, *Domine, salvum fac regem Ludovicum*, and the Count d'Artois, who had not heard these words pronounced since his royal brother had lost his head on the scaffold, could not restrain his tears. The ceremony being terminated, the Count d'Artois was conducted to the Tuileries, amid shouts still uttering enthusiastic acclamations. Arrived at the palace of his fathers, the emotion of the prince became so strong that he could no longer support himself; his attendants, with tears in their eyes, hastened to his aid, and the air re-echoed with cries of *Vive le roi*! Having reached the first floor of the palace, he thanked those who had accompanied him, particularly the marshals, who were now to retire. The latter, on quitting the Tuileries, and leaving the prince, surrounded by the high personages of the emigration, already felt that they would be strangers at this court, whose re-establishment they had so largely contributed, and a look of defiance and regret pressed on their faces gave expression to the sentiments of their hearts.*

The impression produced in the capital by the proceedings of the day was intense. The prince had, no doubt, contributed to this, by the gracefulness of his demeanour, by his unaffected emotions, and the appropriateness of his language; but the effect was principally owing to the great memories of the past, so powerfully awakened on the occasion. It seemed as if the nation and the old royal dynasty spoke to each other in these terms:—"We have sought our happiness apart from each other, and our paths have lain through blood and ruins; let us be happy, and let us be friends by making mutual concessions." The two parties did not, indeed, express these sentiments so clearly; but, though not exactly defined, they were profoundly felt; and if the same memories, which at this moment so deeply stirred and attracted to mutual good feeling the minds of all, did not soon become a source of discord, France might enjoy, under the race of her ancient kings, a peaceful liberty. But what profound good sense would have been needed on all sides to produce such an effect! However, it was legitimate to hope for such a result, and it was believed that the great victim at Fontainebleau, immolated through his own fault for the public welfare, would be sufficient to secure it.

The Tuileries remained open next day, and whoever appeared with a name, no matter whether his rank entitled him to the presentation or not, if he could only say that in such or such circumstances he had seen the prince and had suffered with them or for them, he was graciously received, and his hand affectionately pressed by the Count d'Artois. Each word uttered by the prince circulated instantly through Paris, and flattery, prompt to aid sentiment, compared his gracious and affable demeanour with the abrupt and harsh deportment of the deposed usurper. On every side were heard and read perpetual comparisons between the gloomy, distrustful, and often cruel tyranny of the upstart soldier, and the paternal authority, so gentle and confiding, of the ancient legitimate princes. A thousand *jeux d'esprit*, more or less just, were made on this theme. "We have had enough of glory," said M. de Talleyrand to the Count d'Artois: "pray, let us now have honour." Genius had fallen into as much discredit as glory. These two words, "genius" and "glory," so ceaselessly repeated during the last fifteen years, had given place to others in the vocabulary of flatterers, and nothing was now heard of but "right," "legitimacy," and the wisdom of early times. But so it is: each epoch has its fashionable jargon, which becomes a characteristic of the time, but to which we must not attribute more importance than it deserves.

The Bourbons being now installed in the Tuileries, nothing more remained to be done, but to remove from France, into the retreat destined for him, the conquered lion imprisoned at Fontainebleau. M. de Caulaincourt had been deputed to arrange with the foreign sovereigns the details of Napoleon's journey through France, about which some difficulties existed on account of the southern provinces through which he would be obliged to pass. It had been agreed that each of the great belligerent Powers, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and

* This is M. de Vitrolles's own recital.

England, should send a commissioner as representative to Napoleon, to insure respect for his person and the execution of the treaty of the 11th of April. On introducing M. de Schouvaloff as his commissioner, Alexander said to him, in presence of M. de Caulaincourt, "Your head shall answer to me for that of Napoleon; for our honour is at stake, and our first duty is to see that he is treated with proper respect and arrives in perfect safety at the isle of Elba." The Russian monarch had, at the same time, sent one of his officers to Maria Louisa, that she might not be incommoded either by his Cossacks or by the more enthusiastic of the royalists, who were naturally more numerous on the banks of the Loire than elsewhere.

Maria Louisa, whom we had left on the Blois route, after the battle of Paris, had travelled by short stages, sunk in despair, fearing for her husband's life, her son's crown, and for her own future fate, and, through weakness of understanding, not able to proportion these fears to the real extent of the danger. She had successively received intelligence of the taking of Paris, Napoleon's return toward the capital, his abdication, and, lastly, the appropriation of the Duchy of Parma to her and her son. She had suffered severely during her late vicissitudes, and, though not endowed with the strength of mind that prompts to high resolves, she was gentle and kind: she was sincerely attached to Napoleon, and felt a true maternal tenderness for the King of Rome. The fine Duchy of Parma, where she was to reign independently, was, without doubt, a certain indemnification for what she was losing: however, she scarcely reflected on that for the moment, and the sight of her husband, fallen from the greatest of thrones into a sort of prison, touched her weak but not callous mind. Had she followed her own impulses and the advice of Madame de Lucay, she would have hastened at once to Fontainebleau, thrown herself into Napoleon's arms, and never left him. But the desire to see her father—a desire that Napoleon had encouraged in order to obtain Tuscany—made her hesitate. Moreover, an incident insignificant in itself had produced a painful impression on her mind and strongly indisposed her against the Bonapartes. Her brothers-in-law, seeing the enemy approach from the Loire, had advised her to retire beyond, which she was averse to do, and so noisy a scene ensued that the servants, hearing the outcry, hastened to her assistance. She did not forget this annoyance, and when officers from Alexander and the Emperor Francis came to take her under their protection, she willingly went with them, not suspecting that, with her son, she was about to become a pledge that the coalition would never yield. It was afterward arranged that she should go to Rambouillet, to receive the visit of her father before her departure. The protection of Russia and Austria could not save her from a species of insult only too general in times of political catastrophe. In leaving Paris, she had brought with her the remainder of Napoleon's personal treasure, consisting of eighteen millions in gold, silver, and plate. Added to this treasure were the crown diamonds. The eighteen millions were the last

remains of what Napoleon had saved out of his civil list; and the plate was his personal property. Out of these eighteen millions some millions had been sent him to Fontainebleau, either to pay the army or defray the expenses at head-quarters, and, in virtue of a formal order from Napoleon himself, Maria Louisa had put about two millions into her travelling-carriages for her own use. About two millions were placed in the wagons of the fugitive court. The Provisional Government, being in want of money, conceived the idea of sending emissaries in pursuit of Maria Louisa, to seize this treasure, under pretext that it was money taken from the public treasury. It was nothing of the kind; but in such cases truth and justice have little weight.

According to another custom, common in similar crises, an enemy was chosen as agent, and he, too, selected from the lower ranks of the administration. This was M. Dudo, who had been expelled from the *Conseil d'Etat* by order of Napoleon. This agent, having reached Orleans, seized the ten millions placed in the treasury-wagons, Napoleon's personal plate, and a part of Maria Louisa's diamonds, notwithstanding her expostulations, and the efforts of the foreign commissioners to spare her such an insult. These imperial spoils were carried to Paris, where the new Government was much in need of funds.

From Orleans, Maria Louisa went to Rambouillet, to await the arrival of her father. The Emperor of Austria had entered Paris as the 15th of April, and had been received with great pomp by his allies and very coolly by the Parisians, who did not admire the conduct of the father of the empress. He afterward went to Rambouillet to see his daughter. He overwhelmed her with demonstrations of tenderness, and endeavoured to persuade her that all her misfortunes were attributable to her husband; that Austria had made every effort to bring about an honourable peace at Prague, at Frankfort, and lastly at Châtillon; that Napoleon had never been willing to subscribe to the conditions; that he was undoubtedly a man of genius, but wholly devoid of reason,—one who had forced the European Powers to proceed to extremities; that as for him, (the Emperor of Austria,) he could not have acted otherwise than he had done; that his duty as a sovereign had overlaid his tenderness as a father; but his paternal feelings had not been inactive, for he had procured his daughter a noble principality in Italy; that she should be sovereign there, and could devote herself to her son, and prepare for him a happy and peaceful future; that the most favored branches of the imperial house were rarely treated so well; that when the present storm should have passed away, if she wished to visit her husband, and even to live with him, she would be free to do so, but at the actual moment the wisest thing would be to remain at Vienna until she should have recovered the effects of the many painful scenes through which she had lately passed; that she would be surrounded by the attentions of her family until she should be ready to go either to Parma or the isle of Elba,—but that for the present it would be painful and inconvenient to attempt to join Napoleon, as she would be obliged to

traverse France as a prisoner; that to her husband she would be rather an embarrassment than a comfort: that the life, the safety, of the conquered and disarmed emperor, were a deposit confided to the honour of the allied monarchs; that on this subject she might make her mind easy, and take the advice of passing the first moments of this separation in the endearments of the family circle, and amid the memories of her childhood.

Maria Louisa, finding a solace for her weakness in these proposals, which were certainly made in the most affectionate manner, yielded to the wishes of her father, and consented to go to Vienna, whilst Napoleon took his way to the isle of Elba. She begged M. de Caulaincourt to assure Napoleon of her affection, of her constancy, and of her wish to join him as soon as possible, and bring her son, of whom she promised to take, and of whom she certainly did take, the greatest care.

As to the brothers, sisters, and mother of Napoleon, they had all scattered after Maria Louisa's departure, and sought to reach, as quickly as possible, the frontiers of Switzerland and Italy, in order to escape the insults with which they were threatened. As to the different ministers and agents of the Imperial Government who had accompanied the Regent to Blois, they too scattered, the greater number to go to Paris and give in their adhesion to the acts of the Senate.

Such was the fate of all who belonged to Napoleon in those days. Meanwhile he was at Fontainebleau, perfectly resigned to the rigour of his fate, anxious to see the preparations for his voyage finished: in short, he was anxious to be in the place where he was about to enjoy some kind of rest, though what its nature or duration might be he could not foresee. He each day saw solitude increasing around him. He thought it very natural that people should quit him, for these officers, who had always obeyed his commands except on the last day, were naturally anxious to rally round the Bourbons, in order to preserve the rank which was the just reward of the labours of their life. He only wished they had been a little more frank, and to encourage, he addressed them in the following noble language:—"Serve the Bourbons," he said to them; "serve them faithfully; no other course remains to you. If they act wisely, France, under their rule, may be happy and respected. I resisted M. de Caulaincourt's earnest entreaties to make me accept the peace of Châtillon. I was right. For me these conditions were humiliating; they are not so for the Bourbons. They find France as they left her, and may accept her ancient limits without compromising their dignity. Such as she is, France will still be powerful; and though geographically diminished, she will be still as morally great as before, by her courage, her arts, and her intellectual influence over the rest of the world. If her territorial extent is diminished, her glory is not. The memory of our victories will remain to her as a monument of imperishable greatness, and which will always have immense weight in the councils of Europe. Serve France under the princes who bring back at this moment fortune, so fickle in times of revolution. Serve France under them as you have

done under me. Do not make the task too difficult for them, and leave me, but give me a place in your memory."

Such was the substance of his daily conversations in the continually-increasing solitude of Fontainebleau. We have seen how Ney and Macdonald had left him. Oudinot, Lefebvre, and Moncey quitted him, each after his own fashion. Berthier had also retired, but, in some sort, by an order from his master. Napoleon had confided to him the command of the army, in order that he might transfer it to the Provisional Government, and that during this transmission he might confirm the grades bestowed as the reward of the blood shed in the last campaign. Berthier had promised to return; Napoleon expected him; but, seeing hours and days pass, but no Berthier, he began to despair of seeing him, and suffered without complaining. Instead of the arrival of Berthier, each succeeding day witnessed the departure of some officer of high rank. One left Fontainebleau on account of his health, another for family reasons or for business: all promised to return soon, but not one kept his word. Napoleon feigned to enter into the motives of each, pressed affectionately the hands of all at parting, for he knew that he was receiving their last adieus, and listened, without believing, when they promised to return quickly. Gradually the palace of Fontainebleau had become empty. In the deserted courts the noise of carriage-wheels was still sometimes heard, but after a little attention the ear discovered that these were departing vehicles. Napoleon seemed, amid these scenes, as if assisting at his own funeral. Who has not often seen, at the commencement of winter, a powerful oak throwing wide its leafless branches, whilst at its feet lie the withered *débris* of its former rich vegetation? All around, through the cold air, reigns a profound silence, and sometimes the rustle of a falling leaf is heard. The tree, motionless and proud, retains only a few yellowed leaves, and they, too, are about to fall, like the others; but it does not rear less proudly above the surrounding plain its lofty, but despoiled, head. And it was so Napoleon saw fall off, one by one, those who had accompanied him through the innumerable vicissitudes of his life. There were some who held on a day, two days at most, and who fell off on the third. All, ultimately, reached the same point. But there were a few whom nothing had been able to shake. Drouot, with disapprobation in his heart, sadness on his brow, and respect on his lips, had remained with his unfortunate master. Marshal Bertram had followed this generous example. The Dukes of Vicenza and Bassano had also remained. The Duke de Vicenza was not more of a courtier than formerly, whilst the Duke of Bassano seemed to have become a greater flatterer than ever, and thus gave an honourable excuse for his long submission, by proving that it was the result of a sincere and absolute admiration for Napoleon, alike independent of time and circumstances. Napoleon, touched by his devotedness, said, more than once, "Bassano, people say that it is you who prevented my making peace! What do you say to that? This accusation ought to make you smile, like all

those that are lavished on me at present." And Napoleon repeatedly pressed Bassano's hand, acknowledging thus, in the most noble manner, that it was himself alone who was culpable.

This protracted agony was to come to a close. The commissioners of the different Powers arrived, and Napoleon received them with perfect courtesy, excepting the Prussian commissioner, who recalled two painful remembrances: his former faults with regard to Prussia, and the odious conduct of the Prussian army in our ravaged provinces. Napoleon received the Prussian commissioner politely but coldly. Every thing being ready for the 18th, Napoleon, having received a more detailed account of what had taken place at Rambouillet, saw at a glance that this interview from which he had expected some advantage, less for himself than for Maria Louisa and the King of Rome, would only end in depriving him of their presence, and that these beloved objects, regarded not as members of his family, but as part of the pomp of his throne, would be taken from him with the throne itself. He was so exasperated at the idea that for a moment he was tempted to break the treaty of the 11th of April and to plunge into new adventures. But, soon recovering his self-command, he became resigned and determined to set off. The orders for the Governor of Elba not being sufficiently explicit, M. de Caulaincourt again went to Paris, in order to get them more precisely detailed. At length, on the morning of the 20th, every thing being ready, Napoleon determined to quit Fontainebleau. The battalion of the Guard appointed to accompany him to the isle of Elba was already *en route*. The Guard was encamped at Fontainebleau. Napoleon wished to bid them farewell. He had them drawn up around him in a circle in the castle yard, then, in presence of his old soldiers, all profoundly touched, he pronounced the following words:—"Soldiers, you, my old companions-in-arms, who have always accompanied me in the road to honour, we must at length separate. I might have remained longer among you, but to do so I should have prolonged a bitter struggle, adding, perhaps, civil to foreign war, and I could not bear the idea of longer convulsing France. Enjoy the repose you have so justly earned, and be happy. As for me, do not pity me. I have a mission, and it is to fulfil that that I consent to live, and this mission is to relate to posterity the great deeds we have performed together. I would wish to clasp you all in my arms, but allow me to embrace the flag which represents you."

Then, drawing toward him General Petit, who carried the standard, and who was an accomplished model of modest heroism, he pressed the standard and the general to his bosom, amid the cheers and tears of all present. He then sprang into his carriage with moistened eyes, having touched the hearts even of the commissioners sent to accompany him.

His journey at first proceeded slowly. General Drouot went first in a carriage. Napoleon followed in his, accompanied by General Bertrand; the commissioners of the Powers came next. During the first stages, the cavalry of

the Guard accompanied the cortège. Further on, the detachments having retired, the cortège proceeded without escort. In the early part of the journey, and even in the midst of the Bourbonnais, Napoleon was received with acclamations by the people, who, though detesting the conscription and the *drains résumés*, saw in him the unhappy hero and the valiant defender of his native land. Whilst the crowd surrounded his carriage, crying, *Vive l'Empereur!* they pressed round that of the commissioners, exclaiming, *A bas les étrangers!* Napoleon several times apologized to the foreign commissioners for manifestations of feeling that it was not in his power to prevent, but which proved, however, that he was not so unpopular throughout France as certain persons had asserted. In general, he conversed freely and gently with the functionaries he met on the route, received their adieux, and offered his, with perfect calmness.

The journey soon became painful. In the environs of Moulins the cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* ceased. *Vive le roi! Vivent les Bourbons!* were heard. Between Moulins and Lyons, the people only exhibited curiosity, without adding any more significant demonstration. Napoleon had always had many partisans in Lyons, on account of what he had done for their city and manufactures: still there was a portion of the population who professed entirely opposite sentiments. In order to avoid all open manifestations, the cortège passed through Lyons by night. Some cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* were heard, and these were the last that saluted Napoleon's ears. Passing through Valence, Napoleon met Marshal Augereau, who had just published an infamous proclamation, drawn up, it is said, by the Duke of Otranto, and concluding with these words:—"Soldiers, you are released from your oaths; you are released by the nation, in whom the sovereign power resides; you are released, if more were needed, by the abdication of a man who, after having immolated millions of victims to his insatiable ambition, has not known how to die like a soldier." Poor Augereau was still further from knowing how to die like a soldier; he had not exposed himself to death on the Saône and Rhone, where he had contributed by his weakness and incapacity to ruin the affairs of France. Napoleon, who knew nothing of Augereau's proclamation, but who was well acquainted with his unfortunate campaign, did not make him any reproach; he received him with indulgent familiarity, and even embraced him at parting. Advancing toward the south, the cries of *Vive le roi!* became more frequent, and to these were added, *A bas le tyran! A mort le tyran!* At Orange, especially, the cries were reiterated with violence. At Avignon, the excited population wildly demanded that "the Corsican" should be delivered to them, that they might tear him in pieces and throw him into the Rhone. Whilst the populace treated thus the man of genius, guilty, indeed, but covered with glory, who had so long represented in his own person the prosperity and the greatness of France, they shouted, *Vivent les Alliés!* around the carriage of the commissioners. Still, the popular favour shown to foreigners was at the moment fortunate, as but for this popularity

Napoleon, with his throat cut, might have anticipated in the waters of the Rhone the unfortunate Marshal Bruné. All the efforts of the commissioners, magistrates, and the police, were needed to prevent the commission of a horrible crime. Information was received that a vast multitude was assembled at Orgon, and that violence might be expected. These excited populations, exasperated by the conscription, the *droits réunis*, and by the long suspension of trade, were royalists in 1814, as they had been Terrorists in 1793, and only wanted an opportunity to exhibit the same sanguinary spirit again. The commissioners, upon whom lay so heavy a responsibility, saw no other means of escaping the danger than by inducing Napoleon to assume a disguise. He accordingly put on a foreign uniform, and passed for one of the officers composing the cortège. This humiliation, the most painful he had undergone, had been, we may remember, present to his mind when he swallowed the poison prepared by Dr. Yvan; but, however painful it might be to assume the disguise, it was indispensably necessary. When the cortège reached the little town of Orgon, the people, armed with a gibbet, appeared, calling for the tyrant, and threw themselves on the imperial carriage, intending to open it by force. General Bertrand alone was inside, and his life might have been sacrificed to the fury excited against his master, but that M. de Schouvaloff, springing from his carriage and addressing the multitude in French, which, like all Russians, he spoke remarkably well, endeavoured to awaken in the minds of the exasperated crowd the sentiments that a conquered man and a prisoner ought to inspire. As to the rest, his Russian uniform was of more service to M. de Schouvaloff than his eloquent speech, and he succeeded in calming the most excited of the mob. At the succeeding stages, the demonstrations of violence gradually diminished, and they entirely ceased as the cortège approached the sea.

During these severe trials Napoleon remained motionless and silent, affecting a sovereign contempt for what was going on; but he could not be insensible to the reiterated

cries of public hate, and he once actually melted into tears. He recovered himself quickly, and endeavoured to reassume a haughty impassibility, but he could not help discerning, amid the baseness of these demonstrations, that slow but infallible justice, which would be disgusting to contemplate if we only considered it in the vile instruments it employs, but which, if we raise our eyes to the source, appears as profound as terribly avenging. There remains to the great minds who have provoked this avenging power only one honour, one consolation: that is, to acknowledge, to comprehend, and resign themselves to its decrees. After having shed, not through wickedness of heart, but through excess of ambition, more blood than any Asiatic conqueror had ever poured forth, Napoleon felt, without saying it, that he deserved the violent execrations of the multitude. Alas! this many-headed multitude has often trailed in bloody mire sages and virtuous heroes, who had only merited applause; and it must be confessed that if the popular outcry was never more insulting than on the present occasion, it had often been more unjust.

This punishment was terrible, but happily short. Napoleon found at the Gulf of Saint Raphaël an English frigate, "The Undaunted," which Colonel Campbell, the English commissioner, had ordered to be prepared. He embarked on the 28th of April for the isle of Elba, and cast anchor on the 3d of May in the road of Porto-Ferrajo. On the morrow, the 4th, he disembarked amid the joyous shouts of a population proud of having for their sovereign this monarch, who had fallen from the highest throne of the universe, bringing with him, as they said, immense treasures, and about to inundate the isle with benefits. Thus, to indemnify him for the homage of the universe, he received the acclamations of some thousand islanders, who were either fishermen or miners. Empty and cruel comedy of human life! Napoleon, lord of the great empire that had extended from Rome to Lubeck, Napoleon was now the enthusiastically-received monarch of the isle of Elba.

CONCLUSION.

IN beholding this wondrous reign finish so disastrously, reflections crowd upon the mind suggested by the greatness, the variety and strange character of the events! Let us pause on these reflections before closing our recital: they may tend to our instruction, and to that of future generations.

The republican Government in 1795 had ceased to be sanguinary, without, however, enouncing the spirit of persecution, and had imposed peace on Spain, Prussia, and Northern Germany, and remained engaged in war with Austria and England,—a war kept up, so to

say, through habit, by means of admirable soldiers, and excellent but disunited generals, when there suddenly appeared in the army of the Alps a young artillery officer, of small stature, shy but haughty expression of face, striking but eccentric turn of mind, alternately taciturn or lavishly loquacious, one moment disgraced under the Republic, and then banished into the *bureaux* of the Directory, where he attracted attention by his just and profound opinions on every phase of the war, which procured him the command of Paris on the 18th Vendémiaire, and soon after the command of the

troops in Italy. Reappearing suddenly among the army as commander-in-chief, he immediately impressed an extraordinary momentum on events, crossed the Alps, whose feet only had been touched by any previous general, invaded Lombardy, turned the tide of war in that direction, conquered in succession the different armies of Austria, tired out her patience, forced her to acknowledge our conquests, and obliged her to subscribe to the immense losses she had sustained. He thus gave peace to the continent; and his astonishing deeds he expressed in language entirely new by its originality and grandeur, a language that may be called military eloquence. That this extraordinary young man should appear like a meteor on this disturbed and bloody horizon without attracting every eye and chaining every heart, would have been impossible. Even had France been ice-cold, which she never was, she would have been captivated. She was bewitched, and the entire world with her.

Of all the Powers to whom the Revolution had thrown down the gauntlet, one only remained to be conquered. This was England. Sitting aloof, upon her own element, inaccessible to us as we to her, it might have been believed that she never could become either victor or vanquished. The Directory, looking for occupation for the conqueror of Italy, and believing him to be not only the greatest captain of the century, but the most fruitful in resources, commissioned him to surmount the physical difficulties that separate us from our eternal rival. Young Bonaparte, being appointed general of the Ocean Army, did not find the preparations made to cross the Straits of Dover sufficient for the purpose, and, led on by his powerful imagination, he determined to attack England in the East. It was he that suggested the expedition to Egypt, crossed the Mediterranean, before Nelson's eyes, with five hundred sail, took Malta *en passant*, disembarked at the foot of Pompey's Pillar, conquered the Mamelukes at the Pyramids, the Janissaries at Aboukir, and, having become master of Egypt, abandoned himself during some months to wonder-picturing dreams, which embraced at the same time both the East and the West. Learning suddenly that, thanks to its anarchical nature, the Directory had been engaged in a fresh war, which, through incapacity, was badly managed, General Bonaparte abandoned Egypt, crossed the sea a second time, and by his sudden appearance surprised and delighted France, that was plunged in desolation. He had not been more prompt to covet the supreme power than France was to offer it; for, seeing his mode of directing war, administering conquered provinces, in a word, his manner of managing every thing, France had recognized in him a great political as well as a great military chief. Having become First Consul, he signed, within two years, a continental peace at Lunéville, a naval peace at Amiens, tranquillized La Vendée, reconciled the Church to the French Revolution, re-established religion, gave peace to France and to Europe, and allowed the wearied world to breathe after twelve years of blood-spilling strife. In recompense for so many prodigies, he was invested in 1802 with supreme power for life,

and he continued to win universal admiration by his efforts to reconstitute France and Europe.

Who could prevent such a man remaining in quiet, and peacefully enjoying the happiness he had procured others and himself? Some penetrating minds, seeing his devouring activity, experienced a kind of involuntary terror; but the generation of that time gave themselves up to him, with blind confidence: and, indeed, it would be difficult, in listening to this young man, to doubt his profound wisdom. There was not a single event of the terrible French Revolution that had not deeply penetrated his mind and added largely to his knowledge of human nature. He spoke of regicide, and the effusion of human blood, with horror. He considered party spirit a wild and detestable manifestation, and wished to put an end to it, by tranquillizing Vendée and recalling the emigrants. He condemned the assumption of the French Revolution, that wished to have exclusive control in religious matters, without setting any value on the pontifical authority: it was alike tyrannical for individual consciences, and dangerous for the State. Napoleon, after having arranged with the Pope, again opened the churches, and attended mass, in presence of the angry revolutionists. He had a horror of disordered finances, paper money, bankruptcy, and treated with contempt those flatterers of the populace who had abolished indirect taxation. Besides, in eloquent diatribes against Mr. Pitt, inserted in the *Moniteur*, he decried war, which was his profession, his glory, his power, and said he would be very glad if Mr. Pitt and his adherents were sent to bivouac on blood-stained battle-fields, or to cruise day and night amid ocean tempests, and learn what war really was. Lastly, what bitter railery did he not pour forth against the inventors of a universal republic, who wished to submit all Europe to a single power, and, moreover, wished to model this government on an imaginary type, drawn from their own brain! Who could teach any thing to this young man, so well instructed by the events of the French Revolution? Alas! he was so wise, so thoughtful, when called upon to judge the passions of others; but when it became necessary to resist his own, what was he?

Now the young consul possessed every thing his heart could desire, and satisfied every hope the world had formed of him. His power was limitless, in virtue not only of the laws, but of the adhesion of the nation. He was invested with supreme power for life, which ought to be sufficient for a man who was a husband but not a father; he had also the privilege of choosing his successor, a privilege that allowed him to consult at the same time the interest of the public and gratify his personal affections. As to France, she had, thanks to the revolution and to him, a position which she had never held before, and which she was never again to hold, even when she commanded from Cadix to Lubek. Her frontiers were the Alps, the Rhine, the Scheldt; in fact, all that she could wish for the maintenance of her safety and her power, for acquisitions beyond these limits were contrary to the indications of nature and the principles of sound policy. France had

emancipated Italy to the Adige, taking care to indemnify in Germany the Austrian princes who formerly had *appanages* in Italy. Acknowledging the necessity of the papal authority in matters of faith and its high utility in politics, France had restored the Pope, who was indebted to her for the safety and respect he enjoyed, and from her he expected the restoration of all his States. France wisely despised the powerless anger of the Neapolitan Bourbons. She had arranged the affairs of Switzerland with admirable wisdom. Recognising both the great and little cantons, the aristocratic and democratic cantons, because all existed, obliging them to live in peace and on terms of equality, abolishing the subjection of classes, and territorial subjection, in a word, putting in execution in the Alps the principles of 1789, without outraging nature, whose laws are always invincible, she gave, in the act of mediation, the model of all the future constitutions of Switzerland. But it was in Germany especially that the profound wisdom of the consular policy was most eminently displayed. There were German princes, stripped of their states by the cession of the left bank of the Rhine to France; there were Austrian princes, stripped of their patrimony by the emancipation of Italy. The First Consul never thought of leaving either without compensation, or allowing Germany to remain unorganized. The French revolution had already established in France the principle of secularization by the alienation of ecclesiastical property, and extending the principle to Germany, getting it recognised there, furnished ample means of indemnifying the deposed princes. With what remained of the States of the Archbishops of Treves, of Mayence, of Cologne, and with those of some other ecclesiastical princes, the First Consul collected wherewith to indemnify all the royal families that had suffered loss, and maintain in Germany a sage equilibrium. After having judiciously combined the indemnities and influences in the Confederation, after having secured suitable pensions to the deposed ecclesiastical princes, he maturely arranged his plan, and, not having at that time adopted the principle of writing treaties with his sword alone, he associated in his work Prussia, who was induced to assist through motives of interest, Russia, through self-love, and Austria, influenced by the example of the two other Powers. By these means he succeeded in procuring the adoption of the *recess* of 1803, a masterpiece of practical and profound policy. This *recess*, in fact, without involving us too deeply in German affairs, re-established in Germany order, peace, and content, and placed in our hands the balance of the Germanic interests. It also prepared for us the only alliance at that time desirable and possible, that of Prussia. France was at that moment so powerful, so dreaded, that with the alliance of one continental state she was certain of the submission of the others, and, the continent once submissive, England would be obliged to devour in silence her vexation at seeing her rival so great. Such an alliance France could at that time only form with Prussia. Austria, having lost the Low Countries, Silesia, almost the entire of Italy, and the ecclesiastical principalities, which constituted her clientèle

in Germany, was in Europe the great victim of the French Revolution, and this was an inevitable calamity. A sound policy pointed out that it would be better to humour her, even indemnify her for her losses, if possible, but at the same time showed that it would be impossible to convert her either into a friend or an ally. Russia's alliance was to be purchased only at the expense of fearful concessions in the East. With her, it was necessary to keep up courtesy without intimacy, and avoid as much as possible all actual business. Prussia alone remained, with whom it was easy to come to an understanding. This Power, gorged with church property, was ardently desirous of more, and was become what in France was called un *acquéreur de biens nationaux*. By treating Austria with respect, by showing her favour, and never pushing her to extremities, France was sure of her support. Her prudent and honest monarch was delighted with the policy of the First Consul and sought his friendship. A union with Prussia consequently assured us the submission of the entire continent and the resignation of haughty England. The First Consul had forced the latter, in subscribing to the peace of Amiens, to acknowledge our conquests, and, that which she most disliked, the conquest of Antwerp. With regard to England only one difficulty remained to be overcome: it was by humouring to induce her to pardon us all the glory we had acquired in a few years, and this was possible, for the English admired the First Consul with all the vivacity of British enthusiasm, which at least equals that of the Parisians. A word of flattery from his lips, emanating from the height of his genius, which was elevated as the most exalted throne in the world, would be sure to touch to the quick the heart of haughty Albion. It was possible that this flattery might not always be repaid with flattery; on the pinnacle of glory, to which he had attained, some English orators or some emigrant journalists might insult him; but he could well afford to despise their insolence, and leave to the world, to the English nation itself, the task of avenging him.

There remained still another Power, formerly of considerable importance, but, at the period of which we speak, lamentably fallen: we mean Spain, still under the sceptre of the Bourbons, but fallen into such a state of disintegration, and in this state so prostrate at the feet of the First Consul, that one word sent from Paris to poor Charles IV., or the wretched Godoy, was sufficient to govern her. And, allowing this work of disintegration to advance, it was evident that Spain would soon be obliged to ask from the First Consul, not only a system of policy, which she had already done, but a Government, perhaps a king.

What, then, had he to wish more for himself, or for France, he, the happy mortal who had become her head? Nothing but to persevere in this policy, which was that of force rendered supportable by moderation. No man ever enjoyed so many diverse species of glory as the conqueror of Rivoli, of the Pyramids, of Marengo, the author of the Concordat, of the treaties of Lunéville and Amiens, of the act of Swiss Mediation, of the *recess* of the Diet of 1803, of the civil code, and of the recall of the

emigrants. If one merit were wanted to complete the *fascies* of his merits, it was, perhaps, that he had not given liberty to France. But at that period the apprehension of political liberty, far from being a pretext for degrading servility, was an insurmountable principle. To the generation of 1800, liberty was only another name for the scaffold, for schism, for the Vendean war, for bankruptcy, for confiscation. The only species of liberty at that time suited to France was the moderation of a great man. But, alas! the moderation of a great man, endowed with unlimited power, even were he at the same time endowed with every gift of genius, is it not of all revolutionary chimeras the most chimerical?

But misplaced liberty produces as great evils as her total absence. This man, at that time so admirable, was, by the very fact of possessing absolute power, on the brink of an abyss. In fact, within a few months after the peace of Amiens had been signed, and when the first emotions of joy had subsided among the English, there arose before their eyes, like a mighty but importunately dazzling light, the greatness of France, unfortunately but little shaded in the person of the First Consul. Some flattering attentions offered to Mr. Fox, when he visited Paris, did not in the least detract from the attitude taken by the First Consul, as master not only of the affairs of France, but of Europe. His language, sparkling with genius and redolent of ambition, offended the pride of the English; his devouring activity disturbed their peace. He sent an army to St. Domingo, which was certainly very allowable, but he publicly sent Colonel Sebastiani into Turkey, Colonel Savary into Egypt, and General Decaen into India, charged with missions of observation, which it would be very difficult to construe into scientific missions. These movements were more than sufficient to excite British suspicions. At this period, many emigrants, who persevered in remaining in England, notwithstanding the glory and clemency of the First Consul, put forth against him and his family many publications, which, a year before, would have been universally condemned in England, but for which an imprudent jealousy now procured a favourable reception, which the spirit of the laws did not interdict. These were certainly effusions that only deserved contempt; for what pinnacle could be higher than that on which the First Consul was placed, and from which he could look down on the insults of calumny? Alas! he descended from this glorious eminence to listen to pamphleteers, and abandoned himself to bursts of passion as violent as unworthy of him. To insult him, the philosopher, the conqueror, what an unpardonable crime! As if in all times, and in every country, free or otherwise, genius, virtue, and beneficence have not been insulted! No, torrents of blood should flow because pamphleteers, who every day insulted their own Government, had insulted a stranger, certainly a great man, but, after all, only a man, and, moreover, the head of a rival nation!

From that moment the gauntlet was thrown down between the warrior who represented, in his own person, the French Revolution, and the English people, whose jealousy had not

been sufficiently soothed. Only a few days, and Malta would have been evacuated, but by a singular fatality it happened that at this moment, when all the British passions were excited, the First Consul, exercising in Switzerland his dictatorial beneficence, sent an army to Berne. A weak-minded minister, pandering to British passions, found in this act a pretext for suspending the evacuation of Malta. If the First Consul had had patience, if he had insisted firmly, but gently, the frivolity of the motive would not have long opposed a hinderance to the solemnly-promised evacuation of the great Mediterranean fortress. But the First Consul, influenced not alone by a feeling of wounded pride, but of resentment for outraged justice, demanded the execution of treaties; "for," he said, "no Power shall with impunity fail in a promise made to France or to me." Everybody remembers the sadly-heroic scene with Lord Whitworth, and the rupture of the peace of Amiens. The First Consul vowed from that moment to perish, or to punish England. Fatal vow! The emigrants, we mean those that were irreconcilable, did not limit themselves to writing: they conspired. The First Consul, discovering, with his penetrating glance, plots that the police were unable to detect, pounced upon the conspirators, and, believing that he discovered princes among them, and not being able to seize those whom he considered the real criminals, he went into the heart of Germany, caring little for the rights of nations, to arrest the descendant of the Condés. He ordered him to be shot without pity, and he, the severe reprover of the 20th of January, equalled, as far as he could, the crime of regicide, and seemed to experience a kind of satisfaction in committing the crime in the face of Europe, in contempt and defiance of public opinion. The prudent consul had become suddenly a madman, labouring under two species of mania: the anger of the offended man, who only breathes vengeance, and the anger of the conqueror, voluntarily braving enemies that he is certain to conquer. Afterward, in order to brave his enemies more effectually, and satisfy his ambition at the same time as his anger, he placed the imperial crown on his head. Europe, at once offended and alarmed, saw France and her ruler in a new light. At the sound of the fusillade of Vincennes, Prussia, who had formed a solemn alliance with France, drew back, became silent, and renounced an intimacy that had ceased to be honourable. Austria, more calculating, made no display of feeling, but profited of the opportunity to keep no measure in the execution of the *recés* of 1803. The young Emperor of Russia, Alexander, honest, and full of honour, alone dared, as guarantee of the Germanic constitution, to demand an explanation of the violation of the Baden territory. Napoleon replied by an insulting allusion to the death of Pius I. The czar held his peace, wounded to the heart, and determined to avenge the insult. Thus Prussia, chilled in friendship,—Austria, encouraged in her excesses,—Russia, insulted,—all became auxiliary, from different motives, to the commencement of our struggle with England.

The Boulogne expedition was prepared. Napoleon might have slowly organized his navy,

and directed remote expeditions against the English colonies, leaving the continent, which was ill disposed, but intimidated, in peace; he might then have waited until his expeditions should have caused some sensible injury to England; until our corsairs should have harassed her commerce, and she should be wearied of a war in which we could do little against her, but in which she could do nothing against us, our traffic being at that time exclusively continental.

But this powerful genius, the greatest conqueror of physical difficulties that perhaps ever existed, wished to fight England hand to hand. And in this he was right; for, could any one pass the Straits of Dover with a powerful army, he was most certainly the man. To the genius of profound political combinations he joined the fulminating genius of war; to these he added, in an especial manner, the prestige that fascinates soldiers and disconcerts the enemy; and he could, having accomplished the miracle of crossing the strait, effect a second miracle, that of terminating the war at a single blow. His preparations, though never put into execution, will be for military men and legislators enduring monuments of his capabilities of resource. But see the value of innate disposition! This man, who had the greatest of all difficulties to conquer, that of crossing the sea with an army of a hundred and fifty thousand men, and who, consequently, needed that the continent should be perfectly tranquil,—this daring man, having gone to Milan to assume the Italian crown, declared, on his own authority, that Genoa should be reunited to the empire. The European coalition was again immediately formed. Russia, deeply hurt by the insults she had received from the First Consul, and also offended by the naval pretensions of England, thought to act as mediator, and could not help demanding the evacuation of Malta. But when the annexation of Genoa was made known, she discontinued her demands, and, joining with England and Austria, she gave her armies the order to march, hoping to be joined on her route by the Prussians, who had been restrained until now by the prudence and moderation of their king. Thus he, who had been the sage peacemaker in 1803, was now become the inciter of a general war, merely because he had not been able to subdue his passions.

But he, like Alexander or Cæsar, was a man of genius, and genius is forgiven much and long by fortune. The threats of the continent did not interrupt the preparations for his great expedition: it failed in consequence of the admiral's fault, and fortunately; for had he embarked at the same time that the Austrian army was passing the Inn, it is very possible that whilst he was opening for himself a road to London, the Austrians would have advanced toward Paris. However that may have been, when his expedition was necessarily deferred, he advanced like a lion that springs from one enemy to another, and in a few days, hastening from Boulogne to Ulm, from Ulm to Austerlitz, he overwhelmed Austria and Russia, and then saw Prussia, that was about joining the rest of Europe, fall at his feet and implore mercy from the conqueror of the coalition.

Henceforth the war with England was changed into a continental war, which, indeed, would

not have been a disadvantage, had the political affairs been as well directed as the military. In taking up arms for England, the continental Powers provided us the battle-field we needed,—a battle-field that gave us Austerlitz and Ulm, instead of Trafalgar. There was, consequently, no reason to complain. But when they had been well beaten and convinced of the folly of their efforts, they should have been treated in a manner that would have deprived them of all desire to recommence the strife. Austria ought to have been punished, but not driven to despair: nay, she ought even to have been consoled, as a means of compensating her for her great losses, could an indemnification be found. Russia ought to have been left in her confusion, and the powerlessness resulting from distance, without making or asking concessions; and, lastly, Prussia ought neither to be punished for her faults nor ridiculed for her unsuccessful mediation: it would have been better to make her feel the danger of yielding to the passions of coteries, and she ought to have been definitely attached by giving her some of the *optime spolia* of victory. Then our victorious arms could be turned against England. Deprived of her allies, terrified at her isolation, assailed by our corsairs, and threatened by a formidable invasion, reason declares, and facts prove, that she would not have waited until her conquered allies had signed their treaties, to propose to treat herself. It would have been an extension of the peace of Amiens.

After Ulm and Austerlitz Napoleon was in a position to realize in Europe the wise and profound policy of separating the continent from England, and thus forcing the latter to make peace. Austria, accustomed to warfare during five years, three at least of which were against us, seeing foreign armies advance in two months as far as Vienna and Brunn, losing whole armies in one day, reduced to laying down her arms like Mack, was no longer inclined to resist us, provided she was not driven to the last degree of despair. The young Emperor of Russia, who, at the head of Souwaroff's soldiers, had hoped to act a very important part, and had been reduced to play a very humiliating one, had fallen into extreme dejection. Prussia, that, with two hundred thousand soldiers of the great Frederick, had gone to dictate the law at Vienna, finding us in a position to give laws to the entire world, presented an alarmed and almost ridiculous appearance. How easy, how becoming, how wise, it would have been to be generous to such enemies!

We have already said why it would have been impossible to make a friend of Austria, but, though she could not be made an ally of France at that time, it was not wise to add unnecessarily to her causes of vexation, and change them into implacable hatred. As a compensation for the loss of the Low Countries, of Suabia, the Milanese, and the *clientèles* of the Ecclesiastical States, she might have been given the Venetian States. It was harsh to deprive her of them. However, they were taken from Austria, because warfare cannot be an inexpensive game to those with whom it originates; and, indeed, the freedom of Italy could not with decency be alleged as a motive, when we ourselves had taken Piedmont, and

converted Lombardy into an appanage for the Bonaparte family. But to deprive Austria of every seaport, as Napoleon did then, in taking from her Venice, Triest, and Illyria, and shut her up in her continental possessions, was treating her with a rigour that was without real advantage for us and only calculated to drive her to despair. But not stopping there, but depriving her besides of the Tyrol, Vorarlberg, and the remains of Suabia, in order to enrich Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden, unimportant and unfaithful allies, who only aided that they might betray us, this was only rendering her implacable. To treat people in this way is like attempting their death, and, if we do not kill them, we prepare for ourselves enemies, who at the first opportunity will stab us in the back, and their conduct cannot excite wonder.

Depriving Austria of the Venetian States was, we repeat, harsh; and yet it was the almost inevitable result of the third coalition. It would have been good policy to compensate her for this inevitable rigour. It would have been easy, according to the fashion in which the world was treated then, to send her toward the East, and give her the Danubian provinces. Had this been done, the fate of Europe would have been changed, and Austria, placed upon the Danube, her true position, would have gained more than she had lost, would have always protected Constantinople, and would have been forever at enmity with Russia. This would have been, without doubt, a very dictatorial proceeding; but, as these provinces were afterward given to Russia, it would most assuredly have been better to have gratified Austria at this moment. Russia might have taken it ill, but that would have been her punishment for interfering in this war. As to the Turks, incapable of comprehending the service that had been done them, they would not have interfered; and Austria would certainly have accepted the Danubian provinces, for her only thought was to obtain compensation, no matter how, which indeed she carried so far as to demand Hanover for the dispossessed archdukes.—Hanover, the patrimony of her ally, England.

Far from thinking of compensation, Napoleon only thought of stripping her, of turning her into ridicule, and making her a victim even longer than was necessary. He took away, then, without compensation, and independently of the Venetian States, Illyria, the Tyrol, Vorarlberg, and the remains of Suabia. In general, punishment is inflicted to destroy the will to offend, but here, far from removing the desire, it was excited to passion in the breast of Austria. Toward Prussia Napoleon entertained but one sentiment—to make her the subject of jest. In truth, she supplied the materials! The czar, through the influence of a thoughtless nobility and a beautiful and imprudent queen, had induced the King of Prussia to declare war, and his ambassador, M. de Haugwitz, coming to Vienna on the eve of the battle of Austerlitz to dictate the law, and receiving it on his knees on the morrow, was, indeed, one of those comic spectacles that the world sometimes presents. But if it is ever permitted to laugh at the ridiculous in human events, it is when we are spectators, not directors, of the scene. Napoleon had all

the caprices of power: he would do as he pleased, and amuse himself besides; that was too much, a hundred times too much!

Austria asking Hanover for her archdukes, inspired Napoleon with an idea which he thought most piquant,—that of presenting the spoils of England to her allies. But, instead of giving Hanover to Austria, he gave it to Prussia. This may have been more conformable to geographical unity, but it was contrary to sound policy. Far from laughing at Prussia, he ought, on the contrary, to have pitied her false position. She had always desired to obtain possession of Hanover, but being induced through the error of her court to join in the excitement of Europe against France, it was placing her in a cruel position to force her to accept Hanover at this moment, and only excited in her already anxious mind a conflict between avidity and honour. Without doubt, it is something, it is even a great deal, to satisfy men's interests; but it is nothing if, at the same time, we humiliate them; for, happily, there is as much pride as avidity in the human heart. To humble Prussia in enriching her was not making her an ally,—it was making her ungrateful and her ingratitude would be proportionate to her honesty.

Napoleon offered Hanover to Prussia with the sword at her throat. "Hanover or war," he seemed to say to M. de Haugwitz,—who indeed did not hesitate, and chose Hanover. Napoleon did not stop there, but made her pay for this unwelcome gift, by sacrificing the Marquisate of Anspach and the Duchy of Berg, so that he lessened the value of his gift without lessening the shame of its acceptance. This was a serious mistake, for it was making war with England interminable. In fact, it was impossible that old George III. would ever consent to give up the patrimony of his family, and the English kings had at that time as influence in the monarchical republic of England that they no longer possess. M. de Haugwitz, who had left Potsdam for Schenbrunn, amidst the applauses of the court, in order to give the law to France and declare war for the advantage of England, now returned to Berlin, after receiving the law from France, and laden with the richest of British spoils. What must have been the excitement of an honest king, of a proud nation, and of a vain and impassioned court!

Thus Napoleon, instead of deriving from his incomparable victory at Austerlitz a continental and maritime peace, a double peace which he might easily have secured by discouraging and alienating the allies of England, had oppressed some, humbled others, and left a desperate war as the only resource to all. He had even created an invincible obstacle to peace, by giving Hanover to Prussia.

All the arrangements at Vienna in 1806 were mistakes; and Napoleon did not even confess himself to these serious errors. When he returned to Paris, he abandoned himself to an intoxication of ambition unparalleled in modern times. He planned then an immense empire, supported by vassal kingdoms, which should rule Europe, and which should be designated by a name consecrated by the Romans and Charlemagne:—"THE EMPIRE OF THE WEST." Napoleon had already prepared the

vassal kingdoms, in the Cisalpine Republic converted into a kingdom of Italy, and in the kingdom of Naples, which had been taken from the Bourbons and given to his brother Joseph. To these he added Holland, which had been changed from a republic to a monarchy and given to his brother Louis. But this was not all. The Empire of the West, to be complete, should embrace Germany. Napoleon had made allies there,—the princes of Bavaria, of Wurtemberg, and of Baden. He had abandoned to them the spoils of Austria, of Prussia, and of the unsecularized ecclesiastical princes, gave them up the *noblesse immédiate*, made them kings, and asked in marriage for his brothers, adopted children, and lieutenants, princesses of these houses, and his alliance was eagerly accepted. Germany had not yet recovered from the confusion caused by the system of secularization, and was still in an extraordinary state of disorder in consequence of the many questions that yet remained to be decided. The sovereign princes who remained electors or had become kings pillaged the property of the nobility and of the Church, and did not pay the pensions of the deposed ecclesiastical princes; and all the oppressed, in their despair, invoked, not conquered Austria or ridiculed Prussia, but he who was the master of fate,—Napoleon. This universal appeal to him excited the idea of a new Germanic Confederation, which should be called "The Confederation of the Rhine," and should be placed under the protection of Napoleon. It was composed of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Baden, Nassau, and all the princes of the south of Germany. Thus, the Emperor of the West, Mediator of Switzerland, Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, Suzerain of the kingdoms of Naples, Italy, and Holland, needed only to join Spain to his vassal states to be more powerful than Charlemagne. Such were the projects that the fumes of pride had excited in the vast brain of Napoleon.

In such a state of disintegration, Francis II., not being able to retain the title of Emperor of Germany, resigned it, and was thenceforth called Emperor of Austria. This was the most humiliating degradation after his territorial losses. Prussia, being also expelled from the old Germanic Confederation, drew around her the princes of the north of Germany, and thus became the head of a little, third-rate Germany. She asked permission to form this confederacy, which was coldly granted, with the secret determination to discourage those who might be tempted to join her. This was injury upon injury, both for Austria, that should have been punished without being driven to despair, and for Prussia, that should have been won by helping her interests and protecting her honour. In fact, it was the most delusive of all policies to interfere to such a degree in German affairs. In the Middle Ages, Germany, not being able to arrive at unity, had stood still at the federative state. These states, whilst they preserved their independence, had entered into a confederation to defend themselves against their powerful neighbours, and of course against France, the most powerful of all. This was met by France by a policy as natural as

it was lawful. Profiting of the jealousy of the Germans, she supported the petty princes against the great, and Prussia against Austria. But abandoning traditional and legitimate policy, and creating a Germanic Confederation, which would not be German, but French, which would burden us with the affairs of the Germans and expose us to all their hatred, which would give us allies to-day who would be traitors to-morrow, was the madness of ambition and nothing else. In every country in which a traditional policy exists, this policy has an appointed aim, toward which it always proceeds with greater or less speed according to the circumstances of the times. To proceed a step on this path is only to advance in the natural order of things. To advance more than one step is imprudent; but, endeavouring to reach the goal at once, we are sure to miss, by overpassing it. By the *recess* of 1803, Napoleon had approached as near as possible to the object of our traditional policy in Germany. By the Confederation of the Rhine, he unfortunately overstepped it. His interference was to international law what that of the Jacobins had been to social rights. They wished to remodel society; he wanted to remodel Europe. The guillotine had been their instrument; cannon was his. His remedy was infinitely less odious, and was, besides, surrounded by the prestige of glory. It was not a whit wiser.

Such were the fruits of the great victory of Austerlitz. Spite of these errors, the fact of the victory still remained, dazzling, overwhelming. Russia utterly broken down, England terrified by her isolation, wished for peace, and nothing would be easier than to conclude one with these two Powers. In letting these opportunities pass, Napoleon put the acme to his errors.

Touching the mouths of the Cattaro, which the Austrians had perfidiously given up to the Russians instead of giving them to us, the czar sent M. d'Oubril to Paris. As Austria and Prussia had negotiated directly with France, the czar refused to interfere in their concerns. Russia had constituted herself the patron of two royal families,—Savoy and the Neapolitan Bourbons. She was desirous of obtaining Sardinia for the one, and Sicily for the other. On these conditions she was ready to sanction all Napoleon had done. England had passed from the hands of Pitt to those of Fox. It was a most favourable moment to conclude the maritime peace. Fox had sent Lords Yarmouth and Lauderdale to Paris. England wished to keep Malta and the Cape; and, on condition of obtaining this concession, she would allow us to overturn Europe as we had done, but she, too, wished that Sicily should be given to the Neapolitan Bourbons, and Sardinia to the house of Savoy. Thus the continent of Europe would belong to the Bonaparte family, to which it had already furnished appanages, and the two large Italian islands would be given as indemnity to the two ancient deposed families. On such terms, the great Empire of the West, such as it had been constituted, would have been accepted both by Russia and England. A treaty may be well commenced on such a

basis, but pride and a want of foresight (a rare fault in Napoleon) prevented so important a result.

Napoleon wished to treat separately with England and Russia, that he might the more effectively dictate to them. They yielded to his wish, in a certain degree, through their desire for peace. M. d'Oubril negotiated on the one side, Lords Yarmouth and Lauderdale on the other, but with a secret understanding. By terrifying M. d'Oubril, Napoleon induced him to sign a separate treaty, by which, instead of Sicily, the Bourbons of Naples should have the Balearic Isles, for which Spain would receive a compensation. England was alarmed at this; and now or never was the time to conclude a peace with her, when she was terrified at her isolation. Napoleon thought it more clever to await the ratification of the Russian treaty, flattering himself that he could then do as he pleased with England. Meantime, Mr. Fox died. England succeeded in preventing the ratification of the Russian treaty, and thus the opportunity of peace was lost. An over-refined policy is legitimate, but on condition that it succeeds. When it fails, it only gains for those who were deceived, the reputation of foxes taken in a snare.

However, peace was not yet absolutely impossible. At this moment the fermentation which Napoleon had caused in Prussia had attained its height. Divided between Hanover and honour, Prussia was terribly agitated, and violently excited against him who had reduced her to this alternative. In addition, two pieces of intelligence, following quick on each other, drove her to despair. On the one side she thought she could perceive that France secretly discouraged the princes of the north of Germany from entering into a confederacy with her, which, indeed, was true to a certain degree, but which the Elector of Hesse exaggerated even to calumny; on the other hand, she learned that Napoleon was willing to restore Hanover to the royal family of England in order to obtain a naval peace. He had not said so, but had allowed it to be understood, and, indeed, it was his intention to make a new arrangement with Prussia; to restore her Anspach and Berg, and take back Hanover, declaring that it was on such terms alone that the peace of the world could be secured. But he did wrong in deferring this frank avowal. Prussia considered that she was trifled with, turned into ridicule, and rated as a third-rate Power, and in consequence her agitation turned into rage. Napoleon let her speak and act as she would, thinking it beneath his dignity to give an explanation, which, perhaps, might have been quite satisfactory; but, as she drew her sword, he drew his. He was weary of hearing constantly of the soldiers of the great Frederick, whom he had not yet conquered,—and the Prussian war was the consequence. England and Russia naturally took part in the war, and that universal peace which Napoleon might have obtained by land and sea, together with the recognition of his imperial title and his immense empire, was now deferred until some new miracle should arise.

Napoleon's genius and the valour of his army had now reached the culminating point.

In another month there was no longer either a Prussian monarchy or a Prussian army, and at the sight of the North Sea the soldiers exclaimed,* spontaneously, "Long live the Emperor of the West!" Their enthusiasm had divined his ambition. This caused him the greatest joy; but, however, he did not betray the secret desire he felt for so glorious a title. The Russians had advanced to the assistance of the Prussians. Napoleon hastened to meet them, drove them beyond the Vistula, and, meeting Poland on his way, conceived the idea of restoring her former greatness, without considering whether it might not be as difficult to resuscitate a State as an individual. He was excited against the Russians, and only thought how he could most annoy them or do them an injury. He fought bloody battles at Czarnowo, and Pultusk, and at Eylau, where he had his first experience of the northern climate, and of the despair of peoples before which he was afterward to yield. He performed prodigies of valour and skill, during a winter passed upon the ice. When spring at length arrived, he fought and won the battle of Friedland, the greatest perhaps that was ever fought, both from the promptitude displayed, the profound skill of the combinations, and the importance of the results.

Alexander fell at his feet, as Francis II. and Frederick William had done before; and now the greatest conqueror of modern times paused, for he already felt an insecurity in his position. Alone at the extremity of the continent, surrounded by conquered states, and yet feeling the necessity of having some ally, Napoleon determined to seek the aid of his young conquered enemy. In fact, the Austrian alliance, which at this time was almost impossible, became still more so in consequence of the severities that had followed on the battle of Austerlitz; the Prussian alliance had been allowed to slip away, and there now remained only the Russian. Napoleon, inconstant because he had no fixed principles, passed abruptly from one scheme of policy to another, carrying with him his young competitor, a prince fickle by nature. He then conceived the idea of two great empires, that should rule the world; one in the West, which was to be his, and one in the East, which was to be Alexander's, but his was to be the dominant power. He had an interview with the czar on the raft at Tilsit, where he praised, flattered, and delighted him, and formed at the celebrated raft an alliance with Russia. However, explanations would have been necessary, and, as the alliance was to depend on mutual concessions, the extent of these concessions ought to be determined on. Napoleon was in a hurry, Alexander was charmed: they embraced, and promised every thing, but did not enter into any explanations. Alexander showed the desire he felt to take possession of Finland, to which Napoleon consented, for he had many reasons to be displeased with Sweden. Besides, Alexander showed all the desire of a young man with regard to the East. At the mention of Constantinople, Na-

* Our readers will undoubtedly remember, that at the capitulation of Prussia, Lannes' soldiers uttered this same cry, when they came in sight of the North Sea. Lannes wrote it to Napoleon, who made no remark.

pooleon started, but restrained himself, and allowed his new ally to indulge all the dreams his imagination might suggest. It was on such a basis that the union of two empires was to rest. The treaty was signed at Tilsit. Napoleon deprived Prussia of half her possessions, and only left her the other half at the entreaty of Alexander. Of a part of the Prussian states, and some sacrifices required from Alexander, Napoleon composed the Grand Duchy of Waraw, which was given to the King of Saxony. This was a disturbing phantom for the Poles, and alarming to her co-splotters. With the remainder of the Prussian spoils and the electorate of Hesse, Napoleon composed the kingdom of Westphalia, destined for his brother Jerome. Saxony, increased by the Grand Duchy and the new kingdom of Westphalia, was to form part of the Confederation of the Rhine, which would thus extend as far as the Vistula. It would be impossible to bring together a greater number of contradictions. A Germany under a French emperor and containing the French kingdom of Westphalia, the French Duchy of Berg, (which had been conferred on Murat,) Saxony, enlarged without desiring it, and Poland, half restored, not including half-ruined Prussia, nor Austria rendered miserable by the territory promised to Russia on the Danube; two emperors at the extremities of this un-German Germany, the one of Russia, the other of France, promising each other the most inviolable friendship, provided that each allowed the other to do what he pleased, and taking very good care not to enter into any explanation, lest they should not agree; the one dreaming of going to Constantinople, where his ally was determined not to let him enter, and the other having commenced the formation of a Poland, but his ally would not allow him to finish; and beyond the chaos was England, hovering round these two allied empires with one hundred ships and two hundred frigates, —implacable England, that was determined to avenge the destruction of this monstrous edifice. Such was the system conceived at Tilsit on the morrow of the immortal victory of Friedland. What a political result from so great a military triumph!

Most assuredly, had Napoleon been capable of stopping and reflecting, in the midst of the current that bore him along, he might after Friedland, still better than after Austerlitz, return at once to the excellent policy of the consulate, and find it completed, consolidated, having but one inconvenience, that of being too extended. The continent, which had been vanquished at Austerlitz, might be considered as conquered definitely and without appeal at Friedland. The army of the great Frederick, which had been always cited to pique the pride of the conqueror of Marengo and Austerlitz, existed no longer. Distance, that protected Russia, as the Strait of Dover protected England, had been surmounted. There was no longer any imaginable resistance on the continent. From the height of his universal rule Napoleon might raise up Prussia as though she had never been conquered, and restore her all her possessions except Hanover, which had been sacrificed to a naval peace. At that price he would have won the hearts

of the Prussians, even the queen's and Blücher's, and would have found in Prussia a firm ally, for by the lesson received at Jena, and the generous act which would have followed, there was no suggestion, English, Russian, or Austrian, that could have penetrated her ears or her heart. Reasoning on this hypothesis, Napoleon would have had nothing to ask from Alexander, except that as a punishment for his defeat the Danubian provinces should pass into the hands of Austria. The latter, compensated, would have been half appeased. In short, had he exercised a still higher degree of wisdom, Napoleon would have reconstituted Germany, in confederating her around Austria and Prussia, skilfully balancing the one against the other; and even in neglecting this act of wisdom, he might, in preserving the ridiculous Confederation of the Rhine, cease to make new victims among the German princes; he might, for example, have pardoned the Elector of Hesse, and permitted Prussia to confederate Northern Germany around her. On these conditions Napoleon would have been truly master of the continent, and England, definitely isolated, would have demanded peace at any price. But, we must admit, this is but a dream! There can be no resting-place amid such a torrent. Napoleon, carried away by his passions and the course of events, overturning one state after another, forming and rejecting alliances, went to the banks of the Niemen to pick up the Russian alliance from the mud of Poland, and returned intoxicated with pride, ambition, and glory, and leaving behind him in despair Austria, Prussia, and Germany, whom he hoped to awe by an alliance with that Russia for whom he was preparing a Poland, and to whom he would not give Constantinople, nor even Bucharest nor Jassy! Should we be asked how a man endowed with so great a genius, both military and political, could be guilty of such great errors, we ask in return how, though bringing into play such great talents and such generous sentiments, the French Revolution could have caused the sanguinary follies of 1793. And we reply that it was because reason was put in abeyance, and passion allowed to assume the ascendant. But there is less excuse for Napoleon; for an individual ought to be more easily restrained than a multitude. Unfortunately, experience proves that a man, carried away by pride, ambition, and the desire of conquest, is no more capable of restraint than the multitude itself.

At the return from Tilsit the preconceived comedy was played. Russia, Prussia, and Austria, under compulsion, joined with France, and declared to England that if she did not listen to the voice of her ancient allies, and still refused peace, they would unite against her in a general and destructive war,—a war especially directed against her commerce, by which they would close the ports of the continent against her. And certainly England would have yielded had such a declaration been made in the name of Prussia restored by the generosity of Napoleon, of Austria consoled by his policy, and of Russia wearied by repeated defeats in carrying on war for the advantage of another. But England only laughed at a declaration torn from some by

force, from others by an ephemeral union, and proudly defied the threats of this pretended European coalition. However, the continental blockade commenced. England had laid the continent under an interdict; Napoleon, in his turn, did the same to the sea, in closing all European ports both to England and to those who would submit to her maritime laws. Of all the designs he had imagined during the campaign, this was the most important and the most efficacious. Had this interdict been maintained for some years, England might probably be induced to yield. Unfortunately, the continental blockade only added to the exasperation of the countries that were obliged to submit to the demands of our policy, and Napoleon was preparing an immense compensation for England in abandoning to her the Spanish colonies.

His design on Spain was one of the causes that expedited Napoleon's proceedings at Tilsit. The throne of Philip V. had descended to the Bourbons. It was natural that, in the impulse of his ambition, Napoleon should appropriate it to himself. Next to France, it was the fairest throne that could be appropriated by the Bonapartes, and the necessary completion of the Empire of the West. When this great empire, already suzerain of Naples, Italy, Switzerland, Germany, and Holland, should have obtained the command of Spain, it would have nothing further to seek than the obedience of the peoples to this gigantic edifice. But it was not easy to find a pretext for such an annexation. Among the meannesses that at that time dishonoured the royal family of Spain, its obedience to Napoleon may be considered as one. The good Charles IV. felt an unbounded admiration and devotion for the hero of the age. The nation itself, delighted that the First Consul had become emperor, seemed only to ask his counsels as their guide. How could war be declared against such persons? Besides, the Spanish people were ardent, proud, young-spirited, and capable of immense resistance, which could not easily be overcome. Beneath the apparent weakness of the Spanish court, great difficulties were concealed. Perhaps, by waiting, a solution of the difficulty might be found in the corruption of the court of Aranjuez. An honest king, but weak and imbecile in the extreme, such as are only found toward the extinction of a race, a shameless queen, a barefaced favourite, dishonouring his master, a bad son, who wished to profit of these disorders to hasten his own succession, and an indignant people, ready for any change that would deliver them from such an odious spectacle, offered favourable chances to an ambitious and all-powerful neighbour. It was possible that the Spanish court would sink beneath its own corruption and ask Napoleon for a king. He had already been asked for a wife for Ferdinand, and thus offered an indirect means of attaching Spain to the great empire. But Napoleon cared for nothing indirect or remote. He wished to obtain possession of the crown of Spain fully, and immediately devised a series of plots, all tending to a universal revolt.

He had already invaded Portugal, under pretence of closing it against England, and the Braganza family had fled to Brazil. This was

a ray of light for him. He thought by assembling troops on the road to Lisbon, and directed toward Madrid, that the Bourbons would be terrified and fly, and that he could arrest them at Cadiz. Thanks to these machinations, the Spanish court was about to fly, and the plot was on the point of succeeding, when the people, in indignation, hurried to Aranjuez, prevented the departure, nearly strangled Godoy, and proclaimed Ferdinand VII. king, who accepted the crown snatched from his father. Napoleon, finding in this unnatural act a new excuse to replace that of which the people had deprived him, invited father and son to Bayonne, and there excited them against each other. The father raised his cane to strike his son, in Napoleon's presence, who uttered cries of indignation and declared he had been treated with disrespect, made the father abdicate because of his incapacity, and the son on account of his unworthiness, and then, in presence of Europe, disgusted at this spectacle, and of Spain, confounded and indignant, he dared to place the crown of Philip V. on the head of his brother Joseph, and transferred that of Naples to the weak and ambitious head of poor Murat. Thus commenced the fatal Spanish war, which, during six years, destroyed the finest armies of France, and prepared an impregnable battle-field for the English.

This last fault once committed, its consequences immediately followed. Napoleon believed that eighty thousand conscripts, with a few officers from the dépôts, would be sufficient to bring the Spaniards to reason. But in such a climate, in presence of a popular insurrection, which could only be conquered by well-directed masses and overcome by obstinate and daily battles, it was not conscripts that should have been employed. Baylen was the first punishment of a serious military error and of a grave political crime. This first act—resistance to the great empire—stirred all Europe, and awoke hope in hearts consumed by hate. Napoleon, struck by the excitement manifested from Seville to Koenigsberg, summoned his ally Alexander to a consultation at Erfurt, and was then obliged to lay aside the vagueness of his magnificent promises. He finished by granting the Danubian provinces. This was too much, a thousand times too much; for it was placing the Russians at the very gates of Constantinople. Alexander, who had expected Constantinople, failed to be content, because he wished to complete the conquest of Finland, and he thought it better to accept the banks of the Danube, whilst awaiting something better. Napoleon and he embraced at parting, promising to become brothers-in-law, and half disenchanted with their mendacious alliance. Tranquillised by the interview at Erfurt, Napoleon led his best armies into Spain, those before which the continent had yielded. This was the moment awaited by Austria and all the discontented in Germany.

Then occurred a new European rising, that of 1809. Napoleon, after having driven before him, but not conquered, the Spaniards, who constantly fled, was about to overwhelm the English army under Moore, which could not fly as fast as the Spaniards, when the crossing of the

inn by the Austrians suddenly recalled him to the north. He left Valladolid at full speed, promising that in three months Austria should cease to exist, fled like lightning to Paris, from Paris to Ratisbon, and then, with an army composed of one-third of the old soldiers that had remained on the Danube, and two-thirds of recruits raised in haste, he wrought miracles at Ratisbon, and again entered Vienna as a conqueror, and thus restrained all the insurrections that were ready to break forth in Germany.

However, from the obstinacy with which the victory was disputed first at Essling and afterward at Wagram, together with the excitement of all Germany and Europe, Napoleon felt some gleams of the truth penetrate his mind. He saw that the world needed repose, and that if he did not accord it he would expose himself to a universal revolt of the nations. He then formed some resolutions, which were the result of this short-lived wisdom. He determined to withdraw his troops from Germany (at least from those territories that did not belong to him) in order to diminish the general anger; he determined to finish by arranging the affairs of Spain, and thus deprive England of a pretext for continuing the war; he endeavoured to make this latter Power submit, by the absolute prohibition of commerce, and in this view he systematized the continental blockade. Lastly, he resolved to marry again,—as if having heirs could insure the inheritance of the crown, or as though the imperial happiness constituted the happiness of the people.

However, if these resolutions, formed under wise inspiration, had been seriously carried out, it is possible that the gigantic order of things which Napoleon wished to establish, might have acquired consistence, and perhaps duration, at least in all that was not absolutely opposed to the interests of the people concerned. If he had, in reality, evacuated Germany, and employed in Spain forces proportioned to the difficulty of the undertaking, and persevered, without violence, in the continental blockade, he might, in all probability, have obtained a maritime peace, which would have put an end to the principal sufferings of the continental nations, and suppressed a serious cause of disunion with the nations subjected to the continental blockade, and if he had crowned all by a marriage, that had been really an alliance, he might have consolidated an exaggerated state of things and perpetuated that which was not actually impossible. But his temperament and acquired habits soon led Napoleon to results diametrically opposite to these fleeting pacific inclinations. Thus, whilst evacuating some parts of Germany, he assembled masses of troops from Bremen to Hamburg, from Hamburg to Dantzic, under pretence of a continental blockade. He did still better: to simplify proceedings, he united to the empire Holland, Bremen, Hamburg, Lubeck, and the Duchy of Oldenburg, which belonged to the imperial family of Russia. At the same time he united Rome and Tuscany to the empire. The Pope resisted: he had him arrested, carried first to Savona, and then to Fontainebleau, where he kept him in respectful bondage. From Seville to Dantzic he caused several seizures of merchandise to be made, which, however, without adding any

thing to the efficacy of the blockade, added intensely to the irritation the people felt against the system. Whilst he was so rigorous in the observance of the blockade, especially with those who had no interest in it, he committed the strangest infractions himself, in granting the French licenses to trade with England, which gave the appearance of intolerance to the whole system; for it would seem as though France would not submit to a regimen that had been invented for her sole benefit. As to Spain, where it was of so much importance to put an end to the war, Napoleon, deceiving himself as to the real difficulties, was wrong in not sending larger forces there, or in not going there himself; for his presence would at least have encouraged existing forces to a decisive result. The war in Spain was continued indefinitely, at the expense of the French army, which was exhausted, and to the great glory of the English, who alone seemed to keep the great empire in check. Then Napoleon's marriage, which might have been a signal of peace, a hope of repose for weary Europe, instead of procuring a solid alliance, caused, on the contrary, the rupture of the union with Russia, on which all the imperial policy had been based since the day of Tilsit. It was a Russian princess that Napoleon was to have married, according to the promises made at Erfurt. But when Alexander allied himself with us, he acted singly; for his court and nation, neither as pliant nor as cunning as he, did not perceive that, if he were inconsistent, this inconsistency won him Finland and Bessarabia; but to dispose of his sister's hand it was necessary to remove his mother's prejudices, and this occasioned some delay. But Napoleon would brook no delay, and, abruptly breaking off the negotiation, though it had been only just commenced, and without taking the trouble of freeing himself from his engagements, married an Austrian princess. Austria hastened to offer this connection, less from a desire to form an alliance with France than through a wish to break the bonds that united her to Russia, and Napoleon accepted it, because he had been kept waiting for the Russian princess, and because the Austrian princess was of more noble birth, and because it was an alliance such as the Bourbons had formerly contracted. From this moment the alliance with Russia was broken,—an alliance which was indeed false, mendacious, but specious, and consequently useful. Napoleon was alone in the world with his pride and his army,—an admirable army, but scattered from Cadiz to Kowno.

His pacific views after the battle of Wagram produced but this result, that Holland, the Hanseatic towns, the Duchy of Oldenburg, Tuscany, and Rome were united to the empire; the Pope was imprisoned; the continental blockade was made intolerable by its rigour and inexplicable infractions; the war in Spain was indefinitely prolonged; the Russian alliance was broken off, and no alliance, but a marriage for vanity, contracted with Austria.

Such was the position of Napoleon in 1811, after twelve years of absolute power, either as First Consul or emperor. This needed a solution. Weary of seeking it in the Peninsula, since Massena had been stopped before the lines of Torres-Vedras, Napoleon determined

to seek it elsewhere. Austria and Prussia were, apparently, profoundly submissive; their hearts were pained, but their gestures were humble; each word they uttered was one of deference, and when some too-deeply oppressed interest was to be defended, their language assumed the form of a prayer. Russia, a little less humble, was the only one that dared dispute with the master of the continent, but, indeed, only in the gentlest terms. It was obvious that she still counted on her geographical position, though it was evident she had been made to feel at Friedland that, even at the distance of the Seine from the Niemen, Napoleon's blows could be severely felt. She complained, but with moderation, that her kinsman, the Duke of Oldenburg, had been deprived of his territories. She demanded that she should be reassured by a secret convention as to the future destiny of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which was nothing, but might become Poland. Then she resisted the continental blockade. She said that each nation should be allowed to make such commercial laws for itself as would be judged best suited to its interests; she had promised to close the Russian rivers against British commerce, and she had kept her word; that, indeed, some English vessels had entered under the American flag, but they had been very few, and could not be prevented without exciting a revolt among the people. All this, we must remember, was said with infinite moderation, and supported with the most solid reasoning. Russia said nothing of the insult to the Russian princess, but she showed by her manner that she felt it deeply.

These objections made Napoleon indignant. To resist him even noiselessly and unknown to the world was, in his opinion, to give the signal of revolt. If any one, no matter where, offered opposition to his arbitrary will, he considered that he was defied. In him, calculation was always united to the anger of pride. The Spanish war seeming difficult to terminate, and, above all, likely to be protracted, no effect being yet produced by the continental blockade, and the Boulogne expedition having been long since abandoned, Napoleon determined to bring the present state of affairs to a conclusion on the banks of the Dvina and Dnieper. He pictured to himself that when from Cadiz to Moscow there would be no longer a shadow of resistance, and when Russia would be reduced to the same position as Austria or Prussia, he should have resolved the European question, that overwearied England would yield, and that the French empire, extending from Rome to Amsterdam, from Amsterdam to Lubeck, would be firmly established, having as vassals the kingdoms of Spain, Naples, Italy, and Westphalia! Thus, it was the rage of pride, joined to the expectation of finishing in the north what did not seem likely to terminate in the south, that furnished the true causes of the Russian war.

This fatal undertaking was commenced with formidable resources, and began at Dresden with the unheard-of spectacle which Napoleon and the sovereigns of the continent presented for a whole month, of power on one side and dependence on the other. The monarchs, humbler and more mortified than ever, pre-

sented themselves before their master with humility writ upon their brows but hatred in their hearts. Although Napoleon, far from having lost any of his qualities as a great captain, had, on the contrary, gained all that experience could add to great genius, still the art of war had deteriorated somewhat, from the very vastness of his aims and the precipitation of his enterprises. In every art, indeed, to do too much is to do ill. The conceptions were undoubtedly more vast, but the execution less perfect. And especially in the Russian war, the luxury which had been introduced among our generals, the precautions that were taken against an unknown and dreaded climate, had loaded the army with baggage that would be inconvenient even for short distances, but overwhelming for great. Besides this, the desire to increase the number of soldiers, and the habit of finishing all by a skilful disposition of masses, had introduced a kind of negligence as to the quality of the troops. The corps of Marshal Davout alone remained a model, and two hundred thousand men such as his would have gained the cause that was lost by the six hundred thousand that were marched beyond the Niemen. But—singular example of the progress of meanness under despotic rule!—a somewhat spiteful feeling was engendered against Marshal Davout, because of the strict and severe discipline in which he kept his troops amid the general laxity. Thus that art which had almost attained theoretic perfection in Napoleon's conceptions had become somewhat corrupted in practice. The campaign of 1812 represented an expedition in the style of Xerxes. Scarcely eight days had elapsed after the passage of the Niemen, when two hundred thousand men abandoned their standards, and presented the deplorable and contagious example of a breaking up of the army. Perhaps if Napoleon had paused, serried his ranks, and consolidated his base of operation, he might have been able to inflict a mortal blow on the Russian masses. But in presence of observant Europe, filled with silent but profound hatred, and ardently desiring our ruin, one of those prodigies with which Napoleon was wont to astonish her was needed, such as Austerlitz, Jena, or Friedland. Napoleon went in pursuit of this prodigy even to the banks of the Moskowa, and there indeed he found a prodigy, on the 7th of September, 1812, but it was a prodigy of carnage, and nothing definite: the definite he must seek in Moscow itself, where indeed he found something wondrous; he beheld a fearful patriotic sacrifice, the conflagration of Moscow, and then remained a whole month, uncertain and hesitating, at the extremity of the civilized world. Never, indeed, did he show more frugeness, or more talent in combination, than in the twenty and odd days passed and lost in Moscow. But the exhausted powers of his lieutenants were not equal to the means by which he meant to free himself from the abyss into which he had sprung. It was necessary to return. The army, which contained in its ranks too many foreigners and too many young men, acted upon by the climate and the distance, at the same time that it was labouring beneath its baggage, fell into dissolution in the midst of the frozen immensity of Russia. At

the commencement of the retreat Napoleon sunk for some days into a state of stupefaction, which suggested an idea of weakness of mind; but these were only a few days spent in contemplation, in realizing this prodigious change of fortune. At Beresina his natural disposition shone forth again, and never sank more, not even at Waterloo. Those who blame the military genius of Napoleon at this epoch are guilty of an error of judgment. It is not his military genius that should be blamed, but his frenzied will, that, impatient of every obstacle, wished to extend its influence from men to nature, where it found that resistance that man no longer offered, and it was beneath the unfettered violence of the elements he sank. It was not the soldier that erred and was punished by the effects of his own fault, but the despot, that acted after the fashion of the despots of Asia. In another age, and with less intelligence than he possessed, Napoleon might, perhaps, like Xerxes, have whipped the sea because it disobeyed him. However, there was one thing that bore some resemblance to such extravagance, for during several months the French journalists of that time poured forth unheard-of maledictions on the climate of Russia, the sole cause, they said, of our misfortunes. The external form of things changes, but human folly is ever the same.

Napoleon, deserting his army, as his detractors say, or, as the impartial historian will say, quitting his soldiers without compunction, in order to go and prepare another army, crossed Germany secretly.—Germany more stunned than he, and needing some reflection to enable her to believe in his change of fortune. He had time to escape and re seize the reins of the empire at Paris. Though France was confounded, she hastened to supply him with every thing necessary to avenge our arms, feeling at the same time no indulgence for his errors. He employed these last resources with a military genius tried and improved by misfortune. Germany, lightened of her bonds, held forth her hands to Russia, and Austria was alone wanting to the union against us in Europe. The safety or ruin of France depended on the manner in which this power would be treated. Austria assumed a position that was at once honourable and diplomatic, which we had no right to expect from her, and which was due alone to the minister who had negotiated Maria Louisa's marriage, who skillfully sought to bring about the transition from alliance to war. Austria frankly and boldly interposed as arbiter between the enslaved nations of Europe, who wished that all the oppressed should unite against their common oppressor, and France, who called upon her by the ties of blood. She certainly asked very little; she only required that French Germany, qualified by the title of Confederation of the Rhine, should be given up, that the indispensable ports, Lubeck, Hamburg, and Bremen, should be restored to Germany, that Trieste should be given back to herself, and that the false Poland, called the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, should be abandoned. On these terms she would leave Westphalia, Lombardy, and Naples, in the quality of vassal kingdoms, Holland, Piedmont, Tuscany, and the Roman States, as departments of France; but no men-

tion was made of Spain. She thus yielded to us twice as much as Napoleon's son could keep. Not believing that Austria would seriously dare to constitute herself arbitress between him and Europe, and hoping that since the war had come nearer to the Rhine he could sustain it with vigour, Napoleon hastened, whilst the negotiations were going on, to gain the two battles of Lutzen and Bautzen, where, without cavalry and with infantry composed of children, he conquered the best troops of Europe; then, treating Austria as an inferior, and taking no heed of her advice, or even of her solicitations, convinced that he could restore his grandeur without her or in spite of her, he broke the armistice of Dresden, and recommenced that fatal strife with all Europe which he opened by the victory of Dresden, one of the most brilliant conquests of his reign; he commenced a struggle which might, perhaps, have ended successfully for him had he confined himself to defend the line of the Elbe from Koenigstein to Magdeburg. But in the rash hope of recovering all his ancient glory at a single blow, he wished to extend his left wing as far as Berlin, and his right to the neighbourhood of Breslau, in order to intercept any supplies that might be sent from Prague to Berlin; but whilst he was himself victorious on the Elbe, he was conquered, in the persons of his lieutenants, both on the Breslau and Berlin routes; he was then obliged to concentrate his forces; but too late; he lost the line of the Elbe, which he sought to reconquer at Leipsic, where, in one of the greatest military encounters recorded in history, he fought for three consecutive days without abandoning the field of battle. But, forced to retreat, he was assailed by a fearful accident,—the explosion of the bridge of Leipsic—an accident fortuitous in appearance, but in reality the inevitable result of the gigantic scale on which Napoleon conducted all his plans. There he lost a portion of his army; and this deplorable accident caused a second retreat from the Saale to the Rhine, which, though shorter than that from Russia, was almost as disastrous. The army which France had furnished to repair the disaster of 1812 was almost annihilated on the Rhine by typhus fever.

Once on the Rhine, Austria, persisting in her prudent policy, offered peace to Napoleon on the conditions of the treaty of Lunéville,—that is, France reduced to her natural limits. He did not refuse; but he expressed his acceptance with an ambiguity which partook both of pride and the fear of weakening his pretensions by showing too much eagerness to treat: a new fault, which was indeed the almost inevitable consequence of his previous errors. But Europe, that had trembled at the very idea of invading France, finding, the nearer she approached it, how much Napoleon had alienated the hearts of the people, profited of the ambiguity of his language, and, withdrawing her offers, marched directly on Paris. Napoleon, who thought himself invincible on this side of the Rhine, and believed he had sufficient time to assemble the necessary troops, found he had only the miserable remains of Leipsic to oppose all Europe; that is to say, sixty or seventy thousand men, some exhausted and some mere children, against three

hundred thousand trained soldiers. Now again he was offered peace, but with the France of 1790. For the first time he was right in opposition to his counsellors; and, displaying the noble pride of a citizen, instead of the insensate haughtiness of an Asiatic conqueror, fully comprehending that the France of 1790 would suite the Bourbons better than him, he refused the conditions of Châtillon, and, with the wreck of his army, struggled to the last hour with indomitable energy.

It may, indeed, be said that history does not offer two such spectacles as he presented during the February and March of 1814. His lieutenants, assailed on every frontier, retired in disorder, and betook themselves in consternation to Châlons. Thither he betakes himself alone, with no other reinforcement than his presence, encourages them, gives them new life, reanimates his soldiers, and then hurries forward to anticipate the invasion at Brienne and Rothière; fights with four, sometimes with five, to one against him; astonishes his adversaries by the force of his attacks, and succeeds in arresting their progress; thus, profiting of the few days' respite that had been gained at the point of the sword to provide the Marne, the Aube, the Seine, and the Yonne with indispensable troops, and to preserve a sufficient force at the centre to be ready to hasten to any threatened point, he waited, like a tiger on the spring, for the chance that, in the profoundness of his genius, he had foreseen.—namely, that the enemy would divide their forces between the rivers that flow toward Paris. This foresight having been justified by events, he hastened to encounter Blücher separated from Schwarzenberg, and overpowered him in four days; then, returning to Schwarzenberg, he put him to flight, drew him from the gates of Paris to Troyes, and then for the last time he was offered peace—that is, the crown; but he refused the offer, because it did not include the natural limits of the country. He then attacks Blücher anew, shuts him up between the Marne and the Aisne, and is on the point of annihilating him and restoring his own fallen fortunes, when Soissons flings open its gates! Nowise troubled by this sudden change of fortune, he fought with indomitable tenacity at Craonne and Laon, and is on the point of winning back the victory, when an error of Marmont destroys the possibility. He then retires half conquered, but not discomfited,—does not yet despair, though the manœuvre of hurrying from Blücher to Schwarzenberg was no longer possible, because it had become too evident to the enemy—because Blücher had not been overcome—in a word, because they were too near each other! Always inexhaustible in resources, he determined to fall back on the fortresses and rally the garrisons, and take up a position with a hundred thousand men on the enemy's rear. Before executing this daring march, he made an attack on Schwarzenberg's flank at Arcis-sur-Aube, in order to draw the Austrian general toward him; hastens then to Nancy, when the enemy, marching on Paris, succeeded in forcing the gates. Napoleon returns in haste, finds the enemy dispersed on both banks of the Seine, and is preparing to crush them, when his lieutenants wrest the sword from his hand, pun-

ishing him too late for the bad use he had made of it; and he, the successful warrior, terminates his career, after displaying all the resources of his character and his genius in a desperate war, in which he added to all the brilliancy, daring, and fertility of resource exhibited on his former campaigns, one quality that he had still to display,—and which he then displayed even to a miracle,—unchangeable constancy in misfortune!

Such was Napoleon's career from the commencement to the close. We have recapitulated it in a few pages, to present it better as a whole; let us now compress it into a still smaller space, that we may draw from it the profound lessons it contains.

In the midst of France exhausted of her blood, and disgusted by the scenes she had witnessed for the last ten years, General Bonaparte seized the Dictatorship on the 18th Brumaire, and in doing so, whatever may be said, he committed neither fault nor crime. The Dictatorship was not then an invention of servility, but a social necessity. In order that liberty should be possible, it is necessary that the Government, the opposing parties in the State, and even individuals, should listen to all opinions with unalterable patience. This is scarcely to be expected even when men, having nothing serious to reproach each other with, betake themselves to calumny. But to imagine that the men of those times could discuss public affairs in a peaceful spirit is an illusion, when we remember that they could justly accuse each other of murder, rape, and of leaguings with the external enemy. It is not for seizing the Dictatorship that we ought to blame General Bonaparte, but for the use he made of his power from 1800 to 1814.

When, amid the frightful disasters of a long revolution, his genius, as rational as it was great, applied itself to repair the faults of others, he left nothing to be desired. He found the French inflamed one against another; he pacified Vendée; he recalled the emigrants, and even restored them part of their possessions. He found schism established and disturbing the consciences of all, and, as he could not remove the evil by his sword, he respectfully addressed himself to the spiritual head of the Catholic universe, whom he himself had replaced upon his throne, and induced him by the influence of his reasoning to recognise the legitimate results of the French Revolution, obtained from him especially the approbation of the sale of ecclesiastical property, the deposition of the ancient and the institution of a new and orthodox clergy, and the pardon of those priests who had taken the oath or had broken their vows. After a negotiation that continued nearly a year, he drew up that master-piece of skill and patience, the Concordat—regulating all the relations between Church and State, and which, of all our institutions, is the only one that still endures. The Revolution had commenced, so frame civil law under the influence of the wildest passions; Napoleon took up the work and completed it under the inspiration of good sense and of the experience of ages. He re-established the necessary taxes, which had been abolished by the demagogue flatterers of the multitude; he established an infallible: . . . of France, and

instituted an active, efficient, and honest administration. Externally proud, resolute, but reserved, he knew how to unite force with persuasion. In Switzerland he effected a pacification, like to that of Vendée, by means of the Act of Mediation, which, though under another name, continues the definite constitution of that country. He reconstituted Germany, which had been thrown into confusion by the war, by compensating the dispossessed princes with the property of the Church, and by establishing a just equilibrium between the confederate princes. Thus holding, with firm and equitable hand, the balance of German interests, which he allowed to incline slightly toward Prussia without at the same time offending Austria, he prepared the Prussian alliance, the only one that was then possible, and at the same time equal to our wants. Having thus effected all the good that was practicable or possible, both at home and abroad, admired by the world, adored by France, nothing more remained for him than to rest in this unsullied glory and allow the wearied world to rest with him.

Vain dream! this man, who had so truly estimated and so wisely suppressed the passions of others, could not restrain himself when his own were wounded. The emigrants who had taken refuge in London insulted him; England did not prevent them, because, by the constitution of her laws, she could not, and, moreover, she listened to them, because it flattered her jealousy. What wonder that it was so! what cause could it be of surprise, much less of anger! But this hero, this sage, whom the world admired, could no longer control himself. He demanded vengeance, and, because he did not receive such as his anger demanded, he insulted the ambassador of Great Britain. When he needed but to wait a few days and the English would have evacuated Malta, he broke the peace of Amiens, and thus left Malta forever to Britain. The emigrants who had insulted him conspired against his life, having some princes as accomplices or confidants. Not being able to punish either the one or the other, he seized, on neutral ground, a prince who possibly knew nothing of these plots but who certainly took no part in them, and had him ruthlessly shot. Europe exclaimed against this violation of neutral territory: he insulted Europe. Alas! in his excited mind passion had conquered reason, and, every change of this powerful intellect becoming a cause of revolution in the entire world, the firm and sustained policy of the Consulate gave place to the wild and reckless Government of the empire. This was the first great fault of the First Consul,—and the most important; for it was the source of every other.

At war with Great Britain, the First Consul wished to fight her hand to hand, and cross the Straits of Dover. But to pass the sea in safety it would be necessary to tranquillize the continent; and he took Genoa. Then the continental rose, and the maritime war was exchanged for a continental one,—which was not to be regretted, for it gave him an opportunity of fighting England in the persons of her allies, and deciding the question by land instead of by sea. Having crushed Austria at Ulm and at Austerlitz, he sent Russia home conquered and

ashamed, and Prussia, that came to dictate to him, he covered with ridicule. This was the time to resume the exercise of his reason, and consolidate and extend the peace of Amiens and Lunéville. Had he made Austria suffer only inevitable losses, compensating her even when necessary,—had he by his consideration for her feelings, or by gifts that caused her no shame, consoled Prussia for the embarrassment of her position,—had he asked nothing of Russia but that she should stand aloof in a quarrel in which she had no concern,—Napoleon would have isolated England and compelled her to treat on whatever conditions he pleased, and he would thus have resumed the consular policy at the same time that his imperial title would have been universally recognised, and he would have obtained some useless though brilliant acquisitions. Unfortunately, instead of considering his triumphs at Ulm and Austerlitz as what they were, and what they ought to be, a means of conquering England by land, he only looked upon them as an opportunity of obtaining universal empire. This was his second great fault, and the one that was destined to involve him permanently in the practices of a madly-acquisitive policy. He then proceeded in quick succession to take Naples for his brother Joseph, Lombardy for his adopted son Eugene, Holland for his brother Louis, all three destined to become vassal sovereigns of the great Empire of the West; he overturned that Germany that he had reconstituted, and which was one of his greatest works, and created a French Germany, under the title of the Confederation of the Rhine, a Germany from which Austria and Prussia were excluded; he placed the crown of the Cæsars on his head, and humbled Prussia by the gift of Hanover; and still he was so powerful at this time that these excesses did not render peace impossible, so ardently was it desired, even at any price. Russia had sent M. d'Oubril as an ambassador to Napoleon, and England sent Lord Lauderdale; and their only demand, after all his extravagant enterprises, was that Sicily should be given to the Bourbons and Sardinia to the House of Savoy. Napoleon, wishing to treat separately with each, that he might the better bend them to his purpose, lost the opportunity of making peace with both, a peace that would have been the consecration of all his daring acts; he refused a simple explanation to Prussia on the subject of the restitution of Hanover to George III., and consequently found himself in the centre of a universal war. But he had the best soldiers in the world, and was himself the greatest commander of modern times, perhaps of any time. In a few months he had annihilated the Prussian army at Jena, and completed the destruction of the Russian troops at Friedland. From this day forth, envy could no longer wound his pride; it could no longer pique him with the army of the great Frederick, an army that he had overpowered in a single day; nor could distance any longer render Russia invincible. Now was the time, even more opportune than after Austerlitz, when he ought to have resumed a wise policy and made use of his power on the continent to deprive England forever of her allies. He might, for example, have gratified Austria by the cession of the Danubian provinces, and

have made this gift Russia's sole punishment. He might have raised up prostrate Prussia, by restoring to her all that she had lost by her imprudence, and have overwhelmed her with joy, surprise, and gratitude; and certainly, when he had consoled Austria, attached Prussia forever to France, and twice punished Russia for imprudent interference, isolated England would have surrendered to our arms, and the gigantic empire already sketched by Napoleon might have been securely founded. But the same cause that had made him abandon the moderate policy of 1803, and prevented his resuming it after Austerlitz, still subsisted; and, intoxicated with pride, seeking to systematize his faults, that he might excuse them to himself, excluding from his consideration, as if they did not exist, the greater number of the states of Europe, he would only recognise two great empires, that of the East and that of the West, each resting on the other and gaining strength from this mutual support, and thus enabling him to revel in the exercise of unlicensed power over the enslaved world. This was the third of Napoleon's great faults; for this Russian alliance, which henceforth formed the sole basis of his policy, must either be false or a crime against Europe,—false if he wished to exercise unlimited power himself and not allow the same to Russia, a crime against Europe if he opened the route to Constantinople to his ally. Alas! hurried along by the torrent of conquest, his progress was so rapid, and he gave himself so little time to reflect, that he never decided how far he would allow Russia to proceed toward Constantinople, or what should be done with the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, that ought to become Poland or nothing! What he hoped was that with the assistance of Russia he could decide the Spanish question: that became his ruling thought. Spain, possessed by the Bourbons, was all that was wanting to his vast empire, and he was anxious to make it one of the vassal kingdoms of the West. Spain, submissive and ashamed of her condition, asking him for a system of policy, a Government, and a wife, might perhaps be induced to ask him for a king, if he had waited. But he had become as incapable of patience as of moderation, and sought to make the Bourbons fly from Aranjuez, that he might stop them at Cadiz. As the Spanish people had opposed this flight, he induced them to come to Bayonne, where, exciting the father and son against each other, he took advantage of their dissension to declare the one incompetent and the other unworthy, and finished the sombre comedy by a usurpation that disgusted Europe, excited Spain to revolt, and turned it into a new Vendée, in the midst of which a high-spirited people like the Spaniards, and an obstinate nation like the English, waged an endless war against us. This was the fourth fault of the imperial reign, and certainly the greatest since the abandonment of the moderate policy of 1803, for it caused the ruin of the French army, the sole support of the Bonaparte dynasty since Napoleon had made his reign a reign of physical force.

Baylen—fatal name!—was the first punishment of the crime committed at Bayonne. When a revolted peasantry rose up against our

soldiers and forced them to capitulate, dejected Europe resumed her courage, and in 1809 Austria, impatient of the yoke, gave the signal for a general revolt. Napoleon's best soldiers being in Spain, he advanced with conscripts to meet Austria, and, accomplishing wonders at Ratisbon, he exposed himself to great danger at Essling by his too great precipitation, performed new wonders at Wagram, and thus put an end to the first European revolt, for which Austria had given the signal too early.

However, the ground had become unsteady beneath his tread, and some gleams of reason penetrated to his excited brain. He felt the necessity of appeasing Europe, and formed the determination to evacuate Germany, to carry on the continental blockade with perseverance, to finish the Spanish war, and by this twofold means to reduce England to peace. He would then rest, and allow the world to rest, and marry, that he might have an heir to this universal monarchy.

With these pacific views, Napoleon, in the course of fifteen months, united Holland, Bremen, Hamburg, Lubeck, Oldenburg, Tuscany, and Rome, to the empire, had the Pope imprisoned, forbade the merchants of the continent to hold any communication with the English, at the same time that he granted licenses to Frenchmen to go to London and return; he married an Austrian archduchess, without deigning to break off formally his negotiation for the hand of Alexander's sister, because he had been kept waiting, and thus terminated that mendacious Russian alliance which had gained Finland and Bessarabia for Russia and furnished us the opportunity of ruining our fortunes in Spain.

Nevertheless, the continent, although full of hatred, submitted, under the influence of the battle of Wagram. Russia alone ventured to offer some objections touching the territory of Oldenburg, which had been taken from a prince of his family, and to the manner in which the continental blockade was put in operation, and to the successive augmentation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw until it had almost become Poland. Then Napoleon, ending the Spanish war and the continental blockade too tedious, wished to enter Russia, thinking that when he should have punished, at that distance, a Power that had dared to raise its voice in objection, he would have terminated his fearful struggle with the civilized world. This was the fifth great fault, and it would be difficult to say in what degree it surpassed or fell behind its predecessors in folly; for one would be embarrassed to decide which was the greatest error, to have broken the peace of Amiens unreasonably, or to have sought universal monarchy after Austerlitz; to have, after Friedland, founded his policy on the inexplicable Russian alliance, to have gone to war with Spain, or to have marched on Moscow. However that may be, followed by six hundred thousand soldiers, he now commenced a struggle both against man and nature. But nature can defend herself better than man, and she did it now, by alternately opposing to the conqueror of the Alps diseases, heat, cold, and famine. However, she might herself have been conquered by time! But Na-

poison had not time. The world secretly leagued against him left him none, and he would have needed to complete his conquest in one campaign. He was overwhelmed by the most tragic catastrophe that time shall ever bring forth.

Desolated France generously furnished him with the means of repairing his own glory and ours, and he was about to do so, after Lutzen and Bautzen, even in a higher degree than was desirable, when the insensate hope of recovering all his losses at a single blow made him commit his sixth and last great fault, for it consummated his ruin: this was refusing the conditions of Prague, and extending his line of operations from Dresden to Berlin, whilst, if he had concentrated his forces on the Elbe, he might have rendered his position impregnable. Forced to abandon Germany, he received a last offer, that of the Rhine frontier, to which he had the folly to return an ambiguous reply, through fear of showing too great a desire to negotiate, and whilst he lost a month in explanations, Europe, profiting of this month to inquire into the state of France, withdrew her offer and crossed the Rhine. Napoleon, then employing the same talents, the same force of character, to resist those humiliating conditions, that he had before employed to his own ruin, finished as he had commenced his reign, like a great man,—a reign that was vitiated in mid-career by an ambition after the fashion of Asiatic conquerors,—a wonderful reign, of which it may be said that nothing could be more perfect than its commencement, nothing more extravagant than its mid-course, and nothing more heroic than its termination.

Thus this great and doom-bringing man, after having attained perfection during the Consulate, abandons, at the first offence offered to his pride, the firm and moderate policy of 1803, is about to attack England, but is turned from it by the continent that he has himself provoked, but which he cruelly punishes; it now only needed an effort of generosity and wisdom, and he might have returned to the practice of a sound policy, first at Austerlitz, again at Friedland; but, all-powerful in his influence over others, and infinitely weak in his empire over himself, he dashes into the vague region of chimeras, and frames, in his airy dreams, a vast empire of the West, that is to embrace civilized Europe, from Poland to Spain; to effect the realization of this dream he flatters the Russian visionary views, but receives at Essling and Wagram a first notice of the feeling of exasperated Europe; he thinks to profit of it, and might, perhaps, with moderation and patience have consolidated his chimerical empire, but, as incapable of exercising patience as moderation, he wishes to hasten events, marches into Russia, and only hastens his ruin: still he might, after Lutzen and Bautzen, have conserved his power in a higher degree than was even desirable, but he refused the offer of peace at Prague, a chance which fortune never again presented him, and he fell to rise no more. Such, in a few words, is the history of Napoleon's reign.

If, in order to understand aright this extraordinary spectacle, we draw back a step, as in presence of an object too vast to be judged at a near view, if we recur to the times of the

French Revolution, then every thing is explained, and we see that this reign is one of the phases of this immense revolution, a phase tragic and wondrous as the others, and we recognise it by this essential characteristic of the imperial reign,—excess. From 1789 to 1800 we behold the first outburst of the French Revolution; from 1800 to 1814 we see its reaction on itself, a reaction of which the empire is the condensed expression, and in both the wild whirl of passion is the essential characteristic. The French Revolution dashes into the arena of social reform, with a heart full of generous sentiments, with a mind overflowing with great and fruitful ideas; she encounters obstacles, is astonished, becomes angry, as if the chariot of humanity in rolling over the earth is never to feel the friction; she flies into a rage, becomes intoxicated and furious with passion, pours human blood in torrents on the scaffold, disgusts the world, is herself disgusted at her own excesses, and the offspring of this feeling is a man mighty as the Revolution, imbued with the same desire of effecting good, wishing it ardently, wishing to effect it instantly, by any means, and the consequence is that the projected good disappears from view, convicting him of a thousand self-contradictions, and inflicting on him many severe lessons. Ah, when it is needed to admonish the French Revolution, how admirably Napoleon does so! He condemns regicide, civil war, schism, the captivity of the Pope, a universal republic, the fury of war; he recalls the emigrants, reinstates the Pope at Rome, concludes the Concordat, and grants Europe the peace of Luneville and Amiens. But the world presents a succession of obstacles in whatever direction we march, either forward or backward. At the first error committed by his adversaries, like the true son of his mother, the Revolution, intemperate as she, refusing to brook either resistance or delay, the prudent Consul flies into a rage, commits regicide at Vincennes, revives schism, detains the Pope prisoner at Fontainebleau, relapses into war, now general and prolonged, substitutes for the universal republic a universal monarchy, and—phenomenon of unheard-of passion—like the Revolution, whose continuator, representative, or son he may be called, left behind him immense calamities, high principles, and dazzling glory. The calamities and glory belong to France, the principles to the world at large.

If, after the astonishment, admiration, and terror we experience in contemplating this spectacle, we wish to draw from it a profound, a never-to-be-forgotten lesson, we must be convinced in the secrecy of our own hearts, whether we contemplate the operation of revolutions, even the most glorious and the most praiseworthy, or whether we weigh the conduct of the most highly-gifted among men,—we must be convinced that self-restraint is man's first duty. "Commonplace moral," we hear echoed on every side. Yes, commonplace, we admit, but ever new, if we only consider how succeeding generations profit of it. It is a lesson that must be continually repeated, and is in itself the concentration of all public and private wisdom. In fact, nations and individuals—especially great nations and high-

minded individuals—are never wanting in heroic impulses. What they do fail in is forbearance, cool reason, and self-control. For men, private or public, ordinary or extraordinary, for nations, above all, during revolution, which are often only an unpremeditated impulse toward good, self-restraint is the great secret by which we can retain our honesty or become useful or happy: in a word, it is the great secret of success. If we cannot restrain, that is, if we cannot govern, ourselves, we injure the cause whose triumph, in the excess of our affection, we had endeavoured to secure by violence or precipitation! Let us always keep three great examples before our eyes—the Convention destroyed liberty, Napoleon destroyed the greatness of France, and the house of Bourbon destroyed the cause of legitimacy—that is to say, they destroyed the cause whose success they had each a special mission to serve! But we go too far when we say destroyed, for great principles can never be destroyed in this world. They are only compromised.

After having pronounced judgment on Napoleon's reign, it becomes our duty to pronounce judgment on the man himself, as

soldier, politician, administrator, legislator, thinker, and writer, and assign him a place in that glorious family that reckons among its members Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Charlemagne, and Frederick the Great. But, to pronounce a correct judgment, it is necessary that the great man's career should be finished. The end of his career was not attained at the isle of Elba. Providence reserved two further trials for Napoleon. He was destined to stand again face to face with the Powers of Europe, busy dividing our spoils among themselves, and disturbed in the division by his return from the isle of Elba. He was in a special manner destined to stand face to face with reviving liberty. This is the spectacle presented by 1815, during the period called the "hundred days,"—a mournful and tragic spectacle, whose details we purpose to retrace. After which, we shall judge the man as a whole. And after having judged the man impartially, our task will be finished, and we shall leave to posterity the task of pronouncing judgment on our judgment, if, indeed, posterity will deign to take the trouble of correcting or confirming our opinion.

BOOK LIV.

RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS.

Last operations of the French, who remained scattered in different parts of Europe—Campaign of General Maison in Flanders, and defence of Antwerp by General Carnot—Surrender of Antwerp, and conditions of this surrender—The French troops begin to desert—Firmness of General Maison under a misfortune that threatens to leave France without an army—Long and memorable resistance of Marshal Davout at Hamburg—Conditions on which he surrenders, after having saved a numerous army and abundant war materials—Noble conduct of Prince Eugene in Italy—The French army led back from Italy by General Grenier—Events in the Pyrenees—The news from Paris having arrived too late to stop hostilities, the English and French fight for the last time—Sanguinary battle of Toulouse—Armistice on all the frontiers—Position of the Count d'Artois after his entrance into Paris—Debate as to the title under which he should provisionally govern the Kingdom—The Senate objects to recognise his rank of lieutenant-general, excepting on condition of a solemn pledge with respect to the constitution—Irritation of the Count d'Artois and his friends—The Duke d'Ortante devises a mode of proceeding, which is adopted—The Senate repairs to the Tuileries and invests the Count d'Artois with the lieutenant-generalship, at the conclusion of a declaration in which the Prince, becoming responsible for Louis XVIII., promises the adoption of the principal bases of the Senatorial Constitution—First acts of the Count d'Artois's administration—The provisional government becomes the Prince's council—Constitution of the ministry—Despatch of envoys extraordinary into different parts of France—Sufferings of the occupied provinces, and contemplated alleviations—New quarters assigned to the French armies—The suspension of 1815 suspended—Financial measures of M. Louis—His firm resolution to pay all the debts of the state, to keep up the taxes, and especially the *dont rancun*—Rapidity with which public credit begins to be re-established under the combined influence of this minister and peace—Transient changes effected in our commercial tariffs—Sufferings of the occupied provinces continue to increase—A negotiation is hastily commenced to obtain the evacuation of the territory by the combined armies—The evacuation of the French provinces cannot be spoken of without evoking a similar demand with regard to the foreign provinces occupied by our troops—It being impossible to reduce the reciprocity, it is agreed, by the convention of the 23d of April, to evacuate Hamburg, Antwerp, Flushing, Breda, Zeeu, Mons, Luxemburg, Mayence, and, in a word, the most important fortresses in Europe—The imprudence of this convention is not at first perceived, which becomes soon a subject of bitter reproach—Rapid change which he taken place in the public mind since the entry of the Count d'Artois—The mass of the population, familiarized with the idea of the return of the Bourbons, soon submit to them unreservedly; but the transports of the royalist party irritate the revolutionists and the Bonapartists, and provoke sharp recriminations from both parties—The Count d'Artois commits certain acts of imprudence, which make his most enlightened friends anxious for the return of the king—Various messages despatched to Louis XVIII., and description he receives of the state of France—In consequence of being told that his adhesion to the constitution of the Senate is not indispensable, he defers his decision, and advances slowly toward France—His sojourn at London—Enthusiasm that his presence excites among the English—Imprudent address, in which he assures that, next to God, he is most indebted to England—Dissemination of Louis XVIII. at Calais—His journey through the northern departments, and his arrival at Compiègne—Warm attentions of which he is the object, especially on the part of the marshals, to whom he gives the most flattering reception—Impatience testified to know his character—Character of Louis XVIII., and of the Count d'Artois, and remarkable difference between the two brothers—Interview of M. de Talleyrand with the king—Solicitude of the latter to avoid all pledges—Visit of the Emperor Alexander to Compiègne, and announcement of his efforts to win attention for his advice—Louis XVIII. is not adverse to the idea of a constitution, even of a liberal one; but he wishes to give it himself, in order to maintain the principle of his authority—It is arranged that before entering Paris he shall pause at St. Ouen, and make a general declaration, confirmatory of that of the Count d'Artois, and framed in conformity with the bases of the senatorial constitution—Sojourn at St. Ouen, and declaration of St. Ouen, dated 2d May, 1814—Entrance of Louis XVIII. into Paris, 3d May—The Parisians give him the most cordial reception—Louis XVIII. seizes on the supreme power, and frames the royal council—First meeting of the council, in which all the public questions are slightly touched—General views concerning the army, the navy, the

finances—M. Louis persists in his two principles, respect for the public debts, and support of the necessary taxes—Royal proclamation relative to the *droits réunis*—Adjournment of the question of conscription—Louis XVIII. shows a determination to re-establish the ancient military household, and even to increase it considerably—No member of the council dares resist this imprudent resolution—Fresh efforts to terminate the sufferings in the occupied provinces—It is now evident that the convention of the 23d of April, whilst depriving us of valuable pledges, has not advanced the departure of the allied armies by a single day—The allied sovereigns promise to give fresh orders to their armies, and Louis XVIII. issues a proclamation, commanding the local authorities to disobey the requisitions of the foreign generals—Anxiety to conclude peace—M. de Talleyrand receives a mission to negotiate—Fresh error resulting from precipitation, similar to that committed in signing the convention of the 23d of April—It would be better that the fate of France should be regulated at Vienna at the same time as that of the other Powers, because there would be a diversity of opinions, and the French interests might find support—M. de Metternich believes, on the contrary, that it is for the interest of the allied Powers to treat immediately with France, and defer the solution of the European questions until the assembly of the general congress at Vienna—The royal government does not comprehend the profundity of these views, and, impatient to claim the merit of making peace, is anxious to conclude it immediately—Adoption of the frontiers of 1790 laid down as an irrevocable principle—This frontier adopted with some additions—The Isle of France made an exception in the restitution of our colonies—Noble opposition of the king to every species of compensation for the expenses of the war—He succeeds, thanks to the firmness displayed by him and the government on this occasion—Preservation of the museums—Treaty of Paris of the 30th of May, 1814—Whilst peace is being negotiated, the constitution is also discussed—The king does not wish to confide this task to the royal council, and undertakes it himself with MM. Montesquieu, Dambray, Ferrand, and Bignon—His liberal views attributable to his residence in England, but all subordinate to one condition, which is, that the new constitution shall emanate exclusively from the royal authority—Various questions debated—Pliancy of the king on every point, when his favourite principle is conceded—The sketch of the constitution laid before two commissions, one chosen by the Senate, the other by the legislative corps—The new constitution is called the "constitutional charter"—The foreign sovereigns not wishing to leave Paris before the promises made at St. Ouen are fulfilled, the 4th of June is fixed for the royal audience, when the charter is to be proclaimed—Royal audience of the 4th of June—Favourable results of this audience—Proclamation of the charter—Departure of the foreign sovereigns—Definite establishment of the Bourbon government.

THE departure of Napoleon for the isle of Elba had delivered the Bourbons from the presence of a formidable enemy, who, though conquered, still alarmed the victorious Powers. But, although the monster—as the imperial Government was called—was decapitated, the trunk remained, and its scattered fragments still agitated Europe by their convulsive throes. Various detachments of troops that had not yet received intelligence of what had occurred at Paris, or who refused to believe these accounts, were dispersed through Flanders, Holland, Westphalia, Italy, Dauphiné, Languedoc, and Spain. The first care of the Provisional Government had been to despatch agents to inform these troops of the entrance of the allies into Paris, the abdication of Napoleon, and the re-establishment of the Bourbons on the throne of France. The replies were expected with a certain amount of anxiety, for the Provisional Government would not have wished to command the siege of such places as Strasbourg, Mayence, Lille, Antwerp, Flushing, the Texel, Hamburg, Magdeburg, Wurzburg, Palma-Nova, Venice, Mantua, Alessandria, Genoa, Lerida, Tortosa, &c. &c., nor would the allies like to be obliged to undertake such enterprises. Nor was it without considerable difficulty that the voice of reason could find its way to the hearts of the old soldiers that guarded these remote posts, and at whose head Napoleon had placed energetic commanders, devoted to his interest and that of France. Their last acts are worthy of a place in history, and clearly illustrate the position in which Napoleon left affairs and in which the Bourbons found them. We shall give a rapid glance over these events.

The illustrious Carnot defended Antwerp, whilst the brave and talented General Maison occupied by his activity and courage the whole extent of country lying between Antwerp, Lille, and Valenciennes. It must not be forgotten how Carnot, who of his own will had stood aloof from the Empire and the Emperor, had, as soon as he saw our frontiers invaded, discerned, more by the impulses of his heart than the reasonings of his head, the danger that threatened the cause of the Revolution and France, and wrote to Napoleon, to offer him,

as he said, his *sexagenary arm*, not as an aid but as an example. Napoleon received as it deserved this patriotic offer, and confided to Carnot the task most suited to him, that of defending Antwerp.—Antwerp, the most magnificent creation of the Empire, the depot of our maritime riches, the bulwark of our Scheldt frontier. Carnot had established order in the fortress, inspired the garrison with a sentiment of the most absolute devotedness, and shown the enemy the impossibility of obtaining, otherwise than by a regular and protracted siege, this object of England's intense hatred. The besiegers might indeed avail themselves of the barbarous alternative of bombardment. Carnot, in concert with Admiral Missiessy, had made preparations for such an event. The *escadre* was covered with earth and dung, the magazines and the most exposed works were protected with blinds, and then, with heroic impassability, the besieged supported during several days a continuous shower of bombs and howitzers, taking care to extinguish instantly the flames that from time to time sprung up in different places. The besiegers, after having exhausted their ammunition, saw themselves reduced to a simple blockade, and Carnot, having well victualled the garrison, proved unquestionably that his patience was as indomitable as his courage.

The active troops shut up in Antwerp in consequence of the movement of the invading armies were a great loss to General Maison, who had only 6000 men for the occupation of Flanders. Among the troops shut up in Antwerp, there was a division of the Young Guard, consisting of 4000 foot and some hundred horse, which would have been a great assistance in defending the frontier. Consequently, Carnot and Maison exerted themselves, the one to find the means of sending off these guards, and the other to secure their safe passage through a host of enemies.

General Maison, after having hastily thrown some depot-battalions and some provisions into the fortresses of Berg-op-Zoom, Ostend, Dunkirk, Valenciennes, Maubeuge, Condé, and Lille, hastened with from five to six thousand men from one of these fortresses to the other, relieving sometimes this, sometimes that, de-

stroying from time to time vast detachments of the enemy, and by a series of ambushes giving occupation to the Prince of Saxe-Weimar, who with between forty and fifty thousand men had not succeeded in expelling us from the labyrinth of our fortresses.* Whilst General Maison thus executed actual prodigies of daring and activity, several of our commanders won for themselves unfading laurels by resisting formidable attacks with a handful of men. General Bizanel, obliged to defend with 2700 men the fortress of Berg-op-Zoom, which would have required a garrison of 12,000, was not able to prevent Graham's soldiers, who were favoured by a popular movement from ascending the *escalade* and entering the city as victors. But, undisturbed by this disaster, General Bizanel rushed upon the English columns, overthrew them one after the other, killed 1500 and captured 2500 men. The Prince of Saxe-Weimar, having made a similar attempt on Maubeuge, which was defended by Colonel Schouller, of the artillery, at the head of 1000 national guards and custom-house officers, had seen his artillery dismounted, his soldiers repulsed, and his enterprise defeated in the most humiliating manner.

General Maison, who was seeking a means by which the Roguet division might safely join him, profited of the opportunity afforded by the failure of the attempt against Maubeuge, and advanced toward Antwerp amidst hosts of the enemy. Uniting the two infantry divisions, Barrois and Solignac, that were 6000 strong, and the cavalry division of Castex, consisting of 1100 horse, he left Lille under pretext of going to aid Maubeuge, overthrew the detachments that occupied Courtray, feigned to pursue them in the direction of Oudenarde and Brussels, when, suddenly turning toward Ghent, which he captured, he took up a position before this city, awaiting the arrival of General Roguet, to whom he had sent intelligence of his approach. Carnot, having received timely information, sent out of Antwerp the Roguet division, which joined General Maison at Ghent, increasing his numbers by nearly 5000 men.

General Maison, now at the head of 12,000 men, saw numerous columns of the enemy abandon the blockade of the fortresses, to march against him; he especially noted the Prince of Saxe-Weimar, who was preparing to cut off his retreat with an army of 30,000 men. General Maison did not lose an instant; he marched straight through Thielmann's corps, of whom he killed or captured 1200, and after an expedition of six continuous days entered victoriously into Lille, at the head of a little army, all imbued with the spirit of their commander, and ready again to achieve such deeds as they had lately performed. It was whilst affairs were in this position that General Maison received intelligence of what had occurred at Paris, despatched officially by the Provisional Government. This general, an

ancient aide-de-camp of Bernadotte, and an old soldier of the Rhenish army, was not strongly attached to Napoleon: but untainted by the spirit of intrigue, though endowed with great activity of mind and character, he was incapable of becoming the associate of plotters. Thus, though surrounded by Bernadotte's agents, he repulsed them, threatening to have them shot if they renewed their propositions. But destiny having pronounced its decrees, he submitted, and informed his soldiers of the events that had occurred in France, whose consequences would be henceforth irresistible, and proposed to them to give in their adhesion. His generals unanimously adopted his opinion, but in the lower ranks of the army a general cry arose against the traitors, who, they said, had betrayed the capital. The soldiers could not be persuaded that Paris had succumbed to natural causes or the mere events of war, and the report of a great treason, which was vaguely spread, tended to increase their unwise distrust. They were persuaded that France and Napoleon had been victims to the blackest treason. The old soldiers, through indignation, and the new, through want of discipline, mutinied, saying it was better to abandon standards dishonoured by treason. The imprudent expression, "No more conscriptions, no more *droite réunie*," uttered by the Count d'Artois, had echoed to the remotest provinces. "Let us come away, let us return home," was the language heard from the lips of all the soldiers. In fact, hundreds quitted their standards within a few hours. General Maison understood perfectly well that, whatever might be the government, an army would be always needed. He assembled his soldiers, who at first appeared to feel his energetic representations, but who soon began again to desert in numbers. He then assembled his officers and appealed to their patriotism. These yielded to his remonstrances, and, in their turn appealing to the sub-officers and the veteran soldiers, succeeded in making an impression. In this way, a nucleus of faithful men was formed, and with their aid General Maison, pointing his artillery at the principal gates of Lille, declared that he would pour a shower of grape on the first who attempted to desert. This vigorous demonstration awed the mutineers, and they returned to their duty. The Flemish army had lost about two thousand out of twelve thousand men, but the remainder were staunch and could be relied on.

General Maison's conduct on this occasion was called for by circumstances, for desertion was becoming contagious. Profiting of the anger of the veteran soldiers against them whom they called traitors, and endeavouring to increase in order to take advantage of it, the conscripts deserted in masses, saying they were no longer bound to the service; and, in the end, they enticed their veteran comrades, who began to feel longings after their native villages. In the great army that Napoleon had left at Fontainebleau desertion had spread to a disastrous extent, and there was even danger that none but foreign soldiers might remain, which would be a deplorable condition in which to treat for peace. Many of the immediate partisans of the Count d'Artois looked upon the dispersion of the Imperial

* Napoleon, who had only learned the commencement of the campaign in Belgium, and who had only heard of the retreat from Brussels upon Lille, had often in his correspondence complained of General Maison. He would have spoken in a different tone had he had time to appreciate fully this campaign, which at that period excited the admiration of the military world.

troops as a fortunate event, but the marshals pointed out the threatened danger of the extinction of a public force. Marmont, the principal author of this dispersion, wishing to make his zeal for the interests of the army serve as an excuse for his conduct, was one of the most active in representing the state of things to the Government, and finally the Count d'Artois was induced to make a significant manifestation. He accordingly wrote a letter to General Maison, which was instantly published, thanking him for his noble conduct, and informing him that his services should be made known to Louis XVIII., and would be a claim on the esteem and confidence of his sovereign.

Whilst the Flemish army thus rallied round the new Government, Carnot, whatever his dislike to the Bourbons, could not act otherwise than as a good citizen. He felt that he must submit to the law of necessity and accept the Bourbons, as their government was the sole remaining alternative. But the Bourbons being accepted and recognised, there still remained duties toward France; and though the gates of Antwerp had been opened to the envoys of the ancient dynasty, that was no reason that the place should be delivered to the enemy. Bernadotte had informed Carnot of the events that had taken place at Paris, and endeavoured to induce him to give up Antwerp to the allies; but Carnot replied that these circumstances had not yet been sufficiently proved to induce the faithful commander of a besieged city to regard them as certain, and that, moreover, supposing them true, he would surrender the keys of the fortress confided to him only to the envoys of the King of France. Some days having elapsed, and all doubt having disappeared, Carnot informed the garrison of what had passed, made them assume the white cockade, and kept his gates still closed, waiting the orders of Louis XVIII.

Whilst the French generals established on the Scheldt and Rhine pursued a line of conduct alike prudent and patriotic, an illustrious warrior distinguished himself in Westphalia by persevering firmness in his endeavours to preserve intact the trust confided to him. We have not forgotten how Marshal Davout was besieged in Hamburg at the head of the *corps d'armée* that he commanded. Commissioned to subdue the rebellious provinces in the north of Germany, and to defend the line of the Elbe, he had not put into execution against anybody the severities prescribed by Napoleon, but had contented himself with converting these penalties into *contributions de guerre*, and had sent to the main army lying before Dresden supplies in provisions and money, which had sufficed for its maintenance, and after the disastrous battle of Leipsic, not finding himself joined either by the garrison of Dresden or by any other, he had taken up his position in Hamburg, determined to defend himself there against all the armies of Europe, and to save this important position, which would be a valuable object of compensation in the future negotiations of peace, an important bond with Denmark, and the dépôt of an immense war material, collected by France.

Shut up in Hamburg from the month of

September, 1813, and from the month of November cut off from all communication with France, Marshal Davout had remained immovable, determined to hold out as long as he should have soldiers, ammunition, and provisions. Toward the end of November, a communication, scarcely official, being couched partly in ordinary letters, and partly in cipher, commanded him to go to the assistance of Holland, if he could; if not, to remain at Hamburg, to protect that place and engage the enemy as much as possible. All the roads leading to Holland and France being intercepted, he adopted the latter alternative.

The marshal had under his command nearly 40,000 men, who had become under his instructions excellent soldiers, but of this number seven or eight thousand were incapacitated by sickness. He had laid in large supplies of provisions and ammunition, and had, by Napoleon's command, drawn round Hamburg, Harburg, and the islands of the Elbe a vast line of defence, consisting of earthworks, palisades, and hastily-repaired bastions; thus defended, less than a hundred thousand men, aided by skilful engineers, could not have dislodged him. Never shrinking from danger when it appeared, but never going to seek it, he had deferred, until the place should be invested, the destruction of any buildings that might interfere with the defence; he warned the inhabitants of the terrible struggle that was approaching, advised them to lay in provisions, and declared to them that every person unprovided with the means of subsistence should be remorselessly expelled from Hamburg. The enemy having at length appeared, he got the houses that were condemned to be pulled down valued, and out of eighty thousand inhabitants expelled twenty thousand, who had not laid in provisions. It is true that the poor people thus expelled need only pass the gates, when they would find themselves in Altona, a neutral city belonging to the Danes, but half Hamburgian, where they would be sure of abundant assistance. The marshal then commenced defensive operations, and in various combats killed between seven and eight thousand of Benningsen's soldiers; a circumstance that put a period to these attacks. He passed the entire winter of 1813-14 in this manner, receiving no direct intelligence from the French Government, but many reports through the enemy, some false, others true and depressing; but Marshal Davout, regardless alike of both, determined to persevere in his resistance until all the armies of Europe should advance to overwhelm him.

Always severe, but upright and honest, he was determined to pay for the provisions he took, for the works he commanded, and the property he was compelled to destroy: the expenses thus incurred he defrayed from the *contributions de guerre*, to which Hamburg had been condemned for the rebellion of 1813. Being at the head of an active force, he might, like so many other commanders of besieged places, have refused to make compensation for the injury he caused in seizing provisions, pulling down houses, or raising levies of men. A few individuals would, under such circumstances, be obliged to support all the evils attendant on war. But it was repugnant to

Marshal Davout's principles to lay upon some the burden that ought to be borne by all, and a fine having been levied the preceding year, he thought it more just to employ this money in indemnifying those whose property and services he employed for the public benefit. The Hamburgers had refused, since the French reverses, to pay the imposed fine; and Marshal Davout now assembled the merchants, and informed them that he wanted funds to pay the services he required from the inhabitants, and if they did not furnish what he required, he would seize the specie in the bank, upon which the bills for the payment of the *contribution de guerre* had been drawn. This declaration not having produced the desired effect, he kept his word, took the specie out of the bank, and employed in the public service the thirteen millions of which he thus obtained possession, without converting a single centime to an obscure or equivocal use. He continued to hold his position with indomitable tenacity amidst the bullets of the enemy and the calumnies of the Hamburgers, who were loud in their vociferations against what they called the crimes of the French, forgetting the acts of the English in Portugal, where they burned the harvests, the trees, the houses, and forced the Portuguese, under pain of death, to burn them themselves.

In this formidable position of affairs, Marshal Davout, attacked by the Russian and German armies, held out eight entire months, without receiving either commands from his sovereign or intelligence of his country. About the commencement of April, General Benningsen communicated to him, through the instrumentality of the Danes, what had occurred at Paris, and summoned him to open the gates. The marshal replied by quoting the decrees relative to besieged places, which forbids belief in reports circulated by the enemy, and added, that his sovereign might have experienced reverses, but that reverses did not absolve a man of honour from his duty. General Benningsen then commanded a fresh attack, which was executed in the name of the Bourbons, and under the white flag. The marshal fired on the white as on the Russian standard, and repulsed the assailants after having experienced considerable loss. General Benningsen, thus defeated, had again recourse to negotiations, still through the instrumentality of the Danes, our ancient allies. The marshal did not refuse to listen, and offered to send General Decambre to France, to learn authentic intelligence, promising to look on these accounts as true, and act accordingly, if they proceeded from a French source. General Benningsen consented to this arrangement, on condition that one of the principal fortifications of Hamburg should be delivered to him. This the marshal refused. At length an envoy, a member of his own family, having arrived, bearing official communications from the Provisional Government, he, on the 28th of April, assembled his army, which still amounted to 30,000 men, well armed, well dressed, and loyally disposed, and announced to them the restoration of the Bourbons. He made them assume the white cockade, and declared, amidst universal applause, that he would never yield the fortress until he should receive an order from Louis

XVIII. Marshal Davout by this memorable defence preserved for our negotiators a valuable object of compensation, saved for France 30,000 men, an immense war *matériel*, and the honour of the national standard. Calumnies circulated by interested persons through Europe, and especially through France, cannot dim the lustre of such services. Under any circumstances, it is the duty of the historian to record such events with impartial justice.

In Italy, Prince Eugene had valiantly opposed Marshal Bellegarde, and perseveringly refused propositions made by the allies through the King of Bavaria, his father-in-law. Napoleon, as we have seen, after having ordered him to bring back the army to France,—an order which, had it been executed in time, might have changed the fate of the war,—had unfortunately, after the successes of Montmirail, Champaubert, and Montereau, commanded him to remain in Italy, where the prince successfully maintained his position, until Murat attacked him in the rear. He then despatched the Maucune division to oppose the Neapolitans at the passage of the Po. The brave Maucune had, in fact, routed them whenever they appeared, either alone or supported by the Austrians, and still continued to keep them in check, when positive intelligence of the occurrences at Paris reached Milan. Prince Eugene immediately consented to negotiate with Marshal Bellegarde, and on the 16th of April signed an armistice on the following bases:—The French troops scattered through Italy were to return to France with the honours of war, bringing away their *matériel*. The Italian army under Prince Eugene was to remain on the Po, and continue to guard the fortresses until the allied Powers should have decided the fate of Italy.

The armistice being signed, the noble-minded prince, who, owing to the extraordinary events of the times, had become a foreign prince without ceasing to be a French soldier, took a touching leave of the army from which he was about to be separated forever, and received in return the most expressive testimonies of affection and regret. The French army then advanced toward the Alps under the orders of General Grenier, and were joined on the way by the garrisons that were evacuating the Italian fortresses; they experienced a patriotic sadness in leaving this country, where they had shed so much blood, acquired so much glory, and made so short-lived an impression.

At Genoa some thousand conscripts, under the orders of General Frezia, had disputed the possession of the place with the English, and the Genoese themselves had foolishly hoped to recover their independence by rising against us. Obligated to yield, they too abandoned Italy, retreating along the foot of the Maritime Alps. In Dauphiné, Marshal Angremont, who had not been able to defend either Franche-Comté, or Lyons, nor his own dignity, had fallen back on the Isère, whilst General Marchand, after having made a much better defence at Geneva and Chambéry, had retired to Grenoble. Intelligence of the capitulation of Paris, which had quickly reached this part of France, had caused a cessation of hostilities in virtue of a local armistice. But it was very different at the foot of the Pyrenees, on account

of the distance and the forces engaged, and, even after the roar of cannon had ceased elsewhere, a sanguinary battle marked in this region the last days of the war.

Marshal Suchet, as we have seen, had deprived himself of the best part of his army for the benefit of Augereau, who had not profited of the advantage. With an army reduced to a few thousand men, he took up a position before Figulières, endeavouring to recover his Catalan garrisons in exchange for Ferdinand VII., whom he offered to give up. Not having been able to induce the Spaniards to listen to his propositions, he had in the end set Ferdinand at liberty, by the express order of Napoleon, and had been obliged to trust for the faithful execution of the treaty of Valençay to the rather unreliable word of the new King of Spain, and the generosity of the Spaniards, whose feelings toward us were those of intense hatred. The marshal afterward returned to France, determined to join Marshal Soult, if circumstances afforded him time and means.

Marshal Soult, after the battle of Orthez,—which, had he displayed a little more tenacity, might have been a victory,—had retired to Toulouse, flattering himself that he could draw Lord Wellington thither, and so cover Bordeaux by a simple manœuvre. But Lord Wellington had no intention of pursuing an adversary whom he was certain to overtake when he pleased; he therefore seized Bordeaux, opened that city to the Bourbons, and then set out in pursuit of Marshal Soult, returning for that purpose along the left bank of the Garonne.

The English general had 60,000 men, among whom were many Spaniards and Portuguese, animated by victory, and who, under the influence of example and success, were nearly as good as the English troops, though not resembling them in any particular. Marshal Soult's soldiers did not amount to more than 36,000, but all were tried men, and at this moment filled with truly patriotic ardour. Unfortunately, the marshal, depressed by recent events, had no longer confidence either in himself or his fortunes: he had fallen back on Toulouse, where he had scientifically fortified the position.

It was important in every sense, both military and political, to keep this city, which, like Bordeaux and Marseilles, exercised great moral influence in the south. It is situate, with the exception of the Saint-Cyprien suburb, on the right bank of the Garonne, and in order to attack the city the English general would have been obliged to cross before our eyes a deep and rapid river. Cautious in all his movements, with soldiers incompetent to make long marches, and burdened with an immense convoy of provisions, Lord Wellington would not have been able, by the quickest manœuvres, to elude the vigilance of an adversary determined to prevent his crossing the Garonne. But Marshal Soult, placing his entire confidence in the position he had chosen round Toulouse, did not think of disputing the passage of the river that separated him from the English general, and left him free to traverse the banks above and below Toulouse to seek a position for throwing a bridge across. Lord Wellington carried his researches beyond the confluence of the Ariege and the Garonne, he

even entered Cinte-Gabelle, whether that he hoped to find at this height an easier passage or that he hoped by threatening the communications of Marshal Soult with Marshal Suchet to induce the French to abandon their position. However this may be, Lord Wellington, thinking the risk too great at this distance, redescended the course of the Garonne, and resolved to cross below Toulouse, that is to say, at Granada.

On the 4th of April, the day of Napoleon's first abdication, the English general succeeded, notwithstanding the rapidity of the current, in throwing a bridge of boats across near Granada, and transported to the right bank Marshal Beresford's corps. Scarcely had this corps crossed the Garonne, when a sudden and violent swelling of the river, common to the season of the year, endangered and nearly carried away the bridge. Fifteen thousand English, constituting the best part of the enemy's army, were thus thrown into our power, and, these once destroyed, the entire English army would have been exposed to ruin. The cavalry of General Soult—brother to the marshal—witnessed this happy accident; General Count d'Erlon was also aware of it; and both communicated to the general-in-chief this unexpected favour from fortune, that had been so adverse during the past two years. The marshal, depressed by his reverses, and seeing safety only in the strongly-defended position of Toulouse, dared not go in quest of the English, whom he could have overtaken in twenty-four hours and precipitated into the Garonne. The English remained four days in this perilous position, but, the waters having abated, Lord Wellington repaired the bridge, and transported all his forces to the right bank. On the 9th he appeared before Toulouse, and resolved to attack the French on the following day, taking care that his bridge of boats kept pace with his progress along the Garonne, so that he might be assured of a means of retreat in case of need.

The position taken up by Marshal Soult possessed great advantages. The Garonne, which in the beginning of its course descends perpendicularly from the Pyrenees, turns suddenly to the right on reaching Toulouse, and there making a bend flows afterward nearly parallel with the mountains, to the sea. Though the enemy, having passed the Garonne, threatened the right much more than the left bank, Marshal Soult had naturally thought of defending Toulouse on both banks. On the left bank—that is to say, in the inner angle formed by the Garonne, and occupied by the suburb of Saint-Cyprien—he had thrown up earthworks and planted a strong range of palisades, both extremities of which reached the banks of the river. Behind this line of works the embattled wall of the suburb, flanked with towers and bristling with artillery, formed a second and almost impregnable obstacle. And supposing that the St. Cyprien suburb were forced, the French need only cross the stone bridge which connected the suburb with the city, and then, blowing up the bridge, the enemy would find themselves confined to the left bank, after having lost numbers of men in a fruitless attack. One efficient division would have been sufficient to defend us on this side

and frustrate all the efforts of the British army.

It was not, therefore, probable that the principal attack would be made on the left bank, where there was only a suburb to conquer; it was much more likely that the attack would be made on the right bank, where the prey offered was the city itself. But the approach on this side was not easier than on the other. The great southern canal which surrounded Toulouse, joining the Garonne below the city, offered the first line of defence, which might be warmly disputed, an additional means of prolonging the resistance being afforded by the wall of circumvallation. The banks of the canal had been carefully fortified; the bridges had been protected by works, and mined. In this manner, the entire north of Toulouse was defended by the canal. On the east and south the position was still stronger, because beyond the canal there was a line of heights, reaching from Pujade to Calvint, and everywhere bristling with redoubts and artillery. It was here that Marshal Soult placed the main body of his forces, and it was impossible that the enemy could think of attacking any part of the city until they should have driven the French army from the heights. The enemy would have been obliged to make a descent toward the south, leaving themselves exposed during this movement to an attack from the French, and, crossing the canal that lay on the right and rear, attack the city by the Saint-Michel suburb. But the marshal had taken precautions in this direction, and protected this suburb with works and artillery.

Marshal Soult had established the Maransin division—a detachment of General Reille's corps—on the left bank, in the St. Cyprien suburb. It was sufficient, as we have seen, for the defence of this quarter. The main body of his army was drawn up on the right bank. The Darricau division, belonging to Drouet d'Erlon's corps, stationed behind the canal, at the Matabiau bridge, defended the north of the city. The Darmagnac division of the same corps occupied the interval between the canal and the heights. The Harispe and Villatte divisions of the Clausel corps occupied the heights also. Lastly, behind the heights, and as a reserve, the Taupin division, forming the remainder of General Reille's corps, was placed.

Lord Wellington resolved to commence operations on the morning of the 10th of April. He ordered General Hill, with the Murray, Stewart, and Morillo divisions, to attack the French on the left bank of the Garonne, in front of the St. Cyprien suburb; this was more than a sufficient force for an operation which could only be secondary to the main action. The remainder of the English army was transported to the right bank. General Picton, at the head of the Scotch division, was ordered to force the canal on the north of the city, whilst Alton's light division was to second this attack by one the Spaniards were to attempt against the heights of Pujade. Lastly, Marshal Beresford, with the Clinton and Cole divisions, was to skirt the foot of the heights, advancing from the north toward the south, and endeavour to carry the Calvint position, and then advance in a southerly direction in

front of the St. Michel suburb. He had under his command a considerable portion of the British cavalry.

On the morning of the 10th, General Hill, on the left bank, attacked the Maransin division, in front of the St. Cyprien suburb, but cautiously, as the decisive effort was not to be made on that side. He met a determined resistance, and perceived that it would be a serious matter to persevere in his attempt. On the right bank, the real theatre of the warfare, General Picton attacked the canal courageously. The brave Darricau, the veteran colonel of the 32d, who had distinguished himself at Diernstein, at Hall, and lately in Spain, defended the banks of the canal with his division. Skilfully disposing his soldiers behind this line of defence, and animating them by his example, he repulsed all the efforts of the English during several hours, and covered the line of the canal with dead or wounded Scots. During this time, General Freyre tried to carry, by the aid of his Spaniards, the heights of Pujade, which are connected with that portion of the canal defended by General Darricau. The Spaniards, received with a brisk fire of artillery and musketry, advanced boldly to the foot of the intrenchments. But, arrived at this point, they were attacked on their left flank by General Harispe, and on their right flank by General Darmagnac; they were unable to hold their ground against this combined assault, and numbers were killed. They would have been completely destroyed but for Alton's light division, that hastened to their relief.

On the south, the English had lost nearly 3000 men, and the fruit of their efforts was everywhere the same. They were repulsed both on the left and the right bank, along the canal, as well as before the heights of Pujade.

At this moment, Marshal Beresford afforded the French general a happy opportunity of terminating the conflict by a decisive success. The marshal, advancing from the north to the south along the heights that covered the east of our position, operated in front of us,—a dangerous but necessary flank movement, for it was indispensably necessary that he should come down to the south side in order to approach Toulouse. The danger of this movement was so much the greater, for if at this moment the enemy had advanced upon him *en masse*, he would have been precipitated into the muddy bed of a little river called the Era, which flows parallel to the heights. Fortune smiled upon us a second time within eight days, but this was her last favour. Generals Clausel, Harispe, and Taupin, assembling round the commander-in-chief, urged him to profit of the opportunity, and to pour the mass of his forces on the flank of the rash Beresford, who, feeling the danger of his position, was hurrying the accomplishment of his movement. Marshal Soult, remembering the faults already committed with regard to the English, when the French quitted strong positions for the purpose of attacking them, and fearing to commit a like error on this occasion, hesitated more than two hours, and only made up his mind to arrest Beresford's march when the troops of the latter no longer exposed their flank to his fire, but were marching about

toward the Calvinet point, the extreme right of our position. The Taupin division, despatched too late, abandoned uselessly a village where they might have long defended themselves, and, attacking the enemy with impetuosity, were received by the English with their accustomed vigour: they unfortunately lost their general at the most critical moment. The division was left some moments without a leader, and without orders; and the English profited of their embarrassment to seize the redoubts of Calvinet. The French endeavoured in vain to recover them. General Harispe was wounded severely, and Marshal Beresford then, crossing the line of the heights, on our extreme right, appeared before the south side of the city. The retreat was effected with some little disorder, which put Toulouse for a moment in danger. Fortunately a grenadier captain of the 118th, named Larouzière, assembling his company behind the *remblai* of the canal, surprised the English by a close fire, arrested their progress, and gave the Darnagnac division time to rally. The enemy could carry their attempt no further. Although long the rest of the line we had repulsed the enemy as valiantly as in the morning, the position being turned on the south was no longer tenable.

The entire French army ought now to have fallen back on the walls of Toulouse, determined to fight there to the last. It would have been difficult in this position to force the 2,000 men that Marshal Soult still commanded. But the situation was completely isolated, and such a movement would besides have the city of Toulouse exposed to the most imminent danger. On the other hand, by falling back on Carcassonne, Marshal Soult was certain of being joined by Marshal Suchet, and both united would present to the prudent Wellington a mass of forces against which he could scarcely attempt any thing. Marshal Soult therefore took the wise resolution of reversing Toulouse and falling back on Villefranche. He had killed or wounded about 6000 English, and had himself lost 3500 men. As usual, the Spanish army had been unfortunate but heroic.

At length, intelligence of the late events at Paris was received. The Provisional Government by a little more activity might have spared the lives of 8000 brave men, uselessly sacrificed for the solution of a question that had been solved elsewhere. It was only on the 8th of April that the Provisional Government thought of sending an emissary to the two armies that were battling at the foot of the Pyrenees, and yet they ought to have been the first objects of attention, as they were most likely to renew the sanguinary conflict. M. de Talleyrand had chosen for this mission M. de St. Simon, who had set out, accompanied by an English officer, in order to secure a passage through the enemy's army. The escort of this officer, though it facilitated M. de St. Simon's passage through the English army, rendered him suspected in the eyes of the French, who fancied they saw traitors on every side. Delayed first at Orleans, next at Montauban by the French, and lastly at Toulouse by the English, M. de St. Simon did not reach the camp of Marshal Soult until the 14th. The

marshal had chosen an impregnable position at Villefranche; he there waited the arrival of troops from the Catalan army, and flattered himself that he should be soon revenged of the English. The arrival of M. de St. Simon was therefore a cause of extreme vexation, for, besides the disastrous intelligence of which he was bearer, he checked the marshal at the very moment when victory was not impossible. The presence of M. de St. Simon produced moreover an intense emotion among the troops, who were still more exasperated than the veterans of the other armies. Influenced by all these motives, Marshal Soult endeavoured to persuade himself that the accounts from Paris were not true. He even fancied that these communications might be a snare of the enemy, and was about to put M. de St. Simon under arrest. But the latter effected his escape, and repaired to Marshal Suchet's camp. This marshal immediately gave credence to M. de St. Simon, and showed himself disposed to obey the orders of the Provisional Government, but on condition of awaiting a definite confirmation of the received accounts. The confirmation soon arrived, and an armistice exclusively local, such as had been concluded in other places, suspended hostilities between the French marshals and the adverse forces that had invaded the Pyrenean frontier.

Whilst that in the most remote regions our armies still defended the Empire, of whose fall they were ignorant, on our frontiers, and even at the gates of Paris, brave men fought for their country to the last gasp. Count Marmier, though he had never been a soldier, had enrolled and equipped, at his own expense, a legion of *mobile* national guards, and took up a position in Huningue, where he had heroically defended the place during five months. On his side, the brave Daumesnil, so celebrated as "the wooden leg," had shut himself up in Vincennes, determined that the enemy should not get possession of the immense *matériel* lodged there. Threatened with the rigours of war, he replied by declaring he would blow the place up, if his adversaries persisted in their threat: they consequently desisted. Like all the other commanders, he had only yielded on receiving evidence of the revolution that had taken place at Paris and the regular Government established there. So terminated the opposition that our soldiers, dispersed in so many different places, had not ceased to offer to combined Europe from Antwerp to Hamburg, from Hamburg to Milan, from Milan to Toulouse, and from Toulouse to Vincennes. Henceforth the new Government, delivered from the presence of Napoleon, was also freed from the resistance of his lieutenants, all of whom were now ready to acknowledge the Bourbons.

But, if the resistance of the armies had ceased, that of the passions was about to commence, and to this prudence was the only efficacious force that could be opposed. Could this prudence be expected from the princes of the house of Bourbon and their friends, all returning to their country after twenty-five years of proscription and misfortune? Such was the important question that arose on the fall of the Empire.

The Count d'Artois, established during two

or three days in Paris,—he had entered on the 12th of April,—was, so to speak, carried away by a whirl that would have disturbed a stronger head than his. Having taken up his abode in the Tuilleries, he could scarcely contain his joy at finding himself in such a residence; he wished that the world at large should share in the satisfaction he felt, and endeavoured to persuade the partisans of the Empire that nothing should be changed, whilst, on the contrary, he told the emigrants who returned with him after twenty-five years of suffering that they should have full satisfaction, provided they waited with patience. But he soon perceived that soft words were not sufficient to remove the difficulties of his position. He wanted aides-de-camp, and the choice required deliberation. The friends who had accompanied the prince from foreign lands, or those who having remained in France had been the first to greet him, expected that if high political posts had been given to those who served under the Empire, they at least ought to fill the places immediately near the persons of the restored princes. But where could aides-de-camp be chosen but from among the military? and where were military men to be found but in the imperial armies? The question was a difficult one; and M. de Vitrolles, who understood the true state of things, advised the Count d'Artois to choose some of his aides-de-camp from among the distinguished officers of the Empire. The prince followed this advice, and appointed MM. de Nansouty and de Lauriston, than whom none better could be selected, for they were respected in the army, and were connected with the ancient nobility. These appointments excited loud murmurs among the personal friends of the prince, brought many reproaches on M. de Vitrolles, and were a complete revelation of the sentiments that animated the partisans of the ancient and modern *régime* toward each other in flocking round the Bourbons. The Count d'Artois, entirely engrossed by congratulations, visits, and interviews with the sovereigns, paid but little attention to this incident, and continued to testify his delight by lavishing pressures of the hand and promises. However, it was necessary to take into consideration an important affair, which mere pliancy of temper could not decide; and that was the title with which the prince should be invested, in order to direct the Government. The title of Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom, exercising the royal authority in absence of the king, seemed the most natural to adopt. But how could he dare to assume this title in presence of the Senate? at this moment the sole recognised authority, but who held themselves apart, since they had deposed Napoleon, not wishing to take part in any of the late proceedings, showing by their attitude as well as by the language of several individual members that they would neither invest the Count d'Artois nor the king himself with regal power without a solemn pledge to maintain the constitution. Scarcely could M. d'Artois or his friends be made to understand this difficulty, so natural did it appear to them that, at the bare presence of the legitimate sovereign, or his representative, every other authority ought to disappear, and so ignorant were they that, beside the royal power, any authority

could exist emanating from the people or responsible to them. M. de Vitrolles, who acted as the royalist intermediary with the Provisional Government, being informed of the difficulty, knowing that it ought not to be treated lightly, laid the case before the prince, who confided to him the care of solving the question as best he could, by coming to terms with those to whom the more serious state affairs were intrusted.

Although the people at large still continued to ridicule the Senate, they nevertheless looked upon that body as the only existing authority; and had they supposed that the Bourbons, in order to return to France as absolute princes, refused to receive the investiture of their authority from the senators, the nation would have risen in favour of the latter, the army would have followed the example, and the allied sovereigns would have joined the public and the army, bound as they were by their plighted word, by the dictates of good sense, and by conscientious conviction; the Emperor Alexander, in particular, warmly approved the determination of recalling the ancient dynasty only on condition of supporting a liberal constitution. It would therefore have been folly to dispute the authority of the Senate; but the senators, on the other hand, were considerably embarrassed; public opinion once convinced of the propriety and necessity of recalling the Bourbons had turned in their favour with a kind of enthusiasm. This excitement, the offspring of reason and natural sensibility among the masses, and the result of ambition and sometimes of meanness of character in individuals, continued to increase. The personal qualities of the Count d'Artois contributed very much to this feeling, and the Senate ran the risk of being deserted in a few days. It was, therefore, prudent in both parties to effect a compromise. But, as usual, before attempting to negotiate, each asserted extreme opinions; and it was not M. de Talleyrand who was likely to effect a reconciliation so necessary to both parties, for he habitually, partly through indolence, and partly because he was tired of discussion, shunned disputes. He allowed them to go on disputing, quietly waiting the moment when, both parties being worn out, the difficulty should be solved in some way.

There was a personage whose arrival at Paris we have already mentioned—the Duke d'Ortante—who sought rather than shunned trouble; who was fond of commotion and intrigue; who wished to put himself forward, and bitterly regretted having by his absence lost the opportunity of being the principal actor in the late changes. Since his return he had given evidence of his presence by exclaiming against the treaty of the 11th of April; and he beheld with intense joy, in the question now agitated, a stage ready prepared, where his turbulent and daring activity might be exhibited. It was his opinion that the Senate ought to endeavour to bind the Bourbons, and being a regicide, this was a precaution more needful to him than to others; but he perceived the embarrassment of the Senate, and wished to extricate them, and at the same time do the Bourbons a service which would give him a claim to their favour in future. He

was, besides, better suited than M. de Talleyrand to surmount the present difficulty, because he was more fertile in expedients, because he feared less to take a prominent part, and besides he was better suited to carry on intrigues with the senators. Intruding himself everywhere, he had become as conversant in the affairs of the Provisional Government as one of the members, and M. de Talleyrand, wishing to humour that he might afterward make use of him, had offered no opposition.

The Provisional Government had transferred its sittings from the Rue Saint-Florentin to the Tuilleries, after the Count d'Artois had taken up his abode there, but their doors were not more firmly closed than before; they were still open to busy-bodies, who came to intermeddle or to obtrude their advice, nor were they closed against mere loungers. The Provisional Government was at this moment busy discussing, with a select number of senators, the important question of the day,—the title to be conferred on the Count d'Artois; and M. de Vitrolles, on the prince's part, asserted the rights of legitimate royalty, when M. de Fouché, with a mixture of vulgarity, effrontery, and good sense, rising suddenly, gave M. de Vitrolles clearly to understand that he did not comprehend the question under discussion; that it was necessary that the Count d'Artois should receive the title of Lieutenant-General, but that he should receive it from the Senate, who would confer the title on the prince when he would be willing to pledge himself to support the senatorial constitution. M. de Vitrolles objected the want of powers on the part of the prince, who had not time to receive authority sanctioning his acceptance of the constitution. M. Fouché treated this objection lightly. He said that the difficulty that embarrassed M. de Vitrolles was not of a serious character; that of course the Count d'Artois knew the feelings and opinions of his brother Louis XVIII.; that he might therefore become surety for him, and declare that, aware of his intentions, he was certain that the king would accept the constitution, if not in all its details, at least in its principal bases. M. de Fouché did not stop there; he instantly sketched a document, leaving it optional to modify the terms more or less, but which embodied a positive moral pledge with regard to the constitution, without removing the difficulty of the want of the royal sanction. According to this plan, the Senate should repair to the Tuilleries, where the Count d'Artois would read the prepared declaration, and, this being done, the Senate should invest the prince with the lieutenant-generalship. "But," said M. de Vitrolles, "who can assure us that the Senate will accept this arrangement?" "I can," replied M. Fouché, with his usual effrontery. M. de Vitrolles, who had never seen M. Fouché before, seemed to ask all present, by his looks, who the person was with whom he was discussing, and who answered so confidently for himself and others. Having learned the name, he ceased to be surprised at the presumption of his interlocutor, and felt no doubt of the promised result, without appearing alarmed at the idea of his prince being laid under obligations by a regicide. The proposed expedient was agreed on, and each departed to prepare the

minds of the parties interested. M. de Talleyrand allowed M. Fouché to do as he pleased, like all indolent persons who allow themselves to be deprived of their privileges by the active-minded.

M. de Vitrolles, having returned to the Count d'Artois, communicated to him and his friends the arrangement devised by M. Fouché. The prince was not then the person most annoyed. Intoxicated by success and the applause with which he was everywhere greeted, he was inclined to look upon the proposed difficulties as unimportant subtleties that time would dissipate, and he was ready to consent to every thing, provided that the title of Lieutenant-General was immediately conferred on him. But his friends, whose prejudices were less dissipated by personal flattery, were disgusted at not seeing the legitimate authority acknowledged, and, as it were, adored, the moment it became visible; but, on the contrary, they saw it cheapened, by a power that arrogated a superior authority, under pretext of representing the nation. These pretensions of the Senate irritated the royalists, and they were determined to put them down at any price. As they had triumphed in the case of the tricolour cockades, they flattered themselves that they should triumph as easily over what they called *revolutionary principles*. M. de Vitrolles, after having poured his grievances into the sympathizing hearts of his friends, did not, however, wish to urge them to acts of imprudence, of whose folly he was conscious, and he saw clearly that it would be necessary to come to some conclusion. But what was to be done under the circumstances? It was impossible to remain at Paris without legal authority; to assume it in presence of the Senate and in spite of that body was equally impossible, unless that the Senate could be annihilated, by its dissolution being pronounced, and the chamber where the senators held their sittings closed. But how could such a resolve be put into execution? There were not more than eight or ten of these ultra royalists in Paris; they did not know any person,—not an official of the Administration to whom they could give an order. They had no organized force at their command, for Marmont's soldiers, who alone had abandoned Napoleon, belonged to the Provisional Government, the national guard had assumed the white cockade with visible repugnance, and the soldiers of the allies were at the disposal of the too liberal-minded Alexander. To attempt, in this destitute state, to upset the Senate and the Provisional Government, would have been an act of madness; the projectors would expose themselves to a prodigious amount of ridicule, and probably to a disavowal of their acts by Louis XVIII.; perhaps even that public opinion might suddenly change in favour of the regency of Maria Louisa, if this counter-revolutionary attempt assumed a serious aspect.

The Count d'Artois, disposed to take every thing in good part, said that he could not without orders from his brother, indeed, without his formal approval, expose to perilous chances the cause of royalty, that had just so miraculously triumphed. He thought it better to accept the investiture from the hands of the Senate on the best terms that could be obtained,

take possession of the royal authority as soon as possible, and exercise it to the best of his judgment until the arrival of Louis XVIII., who, once seated on his throne, could do as he thought fit. The Count d'Artois' self-created advisers, seeing him inclined to submit, dared not offer further resistance: they therefore adopted the part of submission, modifying at the same time the declaration suggested by M. Fouché, making the pledges taken by the prince as light as possible, and mentioning only the principal bases of the future constitution. This task being finished, M. de Vitrolles returned to M. Fouché, who showed little concern about the changes of form provided the principles remained. He went immediately to prepare the Senate for the proposed arrangement.

Whilst the ultra royalists were thus employed, the Emperor Alexander, having learned the difficulties opposed by the Count d'Artois' advisers to the conditions of the Senate, commissioned M. de Nesselrode to visit M. de Vitrolles and communicate to him the intentions of the allied sovereigns. On the morning of the 14th, while the Senate was preparing to assemble, M. de Nesselrode had a clear and conclusive conversation with M. de Vitrolles. The Russian minister, whose language in general was simple and moderate, but decisive, declared to M. de Vitrolles, in the name of his master and the allied sovereigns, that it was the Senate who had done every thing; that it was the Senate who had deposed Napoleon, and recalled the Bourbons; that but for the existence of this body the allies would not have found a legitimate authority with whom to treat, and that, reviled though the Senate may be, it contained the most enlightened and experienced men the country possessed; that it was not by the aid of emigrants, who did not understand either the state of France or Europe, nor the spirit of the times, that so formidable a nation as France could be ruled; that it was therefore necessary to submit to the conditions offered by the Senate, which, after all, were not unreasonable. M. de Nesselrode added that there existed at this moment only two military forces,—the army of Napoleon, and the two hundred thousand bayonets of the allied sovereigns; that Napoleon's army was in the interest of the King of Rome, and that the two hundred thousand bayonets of the allies should never serve to enact an 18th Brumaire against the Senate, but would rather be employed to prevent it; that this was a fixed resolution, which he was not commissioned to discuss, but to announce.

M. de Vitrolles again retired, indignant against the foreign influence which, however, he had himself gone to seek at Troyes, and laid before the prince the communications with which he was charged. There was a unanimous outcry against that fool Alexander, as the ultra royalists called the Emperor of Russia, and they waited with a forced resignation the determination of the Senate.

This body assembled on the same day, and heard the propositions of M. Fouché, supported by all M. de Talleyrand's influence. It was not by sound reasons, adduced in public sittings, that the Senate was influenced, but by words whispered in the ear of individual members

by active and crafty agents. And among these none was more conspicuous than M. Fouché. He told the senators that it was absolutely necessary to get out of this difficulty, and invest the Count d'Artois with the Lieutenant-generalship, still maintaining the conditions already stipulated, that is to say, the senatorial constitution and the oath of the king to maintain this constitution.

Influenced by the opinions of MM. Fouché and de Talleyrand, the Senate passed in full sitting the following resolution, which did honour to the firmness of the Senate, and gave no opportunity for ridicule:—

"In conformity with the proposition of the Provisional Government, and the report of a special commission of seven members,—

"The Senate resigns the provisional government of France to S. A. R. Mgr. the Count d'Artois, with the title of Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom, until Louis Stanislaus Xavier, called to the throne of the French, shall have accepted the constitutional charter.

"The Senate further declares that the resolution passed this day shall be presented in the evening to S. A. R. Mgr. the Count d'Artois, by the entire body of the Senate.

"Resolved at Paris, 14th of April."

On his return to the Tuilleries, M. de Talleyrand met M. de Vitrolles, and said, throwing carelessly on a table a copy of the resolutions adopted by the Senate, that the royalists must be satisfied with that, for the Senate would come in the evening to receive the declaration of the prince and to read him their decree. M. de Vitrolles, returning to the prince, found him now less accommodating than on the previous evening. The haughty precision of the terms in which the provisional and conditional power was conferred on him filled him with anger. He flung away the document offered to him, exclaiming that the gentlemen senators might do as they pleased; that he did not know them; that he would not receive them; and that he would be lieutenant-general of the kingdom in virtue of his own right, and not in virtue of their decree.

Thus the prince, who on the previous day had been more rational than his friends, was much less so now; each in turn had become intractable. But necessity, before which the friends of the Count d'Artois had bent, was equally powerful with him. The prince and his friends were not stronger on the 14th than they had been on the 13th of April; they had no power over the army, for that obeyed Napoleon, nor over the national guard, which obeyed the Senate, nor over the foreign soldiers, who were under the command of the Emperor Alexander. They had thought of making use of the legislative corps, a body more popular than the Senate, but possessed of less authority, and for this purpose had endeavoured to learn the sentiments of the most influential members of the legislative corps; but the replies were timid and disheartening. Besides, there were so few of the members then in Paris, that it would be impossible to assemble that body. In short, the day was advancing, the Senate would soon arrive, so that there was not time to get up an outcry. The declaration required of the prince was read over, the pledges demanded of him were made

as light as possible, but allowing the fundamental principles to remain, and these principles were the recall of the king on condition of giving guarantees, which have since received the title of the *Constitutional Charter*, that is to say, on condition of recognising the French Revolution in all its most legitimate and respectable phases.

The Senate arrived at eight in the evening at the Tuileries, and at their head the president, M. de Talleyrand.

This personage, so well calculated to figure in scenes where it was needed to temper firmness with the most refined politeness, approached the prince, and leaning as usual on a cane, with his head inclined to one side, read a discourse, at once haughty and adroit, in which he explained without excusing the conduct of the Senate, for it did not need excuse.

"The Senate," he said, "has promoted the return of your august house to the throne of France. Taught by the present and the past, the Senate desires, with the nation, to fix the royal authority forever on the enduring basis of a just division of power and the security of public liberty,—the only guarantees for the happiness and interest of all.

"The Senate, persuaded that the principles of the new constitution have penetrated your heart, confer on you, by the decree that I have the honour of presenting, the title of Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom, until the arrival of the king, your august brother. Our respectful confidence cannot offer a higher testimony of regard to the spirit of chivalrous honour transmitted to you by your ancestors.

"My lord, the Senate, in these moments of public joy, being obliged, in the discharge of its duties, to preserve a greater calmness of manner, is not the less penetrated with the popular sentiments. Your royal highness can read the sentiments of our hearts even through the reserve of our language."

M. de Talleyrand added to these firm and respectful words protestations of devotedness, then common in every mouth, but which in his case were the least commonplace and mean that could be selected.

The prince replied in the words already agreed on. "Gentlemen," he said, "I have read the constitutional act that recalls to the throne of France the king, my august brother. I have not received from him authority to accept the constitution, but I know his sentiments and his principles, and I do not apprehend a disavowal when I declare, in his name, that he will admit the bases of this act."

After this explicit engagement, the declaration enumerated the bases, that is to say, the division of power, the participation of the executive between the king and the chambers, the responsibility of ministers, the right of the nation to levy taxes, the liberty of the press, individual liberty, freedom of religious worship, permanency of judges, inviolability of the public debt, and of the sales called "national," maintenance of the legion of honour, of ranks and pensions in the army, and an oblivion for the votes and acts anterior to, &c., &c.

"I hope," added the prince, "that the enu-

meration of these conditions will satisfy you and that it comprises all the guarantees that can secure the liberty and tranquillity of France."

These remarks having produced an effect, the prince, emboldened by success, spoke in the most happily-chosen phrases; first to the Senate collectively, then to different senators, with whom he conversed familiarly. One of them could not help exclaiming, "Yes, it is indeed the blood of Henry IV. that flows in your veins." "His blood flows indeed in my veins," rejoined the prince: "I would wish to possess his talents, but, in default of his talents, I possess his heart and his love for France."

These expressions excited warm approbation, and the Senate and the prince appeared to be two powers, thoroughly reconciled. After the Senate came the members of the legislative corps, anxious to give in their adhesion to the act that was consummated before their eyes. The prince addressed them in words that indicated a certain preference, for he complimented them on having resisted tyranny, a compliment which he could not address to the Senate. This little piece of flattery, highly gratifying to the legislative corps, but scarcely perceived by the Senate, disappeared amid the general content.

The prince had achieved a complete success, and he was perfectly happy. The idea of appearing before a great body composed of the most important personages in France, had inspired him with a certain amount of timidity. He was enchanted at having got so well out of the business, and, with his usual volatility, appeared to have forgotten his recent anger. "Upon my word," he said to his intimate friends, "the pledge is taken; we must abide by it honestly, and if after some years things do not go on well, we shall see what can be done toward a new arrangement."

From this moment, the prince might consider himself as legally invested with the royal authority, and he had passed triumphantly through one of the most trying phases of his position. But he now suddenly remembered that during the last fortnight, carried away by the whirl of events, he had always acted according to his own opinions, or the advice of his friends, without thinking of Louis XVIII. He certainly was not guilty of negligence or usurpation, for he had not had one hour free to devote to obedience to the king, and in every circumstance he had only yielded to necessity. But he feared his brother, who was witty, jealous, and sarcastic. Perceiving that in all which he had done since the affair of Nancy he had not once thought of consulting his brother, who in his eyes was a king by divine right, he was terrified. "But my brother," he said: "we have not thought of him, we have not communicated to him any thing we have done. What will he say?" M. de Vitrolles, rather surprised at this innocent and unfounded remorse, replied, that in the first place he had seized the crown, which was a signal service, for which Louis XVIII. must hold himself indebted; that, besides, there had

* This is the account given by M. de Vitrolles, the devoted friend of the prince.

not been time to send intelligence to London, that the sincerity of his conduct was evident in all his acts, that at the utmost the time had only now arrived to send an envoy to London, and that Louis XVIII. would see clearly that this was the first moment the prince had had at his disposal. Somewhat recovered from his alarm, the Count d'Artois selected the Count de Bruges as his envoy to England, to explain to Louis XVIII. what had been done, to show him the reasons for this mode of acting, and to receive his royal orders concerning what was yet to be done, and commands for the preparations of his journey into France.

The Count d'Artois being invested with royal authority, it was necessary to put a term to the existence of the Provisional Government, without, however, estranging the men who composed it, or losing the benefit of their influence. Setting aside all claims of gratitude, it would have been a great imprudence to break with them so soon and so abruptly. The means of satisfying every requirement was clearly pointed out: which was to resolve the Provisional Government into a council for the Count d'Artois, because this prince, even had he been better acquainted with men and things than he was, could not dispense with a council. The Provisional Government was therefore changed into a privy council, deliberating with the prince on all state affairs. The ministers, unexceptionable in every respect, and some worthy of governing France during the brightest epochs of her history, became privy councillors, *en attendant* the return of Louis XVIII., who would confirm them in office.

Meanwhile, the council of the prince, composed exclusively of the Provisional Government, was defective in more than one respect. There was no representative of the army, for the hoary Beurnonville could not be looked upon as such; formerly, indeed, a good officer, he had since fallen into such complete oblivion that the glorious phalanxes that had traversed Europe during twenty years could not think themselves represented by him. Two persons were at first thought of; Marshal Suchet, because of his talents as a warrior and statesman, and Marshal Marmont, because of the signal service he had rendered to the royal cause. But M. de Talleyrand did not wish to be associated with a person so influential as Marshal Suchet, and nobody had either the courage or inclination to enter into close relationship with Marshal Marmont. This unfortunate man, who had hoped to secure to himself the first rank by transferring his services to the Provisional Government, had become odious to his ancient comrades and insupportable to his new friends. Military men ascribing more influence to the defection of the 6th corps than it really had had on the result of the war, took pleasure in thinking, and still more in saying, that treason alone had conquered them, and at the moment when they abandoned Napoleon for the Bourbons, they took especial care to establish a decided distinction between *betraying* and *giving in adhesion*. Thus the more they yielded, the more severe were they on Marmont, who was become the traitor *par excellence*.

This unhappy man, perceiving the abyss into which he had fallen without anticipating it, exclaimed against the injustice of fate.

The more he suffered internally, the more he exerted himself externally, going hither and thither sometimes for the purpose of acquiring additional importance, sometimes to render to the army services for which he was thanked by the military; and it was this that had inspired him with so much ardour in defending the tricolour cockade and instituting measures against desertion. But, without succeeding in clearing himself in the eyes of his ancient comrades, he had rendered himself singularly disagreeable to those he had served, by the commotion he excited, by the excessive pretensions he put forth, and by the reproach of ingratitude, always ready on his lips, when what he wished was not done. His vanity, his fickleness, his very courage, added to the disagreeables of his presence, and he was become a heavy burden to those whose triumph he had secured; a terrible example to those who during political revolutions are tempted to deviate from the line of plain and obvious duty, arising naturally from their position. To elect him member of the supreme council was really impossible, and it was only suggested in order that it might be said that it was impracticable. Marshals Monecy and Oudinot were selected; honest men, who had been among the first to give in their adhesion, but who were incompetent to exercise a political influence. These new colleagues suited M. de Talleyrand, for they could not excite his suspicions. Another of different stamp was elected,—General Dessoles,—who did not put forth any great pretensions. It was long known that the head of Moreau's staff was a distinguished man. This opinion was changed into conviction on the part of those who passed a few days in his society. He gave evidence of a refined, cultivated, and enlarged mind, an upright character, and an adherence to the honest convictions of the times, that is to say, a sincere belief that henceforth peace and legitimate liberty could be found only under the Bourbons. Moreover, General Dessoles had been able, in a few days, to win the good opinion of the national guards, who, drawn from the middle classes of Paris, holding rational and temperate opinions, would become for the new Government a powerful support between the imperial army, already a prey to regret, and the allied army that was under foreign control. General Dessoles was, therefore, as representative of the national guard, and on his own account, appointed a member of the royal council.

There was a personage who, after having served as intermediary between the ruling powers of the day, and even incurred actual dangers for the royal cause, had no idea of being set aside as a henceforth useless instrument: this personage was M. de Vitrolles. Having become the special agent, and almost the personal friend, of the Count d'Artois, he hoped to play under the Bourbons the same part that M. de Bassano had played under the Empire. This was a strange mistake, for the part of M. de Bassano, which was only to receive the wishes of an absolute master, and transmit them to clerk-ministers, ceased with Napoleon's reign. Nevertheless, M. de Vitrolles assumed spontaneously the functions of secretary to the royal council, took notes of the

proceedings, which displeased M. de Talleyrand very much, for he wisely believed that it is the definite resolutions of a privy council that ought to be recorded, and not the thousand fugitive and often contradictory opinions which even men of the strongest intellect put forth before arriving at definite resolutions. M. de Vitrolles undertook the office of recording the deliberations of the royal council, though he was often recommended not certainly to withdraw, but to abstain from writing.

Still, all the claimants for office that hovered round the new Government were not satisfied. There was the Abbé de Pradt, who imagined that he was as useful as he was petulant, and of whom nobody would have thought of making a minister, nor wished to make a colleague, and who on this account was placed in dignified isolation, by being appointed Grand Chancellor of the Legion of Honour. And there was another person, who had long been intimate with Napoleon, who had been his school-fellow, and who, having lost his confidence some years before, repaid by a rabid hatred the disgrace he had incurred: this was M. de Bourrienne, who had on the first change of government been appointed to the office of Postmaster-General. He was allowed to keep the appointment, because he had it, and there would have been a difficulty in finding him another. Among all these appointments, very few were bestowed on the emigrants, who, having returned to France either at a late or more remote period, regarded the reign of the Bourbons, not only as a triumph achieved by them, but as their patrimony. Some had already returned from England or the provinces, and thronged round the Count d'Artois, who, not being able to give them places in the Government of the country, formed them into a private government, and made of them, so to speak, his personal *clientèle*. We have mentioned MM. de Montceuil and de la Maisonfort, who had returned, the one from Franche-Comté, the other from England, men of talent and learning, who must not be confounded with the herd that seek to turn every revolution to their personal advantage. The Count d'Artois installed them at the Tuileries, for the purpose of having near him a kind of secret council, that should possess his entire confidence. Had the Count d'Artois admitted only such men to his confidence,—though antagonistic influences are always dangerous in a Government,—the quality of the choice might have partly corrected the evil. But whilst his brother Louis XVIII., through prudence, idleness, or contempt, had uniformly kept at a distance those royalists who came from Vendée or Paris to England, bringing groundless information, and raising false hopes, the Count d'Artois, who was of a restless disposition and compliant temper, was always surrounded by these men, and he was now beset by them as constantly as circumstances permitted. In fact, the Tuileries were now filled with men, who reminded the prince that they had done this or that, that they had been charged with such or such mission, which according to their account had been most difficult of execution, and they now offered to perform services of any kind whatsoever. Some proposed to go into the departments and depose the refractory prefects or

subprefects of the Empire, or to pursue the members of the Bonaparte family, and tear from them the riches which, it was said, they had carried off. Others went so far as to volunteer to rid France of the tyrant, who, though dethroned, would never allow France to enjoy peace, if he were allowed to live. The Count d'Artois, not listening attentively,—above all, not examining minutely these propositions,—gave a gracious reception to all these busybodies, shook hands with all, did not question any of their pretended services, did not say to any one that he did not remember to have seen him before; he received the offers of all, and, in return, lavished on them promises with a warmth of manner and words, the result alike of his amiability and frivolity. His only care was to send everybody away content; and he treated exactly in the same manner those high-minded royalists who, faithful to their principles, had never stained their honour by a single misdeed, and men who, during the civil war, had covered themselves with crime. To all, without exception, he said that they must have patience, that each should receive the recompense due to his services, provided he would only wait; that for the present, the Government had been obliged to give places to *Bonaparte's people*, who had certainly rendered services that deserved to be rewarded, but that the turn of the pure royalists would come, and that they should not have in vain suffered, loved, and waited during five-and-twenty years.

Incapable of knowingly doing what was wrong, but very capable of allowing it to be done, the Count d'Artois had become almost immediately on his arrival in Paris the centre of two Governments, the one regularly appointed, composed of the ancient functionaries of the Empire, who had invested him with the authority he held; the other irregular, and what might be called clandestine, had not its existence been generally known, composed of royalists, that had been oppressed during the Revolution, and their existence ignored under the Empire, some of whom had passed with unblemished reputation through the ordeal of the civil war, and others stained with all the vices engendered by that period. The Count d'Artois passed from one party to the other, presenting a fair face to each, thinking to conciliate both, and thus strengthen his cause; a double part, in the effort to sustain which the strongest-minded and wisest man might have failed.

Meanwhile, the state of France was deplorable, and called loudly for a remedy. Desolation and terror reigned in Franche-Comté, Alsace, Lorraine, Champagne, Burgundy, and Flanders. The allied troops, particularly the Prussians, committed atrocities of which the French armies, though they had often committed deplorable excesses in conquered countries, had never rendered themselves guilty, at least in the same degree. The allied sovereigns resident in Paris commanded in all sincerity the observance of discipline and humanity, but the officers, believing that they might disobey these orders, or that, at least, their disobedience would remain unknown or unpunished, neither abstained from any excess themselves, nor imposed any restraint on their soldiers. They seized every

thing of which they had need, and allowed still more to be destroyed. In Champagne especially, where the fury of war had been greatest, the villages were reduced to ashes, the inhabitants had taken flight, traffic had ceased, the bridges were cut down, the roads broken up, and the air rendered infectious by exhalations arising from the unburied dead. The enraged peasantry murdered without pity the foreign soldiers that fell into their power. The imperial functionaries had been replaced by persons who had volunteered their services, or who had been found in the locality, and who were employed to levy on the country whatever the enemy needed,—a species of extortion preferable however to pillage. To this disheartening spectacle was added another of a nature to excite intense uneasiness. The French armies, especially those that had seen most service, were in close proximity to the allied armies. Their first emotion was one of satisfaction at seeing a horribly destructive war terminated; but this feeling soon gave place to regret, and this regret was quickly converted into anger against the *traitors*, to whom they imputed the disasters that had befallen our arms. In the excitement of their feelings they were ready to fall again upon the enemy, an event that might have occurred but for desertion, which had become, as we have said, a general contagion. Consequently, the highways were covered with soldiers, deserting in troops with arms, baggage, and horses, so that France was threatened with one of two misfortunes, either to be deprived of soldiers, or to retain those who were too faithful, and ready, spontaneously, to recommence the war.

In the provinces to which the invaders had not penetrated, the authorities, anxious, restless, and uneasy, fearing alike to abandon Napoleon too soon or to join the Bourbons too late, held an equivocal line of conduct, and were not competent to restrain the excited inhabitants. In the midland departments, generally so peaceable, these inconveniences were not strongly felt, the worst disposition manifested being the public ridicule with which the vacillating conduct of the magistracy was assailed. But in Vendée, in the South, and in every place where the royalists and revolutionists found themselves in juxtaposition, the weakness of the authorities became a positive danger. At length, taxation became as obnoxious as conscription. Following the example of the Count d'Artois, the Dukes of Angoulême and Berry had appeared, the one in Gascony, the other in Normandy, amid cries of "Down with the conscription! down with the *droits réunis*!"

The people were desirous that the second of these promises should be instantly realized, and from Marseilles to Bordeaux all refused to pay the indirect taxes. To complete this sad picture, it must be added that the English, faithful to their habit of introducing their merchandise in the rear of their armies, had crowded the seaports on the coast of the English Channel, of the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean, with sugars, coffees, cotton goods, and iron, offered at extremely low prices, which threatened to ruin our merchants and manufacturers, for the former had in their warehouses only colonial goods that had paid a duty

of 50 per cent., and the others could only offer for sale goods manufactured from a high-priced raw material. It was therefore possible that a commercial catastrophe might be added to all the calamities of a frightful war.

Lastly, there was only one disposable million of francs in the Treasury. In the invaded provinces, the public money had been carried off by the enemy, and in the provinces where the foreign troops had not penetrated, the taxes had ceased to be collected.

When we regard attentively the difficulties with which a Government just emerged from a revolution is beset, we are impressed with a feeling of alarm, for it seems impossible that such a Government can be firmly established without the aid of prodigious genius. But genius is never necessary in the commencement of such a work, because a kind of general good will second Governments in their beginnings, and it is only according to the wisdom they display later, when the moments of greatest difficulty seem to be passed, that we should judge them.

Commissioners extraordinary were sent into the provinces for the purpose of making known what were, at that time, called the *acts of the Senate*. They were to procure the public acceptance of these acts, and get them put into execution; they were to set at liberty the priests or royalists who were detained in prison, to put an end to the vexations caused by conscription, to examine carefully the local authorities, the prefects, subprefects, and mayors, to demand their adhesion to the Bourbon cause, and in case of refusal to deprive them of their official rank. The motive in selecting these commissioners was most conciliatory, and they received the most prudent instructions. They were chosen from among *Bonaparte's people*—it is so these men were called who had studied in Napoleon's school, and who had had the worldly wisdom to abandon him before committing themselves—and the grand seigneurs of the ancient nobility, men who were moderate-minded and benevolent, as people generally are in the first flush of triumph.

In a selection so diversified, we find Marshal Kellerman, who was sent to the 3d military division, (Metz;) the Count Dejean, to the 11th, (Bordeaux;) the Duke de Plaisance, nephew to the treasurer Lebrun, to the 14th, (Caen;) M. Otto, an ancient diplomatist, to the 21st, (Bourges;) General Marescau, companion of the unfortunate General Dupont, to the 20th, (Perigueux;) Count Jules de Fall-gnac, to the 10th, (Toulouse;) Count Eger de Damas, to the 4th, (Nancy;) Count Auguste de Juigné, nephew of the former Archbishop of Paris, to the 7th, (Grenoble;) Count Berni de Boisgelin, to the 8th, (Toulon;) Chevalier de la Salle, son of the former governor of Alsace, to the 5th, (Strasbourg;) the Count Alexis de Noailles, to the 19th, (Lyons,) &c.

These persons, whose antecedents were so opposite, set off immediately to announce in the departments the good news of the return of the Bourbons, the approaching peace, and the recognition of constitutional liberty; they were to use every effort to enlist the sympathies of the people in these changes.

One of the first acts of the Government was

to disperse in different localities the army that Napoleon had concentrated round Fontainebleau, and to change the commanders of whom doubts were entertained. The Imperial Guards, hitherto by being concentrated had become so formidable, were dispersed through those departments least likely to be influenced by their spirit. The Old Guard was allowed to remain at Fontainebleau, but the Young Guard was sent to Orleans. The cavalry of the guard was quartered at Bourges, Saumur, and Angers; the artillery at Vendôme. The 6th corps, which, under the influence of Marmont and his generals of division, had separated from the imperial cause, was stationed at Louen and in the environs. The 7th corps, that of Oudinot, chiefly composed of the troops brought from Spain, was sent off to Evreux, with the Count de Valmy's cavalry. The 11th, or Macdonald's corps, was sent with Milhaud's cavalry to Chartres. The 2d corps, commanded by General Gérard, was sent to Nevers with the St. Germain cavalry. Those that remained of the Poles were assembled at St. Denis, to be placed at the disposal of the Emperor of Russia. In like manner the Croats were assembled at Dijon, to be delivered to the Prince de Schwarzenberg, and the Belgians were brought to St. Germain, to be given up to the Prince of Orange. Quartered in this manner, there was no further cause to fear collisions between the French and foreign troops. General Maison, who had distinguished himself in the Belgian campaign, where he had maintained the strictest discipline, was left at the head of the troops in Flanders. Marshal Davout was reputed an obstinate partisan of the Empire. His resistance at Hamburg had exasperated the allied sovereigns; his name made all the enemies of France in Germany tremble; he had not hesitated to fire upon the white flag, when it appeared beside the Russian; and these were acts which, without involving the imputation of intolerance, rendered him unacceptable to the Government. General Gérard was sent to Hamburg to take his command. General Grenier was allowed to bring back the army from Italy without having received any particular orders as to its disposition, and Augereau was to command during the peace the troops in Dauphiné, that he had commanded so badly during the war, but which, judging at least by his late proclamation, he did not seem inclined to give up to Napoleon. Lastly, with regard to the Marshals Soult and Suchet, the decision of the Government was influenced by the reports they had lately received. According to these reports, Marshal Suchet had shown himself calm and temperate; Marshal Soult, refractory, hostile, and inordinately attached to the Empire. The latter was ordered to give up his command to Marshal Suchet, who thus became chief of the veteran armies of Aragon and of Castille.

These pressing matters having been arranged, it was equally urgent to come to some resolution touching the army. The question to be debated was the conscription, a necessary but at that time universally detested institution. The Government, notwithstanding the imprudent promises of the princes, came to the wise resolution of passing no law on the subject at that time, but adjourned the debate, under

pretext of respectfully reserving for the consideration of the absent monarch every deeply important question. But as it was necessary to take some notice of the prevailing desertion, it was decided that the conscripts of 1815, enlisted in 1814, according to the Emperor's custom of anticipating the conscriptions by a year, might remain in their homes if they had not yet joined, or return home if they had already quitted their parishes. This was only in some sort legalizing a proceeding already generally adopted. The Government wisely considered that the soldiers, who were returning in vast numbers from Italy, Spain, Germany, Russia, and England, where they had been either prisoners of war, or had garrisoned the fortresses that had been surrendered, would supply the army with excellent soldiers and in greater numbers, in fact, than they could afford to pay.

Money payments had become one of the principal difficulties of the new Government. Napoleon during the latter part of his reign had supported the Treasury by loans, furnished from the savings he had made out of the civil list after the *domaine extraordinaire* was exhausted. Out of about 150 millions which he had saved from his different civil lists, he possessed, as we have seen, about eighteen millions in January, 1814, of which ten millions, with the Emperor's private plate, had been forcibly taken from Maria Louisa at Orleans. The perpetrators of this act of rapine, regarding this booty as a recovered portion of the public property, wished to bring the wagons containing the ten millions to the Tuileries, and duteously present them to the Count d'Artois; and, in fact, the prize had been conducted intact to the prince's portal.

When Baron Louis, the Minister of Finance, learned this, he was irritated beyond expression. He was, as we have said, a man of impetuous temper, but great intellect, imbued with the soundest principles of finance, understanding perfectly well the resources afforded by an unblemished public credit, and he alone was capable under existing circumstances of attempting the proof, and succeeding in the attempt. To the depth and vastness of his views he united a love of order that amounted to passion. He had warmly espoused the cause of the Bourbons, not because he approved the principles of the emigration, but through a sincere desire of establishing constitutional liberty, which he believed could only be obtained under the Bourbons. Notwithstanding his devotedness to the new Government, when he learned that the ten millions which he needed so much had been transported to the Tuileries, he was highly exasperated, both on account of the loss and the irregularity of the proceeding. He immediately assembled the principal members of the ministry and of the prince's council, informed them of what had occurred, and declared that if the ten millions were not instantly sent to the Treasury he would send in his resignation. The members endeavoured to calm him; they advised him to go to the prince, and explain with moderation and politeness the rules established since 1789, concerning the disposal of the public money, and they promised him that he should receive full satisfaction.

Baron Louis, somewhat tranquillized, sought the Count d'Artois, whom he surprised, but did not displease, by the vigour of his language. He found no difficulty in persuading him to restore money that he had never intended to appropriate to his own use, and which at worst he only would have applied to the benefit of his distressed friends, had he not been told it was the property of the state, and absolutely needed for the discharge of the public debts. The ten millions were restored, with the exception of about 500,000 francs, which were employed to defray the expenses of the prince's household.

This supply was a most timely relief, and, being in specie, was of still greater utility. No person has perhaps ever understood more thoroughly than M. Louis that the secret of maintaining an unblemished credit is by punctually fulfilling our engagements. It is a common error among political parties of all times, to care little about the engagements contracted by their predecessors; and royalists were not wanted, at the period of which we speak, who were disposed to treat lightly the debts incurred during the time of the Empire and the Revolution. But M. Louis declared firmly that, though resolved to economize every penny of the public money, he would never defraud the state creditors of their due, and that consequently former debts, on whatever account incurred, should be faithfully paid. He added, what gave his declaration greater weight, that he was determined to maintain the existing taxes, spite of the clamours of parties or the cries of the populace. A few thoughtless words uttered by the princes, immediately on their return to France, were not, in his opinion, a reason for deviating from the principles of sound finance. The indirect taxes and the conscription were necessary, for every Government stands in need of men and money, and Government ought therefore to have the courage to maintain these two institutions.

The presence of the Count d'Artois, who of all the princes had been the most lavish in promises, put no restraint on the courageous minister, and he asserted that if the Government did not immediately declare in favour of the maintenance of all the ordinary and extraordinary taxes already voted for 1814, it would be impossible to carry on the public business, and that for his part he would not undertake it. He was satisfied on this point by being told that when the king arrived, a strict and minute inquiry should be made into existing taxes. M. Louis therefore continued provisionally the *droits réunis*, with the exception of some changes of form, made in compliance with popular feeling. Thus the tax known as "*détail*" had always been odious to the lower classes, because it was collected at the public house. M. Louis, still maintaining the tax, permitted that in towns where there was an *octroi* the *détail* should be converted into an increase on the entrance duties. He also permitted some simplification in the tax *de mouvement*, which was collected when spirituous liquors were removed from one place to another. Excepting these slight concessions, M. Louis remained immovable on the subject of taxation, and brought over the entire coun-

cil to his opinion. M. de Talleyrand and his colleagues smiled at the earnestness of the Minister of Finance, but even in smiling they gave the Count d'Artois an example of respecting and yielding to that passion so rare, a passion for the public good. The Count d'Artois, at once ignorant and complaisant, and moreover unmindful of his promises, allowed the minister and his council to do as they pleased, being well inclined to listen to men who were reputed to know what he and his companions in misfortune were absolutely ignorant of.

Self-interest inspires a quick and delicate tact that early discovers those that are deserving of confidence. The French public soon perceived that they had to do with a Minister of Finance who was willing to pay, without exception, all the legitimate public debts, and that in order to do so he did not fear to maintain the necessary taxes, caring little about being unpopular, provided he could establish the credit of the state. This credit was created as if by magic, thanks to the prospects of an assured peace, and thanks to a minister whose principles were so lofty and so firmly expressed. Commercial men, the chief organs of public confidence, manifested an extreme eagerness to aid M. Louis, and the latter was immediately able to carry into effect a measure which before would have been impossible; he intended to issue bills at short date, that is to say, exchequer bills.

Custom has consecrated in modern states two kinds of public debt,—the funded debt, where the stock is not terminable, or terminable at a very remote period, and the floating debt, where bills are of short date, and the interest varies according to the state of the public credit. Thus in England and France there are interminable annuities and exchequer or treasury bonds. The discredit resulting from bankruptcy had been so great after the time of the Directory, that, during the Empire, Napoleon had never been able to issue a treasury bond, and was even obliged to cloak the principal involved, by never mentioning the treasury. On this account he had recourse to bills of the receivers general; M. Mollien having afterward wisely created the *caisse de service*, the receivers general's bills were converted into *caisse de service* bills. These were in reality exchequer bills, only the Government dared not to call them so. In 1814, the *caisse de service* was so involved in debt, that the managers dared not issue another bill in addition to those in circulation. M. Louis did not hesitate to create a new floating debt, by issuing exchequer bills for ten millions at short date, and at an interest proportioned to existing circumstances. These bills, thanks to the confidence inspired by the minister, were readily accepted. The Government had received from Orleans ten millions in specie; the taxes were levied, and though not paid in some provinces, they still furnished supplies, and the Government was able during the first month to distribute among the heads of the different departments fifty millions of francs in ready money, which put all the public departments into full operation. Business received a favourable impulse, which contributed to revive the credit on which the

state was henceforth to subsist. Whilst M. Louis began in this way to establish the public credit, he showed equal firmness in maintaining order, which had been the chief merit of the imperial system of finance, and he continued the custom of presenting to the council every month a synopsis of the expenses of the coming month, that proper measures might be taken to find the supplies.

The finances, which were the great difficulty of the new Government, began to assume a favourable aspect, thanks to the skilful and active-minded minister who had taken the burden upon himself. It was necessary in this department of the administration to provide against the serious difficulty resulting from the extraordinary position of the national commerce, to which we have already alluded. Though Napoleon had, through want of patience, failed in conquering England by the system of continental blockade, he had at least laid the foundation of our manufactures. The spinning and weaving of cotton and wool, the mode of preparing iron, and its application to different uses, had made extraordinary progress. The extraction of sugar from vegetables of European growth, and the dyeing of stuffs by chemical agency, had made a not less astonishing advance. Our manufactures were presentable in every market, at a disadvantage certainly as to price, but equal, and often superior, in quality, to British produce. But Napoleon, wishing to destroy the commerce as well as the industry of Great Britain, was not satisfied with forbidding the importation of English manufactured goods, he also prohibited the raw material carried under the British flag, such as raw cotton, indigo, dyeing-wood, sugar, coffee, &c. In 1810, instead of the prohibition, he substituted the famous tariff of fifty per cent., which all these articles were obliged to pay. Nevertheless, our manufactures had been able to support this tax, being protected from English competition by these high prohibitory duties. It is easy to conceive, without comment, how great must have been, under such circumstances, the perturbation caused by the sudden influx of British manufactures. And sugars, coffees, cotton goods, &c., so ardently longed for by the inhabitants of the continent, and scattered abundantly throughout Germany since 1813, were poured into France, in 1814, in the train of the allied armies. These goods had passed the Rhine, the Scheldt, the Meuse, and followed the allied soldiers step by step, or else they had been landed on the coast, for our ports had, even before receiving orders from Paris, admitted the British flag. The consequence was, that our cotton goods had to contend with the English, which to their economical mode of fabrication united the advantage of not having had to pay fifty per cent. on the raw material; and the English coffee, which cost 28 sous at London, and in our ports stood at 38, had to compete with the French coffee, which, having had to pay a duty of 44 sous, was absolutely unsalable, as the purchaser would have had to pay more than four francs. It was the same with sugar, and all colonial produce. Had peace been established without a foreign invasion, the most natural mode would have been to suppress these duties gradually, leaving time to sell off

the goods that had been taxed so highly. But a military and commercial invasion having taken place at the same moment, we were obliged to submit to the consequences of both, but not to prolong the evil by keeping up a tariff that became unsuitable to the commercial condition of the country. For example, raw cotton ought to be admitted duty free, in order that our manufactures might be less burdened in competing with British productions. It would also be necessary to make a considerable reduction in the duty on sugar, coffee, and colonial produce in general, to enable the French vendor to sell at the same rate as the English. Thus, coffee, which in London cost 28 sous per pound, might very well bear a duty of six sous, which would raise the cost to 34 sous, and permit the retailer to sell at 38 sous, the current price at Paris since the arrival of the allies. Without these precautions our markets would be exclusively supplied by smugglers, who sold at the lowest price the goods that had found an entrance into France in the train of the enemy.

These considerations, clearly set forth, served as a preamble to regulations which provisionally modified the duties. By these regulations the minister suppressed the duty on cotton and several raw materials, reduced about seven-eighths the duties on sugar and coffee, and promised to re-establish the custom-houses as soon as the allied armies should have evacuated the territory, and promised to put in force at the same time a new scale of duties which would sufficiently protect our manufacturers against the foreign, without making them pay too high a price for the raw material, or putting on colonial produce, such as cotton, sugar, coffee, &c., heavier taxes than were indispensably needed by the exchequer.

These measures, though undoubtedly very prudent, did not entirely tranquillize the manufacturing towns, where an apprehension prevailed that, under the reign of princes just returned from England, British trade would be favoured. The new regulations, however, lessened the existing pressure, soothed public uneasiness, and gave reason to hope that a better system would be established as soon as circumstances would permit the application of a definite system of legislation to commerce and industry.

To these measures of general interest were added others, exclusively applicable to the provinces ravaged by the war. Commissioners were sent to rebuild the bridges that had been destroyed, to repair the roads that had been broken up, to bury the dead, to reorganize the postal service, and, in a word, to establish order as far as possible. On every side the people, who had been afflicted by the misfortunes of the country, but who now began to be consoled by the prospect of peace and to have confidence in the Bourbons, complied with the demands made on them, and even afforded manual aid in execution of the orders that came from Paris. However, if the Government succeeded in triumphing over the principal difficulties in the unoccupied provinces, it was quite different in those where the enemy still remained. In the latter the foreign troops presented a serious obstacle. They arrogated to themselves the rights of absolute authority,

and committed excesses of all kinds. They did not limit their crimes to despoiling châteaux, to pillaging cottages, and outraging women; they seized the property of the state, and endeavoured to sell for their private advantage the woods, as well as the stores of salt and the metals contained in our arsenals. It was a scene of universal spoliation, both private and public, which, besides ruining the country, exasperated the inhabitants and rendered them ill disposed toward the new Government, unjustly reputed allies and accomplices of the foreigners.

A universal cry was raised, demanding the departure of the allied armies. Their generals had declared, on passing the Rhine, that they had come, not to humiliate France, but to set her free. Napoleon being conquered, disarmed, and departed, and the Bourbons universally recognised, why should the allied armies remain longer in France?

This reasoning, which was perfectly just, was rendered more impressive by the sufferings of the people, and had become the dominant feeling; consequently an unanimous appeal was made to the ministers, and by the ministers presented to the prince to whom the royal authority had been delegated, demanding the immediate evacuation of the French territory by the foreigners. This appeal, so natural, so general, so becoming, was, however, imprudent. In fact, how could we speak to the allied sovereigns of evacuating our territory, without provoking a similar demand on their part with regard to the foreign places we still occupied? These places were fortresses, such as Hamburg, Magdeburg, the Texel, Flushing, Berg-op-Zoom, Antwerp, Mons, Luxembourg, Mayence, Lerida, Tarragona, Figuières, and Girona, filled with a large war matériel, and some of the harbours containing magnificent fleets. Was it possible to ask the Austrians, the Russians, the Prussians, the English, to quit Champagne, Lorraine, Alsace, Languedoc, without expecting them in return to ask us to give up these first-class fortresses, which it was intended we should ultimately lose? The consequence of such a step would be the serious inconvenience of giving up pledges which, in the negotiation of a future peace, would be of the highest importance. Undoubtedly, the conditions of this peace could not vary much, for the principles of the frontiers of 1790 were so generally admitted, that it was only the victorious sword of Napoleon which could effect a change. But in consenting to abandon the Rhenish provinces and Belgium, that is to say, the Rhine and the Scheldt, there remained between these rivers and the limits of 1790 an extensive and solid frontier which might have been claimed by France, as we shall see presently; a frontier that might have been obtained by negotiating with firmness and patience in the name of the Bourbons, in virtue of the good will they inspired, and the desire the allies felt to render them popular. One means of securing success would certainly have been the possession of such pledges as we were about to surrender; for it is easy to imagine how great would have been the embarrassment of the allied sovereigns had they been obliged to recover, by force, Hamburg, Magdeburg, Antwerp, Mayence, &c. &c. But

was it possible, we repeat, to demand the evacuation of France without instantly provoking a similar demand with regard to the territories we occupied beyond the limits of our ancient frontiers? Evidently not, and no negotiator could have obtained a hearing, who would have advanced the one demand without admitting the other.

We certainly might have consented to the evacuation of the more remote fortresses, such as Hamburg, Magdeburg, the Texel, and Flushing, in the north, Lerida, Tarragona, and Figuières, in the south, and endeavoured to retain Antwerp, Mayence, Luxembourg, and Mons, as lying nearer. But the allied Powers would have seen in this proposition an intention to contest the frontiers of 1790, and the offer of a partial evacuation would have been as unacceptable as an absolute refusal to give up any of the fortresses.

A wiser mode of acting would have been to wait patiently for two months longer, asking the Emperor Alexander and his allies to give positive orders to their soldiers to treat our unhappy provinces less cruelly. If the French, amid their sufferings, had been capable of reflection, they would not have failed to perceive that even had the foreign armies signed an act of evacuation on the spot, they could not have left before two months, on account of their claims on some of the magazines, and that before the expiration of two months, as the event proved, peace might be signed. The king, it is true, was absent, but his absence, which was no impediment to yielding the principal European fortresses, could have been no obstacle to commence at least discussing the bases of peace. But grief does not reason, and the unanimous and ardent desire of the nation forced the Government to commence negotiations for an evacuation which should necessarily be reciprocal. Let us in justice add, that the places which there was a question of giving up, Hamburg, Magdeburg, the Texel, Lerida, Tarragona, and others, were evidence of a madly ambitious policy, which had fallen into general disrepute, and traces of which no one cared to preserve.

M. de Talleyrand, who, naturally enough, had been commissioned to conduct the negotiations, was listened to by the representatives of the allied Powers with profound attention and a feigned benevolence for France, which they said they had hastened to deliver from foreign occupation. In reality, the allies were extremely anxious to obtain possession of the fortresses that we held. Prussia was undoubtedly certain of sooner or later getting possession of Magdeburg and Hamburg; England, of having Antwerp; and Austria, Mayence; but ardent desires are accompanied by an impatience that can only be satisfied by immediate possession. The allies promised to evacuate France without delay, on condition that our garrisons would evacuate the places we have named. It was therefore no longer possible to retain Antwerp, Mayence, Luxembourg, by restoring Hamburg, Magdeburg, &c.; yet the allied monarchs had promised to treat France under the Bourbons better than under the Bonapartes. Their ministers did not deny this, and still holding firmly by the principle of the frontiers of 1790, they spoke of

a territorial extension beyond these frontiers, which might be represented by a million souls. Finding it impossible to do better, M. de Talleyrand was obliged to be content with this promise. There now remained the serious consideration of what was to be done with the *matériel* contained in the fortresses we were about to give up. There was in these fortresses, besides the field-artillery, a vast war *matériel* of every kind, which might have been, if not saved, at least disputed. But no attention was paid to this, both parties were so anxious to come to a conclusion. It was stipulated that our troops should leave with arms and baggage, and three field-pieces to every thousand men. It was certainly only a loss in money of thirty or perhaps forty million francs, by no means comparable to the loss of territory, but still it was a loss. But our magnificent fleets lying in certain harbours were not forgotten, and this part of the *matériel* was reserved as an object of future consideration, when negotiations for a definite peace should be commenced.

It was consequently agreed that the foreign troops should evacuate the French territory (that of 1790) in proportion as we withdrew our troops from the remote fortresses we occupied, leaving those of the Rhine within ten days, those of Piedmont and Italy in fifteen, and the Spanish fortresses within twenty days. The most distant should be evacuated by the 1st of June. It was arranged, besides, that prisoners of every nation, no matter in what place they might be found, should be immediately set at liberty.

This convention, being signed by M. de Talleyrand, was the same day submitted to the Count d'Artois and his council. It is a singular fact, and one that proves the strength of an absorbing idea, that no observation was made on this convention, because it fulfilled a universal wish, that of removing foreigners from the soil of France.* The unfortunate prince, upon whom this act afterward induced an unmerited unpopularity, was incapable of foreseeing the consequences of what he did, and sincerely believed that he was delivering France from the presence of foreign soldiers; he therefore joyfully signed the deed. It was instantly published, and on the first day excited no more remark than it had done at the royal council. But the voice of criticism was soon heard, and, thanks to a sudden change in public opinion, became as bitter as universal.

In fact, a very great change had taken place in the public mind since the deposition of Napoleon,—that is to say, within a month. The absolute submission and the almost perfect silence that prevailed during the Empire, had been suddenly replaced by an extraordinary frankness of sentiment and language. Whilst the idea of the return of the Bourbons, which at first appeared strange and rather surprising, began to be received by the mass of the public and regarded as a prudent measure, and that the Bourbons themselves were gaining a certain amount of popularity on account of their mis-

fortunes and their virtues, a sharp and bitter quarrel suddenly sprang up between parties newly called into existence. The press had recovered a certain liberty, enjoyed by sufferance but not by right, for the imperial regulations concerning publications were still in force. The new Government had contented themselves with restoring to the proprietors of public journals the property of which they had been deprived by Napoleon, and required of them in return the appointment of a principal editor, who should be accountable for the acts of each journal. The liberty of the press had sprung up under the equivocal form which made it dependent on a censorship. As usual, the press had become the expression of the passion of the day, and this passion was detestation of the Empire, of its incessant wars and arbitrary government. There consequently prevailed a fearful excitement against Napoleon, against his family, against his ministers, and against every thing that belonged to him. And public opinion, soon running farther back, passed from the Empire to the Revolution, which became an object of no less anger than Napoleon himself. Though the Count d'Artois, on entering Paris, had spoken of an act of oblivion, though the Senate had made such an express condition of the recall of the Bourbons; this act of oblivion, so much easier to promise than put into execution, had not been put into practice by any one. The cruel death of the Duke d'Enghien was commented on, and still more violently was the iniquitous death of the unfortunate Louis XVI. condemned. In this regard, so strong was popular feeling, that Napoleon for a while gave place to the regicides, upon whom a torrent of abuse was poured. Undoubtedly, the existing generation should have lost all memory, and every sense of justice and humanity, not to be penetrated with the profoundest pity in recalling to memory the punishment inflicted by fanatics on one of our best kings; and yet, with regard to the tranquillity of France and the development of its destinies, this cry of the public conscience was a very great imprudence. The clergy, more thoughtless, if possible, than the royalists, and less justifiable in such demonstrations, entertained strong antipathies, of which Cardinal Maury was the principal object. Priests, of whom very few had dared to defend the cause of the church during the Revolution, and of whom not one had refused ecclesiastical favours under the Empire, could not pardon Cardinal Maury, the most eloquent and courageous defender of his order, for having accepted the diocese of Paris. They had commenced by overwhelming him with insults, then declared the diocese vacant, nominated vicars capitulary, and used every possible means to induce the cardinal archbishop to abandon his diocese. Thus violently persecuted, he quitted Paris, and ceded the place to his embittered enemies.

When parties are sought for in this manner, they are easily found. In fact, a few days had sufficed to revive and gather together all the men whom the royalists attacked in this manner. At the first return of the Bourbons, these men, divided and confounded, had held their peace. The revolutionists, avenged by the fall of the Empire, had experienced a mo-

* M. de Vitrolles, an eye-witness, and who noted down events as they occurred, says that not a single remark was made in the royal council.

ment of joy. The civil and military functionaries, eager to secure their own safety, had at first thought only of giving in their adhesion to the Bourbons, and had given it, execrating at the same time the Senate that had dethroned Napoleon, and applauding the raileries uttered by the royalists against that body. But, after a few days' reflection, the revolutionists and the civil and military functionaries felt that their fate was cast in common, and that if the Senate had struck them in striking Napoleon, it had also defended them in stipulating constitutional guarantees. They consequently began to take part with the Senate. In reading in the journals of the triumphant party—the only ones that enjoyed the freedom of the press—furious declamations against all that had taken place since 1790, in seeing gather round the princes, and round the special commissioners, the men of former times, they felt that under the new order of things they could not fail to be in peril, or, at least, in disfavour. The military men, especially, (we mean the officers,) quitting the ranks, like the soldiers, had come in numbers to Paris. They crowded the streets and public places, where they participated in the general agitation, and sought to know what was to be their fate. The War Minister, General Dupont, had issued an order, commanding them to return to their regiments,—the only place, said this order, where they would learn the fate reserved for them. Amid the general confusion, scarcely one of these officers had obeyed. They still crowded the capital, where the presence of foreign soldiers irritated them deeply, and provoked on their part the most dangerous expressions of feeling. They took especial pleasure in declaiming against the traitors who, they said, had betrayed Napoleon and France.

The convention of the 23d of April, whose conditions, as we have already explained, were inevitable, was at first received as a natural, and even as a very desirable event, because it stipulated the evacuation of France by the foreign troops; but ill-disposed people soon began to put forth different opinions. Though the surrender of Hamburg, Magdeburg, Lerida, did not really touch the solid greatness of France, yet these names recalled undying memories; and, besides, when to these remote fortresses were added Mayence, Luxembourg, Wesel, Flushing, and Antwerp, which we were accustomed to look on as French possessions, in seeing all these fortresses given up with the single stroke of the pen, without any guarantee for indemnification, military men were touched with sincere grief. The public even, the rational, disinterested public, spite of the joy infused by peace, spite of their well-founded dislike to distant conquests, could not help feeling a profound sadness, in seeing so many important fortresses abandoned; and though they did not cry out treason, as did the military men, yet they felt that they were under the iron hand of foreigners, who, whilst flattering France in order to render her more manageable, left her only so much of her greatness as they could not deprive her of.

Still the dominant sentiment was a lively and universal satisfaction at the prospect of peace; and, if a bitter censure were heard, it

was from the lips of men whose existence was imperilled by the change of government, or who were disturbed in their retreat by outbursts of royalist feeling. As to the Count d'Artois, he did all in his power to satisfy everybody, and especially to win the good graces of the army. He invited the marshals, generals, and colonels, who were staying at Paris, to dinner; he used every exertion to please them; but they felt sensibly that at the Tuilleries they were only passing acquaintances, not intimate friends. The abiding guests in this palace, which had been occupied, and was still destined to be occupied, by so many generations, of various origins, of different modes of thinking, and of different sentiments,—the abiding guests, we say, at the Tuilleries were the royalists, who began to flock to Paris in great numbers from the provinces, or from those lands whither they had emigrated. Less caressed, less flattered, than the heads of the army, but evidently more loved, they alone enjoyed a real intimacy. They came at all hours, and when the Count d'Artois could not receive them himself, he deputed his most confidential friends to do so. These received, as we have already said, their protestations of affection and offers of service; and, moreover, the reports made by these royalists were received with attention; they were formed into a kind of police, who, merely officious in the commencement, would one day pretend to play a higher part.

We have already spoken of these daring men, whom the Count d'Artois had had the weakness to admit to his confidence, and to whom he had the imprudence to confide important missions, or allow them to assume such. Some of these men had taken upon themselves to pursue the Princess Catherine, wife of Prince Jerome Napoleon. This princess, daughter to the King of Wurtemberg, and universally respected on account of her personal qualities, was arrested near Fossard, when on her way to Germany. She was robbed of every thing. The men who arrested her said they were commissioned by Government to restore to the treasury property belonging to the State, and, under this pretext, the baggage taken from the princess was brought to the Tuilleries apparently intact. Scarcely was this act consummated, when the Emperor of Russia, having learned what had occurred, became indignant, and sent his minister to complain and demand reparation for the insult offered to a respectable princess, protected by the treaty of the 11th of April, and, moreover, his own near relative. The first act of reparation was to restore the princess's trunk, which were all found empty. The diamonds belonging to the princess, which were valued at 1,500,000 francs, had disappeared. The men who had arrested the princess denied the robbery, and threatened, if any thing further were said about it, to compromise the Provisional Government, by declaring what their real mission was. Of this mission they made no secret; it was to assassinate Napoleon.

The affair was certainly of a doubtful character, but amid the existing chaos it was evident that many imprudent expressions had been allowed to find utterance; and if things

went on in this manner, disagreeable incidents might become more frequent. The Count d'Artois had been now twenty days at Paris, and the arrival of Louis XVIII. was already anxiously desired, in order that he might assume the reins of government. This was the wish of the prince's most enlightened friends; it was the wish of the prince himself, who, though anxious to meddle in every thing, was alarmed at seeing his responsibility every day increasing. It was one day the question of taxation on which he was called on to decide; another day, the commercial interests of the country formed the subject of debate, or perhaps the extent of the French territory; and all this in the absence of a brother, of whom the Count d'Artois stood much in fear, who was king, and very jealous of his authority. The Count d'Artois had been joined by his two sons. The Duke d'Angoulême, a modest and courageous prince, not very intellectual, but steady and prudent, had landed a month before at Bordeaux. The Duke de Berry, who had entered France by Brittany and Normandy, possessed considerable talent; his sentiments were generous, but he was hot-headed. These two young princes were received at the gates of Paris with great pomp and many demonstrations of joy. They brought in their train a fresh contingent of devoted royalists, and these arrivals were not a pledge of greater unity and prudence in the Government.

The presence of the king was therefore justly wished for, because much was hoped from his prudence, and because many were anxious for the speedy solution of questions that were left in suspense until the king's arrival. How would this monarch receive the conditions that the Senate wished to impose on him? What value would he attach to the engagements contracted in his name by the Count d'Artois? These were doubts which it was important to solve, and, waiting the solution, each had endeavoured to induce Louis XVIII. to regard his particular views and interests with favour. The Count d'Artois had sent to inform his brother that the engagement into which he had entered was of a very general character; that consequently the king was absolutely free with regard to the substance of the senatorial constitution, and still freer with respect to the required oath; that no positive engagement was contracted; and that with regard to the general bases of the constitution, there was a reservation in favour of the royal pleasure, which left a great latitude. It was evident that the Count d'Artois, to excuse his having assumed too much authority, sought to make the pledges he had given the Senate appear as light as possible. M. de Talleyrand had at first sent M. de Liancourt to Louis XVIII., and he had neither been well received nor his reports listened to, as we shall soon see; others of less note were afterward sent, whilst M. de Talleyrand, instead of speaking of things as they really were, adopted a tone of complaisance; and, wishing to impress the new king with the idea that his authority had not been infringed, he sent him word that with some flattery to the marshals, and a general declaration in conformity with the prevailing opinions of the

day, which should be published immediately on his entrance into France, all existing necessities would be satisfied. M. de Montesquiou, though still adhering to his peculiar view of matters, had been more truthful and more firm. He had, in writing to Louis XVIII., displayed much irritation against the Senate, and against the pretensions put forth by this body to impose conditions on the king, but he had not sought to depreciate either the gravity of the engagements contracted, nor the power the Senate still possessed. He said that France was not so deeply imbued with a royalist spirit as some persons took pleasure in believing; that many regretted the days of the Empire; that others, strongly attached to revolutionary principles, had not made up their minds to abandon them; that the army especially was in general hostile to the legitimate dynasty; that these different classes of malcontents, having physical force on their side, were ready to take part with the Senate, and so render that body formidable; it would therefore be better to make a compromise with the Senate, however disagreeable such a proceeding might be; that the jealousy of the legislative corps might be turned to some advantage, but that this body was weak and incompetent; that the Senate still possessed the chief power; that it would be better to select from the senatorial constitution whatever was least objectionable, and from these materials frame an act purporting to emanate from the royal authority alone; that, besides, the finances were in a perilous state, and would probably necessitate a considerable loan, and that, without the intervention of the great bodies of the state, lenders could not be found. Though these opinions were not in every respect correct, they represented more exactly the real state of things than the accounts forwarded by the Count d'Artois and M. de Talleyrand. On the whole, the intelligence sent by all caused considerable surprise at Hartwell.

Louis XVIII., who after the death of Louis XVII., the unfortunate son of Louis XVI., had become legitimate king, according to the principles of hereditary monarchy, had resided for several years at Hartwell, in England, where his love of study and natural tranquillity of disposition had induced him to fix his abode. He had, so to speak, lulled himself to sleep in the peaceful uniformity of his exile, when the terrible events of 1812 suddenly awakened in his heart hopes that were almost extinguished. He then thought proper to make certain declarations, less vague than the preceding, promising to reform ancient abuses, to forget the past, and respect the alienation of the *biens nationaux*, conditions which at that time comprised the entire programme of the most liberal-minded emigrants. These declarations, scattered through Europe, had never been heard of in France. When Louis XVIII. learned the acts of the Senate, he experienced a delight quite as strong as what the Count d'Artois had felt, though less demonstrative; and, in the first moments of his joy, he thought no more than his brother had done at Nancy of disputing the conditions on which he was to be recalled to the throne. Consequently, M. de Blacas, who had become his confidant and

the executor of all his wishes, received orders to prepare his act of adhesion to the senatorial constitution. Nor did Louis XVIII. think he purchased too dearly his return to France, by accepting a form of government which, since his abode at Hartwell, he had himself seen in operation to the great advantage of England, and without any other inconvenience than disagreements, which sometimes became serious for the ministers.

It was in these dispositions that Louis XVIII. was found by the emissaries of the Count d'Artois, of M. de Talleyrand, and M. de Montesquieu. Very yielding, as we have seen, with regard to things, he was much less accommodating when persons were in question, for old prejudices yield more easily to the former than the latter. Things have no living features; but persons, on the contrary, have, which revive painful impressions and implacable rancours. The worthy M. de Liancourt, hateful to the ancient noblesse because of the good sense he had displayed in the earlier period of the Revolution, was so coldly received at Hartwell, when sent there by M. de Talleyrand, that he took his immediate departure, not being of a humour to bow his high birth, his cultivated mind, and honourable life, before emigrants of any rank. The reception given to the other messengers of M. de Talleyrand was very different, and still more so to those of the Count d'Artois and M. de Montesquieu. As soon as Louis XVIII. learned that these gentlemen had preserved intact the essential principle of legitimate royalty, such as the ultra-royalists understood it, and that he could still retain, not only the colours of the house of Bourbon, but was not even obliged to submit to any condition, nor take an oath, and that it would be sufficient to make a general declaration of principles to satisfy the exigencies of his position, he laid aside his act of adhesion, and prepared to assume an absolutely royal attitude. He had been advised, on leaving England, to make his progress slowly, in order to receive *en route* the homage of the inhabitants, and to make a stay in one of the ancient royal castles, that of Compiègne, for example, which had been splendidly fitted up by Napoleon. There he could hear and see everybody, and become acquainted with men and things before entering Paris and assuming engagements which would be now personal and obligatory. This advice he promised to follow, and decided that, after visiting at London the Prince Regent of England, the host to whom he was indebted for such noble hospitality, he would repair by Calais to Compiègne, to receive there the first homage of his subjects.

It was on the 20th of April that Louis XVIII. made his entrance into London. We may easily divine, without need of expatiating on the subject, what were the sentiments of the English people on seeing the house of Bourbon again in possession of the throne of France. Whilst that every Power in Europe had in succession recognised him who was called the usurper, and refused shelter to the Bourbons, England alone had never acknowledged Napoleon as Emperor; she had received the proscribed princes, and had thrown over them the protection of her inviolable hospitality. In

truth, though her ministers denied it in Parliament, she had always sought the restoration of the Bourbons, as the most certain means of avenging herself of Napoleon and the French Revolution.

Though England had more than once been desirous of peace, though she had been more than once ready to conclude it, and had only been prevented by the obstinacy of Napoleon with regard to Spain, she now forgot these moments of weakness, and thought only of the last triumph of the coalition, of which she attributed all the merit to herself. According to English reports, it was not Prussian, Austrian, or Russian generals with whom Napoleon had to do in the terrible campaigns of 1813 and 1814; it was to Lord Wellington the definite success was due; and yet it must be avowed that it was Marshal Soult, and not Napoleon, whom Wellington encountered. But nothing could efface these notions from the minds of the English, who were absolutely intoxicated with joy and pride. It is undeniable that the English had had a considerable share in bringing about the general result, but it is also true that they had received the largest share of profit. They also believed, and to a greater extent than they were warranted, that the Bourbon princes, now accustomed to the English habits, and imbued with the English spirit, would be the firmest supporters of British policy. Influenced by these feelings, the English resolved to give Louis XVIII. a magnificent reception. During the three days this prince passed at London, all the English wore the white cockade, and he was received with acclamations as joyous as could have been expected in his own capital. Louis XVIII. entered the palace of the Prince Regent, leaning on the arm of this prince, and having as his left hand the Duke of York; he was thus conducted to the chair of state, in quality of king and guest. No sooner was he seated than he listened with proud self-possession to the speech of the Prince Regent, who congratulated him on his restoration to the throne of France; and he congratulated him as it was an event, not alone fortunate for France, but for England, for Europe, for the entire world; an event which every man in England felt as a personal advantage. Louis XVIII. replied in this discourse by thanking the prince for the proofs he received of his friendship, and for his generous hospitality, and added these easily memorable words,—*that it was to his prudent advice, to his noble efforts, to the indefatigable perseverance of his nation, that he should always attribute, under Providence, the restoration of his family to the throne of France.*

These words, so completely in unison with the pretensions put forth by the English, and even with their hopes, were listened to with transport. Instantly circulated with the promptitude of British publicity, they produced an extraordinary effect. In uttering these words had Louis XVIII. thought only of his hosts, to whom he wished to testify his well-founded gratitude in terms the most calculated to gratify them? Or, had he thought of the Senate who pretended to recall him to the throne conditionally, or of the constitutional sovereigns who supported the Senate, and who, basing their pretensions on the services they

had rendered to the house of Bourbon, thought themselves justified in giving the king advice and expecting him to follow it? Did he mean to say to both parties that he had reason to be grateful only to God and to England? It is difficult to say; but it is possible that he was at the time influenced solely by a feeling of courtesy toward the nation to whom he believed himself more indebted than to any other. Whatever may have been the motive that dictated these words, the effect, as often happens, was destined to be greater than the cause.

Fêted at London during three days, and greeted wherever he appeared with enthusiastic applause, Louis XVIII., before leaving, invested the Prince Regent with the *cordon bleu*, the highest distinction in the power of a French monarch to bestow, and which implied the restoration of the order of the Saint-Esprit. He left London on the 23d of April, and arrived the same day at Dover, accompanied by the Prince Regent, the greater number of the English princes, and the most distinguished members of the aristocracy. The next day—the 24th—he embarked and set sail for Calais, escorted by a fleet of eight ships of the line, several frigates, and a number of smaller vessels. The inhabitants of Dover and the environs, headed by the Prince Regent, all wearing the white cockade and waving white handkerchiefs, saluted the French monarch with loud cheers, and did not leave the shore whilst his ship remained in sight. The Duke of Clarence accompanied Louis XVIII. to the coast of France, and took leave of him, amid the roar of the cannon of both nations, a sound that had not wakened the echoes of that locality since the time of the camp at Boulogne. What a contrast! what changes! Alas! in our fitful century, two or three years have often sufficed to bring about changes the most contradictory and the most surprising.

On arriving at Calais, the king was received by a considerable number of persons, who, so to speak, prostrated themselves before him. The people, once habituated to the idea of the restoration of the Bourbons, vied with each other in testifying their delight by the noisiest demonstrations. Besides, the inhabitants of a provincial town when visited by their sovereign are always delighted with the honour, and, profoundly touched at a spectacle novel to them, they experience transports of affection, sincere certainly, but not so durable as they believe, and as may be desirable. But it was not with joy, but with tears, that Louis XVIII. was received, for the recollection of the past was dominant on this occasion, and in thinking of the long and bloody tragedy that commenced in 1789, and terminated in 1814, the French might well shed unfeigned tears. Flattery, as usual, adding something to emotion, we may divine the demonstrations of which Louis XVIII. was the object. After having devoted a day to the people of Calais and the environs, he passed the night of the 26th at Boulogne, the 27th at Abbeville, the 28th at Amiens, imbibing slowly the incense burned before his legitimate authority, and finally, on the 29th, made his entrance into Compiègne, where he was awaited by the most illustrious persons of France and of Europe.

The impatience to see the king and become acquainted with his disposition was extreme, for in this case, curiosity was heightened by the stimulant of self-interest. With what kind of master would these new subjects have to do, some of whom were the originators of the Revolution and the Empire, others of the emigration? With what kind of ally would these continental monarchs have to do, who had just reinstated the house of Bourbon on the throne, and already heard their services disputed? Such were the questions which each asked himself. To judge by the attitude Louis XVIII. assumed, and the sentiments he first expressed in public, one would be tempted to believe him the haughtiest, the vainest and least prudent of the emigrants. In fact, his words to the Prince Regent had already deeply disturbed those who had taken a part in the last Revolution, and had produced a feeling of discomfort among the military men, who detested England more than any of the other Powers, and, lastly, disobliged the allied sovereigns themselves, who were not inclined to admit that England had done every thing, and had been nearly equal to Providence in the late events. Yet it would have been acting with injustice toward Louis XVIII. to have judged him by these first manifestations.

The first impression that Louis XVIII. made on those already acquainted with the Count d'Artois, was that there was a great difference between the two brothers. The Count d'Artois was graceful and elegant in his deportment, whilst the Count de Provence, now become Louis XVIII., was embarrassed in his manner and awkward in his gait. Corpulent to a degree, which was burdensome at sixty, (he was about this age in 1814,) he was moreover gouty and walked with difficulty, leaning on a cane. He wore a blue coat with a general's epaulets, a small English hat, and gaiters of red velvet, completely enveloping his infirm legs. But above this cumbersome and awkward body there rose a handsome and intelligent head, somewhat too large, differing in one particular from the general cast of the Bourbons, that the nose was not very aquiline, with a bright and commanding eye that might have become a man of genius and of lofty character. The manners of the Count d'Artois were characterized by affability and a complaisance that suited itself to everybody's humour, whilst Louis XVIII. was calm and haughty. The two princes were as different in disposition as in person. The Count d'Artois, profiting of his personal advantages, had formerly sought and enjoyed the pleasures of the world, and led a frivolous life at the court of Marie Antoinette, but when the day of adversity came, he repented, became a pious Christian, and of his former life retained only his amiability of manner.

Louis XVIII., on the contrary, destitute of the physical advantages of his brother, sought an indemnification in study, to which he applied assiduously, endeavouring to become solidly instructed, but he only succeeded in acquiring superficial information. He associated with the literary men of his time, that is to say, with those of the second class, for a prince of the blood would have compromised himself too deeply had he sought the society

of literary men of the highest class, such as Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Rousseau. Louis XVIII. favoured the philosophy of the French school, and even its revolutionary principles, but when the hour of adversity came, without repenting, like the Count d'Artois, he still preserved in his philosophy opinions that could not be deemed religious, and retained in politics sound principles. When his brother involved himself in the exaggerations and intrigues of the emigration, he avoided the former through a natural moderation of character, and the latter through aversion to excitement, and he shunned both to mark a distinction between him and his younger brother, whose conduct he did not approve, and for whom he entertained little affection. Not devoid of kindness of heart, though possessing a somewhat malicious wit, often sarcastic, and a little egotistical, seeking above all things that repose which his infirmities rendered necessary, attaching much less importance to the exercise than to the recognition of the principle of his authority, of which he was prouder than any monarch in the world; ever ready to delegate his power to whomsoever submissively acknowledged its existence; detesting business, and avoiding it to enjoy his favourite authors,—the Latin,—whom he quoted often and appropriately; in fact, a crowned wit, admirably well calculated, both by the qualities he possessed, and those in which he was deficient, to play the part of a constitutional king, a part which the English monarchs have, happily for themselves and their country, acquired the habit of performing, Louis XVIII. was insured by his defects, as much as by his good qualities, from committing those faults into which his brother was likely to fall. Such was this prince, such the portrait of him which the impartial historian ought, in our opinion, to present to future generations.

We should not, however, present a correct portrait of Louis XVIII., if we did not speak of a personage who at that time was reputed to exercise great influence over his mind. This personage was M. de Blacas. Men afflicted with physical infirmities, whether princes or private individuals, stand more in need of confidants than do other persons. This necessity is increased, if, like Louis XVIII., such men are widowers without children, and if, in addition, they are occupants of a throne, they possess facilities for forming this circle of assiduous, obsequious, submissive friends, who are sometimes called favourites, and to whom, either justly or unjustly, all the errors of the reign are attributed. Louis XVIII. had long reposed his confidence in M. d'Avary, and, he having died, his place was filled by M. de Blacas. Member of a noble family of Provence, he had been one of the first emigrants, and sympathized in all the sentiments of the French emigration with frigid obstinacy rather than fervent enthusiasm. He was a proud and virtuous man, tall of stature, unbending in person and disposition, and possessing as much good sense as was compatible with strong party spirit. As to the rest, he was more anxious to rule in the prince's household than in the state, and possessed, like his master, a refined taste for the arts, in which he found refuge from the pressure of business. M. de

Blacas might have become in the hands of a skilful premier, who knew how to bend the court to the designs of the Government, a valuable instrument, for he might have been made the means of enunciating, at the foot of the throne, the truth, which he loved when he was able to discern it. However this may be, the courtiers of the various régimes, after having saluted and flattered Louis XVIII., flocked round M. de Blacas, to present him their stupid and vulgar adoration.

When Louis XVIII., accompanied by his niece the Duchess d'Angoulême, whom he called his daughter, and the two Comtes, the father and grandfather of the Duke d'Enghien,—he affected in this way to surround himself with the great victims of the Revolution,—approached Compiègne, the crowd of courtiers, those who were not capable of being any thing else, and those who might have been something much better, the marshals for example—hastened to meet him with unexampled eagerness, and had they dared, had the prince permitted it, they would have thrown themselves at his feet. The marshals had confided in Berthier, on account of his age, his position, and his talents, the task of speaking for them, and he, broken down by recent events, his mind filled with anxiety for the future career of his children, had undertaken this part, though he was fully conscious how little it became him. Without uttering a word derogatory to the great man whose glory he had shared, he gave utterance to the same commonplace which at that time fell from every mouth.

"The marshals, as representatives of the army, hastened," he said, "to greet a father whom France during so long a time had the misfortune to disown, but to whom, taught by experience and misfortune, she now returned with transports of joy, certain of finding under his rule the repose, prosperity, and even the glory she had enjoyed under the sceptre of Henry IV. and Louis XIV. The heads of the army were anxious to offer to this father their hearts and their swords, which, having never belonged to any other than to France, was especially due to the legitimate sovereign restored and regenerated France."

If these are not the exact words, they are at least the sentiments contained in the harangue pronounced by Berthier, and deserve a place here, as a sample of all the public speeches of the time.

The king being fully aware that of all the persons concerned in the late revolution, the marshals were those whom it was most necessary and easiest to flatter, mollified by the most perfect gracefulness the haughtiness for which he was indebted to his natural disposition and his social rank: he shook hands with them, and said that in his exile he had admired their exploits, that these exploits had afforded much consolation to his paternal heart amid the woes of France, that it was a pleasure that the marshals should be the first he met on returning to the patrimony of his ancestors, that he confided in them, that he brought them peace, a precious blessing due to his family, but that should this peace ever be disturbed, old and infirm as he was, he would march at their head, under the ancient

banner of French honour. Then, suiting the action to the word, Louis XVIII. took two marshals by the arm and moved through the spacious apartments of Compiègne, saluting affectionately the crowds that pressed eagerly round him, but showing a marked preference for the marshals, and making to each some appropriate remark. To the old republican Lefebvre he spoke of the gout, and conversed with the unfortunate Marmont about the wound he had received at Salamanca; he introduced the marshals in succession to his niece and to his cousins, and made them stay to dinner; during the repast, toasted the army in English liquor, and did not leave until he had charmed them by the mingled gracefulness and dignity of his manners, totally unlike either the amiability of the Count d'Artois or the abruptness of Napoleon, whose manners, though irresistibly attractive, were harsh.

Close observers remarked with concern the foreign habits of the royal family, of which they seemed unconscious themselves: they remarked the wholly English costume of the Duchess d'Angoulême, as well as the coldness of manner, which the respect inspired by her misfortunes easily rendered excusable; but close observers are rare, especially under such circumstances. But the majority were delighted, and it must be confessed that existing circumstances were calculated to excite the imagination strongly, for here were presented two conditions rarely united, antiquity the most venerable, joined to novelty the most imposing. Under the rule of this ancient family, the men of the old *régime* recovered their position, and the modern men believed themselves secured in that which they had acquired. If, on the arrival of the Count d'Artois, comparisons were made, disadvantageous to the Empire, it was still worse at Compiègne! The crowds assembled at the château declared that now they saw what kingly majesty was, of which they had not before had the slightest idea. And yet the greater number of these men had had the honour of approaching genius in its grandest and most striking phases. We must confess that these men would have been in the right had they said, that between a prince, born to the throne and uniting to the lustre of his origin, talent, knowledge, and a noble cast of feature; between this tranquil authority undisturbed by self-mistrust, and the haughty, fitful, abstracted, often harsh and abrupt rule of genius, there was a very great difference. But very few among them possessed so refined a taste, as to discern these distinctions, and it was strange to hear Marmont, Ney, Kellerman, Oudinot, Moncey, and Berthier speaking of the *majesty* of King Louis XVIII., and assuring each new-comer that they had never seen any thing similar. Such is the unceasing comedy of human life, which men never weary of playing, even though they have already played it a hundred times, and over which we shall pass rapidly, for it would be useless to hold the mirror again before their eyes, as we should never succeed in correcting that spirit of idolatry, which bows before the powers that be. But Compiègne was to be the scene of something more serious than official receptions; Louis XVIII. was to receive there those high personages that held in their

hands the springs that moved the machinery of the state.

The king had, during his protracted journey from Calais to Compiègne, sent M. de Blacas to Paris, to learn from the Count d'Artois, and the most reliable royalists, all that was most important for him to know. The Count d'Artois had hastened to fling himself into his brother's arms, and had received a welcome more affectionate than usual from Louis XVIII., whose heart was softened by joy. Besides, the news he brought was satisfactory. The Bourbons were momentarily becoming stronger, and the Senate weaker, for from the day that this body had, by the Duke d'Otranto's advice, made a compromise by accepting a vague and general promise, legitimate royalty had not ceased to gain ground. However, it was impossible to contest fundamental principles; and though the ultra-royalists had a horror of every thing bearing the name of constitution, still a constitution could not be refused. France, at every change of government, had acquired such a habit of drawing up in writing the conditions of her new position, that now, too, recourse must be had to the pen; and there was no choice but to grant a government like that of England, with two Chambers debating and voting on public affairs, a free press, the impartial administration of justice, the confirmation of the sale of national property, the maintenance of the legion of honour and of the new nobility. The Count d'Artois, M. de Montesquieu, and, indeed, all who had assisted in the work for the last month, were obliged to admit this. But those points to which Louis XVIII. attached most importance had been gained. He was not even obliged to accept the senatorial constitution, he was dispensed with taking the oath, and, in fact, with doing any thing that had the appearance of accepting a constitution. He could give this constitution himself,—give it as emanating spontaneously from his own royal authority,—a proceeding which consecrated the principle of legitimate royalty, such as the ultra-royalists understood it. Besides, he need only choose some members of the Senate, those that displeased him least, and complete the number from the ancient nobility. He could retain the legislative corps, which had given more satisfaction than the Senate, and thus compose a Government more to his taste. In short, in order to make more evident the difference between this truly royal mode of proceeding and that which the Senate had at first required, the king was to enter Paris without giving a constitution, merely making a simple declaration in general terms, almost the same as that made by the Count d'Artois, an arrangement that would leave time to consider maturely the conditions of the new constitution.

These points coincided exactly with the views of Louis XVIII. He had no objection to this kind of Government, which consists of two chambers, that torment the ministers and leave the king in peace, for he had seen this system work very well in England. But his authority, which, with the blood that flowed in his veins, had descended to him from Louis XIV., Henry IV., Saint Louis, and Hugh Capet,—this authority had been recognised, and this was for him the principal point. To

grant what were called written guarantees, couched in whatever style might be desired, provided that he was supposed to have written them himself; to receive oaths, but not to take any, was a mode of proceeding that soothed his regal pride and gratified his feelings. He would afterward allow the country to be governed one way or another, provided that certain limits were not overstepped, and that he should be allowed to have such men as he pleased about his person. His brother, having provided for all these conditions, was welcome, and for the first time, in the king's opinion, his conduct was faultless.

Firmly fixed in these points by the information he had received from the Count d'Artois, M. de Blacas, and M. de Montesquiou, he knew how to treat everybody, and he spoke with some, listened to others, was gracious with all, without promising any thing, but allowing every thing to be expected from his unfettered wisdom, whilst he was firmly resolved not to accept from any one an advice which had the appearance of a condition.

The most important person, and he whose first interview with the king would be of great consequence, was M. de Talleyrand, who had been for some time the principal actor on the political stage. Both Louis XVIII. and M. de Talleyrand had studied their parts well, for they were fond of acting, an art in which both excelled. M. de Talleyrand's part was the more difficult, not because he was the less talented of the two performers, but because of his position. For men who act exclusively upon principle, success is not an absolute necessity, but for men who trust solely to their talents it is an indispensable condition. Up to this time, between those who had refused all connection with the Revolution, and those who had made a compromise with it, the advantage had appeared to be entirely on the side of the latter, for they seemed to understand in what the strength of the time lay, and joined the Revolution in order to guide it, whilst the others, blind and obstinate, had only hurried their king and friends to the scaffold. Suddenly the aspect of things changed, and those who had obstinately refused to listen to any accommodation, seemed to have judged correctly, and if the long Revolution had now assumed its last phase—and the existing phase always seemed destined to be the last—it was they who would be pronounced to have acted wisely and correctly. Between Louis XVIII. returning from exile, and M. de Talleyrand, who, having alternately served the Republic and the Empire, had now, at the end of twenty years, returned to the feet of legitimacy, the advantage of position was entirely with the former. M. de Talleyrand could, indeed, boast of having contributed to the late change of affairs, but such services are soon forgotten. Besides, these services, in the opinion of the ultra-royalists, were only an acknowledgment of his fault, a tardy return to true principles, and for the moment Louis XVIII. was the conqueror, M. de Talleyrand the conquered, although he had himself contributed to his defeat. However, M. de Talleyrand assumed an attitude quite as haughty as that of his royal interlocutor. He also possessed exquisite tact, and a perfect knowledge of affairs, and the art

of disposing of them with a word, and, above all, the art of flattering without demeaning himself, and of never playing a subordinate part, even in the presence of kings and princes. Louis XVIII. and M. de Talleyrand could, therefore, meet without disadvantage on either side, and each had prepared himself thoroughly for an interview, of which both felt the importance.

Louis XVIII. received M. de Talleyrand with extreme courtesy, thanked him for his services, like a prince who felt he owed every thing to his own claims, showed him that those who returned from exile were not, after all, those who had displayed least judgment or penetration, but he passed quickly from this subject to that of the existing state of affairs. In point of fact, the king and his future prime minister coincided, for both agreed in essentials. On one side, the question was a written constitution; on the other, the giving it spontaneously. There was no further need of discussion; each eagerly assented to the points proposed by the other. To concede these two Chambers, which could not be refused, and gratify military men, whom it would be sufficient to flatter, for they neither desired to govern, nor knew how,—such was M. de Talleyrand's project, and the only one to which the king offered no objection. Louis XVIII., on his side, gave M. de Talleyrand to understand that a man such as he, well skilled in the art of diplomacy, and still reflecting the *fiat* of the great Empire, a *prestige* which Louis felt without acknowledging, should always be his representative before Europe. This was sufficient for M. de Talleyrand. The king and the minister then separated, after an interview which royal politeness had made sufficiently long,—the king really satisfied, M. de Talleyrand affecting to be so. It may be supposed the latter was not fully content, for he did not tell any one what reasons he had to be so, and he preserved, which was unusual with him, a profound silence on the incidents of the interview, which proved, at least, the unimportant nature of the conversation. He contented himself with saying, to those who questioned him, that the king was a man of intelligence, of very great intelligence, of a vast mind, indeed, of which no specimens had appeared since the end of the eighteenth century.

Meanwhile, a more important visit was announced, that of the Emperor of Russia. The Emperor Alexander played, with sincerity and success, the part of the generous conqueror at Paris, and interested himself in our future destiny with a warmth and good will that well deserved the gratitude of the French, if it were not painful to be indebted even for one's happiness to a stranger. The King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria thought little of such things. The King of Prussia troubled himself little with what might happen to France, provided he could return to Berlin with solid assurances of peace, and large sums toward the expenses of the war; and the Emperor of Austria thought as little of the fate of France, provided he returned to Vienna with the certainty of getting Italy and the Tyrol. Let the Bourbons get out of the affair as well as they could; that was their business, and that of the French. Nothing more was

asked of them, than that they would not again cross the Alps or the Rhine. As for Napoleon, it would be more agreeable had he been at the Azores or St. Helena, than at Elba; but there he was, and no more interest was taken in him, at least for the present. Alexander thought otherwise. Liberal, and in little danger of being taken at his word on the subject of liberty by his subjects, yet sincere in his sentiments, he thought it more consistent with his own greatness to leave the French free, and also more prudent to leave them content. In the habit of frequenting the society of men who advocated liberal institutions, and very intimate with M. de Lafayette, who, at the first hope of a free government, had left his retreat at Lagrange, he became confirmed in his generous inclinations, bound himself by his words, and had, in some sort, taken upon himself the task of defending the ideas and interests of the Senate, to whom he took a pleasure in acknowledging his obligations, for it was to this body the allied monarchs owed the deposition of Napoleon. Discontented, not with the Count d'Artois, but with the emigrants who had hurried from England and the provinces to Paris, Alexander had sent Count Pozzo di Borgo to Compiègne, to talk reason to Louis XVIII. But, though very adroit, Count Pozzo could not succeed in entering into any satisfactory explanation with this king, so heavy in body and so agile in mind, and who warded off all serious remonstrances with a half-natural, half-affecting thoughtlessness. Alexander, therefore, determined to go himself to Compiègne, a bold step, for neither the King of Prussia nor the Emperor of Austria had gone there; but it was a step that the age and vivacity of the young Emperor might explain, and which could not fail to flatter Louis XVIII. extremely. Alexander wished to make him understand that he must not only grant a constitution, but have about his person the men of the Empire and Revolution, give up the idea of dating his reign from the death of Louis XVII., comply in many points with the prevailing ideas of the times, and, above all, consider the army. Louis XVIII., having been apprized of this visit, determined to receive the Emperor, and to act toward him, as he did toward all who pretended to give him advice, with dignity and general professions of good will.

No sooner was Alexander announced, than crowds of courtiers fell back, leaving face to face the head of the European coalition, and the head of the old French dynasty. Flattered by this visit, and wishing to appear penetrated with gratitude, Louis XVIII. opened his arms to the young Emperor and received him as a father, but as a father whose age and rank placed him above all the sovereigns of his time. Whilst he thanked him for the assistance he had given his family, he affected to refer the great events that had taken place, to superior and Providential causes, and especially to the influence of the great principle of which he was the representative. He seemed to have nothing to learn; when the Czar spoke to him of the new position of France, he listened with politeness, but as a man to whom a young prince could not teach any thing; he disputed nothing, admitted nothing, expressed

decided resolutions on every subject, conformable to his authority, which was not derived from any one, and to his wisdom, which needed no counsel; he allowed his resolutions to be understood without entering into particulars, and, in a word, was almost as incomprehensible to the sovereign as he had been to the ambassador. The embarrassment of the Emperor Alexander was completed by the arrival of a deputation of the legislative corps at Compiègne, to compliment the king, whilst the Senate, resuming its reserve and silence toward Louis XVIII., had neglected to appear. A body that pretended to represent the nation, and that had acquired popularity by its recent resistance to Napoleon, thus hastening to meet the monarch, and prostrate itself before his legitimate authority before he had made any promise, necessarily deprived the Senate's silence of its influence, and gave Alexander the appearance of an importunate adviser. This prince gave up the idea of remonstrating warmly, and returned unsuccessful, though overwhelmed with politeness; he had spoken but few words, and had obtained still fewer from his august interlocutor; he was not more contented than M. de Talleyrand, though he acknowledged it more frankly. Having two hundred thousand soldiers at his command, and being, unfortunately, master of France, it was more to his credit than discredit to acknowledge that he had been politely dismissed. After spending three or four days at Compiègne, in reposing himself and acquiring some notion of men and things, Louis XVIII. determined to repair to Saint Ouen, at the gates of Paris, where he would make a last and short stay before entering Paris itself. He decided with his brother and the members of the Provisional Government, that by publishing a general declaration, announcing the guaranteed constitutional principles, they would satisfy the Senate, who would visit the king, and thus the affair would be finished, three weeks before those men, who wished to procure France solid liberty under the ancient dynasty, would have been able, by the assistance of Alexander, to deny admittance to Louis XVIII. until he promised all that was demanded. But the excitement had become so great within a few days that it could not be allayed, and had the attempt been made, it would seem as if the assistance of foreigners had been sought in order to stop a national movement. France, indeed, having first hesitated whether she would recall the Bourbons, then saw that they were her only resource, and the necessity once admitted, the sensibility of some, and the sordidness of others, had given an impulse to the public mind, unexampled since the taking of the Bastille and the return of General Bonaparte from Egypt. The Senate, which had grown weak by continual concessions, was losing ground every day; but if the Senate was conquered in what regarded its own interests, it was not vanquished in the principles which it had undertaken to support. The Senate had demanded a constitution, and a constitution was about to be granted with the essential clauses. But the Senate did not succeed in making the constitution the result of a combined act of the nation and the king, which would have given the constitution a

strength and inviolability that might have secured its duration; and in this respect the Bourbons lost their cause when they believed they had secured its triumph, for they established the ascendancy of this principle of *octroi royal*, of which the results at a future day were a *coup d'état* and their own downfall.

It was decided that they should confine themselves to a simple, general declaration, and all the Count d'Artois' assistants were set to work.—M. de Vitrolles, his chief instrument, as well as MM. de la Maisonfort and Terrier de Montciel,—who formed a second council in the *entrail* of the Tuileries. The king, who disdained such literature, did not interfere, but depended on M. de Blacas to superintend and revise their work. The question for these many editors was to know what part should be accorded to the Senate, what amount of gratitude should be shown to that body, and how far, whilst carrying out their own wishes, they might seem to comply with the desires of the Senate. It was agreed that these questions should be definitely arranged at Saint Ouen. The king was overjoyed at the idea of returning to his capital, and abandoned himself to the pleasure of inhaling once more that royal incense, which had not been burned before him for so many years, and of which he now received an inordinate measure. He set out for Saint Ouen, where he arrived on the 1st of May. At this, the last station of his route, the influx of visitors overflowed again, and filled the royal dwelling. The Senate had not yet appeared in the presence of Louis XVIII. But it was necessary to put an end to the separation between the king and that constituent body which had recalled the Bourbons, from whose hands the Count d'Artois had received the Lieutenant-Generalship, and which, though detested and even despised, nobody dared dissolve or annul, for the Senate was supported by the high officers of the state, by the army, and the allied sovereigns. But as it had been decided that there should be a constitution, that this constitution should emanate from the royal authority, and that the Senate should compose in great part the upper chamber, there was no reason why the Senate should hold back any longer. The senators therefore consented to visit the king, and M. de Talleyrand presented them to Louis XVIII. at St. Ouen, as he had presented them to the Count d'Artois at the Tuileries. M. de Talleyrand's discourse, carefully drawn up, expressed the current ideas of the day. It was no longer the Senate, he said, but the entire nation, enlightened by experience, that came to meet the king and recall him to the throne of his ancestors. The Senate, sharing the sentiments of the nation, came at the same time to salute the monarch. He, on his side, guided by his wisdom, was about to grant institutions conformable to the wants of modern reason. A constitutional charter would unite the interests of all parties with those of the throne, and strengthen the royal will by the adhesion of the nation's will. The king knew better than any one that such institutions, long and happily tried in a neighbouring nation, offered a support and not an obstacle to those monarchs who based their authority

on the law of the land, and were fathers to their people.

To this discourse the king made a gracious reply, which contained a full assent to the sentiments expressed by the President of the Senate. Strange to say, the members of the legislative corps, whose conduct in these circumstances, dictated by a puerile jealousy, was far from honourable, and very injurious to the public cause, wished to present themselves a second time before the king, though they had already paid him their respects at Compiègne. They repeated the commonplaces of the day, and after them the principal bodies of the state would needs recommence declaiming and haranguing. The 2d of May was appointed for receptions, and but little time remained for serious business. The declaration that was to precede the king's entry into Paris, and which was, in reality, the condition of this entry, was not even drawn up on the evening of the 2d, or, to speak more correctly, it was overdone, for there were five or six drafts, one drawn up by M. de Vitrolles, another by M. de la Maisonfort, besides several others. The king, weary, and caring little about the terms in which he should be made to say what had been agreed on several days before, ordered M. de Blacas to see to the definite arrangement of this declaration that was to be published the following day. M. de Blacas assembled the different compilers, passed a part of the night of the 2-3d of May with them, gave audience to some advisers, each of whom brought a phrase or an idea, took care to dismiss the greater number of them, and then, having softened down those sentences which seemed to express too much gratitude to the Senate or too much dependence on that body, he decided on the form of the declaration. M. de Vitrolles, who was the principal compiler, having asked if it should not be submitted to the king, M. de Blacas replied that it was not necessary to disturb the monarch, who had much need of repose on the eve of such a day as the approaching, and the original of the celebrated declaration of Saint Ouen was dated 2d of May, sent to the king's printer, and in the morning a large number of copies was issued.

The following is the preamble to this declaration:—

“Recalled by the love of our people to the throne of our fathers, enlightened by the misfortunes of the nation that we are destined to govern, our first thought is to invoke that mutual confidence so necessary to our repose and to the happiness of our people.

“Having read attentively the plan of the constitution proposed by the Senate at its meeting of the 6th of last April, we find the fundamental principles of this constitution excellent; but many of the articles bear the impress of the haste with which they were drawn up, and cannot, in their present form, become fundamental laws of the state.

“Being resolved to adopt a liberal constitution, desirous that it should be the result of mature deliberation, wishing that it should be wisely compiled, and not wishing to accept one that would require revision, we summon for the 10th of the month of June of the present year, the Senate and legislative corps, before

whom we pledge ourselves to lay the result of our labours, assisted by a commission selected from these two bodies, and to lay down as bases of this constitution the following guarantees."

After this preamble, the guarantees, which had never varied, were enumerated. Two chambers voting on all affairs of state; responsible ministers bound to appear before these chambers; personal liberty; liberty of the press; liberty of conscience; taxation by vote; the eligibility of Frenchmen of every rank to civil and military employments; the permanency of judges; the confirmation of the national sales; the support of the Legion of Honour, &c. With the exception of the fundamental question of its origin, which made the constitutional charter a concession and not a contract, the promise to give it such as was desired was formal, and, besides, it was made to the Senate, which heightened the importance and authority of this body, and assured the adoption of the most desired resolutions, with one exception, which, we repeat, the Bourbons ought to have been less inclined to reject than any other; for well would it have been for them had they been bound beyond the possibility of retracting.

Under the auspices of this declaration, Louis XVIII. prepared to make his entry into Paris the 3d of May. He left St. Ouen at eleven in the morning, escorted by an immense crowd that came to meet him. He was in a caleche drawn by eight horses, the Duchess d'Angoulême at his side, and the two Princes de Condé on the opposite seat; the Count d'Artois on the right of his carriage, the Duke of Berry on the left, both on horseback. Behind the king's carriage came the marshals; next followed the cavalry of the National Guard, commanded by Count Charles de Damas. Whilst this great cortège was passing, every eye was turned on the infantry of the Imperial Guard, of which some companies had guarded the king at Compiègne, had followed him to St. Ouen, and now escorted him to Paris. The public contemplated with extreme curiosity those manly faces, tanned by twenty-five years' warfare, assisting respectfully at a ceremony opposed to their inclinations, neither joyous nor excited like their marshals, but haughty, though submissive to the desires of France, whose destinies were now being changed. Amidst the ardent and unanimous cries of "*Vive le Roi!*" there was frequently heard "*Vive la Garde!*" an expressive cry, that proved the sympathy of all present for these noble relics of our heroic wars. Even the more rational of the royalists admired their attitude, at once proud and resigned.*

Louis XVIII. was received with enthusiasm. Those deep-seated emotions, the offspring of memory, which the Bourbons possessed the gift of awakening, were perhaps stronger when the Count d'Artois made his entrance into Paris, because the people then felt those emotions for the first time. But reflections told all minds that nothing better could be done

than to recall the Bourbons, and that with them alone could peace and a moderate Government be expected. This was also become the opinion of the middle classes, dispassionate and disinterested judges of the questions of Government. They had a particularly good opinion of the king, who had gained an undisputed reputation for wisdom by his prudent conduct during the emigration; the middle classes were very well disposed, and, possessing great influence with the populace, who are naturally imitative, they caused Louis XVIII. to be loudly applauded, by applauding him themselves. The king's figure was concealed by the carriage, and his noble countenance, rendered more gracious by content, was alone visible, and gave pleasure to all beholders. The desire of peace being universal, no one regretted that the king, now called to the throne, was unable to manage a horse, and the public imagination dwelt with pleasure on the oft-sketched image of an aged father returning to the bosom of his family. The Duchess d'Angoulême, whose usually severe countenance was several times this day bathed with tears, and the Princes of Condé, whose misfortunes were present to every mind, excited general interest. This carriage, which contained the entire Bourbon family, was accompanied by the most respectful acclamations, until it arrived at Notre Dame. After the religious ceremony, the carriage turned toward the Tuileries by the Pont Neuf, where a statue in plaster of Henry IV. had been raised, and at this spot all present hastened to the assistance of the Duchess d'Angoulême, who fainted at the sight of this palace which her parents had left to go to the Temple and from the Temple to the scaffold. At this affecting scene every heart was moved. Brought back in this fashion to the palace of their fathers, this august family might with good reason believe themselves definitely established within its walls. And that it should be so, only one thing was necessary:—that in entering the Tuileries the Bourbons had participated in the advanced intelligence of the age and the enlightenment of the country over which they were come to reign. It was to be desired both for them and for France. But at this very moment these unfortunate emigrants gave a new proof of the difficulty of reconciling them with this France, of which they had seen little during twenty years, and studied still less. The grenadiers of the Imperial Guard, who had attended the king both at Compiègne and St. Ouen, and who had no other thought than to fulfil their duty to him, were placed as sentinels round the Tuileries. When the courtiers, both men and women, learned to whom their safety, and, above all, that of the royal family, was confided, they were seized with terror. They had recourse to M. Dupont, the Minister of War, and asked him if he had lost his reason, when he dared to trust the precious existence of the king to such hands. The general, accustomed to the fidelity of the French soldiers under arms, scarcely understood what they meant. He was at first tempted to laugh at such fears; but they recalled him to what they called the importance of the affair, and that very evening, without any consideration for these brave soldiers, who, though their hearts were full of

* Many writers, and M. de Chateaubriand in particular (who in general troubles himself very little about the truth) have spoken of the deportment of the guards in exaggerated terms. According to the most creditable witnesses, they behaved exactly as we have endeavoured to describe, oddly but submissively.

Napoleon, would still have defended Louis XVIII. against all comers, he was forced to dismiss them and insultingly send them to their barracks. And these were the hearts that were to be united, that were to be fused in love for the same dynasty!*

Next day, the different bodies of the state recommenced their visits to the royal family, always repeating the same speeches; then the allied troops defiled before Louis XVIII. seated on the balcony of his palace, and surrounded by the principal sovereigns of Europe, who courteously yielded the first place to him, wishing thereby to prove to France how much they esteemed both her king and herself.

Some time having been devoted to ceremonies and congratulations, the moment was now come to commence the laborious work of reconciling the past and present, of giving some compensation to the classes injured by a long proscription, without, however, offending the nation, that would not consent to be sacrificed to any private interest; seeking truth and justice through a space of twenty-five years filled with bloody quarrels, and from these to construct a system of government; a very difficult task, and almost impossible, unless a clear and firm intellect should be found in the king, or one of the princes of his family, or in some minister capable of obtaining a decisive ascendancy over the court and Government! Could this phenomenon be found? This was the question, and a very obscure one.

Under the short rule of the Count d'Artois the Government had only had a provisional character, and the ministers had merely borne the title of commissioners of the different ministerial departments. It was now necessary to form a definite ministry. Louis XVIII., taking things as he found them, continued the separation, which had existed under the Count d'Artois, between the royal council aiding the prince with its advice, and the ministers executing his wishes, some ministers being permanent members of this council, and others only summoned to it for the special affairs of their departments. It was a strange combination, and very little suited to the government that was about to be given to France.

In order that a free state, formed upon the principle of deliberative assemblies, should possess that unity of will, without which promptitude and vigour of action would be impossible, and that clearness of perception which can only result from the co-operation of many minds, it is necessary that the ministers trusted with the governing power under the crown and the chambers, should be the sole councillors of the crown, that they should concoct the resolutions of Government, get them sanctioned by the king and the chambers, and then have them executed on their own responsibility, both collective and individual. It would also be necessary, before bringing the great powers of the state to this desirable state of unity, that the ministers themselves should be united by the influence of one among them superior to the others in intelligence, temper, and position. It is under such conditions alone that all the

intelligence of a country can be united for the common good, which is the privilege of free states, and, at the same time, preserve that unity of action which seems to be the privilege of absolute Governments, but which enjoy this advantage only in appearance, for such Governments are frequently the most unstable. Between the crown and the deliberative bodies, there must, therefore, be no other intermediaries than the ministers alone, who are at once the authors, demonstrators, and executors, on their own responsibility, of the different acts that constitute the administrative authority. All additional machinery is useless and consequently hurtful. But in 1814 experience had not yet taught us any thing on these important subjects, and even in England people acted more from instinct than reflection. Free government was a science existing in England practically, but theoretically nowhere.

The king simply accepted the legacy of circumstances,—that is, the superior royal council, which was only, as we have seen, the old Provisional Government transformed into the council of the lieutenant-general, and under it the ministers, some being members of the council and some not. He confined himself to making definite appointments to each department by continuing in office the actual possessors of portfolios, or by changing them as circumstances arose. The following were his selection.

No one would wish to remove M. Louis from the finance department, where, in a few days, he had gained universal confidence. He was named minister of this department. General Dupont, who was well acquainted with the army, and did all in his power to satisfy the feelings of the military, but unfortunately possessed of less firmness than intelligence, and who had with difficulty preserved his presence of mind in the midst of conflicting pretensions, but who had not yet lost the prestige of his long disgrace, was confirmed in the post of Minister of War. M. de Malouet, an honest, laborious man, retained his office as Marine Minister. MM. de Talleyrand and de Montesquieu were summoned to the ministry, however, without losing their places in the council. Although M. de Laforest was Minister of Foreign Affairs, it was M. de Talleyrand alone who had directed the negotiation of the armistice, and he was the only person that could arrange the conditions of a definite peace. He became titular minister of foreign affairs, whilst next to the prince of the blood he was the most important member of the superior royal council, which from custom was now called the "upper council."

Although M. de Montesquieu was a clergyman, he did not wish to be either cardinal or ambassador to the Holy See; he wished to be minister in France, and chief minister. He willingly resigned the foreign policy, which, on account of the peace, he believed would be for a long time, very unimportant, and which also belonged of right to M. de Talleyrand, and reserved himself for the home policy, which was about to become very active, very difficult, and very stormy. He possessed more than one advantage for this department. He exercised a certain authority over his old

* I only repeat in this place, in other words, the very sentiments which General Dupont expresses in his manuscript memoirs.

party, and could be as arrogant to his colleagues as to others; he was accustomed to public life, and spoke with ease. But he was irritable, and did not possess sufficient vigour either of mind or character, and was quite unequal to the burden he was about to assume,—a burden which would have been, indeed, too heavy for anybody. But the royalist party had not, at this time, a better candidate to offer to the king, so that the choice of the minister for the home department was, under the circumstances, the best that could be made. M. Beugnot, who had temporarily administered the home department, was compensated with the command of the police under the title of "director general," an office almost equivalent to a place in the ministry.

M. Henrion de Pansey, notwithstanding the excellence of his character, lost his appointment of chancellor. It was desirable that a man who had belonged to the ancient parliaments should be at the head of the magistracy, and a magistrate was chosen who possessed the learning, and somewhat of the studied eloquence, of D'Aguesseau, and who, endowed at the same time with a mild temper and honourable principles, entertained all the opinions of the old royalists. This magistrate was M. Dambray. Lastly, it would be impolitic to exclude from the official members of the Government a person who possessed so much influence at the court as M. de Blacas, and the ministers, desirous of associating him with themselves, offered him the control of the royal household. M. de Blacas had just been appointed Grand Master of the Bedchamber, the only important office that was vacant at court, for all the others had been given to their old possessors. Vain of this distinguished favour, he thought it would be a degradation to enter the ministry. It was only by great efforts that he could be induced to yield. Great efforts were made, and he was prevailed on to accept a portfolio, which, leaving him near the king's person, without imposing on him any portion of the burden of public affairs, yet united him in the collective responsibility of the ministry.

The Count d'Artois had admitted M. de Vitrolles into the council with the title of secretary of state. A secretary of state, placed between the sovereign and his ministers, in order to transmit to them the orders of a master who never took council but of himself, ought to have passed away with Napoleon. In the new order of things this post should have fallen to the lot of M. de Blacas, and would have been an impossibility even for him. In fact, the ministers had determined to communicate directly with the king, and had already refused to accept the intervention of M. de Vitrolles with the Count d'Artois, which, indeed, was only natural, since they were the responsible authors of their own acts. But one function, therefore, remained to the new secretary of state,—that of keeping a registry of the meetings of the council. The members of the council would not on any account sanction this registry. M. de Montesquieu and M. de Talleyrand said, with justice, that a registry would restrain the freedom of debate, for the certainty of having all they said noted down, whether cor-

rectly or not, would prevent the most sincere and the most courageous members of the Government from speaking with perfect frankness. Therefore, there being no longer any intermediary between the ministers and the king, and not being allowed to keep a register, the secretary of state had no duties to perform. His colleagues did what they could to exclude M. de Vitrolles from the royal council, and to compensate him by a post at court. But he was obstinate, and, being supported by the princes, remained in the council, where his only employment was to take notes of the adopted resolutions, and to correspond with the *Moniteur* or the *Telegraph*. So he remained, little liked by his colleagues, liking them still less, at open enmity with M. de Montesquieu, who was not sparing of arrogance toward a person whose rank he despised, whose merit he did not recognise, and whose services he denied.*

To these personages was added, with the title of minister of state in charge of the post-office, M. Ferrand, a well-informed old man, and a not very skilful writer, endowed with all the obstinacy and the vehemence of the ultra-royalists. He was in the administration of the post-office what M. Beugnot was in the police,—a director-general, with almost ministerial rank.

Such was the cabinet of Louis XVIII., if an assemblage of ministers can be called a cabinet, in which M. de Talleyrand, the most important by his position, was allowed to occupy himself only with foreign affairs; where M. de Montesquieu, the next in importance, was obliged to give his entire attention to affairs connected with the chambers; and M. de Blacas, the third in rank, was allowed to interfere solely in business brought immediately under the king's notice,—a cabinet in which each minister acted almost isolated, not being united by a prime minister, for no such person existed; nor by the superior royal council, which had no leader; for a literary king, indolent and solely occupied with classic reading, could not be considered as a head. There was reason to fear that this ministerial chaos, unguided by any governing power, would be led by the passions of the times, which were very irrational, very exacting, and very unsettled.

On the second day after his entry into Paris the king assembled the royal council, to which, on this occasion, all the ministers were summoned, besides the princes, who were among its habitual members. The king addressed the council in an opening speech which was studied, polite, and affectionate. He spoke in a clear voice, with effect, though haughtily, touching rather superficially on every subject, wishing that, on the first day, a word at least should be said about every thing. He enumerated the different objects that were to be provided for: the army, which should be reorganized, and attached to the present dynasty; the navy, which should be re-modelled, and

* M. de Vitrolles kept, nevertheless, some sort of register of the meetings of the council, very short, but very interesting, and which is still preserved in the archives of the state, and is perhaps one of the most curious documents we possess concerning the Government of the first Restoration.

proportioned to our financial resources; the old military establishment of the king, which was to be again set on foot; the finances, which should be the measure of what could be done for the army and navy; the taxes, which must be maintained and collected in spite of imprudent promises; the sufferings of the occupied provinces, to which a speedy end must be put, the negotiations, which it was important should end in a definite but not humiliating peace; and, lastly the constitution, which was promised for the 10th of June at the latest.

The task with regard to the army was most difficult. It was in the first place necessary to decide on the principle of recruiting, and come to a rational resolution considering the pledge the princes had made to abolish conscription. Besides, notwithstanding the number of desertions, the difficulty was not in the want of men, but, on the contrary, in their too great number, and in the sentiments they expressed. A hundred and fifty thousand men were about to return from England, Russia, Germany, and Spain, and about as many prisoners, all old soldiers. There would be, consequently, four hundred thousand men, at least, and more than forty thousand officers, for all of whom provision should be made. The Minister of Finance declared, that when the state debts should be paid, he would not have more than two hundred millions of francs to devote to the army,—that is to say, that he had scarcely sufficient to pay half the claims that would be made on him. As to the navy, Napoleon's hundred vessels must be given up, for if this number was too great when the empire extended from Lubeck to Trieste, and when France had double the number of sailors, it would be ridiculous when France would be reduced to the frontiers of 1790.

Some words were exchanged on these serious subjects. The Minister of War was requested to produce a plan of organization, which would, as far as possible, satisfy all interests, by conforming to the temporary financial distress. The Minister of Marine was authorized to prepare large reductions, for a long peace with England was reckoned on, and it was not desirable to offend this Power by an expensive and useless display of naval force. The king, who was very sensitive to externals, desired that the names of several vessels, which recalled revolutionary memories, should be changed, whilst those of Austerlitz and Friedland, for example, which only spoke of victory, should be retained. Lastly, he questioned the Minister of Finance, who did not hesitate to explain again his irrevocable intentions. At first he wished to lay it down as a principle, that all the state debts should be paid, even those that were called "Bonaparte's debts," and which, unfortunately, had been contracted to support unwise wars. Whether the money were well or ill employed, these debts had been contracted on the credit of France, and it would have been as scandalous as impossible to deny them. Without this scrupulous exactness in fulfilling the engagements of the treasury there would be no public credit, and without credit, whatever system may be adopted, the taxes being insufficient for several years, it would not be possible to satisfy the most pressing wants of the state. But with credit

it would be possible, provided that the proper means were adopted to obtain it. But as credit would not suffice for every thing, it would be necessary also to require the exact payment of the taxes. The city of Bordeaux, in calling itself the "*City of the Twelfth of March*," signified an intention not to pay the *droits réunis*; and the other cities of the south, encouraged by this example, adopted the like resolution. If the king, now that he was at the head of the Government, did not address the southern populations with great firmness, all help from the taxes, and consequently all public credit, would disappear. So spoke the minister.

The Count d'Artois reminded him that a promise had been given to abolish the *droits réunis*. "You made another promise," replied M. Louis, "that the public debts should be paid, and this promise is much more important than the other."

The king, always glad of an opportunity to make his nephews, and still more his brother, appear to be in the wrong, fully agreed with M. Louis; he declared, that without depriving the people, who had been led away by thoughtless promises, of all hope of amelioration, he intended to address a proclamation to them, recalling them to their duty, and reminding them that taxation, like law, was to be the same for all, and that good intentions, however excellent they may be, would not suffice to pay the expenses of the state. It was decided that this proclamation should be immediately drawn up, signed by the king, and published.

The Ministers of Finance, of War, and of the Navy, having spoken together for a few moments, it was evident that economy should be the inflexible law of the new Government, for without economy it would be impossible to meet the various demands of the different Government departments, and, above all, to satisfy the army, whose good will it was all-important to gain. This was no time to think of expense or luxury, or of any project not demanded by absolute necessity. And still Louis XVIII. spoke in the simplest and most decided manner of the ancient military household of the king, as of an institution definitely re-established. "Already," he said, "the ancient officers of the body-guards have resumed their titles." These were MM. d'Harré, de Grammont, de Poix, and de Luxembourg. But this was not enough; he also wished to increase the number of companies, in order to appoint two new officers chosen from the Imperial Army. And he was desirous of re-establishing the red companies. His determination was fixed, for it was, in his opinion, for want of a sufficient military household that royalty, and France with her, had suffered so many misfortunes in 1789.

To understand how imprudent it was to re-establish this ancient military household, it must be explained that under the name of *red companies* it was meant to assemble two or three thousand gentlemen, some very old, and others mere boys, not deficient in courage, if an occasion called for it, but wholly unfit for effective military service; they were all to have magnificent uniforms, and a rank not lower than that of captain. Besides these, there were to be assembled, under the name of *body-*

guards, three thousand young men who should have the rank of cornets, and to whom were to be added artillery and infantry, to the number of four thousand, which would make altogether about ten thousand men, costing as much as forty or fifty thousand, at a moment when it would be, perhaps, necessary to disband two hundred thousand soldiers, and thirty thousand veteran officers, covered with wounds, and doomed to sink into misery. The king's household, thus constituted, could not cost less than twenty million francs; and should the civil list pay a part, it would be a great imprudence to divert such a sum from the war budget, and give the army, little disposed as it was to interpret favourably the diminution it was about to undergo, an opportunity of comparing its misery with the opulence of the king's household troops. Louis XVIII. distinctly declared that the Imperial Guard should meet the highest consideration; but how were all these things to be conciliated? how were all these expenses to be met?

We may see from this, that the Bourbon princes returned with resolutions ready-formed on the most important subjects. They wished in the present instance to furnish employment to poor gentlemen, (the only specious excuse for the proceeding,) and they actually believed that six thousand gentlemen, well armed, could have checked the French Revolution, an opinion, indeed, which they were not singular in professing. This august family was destined soon to experience what resistance could be made against a revolution with even the bravest gentlemen! No member of the council dared to raise an objection to a resolution apparently irrevocable. Even the Minister of Finance was silent. He gave what money he could, employing all his energy to avoid giving more; and as to how it should be employed, he left that to the consideration of the Minister of War, who was more interested in the question than he. The latter would take good care not to quarrel with the French nobility, who were willing in this fashion to resume the profession of arms. M. de Talleyrand and M. de Montesquieu possessed sufficient power to render them fearless of the nobility, but the former wished to win their good opinion, and the latter agreed with him on this occasion, so that no opposition was offered to a measure destined to be fatal to the Bourbon dynasty. As a proof of his solicitude for the army, and of the attention with which its interests would be guarded, the king announced that he would form a Superior Council of War, composed of the princes, of several marshals, and of some of the most distinguished lieutenants-general of each service. He added that he would himself preside.

The sufferings of the occupied provinces were then spoken of. It was already evident that the Convention of the 23d of April was a deception. The foreign troops that were to have retired in proportion as we evacuated the fortresses, had not even moved. The heads of the armies intended to sell for their own advantage the *matériel* deposited in the magazines and arsenals of which they had taken possession. They even carried their pretensions so far as to lay claim to the salt-magazines, and attempted to cut down the woods for their

private benefit, and, in the disputes resulting from these pretensions, sought a fresh motive for delaying their departure. The sacrifices that had been made in evacuating so many distant posts of the highest importance, met with no compensation, and the immediate relief that had been hoped from the convention of the 23d of April was found to be an illusion.

The king expressed himself very warmly on this subject, and the Duke de Berry, who was always excitable, said that France should not be devastated in this manner on unfounded pretences, Napoleon having already gone to Elba, and all the commanders of the French army having submitted to the new order of things. M. de Talleyrand was ordered to speak on this subject with the sovereigns and their ministers, and to express himself in the most decided manner. He was also desired to introduce the important subject of peace; and as to the constitution, the king, as we have already remarked, said nothing, or almost nothing. But it was of the first importance to fulfil the pledges made to the Senate and the legislative corps, that were summoned to meet on the 10th of June. The allied sovereigns, on their part, showed a desire to leave France, recalled to their dominions by their own affairs, and also desirous to obtain their share of the spoils of the great empire. They were consequently anxious for the speedy conclusion of the peace; and they often insinuated—Alexander more than the others—that they should not consider their obligations toward France fulfilled, and particularly toward those who had rid them of Napoleon, until the question of the constitution should be decided. Influenced by these different reasons, Louis XVIII. declared his intention of anticipating the day appointed for the convocation of the Senate and the legislative corps; consequently the 31st of May was substituted for the 10th of June,—a change which necessitated greater expedition in drawing up a sketch of the new constitution.

During this preliminary examination of the great affairs of state, Louis XVIII. appeared to his councillors to be dignified, affable, and, perhaps, a little superficial to those who, like M. de Talleyrand, M. Louis, and General Dessoles, were capable of seeing beyond the surface. However, the members of the council were satisfied, and, according to custom, affected to be still more so than they really were.

Every subject entered upon was of importance. M. de Talleyrand, having learned from the Minister of the Interior the horrible exactions practised in our provinces, introduced the subject to the allied monarchs and their ministers. To produce the treaty of the 23d of April was sufficient to prove them in the wrong; for it had been decided that from the date of this convention all exactions should cease, that the allied troops should commence their retreat, and that the territories through which they marched should alone be obliged to furnish them provisions during their passage. Although the articles of the convention might in the execution give rise to abuses, still the exactions that had been made were exorbitant, and so odious that no excuse could be

offered for them. Alexander appeared to be sincerely indignant at what he heard, and declared that he had given orders, and that he would now renew them. The King of Prussia, being niggardly and desirous of small profits for his army, was really embarrassed, but promised to issue fresh instructions. Prince Schwarzenberg's language was satisfactory, but his sincerity doubtful. M. de Talleyrand said to the allied ministers that, since all admitted the injustice of what was going on, no one could take it amiss if the king, in a proclamation addressed to his subjects, should advise them to resist the exactions daily committed, both by levies in kind and by the sale of property belonging to the state. The ministers did not dare to object, for that would be to acknowledge themselves the accomplices of their subordinates, and a proclamation was drawn up upon the spot, conformable to the truths that had been admitted, and sent to the Royal Council. There was at the same time laid before the council the proclamation concerning the collection of the *droits réunis*,—an affair always of great difficulty, as we have said, in the southern provinces.

The proclamation intended for the occupied provinces cited the convention of the 23d of April, of which the intention had been to allow France to enjoy an anticipated peace. In the proclamation the inhabitants of these provinces were called upon to fulfil faithfully the conditions of this convention, and consequently to treat the allied armies well, and supply them during their retreat with whatever they might need.

But the proclamation reminded the people of the promises made to France, not to make any further war levies, to respect public and private property, and enjoined them to refuse compliance with every illegal demand, and forbade them to purchase articles offered for sale by the foreign armies, such as wood, salt, or furniture, declaring beforehand that all such sales were illegal and void. The precaution was a good one, for, taking wood as an example, as its cutting down and removal would require several months, the declaration of the nullity of the sale would prevent purchasers from presenting themselves, seeing that they would be certain not to obtain what they should have paid for. It is sad to think that such measures were necessary to prevent the French from assisting in the spoliation of the land; but, since the mournful necessity existed, we repeat that the precaution was well devised. Besides, it was couched in firm and dignified language, which was not at all calculated to offend the allied sovereigns, however severe upon their generals.

The proclamation was adopted and published immediately. The motion concerning the *droits réunis* was less unanimously supported, and met with much opposition from the princes. In treating this subject, the promises made by the Count d'Artois and his sons always presented a difficulty. This prince returned to the charge, reminded the ministers of the promises made to the people, and alleged the excellent dispositions of the refractory provinces. But these remarks had no effect on M. Louis, who said that in financial matters the best-disposed were those who paid the taxes punctually,

and that it was an indispensable necessity that all should submit to the laws, otherwise he should be obliged to retire, and leave his place to those who would undertake to govern in the midst of such anarchy. The king, annoyed at constantly hearing of the promises made by his brother and nephews, and weary of a royalism that manifested itself by refusing to pay the taxes, said that the Vendéans were as much royalists as the Bordelais, and that notwithstanding they paid the public dues. Had the king been better informed, he would have known that the Vendéans behaved no better with regard to the duty on salt than the Bordelais with regard to that on wines. However, the argument was good with respect to others, if not to the Vendéans, and the Minister of Finance, supported by the king and his colleagues, carried the proclamation in dispute: it was published with that intended for the invaded provinces.

In this proclamation, the king, addressing himself to the wine-growing provinces, said that, like Henry IV. and Louis XII., he wished to be called the father of his people, and to be able to suppress all burdensome imposts; but that the present taxes, which had been much ameliorated, were indispensable, until some means should be devised to replace or suppress them; that a sacred duty was to be fulfilled toward the creditors of the state, and toward the army, which could not be done if the finances became disorganized; besides, it was necessary to give an example of respect for the laws, if they did not wish to fall into a frightful state of anarchy; he hoped that his subjects in the southern provinces, who every day bestowed on him lavish expressions of their affection, would now give an effective proof of it, by submitting to a necessity, whose duration he would endeavour to abridge; that he would rather warn than correct, but that if having admonished, his voice were not attended to, he should be obliged to punish, and he would do so, to prevent the disorganization of the finances, the destruction of the laws and the ruin of the state.

These two proclamations were, indeed, only words, but it was useful that they should be heard, especially from the lips of the head of the house of Bourbon. The foreign generals would be less audacious in their exactions, and compelled to greater precaution, now that their acts were disclaimed by their sovereign, and by the Bourbons their allies, besides being exposed to meet with greater opposition from the people. As to the refractory provinces, the affectionate language of the monarch was certainly not capable of converting them, but the resolution so decidedly expressed concerning the execution of the laws would give the authorities a moral force which up to this moment they had not possessed, and would also hasten the time when the taxes might be again collected.

The next objects to be considered were the peace and the constitution. In order to place France in a proper and definite position, externally with regard to Europe and internally with respect to herself.

M. de Talleyrand was naturally the principal agent of the Government in the important negotiation concerning the peace, and the rest

was not an easy one, even for him. A great deal had been said on this subject, in the conversation of each day, but no positive decision had been come to. But there were two descriptions of questions to be decided, those which concerned France in particular, and those which concerned all Europe. Thus, although the principal belligerent Powers were decided as to what they wished for, and tacitly determined to let each satisfy itself; although England, as was well known, had resolved to claim Belgium, in order to join it to Holland and thus create an important monarchy, which would remove us from the mouths of large rivers; although Austria, independently of Italy, also desired a portion of the banks of the Rhine to give Bavaria in exchange for the Tyrol; although Russia and Prussia desired to have Poland and Saxony to share among themselves; and that these motives decided all four to deprive us of the Rhine frontier, in order that these different arrangements might be practicable, still, even in permitting each other to effect these different spoliations, there still remained so many subordinate questions to be determined, both as to the extent of the partitions, and the combinations to be adopted, in order to establish in some sort a European equilibrium, so that the lesser states should not be sacrificed to the greater, that the decision was not easy, and there was no certainty of obtaining it but after long and painful efforts. It was seen at a glance, that, without supposing sittings so protracted as those of the Congress of Westphalia, (which had continued several years,) it would require some months to conciliate all these interests; and the allied sovereigns did not wish to pass these months in Paris. There was another reason why these numerous questions should not be debated in Paris; and this was that France should not be afforded an opportunity of taking part in the discussion. However desirous the allies might be of agreeing, they were almost certain of not doing so, and consequently of quarrelling more than once before arriving at a definite resolution, and they did not wish to give France the immense advantage of being present at the disputes. Besides being a moral triumph, it would offer her an opportunity of recovering with ease a strong position, by uniting herself to one party against the other, and so making powerful alliances. Although the other Powers pretended that France should be better treated than she was at Châtillon, in point of fact they cared little about how she was treated, and under the Bourbons as well as under Napoleon it was determined to reduce her to her ancient limits, and, as far as possible, exclude her from the great European arrangements. There was less to irritate under the Bourbons, but there was also less of the fear that Napoleon inspired, and the one almost compensated for the other. M. de Metternich had since his arrival again taken the chief part in the negotiations, and, thanks to his profound and redoubtable sagacity, he said that it was necessary, first to arrange relations with us, and that there would be afterward less difficulty in arranging the relations of the European states among themselves.

This subtle thought soon penetrated the

minds of the allied sovereigns, and they decided to conclude their arrangements with France at Paris, and reserve for a congress, which should be held in one of the great capitals of the continent, the general arrangements which should constitute the new balance of power in Europe. Austria was treated at this period with great deference because she had secured the general safety by joining the coalition spite of her natural repugnance and the ties of blood, and it was decided that the future congress should be held at Vienna.

The foregoing arrangements being communicated to the French negotiators met with no opposition from them. At first view they appeared simple and free from guile, for it was of the first importance to put an end to the war, and consequently to treat first with France, against whom arms had been taken up. No opposition could be offered to the project of submitting the numerous questions to which the new order of things would give rise in Europe to a future assembly, to be held in a central capital, after the different monarchs should have had time to return to their dominions and arrange their most pressing affairs, and thus be more at liberty to give the necessary attention to those definite arrangements which interested the entire world. It would have been difficult to make any objection to so specious a plan, and one so apparently well founded. In fact, nothing was objected, for on our part we were anxious to enjoy the honour of having concluded a peace which would furnish so happy a contrast between the government of the Bourbons and that of Napoleon.

These resolutions were consequently adopted, and it was arranged that all things concerning France should be first and immediately decided. The frontier question was the first, and beyond all comparison the most important. We had often been told that France would be treated very differently under the Bourbons to what she was under the Bonapartes. More was done than saying this,—it had been written, and a number of proclamations had been filled with this promise. Afterward, in the conversations to which the conventions of the 23d of April had given occasion, there had been mention, but in a very vague manner, and without any definite engagement, of adding a million subjects in addition to our territorial possessions of 1790. As to the principle of the frontiers of 1790, it had never been altered, either directly or indirectly, and no negotiator in the world, except it had been Napoleon himself, flushed with victory, could have obtained a concession on this point. In fact, on this depended the creation of the kingdom of the Low Countries, so anxiously desired by England, the restitution of the Tyrol and Italy for Austria, the acquisition of Poland for Russia, and of Saxony for Prussia, since it would have been impossible to accomplish these projects without depriving us of the left bank of the Rhine. It would therefore have been unreasonable to try to change this resolution. It would be uselessly exerting a tenacity of disposition which could be better employed elsewhere. Consequently, good care was taken not to dispute a point so decided, and every effort was directed to the manner

of defining the frontier of 1790, of which we had been solemnly promised an improvement.

M. de Talleyrand had received certain instructions in full royal council. He had been recommended most particularly to try and obtain the million subjects on the north side of France, and not on the southeast,—that is, in Savoy. The house of Savoy, which was about being restored at the same time as the house of Bourbon, was united to Louis XVIII. by the bonds of blood and friendship, and it would be repugnant to his feelings to share in its spoils. Let us add that our ancient frontier needed much more to be strengthened to the north than to the south. M. de Talleyrand was also desired to require the entire restoration of our colonies, and not to consent to any contribution for the expenses of the war.

The idea of obtaining the promised augmentation to the north instead of the south, although inspired by family reason, was very wise. It would be possible, indeed, without exceeding the limit marked by a million souls, to improve our frontier considerably, and render it almost as strong as that of the Rhine, though neither so extensive in territory nor so formidable to our neighbours. And by extending it a little farther, and letting it pass through the following points, Nieuport, Ypres, Courtray, Tournay, Ath, Mons, Namur, Dinant, Givet, Neuchâteau, Arlon, Luxembourg, Sarrelouis, Kaisers-Lautern, and Speyer, we should have gained a frontier not only more extensive, but more solid, since to the noble enclosure of fortresses that we already possessed we should have joined that of the Belgian fortifications. To the celebrated fortress of Luxembourg we should have added the important position of Kaisers-Lautern in the Vosges, and the fortress of Landau on the Rhine. This would have been a certain compensation for the Rhine frontier, and an immense amelioration with regard to our territorial position in 1790. To obtain such a frontier, it would have been worth while to fight more than one battle.

The two negotiators who assisted M. de Talleyrand in these details—M. de Laforest and M. d'Osmond—had with much intelligence traced this new line upon the map. They proposed it in the first meeting of the negotiators, at which M. de Talleyrand was not present, as he reserved himself for an interview in which he would bring his personal influence to bear upon the monarchs and the allied ministers. MM. Laforest and d'Osmond supported their case by means of an ably-written document. In this document they recounted how it had been publicly and repeatedly promised that France should be left great and strong; that it had been formally said that she should be granted an increase of a million inhabitants; and they asserted that unless the allied monarchs desired to destroy all equilibrium, they ought not—considering the manner in which all the other European Powers had aggrandized themselves since the division of Poland—to condemn France to remain as she had been at the end of the last century.

Hardly had the foreign commissioners heard this memoir read, and cast their eyes upon the map, than they exclaimed against our pretensions, and appeared as much surprised as if the thing had been quite unexpected and what

they could not have foreseen. They had only heard, they said, of the frontiers of 1790; they did not know whether there had ever been mention of *de vive voix* of any augmentation whatever; as for them, they now heard of it for the first time, and could find no trace of it in their instructions. The English commissioner alone, entering a little deeper into the subject, showed that the execution of this project would damage Belgium, which would be contrary to the promises made to the Belgians, that their territories should not be parcelled out and given to different masters. Our negotiators replied that if under the rule of Napoleon the Belgians did not feel much desire to belong to France, on account of the conscription and the *droits réunis*, it would be quite different under the Bourbons; that the feeling of the Belgians was totally changed; and that those who should be left to France would never think of objecting, and that the only objection would be from those who should be given up to Holland,—an assertion whose truth was strictly proved, since the Belgians had had the English and German troops among them, and had reflected on what would be their fate under a Protestant Power. Our adversaries did not reply, and did not advance the only reason which could have had any value, namely, that France would by this means gain the Belgian fortresses in addition to her own, and that the future kingdom of the Low Countries would be without a frontier. Their only defence was an exhibition of profound astonishment, and a declaration that our pretensions were so novel, so unforeseen, that it was impossible to discuss them, nobody being prepared for the subject. It was evidently necessary that the meeting should separate, and each member consult his respective chief.

The French commissioners told M. de Talleyrand of the effect produced by their first proposition, and he immediately determined to confer with those persons, monarchs or ministers, who decided sovereignty in European affairs. Promises had indeed been made him at the time of the convention of the 23d of April, when there was a question of evacuating the most important fortresses, but vague promises, which, if contested, would give no ground for exclaiming against a breach of faith, the mere mention of which would seem an offence. Besides deriving all his strength against emigration from the favour of the foreign monarchs, M. de Talleyrand was not sufficiently at his ease to speak to them with that decided energy which would have commanded attention.

M. de Talleyrand had several interviews with Lord Castlereagh, M. de Nesselrode, and M. de Metternich, the three persons who could alone exert any influence in this dispute. Lord Castlereagh represented the Power to which Louis XVIII. had expressed the most gratitude, and from which some return might be expected. But there was none. M. de Talleyrand found the English minister plain-spoken and friendly, but obstinate as the English ever are when their interests are at stake. England wished to found the monarchy of the Low Countries on a firm basis, and this object she hoped to attain by incorporating the entire of Belgium with Holland, and she certainly

would not contribute to weaken the former by depriving her of her fortresses. England never forgot the continental blockade, and was most solicitous to cut us off from the seaboard. Besides, without avowing her motive, she wished by this means to compensate Holland for the colonies of which she was preparing to deprive her, especially for the Cape of Good Hope. Lord Castlereagh was consequently immovable though polite, and spoke in such a manner as not to leave the least hope. An appeal to M. de Nesselrode and M. de Metternich was equally unsuccessful, though neither the one nor the other had the least interest in the affair, for neither Russia nor Austria desired to curtail our possessions in the Low Countries. But M. de Talleyrand saw that M. de Nesselrode took but little interest in the subject, and was an exact reflection of his master's sentiments. The haughtiness of Louis XVIII., and the little desire he showed on different occasions to gratify Russia,—above all, the spirit that seemed to animate the Bourbons,—were extremely disagreeable to Alexander; for example, whilst Louis XVIII. had been so very eager to offer the *Cordon bleu* to the Prince Regent of England, he had not even thought of offering it to the Emperor of Russia, who was, however, the principal cause of Napoleon's downfall and of the restoration of the Bourbons. Alexander entertained a warm affection for M. de Caulaincourt; but when he sought, certainly without this noble-minded gentleman's solicitation, to obtain him some share of the royal favour, Louis scarcely listened to the request. There had been some question of uniting the Duke de Berry to the Archduchess Anne, who was to have been married to Napoleon, but the restored family did not appear very anxious for the union, though it was spoken of from time to time. Alexander had consequently become cool, and said frankly to his allies that he was not certain whether the restoration of the Bourbons was the best service they could have rendered to France and to Europe.

It was evident that no support could be expected from the Russians, and none was obtained. We might have had more hope from the Austrians. If at the new French court it was commonly said that, with all his talent, Alexander had not common sense, and that he was too lavish of his advice; on the other hand, great praise was bestowed on the wisdom and reserve of the Emperor of Austria, who was neither a liberal, nor eager to offer advice to those who did not ask it, and, moreover, he warmly approved of giving as little liberty as possible to the French. It thus happened that for some time Louis XVIII. had been on better terms with Napoleon's father-in-law than with any other of the allied monarchs. M. de Metternich was mild, friendly, and well-disposed toward the Bourbons, who, he said, ought not to be rendered unpopular. Still, he appeared very much embarrassed. Austria had renewed her union with England, her old and constant friend, and this union had become closer since Russia had acquired such a preponderance. She agreed with her on every point, and expected an unreserved assistance from her in the affairs of Italy. Now, England having formally announced her intention of restricting us to the frontiers of 1790, Austria could not

hold a different opinion. M. de Metternich did not deny that his master had no personal reason for refusing us an extension of territory in the direction of Belgium or the Rhenish provinces, but neither did he deny that England's wishes would guide Austria on this point. He did not absolutely deny the promised increase of a million souls, but he said it was only a form of speech, that the million might not have meant more than five hundred thousand, and that in those must be counted Avignon and Montbéliard, which had been added to the territory of 1790; that certainly something might be added toward the north, but, above all, that the augmentation should extend in the direction of Savoy, and that when five hundred thousand souls should have been gained here and there, there was no reason why they should not be reckoned a million; the *amour-propre* of the allies was concerned in the affair, and they would never contradict the French Government, if, in order to make the Bourbons popular, it should be publicly announced that a million inhabitants had been added to the frontiers of 1790.

It was evident that none would support us, for Prussia would either remain neuter or take part against us. She was preparing to introduce the question of money, a point on which she was particularly sensitive, and she did not wish to lose the good will of any of her allies by disobliging them. It was evident that nothing was to be hoped from our conquerors, at least for the present.

Nothing now remained but to refer the subject to the king's council, explain the position of affairs, and await further orders. For some time past a universal and, it must be admitted, an unjust outcry, had been raised against the convention of the 23d of April, by which we had abandoned the greater number of the great European fortresses. In truth, we had made a mistake, and in desiring to put an end to the evils of war we had not shortened the sufferings of the occupied provinces by a single day. But the intention was good, and, moreover, universally approved; but that was forgotten now as well by the impartial as by the prejudiced and discontented portion of the public. But, what is still stranger, these sentiments had penetrated even into the royal council itself, and when M. de Talleyrand had explained the species of insincerity of which he had to complain, almost everybody blamed the convention of the 23d of April, which had deprived us of our pledges,—as if all had not at that time unanimously concurred in the wisdom of the measure. The Duke de Berry, with his accustomed impetuosity, exclaimed,—forgetting that he was blaming his own father—that it was the consequence of the fault committed in so hastily signing the unfortunate armistice. The king looked maliciously at his brother and nephew, and seemed to approve of what had been said by the latter. The Duke d'Artois, deeply affected, said that it was easy to talk of the convention then, but that at the time it was signed the Government had done as well as it could, and that those who blamed would not probably have done better in the same circumstances. This prince might have added that at that time the idea of hastening the evacuation of the

country was the dominant thought of every mind, that a single objection had not been made, either in the council or elsewhere, on the day the convention was signed. He contented himself with exhibiting a profound grief, the grief of a good man, who receives without returning an injury, and it became an established opinion that the cause of France had been sacrificed by signing the convention too precipitately and without compensation. M. de Talleyrand, who was the author of the deed, replied to the attack by cold and disdainful silence.

However, those who blamed the convention of the 23d of April were about to commit a like fault, that is, a fault of precipitation. Since nothing of what had been promised could be obtained, there remained but one possible resource, which was to appeal to the congress that in a few months should decide the great European questions at Vienna. The armistice was sufficient for the present, because it traced a temporary frontier, that of 1790; it stipulated that all parties should retire without hostilities to these frontiers; it restored us three hundred thousand men who could be held in readiness, and if the Powers were in haste to decide those questions that concerned us, they could have no reason to allege for coming to a conclusion about our affairs and at the same time coming to no resolve on what touched themselves. We, on the other hand, could advance an unanswerable reason, which was, that the sacrifices required from France would assume a different aspect according to the use that should be made of the territories abandoned by her; and that, viewed in this light, the whole matter was resolved into a question of the balance of power, and that, consequently, France, before accepting the position prepared for her, ought to learn what was intended for others. No reply could be made to such an argument, and France would have an immense advantage in appearing at Vienna with her fate still undecided, for in the midst of the divisions which would inevitably arise among her oppressors, she might find allies who would help her to obtain better conditions than those she had been offered. Of course, this same reason ought to induce the other Powers to desire an immediate settlement for all that concerned France; but it was a reason that could not be easily avowed, and a little firmness might have induced an adjournment of all the pending questions to Vienna. In any case France need not have signed, and it would have been impossible to compel her.

One man alone, in the royal council, saw the course that ought to be pursued; and that man was General Dessoles. "Why," he said, "conclude to-day? We shall not possess less influence at Vienna because of appearing there without having our fate irrevocably decided: the other Powers will certainly not be able to decide about the portion each will wish to have; they will have need of us, and we will consequently find allies. There are therefore some chances of our receiving better treatment, and there is no possibility of our receiving worse." This observation, so pregnant with wisdom, was not comprehended by any present, because that minds filled by a domi-

nant prejudice refuse admittance to the simplest ideas. To conclude and publish a peace, to allow the country to enjoy its fruits, and assume to themselves the honour of the deed, was the passion of the moment, as the passion of the previous moment had been to obtain the evacuation of France. And yet, if there were any means of repairing the fault of over-precipitation committed on the 23d of April, it would be by a wise tardiness at the actual juncture, and the courage to defer for six months the conclusion so eagerly urged at the present moment. M. de Talleyrand was ordered to yield to necessity, and to change the line of demarcation drawn up by our commissioners. The line in advance of the Belgian fortresses once abandoned, the frontier question lost all its importance. There now only remained to consider some amendments, which would give our frontier a more regular outline, and obtain us an increase of some hundred thousand inhabitants, together with two or three third-class fortresses, but none equal in value to Mons, Namur, or Luxembourg.

After several days' discussion, these unimportant rectifications were accorded us, nor were they to be despised. In 1790 our frontier line formed a sweep between Mauberge and Givet, leaving Givet at the angle. The line now traced from Mauberge to Givet, being made slightly convex, effaced the sweep, and gave us two additional fortresses.—Philippeville and Marienburg. Leaving Luxembourg without the line, it was continued to Sarre, in such a manner as to preserve us Sarre-Louis. In a word, without reaching the important point of Kaisers-Lautern, a medium course was taken between the line that we demanded and that of 1790, following the course of the Queich, by which we obtained an addition of some importance; for Landau, instead of being isolated, as formerly, in the midst of the German territory, was completely united to ours.

These augmentations, together with Montbéliard and Avignon, which the allied monarchs did not wish to give either to the Germanic Empire or to Rome, did not give us half the promised million souls, of which we were only allowed to speak on condition of resigning our claim. The deficiency was sought to the east and south; that is, in Switzerland and Savoy. We got some part of the country of Gex, around Geneva; then, tracing a line that divided Savoy in two, we obtained Chambéry and Annecy. This frontier was of much less value than that demanded by our commissioners, and which we might have claimed in compensation for what we had lost; but, such as it was, it was a little better than that of 1790, to which we have since been condemned in punishment of the events of 1815. These difficulties being got rid of,—thanks to our compliance,—others might arise on the subject of the general European arrangements, from which an effort had been made to exclude us by the treaty of Châtillon,—a proceeding for which no excuse existed since the re-establishment of the Bourbons. Undoubtedly the desire to exclude us was still the same; but those who entertained it dared not avow the wish. Some general expressions were invented, which formed very vague guarantees as to the

future balance of power in Europe. They were as follows:—

"The German States shall be independent, and united by a federal union.

"Holland shall be placed under the sovereignty of the house of Orange, and receive an increase of territory. It shall never pass under the rule of a foreign prince.

"Independent Switzerland shall continue to govern herself.

"Italy, except those portions restored to Austria, shall be composed of sovereign states."

But touching these European arrangements, announced in so summary a manner, there was one point not immediately made public, and that was the proportions in which the territories taken from France should be distributed among the principal co-sharers. We had the mournful honour of receiving this confidence; but in secret articles, intended rather to shackle our actions than to give weight to our influence. These articles were as follows:—

"Holland shall receive the countries ceded by France between the sea, the French frontier of 1790, and the Meuse."

"The countries yielded by France on the left bank of the Rhine shall serve as compensation for the German States."

"The Austrian possessions in Italy shall be imaged by the Po, the Tessino, and the Lago Maggiore."

"The King of Sardinia shall be indemnified for the portion of Savoy ceded to France by the possession of the ancient republic of Genoa."

Thus, by these articles, all Belgium was to be given to Holland; Bavaria was to receive a part of the ancient ecclesiastical electorates, in exchange for the Tyrol, which was to be restored to Austria; Austria, besides her ancient possessions, was to have all the territory of the Venetian Republic; lastly, the kingdom of Sardinia was to absorb Genoa: and thus the number of independent states would be considerably diminished. Not a word was said of Saxony or Poland; for that was a subject on which nobody dared to touch, so much avidity was anticipated on one side, and so much resistance on the other.

It only remained to decide about the colonies. There it seemed we should be compensated for our sacrifice on the continent, and that if we did not obtain an increase we should not at least suffer any diminution. The restitution of our colonies ought, so to speak, to follow as a matter of course. But we had not yet reached the term of our sacrifices, and, as M. de Laforest, one of our negotiators, said, "Wormwood was poured forth for us drop by drop."

Martinique and Guadaloupe were first mentioned, the latter was to be taken from Sweden and restored to us; Bourbon, in the Indian seas, was also mentioned; and these were spoken of with confidence, and as possessions of whose restoration there could be no doubt. But nothing was said of the Isle of France, that Malta of the Indian Ocean. What was to be done with it we were not told. At last an explanation was given. That Power which had taken the Cape of Good Hope from her ally, Holland, which by a positive breach of faith had deprived Europe of Malta, declared that she must have the Isle of France, because it was the route to India. We were allowed to keep the Isle of Bour-

bon, however, because it lay quite open; but the Isle of France, the great fortress of these seas, England was to have that. What could we oppose to such pretensions, when we had not a single ally?—when the only one that we might have gained, the Emperor of Russia, had been offended by us, and annoyed both in important and trifling matters? Our only resource would have been to break off the treaty, and at Vienna appeal with indignation to assembled Europe against these repeated refusals to do us justice; to appeal to Europe, that would be then enlightened by a careful inquiry into all these questions, and still more by the shameless display of such unlicensed ambition. Unfortunately, such a proceeding was not even thought of.

These new exactions were made known to the Royal Council, and the consternation there was general. It was then seen what it was to be dependent on foreigners, or on their generosity. The English had also announced their intention of depriving us of some of the Antilles, such as Sainte Lucie and Tobago, which were of little consequence in comparison with the Isle of France. Louis XVIII., who did not foresee the value that the Isle of Bourbon would acquire by the development of commerce, said, with apparent justice, "What could we do with Bourbon without the Isle of France? It is like giving us a fortress without the citadel that commands it. Let them take, if they will, Bourbon with the Isle of France, and leave us what we possess of the Antilles." These reflections contained some justice; but to whom were they to be addressed? who could be made to listen? Nothing remained but to yield, or obey, to the inspirations of despair.

We had recourse to private communications with Lord Castlereagh, who decided on all maritime affairs, and indeed on almost all continental questions. M. de Talleyrand found him calm, and even gentle, but obstinate and immovable as a rock. He gained nothing. M. de Vitrolles, endowed with less self-command, had a stormy interview with this minister, and obtained nothing but an almost cynical avowal of Britain's ambition. "Every position on the route to India," said Lord Castlereagh, "ought to belong to us, and shall belong to us." M. de Vitrolles recalled the fine-sounding declarations that had been made at the passage of the Rhine, and still more recently at the gates of Paris, declarations that promised to respect France and her dignity, and only deprive her of what she had taken from others, and which in her hands had become dangerous to the public security. Lord Castlereagh seemed to think that the Powers had fulfilled their promises when they did not treat France as Poland had formerly been treated.

Again we were obliged to submit; for there was no means of resisting those unbridled ambitions all leagued against us. Only one reflection could suggest itself in contemplating such deeds, a reflection of which our oppressors took little heed; and it was that by acting thus they rendered Napoleon much less guilty in the eyes of the world, and the Bourbons less popular in those of France.

There remained but one question to be decided,—an important question, too, and most humiliating should it be decided against us;

this was the question of the expenses of the war. Only one of the belligerent Powers—Prussia—had pretensions on this point, which left us some chance of escaping oppressive exactions. During the last twenty years our armies had visited all the European Powers, and inflicted on them all the evils attendant on the presence of an enemy; but it must be allowed that Prussia suffered more than any other. She expected to be compensated, not only for the contributions which Napoleon had imposed upon her, but for the effects of our presence on her territories during the campaign of 1812. She consequently demanded, besides the restitution of the deeds representing the unpaid expenses, and which amounted to one hundred and forty million francs, deposited in the *domaine extraordinaire*, an indemnity of one hundred and thirty-two millions, exclusive of the share she claimed in the sale of our arsenals and magazines. Prussia had, undeniably, suffered a great deal during our long wars; but if we call to mind that she took the initiative in the aggressions of 1792, merely for the sake of interfering in our home concerns; that in 1806 she abandoned herself to the wildest passion against France; and that, quite recently, during the invasion, the conduct of her soldiers had been most odious; it must be admitted that the wrongs between her and France had been mutual. We were, therefore, less disposed to yield to her demands than to those of any other Power. Her king—honest, but avaricious—held as firmly to the demands for money that he had made, as Austria for the Italian, as England for the maritime provinces. We were presented with Prussia's bill, and requested to look over it, and if we did not receive a summary demand for payment, we heard language that very much resembled it.

M. de Talleyrand peremptorily repelled these demands, and declared that he neither could nor would subscribe to them. He referred the matter immediately to the royal council. None would suffer it, and that sensation of despair was, at last, felt to which the ministers had been more than once on the point of yielding. The king expressed an indignation that was shared in by everybody, and said that he would spend three hundred millions in making war on Prussia, rather than spend one hundred in satisfying her demands. He added that he knew how desirous France was of peace, and how much this desire had influenced the reception given to him and his family; but he knew that she would not brook the excess of degradation now sought to be inflicted on her, and would not take it ill of him if he resisted strangers who thus abused the facility with which they had been received; and that for his part, far from thinking himself ungrateful toward the cabinets of Europe, he believed them to be ungrateful toward him; for the Bourbons had been as useful in effecting their entrance into France, as they had been to the Bourbons in procuring their restoration to the throne. He, therefore, declared that he decidedly refused the new burden that the allied sovereigns wished to impose upon his subjects.

The entire council applauded this resolution, and again deplored the unfortunate convention of the 23d of April. The Duke de Berry exclaimed that, with the garrisons and the re-

turned prisoners, the king would have 300,000 men; that he ought to put himself at their head and fall upon the allies, who had but 200,000, and that this act of patriotic despair would forever secure to the Bourbons the affections of the French people. M. de Talleyrand did not say no, but contented himself with remarking that the 300,000 men, with whom it was proposed to attack the allies, were owed to the much-abused convention of the 23d of April.

M. de Talleyrand, whilst decidedly refusing the demands of Prussia, still felt that the project of 300,000 French attacking 200,000 foreigners was a serious matter, for the general who knew how to lead the French to victory was in the isle of Elba: so he determined to try whether the voice of reason would not be listened to. He had an interview with Lord Castlereagh, the Emperor of Russia, and M. de Metternich. He told them that the king and the princes were determined to let the treaty of peace be wrecked on this question, whatever might be the consequences; that, besides, it was compromising for a miserable pecuniary consideration, not alone the great work of the restoration of peace, but also the restoration of order in Europe, for there was not a sovereign in Europe who was not deeply interested in the security of Louis XVIII. on his throne; that to humiliate the Bourbons in this manner, to render them unpopular, would be to act against the aim the allies had proposed to themselves; and to sacrifice such important interests to the avarice of Prussia was neither wise, dignified, nor honourable. Lord Castlereagh, who was always reasonable with the Low Countries, the Cape of Good Hope, or the Mauritius was not in question, and M. de Metternich, who was always ready to judge the conduct of Prussia without any flattering illusions, agreed with M. de Talleyrand. The Emperor Alexander, whose delicacy shrank at the avarice of his friend Frederick William, was of the same opinion, and all three forced Prussia to yield. The spirit of economy was in this prince a virtue that had degenerated into a vice, and he was capable of acting most unwisely, to gratify a passion that was originally the offspring of wisdom.

The contribution to Prussia was thus avoided. There still remained the common contribution founded on the right of conquest applied to the arsenals, the magazines, and other property of the state. According to the convention of the 23d of April, the foreign armies ought on the very day of the signing of this convention to have given up the administration of the occupied provinces, nor ought they to have levied further contributions, nor large retained any of our public property. But they pretended that for military effects, for captured magazines, for contributions levied but unpaid, and for wood ordered to be cut down in the state forests, there was due to them a sum which they did not blush to estimate at one hundred and eighty-two millions. Of this sum, Prussia claimed the largest part; England asked nothing, for if this latter Power had been severe where territory was concerned, she was remarkably easy in money matters. For example, the Duke of Wellington's troops observed perfect discipline, in the south, and

showed a scrupulous respect for all property both public and private. It was evident that in treating with England we had to do with a great nation, ambitious but not avaricious.

The king's council showed equal firmness concerning this other ill-cloaked contribution of war. Lord Castlereagh and M. de Nesselrode supported M. de Talleyrand; two French commissioners, General Dulauroy and Baron Marchand, charged with this arrangement, defended the French interests with great firmness, and it was finally agreed that we should pay a sum of twenty-five millions, which, according to the laws of war, was very nearly due.

The division of the naval armaments found in the ports yielded by France was deferred to the definite negotiation of peace. It is certain that all this *matériel*, consisting of twenty-five ships of the line afloat, and twenty on the stocks, besides a considerable number of smaller vessels, and a large quantity of stores dispersed in the ports of Hamburg, Bremen, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Antwerp, Flushing, Ostend, Genoa, Leghorn, Corfu, and Venice; it is certain, we say, that all this *matériel* had been procured with French money, that the labour and materials needed for the ships had been paid for, which was an advantage and not a burden, since the people had been employed, and a market opened for the products of the locality. The only exception was the Dutch fleet, built before the union with the Empire, and which should in justice be restored to the Low Countries. It was therefore stipulated that this fleet should be restored unconditionally, but that of the forty-six ships and other vessels of inferior rank, dispersed in the above-mentioned ports, two-thirds should belong to France, and one-third to the different maritime localities where they lay. This decision was not quite just, but the loss was not much to be regretted, as France had in her own ports a larger naval force than she could employ.

The last question remained to be decided, that of our museums. The subject had never been mentioned, and the omission was intentional. The sovereigns were accustomed to visit them daily, to admire them in the state in which Napoleon had left them, that is to say, containing the riches of civilized Europe, and they had almost considered it a duty to respect collections where they had been received with so much warmth and for which they had expressed so much admiration. Besides, this was a question that principally concerned Southern Italy and Spain, for both of which Powers but little interest was felt by the allied monarchs, but the pride of France was at stake, and that must not be wounded. We were thus left the master-pieces conquered by our armies, left them, as one may say, by preterition, by neglecting to speak of them. But in private conversations, much stress was laid on the important concession thus made us, and it had, indeed, a considerable moral influence.

This labour, called the Treaty of Paris, was terminated on the 30th of May, and consisted of several deeds, identical but separate, signed by England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, who became security for all Europe.

Sweden was joined to these signatures, on account of Guadeloupe, which she had for a short while possessed, and Portugal because of the portion of Guiana that was restored to us. The peace with Spain was to be arranged separately, as this Power had no representative at Paris, owing to the position of Ferdinand VII., who had not yet made his entry into Madrid. Besides, the peace with Spain, thanks to the Pyrenees, could be more easily concluded than any other.

However much the excellent frontier was to be regretted, that we might have had in the direction of the Low Countries in compensation for that of the Rhine, and which might have been obtained either by not having so precipitately signed the armistice of the 23d of April, or by referring the definite conclusion of peace to the Congress at Vienna, still this treaty, called the Treaty of Paris, was not so disadvantageous as had been apprehended. We were exempted from paying the expenses of the war; we preserved the immense riches in works of art acquired at the cost of our blood; we had gained, in addition to our possessions of 1790, Philippeville and Marienbourg near the low countries, Landau in the direction of the Rhine, and one-half of Savoy in the direction of the Alps. The Isle of France was the only serious loss, and could not fail to affect our commerce. The Treaty of Paris could only be considered unfortunate in comparison with those of Campo-Formio and Lunéville, which, without menacing the peace of Europe, seemed to have definitely assured our geographical frontier; and in reflecting that but for the faults of the Empire these acquisitions might have been permanent, the sorrow of France ought to be universal and profound. We shall see presently what effect the treaty of the 30th of May produced on the public mind.

It was proposed to publish the conditions of the peace at the same time as the constitution, the framing of which had not been suspended during the negotiations. The allied monarchs, who were desirous of returning to their own dominions, wished to see all the affairs of France concluded at once, and insisted that Louis XVIII. should fulfil the engagements of St. Ouen, for which they considered themselves in a certain degree responsible, especially toward those who had surrendered to the allies in the hope of being protected from the passions of the emigrants. The drawing up of the constitution was consequently continued with great activity and in a spirit of liberality truly meritorious on the part of Louis XVIII., especially when one considers the opinions of the royalist party at that period.

The royalists were not more deficient in talent than others, but they had not studied things in their essence, and did not possess the information that springs from such studies. It was only in the very lowest ranks of the revolutionary party that one could find such narrow and such obstinate prejudices. In the old military nobility there existed a blind hatred of every thing that had arisen in France during the last thirty years, and the conviction that the old regime ought to be re-established by force. The parliamentary nobility, better informed but not more enlight-

ened, could only understand a constitution, such as that of the ancient parliaments, which sometimes contradicted but never checked the king. Among the most distinguished royalists, those whom misfortune and inaction had rendered studious, the love of the past and the hatred of the present had been systematized and formed into singular theories under the influence of M. de Bonald, an excellent but paradoxical writer, who possessed the rather rare merit of developing false ideas in a healthy style. These theories, the inevitable and merited reaction consequent on the excesses of the French Revolution, consisted especially in a profound contempt for written constitutions, which were pronounced to be one of the most impertinent vanities of the modern mode of thinking. It is true, that when we consider the fate of the numerous constitutions which had been put forth in writing during the previous seventy years, we cannot help concurring in the opinion expressed by the royalists. However, these feelings carried beyond a certain degree possessed their own share of vanity and impertinence. For example, M. de Bonald's disciples asserted that constitutions ought not to be written; that, being the offspring of time and not of man, they, like the great works of nature, ought to grow gradually, sometimes taking the form of written laws, but being more frequently the result of custom, traditions, and habits, and that all these combined circumstances, constituting the idiosyncrasies of a nation, formed its true constitution, the only one that would not pass away like a dream. Starting from this principle, they asserted that the ancient France had had a constitution, which had endured for centuries, whilst the constitutions devised since 1789 had succeeded each other like the waves of an enraged sea. The embarrassment of these gentlemen was great when asked to define this constitution, which consisted of an absolute monarch sometimes contradicted by the parliament, from whose expostulations he escaped by having recourse to the *lit de justice* or the Bastille; assembling the States-General once in a century and obliged to dismiss them immediately after, and so little capable of profiting of these institutions when involved in either political or financial difficulties, that it was in consequence of seeking to bring them into operation that the deplorable disorders of 1789 had come to pass. And in fact, what had this so much boasted constitution produced, when set to work in 1787 by the convocation of the notables, and in 1789 by the assembly of the States-General? the French Revolution.

It was certainly a strange idea to eulogize a constitution which had produced such results. Great would have been the confusion of its admirers, had a proposal been made to re-establish this constitution. Where were the nobility, the clergy, the parliament, the *tiers état*, the nation of 1789? Instead of a wealthy nobility enjoying many privileges, and holding all the high military employments, there was left only a scattered, half-ruined nobility, that had no other means of becoming rich than by the consequences of the French Revolution; strangers to the army, by whom they

were not loved and whom they did not love, (we speak of 1814,) and possessing, in a word, no influence; instead of a clergy, proprietors of landed property, noble, eloquent, talented, and at that time of such distinguished merit that the clergy furnished France her ablest statesmen and greatest ministers; instead of such men there was now a clergy poor, restricted to the discharge of professional duties, taken from every class of society, and entirely dependent upon the Government: instead of an opulent hereditary magistracy who enjoyed the administrative functions, as the nobility did the military, by privilege, and who were competent to the discharge of these functions, — instead of these we had a magistracy exclusively selected from among the citizens of moderate fortune, and appointed like the other functionaries by the executive power, upright, but incapable of offering other resistance than a rigorous observance of the civil laws: and, in short, underlying all this was a people entirely transformed, that had attained a sort of absolute unity, no longer admitting distinctions of class, or recognising privileges, having all the same ideas, the same habits, the same ambition: such was France in 1814, and its systematic royalists would have been sadly embarrassed if, taken at their word, they had been charged to reconstruct the old constitution. They would be as embarrassed as an architect who, having full liberty to build upon what plan he pleased, should be condemned to employ materials that were nowhere to be found.

All these theories were in reality only satires on the French Revolution, often indeed just, and even eloquent, when they were directed against its excesses, but vain as the wailing or regret for that which is no more, when they tended to the re-establishment of a past that no power on earth could call back from annihilation.

Among these adversaries of written constitutions, even those who were most deficient in practical sense, when they were asked to decide and commence the work, declared, as everybody did, for a limited enlightened monarchy restrained and strongly influenced by the Chambers; in short, what is called an English monarchy, because the English were the first who established this form of government. These royalists only desired to gather from the vast rubbish of the old edifice a certain number of ancient materials more or less recognisable, and make them figure in the new building. Thus, they wished that the ancient nobility and clergy should be restored and formed into a Chamber of Peers, and that the Lower Chamber should consist of those who formerly constituted the *tiers état*, divided into classes according to their trades. Thus far and no further went the pretensions of those who were compelled to emerge from their perpetual lamentation over the past. But this would have been to impose upon themselves the task of recovering and recombining the destroyed elements, which would have presented a ridiculous contrast with modern society, and shattered that great national unity in which consists the strength of modern France; and it would have been a profitless insult to the existing spirit of equal-

y, for the advantage of a system that could produce no beneficial result, for the Chambers thus constituted would have put forward as strong pretensions as the others, and would have as certainly struggled with the monarch or ascendancy,—a struggle that would have terminated as fatally under such conditions as it had done under others, did the monarch conduct himself in the same manner. In fact, that these royalists desired would be a kind of modern edifice, bearing on its front some ornaments of the middle ages, which would give no real influence on the construction, arrangement, or destiny of the monument.

There was, therefore, nothing serious in these theories, which were only the prejudices of the past, systematized, too late, by some ancient and melancholy minds. It must be admitted, however, that the king and his nephews, obliged to be more practical than their party, and fortunately having just returned from England and not from one of the continental states, did not share in these false notions, or, if they did, acted as though they did not. Without fully acknowledging, and above all, without admiring the empire of public opinion, they were determined not to come in contact with its strongest points. Now, there were two points, which no power on earth could induce public opinion to yield,—first, civil equality, which consists in every one enjoying in the eyes of the law the same rights, and being liable to the discharge of the same duties, in paying the same taxes, performing the same military service, being judged according to the same laws, by the same judges, being eligible to the same public employments, whatever the birth, religion, or fortune of the individual; secondly, constitutional royalty, that is, limited monarchy, restricted more or less by two Chambers. The first of these opinions was the work of the eighteenth century, the second, the result of Napoleon's despotism: both were invincible.

Nothing now remained to be considered but questions of form or style. As to the form, the Bourbons, as we have seen, had brought with them into France an almost insurmountable prejudice. Pretending that they were called to the throne not by an act of the senate, but in virtue of their own right, they wished to *grant* and not *receive* a constitution, and on this point the public, foreseeing as little as the dynasty the danger of this absolute principle, which involved the power of modifying this *granted* constitution, was prepared to admit a pretension that only seemed subtlety of theory, or an affair of self-love. Provided that the essential principles of the constitution were granted, the public cared little whether the constitution proceeded from the king or the Senate, whether it came from above or below. Once arrived at this point, all things must go on smoothly.

The king had confided the task of drawing a sketch of the constitution to MM. de Montesquieu and Ferrand, certain that the only principle by which he was firmly attached, monarchical supremacy, would not be in danger in the hands of those old royalists. As to the other points, he felt more confidence in his deputies than in himself, for he cared little about the matter: with these gentlemen he

associated M. Beugnot, who possessed an easy and facile style, and knew how to choose expressions calculated to conciliate conflicting opinions. He recommended M. de Beugnot to observe the most absolute secrecy toward M. de Talleyrand. Although more inclined than kings in general to allow his ministers to govern, still Louis XVIII. was not desirous of the presence of a minister who wished to interfere in every thing. He wished M. de Talleyrand to confine himself to foreign affairs, M. de Montesquieu to occupy himself with the home department, and M. de Blacas to devote his attention to affairs of the court; he hoped thus to diminish by dividing the power of his ministers. Neither did he wish that in case of difficulty M. de Talleyrand should call the Emperor Alexander to his assistance, and, influenced by all these reasons, he did not wish him to have any part in the formation of the constitution.

The sketch of the constitution being made was submitted to Louis XVIII., who without making any or scarcely any alteration referred it, conformably to the declaration of Saint-Ouen, to two committees, one appointed by the Senate and one by the legislative corps. The committee appointed by the Senate was composed of MM. Barthélemy, Serrurier, (the Marshal,) Barbé-Marbois, de Fontanes, Germain Garnier, de Pastoret, de Sémonville, Boissy d'Anglas, and Vimar. The committee appointed by the legislative corps was composed of MM. Lainé, Felix Fauleon, Chabaud-Latour, Bois-Savary, Duhamel, Duchesne de Gillevoisin, Faget de Baure, Clausel de Coussergues, Blanquart de Bailloul. No objection could be made to these persons, who corresponded to the moderate and liberal ideas of the time. The king recommended as much unity as possible in their labours, and reserved to himself the decision of all contested points, more for the honour of his prerogative than for the value of the things themselves.

The chancellor laid the subject before the two committees assembled at the Chancery, read the plan, and then commenced the discussion of the different articles.

In drawing up this plan, great care had been taken to use expressions which would show that the new constitution emanated from royalty alone, from royalty understanding the wants of the time, and acting under the impulse of its own wisdom, as it had already done in emancipating the *communes*, in instituting the parliaments, in reforming the civil legislation. Consequently, no mention was made of the return of the Bourbons to the throne, the causes of this return, the nature of the monarchical principle, or its hereditary descent from male to male in order of primogeniture, all of which subjects were spoken of in the constitution of the Senate. M. Boissy d'Anglas remarked this circumstance, and regretted it as an omission injurious to the interests of royalty. He was told immediately, and without hesitation, that these omissions were intentional, that the right of the Bourbons to the throne needed no enunciation, that it existed anterior to every other right, and that even when absent and physically replaced by usurpation in France, they still had not ceased to reign there; neither did the

principle and manner of inheritance require to be mentioned, for they were coexistent with the ancient constitution of the French monarchy; that the question at issue was merely the modification of certain parts of this constitution, and granting the French people some rights not formerly recognised; that, therefore, it was only necessary to announce the new enactments, without occupying themselves with those which, amidst all the vicissitudes of time, had not ceased virtually to exist.

M. de Fontanes, anxious to efface the memory of the services he had rendered Napoleon by his compliance with the wishes of the Bourbons, hastened to support this doctrine, saying that the origin of power ought to be allowed to remain wrapped in shadows, in order to preserve its venerable antiquity; endeavouring to approach too near the source would be to destroy the reverence it inspired. As if a *prestige* once destroyed could be restored at will, or by convention. These remarks elicited no reply, and silence was certainly the most prudent part. Assuredly the committees ought, had it been possible, even for the sake of the dynasty itself, to have insisted on these omissions being supplied, in order to deprive the Bourbons of the means of one day breaking the contract that bound them to the nation. But how could the future, which no one penetrated at that time, be unveiled for them?—that future hidden alike from the restored dynasty and those who sought to limit its rule.

The examination of the different articles of the constitution was then proceeded with. The first referred to what was called the public rights of the French, consisting of equality in the eyes of the law, of the equitable divisions of public employments, individual liberty, liberty of conscience, liberty of the press, respect for all kinds of property, equality in the form of military service, and finally a complete oblivion for all acts and opinions since 1789. On the greater number of these points there was no difference of opinion. However, there was a discussion about some, and even in some cases a change of form. After admitting an equal protection to every form of worship, it was added that the Catholic religion was the religion of the state. MM. Boissy d'Anglas and Chabaud-Latour desired that the meaning of these words should be defined, and asked what they meant,—if, for example, they did not give some advantage of position to the Catholic religion, and whether the other forms of worship would not be placed in a sort of dependence by this advantage. They were told that France was Catholic and must not fear to avow her religion. It was then purely and simply an act of deference to the Catholic faith, a sort of apology to that creed for the equality granted to the other forms of worship. No objection was made, for nothing would have been gained by discussion. There was scarce any discussion on the question of individual liberty and the liberty of the press. As to the liberty of the press, all were of opinion that it ought to be granted, only restraining the excesses into which the press was only too much inclined to run. At this period, for want of experience, nobody thought of the distinction which was afterward esta-

blished between newspapers and books, nor did any one think of submitting either to a preliminary examination,—that is, to a censorship.

The respect promised to property, no matter whence derived, was the most important question of the day. It concerned, as may be divined, the property called *national*, which was no other than the confiscated property of the emigrants or that taken from the Church, and which had been sold at different periods of the Revolution for larger or smaller sums according to the state of the times, and so passed into the possession of millions of Frenchmen. The anxiety of the possessors was natural, when they beheld the emigrants, proud of their triumph, confident in their strength, and very much irritated against the detainers of their property, which had in many cases been purchased at a merely nominal price, sometimes for a handful of worthless assignats, and not unfrequently obtained by dishonourable means. But the tranquillity of the kingdom depended on maintaining the validity of these sales, and neither the king nor the princes entertained a doubt on the subject. Their desire to see the emigrants in possession of their property was not inferior to that of the emigrants themselves, but the certainty of an immediate political convulsion restrained them, and the king had consented to this clear and positive announcement:—“*All property is inviolable, not excepting that called national, the law recognising no difference.*”

This mode of expression was perfectly satisfactory, and better could not be desired. But it was too significant for some members of the committee, who, on this occasion, revealed the secret designs of the royalist party, and, especially, the *ruse* by which this party wished to escape from the necessity that weighed upon the Bourbons, and which was the chief condition of their return. M. de Fontanes, pursuing the expiatory system on which he had entered, exclaimed warmly against the proposed enactment. According to him, custom had established a marked difference between patrimonial property and that called *national*; and if this difference existed essentially, how could the law dare assert that none ought to be made? Until this time even the laws of the Revolution had confined themselves to proclaiming the inviolability of national property, but they had never carried their zeal so far as to seek to give it a moral value which it did not possess. What folly, then, to choose the very day on which the Bourbons returned to France to render still worse the condition of these unfortunate persons who had been stripped of their property?

It was easy to reply that these unfortunate persons—not all, indeed, but a great many—had fought against their country, and that, therefore, they could not inspire an unreserved interest; and that the return of the Bourbons naturally exciting their hopes, it was necessary to choose the moment of that return for strengthening the guarantees given to the purchasers of national property. However, the authors of this project were silent, as if to show that they yielded to the necessity of the times, whilst cursing it in their hearts. But M. Lainé rent the veil. He had warmly

sed the cause of liberty twenty years ago, and, like many others, had been utterly repulsed by the excesses of the Revolution, so far as almost to adopt the sentiments of the emigrants themselves. "Let us speak frankly," said he; "let us admit that just humour the holders of national property, —but even whilst humouring them we are desirous that the property they possess should return to its ancient owners. Morality, justice, and the true monarchical spirit, dictate these wishes. Now, this cannot be effected without compromises between the old and new proprietors. Such compromises are being made in many quarters, and they are the effect of public opinion on the new proprietors. Then, seek to lessen the moral force that urges them to make restitution?"

It was simply announcing a wish to inate new proprietors into yielding the property they held to its ancient owners, for a trifling sum. Among the actual holders of property there were certainly some who had purchased for almost nothing; but

they had paid ready money, and at a rate reaching the full value. Besides, thousands of sales had already transferred a great part of this property into new hands, and almost all equal to its full value. The project, therefore, of restoring this property to its ancient proprietors was morally unjust, as well as politically unwise.

Those who had drawn up the plan of the constitution persisted in remaining silent.

M. Beugnot, Minister of State, Commissioner of Police, and compiler of the article under discussion, spoke in its defence. He did so by the reports which he daily received, that degree the indiscreet hopes of the emigrants had become serious threats for the holders of national property; and he gave such a description of the present state of affairs as seriously alarmed the two assembled committees.

However, he could not have carried his point if he had not used a subterfuge. The series of general guarantees contained the article said, "The state can exact the sacrifice of property for the public benefit, if such benefit is proved, but with a previous indemnity."

He placed this article immediately before the one in dispute, and he presented it, as though it would hereafter give opening for an indemnity that the state would pay to the ancient proprietors. This subterfuge, which was only a pretext for a reason for others, terminated the discussion, and the proposed form was adopted.

In this series of general claims and duties were joined the article relative to the military duty, to which every citizen was bound. The expedient already employed for the abolition of the conscription was adopted, in passing a law intended to define, at a later date, the mode of recruiting, which would gradually bring back the old form without its evils, which resulted less from the nature of the institution than from the character of the government called upon to employ it.

The general claims being once decided, the subject to be considered was the form the government was to assume. Upon this point there was not a single dissentient

voice, excepting when extreme measures were proposed. An inviolable king, intrusted with the entire executive power, was universally admitted, and who was represented by ministers responsible to two Chambers of different origin. Whilst the emigrants cherished the most extravagant ideas, the men of the Revolution—emigrants of another kind—did not entertain juster notions; and still fervent adorers of the constitution of 1791 desired but a single Chamber. There was not a man in either of the committees, or among enlightened persons, who entertained these opinions. There was, therefore, no discussion on this point. The fourteenth article, which gave the king the right of regulating the execution of the laws, was taken in its natural and simple sense; and although these words were added,—"for the safety of the state,"—it did not imply that the king should use the regulative power in order to place himself above the executive and be able to overturn the constitution when he pleased. Nobody had any other idea than to accord to the royal power the initiative in all measures of defence at home and abroad,—a privilege which necessarily belonged to the king,—and to unite the regulative power with the executive, which is not less indispensable, the laws, however perfect they may be, leaving a number of details to be regulated, which must of necessity be abandoned to the authority charged with their execution. The dictatorship was not perfidiously concealed in the fourteenth article, because, we repeat, it was drawn up in all simplicity and good faith.

There was one question, that of initiative legislation, to which at that time much more importance was attached than there would be nowadays, because experience had not yet shown that the true initiative for a country is to be able to appoint to the ministry the men of its own choice. Ministers appointed in this way introduce those laws of which a country has most need. At the period of which we speak, the initiative was highly prized, the royalists wishing to secure the privilege for the king, the liberals for the two Chambers. To deprive the Chambers utterly of the initiative, as was proposed, and reduce their power simply to the privilege of adopting or rejecting the measures proposed by the king, appeared even to the authors of the projected constitution a rigorous proceeding. To get rid of this embarrassment that everybody, even the royal commissioners themselves, seemed to feel, a compromise was proposed. This consisted of giving the Chambers the power of addressing the king and requesting him to present the sketch of the proposed laws, with the certainly wise precaution of requiring that the request should not be transmitted to the crown until it had received the assent of both Chambers. It was the initiative itself under a very respectful form, which neither diminished its value nor its authority.

The right of amending the laws submitted to the consideration of the Chambers was thus in some degree ameliorated, but this right could only be exercised after being discussed in the *bureaux* and after the consent of the ministers or royal commissioners was obtained. In all cases, it was the privilege of the king to

ratify the law. These precautions against the right of amendment were superfluous, for discussing laws without the power of modifying them is but a useless expenditure of time. To leave the Chambers no choice between absolute adoption or rejection, was reducing them to extremities, and destroying that spirit of debate which ought to be the actuating spirit of a free country. Besides, the definite sanction being vested in the crown guaranteed the royal prerogative in its full extent.

The changes made in the plan of the constitution by the two committees were, as a matter of course, to be submitted to Louis XVIII., and could only be inserted in the series of articles after receiving his consent. The four royal commissioners presented these amendments to the king, and he admitted them without difficulty, saying that he wished the plan should be as far as possible unanimously approved by the two committees.

Instead of a Senate, it was resolved that the upper Chamber should be a Chamber of Peers, to correspond better with the old French monarchy, it being understood that the king should select from the Senate, not all the members, but those who by their services, their reputation or position, could appear without objection in the new order of things, and that even those members who were not elected should still preserve their salaries. It was decided that the princes should be peers by right of birth. At the suggestion of M. de Semonville, who, from a desire to please, plainly meant the Duke of Orleans, it was decreed that the princes could not take their seats without the king's express permission. As this precaution was contained in the original plan, it was necessary to refer it to Louis XVIII., who simply approved it, without making any sarcastic remark on the prince against whom the measure was directed.

The second Chamber was called the Chamber of Deputies. It was to be composed for the present, and until remodelled, of the entire legislative corps, which, as we have seen, had won the royal approbation, because the legislative corps was jealous of the Senate, and because it had shown more zeal for the Bourbons. It was decided that the deputies should be chosen from the communal of the different wards by electors qualified to vote by the payment of taxes to the amount of 3000 francs: the qualification of the candidates consisting in the payment of taxes to the amount of 1000 francs. Many questions arose on this point. In the first place, should there be a property qualification for the electors and the candidates, and what was to be the amount of the qualification? Nobody hesitated as to the electors. There were doubts about the property tax. M. Felix Faulcon, a worthy man, and much respected, who had for twenty-five years occupied a seat in our assemblies, objected to the property qualification for candidates, and cited himself as an example of the difficulties that would arise from such a condition, for he did not pay the required amount of taxes. His observations were rejected, but with all the deference due to his character, and it was replied that in giving liberty to a country guarantees should be sought among the holders of property, and in their hands should be

placed this novel and capricious liberty, of which the perilous trial was now about to be made. These reasons prevailed. There now remained to be considered the nature of the qualification. The expression *contribution foncière*, or "land-tax," was thought too restricted, and it was proposed to add *mobilier*, or "personal," because the tax implied by the latter term had a good deal of analogy with the other. After some discussion, the words "assessed taxes" were substituted for "land-tax," without any suspicion that by this means the order of things was changed by introducing among the electors the class *patentables*, who are taxed, not for the property they possess, but for the profession they exercise. The question of whether the debates of the Chambers should be published was not discussed.

With respect to the manner of forming the second Chamber, M. de Montesquieu, acting on his own authority, wished that the power possessed by the Senate under Napoleon should be vested in the king,—namely, the power of choosing the members of the legislative corps from a list prepared by the electoral college. In order to prove that such an assembly would not be more subservient than another, he cited the assembly of notables which in 1789 rejected all the propositions of the king. He did not find one to support his opinion. M. de Montesquieu's proposal involved the serious inconvenience of depriving the most popular of the Chambers—that which was supposed to represent the country—of the appearance of independence, which is of as much importance as independence itself; and the example he had cited proved that in the days of the Revolution the king's appointment had been as guarantee, whilst that in ordinary times it possessed all the imputed disadvantages, and caused it to be said that France was again about to be put under the Imperial Constitution. This idea, originated by M. de Montesquieu, was not carried into effect.

The initiative in financial measures was granted to the Lower Chamber without opposition, and to the Upper Chamber the judicial power in certain special cases, when, for example, ministers were arraigned. The Chamber of Peers left to the king's nomination was to be, as a general rule, hereditary, excepting in cases where the king conferred a peerage for life. Not a voice was raised against hereditary rank, which was regarded by all as a guarantee for independence of conduct and stability in form of government.

It was then stipulated that the king should summon the Chambers every year, that he could dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, but under the condition of summoning fresh members in three months, and it was moreover decreed that every petition presented to either Chamber should be in writing. These points being decided, the next consideration was the judicial order based on those principles of independence which have not varied in France since 1789; and lastly, the guarantees, transitory in their nature, which related to the maintenance of the public debt, the Legion of Honour, the military grades and pensions, the two nobilities, &c. &c.

* There was scarcely a discussion on these subjects; and touching those points in which

was agreed that some alteration should be made, and which were consequently submitted to the king, his majesty showed an extreme desire to please, as he considered the monarchial principle quite safe, since he gave and did not receive a constitution. He even consented that it should be made a condition, that the kings at their consecration should swear to observe the constitution faithfully, which was not a contract with the nation, as we have never seen, but with God, and of which he who took the oath, and his confessor, were to be the judges. Whilst these questions were being decided one after the other in the commissions, the king scarcely spoke of them in the royal council, merely saying the work was advancing, and that he was satisfied with the spirit in which it was performed. Only on two or three points, such as the conscription and the initiative legislation, did he submit the difficulty to the council, but in a few words, as a subject that concerned him personally and exclusively.

Four days longer than the time first appointed, that is, until the 4th of June, were accorded for the promulgation of the constitution, and M. Beugnot asked four more, which would extend the time to the 8th, to put the articles in order, to give a last polish to the work, to prepare the preamble, and above all arrange some general principles which would serve as a basis to the electoral law, a subject yet touched on. M. Beugnot would have obtained the desired delay, but that the allied monarchs, anxious to depart since the peace had been concluded, (an event that occurred on the 30th of May,) desired that all should be finished on the 4th of June at the latest. To the allied monarchs, it was evident, considered themselves bound in honour to see this constitution promulgated, without which the men who had trusted in them would be without guarantee, the emigrants would be under no restraint, and France—that is to say, Europe—would remain exposed to fresh storms. M. de Metternich said that urgent affairs summoned the allied sovereigns to their own kingdoms, and that their troops were gaining nothing by remaining in France, their officers were ruining themselves there, and that they could not remain any longer. The king's council appeared both surprised and offended at this demand. "Let them go," hastily and impetuously cried the Duke de Berry: "we do not need their assistance to give a constitution to France; and when they are gone, the concessions that the king is about to make to the country will assume a higher and more independent character." This prince showed an especial desire to get rid of the Emperor of Russia, who was the most exacting of the allied sovereigns. But the foreign ministers declared that, having kept as few troops as possible in the capital, the last should not be withdrawn until the very day fixed for the royal session, and the fulfilment of the promises made at Saint-Ouen put beyond all doubt. The council was obliged to yield, and a royal session was fixed for the 4th of June, but remained to be done seemed of little importance to the king.

The articles relating to the election of deputies might be referred to the electoral law; the

revision of the articles and the drawing up of the preamble were details that could be finished in one night; and orders were given to M. Beugnot to be ready for the appointed day. Two questions remained to be decided—the date of the new constitution and its title. As to the date, Louis XVIII. would not allow a discussion. In his own opinion, he had commenced to reign the day on which the son of Louis XVI. died; he had reigned even while Napoleon, raised to the Empire by the will of the French nation, was gaining the victories of Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, and Wagram, and signing the treaties of Presburg, Tilsit, and Vienna. These were only different phases of usurpation, which disappeared before the immutable principle of legitimacy. Consequently, Louis XVIII. wished that the constitution should be dated from the nineteenth year of his reign. He listened to the opinion of each member as to the title. M. Dambray thought it ought to be called "Ordinance of Reformation," like the ordinances formerly issued by the kings for the reformation of certain parts of the French legislation. Louis, at first, approved of this title. However, M. Beugnot proposed another. When the kings of France granted a legal existence either to the commons or to different civil or religious establishments, they did so by means of a deed called a "charter," a word taken from the Latin. There was an analogy between the business under consideration and what Louis le Gros had done, which pleased the feelings as well as the kingly pride of Louis XVIII.; and he adopted the word "*charter*," since become so famous, adding to it the epithet *constitutional*, to indicate more clearly its object. These two questions being decided, M. Beugnot had only to consider the minor details of form, and it was expected, from his known expeditiousness, that all would be finished in a few hours. The king himself wrote the speech which he intended to pronounce; he learned it by heart, and his speech seemed to form the sole object of his thoughts. When the king should have spoken, the chancellor (Dambray) was to explain the principles of the charter, and M. Ferrand was to read the original. Several royal ordinances were then to be promulgated in presence of the two great bodies convoked for the inauguration of the new institutions. The list of peers was to be read, which contained eighty-three of the old senators, forty of the ancient dukes, and some marshals, who were not members of the Senate. Fifty-five senators were excluded from the peerage; twenty-seven because they were aliens, and twenty-eight because of being regicides or having taken a leading part during the Revolution and the Empire. The ancient senators, whether comprised in the Chamber of Peers or not, were to hold their emoluments under the title of pensions. The legislative corps was to be converted into a Chamber of Deputies, and to sit until a fresh election.

On the morning of the 4th, a grand display of French troops, where the National Guards made a conspicuous figure, preceded the royal session in which the great promise of Saint-Ouen was to be fulfilled. The larger portion of the foreign troops were already *en route*. The remainder were preparing to depart on

that day and the following. The Emperor Alexander, who was anxious to visit the Prince of Wales before returning to his own dominions, had left Paris before the royal session. On the very day of his departure he had insisted that the children of Queen Hortense, whose protector he had constituted himself, should receive the Duchy of Saint Leu, with a large income. He also wished to secure a suitable position for Prince Eugene; but this matter was referred to the Congress at Vienna. He had departed, delighted with the French, whom he had charmed by his grace and amiability, and but little pleased with the royal family, who did not admire his tone of mind. The King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria left about the same time. On the very morning of the ceremony there was great excitement at court. A report was spread that a plot had been laid to blow up the royal family by an explosion of gunpowder. The official agents, who had hastened to offer their services to the Count d'Artois, and who, under MM. Ferrier de Montceuil and de la Maisonfort, had commenced to form a kind of voluntary police around him, had seen masses of powder on the quay of the Seine, which appeared to them suspicious. They immediately became excited, and filled the château with their rumours. M. Beugnot was called upon, who was at the time hurrying with the preamble of the *charter*, and he was called to fling aside his pen and see to his duties as Director of Police. When inquiries were made, it was found that it was the Russian artillery that were loading their powder on the Seine quay, preparatory to taking their departure.

This excitement being calmed, all assembled at the Tuileries. M. Beugnot wished to read the preamble to the king. But the monarch, entirely occupied in repeating to himself the speech that he was to make before the chambers, refused to listen, saying that he confided the affair implicitly to him. They then left for the Bourbon Palace, talking lightly of serious subjects, because they had not yet learned by the experience of a free government how much influence words have on the public mind. The fear of an explosion having passed away, another succeeded. It was dreaded that either in the Senate or in the legislative corps some objection might be raised against the manner in which the charter was about to be promulgated. The chancellor had orders to silence any who would be so imprudent as to speak: it would have been a disagreeable scene, annoying to the royal dignity, and very much to be regretted, had it taken place. But, quickly engrossed by the preparations for the ceremony, all set out for the Palais Bourbon, without thinking any more of these possibilities.

The king passed through the garden of the Tuileries in his carriage, surrounded by the princes and marshals, and arrived at the Palais Bourbon about three o'clock. He was received there with the old royal pomp, and entered supported on the arm of the Duke de Grammont. He took his seat on the throne, having on his right and left, on lower seats, the Duke d'Angoulême, the Duke de Berry, and the Duke d'Orleans, and the Prince de Condé. The only person absent from the assembly was the Count

d'Artois, who was ill from an attack of gout and vexation, of which we shall presently tell the cause. The public, weary of great military exhibitions, of which they had seen so many, and beginning to acquire a taste for political spectacles, had assembled in crowds. The most respectable persons of Paris had been admitted into the body of the hall: and on the benches of the two chambers sat the future members of the peerage and the entire legislative corps. When the king appeared, he was received with unanimous acclamations, and for some time the cries of "*Vive le Roi!*" were repeated with a kind of frenzy. At once moved and reassured, and calculating on a favourably-disposed audience, he pronounced, in a sonorous voice, and with great rhetorical skill, the following speech, adapted with much tact to existing circumstances:—

"Gentlemen," said the king, "now that, for the first time, I have assembled around me in this building the great bodies of the state, and the representatives of a nation that does not cease to lavish the most touching marks of affection upon me, I felicitate myself on having become the dispenser of those benefits which Providence deigns to grant to my people.

"With Austria, Russia, England, and Prussia, I have made a peace, in which their allies are included; that is to say, all the princes of Christendom. The war was universal, and so is the peace.

"The rank that France always held among the nations has not been transferred to another: it is still undividedly hers. The security acquired by other states increases here, and consequently adds to her true power. That part of her conquests which she has not retained should not, therefore, be considered as any diminution of her real strength.

"The glory of the French armies has not been dimmed: the monuments of their valor shall remain, and the *chefs-d'œuvre* of art are henceforth ours, in virtue of rights more stable and more sacred than those of victory.

"The paths of commerce, so long closed, are about to be opened. The markets of France shall no longer be exclusively open to the productions of her soil and industry. Those articles which habit has made a want, or which are necessary for the arts she practises, will be furnished by the possessions she recovers. She will no longer be debarred these things, or forced to purchase them at an exorbitant price. Our manufactures will flourish again, our maritime towns spring up anew, and all promise us that a lasting calm abroad, and an enduring tranquillity at home, will be the happy fruits of the peace.

"Still, a painful remembrance troubles my joy. I was born—and I flattered myself that I should continue all my life—the faithful subject of the best of kings: and to-day I occupy his place! But, at least, he is not altogether dead: he lives still in this testament, that he intended for the instruction of the august and unfortunate child to whom I have succeeded. It is with my eyes fixed on this immortal work, penetrated with the sentiments that dictated it, guided by the experience and aided by the counsels of many among you, that I have drawn up this constitutional charter which is about to be

lead to you, and which places the prosperity of the state on a solid basis.

"My chancellor will acquaint you more in detail with my paternal intentions."

This discourse—simple, dignified, adroit, and as gracefully pronounced as it was well written—in which as much was said of the sense as of the charter, was at first received with religious silence, which was succeeded by a storm of enthusiastic applause. The king appeared enchanted by a success which was not alone political but personal. The chancellor next read a discourse, in which he explained the object of the charter, with the evident intention of showing the royalists that it was inevitable, and also to prove that it emanated fully and entirely from the royal authority. M. Ferrand then read the original of the charter in a rather low tone, and, as far as could be judged during a rapid rehearsal, it satisfied even the most critical; for, except in its origin, which was exclusively monarchical,—it was merely a transcript of the constitution of the empire. When he had finished reading, the chancellor admitted the peers and deputies to take the oath, amid a profound silence, and a very curious curiosity sometimes excited by the great names of the ancient monarchy, which had not been heard for so long a time, and sometimes by the great names of the Empire, which had often resounded in the glorious bulletins of Napoleon, and which were now so suddenly inscribed in the list of those who swore inviolable fidelity to the Bourbons.

The ceremony was concluded in perfect order, and without any of the anticipated incidents. Louis XVIII. returned to the Tuileries, loudly applauded by the two chambers, and personally congratulated by all those whom etiquette permitted to address a compliment to the king. In this solemn spectacle he saw but one thing, his discourse; he was conscious but of one result, his personal success. It is sometimes very wise to applaud princes, as it is also very wise to know when to be silent in their presence. On this occasion the applauses of the chambers and the people were most proper, and made the king as contented with the charter as though it had been the offspring of his fondest wishes. He had consented to it without reluctance, which was a great deal; and he was ready to put it into execution, which was still more. But, in justice, we must admit that it was principally the work of the Senate; that is, of the old representatives of the French Revolution, who had recovered the faculty of expressing their true opinions on the day of Napoleon's downfall, and who did not wish that the downfall of that wonderful man should be also that of the principles of 1789. It must be added that the charter was also, in some measure, the work of the allied monarchs,—not that they loved constitutional government, but they considered it a point of honour to keep their word with the Senate that had rendered such services; they also feared the folly of the emigrants, and thought it necessary to restrain them, not only for the sake of France, but of Europe. From this we may conclude that the charter, like all acts that are not the result of a transient party feeling, was everybody's work.

However, appearances, whether deceitful or

not, must often be taken as reality, and it was well done to attribute the charter to Louis XVIII., who had more or less part in it. He got the credit of it, and all enlightened men felt indebted to him for it. The Senate had no reason to complain, although some of its members were excluded from the peerage; for those who were excluded could by no means appear in the new order of things, with the exception, however, of certain persons, whose omission was much to be regretted, such as Marshal Massena, not admitted because he was born at a league beyond the frontier of 1790,—a circumstance that ought to have been ignored; and Marshal Davout, because his defence of Hamburg had offended the allies. As to the rest, all, whether excluded or admitted, preserved their old emoluments. The legislative corps was to continue undisturbed until the legal time for re-electing a fifth of the members should arrive.

The charter, putting aside the question of its origin, which seemed at that time only a dispute about words, contained all the principles of a true representative monarchy, and was disapproved by none but extreme royalists. It received the approbation of Sieyès, the best of judges, and the least to be suspected; for he was of the number of excluded senators, and he did not hesitate to say that with this charter France could be free if she would, and that no advantage gained by the Revolution had been lost in the ruin of the Empire, except, indeed, our frontiers, the only serious loss, and deserving of long regret.

The Treaty of Paris, published at the same time as the charter, did not meet with equal success. Certainly, peace could not be more desired than it was at that time by France, and with very good reason; but the treaty of the 30th of May, which was now published, was not the peace itself,—for the country had been enjoying peace since the 23d of April; it was the price of the peace, and a very painful price it was. Consequently, the perusal of this treaty produced a most saddening effect, not alone upon the men compromised by the last revolution, but upon the most impartial and disinterested classes of the nation. To their eyes, the cruel hand of the stranger was visible in these transactions, especially in the tracing of our frontiers. These men had not, certainly, flattered themselves that France could preserve her geographical limits; they had not hoped that victorious Europe, having marched to the gates of Paris, would leave us the Rhine frontier; but, hearing it incessantly repeated on every side that France under the Bourbons would obtain much better conditions than when under Napoleon, people did cherish illusory hopes. But suddenly seeing the sad reality revealed, seeing France alone, of all the European Powers, reduced to the position she held in 1790; above all, seeing us in part deprived of our colonies, whose restitution was to be the recompense of the possessions we abandoned on the continent, a deep feeling of irritation was engendered, particularly in the sea-ports, where, however, the desire of peace was stronger than in other places. The loss of the Mauritius was most sensibly felt, and was the source of much irritation against England, who was accused of wishing to prevent the revival of our com-

merce. The bitterest expressions of feeling were uttered against this ever-present rival. Next to England, the nation most execrated was Austria. The conduct of this Power, so justifiable when considered in a political point of view, appeared highly blamable when viewed as a question of natural feeling, and rendered Austria very unpopular. Every evil design was attributed to her influence; and the bad feeling thus engendered was exhibited to her sovereign, whom the French received wherever he appeared with extreme coldness.

It would, assuredly, have been better policy not to refer to the cause, whether true or false, of our misfortunes, but to confine ourselves to seeking the means still within our power of repairing them. But, as usual, people took more pleasure in reproaching each other, and seeking in these reproaches subjects of bitter re-erimination. The revolutionists and imperialists reproached the Bourbons with having returned to France in the train of foreigners, and returned only to consummate the humiliation of the country. The royalists, instead of replying that if they had come in the company of foreigners, they had not brought them, and that it was Napoleon who, by his ambition, had opened to them an entrance into France; the royalists, we say, instead of defending themselves by this simple and incontestable truth, did all in their power to turn into ridicule those patriotic lamentations which they ought to have respected, even if they did not share in them. They laughed at the idea of natural frontiers,—that fantastic object, as they said, which would cost so much blood to nations if seriously pursued; as if all nations did not propose to themselves a certain territorial limit, more or less legitimate, more or less restricted, to which they tend with more or less prudence, skill, or consideration for others, but which is the ever-acting motive force of all their efforts. As if England had not always laboured to fuse into one the three Britannie kingdoms, without mentioning the Indies and all the other objects of her ambition! As if Russia had not always endeavoured to obtain possession of Finland, Bessarabia, and the Crimea; and Austria to obtain the sovereignty of the course of the Danube and the shores of the Adriatic; Prussia to extend her empire to the centre of Germany; and, lastly, has not Spain always sought to unite under her scap-

tre as much as she possibly could of the Peninsula? The royalists said that if France had lost certain territories, she had at least secured a stable peace, which we must admit to be incontestable advantage of all defeated belligerents; and they added that France would be delivered from those false Frenchmen, with the foreign accent, who were putting in claims for public posts; as if it were a subject of congratulation to get rid of such Frenchmen as the financier Corvetto, the juriconsult Lamoignon, the mathematician Lagrange, the seaman Verheul, and the warrior Massena! The royalists added, that if they had lost arable land they had acquired sugar, coffee, and cotton plantations, which were not less needed. They laughed at the idea of the commerce carried on under the Empire, and which was condemned to drag its slow course across the whole extent of the Empire on carts, and they proudly instituted a comparison between that and the winged maritime commerce that was about to be restored to us. The royalists thus committed the double wrong of mocking high-minded grief, and of displaying in vexing contrast their party triumphs, as they were also wrong in reproaching their opponents with the disasters caused by Napoleon and not by his admirers. They ought to have consoled themselves with the thought, that if Napoleon had contracted the limits of France in endeavouring to extend them too far, there still remained to us an immense glory, our powerful navy, and the progress of every description which we owed to the Revolution and the Empire, and, in short, the vitality of the French genius: and that with a few years of peace and a prudently liberal government we should soon recover the moral and physical superiority which was always essentially ours, and never dependent on the possession of a province more or less. This was the real and sole consolation left us. Men in affliction often find a greater comfort in complaining than they could find in the alleviation of their woes, or even in actual cure. Complaining consoles them, and the more bitter the more consolatory. It is best to leave them to their consolation, at the same time reserving to ourselves the privilege of not giving credence to all they say, especially when we have the honour of holding in our hands the scales of history.

BOOK LV.

GOVERNMENT OF LOUIS XVIII.

the public mind during the months of April and May—Revival of parties—The ultra-royalists and d'Artois—This Prince, ill and vexed, makes a long stay at Saint Cloud—Return to France—The friends of liberty place their hopes in him, whilst the royalists already make him the—Great reverse of this Prince—The Bonapartists, their dejection and their dispersion—The revolution first pleased at the fall of Napoleon, are, by the violence of the emigrants, induced to join the Lafayette, M. Benjamin Constant, and Madame de Staël return to Paris, and a constitutional arrangement of the *bourgeoisie* of Paris—The opinions of the capital reflected under the provinces—State of La Vendée and Brittany—The old insurgents again take up arms, refuse to be disturbed by their threats the holders of the *biens nationaux*—Irritation of the cities in the west the Chouans and the Vendéans—State of the city of Nantes—Dispositions of the southern party prevail at Bordeaux, Toulouse, Nîmes, Avignon, Marseilles, Lyons—The presence and ravages of the eastern provinces and attach them still more to Napoleon, whom they regard as the saviour of the land—Return of the troops from remote garrisons and prisons in England, Russia, Germany, and the arrogance of these troops, who are persuaded that a dark treason has betrayed France to an enemy—Embarrassment of the Bourbons, who are obliged to reduce the army to a painful step well with all classes, particularly those who are hostile to them, and obliged (so to speak) to their enemies in opposition to their friends—First resolutions relative to the finances, to the army, to Louis, the Minister of Finance, finally succeeds in passing a resolution that all the state and the *droits réunis* kept up—Limits within which he obliges the War and Navy Ministers to project of organizing the army: conservation of the Imperial Guard and re-establishment of the army household—Difficulty of reconciling these different institutions, and, above all, of supporting the finance of the Legion of Honour, with a change in the insignia—Great military posts bestowed on the army—Discontent with which the army receives intelligence of the new system of organization and an immense number of half-pay officers and unemployed functionaries—Whilst the military reductions to which they are obliged to submit, those attached to the principles of the Revolution, discontented by imprudent manifestations—Funeral service for Louis XVI., Moreau, Pichegru, attacks of the clergy against the possessors of national property—The concordat not having been ratified, the Bourbons determined upon demanding its revocation—Mission to Rome for this object to revoke the concordat, and the Pope asks Louis XVIII. to restore Avignon—Police regular the observance of Sundays and holidays obligatory—Effect produced by the regulation—The king to the party feelings of its supporters, had, within a few months, alienated the military and the priests who had taken the oath, the possessors of national property, and the citizen of the chambers, animated by a monarchical and liberal spirit, infuses a better tone into the Durbach denounces in the Chamber of Deputies the regulation touching holidays and Sundays, legislation that places the daily press under a censorship—The Chamber of Deputies, though composed of M. Durbach, demands a law for these two objects—The king yields to the wishes of the law regulating the press to be drawn up, but a law that confirms the censorship—Public taste for political discussions—After long debates, it is acknowledged that a censorship is not proper, and the law concerning the press is only adopted as a temporary measure—The king accepts the measures, and sanctions the law such as it has issued from the Chamber of Deputies—The question is referred to a special commission—Several publications against the national sales having been made, the Chamber of Deputies condemns these writings, and again solemnly confirms the property called "national"—Bills relative to financial measures—M. Louis presents the financial reform—Incorrectness of this schedule, but excellence of the minister's principles—He proposes the of the state debts, the maintenance of the indirect taxes, and the payment of arrears by means of an interest of eight per cent.—The royalist oppositionists declare against the propositions of the king venturing to speak of bankruptcy, wish that the state creditors should be paid—They find the liberal opposition, who, not comprehending the designs of the minister, exclaim against Louis, by his energy and unstudied eloquence, triumphs over all resistance, and gets his projects into the basis of public credit in France—Prudent commercial measures calculated to effect the state of war to a state of peace—Though the liberals accuse the chambers of timidity, they acquire moderation and firmness the respect of the government and the confidence of the public—Their is a certain calm—Fête at the Hotel de Ville in honour of Louis XVIII.—The body-guards dispute the honour of guarding the king—Effect of this fête—Defect in the administration, resulting from Montesquieu—This talented minister, who possessed the art of pleasing the chambers, was for business, and could neither modify nor direct the personal administration—The provinces, left to the tone of the local passions—Proposed journey of the princes to rally the supporters of the king—These journeys, which excite instead of allaying the popular passions—Journey of the Duke of Normandy, Brittany, Vendée, and Guyenne—His reception at Brittany, and particularly in the heart of Vendée—Sentiments and conduct of the Vendéans of the *Boeage*—What had taken place in the disposition of the inhabitants—Return of the prince through Angers and of good and evil, finishes in August—Departure of the Count d'Artois for Champagne and raises many consolations to all places that have suffered from the effects of the war, lavishes his encouragement at Dijon the intolerance of the *petite église*—His stay and his imprudent conduct at Marseilles—Enthusiasm of the Marseillais—Their ardent desire to obtain the *franchise* of the Count d'Artois promises it and departs, leaving the people intoxicated with joy—His journey to Renne, and Besançon—Unbecoming conduct with regard to the Archbishop Lecoq—Return of the Count d'Artois—His journey has only produced evil, without any admixture of good—Journey of the prince to the frontier provinces—This prince, irritated by the opposition offered by the army, gives way—After a short interval of quiet in August, the passions of the people are again awakened in the journey of the princes, and by the imprudent measures of the Government with regard to the orphan daughters of the officers of the Legion of Honour, and the military schools—the chambers induces a modification or revocation of these measures—Affluence and increasing military at Paris—Disagreeable incident with regard to General Vandamme, and commencement of a new affair—Disgrace of Marshal Davout—Great sensation produced by the proposition of restoring his unsold property—The principle of the proposed measure is admitted, but the language of the ends everybody—The chambers censure the minister, and pass the law, with various amendments, the party called the Chouans, and that of the half-pay officers, experience mutual alarm, the of imaginary conspiracies—The official police endeavour to reduce these conspiracies to the of the official police of the Count d'Artois try to exaggerate them—Weariness and perplexity of the king by the reports of his brother—Part performed by M. Fouché under these circumstances—The king present at a representation at the Odeon, a conspiracy against the royal family is immediately

talked of, and extraordinary precautions taken in consequence—Affected zeal of Marshal Marmont, who commanded the body-guard—Outcry against the War Minister and the Director of Police—The king yields to the entreaties of the court, and replaces General Dupont, War Minister, by Marshal Soult, and M. Beugnot, Director of Police, by M. d'André—He indemnifies M. Beugnot, by appointing him Minister for the Navy—Thus passive almost great confidence in the court party and the ultra-royalists—State of things in December, 1814.

SCARCELY two months had elapsed since the return of the Bourbons, and France already presented the strongest contrast with what she had been, or had appeared to be, during the previous fifteen years. At the termination of a sanguinary revolution, during which men had fallen on each other with actual frenzy, we saw them suddenly seized by the powerful hand of Napoleon, and under the Empire calmed down into a complete moral and physical immobility, and soon despairing of being able to effect any thing against each other, they fell into a species of forgetfulness of themselves, their passions, and their opinions, and, renouncing all interest in public affairs, cast at most from time to time an anxious look at the heroic drama that was being enacted before their eyes. The sudden fall of Napoleon, freeing them from the grasp of his iron hand, had awakened in different classes sentiments as diverse as their positions; the royalists experienced an unmixed joy, the revolutionists a joy mingled with anxiety, and the Bonapartists the stunning effect of a sudden and violent blow. But these sentiments soon underwent some modification. The royalists, when the first flush of joy was passed, found that the reality fell much short of their hopes, and they were filled with jealousy, disputing among themselves who should have the largest portion of the booty. Taking advantage of the return of liberty, which at the first return of the Bourbons existed only for their advantage, and making use of it to pour forth their hate against the Revolution and the Empire, they soon made the revolutionists regret their momentary joy, and extinguished in the Bonapartists the stunning effect of their fall, which had suspended the power of self-defence. The apparent unity that had subsisted under the Empire was thus suddenly exchanged for extraordinary commotion, and as if our history had retrograded seventy years, there were now seen confronting and measuring each other with angry eyes nobles and citizens, religionists and philosophers, priests who had taken the oath and priests who had not taken the oath, soldiers of Condé and soldiers of the Republic, all ready to come to blows, if the Government, instead of restraining and calming them, by giving an example of cool good sense, had excited or even allowed them to follow their own inclinations.

In the first place, the spectacle of these dissensions was presented in the court itself. The Count d'Artois, deeply touched by the censure poured out on his short administration, afflicted at hearing the disastrous peace that had been concluded attributed to the convention of the 23d of April, and his imprudent promises blamed for the difficulty experienced in collecting the taxes—and these reproaches were encouraged by the king—had taken refuge at Saint Cloud, where he was more vexed than sick, and allowed his friends to form a group of malcontents, around whom all those rallied who thought that too much had been conceded to the revolutionists. And

these malcontents did not hesitate to say publicly that the king was a kind of Jacobin, who had again adopted the ideas he had entertained in his youth. The higher classes of the nobility, who, though filling nearly all the high offices of the court, wished to hold also the state appointments, which they were forced to share with the imperialists, were far from being satisfied. They mingled their grief with that of the nobility of the bar, who, it must be confessed, had seldom any sympathies in common with the higher nobility, but who were now offended that they had not been allowed to draw up the new constitution, which they would have done according to their own ideas and for their own advantage. In the same way the surviving members of the ancient parliament had addressed a secret protest to Louis XVIII. against the charter. The provincial nobility, at least those who were as rich, had come in crowds to Paris, to petition for the restitution of their property, and to solicit, *en attendant*, places of every kind, and of every amount of salary. But the Minister of Finance received these gentlemen very roughly, for he believed that public offices ought to be given to those who had experience in business, and they were received with disdain by the Minister of the Interior, who found them a bore. They consequently flocked round the Count d'Artois, saying that the Government was abandoned to revolutionists, and that if things went on in that way a little longer, France and royalty would be again sacrificed.

Whilst that within the walls of the Tuilleries there was thus formed a royalist party, *more loyal than the king*, as was remarked at the time, an entirely opposite species of party was being formed at the Palais Royal, but it must be said, without the personal sanction of him who was reported its chief,—this was the Duke d'Orleans's party. This prince, an old and valiant soldier of the republic, well informed, talented, and prudent, had acquired in an eventful life a precocious experience. He understood the character of the emigrants thoroughly, laughed at them without compassion in the retirement of his own family, and was so happy at revisiting his native land, and recovering there a princely rank and a large fortune, that he thought little of any thing else, his sole solicitude being to protect himself against the malice of the royalists, who were as inimical to him as they had been to his father. Whilst that he was solely occupied with his children, with their education and their scattered patrimony, taking especial care to avoid making partisans, the royalists made them for him in thousands, by persecuting him with their hatred, and so rendering him an object of interest and confidence to revolutionists of every shade. Thus on the right hand of the king was the Count d'Artois, surrounded by the malcontent royalists, and on his left the Count d'Orleans, surrounded by the malcontent liberals, whom he did not see after, for he thought only of his family affairs.

alist the royalists were unintentionally working out serious political events.

In another sphere, the high dignitaries of the Empire, who could not have consistently lied round the Bourbons, or who had not wished to do so, having recovered a little from the effects of their fall, began to unite, but not readily, and without making any hostile demonstration. There were M. de Caulaincourt, whom even the patronage of the Emperor of Russia had not been able to get admitted to the peerage, and who kept aloof, deeply touched by the disasters of France and the calamities of which he was the object, in connection with the abduction of the Duke of Angoulême; the Prince Cambacères, more taciturn than ever, and making no greater display in receiving at his table some old friends, discreet and sensual as himself; the Dukes Bassano, de Cadore, de Guéti, de Rovigo, the Counts Mollien and Lavalette, talking within their own circle of the catastrophe they had witnessed, regarding with pardonable satisfaction the embarrassment of their successors in power, and visiting, but with considerable precaution, the Queen Hortense, who had remained at Paris to defend, under the patronage of the Emperor of Russia, the interests of her children. This princess had lately lost her mother, the Empress Josephine, who died of a chill to which she had exposed herself in receiving the Emperor Alexander at Malmaison. She was universally regretted by those who knew her, on account of the elegance of her manners and the goodness of her heart; she was regretted by the public, who saw in her death an additional calamity among many. In fact, of the prisoner of Elba's two wives, one had just died of exhaustion and a feeble mind, the other had returned crowned, and with a portionless child, to the dominions of her father, scarcely acknowledged as a princess, though Archduchess of Austria by birth, and already half forgetful of the husband with whom she had shared the sceptre of the world!

Marshal Soult had also come to Paris, deprived of his command, and deeply irritated at the preference shown to Marshal Suchet, which he complained with a want of prudence that he seldom displayed. Marshal Massena, too, was at Paris, almost forgetting the injustice of Napoleon in beholding the misfortunes of France, offended at being treated as a foreigner who should be naturalized in order to become a Frenchman, and living in seclusion and isolation, never seeking at the flatteries which all the marshals were sure to receive; and, lastly, there was at Paris the Marshal Davout, proud of the reticence he had made at Hamburg, caring little about what the royalists and the adverse generals said, and preparing, in his estate at Wagny, whither he had retired, a memoir, in which he narrated with daring frankness all he had done in fulfilling his military duties.

In the same class with these men, but not mixing with them, were the revolutionists of every shade of feeling, who, though by no means hostile to the army, lived apart from it, and especially from its chiefs. Pleased for a moment, as we have said, at the downfall of the Empire, they now began to regret it. The

revolutionists who had most compromised themselves, such as Tallien, Merlin, and others, assembled at the house of Barras, who was still tolerably rich, and deplored in common the destruction of liberty, which they attributed to Napoleon. With these were united some few military men, such as Marshal Lefebvre, who, though distinguished and rewarded by Napoleon, had conserved his ancient opinions, and beneath whose glittering marshal's uniform there beat the heart of a republican. The personages we have just named found in the suburbs a certain number of the lower classes who sympathized in their opinions, the old bound by memories of the past, the young by tradition, less daring than they had once been, but ready to resume their former attitude under the influence of events and the excitement of political discussions. Above and apart from these were the more decided revolutionists, who had been at first well treated by Napoleon, but who were afterward separated from him, either in consequence of their convictions or some error in conduct. The greater number of these were senators, excluded from the peerage because they had voted the death of Louis XVI., and on this account called *the voters*. The two most important were MM. Sieyès and Fouché, the former ever morose and solitary in his habits, approving the charter, but doubting whether it would be put into execution; the latter, on the contrary, always untiringly active, keeping up an acquaintance with all parties, endeavouring to win the confidence of all, and, though ill recompensed for the services he had rendered the Count d'Artois, he sought the count's friends in private, and endeavoured to persuade them that he alone, amidst existing difficulties, was capable of guiding and saving the Bourbons.

But France was not exclusively composed of partisans, dreaming of the re-establishment of the ancient *régime*, or regretting the excesses of the Revolution, or deploring the rich appointments held under the Empire. There were, both among the middle-aged and the well-informed young men brought up in the imperial schools, a considerable number of distinguished persons, who turned their thoughts to the future, uninfluenced by the prejudices or interests of any epoch, and seeking liberty under the Bourbons, whom Napoleon's errors had reinstated on the throne of France,—a circumstance not to be regretted, should the restored dynasty only know how to accommodate themselves to the opinions and circumstances of the French people. These men assembled most frequently at the house of Madame de Staël, who had returned from the exile in which Napoleon's gloomy suspicions detained her. She pined for Paris, and Paris longed for her; for she was the soul of the French intellectual world, receiving in her *salons* conquerors and conquered, and endeavouring to persuade both parties that they must try to acquire, under the restored Bourbons, British liberty. M. Benjamin Constant had also returned from exile, and was preparing, with his fluent and brilliant pen, to throw light on constitutional questions. M. de Lafayette had issued from his retreat at Lagrange at the appearance of the first ray of liberty, and it was

not without some degree of pleasure that he again beheld the Bourbons, under whom he had passed his youth, and whom he was disposed to serve if he found them inclined to serve the country. These were the most distinguished members of this society, which was frequented by the most talented and most esteemed men in Paris, and it was here that party took its rise which has been since known as "the constitutional party."

The well-minded citizens of Paris sympathized with this class more than with any other. The bourgeoisie were peacefully disposed, moderate, and disinterested, not seeking Government places, but solely anxious for the prosperity of trade. They had become familiarized with the idea of the return of the Bourbons, since the necessity of their return had been proved; they had placed their hopes in them, especially in the king, desiring with peace a prudent liberty,—that which consists in being able to prevent Governments from destroying themselves. The bourgeoisie of Paris offered up their best wishes for the Bourbons, and were ready to afford them an efficacious support by means of the National Guard, of which they formed the principal part, provided that their opinions, sentiments, and dignity, were not too rudely hurt. Offspring of the Revolution, but unsoiled by guilt—not having contracted either criminal habits or dangerous ambition—having no other interest than the public welfare, the bourgeoisie of Paris was at this moment the truest, the best, and most popular expression of opinion in France.

In the provincial parts, the same shades of politics, but more decided in the colouring, were to be found; and the same passions, good and evil, with fewer modifications. In Lower Normandy, in Brittany, and in Vendée, the rural population, so profoundly tranquil under Napoleon, were, so to speak, "up." The Chouans had assembled with incredible celerity under the leadership of their surviving chiefs; they replaced those that were dead, and had, in fact, assumed arms, without knowing what they were about, merely for the pleasure of taking them up and threatening their old adversaries, or, as they said themselves, for the purpose of supporting the king. In their eagerness to obtain arms, they had rushed into the houses of those they called "blues," and taken forcible possession of their muskets. The local authorities entreated them to remain quiet, assuring them that the king was not threatened with any danger, and consequently did not need their assistance; but secret intriguers, for the most part emigrants who regretted their lost property, or who were ambitious of Government employments, assured them that they must not believe the prefects, and that the princes were desirous that they should hold themselves in readiness. Their ill will was especially directed against the holders of national property. This class of persons was much more general in the country districts than in the large cities, though even here there were many who had purchased ancient mansions and convents. Nearly all who had favoured the Revolution of 1789 looked upon the priests and nobles as enemies, and had had little scruple about becoming possessors of their

property, which they purchased at a low price and afterwards rated at its full value. Such persons were especially numerous in Normandy, Brittany, Vendée, and the southern provinces, and now became alarmed for their personal safety, as well as for their property. Placing little trust in the sincerity of the local authorities, they had not yet taken up arms, but were on the eve of doing so. The inhabitants of the cities, both great and small, even without being holders of national property, but having still fresh in their memory all the horrors committed by the Chouans, sympathized on this account with the holders of national property, and constituted what in the west of France were called "*the blues*," in opposition to the party called "*the whites*." As to the latter, they employed their time in smuggling, waiting a favourable opportunity for engaging in something more congenial to their taste; they refused to pay the tax on salt, and carried off immense quantities of this commodity from the salt marshes without paying the dues. To all these causes of commotion must be added the passions of the clergy, who were a hundred times more imprudent than any of those who hoped the return of the ancient order of things. The old quarrel between the priests who had taken the oath and those who had not taken the oath sprang up under a new form, that of submission or resistance to the concordat. Where there existed (as in the diocese of Rochelle, for example) an ancient titular bishop who had not given in his resignation at the command of the Pope in 1802, and had retired into England, the people refused to obey the bishop appointed by the emperor and sanctioned by the Pope. Touraine, Mans, and Perigord offered several cases of this kind. The concordat was in these places trampled under foot, and denounced as the fruit of the Revolution. The priests who sanctioned it, and who had for the most part taken the oath, fell into great disfavour; people said, that having accepted the civil constitution of the clergy, it was no wonder they found the concordat quite to their taste. In short, the restitution of church property was publicly announced. The clergy and nobility declared openly that if the Bourbons, immediately on their return, had not been able to do them justice, it would soon be done; and that, in any case, the Count d'Artois and his son ardently desired it, and would ultimately bring over the king to their opinion.

This position of affairs began to cause uneasiness to the bourgeoisie; even to those who though they had no personal interest in the question of national property, were not uninterested in the question of public order, and would have beheld with alarm any attempt to restore the ancient *régime*. In the space of two months, things had arrived at that point that Nantes, one of the maritime cities not attached to peace and the Bourbons was become, on account of the chouanism arising on every side, almost hostile to the restoration. Descending in a southerly direction, there was Bordeaux, which had assumed the title of the "city of the 12th of March," because on that day its gates had been opened to the Duke d'Angoulême. Bordeaux was not changed in sentiment, but certainly set up pretensions that did not harmonize with the general interest.

In the first place, the inhabitants positively refused to pay the *droits réunis*, asserting that they had not supported the cause of legitimacy to submit to the ordinances of usurpation; they complained bitterly that the Mauritius had been abandoned, and burst into violent invectives against the English, whom they had at first received with the warmest enthusiasm. The same feelings prevailed at Toulouse, but with certain differences. In this city there was less animosity manifested against the English, because no maritime interests were at stake, but, on the other hand, there prevailed a violent hatred of class against class, of royalists against revolutionists, because that the nobility, richer and more powerful in an agricultural than in a maritime province, were more frequently placed in antagonism with the bourgeoisie. Throughout the remainder of Languedoc, at Montpellier and Nîmes, the same sentiments prevailed, heightened by the bitterness arising from religious quarrels. The Catholics detested the Protestants, and said they had been excluded by them during five-and-twenty years from all the advantages arising from the possession of power, and wished to proceed to acts of extreme violence, from which they were with difficulty withheld. On the other hand, the Protestants began to take up arms in self-defence. Nîmes was like a volcano ready to pour forth flames. Some persons of low birth, assuming the right of representing the Catholic nobility, some through natural excitability of character, and others through love of office, pretended to overrule the magisterial authority and follow no will but their own. They had publicly and in the bitterest language condemned the senatorial constitution, poured forth a thousand imprecations against the Senate, demanded an absolute royalty, and protested against the charter. At Arles the same line of conduct was pursued, and in the environs the holders of national property had not merely been threatened, but some of the former proprietors had taken forcible possession of their property.*

Marseilles surpassed, if possible, all that we have related of the other cities of the south. It was natural enough that the Marseillais should refuse to pay the *droits réunis*, but they required besides that the entire commerce of the Levant should be placed in their hands, and, to effect this, that they should be emancipated from all the commercial laws that bound the rest of France, that Marseilles should be declared a free city, with permission to trade with the entire world, without being subjected to any of the restrictions established for the protection of the national commerce. Every ordinance that opposed the fulfilment of these wishes ought to be trampled under foot as the work of usurpation, and in order that the king should be free to do what was suitable to his most faithful subjects, it was necessary that he should possess absolute power, unrestrained by chambers or any other institution of revolutionary origin. Consequently, Marseilles execrated the charter, and with the charter the English, who had deprived us of the Isle of

France. In combining all the follies that triumphant royalism gave vent to in Vendée, at Bordeaux, Nîmes, and other places, it would be difficult to equal the extravagances that found expression in the city of Marseilles, at present so enlightened and so prosperous, but at that time wrought to madness by twenty-five years of fearful sufferings.

Advancing towards the Rhone, we find the same violence exhibited at Avignon, with a spirit of vengeance easily conceivable in a district that had witnessed the crimes of *La Glacière*. Mounting still higher, along our great southern stream, that is to say, at Valence and at Lyons, these sentiments gradually assumed an almost opposite character. Though there were at Lyons ardent royalists filled with the remembrance of the siege of 1793, and united under M. de Précy, who had gloriously directed that siege, and had on that account been invested with the command of the national guard, there were also numerous imperialists strongly attached to Napoleon through gratitude for the benefits he had conferred on their city, and the prosperity of their manufactures during his reign, and these dispositions were confirmed by the presence and bad conduct of the foreign troops. More north still, in Franche-Comté, Alsace, Lorraine, Champagne, and Burgundy, provinces that had been the theatre of the war, the spirit of patriotism had suffered so severe a check that the people had become *Bonapartists*. During the Revolution these provinces, which were generally more tranquil than those of the centre and south of France, had never fallen into extreme opinions, but had maintained the moderate sentiments of 1789. Though they had once admired Napoleon as the regenerator of France and the conqueror of Europe, they had afterwards deplored his errors, and separated from him without hesitation. But seeing him in 1814 struggle with so much glory and perseverance against the European coalition, sharing with him the anxieties and sufferings of the war, they had become again attached to his Government. They had conceived an abhorrence of the foreign armies, and had grown cold towards the Bourbons, because they had returned in company with the foreigners.

The eastern provinces exhibited towards the king's Government a positive coldness, less injurious, however, than the ill-regulated zeal of the royalists in the west and south. To all these elements, fermenting at the same time, there was now added another, in the number of old soldiers who returned to France, either as discharged prisoners, or because of the evacuation of the foreign fortresses. About twenty thousand men had returned from Spain by Perpignan; twelve thousand had returned through Nice and Toulon from Genoa and Tuscany; more than thirty thousand, composing the Italian army, had returned through Chambery; eighty thousand at least, that had evacuated Wurzburg, Erfurt, Magdeburg, Hamburg, Antwerp, Berg-op-Zoom, returned by Strasbourg, Metz, Maubeuge, Valenciennes, and Lille. More than forty thousand, who had outlived the horrors of the English hulks, had landed at Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, Dieppe, Havre, Cherbourg, and Brest. A large number of prisoners to

* In this description of the state of France, I follow the reports of the police which were every day laid before Louis XVIII.

be restored by Russia, Germany, England, and Spain, was also expected. All these men wore the tricolour cockade, which no remonstrance could induce them to lay aside. Old soldiers, for the most part, who nourished in the depth of their hearts the sentiments that prevailed in their country when they quitted it, they could not cease, though they had been often irritated against Napoleon, to regard him as the representative of France, of her greatness, and her independence; whilst in the Bourbons they saw the very opposite. The idea that had taken root in their minds was, that in their absence foreigners, aided by some nobles and priests, had effected a revolution alike disastrous to France and the army. This idea infuriated them, and filled them with contempt for a Government which they declared was the tool and accomplice of foreigners. These assertions, though apparently true, were radically unjust, for, as we have already remarked, if the Bourbons in 1814 returned to France in the train of foreigners, it was a misfortune not attributable to them, but to Napoleon, whose fault it was. But this evident truth was disregarded, and the Bourbons were looked on by the old soldiers as the agents and allies of the European coalition.

From what has been said, it is easy to conceive the difficulty the king's Government had to encounter in endeavouring to bring under its authority the troops that were returning to France. At Strasbourg some officers, who were present at a theatrical representation got up for the occasion, jumped upon the stage and silenced the royalist songs that displeased them. At Metz, and in other cities, the tricolour flags and the eagles were displayed in the processions of the *Fête Dieu*. On the sea-coast, where these soldiers had landed from England, they carried their violence so far as to wish to remove the cross of Saint Louis from the breasts of our old navy officers. At Rouen they hooted General Sacken, who, however, as governor of Paris, had acted with extreme moderation. They entered the shops of print-sellers, and tore up the caricatures that ridiculed Napoleon, and frequently did not respect the portraits of the king and the princes. They sometimes went so far as to sing seditious songs, and at Paris, especially, there was much difficulty in restraining them. The Austrian troops having stuck branches of foliage in their caps, the French soldiers took offence, believing the manifestation was intended to indicate a triumph over them. The Prince de Schwarzenberg deemed it necessary to publish a note, explaining that the manifestation was not meant as an offence, but was merely a customary usage among the Austrian troops when in the field, which, however, would be now interdicted them.

The greater part of these soldiers had returned to France after having suffered severely. There were many among them who had not received their pay during six, twelve, and eighteen months. They did not blame the empire, but the restoration, for this, because payments were not made at the war office as quickly as they wished and as their wants demanded.

The system of flattering the heads of the army did not produce the effect of calming and

subduing the army itself. Our soldiers did not think themselves at all honoured in the persons of their generals, when they saw Berthier, Oudinot, Ney, Macdonald, Moncey, Angereau, Serurier, and Mortier, seated at court between the king and the princes. They, on the contrary, looked on these honours as the price of a dark treason. Marmont, who was certainly guilty, but much less so than was believed, was in their eyes the type of this imaginary treason, to which they attributed our reverses; and reports were every day circulated of his having been killed in a duel,—false reports, which were constantly contradicted, and constantly renewed, but which expressed the wishes of those with whom they originated. The king and the princes, in flattering the heads of the army whom they did not love, only compromised their own dignity and that of the marshals, without gaining the affections of the officers and the soldiers.

Numbers of officers had flocked to Paris to learn their fate, and enjoy the consolation of lamenting together over the change that had taken place in their condition. The repeated commands of the War Minister, ordering them to return to their regiments, and threatening them with the loss of their commissions if the military inspectors did not find them at their posts, were disregarded. The officers took advantage of the general confusion and remained at Paris, flocking to the theatres and public places, where they ridiculed and insulted the Bourbons beyond measure. In the same category were numerous Government functionaries, who had returned from the surrendered provinces, custom-house officers, tax-gatherers, and police-agents, who, far from laughing and jesting, wept over their misfortunes. Altercations were of daily occurrence, and in these affrays our soldiers were not worsted, whilst the Government, not daring to employ foreign troops to re-establish order, made use of the national guards, who, with their pacific and respected uniform, restored peace by their presence and advice. The rioters obeyed, because this guard was in their eyes the representative of the nation assembled to protect the public peace, frequently participating in the sentiments of the young men whose allies they repressed, but who appreciated better than they the necessity of submitting to circumstances, and of looking to the future, and not the past, for the happiness of France.

We may judge from this plain description the state of the public mind, the embarrassments of every kind that threatened the new Government, the difficulties of the task they had to fulfil, and the serious errors into which they were liable to be betrayed. The first object to be considered was the army, which was to undergo reductions, inevitable in a country passing from a state of war to one of peace, and at the same time manage the more difficult operation of reducing an immense military establishment to a very limited one, and effecting these changes in a manner that the army should attribute them neither to ill will nor a partiality for the principles of the emigration. The Government required equal caution not to offend the revolutionists, whose presence recalled so many calamities, and who, if offended, might join the imperialists,

which they had not yet done. It was necessary to tranquillize the holders of national property, who constituted a considerable portion of the landed proprietors, and not make them Bonapartists. It was necessary to restrain the clergy who had remained faithful to the Bourbons, and prevent them from maltreating the clergy who had taken the oath, and who formed the larger number, and not alarm the latter about the concordat, which was their sole guarantee. In fact, the object of the Government was, not to make implacable enemies of these divers restless classes, all ready to become malcontents, regretting the empire which they did not love; and these precautions were doubly needed whilst the principal and almost sole support of the Government was the wise and prudent bourgeoisie, who entertained only moderate wishes, and who, were their good sense, justice, and love of equality wounded, might be tempted to join the malcontents. But, considered dispassionately, what a severe task was imposed on the Bourbons and the emigrants who had returned with them! They were called upon to prefer the soldiers of Napoleon to the soldiers of Condé; they were expected to show a preference to men who had been the executioners of some of their friends, or who had purchased the property of others for a trifle; they were expected, we say, to prefer these men to their own friends! They were expected to prefer the priests who had conformed to the principles of the Revolution to those who had refused to recognise such opinions. They were expected to feign for classes that had sprung up in their absence as much regard, because they were rich and intellectual, as they felt for the nobles, with whom they had lived at court in their youth, and in exile in their riper age. In short, in one word, it was expected that the Bourbons should extinguish in their bosoms memory and feeling, in order to appear in the eyes of France what they were not! It must, therefore, be admitted, even whilst animadverting on the faults of these princes, that it would have been very difficult for them to do otherwise than they did. Revolution, counter-revolution,—alas! terrible events, alike distant from the True, the Just, the Possible. The one overshoots the mark, the other falls short of it; neither stops at the right point. But, as an excuse for both, it must be admitted that if the former has the merit of embodying the spirit of the times, the latter possesses that of obeying the noblest sentiments of the human heart, respect for antiquity and a tender affection for the past.

The question that pressed most on the consideration of the Government was what concerned the army. It was first proposed that the soldiers should receive their arrears of pay, of which they stood very much in need, and which brokers sometimes advanced them at the very door of the war office at a profit of 50 per cent. But, though the Minister of Finance intended to discharge all the debts of the state, he could not hope to discharge arrears out of the current resources, which scarcely sufficed for the most urgent necessities. Of these arrears a sum total had been formed, which it was proposed to pay by raising credit, which would necessarily involve some delay. How-

ever, an exception had been made in favour of the soldiers' pay, and M. Louis had determined to devote immediately to that object thirty or forty millions in ready money. For this purpose he had opened to the War Minister the necessary credit; but two causes delayed the employment of these means. In the first place, the difficulty of bringing from a distance the accounts of the different regiments; and secondly, the difficulty of reorganizing the war office. General Dupont had not hesitated a moment to restore the mansion occupied by the war office to its former owner—it was the unsold property of an emigrant; he had transferred his offices, and this removal, together with changing several clerks, and combining into one the two departments of the *personnel* and the *matériel*, which under the empire had been kept distinct, had occasioned a momentary confusion in the administration that had retarded business. However, General Dupont had made every effort to pay some accounts sent in from remote garrisons, and he also assisted the discharged prisoners that were thronging into France.

These preliminaries concerning the army having been arranged, it was necessary to proceed to its definite organization, and reduce it to proportions more suited to the extent of our territory and the state of our finances. At one time, by reason of desertions, a fear was entertained that there would be a dearth of soldiers. The conscripts of 1815 had been authorized, as we have seen, to return to their homes; and as to the conscripts drawn anterior to that period, and who had deserted in crowds, the ingenious pretext had been devised—in order to avoid severe measures, and to retain the right of recalling them in case of need—of considering them on a limited leave of absence. But the return of the garrisons and prisoners had soon dissipated the fear of suffering from want of men, and had restored to France 400,000, that would enable the Government to dispense with the conscription for a long period, and declare the system provisionally abolished, deferring to a later period the passing of a law on the subject of recruitment. By granting to a portion of these men—for example, the most fatigued—a limited congé, and keeping the others under arms, France would possess a superb army, composed of the best soldiers in the world. But was the Government in a position to pay these men and make a provision for forty or fifty thousand officers, the glorious remains of our long wars?

This question was warmly debated in the Royal Council, where, as we have observed, the members of the old Provisional Government and the ministers had seats. General Dupont was summoned to present his project; and he forwarded the command to Baron Louis, in order that the latter might declare what amount of money he was disposed to devote to the army. The Minister of Finance declared that he could not give a definite answer until he should receive the budget of the different departments, and until he should have succeeded in re-establishing the collection of the taxes. The Duke de Berry, the youngest and most active of the royal princes, and who exhibited a sincere zeal for the interests of the army, pressed the Minister of Finance to be explicit, and the

latter declared he could not promise more than two million francs. For a military establishment comprising more than 400,000 men, soldiers and officers, this was very little, though a soldier does not cost, and certainly did not cost at that time, a thousand francs.* With great economy, 200,000 men might have been kept on service, but with the inevitable expenses attendant on the transition from a state of war to a state of peace, it was almost impossible, and the utmost that could be done would be to keep 150,000 men on service. A rigorous economy was imperatively called for, that would not permit any sacrifice to luxury or party feeling.

The next question brought under consideration was the imperial guard: what was to be done with it? To dissolve it seemed difficult and dangerous; to retain without confiding to it the care of the sovereign's person, and thus keep the imperial guard in a species of semi-disgrace, was still more dangerous. However, General Dupont and the princes believed they had found a solution for the difficulty, at once prudent and pleasing. They proposed that the old guard should be retained as a *corps d'élite*, with the same high pay, the same privileges, and an honourable title, without, however, being intrusted with the guard of the king's person, an honour reserved for the household troops. The young guard having been almost destroyed during the war, and the remains consisting of only a single regiment, originally drawn from the old guard, with which it could not be again incorporated, the remnants of both were fused into two infantry regiments, each consisting of four battalions; one regiment of grenadiers, to be called the "*Grenadiers de France*," another regiment of light infantry, to be called "*Chasseurs à pied de France*." The cavalry was distributed in the same way, into four regiments, one of cuirassiers, one of dragoons, one of light horse, and one of lancers, enjoying the same advantages, and with similar titles, of *cuirassiers*, *dragons*, *chasseurs*, *lanciers de France*. As to the reserve of artillery, that was broken up and reincorporated with the regiments from which it had been originally drawn. The entire might amount to about 80,000 men, horse and foot, which would cost some fifteen or eighteen million francs. It was a serious question to consider whether in a great state there ought to be any *corps d'élite*, but the men who governed in those days solved the question, as we shall see, in a strange manner, by creating two of these bodies, one to guard the person

of the sovereign, and the other to guard nothing at all, excepting it might be the shade of the glorious monarch under whom they had served, whose memory they incessantly recalled to others, and which they could never forget themselves.

The next military question was concerning the troops of the line, and it was necessary to reduce the entire to dimensions commensurate with our finances. The minister proposed to retain 90 infantry regiments of the line, each consisting of three battalions of six companies, and 15 light infantry regiments, which would make 105 infantry regiments comprising 300,000 foot-soldiers fit for service. These 300,000 soldiers actually existed, and were about being organized when all our soldiers who were detained in foreign parts returned to France; the Government not being able to pay more than half, the others were dismissed on unlimited leave, and the men were thus exposed to die of hunger if they did not adopt some trade, and, if they did, they would be lost to the army, which would be thus deprived of so many veteran soldiers. How to dispose of the officers was a question that presented still more serious difficulties.

According to the proposed organization, thirty thousand officers would remain without employment. The war council was deeply perplexed. The Duke de Berry insisted that some means of employing them should be found, but it did not occur to any one that by cutting off the expense of the imperial guard and the king's military household, 60 or 80,000 additional soldiers might be retained in service, the number of officers being increased in proportion. A middle course was adopted for the officers, as there had been for the imperial guard. Those officers that could not be incorporated in the proposed organization were attached to the regiments; they were promised half pay with a right to two-thirds of the vacancies that might occur. This procedure involved the double disadvantage of creating a large class of malcontents, and cutting off nearly all chance of promotion from the officers on actual duty. It may be said that the evil was almost inevitable, but it ought not to have been aggravated by useless expense.

The same system was pursued with regard to the cavalry, but not carried out so strictly. Fifty-six cavalry regiments of four squadrons each were formed, of which 14 were heavy horse, 21 *cavalerie moyenne*, and 21 light horse, the entire forming an effective force of nearly 36,000 horse. Twelve artillery regiments were retained, of which 8 were infantry, and 4 cavalry, comprising 15,000 artillerymen and three regiments of engineers, the entire amounting to about 4000 men. In this service, as for the infantry, the unemployed half-pay officers were attached to the regiments with a right to two-thirds of the vacancies.

These different services taken together amounted to about 206,000 men; 214,000 including the imperial guard, involving an expense which the Minister of Finance estimated at two hundred million francs. This minister, for want of administrative experience, deceived himself strangely, as we shall soon see; for this sum would not suffice to maintain 150,000 men on service. This was evidently not the time to

* It is a generally-received opinion that in France a soldier costs 1000 francs, and that 100,000 cost one hundred million. This is an erroneous idea. This calculation was based on the state of our military establishment during the first half of the present century, because at that time a budget of three hundred millions only maintained 200,000 men. But in this sum were comprised all the expenses of our military establishment, that is to say, the fortresses, the staffs, the *matériel*, the pensioners, the gendarmerie, and it was by estimating this expenditure at the cost of the men alone, that each soldier was rated at 1000 francs. But if, on the contrary, we consider a man, draughted into an existing and paid regiment, where the expenses of the staff and *matériel* are already liquidated, a soldier under such circumstances is far from costing 1000 francs. Eighteen years ago, a soldier was maintained in time of peace for about 400 francs. Calculated in this way, 100,000 men, recalled from furlough and draughted into existing regiments, ought to cost 40 and not 100 million francs.

carry out the project of re-establishing the ancient royal military household, and thus creating a body of military nobles, horse and foot, that would cost as much as 50,000 soldiers on actual service, and who would furnish, by their luxurious manner of living, painful comparisons with the misery endured by the rest of the army. But there were old gentlemen of ancient family who were devoted to the king, and, through poverty, in want of employment; there were young men, filled with enthusiasm, who were desirous of entering by this means on a military career: it was believed that a few thousand brave nobles would be an infallible preservative against future revolutions; moreover, each of these nobles had been allowed to resume the title and rank he had formerly held in the king's household, and there was no need of further discussion: nothing remained but to seek the means of accomplishing a fixed resolution. As to the rest, it was said that a portion of the expense would be borne by the civil list, which certainly might be done, for the civil list amounted to 33 millions, which were equal to 45 millions at the present day. But this was only a weak excuse, for if the civil list could bear such an expense, it would have been wiser to reduce it by that amount, or, better still, make it available for the imperial guard, which would have remained faithful, had some little effort been made to win the affections of the men, and the expenses of the guard thus transferred would have afforded a great relief to the army budget. None of these simple ideas occurred to the stultified minds of those who were engaged in the discussion of these grave subjects.

General Bernonville, who had served both before and after the Revolution, was commissioned to organize the royal household. The ancient red companies were re-established under the names of "gray musketeers, black musketeers, gendarmes, and light horse." Each company was to consist of three or four hundred gentlemen, holding the rank of officer, who were only to perform honorary service on days of ceremony, and these were commanded by the highest nobles of the court. The body-guards were also re-established, that formerly numbered four, but which were now increased to six companies, because MM. d'Heavré, de Grammont, de Poix, de Luxembourg, titulaires of the ancient corps, had resumed their command, and it was thought desirable to confide two companies to marshals of the Empire. The two marshals selected were Berthier, on account of his high position, and Marmont, whom it was necessary to recompense in some manner for the service he had rendered. This unfortunate man was already much disappointed in his hopes, and not to give him this appointment would have been to justify those who condemned him without mercy.

The officers commanding the six companies of body-guards were ordered to form their corps by enlisting the provisional royalists and the disbanded guards of honour; they had even permission to take young brave soldiers from the army, with injunctions to select those who to military proficiency, added sound political opinions, and who would be attracted by the rank of sub-lieutenant which was assured to them. These six companies, each comprising

three or four hundred men, were to perform an effective service about the person of the king, dividing among them the twelve months of the year. The company of horse grenadiers was re-established, and was given to M. de la Rochejaquelein. There were also re-established the *gardes de la porte*; the *gardes de Monsieur*, &c. &c. To these cavalry troops we must add an infantry corps of about 4000 men, with fifty or sixty cannon. This list, had it been complete, would not have comprised less than from nine to ten thousand men, holding the rank of officer in the cavalry, and of subaltern at least in the infantry.

We may easily suppose what annoyance the pride and luxury of such a corps were likely to occasion the mass of the army, especially in comparing the prodigality of which this corps was become the object, with the parsimony with which those that were not *corps d'élite* were necessarily treated. A few fortuitous meetings between the officers of the royal household and those of the army were sufficient to involve unfortunate collisions and implacable hates. If to all this we add the restoration of the Swiss guards, which under the Empire had only enjoyed a nominal existence, and whose actual re-establishment was certainly desirable, for it was the only means of associating with us a valiant people, obliged by the law of nations to remain neuter, if, we say, we consider all these circumstances, we shall see what a multitude of grievances was heaped on the Government, some certainly inevitable, others created voluntarily for the mere gratification of party spirit.

Some other changes were introduced into the army, in order to restore the exterior forms of the period previous to 1789, and to obliterate as far as possible all recollection of the emperor and the Empire. In the list of regiments many numbers were unrepresented, because several had been destroyed during the war, others had been disbanded. This circumstance was profited of, to change the numbers of all, by transferring the vacant number to the next regiment, and the number thus left vacant to the succeeding regiment, which induced a general displacement in the series, and entailed on all the regiments the loss of the number under which they had distinguished themselves. This was an attempt to diminish their glory by endeavouring to efface from their minds and those of others, undying memories. With the intention of attaching the army to the monarchy by means of certain honorary titles, the first regiment of the time was called, "the king's regiment;" the second, "the queen's regiment;" the third, "the dauphin's regiment," and so through all the royal princes whose names could be given to regiments. In order to furnish the princes with a motive for interfering in military affairs, they were made colonels in the different services. The Count d'Artois was nominated Colonel of the National and Swiss Guards. The Duke d'Angoulême was appointed Colonel of Cuirassiers and Dragoons; the Duke de Berry, Colonel of the Chasseurs and Lancers. The old Prince de Condé was made Colonel of the Infantry of the Line; the Duke de Bourbon, Colonel of Light Infantry; and lastly, the Duke d'Orléans, Colonel of Hussars. These titles had been

granted by Napoleon to the most distinguished lieutenant-generals of the service; and these gentlemen could not feel otherwise than deeply offended at being thus dispossessed. To soothe their feelings, they were allowed to retain the emoluments and to exercise the functions of the rank of which they were deprived. They were appointed inspectors-general of the different regiments of which the princes were made colonels.

But it was not the army alone which needed a reduction proportioned to our territory and our finances, the navy was to undergo a like change, and in this department of the public service the retrenchments were to be still greater than in the sister service. Instead of one hundred ships of the line, and two hundred frigates, which Napoleon had laboured to construct, and which, with the immense extent of coast he commanded, he would have been able, in two or three years of peace, to equip fully, we, in time of peace and in the actual state of our finances, could hardly keep up two or three ships of the line and eight or ten frigates, and it was necessary to make proportionate reduction in the *matériel* and *personnel* of our navy. As to building new ships, that was not to be thought of for a long time, for the vessels built under the old *régime* and those remaining from imperial France would be more than sufficient for a war armament. As to the sailors and workmen, maritime commerce offered them a certain means of employment. But the navy officers and engineers would be placed in a most difficult and painful position. For them, as for the military officers, the expedient of half pay was employed, with a right to two-thirds of any vacancies that might occur. They were also allowed to serve on board merchantmen without injury to their rights and rank in the royal navy. But these were poor palliatives, wholly inefficacious to soothe the distress of the two services.

One of the dearest interests of the army was yet to be discussed,—the Legion of Honour. The charter had decided that it should be maintained, and nobody would have dared to propose its suppression. But it was necessary to reconcile the existence of the Legion of Honour with that of other orders, ancient and modern, about which it was imperative that some regulation should be made. The Archbishop of Malines—M. de Pradt—who had become Grand Chancellor of the Legion of Honour, proposed that a new order should be created, entitled “the Order of the Restoration.” This order, which would have become within a few days as ridiculous as that of the “Lily,” which was conferred on 500,000 persons, was unanimously rejected by the Royal Council. The Order of Saint Louis gave rise to more serious discussion. This was a respectable order created by Louis XIV., for the special reward of military merit, and the insignia of this order still figured on the breasts of some of our old officers who had served in the wars of the previous century. It would be scarcely possible for the Bourbons to abolish the order. M. de Blacas proposed that it should be amalgamated with the Legion of Honour and the two fused into one order, of which Louis XVIII. should be the creator, the patron and legislator. The Chancellor Dam-

bray remarked very honestly that such a proceeding would be violation of the charter, which had stipulated the unconditional maintenance of the Legion of Honour. The Royal Council coincided in this opinion. It was decided that the two orders should exist simultaneously, and that in order to popularize the cross of Saint Louis, it should be conferred on some of the most distinguished officers of the Imperial army, who would thus have two crosses instead of one, and would have the satisfaction of seeing their newly-acquired glory consecrated by the justly-honoured insignia of the glory of former times.

It was also decided that without proscribing the cross of *la Réunion* which recalled vain and even dangerous recollections—the union of territories which under Napoleon had so alarmed Europe—this decoration should not be again conferred on any one. This was a certain means of extinguishing the order. As to the Order of the Iron Crown, which now belonged to the sovereigns of Lombardy, that, as well as other foreign orders, could not be worn in France without the king's permission.

In maintaining the Legion of Honour, it would be necessary to modify the decoration, for Louis XVIII. and the princes of his family could not be expected to wear upon their breasts a likeness of Napoleon. M. de Talleyrand was the first member of the council who spoke on this subject. Treated in general by Louis XVIII. with a politeness unmingled with the slightest shade of gratitude, he felt that to maintain his position he must endeavour to please, and, spite of his personal haughtiness, he did not disdain to give himself the trouble. He proposed that the likeness of Louis XVIII. should be substituted for that of Napoleon on the *plaque* of the Legion of Honour. Marshal Oudinot, with great simplicity, eagerly adopted this opinion. The other members of the council, entertaining grave objections to this proposition, but not daring to make them in presence of the king, observed a profound silence. This silence soon became embarrassing for the flatterer who had been so ill supported, and might have become embarrassing to the king himself, had not Louis, with a rather sarcastic smile, appeared to enjoy the confusion of the others without participating in it. Wishing to put a termination to the awkwardness of this mute scene, General Bournoville proposed that the question should be referred to a special commission selected from the members of the council. This proposition did not put an end to the silence which still prevailed, as if the members of the council entertained sentiments which could not find expression in the king's presence. The Duke de Berry—the only member of the council who was never embarrassed, and the only one for whom, either through affection or fear, the king showed any consideration—spoke out boldly, and made no scruple of saying that it would appear very strange to see a likeness of Louis XVIII. decorate an order created by Napoleon for services performed under Napoleon, and proposed the likeness of Henri IV., which might, without fear of instituting comparisons, replace all others. The hardness and good sense of the prince untied the flattered tongues, and M. Ferrand, with a frankness be-

coming in friends, adopted and supported the opinion of the Duke de Berry. M. de Blacas then proposed, not a likeness of any king which might suggest comparisons not agreeable to Louis XVIII., but a figure of France. This proposition was too suggestive of republican ideas. Louis XVIII. at length broke the silence which he had hitherto observed, thanked his nephew very much, observed that he was not one of those princes who were desirous of statues whilst they were yet living, and that, were he capable of such weakness, the fate of him whose likeness they were about to set aside would be sufficient to correct the folly, but that, after having maturely considered the proposal of the Duke de Berry and that of M. de Blacas, he approved the project of adopting a likeness of Henri IV. The skilful flatterer who had sought to please, saw his flattery rejected on every side,—rejected even by him to whom it was personally addressed; but he was not a man to be embarrassed about such a rife. Like the others, he adopted the opinion of the king, and it was agreed that on one side of the medal of the Legion of Honour, the likeness of Henri IV. should appear, and on the other, three *fleur de lis*. It was also arranged that as soon as the change was effected, all the Bourbon princes should wear the cross of the Legion of Honour on their breasts.

The different measures we have just recorded, though dictated, for the most part, by impetuous necessity, would have deeply offended the army, even had they not furnished any pretext of malevolence. But considering all that the Bourbons had done merely to please their friends, and the irritation that prevailed among military men, and the spirit of injustice, consequent on this irritation, it is no wonder that these proceedings were taken in bad part, provoked bitter criticisms, and often even dangerous resistance. The imperial guard still resided at Fontainebleau. The old guards had not been disbanded, but as they were no longer to guard the sovereign's person, neither should they reside at Paris,—a privilege so ambitioned by the troops in general. A report was circulated, which was certainly well founded, that even at Fontainebleau the guards were thought too near the capital, and that the infantry could be sent to Lorraine, and the cavalry tolanders, Picardy, and Touraine. This intelligence produced a great commotion in the ranks, and a number of the soldiers traversed the streets of Fontainebleau, exclaiming, "*Vive l'Empereur!*"

To the Duke de Berry was confided the task of establishing a good understanding between the army and the house of Bourbon, and no person could be better suited to the task. He went to Fontainebleau to visit the guards, who did not yet feel honoured by the presence of any member of the royal family. Officers whose good will had been won by flattering their ambition, endeavoured to prepare him a deception. He was received respectfully and in silence. Cries of *Vive le Roi!* were uttered by some partisans, but met with no response. However, the prince, accompanied by Marshal Adinot, who commanded the infantry of the guards, and by Marshal Ney, who commanded the cavalry, was easy and familiar in his manners, and paid many compliments to the old

soldiers. The pains he took had the effect of making them conceal the sentiments which sometimes burst forth imprudently, but did not change them in any degree. It is possible that the king might have won the affections of the guards had he frankly confided his person to their keeping, conferring on them exclusively the privileges and title of a *corps d'élite*; at least he would have obtained sufficient influence over them to have been quite safe in their hands. But in re-establishing the household troops and confiding the care of his person to them, he had irrevocably rendered back to Napoleon the affections of the imperial guard.

Since the departure of the foreign troops, especial care had been taken to garrison Paris with the regiments favoured with new titles, such as the regiments of the King, Queen, Monsieur, &c. These precautions did not tend to excite a better feeling in the barracks. In these places cries were every day heard of *Vive l'Empereur!* The Duke de Berry made a point of visiting the barracks frequently, but that did not prevent his frequently hearing seditious cries. Not deficient either in presence of mind or quickness of repartee, when able to control his temper, he drew near a soldier, who during one of his visits had cried *Vive l'Empereur*, and asked him why he uttered that exclamation. "Because Napoleon has a hundred times led us to victory," replied the soldier. "A great miracle, indeed," said the prince, "with soldiers like you." The reply made an impression, and was quickly circulated through the barracks. The prince was highly complimented on his wit, but the sentiments of the army continued unaltered.

But things assumed another aspect when the young men of the household troops appeared in the streets of Paris. Their uniform was very handsome; of this they were proud, as was natural enough; and as they enjoyed the rank of officer, they had a right to the military salute. More than once the soldiers refused this salute, and military punishments had no effect in changing their dispositions. What was still more serious, the national guard became engaged in the quarrel. No sooner was the first corps of the household guard organized, than this body supplanted the national guard in the interior of the palace, leaving the latter only the external posts. This was, so to speak, giving the national guards the door, and it would have been better either to deprive them of all their privileges, or leave them all. But a fortuitous circumstance aggravated this exclusion from the interior of the Tuileries. The day the body-guards were first put on duty, they repaired to their appointed post at an hour when the greater number of the national guards were gone to dinner. They took possession of the post without ceremony, putting the arms of the absent soldiers outside. When the latter returned, they found their place taken, and their arms displaced without any of the forms usually observed by soldiers towards each other under such circumstances. The national guards complained loudly, and went about communicating their discontent to the neighbouring detachments. Though what had occurred was only the effect of awkwardness, and not of any intention to offend, nevertheless a general commotion was excited

through the ranks of the national guard. The legion, generally posted at the Tuileries, declared that they would not mount guard there again, either within or without the palace, and the effect produced was such that M. de Blacas was obliged to write a letter to General Dessoles, thanking the national guards in the king's name and in the most flattering terms for their services. A banquet was even got up between the body-guards and a select number of the national guards, but all these measures only served to publish, not to appease, the discord.

The king, on his side, continued to show the most marked attentions to the heads of the army. He received Marshal Massena, complimented him largely on his great exploits, and informed him that he should soon be naturalized by an act of the two chambers. The king also received Carnot in his quality of head inspector of engineers, and Admiral Verhuel as a navy officer, who had remained in the French service, without seeming to remember that the former was a regicide, and that the latter had defended the Texel to the last extremity. After having made so many sacrifices, it would seem that the Bourbons had need to soothe their wounded feelings at the expense of some great military hero of the day. Marshal Davout was the victim devoted to satisfy the resentments of royalty. His resistance at Hamburg, as we have already said, had offended the allied sovereigns; and, as we have observed, this marshal had fired on the white flag, seeing it associated with the Russian. Actuated by these different motives, the Bourbons were strongly irritated against him, and, besides, they believed him devoted to Napoleon, which proves how badly they were informed, for the marshal had been in disgrace since 1812. He was consequently the only one among the marshals whom the king would not receive. The War Minister was commissioned to inform him that, having compromised the French name on foreign service, it was necessary that he should explain his conduct before he could be admitted to court. The marshal received this intelligence with great indifference, and proceeded with the memoir he was writing, to show France and Europe what his conduct had been at Hamburg.

From this moment Marshal Davout, who had been always much respected, but very little loved, by the military, became suddenly their idol. The Boulevard des Italiens and the Palais Royal constituted a kind of public meeting-place for the officers who had left their regiments, and who were not in a hurry to return, notwithstanding the repeated orders of the War Minister. Some were possessed of personal property, and spent at Paris the money they received from their families; others had no private fortune, and consumed in a few days their arrears of pay, but preferred remaining in the capital and giving vent to their discontent than to return to their regiments and become what was called half-pay officers. They crowded the Palais Royal and the Boulevard, put their own construction on every act of the Government, ridiculed the impotent king, and contrasted his lumbering heaviness with the rapid movements of the man whose

diabolical activity they had lately cursed; they laughed at the king's household troops, and still more at the old emigrants who daily repaired in deputations to the Tuileries, and who certainly afforded abundant food for laughter. Sometimes it was a deputation from one of the Vendean armies, or from the army of Condé, that served so long on the Rhine, or representatives of the celebrated camp of Jales that appeared in the provincial costume of their time; they visited the king, and then visited Monsieur, and poured out all the feelings of their hearts to the latter; they presented petitions, and returned decorated with the order of the lily, or gratified with the promise of a pension. Here was continual subject of merriment for our young officers; and some, with the heedless folly of their age, went so far as to borrow the costume of the soldiers of the old *régime*, and walked through Paris, followed by crowds of their comrades, when the sight of this disguise threw into roars of laughter. But these scenes did not always end so jocosely, for duels sometimes ensued, but happily not often, few daring to seek a quarrel with officers of the imperial army, and the princes restrained those who would have ventured. But mingled with these wild jests was a well-founded sadness. We have already spoken of the hundreds of Government functionaries, custom-house officers, tax-gatherers, and police-officers, who had accompanied the troops on their return, shared their dangers, imitated their heroism, and who were, with their wives and children, dying of hunger at Paris. It was only natural that they should join the groups of discontented officers, and the gayety of the latter heightened the desolating spectacle of their misery. Baron Louis, more solicitous to establish order in the financial department than to relieve these unfortunate men, had the folly to refuse them the assistance which, without adding much to the budget, would have solaced unmerited misfortunes: the consequence was that many committed suicide. This strange combination of scenes, some burlesque, others heart-rending, produced an unfavourable effect upon the public mind, and caused much disquiet.

One of the means devised for re-establishing military discipline, and furnishing high appointments to the marshals who had not obtained offices at court, was to place them in the principal military divisions, with increased powers and rich emoluments. In the first place, the Government thought it prudent to disperse the marshals; secondly, the Government was well aware that, if the marshals were not always pleased with a court where they felt they were strangers, though highly flattered, yet they did not desire the return of Napoleon, and that, if dispersed through the provinces, they would endeavour to exercise their authority over the troops, and labour to bring them back to their duty. It was therefore determined to send the marshals to the provinces. At Paris, the commander of the military division was placed too near the royal authority to possess much importance. However, a man of determination was needed, and General Maison was chosen, who at Lille had displayed such extraordinary energy, and was not reputed a friend of Napoleon's. The mar-

als were differently disposed of. Marshal Oudinot was sent to Rouen, where he had unfurled the white flag; Marshal Mortier was sent to Flanders, Marshal Oudinot to Lorraine, Marshal Ney to Franche-Comté,—the three latter to the provinces where they were born; Marshal Kellerman was sent to Alsace, where he had always had the command of the depots; Marshal Angereau, to Lyons, where he had recently commanded; Marshal Massena was appointed to Provence, where he was stationed at the time of the Restoration; Marshal MacDonald was sent to Touraine, and Marshal Oudinot to Bretagne. The latter, who had fallen into disgrace after the events at Toulouse, had at first shown considerable irritation, but afterward, yielding to the good advice of General Dupont, had become gradually calmer, and had sent assurances to the king of his sincere loyalty. He had, consequently, obtained the command of the most royalist province in France, where it was thought his good faith might without risk be put to the proof. We shall soon see the result of these brilliant appointments, of which in the commencement such sanguine hopes were formed.

Whilst such little influence was gained over the soldiers, even in making such great efforts to gain the good will of their chiefs, there was still less success achieved with other classes, whom it was necessary to manage carefully to prevent them joining the discontented military. Scarcely was the royal family established in France, than a funeral service was ordered for Louis XVI., Marie Antoinette, and the other august victims who had perished on the scaffold. There was certainly no event of the Revolution more calculated to inspire sad reflection than the death of the unfortunate Louis XVI., whose good intentions had been repaid by an iniquitous condemnation, and celebrating a funeral service for him was merely rendering homage to his misfortunes. But when party spirit runs high, what some do in all simplicity others do maliciously, and the public pay especial attention to the latter. It was to be feared that this homage to great misfortune might become the source of fresh discord. However this may be, the 16th of May was chosen,—the anniversary of the death of Henry IV.,—and a funeral service was celebrated in all the churches of Paris in honour of the royal victims immolated in 1793. Conformably to the doctrine of forgetting the past, the will of Louis XVI. was read, in which, on the eve of his death, he pardoned in such touching terms all his enemies. But in the provinces, the example which was followed with regard to the ceremony was not observed with regard to the manner of celebrating it. The clergy pronounced funeral orations, and gave utterance on the occasion to incendiary language. The entire Revolution was represented as one long crime, where all, both men and things, were stained with guilt, where every thing was to be condemned, even the principles of justice, in whose name the Revolution had been effected, and which had just been consecrated by the charter.

The royalist press envenomed still more the quarrel, by replying to those who appealed to the oblivion promised by the charter, saying at the sense in which the Government had

promised the act of oblivion was, that the authors of the revolutionary crimes should never be judicially punished, but that no promise had been made to silence the public conscience in their regard, or to consider as indifferent acts which were in themselves atrocious, or to suppress, in the eyes of France, tears due to noble victims; that if these testimonies of grief offended the perpetrators of certain crimes, their susceptibility could meet with no attention, as, on the contrary, those persons ought to consider themselves happy in being allowed to exhibit on the soil of France their barefaced impunity, but that they could not be promised either the esteem or silence of honest people, and that if the days of public mourning were disagreeable to them, it was the duty of criminals, and not of the expiators of crime, to hide themselves during those days, which were so short and so rare. We may easily suppose the effect produced by such language, both on the men directly attacked, and on those connected with them, if not by a community of acts, at least by a community of principles.

Having once betaken themselves to inopportune recollections, the royalists did not know where to stop. After Louis XVI. and Marie Antoinette came Madame Elizabeth, the Duke d'Enghien, Moreau, Pichegru, and—can it be believed?—even Georges Cadoudal, who, before the bar of public justice, had confessed his intention of killing the First Consul on the road to Malmaison. The priest who assisted him in his last moments was sought out, and commissioned to officiate at the funeral ceremony. The royalists went further, and had the impudence to announce that the king would defray the expense of the ceremony. This was gratuitously compromising Louis XVIII. with the moderate liberals, who were disposed to regard him as more prudent than his family and his party. This ceremony produced a great commotion among the military, who did not conceal their indignation, and so alarmed the police that they thought it their duty to acquaint the king with the circumstance.

Acting in this manner was sure to bind in a common and close bond the revolutionists, even the most moderate, with the military and all the partisans of the Empire. Nor were the holders of national property, and the priests who had taken the oath, treated with more circumspection. In reality, the Bourbons were deeply grieved that, being re-established in France, they were not able to restore to the emigrants their property; and they were vexed to hear it said that, now in possession of the Tuilleries, they did not bestow a thought on those who were starving because of their devotion to the Bourbon cause. The princes need only possess good and grateful hearts, to adopt these opinions and sentiments. But the science of politics, without being either ungrateful or immoral, and solely because it is reason applied to the government of states, is often condemned to make painful sacrifices. But when we consider that the church property might have been legitimately alienated; when we reflect that the property of the emigrants might have been as justly dealt with,—for the emigrants had made war on their country,—and that the power of confiscating property,

since justly abolished, but which was at that time the law of the land, might have been correctly applied to the acts by which these persons had rendered themselves guilty; and especially when we consider that a general subversion of the ownership of property would have followed the revocation of the national sales, state policy, which was not supposed to feel and reason like the Bourbons, was right to sanction these sales by an irrevocable act. But the Bourbon princes thought as M. Lainé, and wished that the holders of property, sanctioned by law but opposed by public opinion, should restore this property to the ancient proprietors for a pecuniary consideration. Holding these opinions, it was only natural that the Bourbons should encourage or permit every act conformable to such ideas.

The clergy, still more imprudent than the emigrants, began to hold in the provincial pulpits a language still more dangerous. They preached publicly against the Concordat, against the sale of church property and the sale of emigrants' property, and carried their temerity so far as to refuse the sacraments to the holders of such property who refused, when dying, to make *restitution*, according to an expression at that time in general use.

But they did not limit their attacks to the holders of national property: they were equally severe against the moderate clergy,—against those that had accepted the Concordat; and they thus awakened dissension in the bosom of the Church. Unfortunately, the constitution drawn up by the Senate had not guaranteed the maintenance of the Concordat; and if any thing can give an idea of the service rendered by this body in sanctioning afresh the social and political principles of the French Revolution, it is the subversion that now threatened the religious order of things because the Senate had neglected to ratify the Concordat. In fact, nothing less was contemplated than the abolition of all the changes that the Revolution had effected in the Church, and which had been sanctioned by time, by the law of the land, and by the approval of enlightened men.

We have not forgotten the state in which the First Consul found religion in 1800. A considerable number of priests had accepted the civil constitution proposed to the clergy, either through meekness of temper, through love of peace, or through sincere approval of what was reasonable in this constitution. Others had refused through conscientious scruples, and some through party spirit. The priests who had sworn to observe the civil constitution had at this price retained the right to celebrate public worship. Those who refused had incurred the interdict of the Government, but preserved the confidence of the faithful. The former celebrated public worship in the churches, in absolute solitude; the latter officiated in private houses, surrounded by large congregations. The latter declared every official act of the priests who had taken the oath to be void, and re-married and re-baptized all those for whom the others had performed such services; and so of all the acts of civil life in which religion had a part. But the dissonance did not stop here. Many bishoprics had remained vacant, because the Pope refused to

consecrate bishops nominated by the temporal power; and in this confusion of opinions, since believers did not know to whom they ought to listen, the unbelievers took occasion to despise alike the priests who had taken the oath and those who had not taken it. They went so far as to proscribe all, as we have seen during the epoch called the Reign of Terror. But, whilst the convention proscribed the priests, the royalists in Vendée made use of them to excite, keep up, and foment the civil war. Such was the state of the Church immediately previous to the passing of the Concordat. The First Consul, exulting in his then stainless glory and unlimited influence over the public mind, and his then unrivalled power in Europe, had induced the Pope to sanction all that was reasonable in the civil constitution of the clergy, to make the diocesan circumscriptions coincide as nearly as possible with the administrative, to diminish the number of bishoprics (which was excessive) and proportion them to the number of departments, and accept the double principle of a temporal nomination of bishops by the head of the state, and their spiritual consecration by the Holy See. He induced the Pope, moreover, to recognise the principal social changes that had taken place; such as the discharge of civil functions by civil magistrates, the abolition of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and the alienation of church property, &c. &c. The First Consul had promised, in return, that the state should protect the Catholic worship, give the clergy suitable incomes, and, in a word, confer on them all the distinction to which they are entitled in a country at once religious and enlightened. In short, wishing to put an end to a deplorable schism, the Pope and First Consul had agreed to abolish the ancient *personnel* of the French Church and reconstitute it, by selecting from among the *assermentés* and the non-*assermentés* clergy—that is, from among those who had taken the civil oath and those who had not taken it—those who were most virtuous, pure, and attached to religion and to France. Such was the great treaty of peace with the Church, which did so much honour to General Bonaparte and to Napoleon VII., because it was conducive alike to the good of the country and the Church; a treaty more glorious and more solid than those of Luneville, Presburg, and Tilsit, for whilst the latter, the offspring of victory and short-lived as the source from which they sprung, have been effaced from the national law of Europe, the former, founded on immutable reason, still subsists, and, spite of the exaggerations of certain men, will subsist as long as public worship exists in France, because it is the only rule that an enlightened religion and a policy at once pious and independent can accept.

If there was any single act which tended to strengthen the power of the First Consul and to abridge his passage to the throne, it was incontestably the Concordat. Peace with the Church, peace with Europe, and the civil code, had been Napoleon's three dazzling titles to the empire. The Bourbons in their exile had felt the full force of the Concordat. They had feared, opposed, and hated it more than any other act of Napoleon; and they had, by their influence, contributed very much to prevent the bishops from giving in their resignation

to the Pope, as he demanded. In fact, thirteen bishops had refused, and ten or twelve of these were still living. But so conformable was the Concordat to public opinion that these recusants retained no authority, and the prelates nominated by Napoleon and Pius VII. to the sees, whose former occupants had not given in their resignation, had been recognised, respected, and obeyed like those who had been nominated to vacant sees. Some unbending priests obstinately refused to recognise the bishops whose predecessors had not resigned their functions, and were living in London: these received the ridiculous and deserved appellation of *the little church*,—a title that corresponded with their position and importance in the religious world.

Napoleon having, through his own fault, put the Bourbons in possession of the throne, his wisest work was threatened to be involved in the same ruin as his most foolish. In fact, the Bourbon princes, bound by the senatorial constitution, since called the *charter*, were obliged, by policy as well as by law, to respect certain principles; but they were free in religious matters, because no provision had been made for the maintenance of the Concordat, and they wished in this particular to restore absolutely the past form of things. And this mode of thinking on the part of the Bourbon princes was very natural, for, besides that their religious principles had that tendency, they were urged to it by the importunities of their friends, against whose arguments they could not, in this case, allege the obligations of an article of the charter. Add to this that the Bourbons not only detested the Concordat, remembering the evil it had caused them, but they detested the Pope himself, whose complaisance to Napoleon they had not yet pardoned, and whom they regarded in the light of a priest who had taken the civil oath, but to whom they were obliged to be civil, because that his power, like theirs, was based on legitimacy; but they were at the same time determined to abolish all of his works that they could. Let us only imagine the consequences of such an undertaking. We should see the Pope abolishing the existing ecclesiastical dioceses to re-establish the ancient, and a second time demanding their resignation from the bishops in order to restore those he had formerly dispossessed, thus reorganizing the clergy of a country in a spirit of blind reaction, which would be, in other words, only to fall back on the former distinction between priests *assermentés* and non-*assermentés*, which would be reviving schism in the Church, setting the priests at war, and putting the faithful in confusion; whilst the Pope, belying by his own act his infallibility, would have proclaimed himself the most fallible of princes, and the Church would have resold, under threat of excommunication, the ecclesiastical property which the Bourbons had pledged themselves, by the conditions of the charter, to leave in possession of the actual holders! Nothing but the profound ignorance of the emigrants with regard to all that concerned France, could excuse an enterprise which, at every step, would have plunged them into inextricable embarrassment and immense danger.

However, being free to make the attempt,

the Bourbons were determined to do so; and they began by refusing to recognise certain bishops or hold any relation with them. Cardinal Maury had already been expelled from his see, because the Count d'Artois had declared that he would not be received by him at Notre-Dame the day he entered Paris. Cardinal Maury was not certainly, even according to the conditions of the Concordat, in a regular position; but a like resolution was adopted with regard to many whom the Pope had nominated, under pretext that some had taken the civil oath, and that others occupied sees whose ancient titulars were living in London, after having, in 1802, refused to give in their resignation to the Pope. These bishops, who had not given in their resignation, quitted London and hastened to Paris, where they were made acquainted with the project, which indeed was no longer a secret, of overturning the conditions of the Concordat. All the clergy were informed of the projected change, and immediately, in all the sees where there were two titulars, schism again sprung up. For example, at Rochelle, as we have already said, the titular appointed by Napoleon in virtue of the Concordat, and installed by the Pope, and consequently possessing the double investiture, temporal and spiritual, was opposed by the ancient titular, who had not given in his resignation. A species of sedition sprung up among the clergy. The greater number refused to acknowledge the authority of the modern, but accepted that of the exiled bishop, who opposed the Concordat. This species of schism had made rapid progress in the two Charentes, Dordogne, Vendée, the two Sèvres, the Lower Loire, Loire-et-Cher, Sarthe, and Mayenne, so that the people no longer knew what religious authority they ought to obey. Consequent on this disorder was the rule of passion, the only influence that then was obeyed. Sermons were preached against the Concordat, against the priests who had taken the civil oath, and against the holders of national property; so that the ebullitions of political zeal were added those of a religious character. At the other extremity of France—that is to say, in Franche-Comté—where the public mind, though moderate in political matters, was violent in religious, there arose disorders of a somewhat different character, but quite as serious, and more scandalous, if possible. Lecoz, Bishop of Besançon, an ancient constitutional prelate and a priest of high character, had, owing to the firmness of the First Consul, been consecrated by Pius VII., and recognised as one of those elected in virtue of the Concordat. He had thus received the twofold installation of the temporal and spiritual powers. He administered his diocese with piety and propriety, but he had given asylum among his flock to several priests who had taken the civil oath, without displaying either vindictiveness or partiality toward the others. In short, in his case, there did not exist the pretext which the existence of an ancient titular who had refused to give in his resignation might furnish. Yet a kind of interdict had been pronounced against the Bishop of Besançon, and the people, without refusing him a material obedience in favour of a non-existing competitor, shunned him as a criminal, and refused to see, not only him, but

all the priests belonging to the accursed class of *assermentés*. The prefect was the first to give this lamentable example.

Though the French clergy, throughout the kingdom, in the thoughtlessness of their conduct only acted in conformity with the proceedings of the Government, yet they carried things so far as seriously to annoy and embarrass the Government. In fact, it was impossible to revoke the Concordat without the sanction of the Pope, and those who through zeal for the Church had revolted against her decrees could not, however, so far ignore her existence as to wish to act independently of her authority. It was, therefore, a matter of absolute necessity, whilst the revocation of the Concordat was being negotiated with Pius VII., that the existing religious authorities should be recognised, under penalty of inducing a general anarchy, for in some parts of France there were persons ready to expel certain priests by violence, and to dispossess the holders of national property.* The Abbé de Montesquiou, who clearly foresaw the consequences of such conduct, pointed out the danger to the king, and obtained authority to write a letter to the Bishop of Rochelle, who was actual titular in virtue of the twofold nomination by the Emperor and the Pope, telling him that he ought to exact obedience from the priests of his diocese, that those who entertained scruples had only to resign their functions, and, that if secular authority was needed to secure their obedience, this authority was at his command. But the silence observed in this letter with regard to the Concordat proved that the Government regarded this treaty only as a provisional regulation of temporary obligation, and that they were inclined to afford the unfortunate bishop a purely physical, and by no means a moral, force. Consequently the letter, written rather for the information of Paris than of Rochelle, had no influence whatsoever, and the police found it necessary to notify to the king its complete inutility.

Meanwhile negotiations were being carried on at Rome. The king had selected M. Courtois de Pressigny, the venerable Bishop of Saint Malo, and appointed him ambassador extraordinary to the Holy See. His instructions were as follows:—Whilst conserving toward the Holy See the respect which the house of Bourbon could never refuse, Pius VII. was at the same time to be made gently to understand that he had been too indulgent toward the usurper, but that the Bourbons, in consideration of his sacred character and his misfortunes, were willing to forget this; but that, if they showed such consideration, he would be expected, on the other hand, to erase all traces of his weakness, by ignoring what had taken place, even with his concurrence, since the entrance of the French into Italy, a proceeding that would wholly nullify the Concordat. As the immediate consequence of such an act, the Pope was required to immediately reconstitute the ancient sees to the number of 135, to re-

* It has sometimes been denied that things had reached this extremity, especially in what regarded national property. It is only necessary to read the police reports laid before Louis XVIII., and the correspondence relative to ecclesiastical affairs, to perceive that there is nothing more than the exact truth in the description we have made.

establish in these sees the bishops who had refused to resign in 1802, and who were still living, for, as the court of France said, they had been persecuted and exiled during five-and-twenty years for the true faith, and they had as good a claim to return to their dioceses as Louis XVIII. had to return to Paris, or the Pope to Rome. Pius VII. was in fact requested to re-establish a circumscription that the Church herself had pronounced to be unreasonable; he was asked to dispossess bishops that he had himself invested, to reinstate those whose dismissal he had demanded, and who had disobeyed him, and he was required to act thus a second time in twelve years by those who had declared his conduct overweening and illegal when he had first attempted to put these measures into practice! What deplorable and scandalous contradictions to impose upon an unfortunate pontiff, whose moral authority ought to have been dear to princes whose interest it was to exalt that divine right from which they pretended kingly power had emanated!

But, whilst this embassy was in preparation, reason was not more influential at Rome than at Paris, and Pius VII., wishing to modify the Concordat on some points that touched the Church of Rome intimately, sent a messenger to Louis XVIII., who arrived at the very time that the ambassador whom we have mentioned was leaving for Italy. After having congratulated the head of the house of Bourbon on the re-establishment of his family on the throne of France, the Pope expressed the greatest confidence in his religious sentiments, and advised him not to accept the senatorial constitution, (the promulgation of the Charter was not yet known at Rome,) he begged him to refuse freedom of religious worship, and to restore to the French Church endowments in landed property. He moreover implored his influence with the other Powers to procure the restoration to the Holy See of the Legations, Pontecorvo, and Benevento. (Benevento belonged to M. de Talleyrand, through whom this message was to be transmitted to the king.) He lastly demanded the restoration of Avignon, which was in the hands of the French, and which Louis XVIII., Pius VII. said, could not, as eldest son of the Church, refuse to restore to the Holy See.

It must certainly be admitted that those revolutions that have for their object a remote future, and make no account of the present, are often very unreasonable; but those counter-revolutions that pretend to recall an irrevocable past are not less so; and one is unavoidably struck with this truth in beholding Louis XVIII. demanding from the Pope the revocation of the Concordat, whilst the Pope in return requires of him the restoration of Avignon!

Fortunately the pretensions of neither the one nor the other had any chance of meeting serious attention, but the agitation excited in many parts of France had not yet subsided, and there still remained the bad effects of many imprudent acts committed in religious matters, which France was disposed to take in very bad part. Of this there was at the very time a sad and vexatious example.

The Count d'Artois, and the Duke and Duchess d'Angoulême, had been much grieved on their return to France to see the Sabbath

so ill observed, and to see, on this day appointed for rest and prayer, the shops open from early morning, and men often engaged in the public works until evening; besides, places of public amusement were more accessible and more frequented on the Sunday than on any other day of the week. They were surprised, returning fresh from England, where life is as it were suspended on Sunday, to find Catholicism less observant of the precepts of Scripture than Protestantism; and they several times declared to M. Beugnot, chief of police, that it was a revolutionary scandal, that ought to cease with the return of the legitimate princes. M. Beugnot, touched by these reproaches, and besides looking upon Sunday as an institution as respectable in a social as in a religious point of view, carefully rummaged all the edicts of the monarchy, and even all the ordinances of the republic, touching the observance of the *décadés*, and in his researches brought to light enactments which he believed he had a right to revive. Consequently, on the 4th of June, he issued a police ordinance, prescribing the rigorous observance of Sundays and holidays. In virtue of this decree, the shops were to be closed on Sunday from morning to evening; no workmen would be allowed to appear on scaffoldings or in workshops, and vehicles used for the transport of goods were forbidden to travel. Public houses and cafés might be opened after noon, and rooms for public dancing in the evening; chemists only and herbalists were allowed to keep their doors open the entire day. These regulations were enforced under penalties varying from one hundred to five hundred francs, and the confiscation of the prohibited goods.

These decrees proved a total ignorance not alone of the spirit of young France, but of France at every period of her history, for she had always preferred personal to political liberty, not brooking restraint in her easy and often careless gait of going when it pleased her to assume such; inclined to find fault and offer opposition still more in little than in great things, sometimes permitting her Government to perpetrate without opposition an act that might decide her fate, and suddenly taking fire about a public show of which she was debarred; ready to become pious under an infidel Government, and almost impious under a religious one, and yet in reality more sober-minded than any one could suppose who considered only these singular contradictions. A great commotion was raised in Paris when on Sunday an attempt was made to force the shops to shut in the morning which were generally closed only in the afternoon, and to expel the artisans from the workshops which were usually open for the greater part of the day, and to stop vehicles under pretext that what they carried was inducted, and enforce for these delinquencies severe penalties, adduced from edicts published a century before. To call out the national guard for the enforcement of these regulations was scarcely possible, for the men were already fatigued with repressing disturbances of another kind. It was the municipal guard of Paris, though fully occupied with other duties, that was employed on this, which they executed amid the outcries of an active and industrious population.

The effect was nearly the same on all classes, and the Government which the people called a Government of foreigners, of nobles and emigrants, was now called, in addition, a Government of bigots; and the fault-finders who already laughed at its policy now sneered at its devotion. The public excitement became so strong as to alarm the council, and bring down upon M. Beugnot from the Duke de Berry severe reproaches, couched in a soldierly style.

"You wish," he said, "to get us the reputation of being bigots, and you could not select a more certain means of rendering us unpopular in France."

Louis XVIII., who, without being a bigot, was desirous of the abolition of the Concordat, said that on this occasion measures had been too promptly adopted, and were, to say the least, imprudent.

It was scarcely three months since the Bourbons had returned to France, and already, without any bad intention, but solely because they had not been able to restrain themselves and their friends, they had alienated the army by reductions which were certainly inevitable, but maladroitly effected at the same time as the re-establishment of the king's military household; and they had hurt the feelings of the men still attached to the Revolution by pious ceremonies, certainly due to the memory of Louis XVI., but accompanied by some serious inconveniences, and induced them to join the Bonapartists, to whom they were by no means attached; the Bourbons had completely alienated the moderate-minded clergy, by far the most numerous of their class, by extravagant attacks against the priests who had taken the civil oath, and against the Concordat. The holders of national property had been alarmed by orations, sanctioned from the pulpit, against the sale of church property, and by numerous remarks that had their origin at the Tuileries. And ill-judged police regulations had exasperated the influential middle class, whose members, without being irreligious, wished to remain free to choose their form of worship on customs of life; to be religious if they wished, or the contrary if it suited them. And so the Bourbons proceeded, establishing an opposition in all things—not alone against the personal interests and intelligence of the people, but against their customs and tastes, and even the peculiarities of the time and country.

These different acts, following each other in quick succession, were to be submitted to a very high tribunal, fortunately a very prudent one, and by no means inclined to bend to court influences: this tribunal was that of the two chambers constituted by the Charter. The king, it must be remembered, had assembled the chambers on the 4th of June, to communicate to them the conditions of the Charter and put them in a position to proceed with their labours. From that period they had regularly met, and had in the first instance laid down regulations by which their debates were to be governed,—a labour which ought of necessity to precede all others, for before commencing to deliberate it would be necessary to determine the form of their deliberations. After some discussion, this question was decided, and that form of proceeding was adopted which seemed

most favourable to the peaceful and serious examination of business. The terrible memories connected with the Committee of Public Safety had brought everlasting odium on permanent committees, which, seizing on certain departments of the Government, such as the financial, the war department, foreign or home policy, the magistracy or the police, had established in these departments a kind of sovereignty, and exercised a dangerous, often a sanguinary, despotism. But, as every assembly must of necessity be subdivided in order to examine each question in the calm of private meetings, the chambers adopted the system of selecting committees of twenty or thirty members, to be changed every month by lot, and these were to examine in a summary manner the affairs submitted to them, and transfer to a commission appointed for the purpose, the care of entering more minutely into details and making a report to the assembly in full sitting. This form of proceeding having been adopted, the rest followed, as a matter of course; and it is this mode which has since prevailed, and must always prevail, where a determination exists to escape the tyranny of parties.

These regulations having been agreed to, the two chambers commenced their sittings, and notified the fact to the king. The Chamber of Deputies, formerly the legislative corps, presented five candidates, from among whom the king, according to the conditions of the Charter, was to select a president. The king chose M. Lainé, who had the largest number of votes, and who was indebted for this twofold preference to his high talents, his good sense, and the part he had played the preceding December, when, acting as representative of the legislative corps, he so highly excited the anger of Napoleon. The Chamber of Deputies, being now fully installed, set to work.

Amid the revival of political passions so long suppressed, the assembling of the two chambers for business was a grave circumstance; and though they were the same that assembled under the Empire, the one consisting of two-thirds and the other of the entire of the former members, they held in abhorrence the idea of resembling the former assemblies, and were determined not to relapse into the submission with which they had been so often reproached. Happily, the chambers were composed of prudent, experienced men, imbued with the spirit with which the Government ought to have been penetrated. These men had not wished the return of the Bourbons, but Napoleon had become an impossibility; they had recalled the Bourbons as a necessity, and they sincerely wished that these princes should become one with France, such as a prodigious revolution had left her. These men did not wish to hasten events, they had even come to the determination of tolerating many errors, but on condition that the general direction of the Government should be rational and directed toward the proper object.

On the other hand, the Government, seeing the chambers in full operation, preparations for which had occupied the month of June, and conscious that certain thoughtless acts would be severely judged in the chambers, began to consider what line of conduct should be adopted with respect to them. M. de Mon-

tesquieu, who, as Minister of the Interior, had a right, and as ancient member of the Constituent Assembly, believed he had a claim to appear before the chambers and obtain a hearing, gave it as his opinion that the ministers ought to observe an extreme reserve with regard to the chambers, to bring few matters under their consideration, and avoid as much as possible bringing forward questions in which they had a right to take the initiative; and the budget once passed, and the financial system accepted, it would be better to adjourn the sittings to afford rest both to the members of the chambers and the ministers.

The advice thus offered was founded on an opinion more false than true, though very generally received, that the ministers, not possessing the patronage which exists in England, would not be able so easily to manage the French Chambers, and, not being sufficiently powerful to guide, ought to treat them cautiously.

The Duke de Berry exclaimed against a mode of proceeding which would annul or at least diminish the royal authority, but his remonstrances were disregarded; the ministers were accustomed to his outbursts of feeling, and the advice of M. de Montesquieu was adopted, with the exception that the mode of conduct traced by that minister was to be modified according to circumstances.

But the chambers were determined, under any circumstances, to make the ministers act openly and declare their policy; and their mode of effecting this object was by acting with vigour themselves. No sooner had the Chamber of Deputies met for business, than notices of motions followed each other in quick succession. M. Bouvier-Dumolard—an ancient prefect of the Empire, and formerly a member of many public bodies, an honest but hot-tempered man, fond of noisy declamation, and more inclined to speak than his auditors were to listen—proposed a petition to the king, requesting that a law should be passed declaring that the two chambers were the real parliament of France, and the only public body that had a right to be so called. M. Bouvier-Dumolard wished by this measure to place the two French Chambers in the same position as the English Chambers, and at the same time reply to a protestation said to have been made against the Charter, and much talked of at the time, which was believed to be the work of the surviving members of the ancient parliaments. M. Bouvier-Dumolard's vague proposition produced no effect, but it might have had, had the protestation to which we have alluded possessed a more serious character. Two propositions followed, which met with more attention.

M. Durbach, one of the members for Aves, a man devoid of all personal pretensions, but full of fervent feeling, and closely connected with the revolutionists, condemned, as contrary to the spirit of the Charter, the prohibition of the police concerning holidays and Sundays, and the royal ordinances, which placed the press under the same regulations as existed in the time of the Empire. He maintained that an inspector of police had no right to levy fines under the pretended sanction of ancient edicts, and that, the Charter

having promised liberty of the press, it was not conformable either to the text or spirit of that document that the daily press should remain under a censorship. The journals and pamphlets were indeed submitted to a preliminary inspection, which was certainly exercised with much prudence, for the duties of the censorship were discharged by an illustrious philosopher, M. Royer Collard, who became one of the most distinguished personages of the time and a writer of great ability. He was a decided partisan of the Bourbons, but a proud, independent, and liberal-minded man. He certainly would not have lent the sanction of his name to a tyrannical exercise of the censorship. Still, the censorship did exist; the director of police sometimes summoned the chief editors of the journals, and, though limiting himself to admonition, he held them to a certain degree in check, which, however, did not prevent the royalists' journals from frequently indulging in the most violent language.

M. Durbach denounced the regulations relative to the press and the proclamation concerning the observance of Sundays and holidays, with a coarseness of language to which the assembly was not accustomed, and in consequence of which his propositions were rejected. Still, a general feeling prevailed that these propositions were well founded, and would have been supported had they been presented and advocated with more moderation. Some days after, M. Faure, incited by a powerful party in the chamber, brought forward a motion relative to the press alone, begging the king to give instructions for the passing of a law regulating the right of publication. This was saying very plainly that the regulations which had placed this right under a censorship were looked upon as illegal. M. Faure's motion was carried without a dissenting voice.

As to the proclamation concerning the observance of Sundays and holidays, the chambers were embarrassed as to the line of conduct they ought to adopt, for it was a question which did not admit of definite legislation. In passing a law on the subject, it would scarcely be possible to insert any other conditions than those set down in M. Beugnot's proclamation, for the chambers could not declare officially that Sunday should only be half observed, neither could they embody in a legal act the prescriptions that had already so much indisposed the public mind. Not daring to annul them, which would seem like abolishing Sunday, and not venturing to support them, which would have still more strongly excited public opinion, the question was referred to a commission to be examined seriously and dispassionately.

This promptitude of the deputies in immediately discussing those subjects which occupied public attention, proved how much those were mistaken who believed that it would be easy to measure out to the chambers their share in public affairs, and that by a little reserve they could be kept at a distance, like a forward person of whom we disembarass ourselves by not speaking to him on the subject which he is most anxious to discuss. When a legislature decides upon introducing the system of representative assemblies into the

Government, it must not be done by halves, for these assemblies force the doors that are only half open to them. If these representative assemblies are to be recognised by a Government, let them be recognised frankly, let ministers act toward them with confidence and determination, and they will be able to direct their councils, that is, if ministers themselves understand what they desire, and if what they desire is avowable, if they wish it strongly, and if they possess an eloquence powerful enough to inspire in others wishes correspondent with theirs. Under such circumstances, these assemblies combine with the Government, become interested in its success, advocate measures brought forward by ministers, and are converted from impediments into sustaining Government force.

The Government saw clearly that it was impossible to evade the difficulty, and that the Chamber of Deputies, urging the 8th article of the Charter,—which declared the press free, with a provision that abuses should be legally repressed,—could not be flung aside like the author of a motion that did not represent the feeling of the country. The first motion, that of M. Durbach, having been rejected on account of the form in which it was couched, and the second, M. Faure's, having been passed unanimously on account of its moderate tone, it was evident that the motion for a law to regulate the press would be incessantly revived, that this motion would be favourably received by the Chamber of Peers, and would inevitably reach the foot of the throne.

The king felt these truths, and the privy council having been convoked on the occasion, the king said, "The first motion was rejected because Durbach spoke too boldly, but the second, being more moderately expressed, passed unanimously. We must therefore yield with a good grace, if we do not wish to be forced."

The king's prudent advice was followed. There was a mode of proceeding peculiarly agreeable to the king, which was to confirm by the passing of a law the existing *régime*. This *régime* was that of the Empire, which submitted books to a censorship, and as to journals, they were abandoned as vulgar things to the surveillance of the police, who, during Napoleon's reign, scarcely meddled with their insignificance. But since the fall of the Empire, passions had been awakened in the public mind, and the journals which were their daily expression, having acquired an importance which pamphlets shared according to their different degrees of merit, the police had been obliged to pay more attention to this class of publications than they had previously done. The police endeavoured, but in vain, to moderate the tone of the royalist press, and treated with great indulgence the liberal press, which was still timid, but in both cases frequent interference was needed. This frequent interference soon became annoying and almost insupportable.

M. de Montesquieu, who was commissioned to draw up the bill, did not hesitate to take the imperial regulations as the basis of the measure. He established a distinction in favour of books, which he proposed to treat differently

from pamphlets and journals. Books were distinguished from pamphlets and journals by bulk, whose limit was fixed at 480 octavo pages. Every volume of this size was considered a book, and as such exempt from the examination of the censor before being printed. This privilege was accorded to books in consideration of the reflection the author was supposed to bestow on his work, and to the fact that his readers would be of the more reflecting and least numerous class. Those works that consisted of less than 480 pages, whether periodical or not, should undergo a preliminary examination, that is to say, they should be submitted to a censorship, and the publication deferred, if it were believed that their immediate appearance would be attended with any inconvenience. In order to mollify the rigour of this preliminary examination, it was said that the prohibition to publish was only temporary, and that at the commencement of each session a commission of three peers and three deputies should inquire how the censorship had been exercised. This amelioration was of little avail, because, as far as concerned newspapers and pamphlets, an adjournment of a few months was equivalent to an absolute interdict. Moreover, the printers were made accountable to the police, and in case of misdemeanour could be deprived of their license, an arrangement which constituted them preliminary censors of the writings they were employed to print.

This law might not have given rise to any serious difficulty, had the Government announced that it was a temporary measure and called for by circumstances at once novel and grave. But the desire of making the censorship pass for a fundamental institution authorized by the Charter, was founded on groundless pretensions, such as the presumptuous Abbé de Montesquieu could alone have put forth. He was confident of success, and received the royal sanction to bring in the bill, whose bases we have enumerated.

He entered the Chamber of Deputies with the bill, accompanied by M. de Blacas, Minister of the king's household, and M. Ferrand, Minister of State. M. de Blacas appeared as deputy for the king, and M. Ferrand as publicist of the royal party. The bill could not be introduced under a more respectable escort. The Chamber of Deputies was very much flattered at seeing the Crown yield so readily to its wishes, and even before these wishes had received the sanction of the peers. The chamber received the bill gravely and respectfully, and immediately referred it to a committee.

No sooner was the object of this bill made known than the public mind became violently excited. Hitherto the most important questions had turned upon quarrels consequent on the transition from one *régime* to another. It was the military who complained of the partiality exhibited toward the soldiers of Condé or Vendée, or revolutionists taking offence at the reprimand of royalists, or holders of national property becoming alarmed at the attacks to which an entire class of proprietors was subjected. Or, on the other hand, it was the officers of the ancient *régime*, the priests or the emigrants, who complained that the Government paid too much court to the soldiers of the Empire, or were too indulgent to revo-

lutionists covered with blood, or too patronizing to holders of usurped property. But there now arose a question of principle which touched neither the interests nor passions of any party. This measure excited, as we have said, a profound but not stormy commotion in the public mind, and occupied in an especial manner the attention of enlightened men, who were anxious to see all the principles laid down in the Charter carried into operation.

The mode of considering public questions depends in a great measure on the impressions of the moment. The liberty of the press, which has experienced so great a variety of fortunes in France, had at that time a greater number of advocates than even at present, because, instead of having just escaped from the convulsions of the Revolution, the nation was just delivered from the despotism of the Empire. The people had learned what uncontrolled authority was capable of achieving, and said that had the public bodies of the state or the journals enjoyed freedom of speech, an ambition-blinded conqueror would not have been permitted to sacrifice in Spain, in Russia, and in Germany a million Frenchmen, abandon our natural frontiers, and at the same time destroy himself. In reviewing the past, the disorders of the Revolution certainly stood out conspicuously. But these disorders could not be imputed to the press. In our own days we have seen the press, while the country was quiet and the public mind unimpassioned, excite the strongest commotion, but in 1792 and 1793 the people were moved by the working of their own passions, and their errors were entirely attributable to that source, and the press, when free, reproved the faults of the excited people. Neither the records of the Revolution nor the Empire offered any argument against the liberty of the press. Besides, the great events that had recently occurred were a powerful argument in favour of all kinds of liberty. The French Revolution, setting out with ideas the most simple and most just, had in a very short time adopted the strangest views of things, and traversing successively the entire circle of human errors, had ultimately returned to its starting-point of truth, and carried the spirit of repentance so far as to recall the dynasty whose chief had perished on the scaffold. In contemplating such a spectacle, the opinion was universally adopted, that allowing truth and falsehood to enter into open competition, truth would ultimately triumph, and the result of this opinion was a wide-spread confidence in the good effects of liberty,—a confidence, unfortunately, much weakened in the present day.

We do not now allude to the emigrants, who regarded every free institution as a return to the *régime* of 1793, nor to the revolutionists, whom the mere aspect of the Bourbons filled with a species of fury. We speak of the powerful, impartial masses, and of the more intelligent class of men that wished to see France enter on the pathways that had conducted England to liberty and glory. As to the former, they were confiding, and did not think of shackling the press. The enemies of the press existed rather among the members of the Government, who, adducing their experience, demanded that the press should be restrained

in its operations. But the peaceful masses, offspring for the most part of the Revolution and the Empire, seemed rather to defend their personal position than to maintain a principle. Many royalists even were well disposed toward the daily press, of which they made use against the revolutionists, and many young men, who were at the same time royalists and constitutionalists, did not hesitate to say that the most precious species of liberty that the country possessed should not be sacrificed to protect some upstarts, whose sole anxiety was to secure their own importance and comfort.

In the numerous salons of Paris, where politics excited a lively interest, this question was warmly discussed, and, in general, with sentiments favourable to the press. M. Benjamin Constant defended the interests of the press with pointed wit and powerful argument. The *Journal des Débats*, a journal that had acquired great popularity in the time of the Empire, by the only merit then possible, that of literary criticism, warmly advocated the liberty of the press, arguing that the press ought to be particularly dear to the royalists, for had it been free under the empire, or under the Committee of Public Safety, a million of Frenchmen would not have perished on the scaffold or in unwise wars.

The committee appointed by the Chamber of Deputies examined the law in this spirit, and pronounced against it. Affecting to find authority for a censorship in the 8th article of the Charter, appeared a very insincere assertion. Had the opponents of the press said frankly that the author of the Charter had intended to grant liberty to the press, that he still intended it, but, that for the interest of the new order of things, a temporary suspension of this liberty was required: if, in this way it was admitted that the censorship was regarded not as a permanent régime, but a merely temporary suspension of a recognised right, the argument might have been listened to.

But the members of the committee were offended and annoyed at hearing it asserted that the censorship was sanctioned by these words in the 8th article of the Charter:—"The French have a right to print and publish their opinions, observing at the same time the laws which repress the abuse of this liberty."

This was, in the first place, wishing to make the censorship considered as a principle of the Charter, and next, it was calculated to inspire a doubt as to the sincerity of those who interpreted the text of the Charter, and it was besides a puerile subtlety to assert, as was done, that by *repress* was meant *prevent*. In fact, according to the arguments of those who defended the bill, every law, which merely punished, but did not prevent offences, operated in the spirit of vengeance and not with a regard for the public welfare. To *repress*, therefore, in the true legislative language, meant to *prevent*. This subtlety irritated by its want of frankness.

In reply to these objections it was said that every law prevented by the fact of repressing crime; that in punishing past misdemeanours, the law prevented future offences by the fear of punishment; that the law could in no other way prevent offences; that every action must

be accomplished before it could be legally pronounced either good or bad; that, otherwise, all human actions should be arrested at the commencement, lest they might terminate in evil; that all free action should be interdicted to mankind; that life should be, so to speak, suspended, did the law take cognizance, not of an accomplished, but a possible act. But putting aside all these quibbles, the question was boldly asked, what was meant by the censorship? and whether it was not a suppression of the liberty of the press? whether, in those countries where the liberty of the press was ignored, the intervention of the Government was not limited to a preliminary inspection of works, in order to pronounce upon their fitness for publication? But did not the Bourbon Government, in imposing a preliminary examination, annul the liberty of the press, which was a fundamental principle and almost identical with parliamentary freedom of discussion? and did not this Government, within two months after the publication of the Charter, abrogate one of its most essential articles, and that, too, when no important change had taken place in the country, nothing that could reasonably alarm the Government, but, on the contrary, when the most fortunate revulsion of feeling had occurred,—when, notwithstanding the many interests injured, and the many acts of imprudence committed by the dominant party, France, though at first astonished at the return of the Bourbons, had submitted to their sway, and had given efficacious support to their Government?

These were powerful arguments; but the committee was offended by the obstinacy exhibited in maintaining that the censorship was sanctioned by the Charter, for apart from the falsehood, there was the wrong of wishing to give the censorship the weight of a principal and permanent institution. The committee might have been appeased by a sincere avowal of what the Government desired, and by the request of a temporary suspension of the liberty of the press. There was among the members of the committee a man who, though advanced in life, was full of vigour, endowed with high intelligence, sincere, courageous, possessing all the southern vivacity of temperament, and enjoying a brilliant literary fame. This man was M. Raynouard. He had shared with M. Lainé the honour of opposing Napoleon in the session of the preceding December, on which occasion he had given utterance to sentiments as inflexible as high-minded. He was one of those enlightened men, so numerous at that time, who were desirous of a monarchy tempered with liberty, who wished the return of the Bourbons, but wished to see them restrained by the conditions of a judicious constitution. He was, besides, an author, and as such interested in the liberty of the press. He possessed great influence with the other members of the committee, and proposed, as a punishment for the obstinacy exhibited in maintaining the bill in its original form, that it should be rejected. Some of the members, though acknowledging that he was right, feared to give the Government too severe a check, and proposed to do what the ministry ought to have done, that is, to declare the liberty of the press a fundamental principle of the Charter,

but that, under existing circumstances, it would be temporarily suspended. But M. Raynouard was not satisfied with such a concession. He persevered in his motion, carried the rejection of the bill by a majority of one, and was appointed to make a report of the resolution come to by the committee.

The minority, on the contrary, proposed the adoption of the law, with the three following amendments:—1st, That the line of demarcation between works exempt or not exempt from the censorship should be changed; that works of twenty instead of thirty sheets (320 pages instead of 480) should be dispensed from the preliminary examination; 2d, That the censorship should only last to the end of 1816; and 3d, That the opinions of the members of the two chambers should not be obnoxious to the censorship.

Great numbers flocked to the palace, where the sittings of the chambers were held, on the day M. Raynouard presented his report. A like interest had never been exhibited in the deliberations of the legislative corps. The crowds that flocked on the present occasion to the chambers exhibited a thousand different shades of politics, as France herself had exhibited during the last three months. Among the throng was the more educated portion of the emigrants, who had accepted the Charter through necessity, but whose intellectual tastes were based on a standard as ancient as the French nobility. There were also the friends of liberty,—modern men,—who accepted the Bourbons as the others did the Charter, through necessity. They were willing to receive liberty from the hands of the restored dynasty, and were resolved to be faithful if the others proved sincere. The malcontents, too, presented themselves,—the revolutionists, the military men, and the partisans of the Empire, affecting to be friends to liberty, and becoming really such without perceiving it. All were attracted by different motives: some by the interest they took in the affairs of Government, others by the pleasure they took in seeing the ministers opposed. Many were influenced by zeal for the success of the question under discussion, all were actuated by curiosity, and, it must be said, an enjoyment in the eloquent discussion of public affairs, a taste that began to be developed in France. When a people of lively temperament lay aside a long dominant taste, they almost immediately adopt another. If France had long indulged a passion for military glory, she had had, unfortunately, during a lengthened period, opportunities of satisfying the feeling. During eighteen successive years she had kept her eyes fixed on one man; and at a signal from this man, she had seen blood flow in torrents, with no other final result than his own ruin! But the patriotism and the intellectual wants of the people now demanded different scenes. The spectacle of men distinguished by their moral character, intellectual power, and varied accomplishments, holding different opinions, and expressing these opinions boldly: rivals certainly, but not rivals so implacable as those generals who, in Spain, immolated whole armies to satisfy their personal jealousies; these men, ever occupied with the gravest interests of the nation, and often inspired by the vastness of these interests with

the highest eloquence; these men, grouped around some leading minds but never enslaved by any, and presenting in this way a thousand intellectual phases, animated, intense, and true as nature always is in a state of liberty,—this intellectual and moral spectacle began to lay hold of and fix the attention of France. Even the military men were weary of pouring forth their blood, and were not among the least eager to witness these debates and take part in them. Great statesmen had not yet appeared, but they were looked for, hoped for, and their coming believed in; for the French were accustomed to see their country produce whatever she needed. She had produced generals in 1792, and the people felt certain that she would not fail to produce statesmen and orators in 1814. The report drawn up by M. Raynouard was a little diffuse, a little stiffly academical, and did not possess the nervous eloquence of business-like language which practice alone can infuse into French oratory; but the report was listened to with religious attention. It certainly put forth every argument, direct or ancillary, that could support his views, and produced a great effect. That evening, the report formed the general topic of conversation in Paris.

The discussion was adjourned to the 6th of August. On that day all the galleries were filled; so numerous was the attendance that even the hall and the seats reserved for the deputies were encroached on by the public. Remembering what had occurred during the Revolution, the members of the chambers had made a standing rule that no person but a deputy should enter the main body of the hall. This rule was appealed to by some deputies, who became alarmed at the spectacle presented by the chamber, and the president ordered all strangers to withdraw. In consequence of this incident the debate was adjourned to the following day, to the great vexation of the crowd that had thronged to witness a spectacle so novel and attractive.

The following day—the 6th—the debate commenced. Parliamentary eloquence, then in its infancy, could not dispense with written speeches, nor maintain a discussion by replying to unexpected observations with a prompt elocution, inspired by the circumstances of the moment. Each member appeared with his written speech, read it, and received the attention which he was expected to repay to his fellow-readers. But, whatever be the mode of discussion adopted, every reason for and against a measure can be adduced, and by patient inquiry a subject will be ultimately placed in the clearest point of view.

The opponents of the law rejected, with a severity that prohibited their reappearance, the subtleties to which the words *repress* and *prevent* had given rise. They insisted that the liberty of the press was guaranteed by the 6th article of the Charter, that a censorship would annihilate this liberty, and that the establishment of such an institution was a strange proceeding within a month after the promulgation of the Charter. They asked what had occurred that a right, the spontaneous gift of royalty, should be so quickly annulled. After these observations, based on the spirit and text of the Charter, common sense, of which the en-

tors of the liberal party were most frequently the exponents, was adduced to prove that within twenty-five years every thing that could be said had been said; that every imaginable folly had been put into operation; that it would be impossible to conceive a folly that had not seen the light during that time either at the clubs or in the pages of the public journals; that, if the public mind could have become a prey to madness, it would have been overtaken by that calamity, but it had remained rational and prudent, and the best proof of its sanity was its present recognition of all that was best in the monarchical and liberal opinions of 1789; in the almost universal adhesion to the Bourbons and the Charter. The opponents of the censorship maintained that it was better to trust to liberty than always to stand in awe of her; that besides, in past times, when the liberty of the press had an existence, that liberty had been used to check the excesses of democracy and despotism; that had the press been free, it would have resisted Robespierre and Napoleon; that even in England the press put a limit to the omnipotence of Parliament, an omnipotence to which no other counterpoise could be found; and that in France, where the English form of government was about to be adopted, it would be prudent to raise up against ministers that powerful corrective, the only imaginable check that could be opposed to them.

All these arguments were founded on the opinion that the Revolution was finished, and that we were on the morrow, not the eve, of its convulsions. The partisans of Government took part with the minority of the members of the committee, who dared not support the bill except with amendments, and who quoted, but with little effect, the ordinary arguments against the liberty of the press, against that capability, as they said, of continually agitating the minds of the public and urging them to all kinds of excess. They only produced a sensible effect by appealing to personal interests, and alleging in this regard arguments to which, unfortunately, the press has not yet replied under any *égide*, in a steady and moderate tone.

"Who," said the Government supporters, "will protect the public against the attacks of the press, if it be not previously submitted to the inspection of well-meaning men, of acknowledged prudence, who would be themselves responsible to a committee of the two chambers?" "And in order to live in peace, is it necessary that a man should be able to defend himself—with the pen or sword?" "Let us suppose," said a deputy, "let us suppose a pamphleteer endowed with Beaumarchais' abilities: should a man, in order to escape his attacks, be possessed of his rancorous talent? Let us suppose an assassin writer,—and there are such: must a man be skilled in fencing in order to make himself respected? A public verdict is but a weak indemnification when the character of a man's wife or daughter is attacked, or when he is himself made the subject of accusation, the bare mention of which is an insult, and leaves in the mind recollections whose bitterness is never effaced!"

To these powerful arguments no other reply could be made than an appeal to that contempt for calumny which habit alone can give, a habit

which at that time nobody had acquired, and which is only purchased at the price of bitter suffering; consequently, these arguments produced a certain effect, but were not sufficiently strong to efface a dominant popular idea, which was that the liberty of the press was guaranteed by the Charter, which made no mention of a censorship, and that, consequently, a temporary law only could be passed on the subject. The majority of the chamber being of a compliant disposition, did not wish to oppose the majority of the committee, who were certainly right, but, at the same time, they did not wish to give too severe a check to the crown in the first proposed act of legislation emanating from that source. They also appreciated, to a certain degree, the danger of suddenly unshackling the press at a period when the public mind was still ruled by passion. The majority of the chamber was evidently inclined to adopt the opinion of the minority of the committee,—that is, to pass the proposed bill with amendments.

This was the opinion which all the partisans of Government gave the ministers, who transmitted the intelligence to the king. And after all, two years' censorship was a great amelioration in the first moments of freedom, and represented a considerable space of time in our agitated century. It was, besides, a sort of conciliatory measure, that spared the Government the mortification of a defeat. The king, with a moderation that cannot be too highly praised—for in France royalty has rarely shown so much good sense—consented to the amendments proposed by the minority of the committee, and thus admitted that the law should die a natural death in 1816, if the chambers did not renew it; that the line of demarcation between writings liable or not to the censorship should be fixed at twenty instead of thirty pages; lastly, that the opinions of the members of the chambers should be exempt from all preliminary examination.

M. de Montesquieu, at the termination of a discussion that had lasted five days, rose and announced the adhesion of the king to the amendments proposed by the minority of the committee, and then, in a speech flowing in style, moderate in sentiment, delivered with ease, and apparently extempore, he eluded the principal difficulty—that of determining whether the censorship was or was not embodied in the Charter—and claimed the benefit of the doubt for the crown; asserted that the Government wished for liberty, but prayed for prudence in the manner of dispensing it; and concluded his speech by adducing very plausible reasons for a temporary censorship. The Minister of the Interior obtained, on this occasion, a signal triumph for himself and for the Government. The amended bill, having become that of the ministers, passed by a majority of 57 votes in a house of 217 members.

This result satisfied every reasonable man. The liberty of the press was acknowledged as a principle; its suspension was temporary, and necessitated by circumstances. An independent majority had stood forth, that did not seek to curtail the prerogatives of the crown, but would not allow the liberty of the subject to be sacrificed. The power of the king had been checked, without being humiliated; the

chiefs of parties had waived their personal feelings in favour of the general interest, and began to feel an inclination to refer their differences to an equitable, firm, and independent tribunal, which was to be found in the chambers, and which, untouched by the rancour of party spirit, and entertaining no extreme opinion, would serve as a moderating power to the violence of all parties, and tend to arrange their differences by negotiations, not by battles.

The vote given on this occasion, followed by several others, dictated by the same spirit, infused into the public mind a certain tranquillity, which unfortunately was not destined to be of long duration. The committee appointed to inquire into the police decree concerning the celebration of Sundays and holidays, made a report, in which all the reasons for and against the question under consideration were set forth with great impartiality. The report condemned the imprudent use which some persons sought to make of that article of the Charter that declared the Catholic religion to be the religion of the state, and denied that this article gave authority to submit all forms of worship to the practice of one. At the same time, the necessity of one day of rest in the week was acknowledged, which it was only natural should be the same as that observed by the religion of the majority of the citizens. But the report added that great precaution was needed in giving either to religious or social customs an obligatory character; and the report further declared that the law, the law alone, and that a new law embodying the spirit of the times, ought to decide so delicate a question.

Two advocates of considerable reputation, MM. Dard and Falconnet, ardently devoted to the cause of emigration, had written against the validity of the sales called *national*. These writings, which breathed extreme violence, contained some subtle reasoning. It was asserted that the king had not the power to declare sales irrevocable that had not been regularly effected, and that scarcely one of those in question was so; that in any case, there were things which the king could not promise, because impossible even for him. For example, the king could not forcibly take away the property of any of his subjects; whence it followed that the article of the Charter relating to national sales was void, because not founded in justice. Both these pamphlets revealed the real and crafty policy of the emigration, which was a desire to induce individual negotiations between the ancient and new proprietors, and oblige the latter through fear to restore to the former, at the lowest price, property that the State had alienated. These pamphlets, received with transport by the emigrants, with uneasiness by the mass of the public, and with indignation by the persons immediately interested, were denounced to the chambers in numerous petitions. The Chamber of Deputies, the first called on for an opinion, declared null and void every attempt to injure the irrevocability of the sales called "national;" and the members of the chamber showed, by a unanimous resolution, that they were determined to enforce the observance of the articles of the Charter in question. However, an appeal was made to the ministers on this grave question, and the Chief of Police caused MM. Dard and Falcon-

net to be arrested as disturbers of the public peace, and as having caused dissension between various classes of the citizens. It must be admitted that this demonstration produced no result; but for the moment it exculpated the Government, and was of a nature to tranquillize those whose interests were immediately involved. The financial business was next laid before the Chamber of Deputies, and afforded the members a fresh opportunity of displaying their firmness, justice, and intelligence.

The royal council had been long urging M. Louis to bring forward his budget, and explain the means by which he hoped to defray the expenses of the State. The intrepid minister, who had the honour of being the creator of public credit in France, read his budget, and explained his system of finance, as soon as his colleagues furnished him with a list of their wants. Assisted at first by M. de Montesquieu—who being the intermediary between the king and the chambers was fully aware of their susceptibility in financial affairs—M. Louis persevered in restricting the expenses of the war department to 200 million and the expenses of the navy to 51 million francs. M. Louis on this point alone erred; for he would have done better to brave the greatest parliamentary opposition than limit himself to an amount that was evidently insufficient, as by such a proceeding he compromised at the same time the authority of the Government and the popularity of the Bourbons with the army. It is true that the budget of 1815 was alone in question, whilst that of 1814—that is, of the current year—remained open to any unforeseen necessity. Be this as it may, the Minister of Finance—who never lost sight of his main object, the establishment of public credit—remained inflexible, and persevered in fixing the expenditure of the two great departments at the sums he had named, and which were not to be exceeded. The sums allowed for diplomatic expenditure were also diminished. The Minister of the Interior was only allowed what was absolutely necessary for the support of the public roads; 33 million francs were allowed for the expenses of the civil list, which was an extravagant expenditure considering the value of money at that time; but this expense was created, though not acknowledged, by the cost of the king's military household, and by the benevolence of the Bourbon princes toward their former companions in misfortune. The total amount of the budget of 1815 was fixed at 618 million francs, exclusive of the expense of collecting the taxes. In these 618 millions were comprised 70 millions for *arrears*; that is to say, for the unpaid public expenses of 1813 and 1814, such as the pay, provisions, and clothing of the troops, which could not be liquidated by means of credit, and for whom discharge ready money was absolutely needed.

The most important project devised by the Minister of Finance, was that which related to the general discharge of the debts of the State, whatever their origin. M. Louis had, with rare firmness of principle, enforced his opinion concerning the collection of the taxes and the entire discharge of all the anterior debts of the State, whether incurred by *Bonaparte* or not, to use an expression then common. M. Louis had frequently, by his excitement under con-

radiation, provoked a smile from the king, but had uniformly won his approbation. "It is not here a question," said the minister, "of abstract theories, about which political economists argue without result. Here, consequences follow immediately on your resolves. I cannot provide for all the expenses of the State without having recourse to credit, for I only live and you only live on the credit that I have succeeded in creating, the revenue being far from adequate to the daily expenses. Now, I can sustain this provisional credit, and convert it into definite credit, only by two means—the rigorous collection of the taxes, and the entire discharge of the debts of the State. Without this twofold condition, I shall be obliged to close the public coffers, and allow the State functionaries, the clergy, magistracy, and even the army, to die of hunger at the gates of the treasury."

In reply to this energetic declaration of principles, the Count d'Artois and the Duke d'Angoulême, who were always embarrassed by the promises they had made to the people on their return to France, endeavoured to fall back on the question of the *droits réunis*. But they were opposed, in the first place, by M. Louis, the vehemence of whose language touched those spirits which respect for the royal presence would not allow him to overstep; they were opposed by the king, who cared little about the promises made by his brother and nephews; they were even opposed by the Duke de Berry, who had constituted himself champion of the king, and who, finding himself always met by the cry of financial distress when he advocated the interests of the army, would not on any account consent to a diminution of the resources of the treasury. This prince declared very plainly that those royalists of the South, who wished the abolition of the *droits réunis*, ought to be answered with a discharge of artillery. The tobacco-monopoly, which began to yield considerable profits, gave offence in certain provinces, where it was described as a *revolutionary work*. Baron Louis, however, persevered in maintaining this monopoly, and succeeded by his usual arguments. As to the direct taxes, he simply proposed to legalize the decrees by which Napoleon had, in the preceding January, increased them by the addition of some centimes. These centimes having been originally laid on to defray the expenses of the war, it was only natural they could exist as one of the consequences of the war, even after the conclusion of peace. The *droits réunis* would fall heaviest on the cities; the superadded centimes would be felt most in the country districts. It was a general lesson, teaching all that great faults ought to be avoided, but that, once committed or permitted, their inevitable consequences must be borne. As to the question of the entire discharge of the State debts, no matter what their origin, there were no advocates of a national bankruptcy found in the royal council. The necessity of establishing public credit was too fully recognised by all the members to admit of a single doubt. But these debts being acknowledged, the important point was to find the means of paying them. M. Louis had drawn up the balance-sheet of his predecessors, MM. de Gaëte and Mollien, whose port-

folios he had received,—those of the finance and treasury,—in the way that the balance-sheet of a defunct Government is generally drawn up,—that is to say, with very little justice, not as to the actual figures, but as to their moral worth.

He had estimated the deficit at 1308 million francs, admitting that of this sum only 818 millions could be considered as immediately *demandable*. This acknowledgment alone was sufficient to prove the exaggeration, certainly unworthy of him, with which M. Louis represented the burden transmitted by his predecessors. He had, in fact, added 244 millions to the arrears, a sum which during the past ten years the *domaine extraordinaire* had justly contributed to the treasury; for the *domaine extraordinaire* owing its origin to the benefits derived from the war, it was only natural it should bear the loss consequent thereon. Moreover, the *domaine extraordinaire* belonging to the State, it was the State that was indebted to the State, and there was no reason for comprising this sum in the total of the debt for which immediate payment could be demanded. Another sum of 246 millions had been also unjustly placed under the same head. These were moneys deposited as security for the fulfilment of certain services to the State, and which during many years had been considered as part of the funded debt, for the depositors of such security had, when entitled to withdraw these moneys, been always succeeded by others, who invested equivalent sums. Consequently, the State was never obliged to reimburse this money, which bore an interest much below the ordinary rate. It was, therefore, only the securities of depositors abiding in countries now severed from French rule, that could be justly comprised in the *demandable* arrears, and these amounted to a very small sum.

The *demandable* arrears could therefore be reduced to 818 million francs, from which was to be deducted a sum of 12 millions in ready money found in the treasury, and 70 millions added to the budgets of 1814 and 1815, because this sum formed portion of the arrears that were to be paid in ready money. There remained 736 million francs, whose payment could be instantly demanded; and a close inquiry will show that from this sum many items may be deducted, which were unjustly comprised therein. It may be a matter of doubt whether a sum of about 700 million of francs could be considered a burden that the preceding Government had neglected to discharge, when we reflect that this administration had not increased the taxes until reduced to the last extremity, and then only by the addition of some centimes, of which very little had been collected at the time of Napoleon's deposition; it rather becomes a matter of astonishment that two wars like those of 1813 and 1814 left only a deficit of 700 millions. Whilst deploring the policy that brought allied Europe to Paris, we cannot help admiring the administrative genius that was able to confine within such limits the expenses of a fearful struggle; and we must acknowledge that the most rigorous order had been maintained in our finances, amid the horrors of war.

But M. Louis, though a great financier, was

a partisan, and would not acknowledge these truths; for he thought more of his own fame than of the reputation of his predecessors. Be this as it may, it was necessary to provide for a deficit of about 700 millions; but as the claims on this sum would be made successively within two or three years, the entire might be cleared off within that time at the rate of 250 millions per annum.

There were two means of providing for this deficit. It could be met either by means of interminable annuities, or by bills of short date, such as exchequer bills, of which the minister had already issued some millions, and with good effect. But in having recourse to interminable annuities, a serious question arose. Should the interest given to the public creditor be fixed *au pair*, or fluctuate with the current price of the day? If fixed *au pair*, the creditor lost 35 per cent.; for at the actual date the Five per Cents. were down to 65 francs. To fix the interest at the current price of the day, would be exposing the State to pay more than the real debt; because there were good grounds to hope that the funds would rise with the return of peace and the renewal of credit. The State would have been, besides, bound to pay a continuous interest of 8 per cent., without reckoning the inconvenience of throwing into the market a quantity of stock much greater than the demands of the market would meet. There was a much better means of providing for the emergency, which was to issue bills payable in three years, at an interest proportionate to the circumstances of the capitalists, amounting to about 8 per cent. These bills, favoured by peace and the confidence felt in the minister, were likely to keep pretty near par, and three years allowed leisure to provide for their payment. M. Louis wished to alienate gradually 300,000 hectares of wood: the State still possessed about 1400 thousand. He also reckoned on the receipt of certain sums arising from the sale of the *biens communaux*. By steadily applying these various resources, as they fell in, to the liquidation of the lately-issued bills, there was a certainty of keeping up their value at about par, and in three years the credit of the State would be re-established, when it would be possible to issue bills at an advantageous rate, and discharge on easy terms the unpaid portion of the arrears. The Finance Minister departed, on this occasion, from the principle he had had the honour of being the first to lay down clearly, and whose truth he had verified by experience, which is, that when the rate of money is very high, it is better to borrow on bills of short date than on interminable annuities, because by this means the State is subjected only for a short time to the increased rate of interest.

M. Louis therefore issued temporary bills, called *reconnaisances de liquidation*, bearing an interest of 8 per cent. and payable in three years. These were to be issued as the others were paid off, and the acceptors were to have as security the 300,000 hectares of wood, in addition to the price of the *biens communaux*. M. Louis did not entirely reject the resource of the interminable annuities, and he proposed to grant some to those State creditors who would accept them at par, an offer that would

certainly be accepted, when, consequent on the revival of public credit, the stocks would rise. This project was sufficient evidence that the minister who conceived it was endowed with extraordinary perception and unerring forecast. M. Louis had already induced the public to accept some exchequer bills at 8 per cent.; but when, in presenting his financial project, the intention to pay the State creditors to the last farthing would be announced, and that as a guarantee of these payments 300,000 hectares of wood would be disposed of, which might be easily effected in three years, public confidence would revive, and the minister would be able to await the time when a Government loan might be effected on favourable terms. This was a most able manner of reviving public credit: for had a quicker process been attempted, public credit would have been injured by a breach of faith, which would have been the inevitable consequence of an attempt to force the State creditors to accept stock at par; and this credit would have been burdensome to the State were the stock made to bear the current interest of the day; and in either case, the simultaneous issue of a considerable quantity of Government bills would have damped public confidence. There was another and purely political consideration, which the minister abstained from pressing on the reconsideration of the king and princes, which was, that the alienation of the 300,000 hectares of wood, which had been the property of the ancient clergy, was a measure calculated to inspire the holders of national property with confidence, and to terminate, or at least diminish, one of those sources of uneasiness that most disturbed the Bourbon Government. Considered in every point of view, M. Louis's plan was admirably well conceived.

The project was communicated to M. de Talleyrand, who had very just notions in financial matters, and to M. de Montesquieu, who, though he did not understand the subject, had sufficient good sense to appreciate the wisdom of M. Louis's views; it was then laid before the royal council. The king, who was absolutely ignorant of financial affairs, seeing that the project was universally approved, and being moreover resolved to defer to his ministers in things that they understood better than he, gave his consent. M. de Blacas alone raised some objections. He, though a well-meaning man, was one of those who saw in the *arrears* the concentration of the debts incurred during the Revolution and the Empire, and who, on this account, was not very anxious for their liquidation. Indeed, he would have been very glad to pay "Bourbon's creditors" with something else than money. Stock at par seemed to him sufficient payment for such creditors, and he made a proposal to that effect. M. Louis became warm, and replied, very justly, that to become bankrupt for the entire or part of a debt was still a bankruptcy; that by such a proceeding the Government took a place among those who paid their creditors 50 per cent., instead of not giving any thing; that for his part, he did not wish to be classed with either; and if the Government acted in that manner, the funds would instantly fall, for two reasons—the breach of faith, and the too great number

of bills issued; and that instead of public credit being re-established, it would by such a measure be irrevocably destroyed. M. de Blacas replied, that the reduction in the funds, which the minister wished to prevent, would fall on the lately-issued bills, which would be only changing the nature of the evil. But this mode of reasoning had no effect. It only proved that M. de Blacas, who was no financier, had not fully comprehended M. Louis's project, and did not perceive the dependence of each part on the other. M. Louis's plan was adopted and laid before the Chamber of Deputies, supported by a sound statement of the motives that actuated its originator; but the statement did not render justice to the proposed measure, for this able minister was more capable of conceiving than giving expression to his ideas, though on some occasions, when excited, he became eloquent, and expressed himself in terms at once energetic and picturesque.

M. Louis's project was referred to the *bureau* of the chamber, and from the *bureaux* to a select committee. The measure was expected with impatience, and produced a great effect. The real extent of the burdens of the State was now for the first time fully laid bare, and though considerable in the actual state of things, it was not more than France could bear. There was now shown the possibility of making the expenses of the budget ally with the resources of the State, and there was exhibited on the part of the Government frank and sincere desire to pay the public debts, for which sufficient resources existed, and the public now saw a minister energetic, able, and thoroughly competent to the task he had undertaken; a task from whose responsibilities he did not shrink, and which he felt convinced he could discharge.

The day M. Louis's project was laid before the royal council, the funds stood at 65: within a few days they rose to 70, and soon to 75. It was evident that the Minister of Finance understood perfectly well the temper of the money-market, and how to inspire confidence there; and it can be confidently asserted that underhand methods of influencing the funds, though often employed, had no share in their rapid rise on this occasion.

The committee examined M. Louis's project on all its bearings, without any feeling of comacency toward the Government, and with the desire natural to committees that represent public assemblies, to make improvements in measures proposed for their consideration. But after an attentive examination both of the budget of 1815, and of the means proposed for liquidation of the arrears, the committee acknowledged that the proposed measure was the most certain and least expensive method of extricating the treasury from its embarrassments. With the exception of one or two amendments in the mode of drawing up the statement, the minister's budget and his financial plan were integrally adopted.

The report was laid before the chamber, and discussed in the latter days of August. The public could not be expected to testify the same interest in this as in the law concerning the press; for the subject was less likely to excite the passions or call forth a brilliant

display of eloquence. Besides, the matter was rather abstract. But the subject was deeply interesting to commercial men and to politicians, who fully appreciated the importance of the subject. The galleries of the Chamber of Deputies were less thronged with partisans; but there was a large number of serious-minded men among the auditory. M. de Montesquieu accompanied M. Louis to all the sittings where the question of finance was discussed, in order to afford him the aid of his personal influence, and, if needs were, that of his eloquence. The discussion lasted twelve days, and was very animated, ably supported on both sides, though exhibiting the inexperience of men who were for the first time called on to discuss serious interests in a really free assembly. The members commenced by a demonstration of zeal for royalty, and passed the civil list, which amounted to 25 millions for the king and 8 for the princes. Afterward, in a spontaneous outburst of feeling, they offered to pay the debts contracted by the royal family during the emigration, and granted 30 millions to defray an expense that was purely accidental. After this manifestation of loyalty, the members proceeded to business, and began to examine the budget in all its details.

The budget of 1815 was first taken into consideration; for that of 1814 was liable to all the chances of a laborious liquidation, whose result would yet remain unknown for some months. Besides, the *arrears*, being burdened with the expenditure of 1814, could alone be affected by it, and 50 millions more or less, in the 600 or 700 that were to be raised by credit, were not worth mentioning under the head of resources. The chamber consequently turned its entire attention to the budget of 1815, which represented the future, and about which alone any measures could be taken. According to the habit of public assemblies little accustomed to state affairs, the members exclaimed against the enormity of the expense. There were some deputies who, like M. de Flaugergues, a man of talent and a sincere and upright constitutionalist, complained that this budget of 618 millions was nearly as great as that of the Empire in time of peace, though in the time of the Empire France reckoned 180 departments. The complaint was groundless, for, with the exception of military expenses, a few departments more or less could not make any sensible difference in the expenses of a great State. Had the members of the chamber been thoroughly versed in public business,—a knowledge that can only be acquired in a free country,—they would have criticized M. Louis's budget in a very different spirit; for the real error of the budget was the insufficiency of the sums allowed for some of the principal departments of the State. For example, the ministers of the War and the Marine Departments, whose expenditure had been so curtailed by the Finance Minister, had in the end persuaded themselves that they could defray their current expenses, the one with 51, the other with 200 millions, which was a complete illusion, attributable not to a wish to deceive, but to their inexperience. Expenses to the amount of at least 100 millions had been unintentionally dissembled in

this budget. But that was of little importance at the time. The great point was to re-establish public credit by an open discussion of the state of the finances, and by a statement not wholly disheartening of the resources of the State. Succeeding years would bring forth calculations more correct and more conformable with the real state of things. The budget was consequently criticized in a sense inverse to the truth; but the objections produced no effect, because they did not touch the essential question, one that would awaken the passions; that is to say, they were not brought to bear upon the proposed plan of raising credit. A few words were said about the state revenue. Some deputies, who represented the wine-growing departments, remonstrated, but without being supported, against the indirect taxes. The chamber, though constituted several years before the Restoration, was essentially imbued, as we shall see presently, with the spirit of landed proprietorship, and was more concerned about the direct than the indirect taxes. The chamber silenced by not giving attention to the deputies from the south, and appeared to attach importance only to the additional centimes that had been levied by a simple decree within the last three months of the Empire, and converted into a law in the budget of M. Louis. The sum total of these centimes, whether for the expenses of the departments or for general expenses, amounted to sixty. The chamber seemed inclined to reduce them, but deferred a final determination until the day when the amendments should be debated.

A general feeling of impatience at length brought on the question of the arrears, and the means proposed to defray them. M. Louis's plan was opposed by two classes of adversaries; the deputies, who were certainly few in number, that participated in the sentiments of the emigration, and who wished to pay the State creditors with paper, and not with timber belonging to the clergy. And there were the ultra-liberals, such as M. Durbach, who, with good intentions, but without discernment, looked upon the proposed means of raising credit as a system of stock-jobbing, not perceiving that nothing could be more opposed to stock-jobbing than paying one's debts punctually. Both parties uttered with much pomposity a vast number of puerilities.

Those who were well disposed toward the emigration dared not propose a national bankruptcy. It must be said, for the honour of those times, that ideas of financial honesty had already made so much progress that no one would have ventured to deny the principle of the total liquidation of the State debts, whatsoever their origin. We must even add, for the honour of the members of the legislative corps, that they would not have suffered it. But indirect ways were adopted: it was asserted that it would be sufficient to pay the State creditors with stock at par; that it would be placing them in the same position as all the holders of Government stock, and that they would have no right to complain. The supporters of this view insinuated besides that among the State creditors there was a number of Government contractors who had largely defrauded the Treasury, and that paying them in the proposed manner there could be no

doubt but that they would receive more than their due. The alienation of three hundred thousand hectares of wood was next condemned. The speakers repeated those arguments so often adduced against the destruction of timber, but they carefully abstained from alluding to the point which weighed most with them, which was that the wood in question had been the property of the clergy. They said that the proposers of this measure were about to injure forest property, by putting up for sale such a quantity of timber, and considerably diminish the quantity of timber belonging to the State, for the State possessed in all 1,400,000 hectares of forest; that of these, 400,000 would return to the former proprietors, should their unsold property be restored to the emigrants; that, consequently, there would not remain, at the utmost, more than a million; that if of these, 300,000 were sold, there would only remain 700,000; that the forest property of the State would be thus reduced to half, which would entail a serious injury on the country, as it was only the woods belonging to the State whose preservation was secured. All this was said in an irritated tone, and with a great want of candour. But the legislative corps saw very clearly the motives that inspired these speakers.

As to the ultra-liberals, they exclaimed against the creation of a fresh paper currency, and, above all, against an interest of 8 per cent., which, in their opinion, was excessive. They forgot that the minister had already created this paper money, that a large quantity had been already issued under the title of exchequer bills; that he had succeeded in getting them accepted, thanks to his recognised principles, and thanks to an interest of 7 per cent.; that an interest of 7 per cent. on bills of three or six months supposed at least 8 per cent. for bills payable in three years; that it was fortunate that such a plan had been devised and had succeeded, for the taxes had not brought 200 millions to the Treasury, and 350 millions had been paid away, thanks to the plan devised by the minister. Not being aware of these facts, or neglecting to inquire into them, not having a desire to learn them, nor possessing sufficient talent to seek them, the provincial deputies said, what provincial deputies often say, that the Government was seeking to increase the facilities for stock-jobbing, and sacrificing the property of the people to Paris speculators.

One opponent alone proposed something less futile, which was to give the State exchequer bills at 5 per cent., redeemable at 3 per cent., which would render the liquidation more prompt, and keep these bills at a much higher value than the stock, which was only redeemable at 1 per cent. But this proposal, apparently favourable to the Treasury, as it seemed to show that at an equal expense the public debt could be much sooner liquidated, was, in reality, only an attempt to frustrate the financial plan of the minister. In fact, by making part of the interest redeemable, it was reduced to 5 per cent., consequently lower than the commercial rate, which was 7 per cent. for bills of three and six months, as was shown in the case of the exchequer bills. It was, therefore, only a puerile effort to evade the con-

on commercial law, which is to pay for things their actual value. As to the rest, the project in question, though subtle in itself and supported by arguments still more subtle, was not favourably received, nor warmly supported.

The project of M. Louis was supported by the committee, and many well-informed deputies, who adduced excellent reasons for their opinions, but all these arguments were in vain, for the most part without order or connection; but they produced an effect, for sound reasoning will ultimately prevail, whatever be the form in which it is put forth. The best defender of the ministerial plan was the minister himself, who, in a written and sound discourse, discussed all the parts of his system, in a manner comprehensible to the humblest intelligence. But when details came to be examined, the discussion became warmer, and, consequently, more serious and more effective, and, the written speeches being laid aside, the minister produced a still greater impression on the chamber. M. Louis was not endowed with the gift of eloquence, and, besides, he spoke with a kind of stammer, the effect of his extreme vivacity; but there was an energy in his language, consequent on intense thought, and which produced a powerful effect on his hearers. He began by saying that he had never neglected any means of reducing the public expenses, and that he had arrived economy to its extreme limits. As to the taxes, he treated with contempt those orators who affected to pity the tax-payers, and said that the first of all duties was to provide for the wants of the State, which represented the most imperious wants of every individual; that people could no more do without soldiers, judges, and roads, than without bread; that the direct and indirect taxes were indispensable; that they should be submitted to; and that besides, of all the countries of Europe, France was one of the least burdened by taxation; that, in short, France should pay the price of her errors, which was the most certain way to get rid of them. Passing afterward to the question of the arrears and the proposed plan for raising credit, the minister maintained that, as a principle, the State ought to pay the public debts, and pay them fully; that such was in the first place the duty of honest men, and, in the next place, the policy of wise men; that, instead of becoming poor, the people became rich by acting in this manner; for public credit would be thus re-established, and with public, private credit, and with private credit, the vitality of commerce; that, in fact, there was not a member of the Government who thought otherwise; that the king subscribed to the principle of paying the arrears, no matter what their amount, nor by whom contracted. The minister expressed these opinions with the energy of profound conviction, and added that not being able to pay the State debts by means of new taxes, and not wishing to increase them, they were already thought too heavy, no other way remained to him but credit; that he was sure of succeeding by this means, as he had found by recent experience, but that success depended on two conditions: first, that the Government should establish a claim

to credit by the punctual discharge of existing engagements, and by paying according to the actual rate of the money-market; that if the Government pretended to pay the State creditors by giving them stock at par, they would defraud the creditors of 25, 30, and 40 per cent.; that if, on the contrary, the interest was to be rated at the current price of the day, the State would be exposed to pay more than the actual debts, and would be, moreover, bound to an interminable interest of 8 per cent.; and that, lastly, the money-market would be inundated by the quantity of bills issued; that, for all these reasons, bills at short date were preferable, which would certainly bear an interest of 8 and even 9 per cent.; but the burden would be only temporary, and would neither defraud the State nor the creditors, as by this means nothing more than the capital really due would be paid; that these bills were not a chimera, but a reality, for those already issued at three and six months' date continued to bear an interest of 7 and $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., which was equivalent to about 8 per cent. on securities payable in two or three years; that the woods in question were much more a guarantee than an actual alienation of forest property; that if a portion of this wood were sold, to the amount of a hundred million francs, for example, and that with this money the bills issued should be redeemed, public credit would become so stable that the Government might then obtain a loan, with which the unpaid portion of the arrears could be paid off; and of the woods whose alienation was proposed, it was not probable that more than a third would be sold. Besides, as for what concerned forest property, the Government proposed to sell only those woods of small extent, which could be better managed by private individuals than by the State; but the woods containing timber suited for ship-building or important from public considerations should remain intact; and the fears conceived or expressed on this subject were perfectly chimerical; that the financial project devised for the accomplishment of all these objects formed a whole, whose parts were intimately dependent on each other, and to withdraw one involved the destruction of the entire. And the minister finally declared that he knew no better means to adopt, nor did he wish to try any other, being certain, after five months' experience, of the efficacy of the means proposed.

M. Louis repeated these reasons several times in the course of the discussion, as circumstances called them forth, and with an emotion of voice and features that testified to the sincerity of his conviction. The members of the chamber were persuaded. Seeing that they had to do with a man of talent, who understood perfectly well what he was about, they closed the debate, notwithstanding the cries of a many-shaded opposition. The examination of the details was then commenced, and adjourned to the next sitting.

After having ascertained the real feelings of the chamber, the two ministers recognised the necessity of making a concession, not upon the budget nor the financial plan, but in the matter of the additional centimes. The spirit of landed proprietorship that prevailed

in the chamber, demanded a sacrifice in favour of the direct taxes. The additional centimes were consequently reduced from 60 to 30, but no alteration was made in the sum total of the budget, which remained fixed at 618 million francs,—a proceeding that implied a pledge on the part of the chamber to make up this total the following year, by some means or other. The thing being agreed on, the amendment was proposed at the final sitting, and accepted by M. de Montesquiou. The Minister of Finance left the chamber at this moment, not wishing to be responsible for a concession that was repugnant to the inflexibility of his principles; for he argued that the chamber, having voted the expenses, ought at the same time to have voted the resources that were to meet these expenses. The amendment was put to the vote, and carried.

The last point of difference remained to be decided. The opposition had rallied all their forces for the discussion of an amendment that proposed to reduce the interest on the lately-issued exchequer bills from 8 to 6 per cent. The amendment presented serious dangers. In the first place, medium measures suit public assemblies, that for the most part seek truth in a middle course. Besides, many honest men, but profoundly ignorant of financial affairs, believed that by this diminution of the interest they were protecting the public money; and there were many malicious opponents who saw in the proposed amendment the ruin of the minister's project, a prospect highly gratifying to the ultra-royalists, who did not wish to pay "Bonaparte's creditors;" and it was equally pleasing to the enemies of the Bourbons, as it would be a severe check to the restored dynasty. M. Louis made a vigorous opposition. He said that, in proposing 8 per cent., he had not made an arbitrary but a necessary proposition; that money had a commercial value independent of the will of Governments; that he had already obtained money at 7 and $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on bills of short date; that possibly he would be obliged to pay 8 per cent. on bills of a longer date; that if possible he would make a better bargain, but it was indispensable that he should enjoy a discretionary power on this point, a refusal of which would be equivalent to a rejection of the entire financial project, and even of the budget, in which case he would leave to the authors of the amendment the task of meeting the difficulties of the position.

A courageous sincerity in a ministry visibly attached to the public welfare, never remains without response in a general assembly. The amendment, however popular, was only supported by 101 voices, and rejected by 122, which gave, it is true, only a majority of 21 for the Government; but this majority did not represent the chamber, for when the total of the ministerial proposition was put to the vote, 140 members voted for and only 66 against it,—giving a majority of 74, which was enormous considering the number of voters.

This triumph produced a great effect on the public, who saw on the one side a powerful and rational majority, decided to support the Government; and on the other side, this Government, steady, prudent, skilled in financial affairs, knowing what was desirable, and desir-

ing it ardently. The following day the Five per Cents., which had risen from 65 to 75 francs on the presentation of the financial project, rose when it passed the chamber to 78; and should the peace continue, it was not chimerical to believe that the funds would rise to 90, an extraordinary figure at that period. Under these circumstances, it would be easy for the Government to effect a loan, and immediately pay off the entire of the arrears, alienating only part of the woods ordered to be sold.

But questions of finance were not the sole difficulties on which M. Louis was called to decide. The termination of the continental blockade, which occurred at the same time as the fall of the Empire, necessitated an immediate consideration of the state of commerce and manufactures. Napoleon had not persevered sufficiently long in the continental blockade to conquer England by commercial means; but he persevered long enough to lay the foundations of our manufactures, and it naturally followed that, when our country was invaded, and the barriers that opposed the influx of foreign manufactures fell, our commercial market should be powerfully disturbed, and add to the military, to the civil functionaries, and holders of national property, a new class of malcontents, disposed to regret the Empire.

We have already seen that, immediately after the return of the Bourbons, M. Louis had taken some provisional measures to accommodate our commercial legislation to the new state of things. For example, he had reduced the duty on raw cotton to a mere *droit de balance*, in order to enable our manufacturers to work cheaper. He reduced the duties on sugars and coffee to a rate that enabled the French to compete with the British commerce. But these measures were only temporary, and many others were needed to secure the existence and development of our manufactures. But as always happens in such cases, each class demanded a prohibitory duty for its own advantage, refusing at the same time a merely protective one to others; and the chamber, as the arbitrating power, were beset with pressing petitions from all our manufacturers. The minister had endeavoured to satisfy the greater number of these demands by the introduction of moderate measures, calculated to obtain the consent of the chamber.

In the first place, he had re-established custom-houses along our frontiers, and had at the same time stopped a species of fraud resulting from the exceptional circumstances of the time. The districts added to our territorial possessions of 1790 by the treaty of Paris, though not of great extent, held at that time considerable quantities of merchandise. These districts, lying in the direction of Belgium, the Rhine, and Savoy, were filled with English manufactured goods, which became French property, as a matter of right, the day on which definite possession of the new territory was made. With regard to these goods, the minister ordered the re-exportation of those that were prohibited, and demanded duty for those whose entrance was not prohibited by the tariff. As to prohibited goods, thread or cotton, &c. With respect to wool, it was also

ry to enforce the existing laws. Our spinners and weavers, being at length obtain the raw material, not at the hat prevailed during the continental le, but at the rate current through Europe that year able to compete at the fair with English manufactured goods. ours were found to be of a better . Our manufacturers had certainly ed a considerable loss, immediately the abolition of the duty on raw cotton; y were obliged to sell their goods at the which the suppression of this duty had l them. The loss thus sustained was at 30 million francs, and the manufac- did not hesitate to demand the reim- ent of this sum from the chambers, as asequence of a tax unduly collected. is angrily rejected the claim, and the r agreed in his opinion. The deputies on the loss thus sustained by the manu- rs as one of the inevitable evils of war, ich a Government can no more avert certain branch of manufacture, injured alteration in the frontiers, than they rom a province occupied by an enemy. to cotton, the most important of our manufactures was of iron. This metal, o replace stone and wood in a thousand as destined to become one of the most instruments of modern civilization. manufacture of this metal had been greatly ed in France in consequence of the metal blockade, which prohibited the ce of foreign iron brought by sea. The on of this interdict exposed our metal- manufactures to a formidable rivalry. t revolution had been accomplished in id in this branch of trade by the sub- on of sea-coal for wood as a combustible, y the use of the rolling-mill instead of mmer in working the metal. The con- ce was that the English were able to ron at 350 francs the ton, which the h could not do at less than 500. It is that the French iron, smelted by the of wood and worked by the hammer, sed incontestable advantages as to qua- but could not support the impending . Consequently, our metallurgic manu- rs were among the most restless and s. The great iron-manufacturers de- and with reason, that if they were not ed against foreign iron they would be to stop their works, which would de- rance of an article of the first necessity, der her dependent on the English, who soon make her pay a higher price than ch themselves. These were supported great timber-proprietors, who could market for their goods if the manu- rs of iron ceased to purchase. These lers were opposed by the inhabitants of -ports and the wine-growing provinces, ped to export their wines to those n countries that might send iron to . Not daring to avow their true mo- hey asserted that France deprived of m and the Rhenish provinces would able to furnish a quantity of iron suffi- or her wants, an assertion that expe- has belied. The iron-manufacturers ded a prohibitory duty, whilst, on the

contrary, the merchants and proprietors of vineyards clamoured for free trade. The minister proposed to put a duty of 150 francs per ton on foreign iron, which added to 850—the English market-price—would bring it up to the rate of 500 francs. He thought this protective duty would be sufficient. There was a lively discussion in the chambers, where both the opposing parties found warm defend- ers. An amendment proposing a duty of 250 francs was presented and largely supported, but the duty of 150 francs was carried, and in this affair also the wishes of the Government prevailed in the chambers.

After the iron-manufacturers came the sugar-refiners, who addressed strong remonstrances both to the Government and the chambers. Sugar-refining was an ancient branch of French manufacture, and one of the most extensive and productive, especially when France, pos- sessing St. Domingo, drew thence large quan- tities of raw sugar, which, being refined, found a sale in all the markets of Europe. War, which had favoured our national manufactures, had also served some rival productions, among which was the refining of sugar in other coun- tries. The French refiners remonstrated. They appealed to the mighty memories of our colo- nial prosperity: they were listened to, and a prohibitory duty was passed.

The agriculturists also put in their claims, and found among the members of the legisla- tive corps many inclined to hear them favour- ably. Our agriculturists wished to profit by the opening of the seas, to export their grain and wool. Grain of all kinds had been retained in France during the late times of scarcity, and as to wool, Napoleon had prohibited not alone its exportation, but that of sheep, be- cause he wished that the great importation of merino sheep should tend exclusively to the improvement of French woollen goods. The agriculturists, consequently, demanded free trade in corn, wool, and sheep; but they were opposed by the inhabitants of the sea-coast,—that is, by the people of Normandy, Brittany, and Vendée,—who were violent royalists. They were also opposed by all those who worked in wool; in the first place, the manufacturers of woollen cloth; and next, the manufacturers of those various tissues, known as “merinos,” which have become a real blessing for the people by their extensive use and low price. But the agriculturists had sound arguments on their side; for if, for the protection of na- tional manufactures, it is natural to prohibit the importation of foreign produce, it does not appear so reasonable to prohibit the exporta- tion of home produce. The agriculturists ap- peared to be right. Their arguments were popular; and the Chamber of Deputies, adopt- ing the views of the Finance Minister, sanc- tioned the exportation of grain, subject to a fluctuating duty that varied with the price of the commodity. The exportation of wool was also permitted, that of rams alone being subject to duty.

Such were the principal measures used to modify the transition from the continental blockade to a free marine commerce. We have already said that the duty was suppressed on foreign raw materials, such as raw cotton, dyes, dyeing-woods, which Napoleon had over-

taxed, as articles connected with British commerce. Cotton manufactured goods were still prohibited, in order to afford the home manufactures an absolute protection. A duty was put on iron equivalent to the difference between the price of that article in the English and French markets; and as to goods of large consumption—such as sugar and coffee—the duty imposed on them, being exclusively for the benefit of the exchequer, was much diminished, and this was done with a view to lessen the incentives to smuggling, which had much increased since the return of peace. Lastly, foreign refined sugar was prohibited, and the exportation of our agricultural products was declared free, or nearly so.

These measures, conceived in a praiseworthy spirit of moderation, met with general approbation. The Government was thus alternately supported and checked by the chambers, that had become the tutelar authority, beneath whose shelter all the aggrieved classes of the community flocked. Still, some men, who entertained exaggerated ideas of liberty, often expressed regrets that the Chamber of Deputies did not act in a more decided manner. These men wished, for example, that the chamber had unconditionally rejected the law concerning the press. But by making this law temporary, the Chamber of Deputies had preserved the principle of liberty, and for prudent men that was enough; for to go further would have been to give the crown a check which would have weakened the kingly power, and deeply irritated the Bourbons against the new order of things. Politically speaking, this mode of conduct was evidently the wisest.

The Chamber of Peers, on the other hand, had not acted less wisely than the Chamber of Deputies. The peers had thoroughly discussed the law of the press, and had passed it after retrenching the preamble, which seemed to imply that the censorship was a principle of the Charter. The peers addressed an excellent reply to the Minister of the Interior, on the occasion of a report presented to the chambers on the state of France. Napoleon, we must remember, caused a statement to be every year laid before the legislative corps of the position of the empire, in order to ascertain the general state of progress. The new Government thought it well to follow this example, and took advantage of the opportunity to dilate upon the state of desolation in which the Empire and the Revolution had left France. The statement of the Minister of the Interior, considering France from one point of view, was only true in the description made of the miseries resulting from war. The Chamber of Deputies replied to this document by a simple vote of thanks; but the Chamber of Peers, of whom two-thirds were members of the Senate, would not allow the Revolution, nor even the Empire, to be so unjustly treated. The peers made a thoughtful reply, in which were recounted the immense benefits that France owed to the application of the principles of 1789, to the abolition of wardenships, and all the shackles that formerly fettered manufactures in the interior of France; to the division of landed property; to the increase in the number of landed proprietors, the improvement of land, the establishment and advance-

ment of manufactures; and, after recapitulating these various benefits, the peers added that they saw in these things, as well as in the peace and liberty for which France was indebted to the Bourbons, motives for hoping a speedy return of public prosperity. The reply, though perfectly respectful, was dignified, veracious, and pointed.

It was evident that the two chambers, though not so enthusiastic as the liberal party, deserved the confidence of enlightened men, and had begun to obtain it. They were also gradually acquiring the power of restraining and supporting the Government, two conditions alike desirable. Unfortunately, the opposition that the Government met, though it did not irritate the members against the constitutional régime, had not in any way ameliorated their feelings. The king was pretty much as usual—that is to say, tranquil, considering political questions quietly, and inclined to allow his ministers to do as they pleased when the principle of his authority, or any of the essential interests of the emigration, were not in question. To these interests he was deeply attached. Thus, with regard to the national property, he actually did himself violence; and had it been in his power, he would have restored it to the ancient proprietors. He had especially disapproved the arrest of MM. Baul and Falconnet, authors of the two pamphlets that condemned the irrevocability of the national sales. After a short imprisonment, these two lawyers had been set at liberty and the loud applause of the high emigrant party, who had visited and offered them the most lavish attentions during their short captivity, and continued to throng their houses after their liberation. The king also took part with his body-guards in their quarrels with the national guards and the soldiers, and expressed his intention of supporting them at all hazards. His ministers, without contradicting him, contented themselves with trying to prevent collisions, or to correct the effects when they had not been able to prevent the cause. With these exceptions, the king allowed his ministers to follow the bent of their inclination. As to the Count d'Artois, who had returned from St. Cloud to Paris, after an absence induced by ill health and bad humour, he as usual made himself very busy. He turned an attentive ear to those provincial petitioners who came to beg places as a recompense for their loyalty; made them promises that he could not fulfil, and sympathized in their exaggerated feelings, which made him more and more the object of the hopes and love of the ultra-royalists. Influenced by a spirit of curiosity, a fondness for meddling in Government affairs, and the distrust that characterizes weak minds, he had allowed a kind of junta to gather round him, composed of the plotters of every régime—the worn-out remnants of former police forces, who sought at what was then called the *Pavillon Maroon*—the present residence at the Tuilleries—employment that they were refused in the Government junta. The prince was delighted to receive, through these channels, reports, either annoying or alarming, which he carried to the king, to prove to him that he was badly served, or that he had made a bad choice in his officials: and

he was reading his classic authors, by was undermined and threatened calamities. Louis XVIII., being informed by M. Beugnot of the loss of the information brought by him, had several times enjoined his give up this gossiping, and allow in peace. The Duke d'Angoulême, son of Monsieur, was not very he was prudent and modest, and end to play a more important part flattered him. He was then travel-west, endeavouring to recover for authority that respect which in these had declined very much. The other de Berry, who was not deficient at uncontrollably irritable, had at led with the troops, to whom he st lavish attentions; but he ultided them by the violence of his h he had at first restrained, but tirely suppress, and which became ent as each succeeding day proved y of attaching the army to the Thus these three princes, notwithir difference of disposition, particularly in the prejudices of their e able to resist their influence or rrors. Scarcely a day passed that station on their part did not add idents, of which party ill will is d to profit.

of August was the day on which, upire, the feast of Saint-Napoleon ed. It would have been better to ce of the day and allow it to pass

But the royal family wished, on r, that the day should be still a yalist fête. The 15th of August on which Louis XIII., in gratitude nancy of Anne of Austria, had by w placed France under the protec- blessed Virgin. However interest- orical souvenir might be, it would ell to consider the actual circum- e time before enjoying the plea- lling it. But the Bourbons did the kind, and ordered a solemn throughout France to revive and row of Louis XIII. At Paris the ked in the procession, carrying eir hands, and this spectacle did a favourable effect on those whom e zeal of the Bourbons was calcu- and. The half-pay officers were ed by the devotion of the princes, dlers bought candles to celebrate Saint-Napoleon by illuminating ks. It was not without consider- y that this seditious illumination ished in the evening.

tation of a different character pro- e 29th of August a not less dis- ect. The king was invited by the e to a magnificent banquet, and e at the *Hôtel de Ville*, which he ne since his return to France. he arrived when it became neces- ase a quarrel that arose between rd and the national guards. The wanted to occupy the inner apart- banish the national guard to the was a pretension that involved

inconvenience, for the national guard was, in fact, the city of Paris itself that took up arms to do honour to the king, and at the *Hôtel de Ville* the members of the national guard were in their own home. To banish them to the gate of the palace, whilst the body-guards occupied the interior, would be a strange forgetfulness of the decencies of life. The quarrel became warm, the king took part in it, and it was agreed that the national guards and the body-guards should occupy in equal numbers the inner apartments of the *Hôtel de Ville*.

The fête commenced by a dinner to the king; a ball was to follow. The magnificence and taste displayed on this occasion were worthy of the great city that received its king, and of the august guest that she received. Louis XVIII. sat at the chief table with the princes of his family, and admitted to the same table, by an infraction of ancient customs, thirty-six ladies. In this number were comprised the most distinguished ladies of the ancient court, and only three or four of the modern nobility. But this was not the most remarkable circumstance of the entertainment. The prefect, standing behind the chair of the king, waited on the monarch, and the prefect's wife, in the same attitude, waited on the Duchess d'Angoulême. The members of the municipal council performed the same services for the princes. It is true that in earlier times, princes and even kings had waited upon emperors, but we may add, without adopting any vulgar democratic prejudice, that the time for such exhibitions had passed away. Napoleon, with all the prestige of his glory and his power, had not been able to renew these customs, but he had never tried the experiment on so large a scale. The morrow of the fête at the *Hôtel de Ville*, the court flatterers were loud in their encomiums on the magnificence and moral beauty of the spectacle presented on the previous evening. They spoke of the fêtes of the Revolution and the Empire with profound contempt; they said that neither had ever presented any thing like what they had just witnessed; that it was legitimate authority alone, recognised and accepted by all, that could command such a spectacle; and that those who had the happiness of witnessing it, would preserve during their lives ineffaceable recollections of the scene. Those sycophants dealt out in this way commonplaces that are uttered after every public fête, and which obtain favour only with those who have partaken of the banquet. It is true, and happily so, that even in our days crowned heads can still command respect, but it is when they exhibit much virtue, simplicity of manner, and correctness of taste, and testify for the rest of mankind a respect equivalent to what they demand for themselves.

The masses judge by their eyes, and, for the most part, form their opinion of the moral strength of a Government by its external manifestations. The part played by the magistrates at the city feast, with regard to the king, was, in their eyes, only a counterpart of the task that certain men would wish to impose on France herself; and they connected the scene enacted at the *Hôtel de Ville* with the extravagant acts in which certain landed proprietors had lately indulged in Normandy, Brittany,

Languedoc, and Provence. Some of these seigneurs required that in their village churches the incense should be swung before them; others insisted that the consecrated bread should be offered to them before being presented to the municipal authorities: these pretensions had induced ridiculous contests, accounts of which had been eagerly propagated by the journals, and the acts themselves denounced in the chambers. But these incidents would have been trifles under a staple and rigorously legal Government, consistent with the institutions it had granted and animated by the spirit displayed in the chambers. Unfortunately, such a spirit could not exist in a ministry that had neither unity, head, nor a steady principle of conduct, and was, consequently, without influence. M. de Montesquiou, Minister of the Interior, had more direct intercourse with the country than any of his colleagues. His manners were amiable, when he laid aside the self-sufficiency of which he was sometimes accused; he was moderate, considering his birth and the party to which he belonged; he spoke with fluency, and was listened to with attention in the chambers, but he was, in spite of these advantages, the most incompetent of the ministers, because he possessed neither firmness nor application to business. After recalling the special commissioners, he had left the imperial prefects in office, without entering into any explanation, without telling them whether they should be continued in office or be dismissed. It was reasonable enough to retain special functionaries, such as clerks in the finance, the roads and bridges, the war and marine departments; nothing could be better, for it would have been difficult to find substitutes for the men who filled these places. But it was a dangerous experiment to retain in office the prefects who were exclusively political personages, and who were supposed to represent literally the spirit and sentiments of the new Government. However, for want of suitable men, M. de Montesquiou had been obliged to continue in office a great number of the prefects of the Empire, for the royalists, long removed from the sphere of business, were unfit for these posts. It would have been wiser to have transferred these men to new departments, which would have given their appointment a sort of royal sanction, and spared them the annoyance of appearing self-contradictory in the eyes of their fellow-functionaries.

M. de Montesquiou had taken none of these precautions; he contented himself with appointing as prefects and sub-prefects, in some departments, certain ancient nobles who were reputed fit for public business, and these he left to act according to their own inclinations, without entering into any explanation about the imperial prefects. The consequence was, that the royalist prefects indulged all the passions of partisans, and the imperial prefects who were retained in office exhibited extreme weakness of character, fearing to excite the anger of the royalists. So one party boldly did the evil, and the other complacently allowed it to be done, and suffered it to be publicly said that the Charter was a temporary expedient; that the Bourbons, once firmly fixed on the throne, would complete the Restoration

by reviving the tithes, and restoring the clergy of the Church and the emigré obviated the commission of all these crimes. A minister would have been obliged to voluminous correspondence, and immediately to all these letters, and give in a word, he would have been obliged and of this M. de Montesquiou was not. He scarcely seemed to perceive the serious accidents, even when followed by like that connected with the Bishop of and when forced upon his attention, suffered with a cold, inefficacious letter Beugnot, a man of high intelligence, the direction of the police was confided seen this state of things, and had seen departments sensible, enlightened agents had sent him a succession of well-drawn reports, describing the strange position at that period. It was a delicate task to communicate these reports to Louis XVI was, in other words, to denounce as sometimes very criminal, his most friends. When M. Beugnot happened to receive a very piquant report, once amusing a sarcastic monarch, he seized the opportunity to lay the truth before his eyes. Louis XVIII. read the report, it to M. Beugnot, and contented him joining his minister in a laugh against whom he designated the friends of his Things remained in this state, and the entire system of government. weakness of the administration was acknowledged, and the princes themselves that they ought to appease, that their presence would not subdue every heart, and kindle on the flame of loyalty. They were mistaken, and did not perceive that in diminishing they were about to do evil. Good government on the part of king under such circumstances consisted in restraining his friends, bringing the princes into the provinces exciting the popular feeling, whose would be some few acclamations of vain as the acclamations of the popular rally are, who applaud when their passions are aroused, and forget on the morrow of the previous evening, ready to utter a different cry on a new morrow as the passions be aroused in favour of another cause.

It was thought prudent to send the princes immediately to the west, to the most disturbed part of France. d'Angoulême was selected for this, and a better choice could not be made; the prince consecrated the months of August to his tour. It was decided September and October the Count should visit Champagne, Burgundy, Provence, Dauphiné, and Franche-Comté; that at the same time the Duke de Berri visit the frontier provinces, where they were stationed in great numbers.

The western provinces, that is to say Normandy, Brittany, and Vendée, had offended Louis XVIII., because they made little account of him, and spoke more of M. de la Rochefoucauld as a royalist chief than of the king himself.

insurgents of these provinces, as we have already said, had assembled, and armed themselves at the expense of the blues, whose musters they seized; they recalled their ancient chiefs, and elected new ones in cases where the former had died, and obeyed these leaders much more strictly than they did the Government. To the Duke d'Angoulême was committed the task of informing them that there was a king in France, that there was but one, and that it was his authority alone they ought to recognise and obey. To avoid fixing public attention on a journey into provinces formerly insurgent, the prince announced his intention of visiting the seaports of the English Channel; that is to say, Brest, Nantes, Rochelle, &c. &c. Conforming with this announcement, he left the country of the Chouans on the left, and proceeded directly through Lower Normandy to Rennes and Brest. He was received with a warmth of feeling and demonstrations of joy which might be naturally expected in provinces where his presence brought back the memory of many sufferings endured for the Bourbon cause, and where there were numbers of old men to whose eyes these memories brought tears. The prince found that the royalists, both ancient and modern, spoke very lightly of the Charter, and looked upon the maintenance of the national sales as a merely temporary act of prudence; they considered the Concordat as another kind of charter, that had lost its force on the abdication of Bonaparte. He found the people disposed to regard the axes as a remnant of imperial tyranny that ought to be cast aside as soon as possible. They were, besides, determined not to suffer the exportation of corn, though decreed by a royalist Government. The holders of national property were alarmed, and ready to combine for self-defence. The magistrates were distrustful, and expecting with anxiety the new investiture they had been promised; and, lastly, the army was dispirited, hostile in feeling, and scarcely respectful in manner. The prince had not sufficient penetration to appreciate the tendency of this state of things, but he possessed sufficient good sense and uprightness to perceive that it was opposed to order, and in direct opposition to the promises made by the king, which, in his opinion, ought to be honourably fulfilled; and he spoke admirably well on every point with the exception of religion, for on that subject the Bourbon family held most dangerous opinions. The prince took especial pains to persuade the people that there were not two kings,—one residing at the *Pavillon de Flore*, called Louis XVIII., an ancient Jacobin, as the provincialists called him, very crafty, and making promises that he never intended to keep: the other, the Count d'Artois, residing at the *Pavillon Maroon*, whose heart was filled with the true sentiments of a good royalist; the former represented by the prefects, who ought not to be either obeyed or believed, the second by some Chouan chiefs, whose advice alone ought to be listened to and followed. The prince declared that there was but one king; that his orders ought to be obeyed, the taxes paid, and corn allowed to be exported, that the holders of national property ought not to be disturbed; in a word, that people ought to live peaceably

and enjoy the restored public tranquillity, and allow it to be enjoyed by others. He spoke less prudently to the priests, in whose errors he seemed to participate, excepting in what concerned tithes and Church property. He strengthened as much as he could the legal authorities, called forth the enthusiasm of the masses by the mere fact of his being a Bourbon, and satisfied honest men by his moderation and uprightness, but unfortunately did not fascinate anybody, and, after having traversed Laval, Rennes, Brest, Lorient, he left the country as disturbed as he found it, because, though he spoke rationally, his presence excited deep emotion, and at that moment emotion of all kind was an evil, because it awakened passions that ought to have been suppressed.

To visit Nantes was an important point. This city contained a rich commercial population attached to the principles of the Revolution, but detesting its excesses, of which many cruel instances had occurred before their eyes, and hating as strongly the Vendean insurrection, and discontented with the arrogance of the nobility on both banks of the Loire. The people of Nantes entertained an exceeding dislike to Napoleon's Government, because under that their commerce had been destroyed, and this aversion naturally inclined them to look favourably on the Bourbons, who brought with them peace and the Charter. But the extravagances of the priests and the emigrants on the one hand, and on the other the difficulty they found in re-establishing their commerce, had rendered them discontented. They bitterly regretted the Mauritius, attributed to the English the worst designs, and entertained an ill feeling against the Bourbon Government on account of the partiality shown to England. Our colonies, on which the merchants of Nantes had reckoned so much, were now under the protection of the British flag, stocked with European produce, and under existing circumstances no great traffic could be expected in that quarter. Influenced by all these motives, the people of Nantes were sincere royalists, already somewhat disappointed in their hopes, but still perfectly constitutional. The Vendéans having announced their intention of erecting a post on the left bank of the Loire, bearing the inscription, "Here Vendée commences," the Nanteans declared they would erect a post at the gates of their city, with this inscription, "Here Vendée was foiled."

The Duke d'Angoulême was well received by the Nanteans; he addressed them in a tone of moderation that produced an agreeable impression, and brought them back to an excellent frame of mind. On quitting Nantes, he journeyed through the centre of Vendée, stopping first at Beaupréau. He was now in the "Bocage," this wooded and almost inaccessible country, where nobles lived after a patriarchal fashion with their tenants, whom they had formerly led to battle against the armies of the Republic. In these rural districts, there abode much sincerity of feeling and simplicity of manners, and very little of the spirit of intrigue and brigandage that had characterized the progress of *Chouannerie*. The peasants of the Bocage were tolerably

quiet under the direction of their seigneurs, who bade them have patience and obey the orders of the king. The only symptom of insubordination exhibited by these people was a reluctance to pay the taxes, which they hoped to see soon abolished. About five or six thousand of them arrived at Beaupréau, with their seigneurs and their white banners, deeply touched by the sight of the prince, as was natural when they recalled the many struggles, the many sorrows and heavy losses they had endured in the royal cause. Their language was not unreasonable; besides, they remembered the concessions made since 1789, and had no wish to see tithes and feudal rights revived. Here, in the centre of the Bocage, many touching scenes had taken place, and scarcely one that could awaken regret. At Bourbon-Vendée, the prince found the public spirit less simple and less innocent among the people of the Marais. In this region, the people were less agricultural than commercial, they were fond of excitement, and assumed a certain importance; they smuggled, and evaded the payment of taxes, and exhibited on the whole rather turbulent passions. The clergy, especially, displayed a total want of common sense. The prince repeated here to those who came to hear him what he had already said throughout his progress, and his discourse was not without effect. He afterward repaired to Rochelle, where he might have done a great deal of good by receiving the titular bishop, against whom the clergy of the diocese had revolted, preferring the ancient bishop, who had not given in his resignation. Unfortunately, the Duke d'Angoulême, who was the most pious of the Bourbon princes, refused to receive the titular bishop, and by this conduct gave a most deplorable contradiction to M. de Montesquieu's letter. The "little church" was transported with joy, and became more arrogant than ever, for no act could be more significantly favourable to her than a refusal on the part of the prince to receive the prelate *en fonction*, to whom the Government had but lately enjoined a complete obedience. This was declaring by the mouth of the prince that the official Government was a delusion of which nobody ought to be the dupe.

At Bordeaux the prince found himself, so to speak, in his capital. It was there that the Bourbons had first appeared on their return to France, and the Bourbon who represented the family on that occasion was himself. But at Bordeaux, as elsewhere, the first fervour of the people had passed away, as well as their alluring hopes. After having looked upon the English as liberators, and also as extensive consumers of their produce—for they had carried off and drunk a great deal of wine—they were exasperated against them, since they had learned the loss of the Mauritius, and the state of our colonies, whose markets were filled with British merchandise. And the Bordelais were, besides, displeased at some imprudent outbursts on the part of the Guyenne nobility, and especially irritated by the obstinate maintenance of the *droits réunis*. Hatred of the English, dissatisfaction against the nobility, and irritation against the *droits réunis*, were the three prevailing sentiments of the Bordelais, and which the Duke d'Angoulême was

called upon to remove or at least moderate. The prince did all in his power, and admitted—which was true—that the English had not acted like generous conquerors, but maintained that they had not done any thing to prevent the revival of French commerce, and that with a little time and industry trade would again flourish. He treated the rich citizens with distinction, and finally insisted on the absolute necessity of the indirect taxes, without which the expenses of the State could not be met. On this point, he succeeded in producing an effect on the minds of the more enlightened of the Bordelais merchants.

After leaving Bordeaux, the prince repaired to Mont-de-Marsan, Bayonne, Pau, Toulouse, and Limoges, making sensible speeches everywhere, giving here and there useless advice, and exciting, unintentionally, the passions of the royalists more than was beneficial either to the interests of France or his family. He returned to Paris by Angers and Mans.

Angers was one of the most disturbed and one of the most important cities of the west. The citizens and the nobility held opposite opinions on every subject which at that time occupied public attention. The infantry of the national guard was for the most part composed of the citizen class, and the cavalry of the nobility, because the latter being richer could provide for the maintenance of horses. The cavalry had adopted a special uniform, which they called the "Vendean uniform," and which, notwithstanding reiterated commands from Paris, they refused to lay aside. The cavalry had, moreover, declared their intention of exclusively surrounding the prince, and constituting themselves his personal guard. These pretensions were exhibited in more than one place, and especially at Mans, in the centre of the ancient country of the Chouans. But the latter had announced a more serious project, which was no other than to assemble to the number of twenty thousand, with their chiefs and banners, and so accompany the Duke d'Angoulême during his stay in the province. During more than two months previously, the prefects of Angers and Mans had used every effort to prevent manifestations of this kind, but had not succeeded. However, as the Duke d'Angoulême drew nearer, thanks to several sage admonitions emanating from the prince, the prefects succeeded in making their silly fellow-citizens listen to reason; and at Angers, in particular, the cavalry guard promised to abstain from all pretentious display, and the infantry made a like promise. Notwithstanding these pacific assurances, when the prince arrived at the gates of Angers, and the authorities, accompanied by the troops, went out to meet him, a company of the infantry, national guards, who suspected the intentions of the cavalry, broke the line of the *cortège*, and suddenly surrounded the prince, whom they placed in a kind of square. Neither the prince nor the military authorities dared act with severity, for the insurgents were supported by public opinion, and the prince was obliged to enter the city escorted in this fashion. Having arrived at Angers, he determined to make both parties feel his authority. He dissolved the company of infantry that had disturbed the tranquillity of

the *sûte*, but adjusted the balance by addressing a sharp remonstrance to one of the principal nobles. "It is you, sir," he said, "who wish to be here more king than the king himself; it is you who wish that the soldiers should present arms to you and obey you, instead of obeying the legally constituted authorities; it is you whose pretensions disturb a country where you ought to give an example of peace and submission to the laws. Royalists such as you are more dangerous than the most formidable enemies. You may withdraw."

This scene, which soon became the subject of conversation throughout the city, delighted the citizens, and would have produced a highly beneficial effect had it been made known through the entire of France. But the journals were forbidden to allude to the circumstance. The prince afterward pardoned the company of the national guards that had been dissolved, allowed it to be formed again, and left all the sensible people of Angers perfectly satisfied with him.

At Mans, the Chouan chiefs had been induced to listen to reason, an effect that was in a great measure attributable to the fact that they were not able to enlist so many of their old soldiers as they had expected, and among the new, very few could afford to make a journey of fifteen or twenty leagues at their own expense, to take part in a political demonstration. The prince was, consequently, spared some annoyance. But he saw many ardent royalists, numbers of old soldiers, remnants of the civil wars, who gave utterance to sentiments by no means moderate, without, however, proceeding to any vexatious demonstration. The prince returned to Paris about the middle of August. He had set out on his journey with the intention of doing good, but it had been his fate, in several instances, to do evil, by unintentionally exciting districts that most needed to be tranquillized.

Immediately after the return of the Duke d'Angoulême, the Count d'Artois proceeded to visit Champagne and Burgundy. He was authorized to make large promises of Government favours, and not to refuse any merely honorary distinction, the measure in the latter case not depending either on the budget or the tyranny of custom. He could confer on the majority the order of the lily, on military men and magistrates the cross of the Legion of Honour, on select royalists the cross of Saint Louis, and he was not a man to keep his hand closed when he had the king's permission to open it. He first visited the banks of the Seine and the Aube, and particularly the cities of Nogent, Méry, Arcis-sur-Aube, Brienne, Bar-sur-Aube, and Troyes, where the war had made fearful ravages. He found part of the population sunk in wretchedness, and living in the midst of ruins. He was compassionate and demonstrative; he was touched by all the sorrows he beheld, he did not conceal his emotion, and won the affection of the sufferers by the sympathy he displayed. As he journeyed along, he melted in tenderness over those that were afflicted; he even wept with them, he called them his friends, his children, and promised to acquaint the king with their misfortunes, as if the king possessed the means of

remedying these woes. The Minister of Finance had taken precautions against the prodigality of the prince, and laid it down as a principle that the State could do nothing for the districts ravaged by the war; that the utmost amelioration that could be afforded would be the reduction of the taxes, but that only in cases where the impossibility of payment was proved. Monsieur promised all the districts he visited to petition for exemption from taxes; he even promised them loans of money, and gave them permission, meanwhile, to cut down 120,000 trees in the State forest, to help in rebuilding their houses. To these aids, which were only just and of some importance, he added alms as large as the civil list permitted, which was already burdened by grants made to the emigrants. To these aids, he added the decoration of the lily, which he bestowed at the rate of five or six hundred at a time, relieved occasionally by some crosses of the Legion of Honour or Saint Louis. He quitted the people of these districts, leaving as the chief consolation of their sorrows the emotion caused by a prince's visit; and hope, which, whether groundless or well founded, always cheers the human heart.

After this visit to the provinces, suffering from the effects of war, the Count d'Artois went from Troyes to Dijon. Dijon was an ancient parliamentary city, inhabited by an old *noblesse de robe*, formerly well educated, still very pretentious, and unwilling to recognise any other liberty than that of the privilege of *remonstrating*. The inhabitants of Dijon were consequently imbued with a bad spirit, and encouraged in these dangerous sentiments by a prefect who shared in them. They treated the bishop, who owed his elevation to the Concordat, very badly, and accused him of favouring the priests who had taken the civil oath, because he had taken it himself. These people declared openly, and with great self-sufficiency, that they could have arranged matters much better than Louis XVIII. had done; they pronounced the Charter to be a detestable production, but said that there was still time to repair the faults committed, by acting differently when the opportunity presented itself. Thus, whilst in Champagne there prevailed a certain degree of calm, disturbed solely by the sufferings resulting from war, in Burgundy, on the contrary, the public mind was extremely agitated, one portion of the inhabitants ardently desiring a return of the ancient form of things, a feeling that excited in the minds of the others a profound alarm. Monsieur, as might be expected, was received with transport by the royalists, in whose sentiments it was well known he shared; and, with his usual facility of temper, he did not question any thing they told him, believed all he heard, and recommended patience. As to the manifestation which ought to have been the most significant, he did not fail to render it the most vexatious; for he refused to receive the bishop, a circumstance that made a profound impression in the district, and tended to increase rapidly the dissensions that were already beginning to disturb the clergy.

Monsieur found affairs in a bad position at Dijon: he left them in a worse state, and repaired to Lyons. This great city, at that time

the most important in the kingdom next to Paris, did not present a less troubled aspect than the others. On one side was a host of ancient royalists, filled with recollections of the siege of 1793, detesting the Revolution and its results, and now united in a state of high enthusiasm under their former chief, M. de Pr  cy. On the other side was the rich class of merchants and manufacturers, too young to remember any thing of 1793, but sensitively alive to the memory of all Napoleon had done to repair the misfortunes of their city, and, above all, to protect their trade, which during his reign had increased prodigiously. The maritime war, that had ruined Nantes, Bordeaux, and Marseilles, had, on the contrary, enriched Lyons. This city, situate on the Sa  ne and the Rh  ne, at the conflux of all the fluvial communications with Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and Spain, had become the centre of a most active and extensive trade. The possession of Italy and the faculty of procuring thence raw silks at a low price, the facility of transporting rich stuffs to all parts of the Continent, together with large orders from the imperial palace, were advantages that Lyons had fully appreciated, but which had visibly diminished since the opening of the seas; for the fluvial navigation lost what the maritime had gained, and the English, having as much power in Italy as the Austrians, raised the price of raw silk by purchasing for their own consumption. If we add to these annoyances the exactions committed by the Austrians, and for which the Bourbons were unjustly blamed, we may comprehend the divers motives that rendered cold, if not hostile, to the royal cause the Lyonnaise merchants, as well as many of the richest and most influential persons of the country. The people, imitating these dissensions, were also divided. A small but enthusiastic number had joined the royalists; the remainder adhered to the opposite party. The royalists held their meetings in a caf  , since become remarkable by the violence of the speeches uttered there; and thence they sometimes issued in search of their adversaries, intending to provoke them to quarrel; but the latter, though far more numerous, were timid. The mayor, a quiet, honourable-minded man, a royalist by birth and connection, allowed himself to be carried away by the current of Lyonnaise passion, and quarrelled with the prefect, M. Bondy, who endeavoured in vain to allay the disorder. The prefect, though actuated by the best motives, was left to struggle alone between the extreme parties, for neither M. de Pr  cy, head of the national guard, nor the Marshal Augereau, who commanded the troops, afforded him any assistance. The latter was despised by the troops and the bulk of the population for not having defended Lyons against the Austrians; he was also despised on account of his famous proclamation, and consequently possessed no influence, and could not unite the local authorities in a common line of conduct, at once firm and conciliatory.

It was into this blazing furnace that the Count d'Artois came to throw fresh fuel. His arrival excited violent commotion. The precursor of legitimacy, as he was at that time called, the brother of the king,—and, in the

opinion of the extreme royalists, the real king,—ought naturally to be received with enthusiasm. M. de Pr  cy, commander of the national guard, and M. d'Albon, the mayor, accompanied by the most enthusiastic of the population, received him at the gates of Lyons, and in his presence took an oath, in the name of all the inhabitants, to remain ever faithful to the Bourbons. The bystanders confirmed by their acclamations this pledge, which was taken in all sincerity. The prince was afterward conducted through the city, and the municipal authorities, pausing in the most public places, renewed on their knees the oath never to acknowledge any other dynasty than the Bourbon. It was after this fashion that the prince was conducted to the palace, where he was to take up his abode. During the following days he visited the public establishments, and inspected several manufactories, whose owners were very much flattered by this distinction, and became for the moment good royalists. He was next shown traces of the siege, of which Napoleon had not allowed a great number to remain; and, lastly, there were presented to him all that remained in the city of those that had assisted at that memorable siege, those who had been wounded or had suffered in any way on that occasion. They were introduced by M. de Pr  cy, than whom none could be found better fitted for the office. The prince embraced these brave men with his accustomed cordiality, gave the cross of St. Louis to several, and afterward laid the first stone of a monument intended to perpetuate the memory of the resistance made by Lyons to the National Convention in 1793. No Government had ever made more promises to forget than did the restored Bourbons, and no Government had ever shown a more retentive memory: Monsieur was made to please, those especially who were of his own opinion; and, after having passed some days at Lyons, he won the hearts of all his own party, and enkindled passions which it would have been wiser to extinguish. He had not been unfriendly either to the prefect or Marshal Augereau, for he was incapable of offending anybody; but he had not strengthened their position. But he had, on the contrary, poured forth his feelings to the mayor, to M. de Pr  cy, and some of their friends: telling them all that, without doubt, many concessions had been made to the revolutionary party, but that it was better to be patient; that the king would in time repair all that was reparable, but that for the moment prudence should be observed, in order not to furnish pretexts to their adversaries. The prince was himself so imprudent, that the prefects of the environs having come to Lyons to visit him, he said to one, who had served under the Empire and was noble by birth, "Well, my dear prefect, what do you think with regard to the national property? Do you think it could be restored to the ancient proprietors?" The prefect replied, that if the Government wished to excite an immediate and violent revolution, nothing would effect that object more certainly than making such thoughts public. The prince, perceiving that he had ill chosen his confidant, hastened to retract his opinion, and explain what he had said as best he could. We may divine the tone of his conversation with his own adherents.

The Count d'Artois left the city of Lyons in a state of violent excitement, and the inhabitants more at variance than ever. At Valence, he permitted a manifestation of feeling that produced a very bad impression. He was invited to a public dinner, that was served on several tables, in order to accommodate the numerous guests, among whom were the members of the council of the department. One of these, a rich and influential man, was son of a citizen who, in former times, had had the weakness to sign one of the numerous addresses presented to the Convention after the death of Louis XVI. Local malevolence had taken the trouble to recall this circumstance, and communicate it to the retinue of Monsieur. Some of the officers who accompanied the prince were seated at the table where the obnoxious member was to dine; they rose when he made his appearance, and retired with an affectation of disgust. This circumstance gave occasion to some sharp observations, and was, within a few hours, talked of throughout the district.

The prince traversed Avignon, where he pursued the same line of conduct, and finally arrived at Marseilles, where he was expected with extreme impatience.

This great city, formerly the queen of the Mediterranean, and which has again become so, though by means very different to what she then contemplated, had many reasons to hate both the Revolution and the Empire, for through them she had not only ceased to be prosperous, but had been reduced to beggary. During five-and-twenty years she had seen more than three hundred merchant-vessels fast anchored at her quays, and rotting there.* From time to time, indeed, but very rarely, a vessel laden with corn or sugar entered the port, having by a miracle escaped the enemy. The English had seized several within the mouth of the harbour, and even under the fire of the forts. This unfortunate city had fallen into fearful distress, and suffered so much, that the inhabitants would certainly have revolted, had not an energetic prefect, the Count Thibaudeau, restrained them with a hand of iron. The sole comfort afforded to their misery was, when from time to time they committed to the flames the English merchandise they had seized, and which was burned in one of the principal squares of the city, before the eyes of a starving people, who saw destroyed in a few hours wealth that would have relieved all their wants. Consequently, the day of Napoleon's downfall and the return of the Bourbons was one of frantic joy; of a joy of which no description could give an idea. But joy is transient, for it frequently consists in picturing to ourselves unattainable happiness.

* Born and brought up at Marseilles, this spectacle is still present to my eyes. I can fancy that I still see that vast number of motionless vessels, several lines deep, extending from what is called *la place de la Cannebière* to the foot of Fort Saint Jean. A child at that time, I was often brought down to the quays, where I acquired the habit of remarking these vessels; I knew their names, and can still recall their forms, as one does the houses of a street one is accustomed to frequent, and I never saw a single vessel change place during the latter years of the Empire. Consequently, the fall of the Empire occasioned an outburst of joy at Marseilles, greater than I have ever witnessed at any time under any circumstances.

And Marseilles soon witnessed the loss of the Mauritius, with which her merchants had kept up an extensive commerce. The Marseillaise conceived so great a hatred against the English, that they could scarcely endure to see them enter their harbour. The Marseillaise merchants found the colonies restored to us stocked with European and wholly destitute of colonial produce; all the commercial relations were changed. Spain was in disorder—the Mediterranean was in the hands of the English and the Greeks—the harbour of Marseilles, formerly a free port, was now beset with imperial custom-houses; and, lastly, the *droits réunis*, to which they imputed a great part of their sufferings, were maintained and confirmed. Consequently, the joy of the Marseillaise cooled down rapidly, and they sought with bitterness the cause of their delusion. Marseilles was not aware that a vast manufacturing industry would soon be developed around her walls, that a new empire acquired by France—Algeria—and a general *renaissance* of the Mediterranean countries, would render her the queen of the southern seas, and richer in her regal power than she had ever been; but, like many others, she sought for her lost crown in the past instead of the future. She fancied that her former prosperity resulted from her being a *free port*, a freedom that consisted in receiving without inspection, and without payment of duty, the merchandise of the entire world, which was exempt from dues within two leagues of the walls of Marseilles; as if removing a line of custom-houses to a distance of two miles could alter the fate of a city, or restore commercial relations once lost. A mart may facilitate commercial relations, but cannot create them. Hamburg, one of the most important trading-cities in the world, owes its greatness not to being a free port, but to the Elbe, which renders it the thoroughfare of German commerce with the rest of the world. But Marseilles, poor emigrant, rendered frantic by thinking over the past, longed to become again what she called a *free port*, and fancied that under these conditions, the restoration of the Bourbons would be for her the greatest of benefits, a benefit such as she had pictured in her fondest dreams.

The visit of Monsieur revived the former illusions of the Marseillaise. They received him with transport, and entertained him with discourses more extravagant than any he had heard during his journey. They said they had wished to see among them the king, the true king, the independent king, emancipated from every restraint, in a position to secure the welfare of his subjects, unfettered by the shackles with which revolutionists sought to fetter him. This was saying, in other words, that they wished to see the prince removed from the influence of any sensible people who might raise an objection against making Marseilles a free port. In addition to all this, the prince heard vehement declamations against the *droits réunis*, but he conducted himself at Marseilles as he had done elsewhere. He told the Marseillaise that he was of their opinion; that they were certainly right; that he believed he could promise them speedy satisfaction, but that it was necessary to have a little patience, and give the king time to accomplish

the contemplated good. The people were so happy to look upon him, to press his hands, that they seriously believed all he said, and under this impression prepared him magnificent fêtes. On such occasions, every city puts forth its best. Marseilles displayed her fine haven, which was far from being then what it has since become, and which on this occasion was made the scene of brilliant aquatic exercises. At the close of one of those days of amusement, as the shadows of night were closing in, a mountain that overlooks the harbour suddenly burst into flames, presenting the appearance of a volcano. This effect was produced by the use of a thousand casks, filled with inflammable materials. The mayor told the Count d'Artois that the picture presented to his eyes was only a feeble image of the ardent sentiments of the Marseillaise. After this exhibition, the prince was conducted to the principal theatre of the city. Here a scene occurred in which the public joy bordered on delirium. Monsieur had written to the king, asking the freedom of the port. This request was strongly opposed in the royal council, but the king wrote to his brother that he hoped soon to obtain it by forcing the will of his ministers. The prince, regarding as done what was only promised, announced in the open theatre the freedom of the port as a *fait accompli*, whereupon the mayor, falling on his knees, kissed the prince's hand in the name of the entire population of Marseilles. The audience rose from their seats eight or ten times, uttering cries of joy and gratitude.

After having passed some days among people that were nearly wild with joy, the prince repeated to the Marseillaise what he had already said to the Lyonnaise, to the Burgundians, and to the Champenaise—that the days passed with them had been the happiest of his life. He left Marseilles and went to Toulon; then, retracing his steps, he visited Nismes, where he might have done a great deal of good by restraining the Catholics and giving confidence to the Protestants, neither of which he did. He journeyed on to Grenoble, where he was warmly received by the royalist party, small in number, but fervent in feeling, and at length reached Franche-Comté.

The state of parties at Besançon was such as required the most prudent and steady conduct. A haughty nobility, entertaining the strongest prejudices, and the prefect of the department one of the local nobility, who excited instead of restraining the violence of party feeling, all of which circumstances had strongly indisposed the mass of the population. One fact in particular aggravated this state of things. The Archbishop Lecoz was located at Besançon. This prelate, of whom we have already spoken, was an old constitutionalist, a very worthy but obstinate man. He had afforded protection to the priests who had taken the civil oath; but, in other matters, his nomination had not occasioned any regret either to the spiritual or temporal authorities. On the downfall of the Empire and the accession of the Bourbons, the "little church" had poured forth its anger on the archbishop, the nobility had joined their voices to the outcry, the prefect had added fuel to

the fire, and the result was a species of religious war, which, however, went no further than evil speeches, the combatants never proceeding to the use of arms. The prefect and his partisans annouced openly that the prince, in passing through Besançon, would not receive the archbishop; to which the archbishop, with his accustomed obstinacy, replied, that he would not fail to appear at the levée of the Count d'Artois. Piqued by such boldness, the prefect declared, that if the archbishop kept his word he would keep his, and have him arrested. Such were the remarks publicly exchanged at Besançon between the civil and religious authorities, and, as no secret was made of these quarrels, all the inhabitants of the district heard and repeated these insulting speeches.

Monsieur might, on this occasion, have done what would have been both wise and salutary. He might, by his conduct, have contradicted the remarks of an imprudent prefect, by entering into at least official relations with the prelate; relations which were supposed to exist until the revocation of the Concordat, and which were besides an inevitable consequence of the letter written by the Abbé Montesquieu to the Bishop of Rochelle. Unhappily, it could not be expected that Monsieur would adopt such a line of conduct. Having arrived at Besançon, where he was greeted by the warmest demonstrations on the part of the ultra-royalists, he would not go to the cathedral, for fear of meeting the archbishop there; and fearing that the prelate might visit him, he caused it to be intimated that he would not receive him. The prefect had orders to transmit this communication, which he was only too willing to do. The bishop, as obstinate as his adversaries were imprudent, asked the prefect to put his communication in a written form, as he ought, in such a case, to assume all the responsibility of his acts. The prefect, quite as unreasonable as any of his party, wrote to the bishop; and, not content with this exaggerated mode of proceeding, he completed the scandal by making the chief of the gendarmerie bearer of the document. This brave officer, who participated in the upright sentiments of his corps, whose members have at all times admirably discharged their duties, went to the archbishop, expressed his regret at what had occurred, and entreated him not to leave the episcopal palace during the prince's stay at Besançon, giving him at the same time to understand that he was empowered to enforce this advice. The prelate submitted for once, and remained within-doors; but he wrote immediately to Paris, determined to denounce such scandalous proceedings to the two chambers. The effect produced in the surrounding district was immense. The clergy presented the appearance of two opposing forces, behind whom the people ranged themselves; but the numbers of the latter were unequally divided, the greater portion taking part against the nobility and those of the clergy who had excited these stormy proceedings.

Monsieur, continually flattered by his partisans, proceeded on his way toward Paris, having by his graceful manners won the affection of those whom he had not offended by some act of in-

dence; having lavished the Cross of the Legion of Honour by thousands, and those of the Legion of Honour and Saint Louis by hundreds. He left the districts through which he passed more disturbed than he had found them, nor had he, like the Duke d'Angoulême, given any good advice along his route. Monsieur arrived at Paris about the end of October.

Meanwhile, his second son, the Duke de Berry, had performed an exclusively military career along the frontiers. He had visited Aubeuge, Givet, Metz, Nancy, Strasbourg, Toul, Lunenburg, Belfort, and returned to Paris by Langres. He had given his entire attention to inspecting the troops, and putting them through their exercises. He gave them standards, distributed crosses among them, but neither found nor left them satisfied. This prince, who was short of stature, endeavoured to imitate Napoleon in his bearing, and succeeded in gaining some degree of favour with the army during the first days of the Restoration. But whether attributable to the difficulty of winning the affections of the malcontent officers, or to the faults of the Government, or to the prince's own faults, his success with the army was very short-lived. Instead of being more lavish of his attentions, in order to soothe those adverse spirits, he became more so when he encountered opposition, and especially during his last tour he abandoned himself to outbursts of passion, which the tongues of the malevolent retailed, exaggerated, and talked of in every direction, and which produced consequences as injurious as the effects of political and religious imprudence admitted by his father.

The princes had not effected by their presence in the districts through which they passed, all the good they hoped, though they had been received in the different cities with great enthusiasm. To render their journeys really useful, there should have existed in France a government determined in its views, firm in its resolutions, and animated by the spirit of the chambers, a spirit at once liberal and moderate; and in addition to this, the princes should have declared on all occasions to their friends a truth of which the latter seemed wholly ignorant, which was, that the Charter was a solemn act, whose entire consequences they were resolved to abide by. In such a government at Paris, and princes acting as its organs in the provinces, the exalted feelings of friends might have been calmed down, and the alienated affections of the people won back; and with the people thus reconciled over, the army might have been retained, whose discontent would not have arisen, under such circumstances, as a hopeless evil. But such a government, as we have seen, did not exist in France. There was a moderate-minded but careless king, who certainly did not restrain the actions of his ministers; but neither did he restrain his brothers and nephews in the commission of errors. There were princes totally divergent in their modes of conduct. One—the Duke d'Angoulême—sensible, but not brilliant; another—the Count d'Artois—amiable, but possessed by the spirit of interference, and never interfering in a profitable manner; a third—the Duke de Berry—rather intellectual, rather military in

his tastes, but inconsistent in his conduct, alternately flattering or offending the army, not knowing how to respect the feelings of the soldiers, nor to make himself respected by them. There were ministers without a leader, without system; alternately bold or timid in their conduct toward the chambers, with the exception of one. This combination was not a government: it was a party in power; and a party in power is a naughty child, wielding a thunderbolt.

The position of affairs had deteriorated considerably during the months of September and October, the months dedicated to the journeys of the princes. Various measures, the necessary consequence of the course public affairs had taken, had been very badly received, and met so determined a resistance in the chambers, that they were of necessity withdrawn. For example, the War Minister, embarrassed by the unexpected expenses imposed on him, had endeavoured to economize as much as he could, and made an effort to save two millions out of the sum allotted for the support of the *Invalides*. Our protracted wars had greatly multiplied the number of wounded and indigent soldiers; and branch establishments had been erected for them at Arras and Avignon. The minister intended to lighten his expenses by giving those pensioners who, since the alteration in the frontiers, could no longer be considered Frenchmen, a small sum of money; and by sending to their homes a portion of those who were French, allowing them an annual pension of 250 francs. He fancied that this pension would be sufficient to support them in their villages, whilst that at Paris, in the *Hôtel Royal des Invalides*, the support of one man cost 700 francs. Of the saving thus effected there could be no doubt, but the measure appeared very harsh; for 250 francs would be far from sufficient for men who, for the most part, possessed no family ties; and it was said that soldiers wounded in the service of their country were expelled from their asylum, whilst money and promotion were lavished on men who had fought against France. And in fact a commission had been appointed to pay the army of Condé, and distribute aid among the old Vendéan soldiers. Another measure, as ill-advised as that touching the pensioners, excited an equally great degree of discontent.

It became necessary to make an inquiry into the state of the funds appropriated to the maintenance of the Legion of Honour. The endowment had been converted into funded property, and was not sufficient to meet the expenses of the nominations made by Napoleon on account of the last war. It had been determined that no pensions should be attached to the appointments made since the last war, until the resources of the institution would warrant the expense. But it was necessary to furnish funds for the establishments appropriated to the education of the daughters of poor soldiers. The establishments of Saint-Denis and Ecouen were to be supported, as well as several secondary institutions, of which two were known as *des Barbeaux* and *des Loges*. These houses were filled with young girls, the greater number of whom had become orphans in consequence of our long wars. It was pro-

posed to suppress three of these institutions—those of Ecouen, *des Barbeaux*, and *des Loges*—and to treat the young girls thus expelled from their asylum in the same manner as the wounded soldiers, by giving them a pension of 250 francs each. There was a circumstance that tended to complicate the question still more. The chateau of Ecouen belonged to the princes of Condé. It was therefore natural to believe that in order to restore the chateau to its former masters, a number of young orphan girls were about to be thrown into the streets, whose fathers had fallen in the service of France. When this intelligence became bruited about, the military, already discontented, became still more so, and the public caught up the same feeling of sympathy for these poor children, who could not live on 250 francs, and of whom some had neither father nor mother. The marshals took up the cause, and Marshal Macdonald remonstrated in the Chamber of Peers, of which he was a member, and even pleaded with the king, to whose presence he had access.

Lastly, an unfortunate project of the War Minister with regard to the military schools, completed this combination of ill-concerted measures. The minister wished to combine into one the three military schools of Saint Cyr, Saint Germain, and la Flèche, to give them, as he said, more unity, and to allow the nobility of the kingdom to enjoy the advantages secured to them by the edict of January, 1751. A royal ordinance was accordingly issued decreeing the fusion of the three schools into one—that of Saint Cyr. The general tone of the ordinance seemed to imply an intention of excluding the citizens from the military schools in order to fill them exclusively with the nobility, by whom the profession of arms would consequently be alone exercised, as was formerly the case.

To describe the effect produced by these different measures would be indeed difficult. Though the opinions uttered by a discontented public, and the journals that acted as their interpreters, were of course exaggerated, still it was evident that in order to meet unreasonable expenses, such as the re-establishment of the king's household troops, or the pensions of emigrant officers, the misery of the army was increased; and it was no less evident that the project of introducing the ancient order of things was entertained, by which the nobility should enjoy all the high military grades. Remonstrances rose from every side. The importance of the right to petition is little felt in ordinary times, when there are no serious wrongs to be redressed, but if ever its utility was recognised, it was on the present occasion. Numerous petitions were addressed to both chambers. The Chamber of Deputies wished to hear the report immediately, and spite of the opposition of a minority devoted to the emigrants, and spite of the imprudence of another minority devoted to the opposite party, the Chamber of Deputies condemned the proceedings of the Government by presenting the petitions in question, accompanied by a request couched in mild but positive terms that the obnoxious acts should be revoked. The Government was consequently obliged to undo its work. It was publicly

declared that the allusion to the edict of 1751 did not imply a preference for the nobility in the admission to the military schools. It was decided that the branch establishments of the *Invalides* should be supported until the demise of the soldiers who occupied them; that none should be sent home with pensions except at their own express wish; that the same rules should be observed with regard to the female orphans of the Legion of Honour; and that the houses of *des Barbeaux* and *des Loges* should be reopened for those young girls who either would not or could not return to their families.

The chambers, though moderate in tone and sincerely loyal, were always prompt to check an undue assumption of power on the part of the crown, and it would have been desirable that offended partisans had confided in the chambers, instead of seeking satisfaction and security elsewhere. But irritated passions look for more than justice—they seek for vengeance, and are not scrupulous in the employment of means. The half-pay officers who thronged the capital, some frequenting the salons of Paris, and others the public places, held language which every day became more violent and more irritating. Their audacity provoked the Government, and brought down upon themselves inevitable punishment; and provocation followed provocation, until the result was a kind of open war, which, beginning in angry words, might unfortunately terminate in violent acts.

Murat had, up to this time, thanks to his defection, remained King of Naples. But his presence on the throne of Lower Italy disturbed not alone the Italians, but the Spanish and French Bourbons, who demanded his deposition at the Congress of Vienna. The rival police, one belonging to the Government, the other to the Count d'Artois, indulged in all kinds of suspicions and inventions, and fancied that the agitation of the public mind resulted, not from the faults of the Government, but from the action of hostile parties. Excited by the reports of these two police forces, the Government sought elsewhere than in itself the cause of the evil, and fancied that Murat and Napoleon, who had been recently reconciled, and possessed considerable riches, made use of these to keep alive the hostile spirit of the military and unemployed functionaries.

Lord Oxford, a fantastic Englishman, of whom there are many such, had conceived an intense admiration for Bonaparte, a sentiment so contrary to the general feeling of his compatriots. He passed through Paris on his way to Italy, and was believed to be the bearer of a secret correspondence between Naples, the Isle of Elba, and the discontented French military. The French Government had a communication with the English embassy; Lord Oxford was arrested, not with the intention of depriving him of his liberty, but for the purpose of taking away his papers. The examination of these papers caused a degree of surprise which the members of the Government would not have experienced were they endowed with more self-possession. The most culpable document among these papers was one written by General Exelmans, and the guilty secret it contained amounted to very little, as we shall

on see. General Exelmans, having heard at one of the allied armies was to be sent against Murat, wrote to this prince, under whom he had long served, and who had loaded him with benefits, saying that there were any officers as well as himself, who would fer him their swords were the throne of aples in danger. But there was not a word lative to the Bourbons of France, or to any oject against their government.

This letter, though it did not contain a tittle what had been suspected, irritated the king d princes exceedingly. They wished to enge on General Exelmans all the imaginary nspiracies of which they had no proof, but whose existence they persevered in be-ving. It was resolved to arraign him on a minal charge of having kept up a corre-ondence with the external enemies of the te, a crime aggravated by the fact of his ing an officer on active service. General pont, the War Minister, though often weak, isted on this occasion in the most prudent l honourable manner. He observed that King of Naples had been hitherto recog-ed by all Europe; that France, though soling his deposition at Vienna, had not yet lared open war against him; that French ojects could consequently, without incurring imputation of criminality, offer him their vices; that no tribunal would think of at-hing criminality to General Exelmans' let-; that the general being on service, and equently aware of the sentiments enter-ined by the court of France toward the rt of Naples, might be accused of indiscre- n and want of zeal, and thereby subject nself to be reprimanded, but nothing more. ough the king was quite as much irritated the princes against General Exelmans, he nprehended the reasons adduced by the War nister, and admitted that a reprimand was, severest punishment that ought to be in-cted. The War Minister sent for General elmans and reproved him for his conduct, d for the moment, this affair, destined at a er period to excite a terrible commotion, as suppressed, thanks to the wisdom dis-ayed by General Dupont on the occasion.

The young officers who thronged Paris, and turbed it by their remarks, quickly learned at had befallen General Exelmans, and ough he had only suffered a slight punish-ent, they made a great noise about the mat-er. These gentlemen were soon furnished th another grievance of the same nature. General Vandamme was an officer of great rit, but of violent temper; he held extreme olutionary principles, calculated, if not to stify, at least to provoke, calumny, and as wrongly reputed a most wicked man. He ared with Marshal Davout the hatred of the enaies of France. Returning from a Rus-an imprisonment, he had been shamefully ulted in passing through Germany, and this ident ought to have excited a universal in-reat in his favour throughout France. But e effect was quite different, and the king was ised, should General Vandamme appear at e Tuileries, to make him an exception to the urtheries lavished on the heads of the army. ooner had the general arrived at Paris, an he repaired to the Tuileries on the day

appointed for the reception of officers of his rank. He was refused admission to the palace, and the body-guards expelled him, so to speak, from the royal dwelling. This old soldier, who had passed his life fighting for his country, became indignant at receiving such treat-ment from young men who had never heard a musket fired; he filled Paris with his com-plaints, and found many-tongued echoes of his grievances.

Whilst one of the oldest soldiers of France was treated in this manner, a report was sud-denly put in circulation that the family of Georges Cadoudal had received a patent of nobility. Nobody could deny the courage of Georges, nor his devotedness, but neither could anybody approve the means he had de-termined to employ against the First Consul, and which he had acknowledged before the bar of justice. We need not say what bitter thoughts and violent expressions such a cir-cumstance was calculated to excite.

Whilst young unemployed officers hurried restlessly from one part of Paris to another, there was one who lived quietly and in soli-tude. This was Carnot, who after the defence of Antwerp had retained the post of inspector of engineers, and was even presented to the king, but shunning the court and the revolu-tionists, he retired into one of the most remote quarters of Paris. He cared little about the insults to which the military were subjected, as he regarded them for the most part as giddy-headed men, but he was deeply moved at the manner in which the Government treated the ancient patriots, whilst Chouan chiefs were raised to the rank of nobles. Carnot was a man of vigorous mind, but not a correct reasoner; he was a proud honest man, led astray by the passions, and, above all, by the logic of the Revolution; he was convinced that he exercised a legal authority, and was perfectly right in condemning Louis XVI. to death. Influenced by this belief, he came to the strange resolution of discussing the ques-tion of regicide, and discussing it in a memoir addressed to the king himself. He had not made up his mind as to the use he should make of this memoir, but writing it was a con-solation to his feelings. In this memoir, which was written with great vigour, bitterness, and irony, but which contained no insult against the royal authority, he discussed this fearful question of regicide, reproducing those argu-ments that prevailed in the days of the Con-vention.

Are kings inviolable? "This," he said, "is a serious question, decided in different ways at all times, in every country, and even in the Bible. In any case, this inviolability admit-ting many exceptions, for it could not be as-serted that monsters like Nero and Caligula should be inviolable in the eyes of their peo-ple. Besides, the French nation, in nomina-ting the Convention, had invested its members with a mission to judge Louis XVI. Had they judged well or ill? History would decide that question, but, in any case, his judges were not called on to give an account to any earthly authority. They might have been mis-taken, but they erred in good faith, and upon all occasions they had given proofs of an in-trepid patriotism. Now, they were attacked,

and called criminals; but in whose name? by what right? France had by numberless addresses confirmed the judgment they pronounced, and raised the judges of Louis XVI. to the highest offices of the State: should France be called a regicide, or the accomplice of regicides? But this was not all. Europe had lowered her uplifted sword before these men, and signed with them treaties such as of Bale. Should Europe, too, be designated a regicide? In short, who were these accusers, who now returned from foreign lands to insult those among their countrymen who, during five-and-twenty years, had fought for France and for liberty? It was these very emigrants who, instead of making a rampart of their bodies for Louis XVI., had taken flight under pretext of making war on the Rhine; and who, in addition to the crime of bearing arms against their country, had committed the enormous error of exciting against Louis XVI. a storm of anger that entailed the destruction of the unfortunate king."

Such was the terrible logic of the old Conventionalist, from which only one conclusion could be drawn, which was, that in these formidable times, whose events bore down the strongest minds, everybody had erred, and the wisest mode would have been to shelter everybody under the oblivion promised by the Charter. Unfortunately, the act of oblivion promised by one party, and asked by the other, was not in reality conformable to the wishes of either.

It appears probable that Carnot had not intended to print the memoir we have just analyzed; but, blinded by revolutionary prejudices, he believed he could get it presented to the king, and so discuss the question of regicide *elle-dieu* with the brother of Louis XVI. Though living so retired, he frequented the society of certain regicides, such as MM. Gard, Fouché, and some others, and to these he showed his memoir, impelled by the necessity of giving vent to his feelings. To give it to be read was to run the risk of soon seeing it printed; and in any case, if he desired a prudent counsellor, it was not such a man as M. Fouché whom he ought to have taken into his confidence. The memoir was scarcely shown to a few persons when it was copied, printed, and, within a few days, circulated as widely as M. Necker's famous financial report had been. It was printed by thousands, both in France and abroad. In fact, it chimed in with the prevailing passions of the hour, with the irritation of the revolutionists, who still formed a numerous party, and was equally gratifying to the holders of national property, who were still more numerous than the revolutionists; it accorded with the discontent of the military and the unemployed functionaries; it even pleased the liberal party, who certainly did not approve regicide, but who looked upon this memoir as a deserved retaliation for all the acts of indiscretion committed by the emigrants. Lastly, the emigrants themselves, in their anger, were eager to read a memoir universally talked of. All this was sufficient to render Carnot's memoir, within a few days, known, not alone throughout France, but throughout Europe.

As might be expected, this memoir produced

a wonderful sensation among the emigrant party. This party replied, and the reply, as to justice and moderation of sentiment, was no ways inferior to the attack. Carnot was told that there were men who, if they possessed a gleam of common sense, would think themselves happy in being allowed to enjoy the impunity in which unprecedented goodness was willing to allow them to exist: that they ought to be satisfied, and seek an asylum in the most profound obscurity, and by such conduct win for themselves, if not indulgence,—which would be impossible for such a crime as theirs,—at least forgetfulness, which would be accorded them, on condition that they did not continually recall their existence to the execration of contemporaries, and that to their abominable crimes they did not add apologies still more abominable; that, as to the rest, their writings corresponded with their acts. The authors of the reply added, that among these men there was one whom they had had the weakness to set apart from his fellows, in giving him credit for some honesty and good sense, but that the puerility of his reasoning equalled its wickedness; that the authors of the 24th of January were decidedly superior to the present writers; but that, in short, these men ought only to think of avoiding the observation of the indignant world, and make up their minds, after having shed the blood of the fathers, to respect the repose of the sons.

But invectives were not the only reply. The Government commenced a prosecution against Carnot's memoir. The author was summoned, and he proudly avowed what he had written, adding that he was not accessory to the publication, and his word was believed, for his adversaries esteemed his character more than they cared to acknowledge. Inquiries were made of several booksellers suspected of issuing clandestine publications, for the purpose of ascertaining what part they might have had in propagating the memoir in question. They were all brought up for examination, a circumstance which contributed not a little to increase the public agitation. The voters who assembled at the house of Fouché and Berni were very much excited, and made fresh advances toward the military,—that is to say, toward the Bonapartists,—who seemed every day more inclined to join them. Incidents soon multiplied, as if destiny had decreed that every person and every circumstance should in some way tend to hasten the approaching crisis.

It was with considerable reluctance, as we have seen, that the emigrants submitted to the article of the Charter that guaranteed the inviolability of the national sales. They now ceased complaining, and said that the Burbons, having recovered the crown, believed they had recovered every thing, and allowed those who had made great sacrifices for their cause to remain in distress. Private negotiations, from which much had been hoped, produced no great result, though supported by intimidation, violent sermons, and even the power of the confessional. The new proprietors expected to be paid if they gave back the property they held, and very few among them, particularly the peasants, would consent to give up possession, even on condition of re-

ceiving a reasonable price. Wishing to know what right they really possessed, they made inquiries, and found that the Charter and the chambers would afford them all-powerful protection. Consequently, all those that the clergy had not won over by disturbing their consciences, firmly upheld their rights, and would not listen to any compromise. The Government, conscious of its weakness in this matter, but willing to give some satisfaction to the men who complained that the Restoration had been of no advantage to them, resolved to restore the unsold national property. The amount of this kind of property held by the State was very considerable, and consisted for the most part of timber. It comprised three or four hundred thousand hectares of forest land of great value. The Charter did not protect this property: it only protected the property already sold. There was one circumstance connected with this projected restitution of property, which rendered it particularly agreeable to the king and the princes—which was, that the property in question belonged for the most part to the old nobility, to families with whom they were personally acquainted, and with whom they were in daily intercourse; and to satisfy the wishes of these persons could be to silence the most troublesome rumblers. The restitution of this property was therefore determined on: it only remained to consider the arrangements.

Had this restitution been dictated by an unbiased spirit of justice, it would have been carried out in a manner very different to what was designed. The high nobility were certainly not the most to be pitied, for they had their imprudence contributed to aggravate a violence of the Revolution. It was the numerous emigrants of the lesser nobility and the *bourgeoisie*, who, involved almost without being aware of it in the common disaster, had paid the price of our dissensions sometimes with their lives, and almost always with their property. These certainly deserved consideration; but the Government ought to have relieved them without disturbing the public tranquillity, and without committing, for the advantage of these persons, acts of injustice as great as those from which they suffered, and the assistance thus afforded ought to have been distributed so as to aid those that deserved most pity and least blame. The principle might have been laid down, and put into immediate operation, that an indemnity was to be granted by the State, not to a few individuals, but to all who had lost their property; and that this indemnity was to be furnished for a great part by the State property. This indemnity might have been so distributed that the poorest should be best treated; and with this might have been combined a financial operation, based on the three or four hundred thousand hectares of timber still in the possession of the State, and to which, when the rate of the exchequer permitted, two or three hundred millions of francs might have been added. By this means might have been accomplished a work not alone of reparation, but of pacification. The ancient proprietors being indemnified, if not to the full extent of their wishes, at least as far as possible, would have been deprived of all pretext for quarrel-

ling with the new holders, and the latter would have been left in peaceable possession. But no such idea was conceived.* The princes thought only of satisfying the ancient nobility, whose misfortunes had certainly the fewest claims on compassion, and who were the most importunate in their clamor. The crown held the landed property of these families, and the Bourbons thought only of restoring this property to satisfy and silence the owners, without reflecting that they were depriving themselves of a valuable pledge that might have served as basis to a general operation for alleviating the misfortunes of the entire mass of sufferers.

The bill on this subject was drawn up by a committee of which M. Ferrand was president, and laid before the council for discussion. The principle laid down was the unconditional restoration of the property that the State had not alienated. But this principle, apparently so simple, presented serious difficulties in the application. For example, certain parishes possessed a considerable quantity of this unsold property, which was applied to the use of the hospitals. The sinking-fund also possessed a portion, which served as security to the annuitants. To take back the lands possessed by the parishes would be to strip the poor and the sick. To take back the lands held by the sinking-fund would be to injure public credit. Spite of their inclinations, the authors of the bill were obliged to abandon their project and content themselves with holding out vague hopes to the proprietors of the unsold property. There was also property of this nature applied to certain public services, such as mansions converted into State offices, and works of art transferred to the different museums. For example, a portion of the Artillery Museum might be claimed by the Condé family, who, as was well known, would not be slow to assert its claims. Many serious inconveniences would have resulted from the restitution of this property; the idea was therefore abandoned, and it was decided that the State should retain this species of property, whether landed or personal, paying the value to the former proprietors. It was agreed that a certain sum should be added to the budget for this purpose. These difficulties being removed, another arose, whose importance became apparent after a few moments' reflection. The clause of the bill regarded the arrears due to the treasury by the new holders of property as being in reality due to the ancient proprietors. The principle laid down that the State ought to restore, as ill got, the property in question, was only saying, in other words, that the unpaid portions of the purchase-money were really owed to the so-called legitimate proprietors. But as the institution of the laws about national property had kept pace with the depreciation of the assignats, and were consequently very complicated, there was scarcely a holder of national property whose possessions might not give rise to quarrels about pretended arrears, which would serve to reinstate the former proprietors. In fact, the passing of this law would put them in a posi-

* The records that remain of the debates in council prove that this question was never even suggested.

tion to commence law proceedings against all the holders of national property. It would be arming them with a formidable weapon that might triumph over the protecting power of the Charter.

The clause in question would have passed without objection, thanks to the inattention of the members of the council, who were for the most part ignorant of business, if the sagacity and vigilance of the Minister of Finance had not raised an obstacle. He pointed out the bearing of the proposed measure, and the council, alarmed, immediately abandoned it. M. Ferrand did not persist. The bill was then submitted to the two chambers, with the proposed modifications.

Unfortunately, a statement of the motives that dictated the measure, and which were quite as important as the bill itself, had not been laid before the council. Even the king had not read it. The whole business was confided to the principles and talents of M. Ferrand, who was a man advanced in life, mild tempered, well informed, and a good writer; but he was obstinate, devoid of tact, and an ultra royalist.

He had condensed his statement of motives into a sentiment, which was shared by the court, that the Government in restoring the unsold property of the emigrants scarcely fulfilled its duty; that it was painful not to be able to do more, but that, in default of additional satisfaction, the Government would give hopes of future compensation: in a word, that the Government would do all that was possible at the time, and promise to do more at a future period.

M. Ferrand entered the Chamber of Deputies accompanied by MM. de Montesquiou and Louis, and read his statement in a low, drawling voice, which at first weakened the effect. In this statement, which was particularly addressed to the emigrants, the king apologized for not doing more for them, and for being so tardy in doing what he did. But on the morrow of a great revolution, obstacles spring up so rapidly that it is difficult to return to the ways of justice and truth. It was only slowly, and with precaution, that good could be effected. "Undoubtedly," said M. Ferrand, "*the king will rejoice in the happiness of those to whom he is about to restore their property, and he stood in need of this satisfaction to mollify the regret he felt at not being able to make this act of justice as complete as he could wish.* But he hoped that, thanks to the prudence of his administration, and thanks to the order observed in the public expenditure, the day would come when the state of the finances would diminish successively the painful exceptions necessitated by existing circumstances."

The intensity of this regret proved what violence the king did himself in adhering to the conditions of the Charter, and these vague but ill-defined promises, giving so much ground of hope to some, and consequently causing so much alarm to others, could not fail to produce a bad impression. (One passage in this statement produced a sensation of a different kind, resulting from an offence offered to the entire nation. Endeavouring, with a flagrant want of tact, to estimate the moral merit of those who had emigrated and those who re-

mained in France, M. Ferrand added, "It is universally acknowledged at present, that so many good and faithful Frenchmen in leaving their country only contemplated a short separation. Wandering in foreign lands, they wept over the calamities of the country which they still flattered themselves they should again behold. It is well known that the fondest prayers of the French who remained at home, as well as of those who emigrated, were for a happy change in the state of their country, even when they dared not hope for it. The result of these misfortunes and convulsions was that both parties found themselves in the same position—both had arrived at the same point; *the one party in following the right line, without ever deviating from it, and the other after having followed more or less the phases of the Revolution, amid which they had remained.*"

These words, though pronounced in a voice little calculated to excite the passions, produced a strong emotion, an emotion which gradually increased until it assumed the magnitude of an event. It was, then, a recognised fact in the eyes of the king that the emigrants alone had followed *the right line*, and that all other Frenchmen had more or less abandoned this line. And so the entire nation, with the exception of twenty or thirty thousand individuals, had deviated from the right path! And so all those who had lost their lives endeavouring to snatch France from the hands of furious demagogues, had deviated from the right path! And so Malherbes, who had not followed the princes, but who died for having defended the king, and Boissy d'Anglas, who had nobly held his place in presence of the bleeding head of Ferrand, had deviated from the right path! The king, Louis XVI. himself, was excusable only because he had failed in the journey to Varennes! And so all those who, during twenty years, had so ably governed France, all those who had died, by hundreds of thousands, to save her from the power of foreigners, or to exalt her to the summit of glory—all those had deviated from the right path! Deraix, Kleber, Marceau, Laanée, were all wrong-headed men who had deviated from the right line! It was only those men who during five-and-twenty years had plotted or prayed incessantly that France might be at length conquered or invaded—it was these alone who had followed the right path!

These reflections arose at first confusedly before the minds of the hearers, but the next day they became more distinct, and the following day still clearer, until the strong impression produced on the first day in the assembly became stronger on the succeeding days, and continued to increase. This feeling was transmitted by the members of the assembly to the minds of the general public, and passed from Paris to the provinces. Propagated by a press that was scarcely restrained by the censorship, the sentiment soon became as vivid as universal. In addition to this, M. Ferrand's unfortunate expressions were maliciously applied to every possible circumstance. *The right line* became all at once a proverb: everybody was on the right line or the curved line—that is to say, those who had emigrated possessed real merit.

There were different degrees of merit, but those who had not emigrated were barely excusable. Though malevolence strangely exaggerated the sense in which these words ought to be taken, and attributed to them a significance that M. Ferrand never contemplated, it was unfortunately true that they did represent the opinions of the king, the princes, and the emigrants. When in the royal council the conditions that should determine the pensions of the emigrant officers were laid down, the princes drew a line of demarcation between the emigrants themselves. It was not sufficient to have followed the king or served under Condé to be entitled to a reward, for if these emigrants had returned to France without the sanction of the princes, their claim became less, and their pensions diminished proportionately. It was not, therefore, the mass of the nation alone that was excluded from the great merit of having emigrated; there were among the emigrants themselves some who, fatigued with ten years' exile, and thinking that their native land, pacified by the First Consul, was still a country worthy of being loved and inhabited—it was these too who had deviated in some degree, a degree that was quite appreciable, and which the committee appointed to award pensions was expected to determine exactly.

The universal belief of the country at this period was that the Government was composed of emigrants imbued with all the principles of that party, and ready to put those principles into action if the opportunity served. This opinion, without being a definite condemnation of the Government, was the foundation of much disaffection. But there were the chambers, upon whom the people could depend to check the Government, and if they could not inspire its members with patriotic sentiments, which was not in their power, they could at least oblige them to listen to such. The chambers responded to the hopes placed in them, and did not betray their mission.

All the *bureaux* of the chamber received the proposed law as an act of justice, for even the liberal party wished to defend the principles, but not the excesses, of the Revolution. But in accepting the measure as an act of justice, they expressed strong indignation against the avowed motives, demanded that they should be suppressed, and a vote of censure passed upon the minister who had drawn up and presented the bill, and that a public protestation should be made against his anti-national language.

The members of the committee appointed to examine the projected law were imbued with the sentiments of indignation expressed by the *bureaux*, and acted under the impulse of the moment. They passed the law, with some changes insignificant as to its operation, but very important as to its moral tendency. Thus, for the word *restitution*, *resignation* was substituted, which ignored all right on the part of the emigrants to the restored property. This property being held by the State was given up to the emigrants, in order to put an immediate termination to their distress. As to the property that had been applied to public services, such as to hospitals and the sinking fund, and of whose restitution the law made

an exception *for the present*, the words *for the present*, which made the exception provisional, were suppressed, and by this means all promises with regard to the future were cancelled. The members of the committee requested the chairman to make his report the antithesis of the minister's statement of motives.

M. Bedoch, who was chairman, read his report in the chamber on the 17th of October, and condemned severely all that M. Ferrand had said. He announced that he was appointed to re-establish public confidence, which had been shaken by the imprudent expressions of the minister, who had attributed to Louis XVI., personally, sentiments which the King of France ought neither to entertain nor express. The balance of good and evil in our vast revolution could not be nicely discriminated, for it would be necessary to examine the conduct of those who by a misplaced zeal had accelerated the misfortunes of the king and of France. And even could such a task be accomplished, it ought not to be attempted. The king had promised to look on France as one large family, composed of his children, and he ought not to attempt to establish invidious distinctions, nor ought others to do so for him. The king's profound regret was spoken of, but the king ought to entertain no other sentiment than a firm determination to keep his promises; and among these promises none was more sacred than that which implied a respect for property, no matter from what source derived. As to the future, it was not possible to anticipate a time when the emigrants should be better treated than at the actual period, for it was to be hoped that the taxes would be always applied to the wants of the State.

The report, as may be seen, was firm and severe, and contained a direct lesson addressed to those higher placed than the minister. Though the members of the chamber approved the report, they hesitated when the question of printing it was put. It had been printed in the ordinary way, like all reports, but discourses highly approved by the chamber were favoured by an order for a special reprint. The chamber dared not grant the latter distinction.

M. Ferrand, taking advantage of this hesitation, thought it afforded him a favourable opportunity of replying to the chairman, and for that purpose, making use of the most accredited of the royalist journals, he asserted that the chamber interpreted his speech in the same sense as himself, which was evident from the fact that M. Bedoch's statement was refused the honour of being printed.

No sooner was this assertion put into circulation than a sudden revulsion of feeling took place in the Chamber of Deputies. A member of the committee made a speech, in which he reminded the house that the *bureaux* had demanded either the refutation or the suppression of the minister's discourse; that the members of the committee had, therefore, only obeyed the formal mandate of those by whom they had been nominated, and that the chairman had been their faithful organ. But, in consequence of the doubts now raised, it was necessary that the chamber should pronounce a decided opinion, and declare whether the

report in question had been approved by the members. The opinion of the chamber was now unmistakably expressed by a large majority. The report and the speeches made on the subject were ordered to be printed. The discussion on the bill still continued. It was long and stormy, and occupied the latter part of the month of October. The debate called forth a display of angry feeling on both sides. A member of the *right* (the fashion had already commenced of designating the different parties by their relative positions in the chamber)—M. de la Rigaudie—in a vehement speech, interrupted every moment by murmurs of disapprobation, arraigned the entire Revolution, and excited such a commotion that the police forbade the journals to publish a full account of the proceedings. A reply was made to this speaker, and, fortunately, not in the exaggerated style he had employed. M. Durbach made a very reasonable proposition to the chamber, which was, to take possession of all the unsold national property and make it the basis of a financial operation, by which an indemnification could be made, not to a privileged class of emigrants, but to all, and particularly to the poorest. This proposition was rejected, and the bill passed with the amendments proposed by the committee. An almost unanimous vote of censure was passed on M. Ferrand's speech.

The prosecutions carried on against the memory of Carnot, the different events relative to the *Invalides*, to the female orphans of the Legion of Honour, to the military schools, and to the Generals Vandamme and Exelmans, the journeys of the princes, the conduct pursued with regard to the Archbishop of Besançon, the law about the surrender of the unsold national property, and the expressions of M. Ferrand about the *right* line, had rendered the months of October and November a period of great agitation. The species of tranquillity that had prevailed after the first legislative discussions, and especially after the vote on the budget, which was a measure stamped with wisdom, had given place to violent agitation, not less violent among the partisans of the emigration than of the Revolution. The latter comprised at this period not alone those revolutionists who had seriously compromised themselves, such as the *voters*, but also the functionaries of the Empire, the military, the moderate liberals, and a great number of the citizen class, who were offended by the pretensions of the nobility and clergy. The public journals, though restrained by the censorship, reflected clearly the irritation of both parties. Paris presented a highly-animated spectacle. It was the beginning of the winter season, and many persons of importance had returned to the capital. The police kept a strict watch on them. These were MM. de Bassano, de Vivenza, de Montalivet, de Cadore, de Rovigo, Lavalette, and others, who did not enter into conspiracies, but who lived among revolutionists, and who could not be sorry for the errors of a Government that they regarded as adverse to them. The Government would have been glad to expel them from Paris, but dared not. These gentlemen were so cautious that Prince Cambacérès, who enjoyed the society of his friends only at his own table, forbore

to invite the military, for fear of exciting suspicion.

There was one circumstance which much perplexed the police, and, though of no importance in reality, kept them in continual agitation. This was the presence of some of the marshals, who ought to have been in their departments, but who had come to Paris, one after another, by mere chance, and without any political motive. The names of Soult, Suchet, Oudinot, Massena, and Ney were mentioned. Marshal Soult had come to prefer a petition, and, as we shall presently see, the Bourbons had nothing to fear from him. Marshal Suchet, who had commanded the two armies in Spain, was at Paris only because these two armies had been disbanded. He was of a peaceful disposition, and generally looked upon as the man best fitted to become War Minister. Marshal Massena, having obtained his letters of naturalization, had set out for Provence, whither his duties called him. Marshal Oudinot had only remained some days at Paris. Marshal Ney took up a permanent abode in the capital. More flattered by the princes than any of his brother marshals, he had in the commencement seemed very much pleased, but had suddenly become malcontent. Having flattered himself that, by the intervention of Louis XVIII., and the favour of the Emperor Alexander, he could retain his emoluments, which were the produce of foreign possessions, he was disappointed in this hope, and reduced to his pay. Burdened with a large family, he found himself embarrassed. The war, which to him as to others had seemed protracted, was, however, a source of glory and profit, which was now closed: he already regretted warfare, and preferred it to an idleness mingled with many causes of annoyance. In fact, the false flatteries of which he had been the object had gradually assumed their true character, and contempt peeped out from amid compliments. His beautiful and happy wife had experienced at the Tuileries from the court ladies, who were less prudent than their husbands, annoyances which she felt deeply, and which had greatly offended her irritable husband.* One circumstance had put the acmé to the marshal's ill humour. The Duke of Wellington had been appointed English ambassador at Paris, and displayed in the French capital considerable vanity, the only weakness of this simple and strong mind. He enjoyed with much self-complacency at the court of France the glory of his conquests, which the royalist party took pleasure in exalting. At this moment there was a universal outbreak of angry feeling against England, for to her were attributed the severe conditions of the treaty of Paris. The destruction of Washington, recently burned by the English army, (the war was still going on between England and America,) had exasperated all parties to such a degree, that it became necessary to restrain even the royalist journals. Besides, the Eng-

* A gentleman whose character and high position put his testimony beyond doubt, assured me that he saw in the hands of Madame Ney a letter from her husband, written at Lons-le-Saulnier the very day he abandoned the cause of the Bourbons for that of Napoleon. In the letter were these words:—"My love, you shall not again have cause to weep on leaving the Tuileries."

lish army had passed from Bordeaux to Brussels overland. Lord Wellington, though at Paris, seemed to command this army, and the French people, as if they had foreseen the fast-coming future, were deeply irritated. This feeling rose to such a pitch, that the police were obliged to keep continual watch lest Lord Wellington should be publicly insulted.

When Marshal Ney compared the loneliness in which he and his wife found themselves at the Tuileries, with the eager flattery of which the British general was the object, his soul was filled with bitterness. "This man," he said, speaking of Lord Wellington, "has been successful in Spain owing to the errors of Napoleon, and not of our generals; but should we happen some day to meet him in a position where fortune has not prepared every thing for his triumph, the world shall see what he is. And then to see him flattered in this way in the presence of French marshals,—he, the bitterest enemy of France!"

The generous indignation that the marshal experienced became so strong that he could no longer conceal his feelings; he even reviewed his intimacy with Marshal Davout, with whom he had been at variance since the fatal day of Krasnoi. Marshal Davout, who, as we have said, had retired to his estate at Savigny, had drawn up a circumstantial statement of his conduct at Hamburg, in which he demonstrated beyond all possibility of doubt, the baseness of the calumnies of which he had been made the object. He asked the king's permission to publish the memoir. The king, instead of treating this faithful servant of his country with the distinction he deserved, contented himself with telling the War Minister that the reasoning of the memoir was strong, so strong that it would be impossible to treat the production with severity, (this silly idea had been entertained,) and that the publication would be permitted. And notwithstanding this declaration on the part of the king, the marshal was allowed to remain in the kind of real, though not avowed, exile in which he lived at Savigny. But it must be said that it was the marshal who had banished himself at Savigny; he seldom went to Paris, where he could not appear without being beset by enemies.

The conduct pursued toward the glorious defender of Hamburg was one of the principal causes of the exasperation of the military. They said, and with justice, that such conduct was shameful, and insulting to the entire army. Ney repeated these expressions wherever he went, and declared that the marshals ought to unite, and lay their complaints at the feet of the throne.

The princes would have been glad to silence these indiscreet men whom they had uselessly flattered, but they dared not strike hard enough to effect that object. The audacity of the emigrant party, and their desire of vengeance, had not yet risen so high as to aim at the glorious head of Ney. To engender such an ambition, fresh disasters and a vast catastrophe must happen. No stronger measure was adopted than to send General Vandamme away from Paris, who, since he had been denied the entrée of the Tuileries, had given utterance to

the most imprudent expressions. But the evil was not remedied by these means, and during the month of November the public disquietude increased daily. The funds went down, and the five per cents., which M. Louis's financial plan had raised from 65 to 78 francs, fell to 70, though the financial position of affairs was visibly improving, though the indirect taxes were coming in, and the *reconnaissance de liquidation* were negotiable on 'change at a very low premium. Public confidence was severely shaken, and the cause of this disturbance was political, not financial.

M. de Chateaubriand took up his pen on the occasion, and, unlike his wont, his style was steady, sober, and rational. He endeavoured to calm all parties by proving to them that extreme desires were irrational, and impossible to be realized; whilst, on the contrary, rational desires were either realized, or about to be so; that consequently all parties ought to be satisfied, and contribute to the triumph of a state of things in which both had an equal interest: the royalists, because it was the cause of the Bourbons, the revolutionists and Bonapartists, because it was the cause of liberty, which was the sole possible guarantee for the rights and security of all. He thus gave all parties, and particularly his own, good and prudent lessons—lessons more prudent than his own conduct. He gave these lessons in articles inserted in the *Journal des Débats*, or contained in pamphlets which the king praised publicly. But nothing could allay the general disquietude and the fear with which each party inspired the other.

Both believed they were plotted against, and that the plots were ripe for execution. The Bonapartists—that is to say, the military men and the revolutionists—united in common hate against the royalists, were persuaded that twelve or fifteen hundred of the most daring Chouans had been brought to Paris with the intention of securing their assistance in removing the king to Compiègne, that the Government would be afterward changed, the Charter abolished, the most remarkable persons among the military and the revolutionists seized, the principal put to death, the others exiled, and then the unconditional re-establishment of the ancient *régime* proclaimed. On the other hand, the royalists, to whom these projects were attributed, were convinced that the young generals who flocked to Paris, and who had some thousands of unemployed officers under their command, and could reckon on the adhesion of some regiments, were about to execute a *coup de main*, carry off the royal family, murder or send them beyond the seas, treat the French nobility in the same manner, and proclaim Napoleon I. or Napoleon II., and commence a new imperial reign, by ravaging Europe for the advantage of a race of mame-lukes, the offspring of war, and whom peace could not satisfy. This great conspiracy was, in the opinion of the royalists, concerted in conjunction with Napoleon and Murat, who had been lately reconciled, and who subsidized all the conspirators. The suppositions about Napoleon were boundless, as was the idea entertained of his ceaseless activity and his prodigious influence. Never had he occupied a larger place in the imagination of men than

when banished to the wretched isle that served as his asylum, for whilst hate laboured to paint him as a vile wretch, devoid alike of genius and courage, fear converted him into an indefatigable giant, exhaustless in resource, always on the alert, and now on the eve of overturning the world. He had, it was said, carried off vast treasures to Porto Ferrajo, whence he guided the thread of all the European conspiracies, particularly those of Vienna, where the Powers were at this moment assembled in general congress. He fanned the flame of discord in that capital, and held his weak-minded father-in-law in subjection, as he was about to put himself at the head of the Austrian armies, and fall upon the French and Spanish Bourbons. At other times, the current report was that Napoleon had escaped and taken the command of the American armies against England, or of the Turkish armies against Europe, or of the Neapolitan against Austria; for contradictory reports cost nothing. In a word, Napoleon was believed to be everywhere, and the fear felt by his enemies compensated for the efforts their hate made to diminish his greatness. Of the thousand plots which each party attributed to the other, how much was true? All and none. All, if we consider as plots the empty remarks of partisans; nothing, if we only regard as plots projects maturely concerted between chiefs and agents who understand each other perfectly well, who have at their command means proportioned to the object in view, and who have appointed, or are ready to appoint, the day for executing their project. But nothing of this kind existed. It was certainly impossible to deny that, had they been able, the royalists would have annihilated the Charter, and had they been as wicked as their words, they would willingly have got rid of the heads of the army, and the chiefs of the revolutionist party. But they were more powerless than their adversaries, they possessed far less courage, and contented themselves with uttering extravagant expressions, which being repeated to the revolutionists and the Bonapartists, threw them into actual terror. But, on the other hand, it was equally true that had the Bonapartists and the revolutionists possessed the power, they would have seized the royal family and their court, and done, no matter what with them, provided they could only get rid of them. It is equally true that had they agreed among themselves, combined and pulled together, they would have been able to accomplish all they wished, for public opinion was entirely in their favour. It is also true that, perceiving what they might have been able to do, they foolishly declared that they were about to do it, and by the intemperance of their language they rendered themselves as formidable as they were really powerless. The public mind might have regained tranquillity, had the public been able to perceive the real state of parties; but, according to custom, the public estimated the designs of parties by their words and by their own fears. Consequently both sides took precautions. Frequently did these agitated military men pass the night standing, with their swords and pistols in their belts, convinced that they were about to be attacked; whilst the terrified police, having given the alarm to

the authorities, the national guard, the companies of the body-guard, and all the disposable forces, were called out, excepting the garrison troops, who were held in suspicion: both parties continued in this state until day dawned, each causing the other daily alarm.* On a night spent in this fashion, in the month of November, the patrols crossed each other in hundreds, without any other result than exciting a general panic, which destroyed all public confidence, and lowered the funds, to the great detriment of the finances.

The principal police—that is, the Government force, commanded by M. Beugnot—did not indulge in these ridiculous alarms, or at least only in a very slight degree; and they, in their reports, endeavoured to tranquillize the king, which was no difficult task, for his majesty, through natural indolence and love of ease, was inclined to take pacific views of things. But Monsieur, who could not remain quiet, and his police, who were equally incapable of enjoying tranquillity, declared that France was on the brink of a volcano, which was ready to break forth, that the official police were incompetent, that they actually betrayed the trust reposed in them, and that the royal family ran the risk of being carried off some morning, in consequence of their blind credulity. Monsieur went to the king, told him he was badly served, and that he was on the eve of a catastrophe. The king rejected his advice, and told him that he was, as usual, the tool of intriguers; and yet the king was somewhat disturbed by these incessant alarms, and fell into a kind of perplexity.

His nephews, whose opinion the king valued much more than his brother's, joined the Count d'Artois, declaring that things were in a bad state, and ought to be remedied in some way. But this was the difficulty. Things were undoubtedly in a bad state, and the remedy was one which Governments will never recognise, which is, to resist the promptings of their own passions, and, still more, to reject the passion-prompted advice of their friends, to tranquillize the mass of the nation, who were as partisans, and desired only the general good. But they were far from reasoning in this fashion, and complained of those who governed—that is to say, of the ministry, who are generally held responsible for every thing that occurs in a State that is free, or nearly so. The ministry, it was said, had no unity, which was perfectly true. But, in order that the ministry should possess unity, it ought to have been constitutionally organized—that is to say, the ministry ought to constitute the sole council of the crown, from which the princes should be excluded; and one, or at most two, principal men chosen, in whom implicit confidence should be placed. But the Government was far from thinking of such means, and complained not of the council or its formation, but of each individual minister, and of the War Minister in particular. He did not restrain the army, it was said; he possessed no influence over the soldiers, and

* Nothing can be more amusing than the number of police reports drawn up by M. Beugnot. It is evident from these reports that the month of November was one of groundless alarms, which increased the national debt, which we are about to relate.

knew neither how to govern nor content them. Such is the recompense reserved for weak-minded ministers! General Dupont was as unfortunate during this short ministry as he had been in Spain. He was a man of talent, and well intentioned; he had done all in his power to satisfy his ancient companions-in-arms; he had concealed their follies, and, in short, endeavoured to satisfy them and the emigrants, but had only succeeded in rendering both parties discontented. It would have been impossible, in his position, not to commit faults, as it would have been impossible to content the army, that was obliged to undergo severe reductions and submit to a *régime* highly displeasing to the military of every grade. And he had committed faults, and serious ones; but who obliged him to commit them? Those very princes who accused him; it was they who had done so by establishing the military household, and by lavishing commissions as rewards for services during emigration, &c. &c. When the anticipated and inevitable result of these faults became apparent, the princes blamed the too complaisant minister, who had acted at their suggestion, and said that it would be dangerous to leave the army under his control. The king made no objection, for he did not understand the business, and seemed inclined to yield implicit credence to his nephews, who busied themselves very much in the affair.

There was another subject on which the king was disinclined to listen to the remarks made; in the first place, because these remarks originated with his brother, and, in the next, because his judgment was sufficiently clear to let him see that they were made without sufficient foundation. He was told that the police were badly, deplorably constituted—that it was a matter of which M. Beugnot, intelligent as he was, understood nothing, that he was duped by the Bonapartists, and was unconsciously deceiving the king, and hurrying the destruction of the monarchy. Louis XVIII. was annoyed in the highest degree by these remarks, which he plainly saw originated with his brother, who was ever inclined to interfere, and was the constant dupe of the intriguers of every *régime*. The king regularly read M. Beugnot's witty and amusing reports, which were seasoned with a little skilful flattery, and presented a piquant picture of contemporary personages. The truth of these reports was evident to his good sense, and their piquancy amused him, whilst their flattery gratified his self-love. But Monsieur tried to persuade him that M. Beugnot only entertained him with gossip, and that there was but one man in France who, if his majesty would venture to confide in him, could properly fulfil the functions of Minister of Police, and save the kingdom. Will it be believed that this man was the regicide Fouché? Monsieur, even when he did not hate people, could never do them justice, through want of discernment and coolness of judgment, but he had suddenly become not only impartial, but indulgent, even friendly, toward M. Fouché. The latter, as we have already said, was not in Paris at the time the Revolution of 1814 occurred, but since then he had sought to take up the part he would have played on that occa-

sion, by interfering wherever his interference would be permitted. When Monsieur sought to be invested with the lieutenant-generalship of the kingdom by the Senate, he had found the Duke of Otranto officious, zealous, skilful, and, although a regicide, free from hatred of the Bourbons, and at least as anxious to please them as to get the Senate out of its embarrassing position. He had, consequently, conceived the most favourable opinion of the man, and entertained a friendly feeling toward him. These favourable dispositions had been confirmed by the reports of the agents of the *Pavillon Marsan*. There were, undoubtedly, many royalists among these agents, but the greater number was composed of men ready to assist any *régime*, men whom the police employ and fling aside when their services are no longer needed, and who, when rejected, offer their services to any one that will enable them to procure their daily subsistence. They are an abject race, whom an honest man never employs, only from necessity, when it is his duty to watch over the safety of the State; and whom he is only too happy to break with, once he is relieved of the cares of Government. Far from avoiding the society of such men, M. Fouché eagerly sought their acquaintance, and often supported them at his own expense, when he could not dispose of the resources of the State. By these means, he collected information of all kinds, true and false, without, however, always distinguishing the one from the other, which, added to what he himself collected in his visits, alternately paid without offending any of them, to MM. Carnot, de Lafayette, de Blacas, de Bassano, and even the foreign ministers, whose doors opened to the talisman of news—he thus acquired the air of a magician, knowing all things, guiding every thing, and possessing the secrets, the confidence, and guiding the will of all parties, whom he could restrain or set loose as he pleased. In a word, he seemed the king of this chaos, which he alone could organize and govern.

These agents, repelled by the official police, and received at the *Pavillon Marsan*, were the assiduous panegyrists of M. Fouché to the Count d'Artois, and succeeded in inducing the prince to receive him. Yielding to his natural taste for intrigue, the Count d'Artois admitted M. Fouché, and was charmed by the conversation he had with him. M. Fouché, unlike Carnot, far from boasting of being a regicide, expressed on the contrary the humiliation and repentance that it caused him; and, speaking with respect and submission, declared his ardent desire to repair his fault by supporting and saving the Bourbons. Then, making use of his knowledge of men and things, he dazzled the prince, to whom he appeared the saviour to whose care the destiny of the monarchy ought to be intrusted; and thus the Count d'Artois, the idol of the ultra royalists, passed to the opposite extreme, even to the region of regicides, to associate with an unprincipled intriguer, and bestow on him the confidence that he refused to the most respectable friends of liberty.

It was under these circumstances he conceived the idea of getting the Duke of Otranto appointed Minister of Police to Louis XVIII.

—an appointment of which he not only gave him hope, but almost certainty. The Duke d'Otranto left the prince with the most sanguine expectations, and proclaimed to every one his desire and hope of re-entering the ministry. M. d'Artois had, however, promised too much. It was not in his power to bestow portfolios as he would; and his good opinion, far from winning that of Louis XVIII. for the same object, had a contrary effect. The promised portfolio not appearing, M. Fouché was offended, and went about Paris telling that he had been offered the Ministry of Police, but had refused. All this was very skilfully related to Louis by M. Beugnot, and the king laughed at his brother whenever he was not made too angry by these provoking accounts.

The Ministers of War and Police were both thus attacked at court, the sole employment of the latter being Director-General, with the title of Minister of State. The king, fond of repose, averse to change, and seeing that there was more of danger than utility in the proposed remedies, told M. de Blacas of the annoyances with which he was beset. M. de Blacas agreed with the monarch; for, though prejudiced, he was not devoid of good sense, and was besides willing to agree with his master. However, he was too sincere to conceal the truth from the king, or to hide from him that many complaints were made against the War Minister and the Chief of Police. The king was perplexed, and, had it been possible, would have been very much agitated; but his cumbrous body weighed down his mind, and often oppressed it even to inertia.

The month of November had passed in domestic anxieties, which were seldom revealed to the gaze of the public, when, on Wednesday, the 30th of November, the king, being about to go with great pomp to a theatrical representation at Odeon, Monsieur's police took alarm and hastened to the Tuileries, where they announced a plot that was to be put into execution on that very day. The object of this plot, they said, was to seize the king and royal family, and either fling them into the Seine or carry them off to some other country, and then change the Government. This bold stroke was to be accomplished by some hundreds of audacious and intrepid military men. These were in communication with the heads of the different parties, and all arrangements were made for what was to follow, once the deed was accomplished. The official police knew nothing of all this, which was an additional reason for the extreme royalists giving it explicit credence. Marshal Marmont and his company of body-guards came to attend the king. He was as credulous as thoughtless, and, moreover, detested General Dupont, because this minister occupied a place he thought due to himself, and which he had still a vague hope of obtaining. He was, consequently, one of those who most frequently asserted that the army was not properly guided and was left a prey to conspirators. On the morning of the 30th, he was awakened by one of those official agents who usually disturb the repose of courts, and, being informed of the plot that was to be executed that evening, he ran all breathless to the king, to whom he made the greatest display of devotion, without, however,

exciting either gratitude or anxiety in that prince; for Louis had little faith in the danger that was announced to him. The marshal commanded his guards to mount, sent a message to General Maison, commanding the First Military Division, and General Dessoles, commanding the National Guards, both of whom hastened to call out their soldiers; whilst Marmont took very good care not to give the least information to the Minister of War, who ought to have been the first informed. The principal persons of the court resumed their military dress, secreted arms of every kind about their persons, and proceeded to Odeon armed to the very teeth. The streets were filled with troops, the boxes of the theatre with uniforms, which gave the affair rather the air of a review than of a theatrical representation. In the midst of this display of uniforms, one man alone—the War Minister—arrived, dressed in a black coat, and with an air of indifference and ignorance that was most offensive to all those who were oppressed by zeal, terror, or prudence.

The king was applauded as usual, and retired without being attacked or offended. The next day, the newsmongers laughed loudly at this violent alarm; but those who pretended that they had saved the king—and Marshal Marmont was at the head of these—were indignant at the carelessness of the War Minister and the Director of Police. There was the most unheard-of excitement at court; and, as some change was necessary to calm people's minds after all this agitation, a modification of the ministry was demanded. The king's nephews demanded the appointment of a new War Minister, and his brother begged that there should be a new Director of Police. The king, wearied, and believing in the end that he had been in danger, yielded, and consented to the desired changes.

He would not listen to the proposal of making the Duke d'Otranto Minister of Police, and confided the functions of this office to M. d'André, an old constituent, a well-informed functionary, industrious and sensible, and who had corresponded with the Bourbons during their residence in England, for all which reasons he inspired the emigration party with sufficient confidence. But, whilst he gratified his brother by removing M. Beugnot, Louis XVIII. did not mean to sacrifice him, but rather to elevate his position, which he did by appointing him Naval Minister, an office that had just become vacant by the death of the distinguished and lamented M. Malouet. M. Beugnot was thus doubly recompensed for his witty and sensible reports; for he was not only freed from the police, but was appointed minister, with a portfolio.

The War Minister was still to be appointed. The army at that time possessed two men—Marshals Davout and Suchet—who united in an eminent degree the rare qualities required in a War Minister, and in whom moral influence was joined to administrative talents. The appointment of Marshal Davout was impossible, for he was an object of hatred both to the Allies and the emigrants. He could not even be thought of. Marshal Suchet, whose natural disposition inclined him to that eagerly liberal

government which the Bourbons might have established in France, and besides being very well liked at court, had been more than once spoken of as suited to the office of War Minister. He had, indeed, without his knowledge, figured in all the ministerial combinations which the Duke d'Otranto had proposed to Monsieur. However, being a man of great reserve, he had not testified sufficient devotion to win the good opinion of the court. Marshal Soult, contrary to what might have been expected, had succeeded completely with the royalists, whose idol he had become, as M. Fouché was that of the Count d'Artois' coterie. We shall now see by what means he reached this high degree of favour.

He had been ill treated at first, because of his having fought the battle of Toulouse, after peace had been declared, and ill treated most unjustly, for he was ignorant of the state of affairs of Paris at the time, and consequently became a malcontent, and a daring malcontent, so unmeasured was the expression of his feelings. General Dupont, an excellent man, who was seeking to gain as many adherents as he could for the Bourbons, had received and listened to Marshal Soult, whom he inspired with some little hope, and succeeded, at the same time, in calming his feelings somewhat. This minister, pursuing his work, resolved to give an appointment to Marshal Soult, that he might attach him definitely to the Bourbons, and for that purpose determined to send him to Alsace, but upon reflection he preferred Brittany, a province that would test the fidelity of a doubtful functionary. The loyalty of this province was such as to call forth all sorts of danger, whilst, at the same time, it afforded an opportunity of ascertaining the sincerity of the man's conversion who should be employed there. The War Minister's calculations were crowned with success. Marshal Soult, surrounded by the most ardent royalists, had given them perfect satisfaction, and had shown himself their equal at least in political sentiments, for he did not hesitate to declare that for twenty-five years past the Bourbons had been the "good cause;" that those who had served another had been deceived, but that they were ready to repair their error by an unbounded devotion. He did not confine himself to mere words, but went to visit the mournful battle-field of Quiberon, where he found some unburied bones, as often happens on a field of battle, and opened a subscription for the erection of a monument to the French officers who had fallen on that fatal day. Those brave men most undoubtedly deserved to be held in sad remembrance, who, employing their bravery so ill, had perished on the gloomy banks of the Quiberon; but this was not the time to renew such memories, and one may be indeed surprised to find them awakened by the new Governor of Brittany.

The astonishment of the army was as great as the satisfaction of the royalists. Marshal Soult was a valuable conquest, that merited preservation. He had been excluded from

the peerage, together with the Marshals Masséna and Davout, and therefore, when he completed the subscription for the monument at Quiberon, he returned to Paris to renew his solicitations for that distinction; he was very badly received by his old comrades, but very well by the Court. He was still occupied in this pursuit when the office of War Minister became vacant. It was almost unanimously agreed to confer it upon him at once, notwithstanding the pretensions of Marshal Marmont, which nobody considered serious. As Marshal Soult combined with an unusual application to business the deportment of a determined man accustomed to command, he seemed the very personification of an accomplished Minister of War. This choice filled the public with surprise, and the court with joy and hope.

These different appointments were published on the 4th of December by royal ordinance. The king had rather consented to than desired them. A strange circumstance, but a natural one for the time, and which shows the idea entertained of a constitutional government at its commencement, was that the Royal Council learned these ministerial changes only a few hours before the general public. M. de Blacas informed his colleagues, in the name of the king, of what had occurred; they were much surprised, but did not apprehend that the harmony of the Cabinet would be disturbed by these events. M. de Blacas despatched a courier with an account of the ministerial changes to M. de Talleyrand, who had already set out for the Congress of Vienna, and he with whom these modifications ought to have originated, was scarcely made acquainted with them even after their accomplishment. As Louis the XVIII. disliked explanations, because that his repose and royal dignity suffered somewhat by them, he would not speak himself to Marshal Dupont. He had avoided receiving him since the scene at Odeon, sometimes alleging illness as a cause, and sometimes that he was about to take his customary exercise; but on the 3d of December he sent M. de Blacas to demand his portfolio, and offer him a pension of 40,000 francs, together with a provincial appointment. M. de Blacas took care to inform General Dupont that he was not the author of this change, which was indeed true; he surprised him not a little by announcing the name of his successor, and attributed his dismissal to the king.

Thus ended the crisis, by the dismissal of the War Minister, to whom were attributed the bad feelings of the army, and by the change of the Minister of Police, who was blamed for imaginary conspiracies, merely because he would not believe in their existence. As always happens in such cases, a short calm ensued until the inutility of the remedy had been felt, and the sinister prophecy of Napoleon had been realized—"The Bourbons will reconcile France with the rest of Europe, but set her at war with herself."

BOOK LVI.

CONGRESS OF VIENNA.

STATE of Europe since the peace of Paris—Discontent of the Belgian and Rhine Provinces, which were annexed to Protestant countries, and ill treated by foreign armies—Confusion that threatens—The Germans expect their promised liberty in vain, and the small states dread being swallowed up by the larger—Outbreak in Switzerland in consequence of the struggle between the old and new cantons—Sai state of Italy—Bad government of the King of Prussia, and rigorous proceedings of the Pontifical Government at Rome—Revocation of the French Concordat, which was on the point of being granted, but is deferred—Murat is surprised to find himself still on the throne of Naples, the Powers are displeased at it—State of Spain—Perfidious and cruel conduct of Ferdinand VII.—To please the English he abandons the family compact—Whilst Europe is in this state of excitement, the allied sovereigns are present at seven brilliant fêtes in London—They renew their promise to remain united, without, however, entering on any explanation of disputed point—The Congress of Vienna put off till September—Dispositions with which they meet—Only two sovereigns, the Emperor Alexander and the King Frederick William, arrive there on good terms with each other—They consider that Europe owes them every thing, the one wishes to get all Poland, the other Saxony—England sees nothing of this; Austria discovers it, but is silent, in the hope of disappointing them without disturbing the European union—This state of affairs would have been very profitable to France if she had come to Vienna free of engagements, and without having signed the treaty of the 30th of May—M. de Talleyrand is left at liberty to act as he thinks proper—The king imposes but one condition on him, that Murat should be expelled from Naples—Departure of M. de Talleyrand, accompanied by the Duke Dalberg—His desire to play an important part, and his determination to take legitimacy as the groundwork of his policy at Vienna—Solemn entry of the allied sovereigns into the Austrian capital—Magnificent and expensive hospitality with which the Emperor Francis receives them at the palace of Schwarzenberg—The pretensions of Prussia and Russia to Poland are soon discovered, and become the universal subject of conversation—The German princes protest against these pretensions—Embarrassment of England and Austria, who are anxious about the maintenance of the Alliance of Chaumont—The more danger there is of disunion, the less they affect to believe it, and promise to remain united—Secret arrangement of Austria, England, Russia, and Prussia to arrange every thing themselves, and to allow the presence of the other sovereigns only as a matter of form—The agreement being soon discovered, is a new source of discontent to the Powers of the second rank, who fear that their exclusion is only a means for their destruction—The members of the French legation do not confine themselves to their irritation, to protesting against these projects of exclusion, but they immediately take the part of Saxony against Russia and Prussia—Prussia avenges herself by saying that France intends to resume the Rhine boundary—The members of the French legation are reduced to make protestations of being disinterested in order to correct the effects of their hasty proceedings—Alexander's anger is principally directed against M. de Talleyrand—His interview with the French plenipotentiary—When some weeks have been passed in parleys and bitter remarks, a proposal is raised for the assembly of the Congress—The *four*, that is England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, seeing the danger of a general and immediate meeting, propose a delay of a month, which defers the Congress until the 1st of November, under pretence of preparing the different questions—M. de Talleyrand places himself at the head of the opposition—He requires that the Congress take place immediately, and wishes to profit of the occasion for the raising a decision concerning the admission of the representative of Saxony, and the rejection of the Neapolitan representative, which would be an indirect manner of deciding immediately the two most important questions of the moment—Resistance of the *four*—After some days' discussion, the Congress is deferred until the 1st of November, when all promise to meet, and some expressions are used which give some hope of their respecting what was called public justice—Having prevented the exclusion of the secondary Powers, the members of the French legation, instead of refraining from engaging further in the Saxony question, declare themselves even more decidedly—The Russian and Prussian, on their side, express themselves with the greatest haughtiness—Activity of the lesser states, particularly Bavaria—The latter unite with the French legation—Increasing embarrassment of England and Austria—Lord Castlereagh, dreading a quarrel with Prussia, whom he needs in his policy with regard to the Low Countries, will give her Saxony in order to save Poland—M. de Metternich, on the contrary, wishing rather to save Vienna than Poland, disapproves of this plan, and yet lets it go on in hopes that it will not succeed, for Frederick William will not be satisfied unless Alexander is so too—Lord Castlereagh speaks out boldly—Warm conversations with Alexander, followed by firm and bitter notes—Bavaria, always the most active, does not hesitate to speak of war, and tells Austria that it is better to think of an alliance with France—M. de Metternich, dreading disunion, says that France is not an army—Bavaria reports his expressions to the French legation to pique their honour—M. de Talleyrand sends Louis XVIII. to prepare his armaments—Deliberation on this subject in the Royal Council—The Minister of France agrees to give fifty million francs in order to equip the army—M. de Talleyrand is delighted, and is anxious to renounce the preparations going on in France—Meanwhile, disputes are as warm as ever at Vienna—M. de Metternich is obliged to yield to the tactics of Lord Castlereagh, and advises Prussia for her own sake not to accept Saxony, but consents to give it to her on certain conditions that Prussia will not accept—Alexander, in his anger, even dares to leave every thing—He gives up Saxony, which he held, to Prussian troops, and concentrates all his force on the Vistula—Irritation at Vienna, general desire that the Congress should assemble on the 1st of November—Violent altercation between Alexander and M. de Metternich—Assembly of Congress at the appointed time—The eight who had signed the treaty of Paris, France, England, Austria, Russia, Prussia, Spain, Portugal and Sweden, taken the initiative in the convocations and resolutions—Division of the Congress into committees—Committee for the verification of credentials—Committee of six, composed of France, Spain, Austria, England, Russia, and Prussia, for the great European affairs—Committee for German affairs, for Italian affairs, for Swiss affairs, for the liberty of the negroes, for the free navigation of rivers, &c. &c.—It is decided that, when the principal persons concerned in each question shall confer in committee, the eighth should come to assist in their decisions, and ratify their resolutions—Labours of each committee—Italian affairs—Questions concerning the annexation of Genoa to Piedmont, and the accession to the crown of Savoy—Questions of Parma and Naples—M. de Metternich's wise reasons for preventing discussion on the affairs of Naples—Swiss affairs: continuation of the struggle between the old and new Cantons—Influence of France over the aristocratic cantons of Bern, and over the democratic cantons of Uri, Glaris, Schwyz, &c.—she is employed to bring about an accommodation—Whilst the affairs of Switzerland and Italy approach a reconciliation, those of Saxony and Poland become more complicated—Lord Castlereagh's exertions to detach Prussia from Russia—Alexander perceives this, and forces Frederick William to an explanation—After the explanation, the two sovereigns embrace, and promise to be more united than ever—Proclamation of Prince Bismarck, naming governor of Saxony, which announces that this kingdom is about to pass into the possession of the King of Prussia, with the consent of England and Austria—These two Powers deny it vehemently—The overtures of the German princes make the Prince Regent of Prussia oblige Lord Castlereagh's instructions to be moderate, he has changed his tactics, and joins M. de Metternich for the determined defence of Saxony and Poland—War must be threatened—Plan of the campaign decided on by Prince Schwarzenberg, who disposes of the troops of France without consulting her—Plan of introducing in the spring 200,000 Austrians and Germans into Poland, 150,000 into Silesia, and 100,000 into France and Westphalia—On the 10th of December, M. de Metternich receives a note, in which he withdraws the half consent that he had given to the sacrifice of Saxony, on the pretext that Prussia had not fulfilled any of the conditions required by Austria—The irritated Prussians wish to make an outbreak, but Alexander consents to restrain them—After several conversations with Prince Schwarzenberg, the Czar is convinced that he

Powers are determined to resist his designs, and he thinks of making some sacrifices—He determines to keep all Poland, and abandon the duchy of Posen to Prussia that she may have less claim in Germany, and at the same time he endeavours to be on friendly terms with Austria, relative to the Prussian frontier in Galicia—By Alexander's advice, Prussia replies in moderate terms to Austria—Austria's reply, in which she proves that, in giving 3000 or 4000 souls to Prussia in Saxony, the engagement of restoring her position of 1805 will be fulfilled—Prussia enters into those calculations, and the question then becomes one of figures—Formation of a commission of valuation, into which France is admitted, although it was first intended to exclude her—The questions of quantity are warmly debated in this commission—The news of the peace concluded between England and America restores all his energy to Lord Castlereagh—A violent scene takes place between the English and Prussians—Lord Castlereagh goes in a passion to M. de Talleyrand—The latter profits of the opportunity, and proposes an alliance offensive and defensive to the British minister—Treaty of 3d of January, 1815, by which Austria, England, and France unite, and promise to furnish each 150,000 men to insure the success of their projects—Hard condition imposed on M. de Talleyrand, that if war should be declared he should confine himself to the limits of the treaty of Paris—A French General is sent to discuss the plan of the campaign—The convention of the 3d of January, though a secret, is communicated to Bavaria, Hanover, the Low Countries, Sardinia, in order to gain their alliance—Notwithstanding this secrecy, Russia and Prussia perceive that their adversaries have come to an agreement, and therefore they determine on deciding the different questions—Half its territory and one-third of its population is taken from Saxony to be given to Prussia—Last struggle for the city of Leipzig, which is left to Saxony—Frederick Augustus is summoned to Pesh, in order to extort his consent—The great question which divides Europe being decided, and Lord Castlereagh being summoned to the British parliament, the others hasten to conclude—Decision of the questions in debate—Definite constitution of the Low Countries—Re-establishment of Hesse Cassel and Hesse Darmstadt—These houses give up Westphalia to Prussia for a compensation—Exertions of Prussia to obtain a continuity of territory from the Meuse to the Niemen—Unjust conduct towards Denmark—Luxembourg falls to the Low Countries—Mayence becomes a federal fortress—Bavaria gets the Rhine palatinate, and the duchy of Wurzburg, and gives the Tyrol with the line of the Inn to Austria—Germanic constitution—Austria refuses the Imperial crown, and obtains the perpetual presidency of the Diet—Organization of the Federal Diet—The cessation of Swiss disputes chiefly due to France—The new cantons preserve their existence by paying a pecuniary indemnity—Bern gets a territorial indemnity in Porrentruy and the duchy of Basle—The Swiss constitution taken almost entirely from the act of mediation—Difficulties of the Italian question—M. de Talleyrand not having demanded any thing as the reward of his assistance in the affairs of Saxony and Poland, is in danger of being totally abandoned in the affair of Naples—Happily for him, Murat solves the difficulty by addressing an important summons to the Congress—Austria replies by announcing that an army of 150,000 men will be sent into Italy—General determination to destroy Murat—Difficulties of the affair of Parma—At the demand of the two houses of Bourbon, the Congress is inclined to restore Parma to the Queen of Etruria, and to leave Maria Louisa only the duchy of Lucca—The latter is advised to resist, and succeeds in awakening the tenderness of her father and the generosity of Alexander—Lord Castlereagh, without M. de Talleyrand's knowledge, is commissioned to negotiate, at Paris, a direct arrangement with Louis XVIII., in order that Parma may be left to Maria Louisa for her life, and that in the mean time the Queen of Etruria should have only the duchy of Lucca—It is decided that the Legations should be restored to the Pope—Resolutions adopted as to the liberty of negroes and the opening of navigable rivers—All these questions being decided in February, the monarchs prepare for their departure, and leave to their ministers the charge of drawing them up—It is decided that there shall be a general instrument, signed by the eight Powers who took part in the treaty of Paris, containing all resolutions of general interest, and that there shall be particular treaties between the interested parties for what concerns them individually—When they are about to separate, the news of Napoleon's landing surprises all persons—It is determined to remain together until the termination of the new crisis—All European arrangements which had been adopted are maintained—True character of the Congress of Vienna, and what may be thought of its results, which, with a few changes, have lasted half a century.

We have seen in what position the Bourbons had placed France, although they were bound by a written constitution, and watched over by public opinion of a most censorious character, and though they were actuated by the best motives, but they yielded to the reactionary influence which tended to re-establish the old régime on the ruins of the Revolution and the Empire. We should next consider Europe divided into a number of governments, unrestrained by law or public opinion, and consequently at liberty to seek the re-establishment of the old order of things, and determined to resume the territories they had lost, or to appropriate those to which they had no claim. This unhappy Europe was fearfully disturbed by its emigrants, as short-sighted as ours, as well as by its ambitious chiefs, who were tearing it to tatters. It thus presented a kind of chaos, where avidity struggled with madness. The man who was then called the "Genius of Evil"—Napoleon—might well from the watch-tower of his isle say, with all that bitterness of which he was accused, and which he indeed possessed, that his fall had not been the triumph of disinterestedness and moderation. We must consider this distracted Europe for a moment, in order to form a just idea of her state at the period which was called that of her deliverance.

The Belgian provinces, which had at first felt a real relief in escaping from our yoke, were surprised and annoyed to find themselves oppressed by another quite as heavy, and, at the same time, opposed to all their national feelings. It was the conscription, the *droits réunis*, the closing of the ports, and regulations

in matters of religion, which had alienated these provinces from us. They were freed from the conscription for the moment, but not from indirect imposts, which were still maintained. The ports, indeed, were open, but only to allow the English, those rivals of the Belgians, to bring in their goods, whilst they were debarred from intercourse with France, whose commerce had so much contributed to enrich them. The Pope was re-established at Rome, whilst the Belgians were placed under the rule of a Protestant nation for which they felt no affection. They were annoyed by the presence of the British army, which was constantly increasing in order to protect the new kingdom of the Low Countries, and they accused Austria, that had principally contributed to their separation from France, of having betrayed and sold them to England.

The Rhenish provinces were no better satisfied. If, like the Belgians, they were no longer subjected to conscription, and the Rhine, the chief source of their wealth, was allowed free communication with the sea, the French markets were no longer open for the products of their industry, which had greatly increased under the Empire, nor was the commerce of Prussia a compensation for that of France. In a word, it seemed as little natural to them to be fellow-citizens of the inhabitants of Königsberg as of the Parisians, and the liberty of the Pope was no more consolation to them than to the Belgians for being ruled by a Protestant sovereign. They also experienced the inconveniences of foreign occupation, for the Prussian army was in their territory, and they were horribly ill-treated by Blücher's soldiers,

who had not yet learned to consider the inhabitants of Cologne and Aix-la-Chapelle as fellow-countrymen.

Beyond the Rhine, discontent resulted from other causes. The Prussians were satisfied, and justly, for they were conquerors, and expected great aggrandizement; but they hoped to receive as the reward of their patriotism the liberty that had been promised them, but which, it seemed, there was no hurry to grant. Hanover, Brunswick, and Hesse, whilst anxiously awaiting the decision of their fate, were devastated by the passage of the allied armies. Saxony, that had abandoned the French on the field of battle, was thrown into despair by the prospect of falling under the power of Prussia, and losing her nationality as the reward of her defection. Meanwhile, she had the mortification to see her sovereign a prisoner at Berlin. The princes of the smaller German states were disturbed by the projects imputed to the more powerful sovereigns of the country, and the peoples were discontented by the little liberty that appeared in the principles avowed by their princes. Bavaria having considerable claims to indemnification for what Austria was about to deprive her of, she felt little pleasure at the prospect of being compensated on the left bank of the Rhine, quite close to France, with which Power it was thus intended to compromise her.

Switzerland had fallen into a state of confusion from which it was impossible to free her, and which put all her interests in opposition, all her populations in arms. The act of mediation, making a happy application in the Alps of the principles of 1789, by setting the old subjugated countries at liberty, and forming all into nineteen independent cantons instead of thirteen, had abolished the inequalities of condition, together with all kinds of oppression, and had created a perfectly well-balanced state of things, which had rendered Switzerland perfectly happy during ten years, and which would have left her nothing to desire had not war disturbed the happiness of the whole world.

It was this same act of mediation which the inhabitants of Berne had intended, and succeeded in destroying by introducing the Allies into Switzerland during the preceding December. Immediately all the old pretensions were renewed. Berne wanted to bring Pays de Vaud and Argovia under her yoke, and deprive them of their position of federal cantons. Uri wished to deprive Tessin of the vale of Levan, and actually took possession of it without an appeal to any authority. Schweitz and Glaris were preparing to snatch back the territories of Utznach and Gaster from the canton of St. Gall, and for that purpose excited disturbances in these ancient districts. Zug claimed Argovia as her dependency, and Appenzell flattered herself with the hope of recovering the Rheintal. On the other side the threatened cantons put themselves on the defensive. The citizens of Vaud, Argovia, Thurgovia, Saint Gall, and Tessin, had taken up arms to the number of twenty thousand men. The interior policy of the cantons was in no less danger than their territorial possessions. The subjection of class to class was about to reappear. It was at least intended to re-esta-

blish the system, and all the new and legitimate interests, which had been recognised by the act of mediation, seeing the threatened danger, were ready to revolt.

The diet having assembled at Zurich, wishing to put a stop to this state of anarchy, had tried to reconstitute Switzerland. But the five cantons, which were meditating these territorial changes, viz., Berne, Uri, Schweitz, Glaris, and Zug, having induced the cantons of Fribourg, Soleure, Lucerne, and Unterwalden, which shared in their sentiments, to join them, formed a counter-diet, which would neither yield to that held at Zurich nor recognise its acts. The diet at Zurich was composed of the cantons whose liberties were in danger—viz., Vaud, Argovia, Thurgovia, Saint Gall, and Tessin, together with the so-called impartial cantons of Zurich, Basle, Schaffhausen, Appenzell, and the Grisons. The latter diet represented ten cantons: its opponents, nine.

Fortunately for the cause of justice and good sense, Alexander, liberal both from feeling and education, besides being influenced by M. de Laharpe and General Jomini, had no idea of lending his aid to such a work of destruction. Under his influence the allied sovereigns declared that they would recognise no other diet than that of Zurich, nor would they consent to the suppression of a single one of the existing cantons; and that as Berne had lost much they would endeavor to compensate her with some portion of the territory recovered from France.

The Diet of Zurich, strengthened by this support, conquered and even absorbed the dissenting cantons. This Diet had drawn up the plan of a federal union, recognising the existence of the nineteen cantons, and which, leaving to the Congress of Vienna the care of deciding territorial questions, had preserved all that was good in the act of mediation with regard to civil equality and legislative power. But, this plan being rejected by the dissenting cantons, those cantons whose existence was threatened refused to lay down their arms. Pays de Vaud was transformed into a sort of camp, and, instead of being, as once, the seat of wealth and repose, presented nothing but a scene of anxiety and agitation. This was all that Switzerland had gained, at least for the present, by the deliverance of Europe. It depended on the Congress of Vienna to restore order and justice, if possible.

As we pass the Alps the prospect becomes sadder and drearier. The French, in retiring, had left the wrecks of their Italian army at Milan, and the Austrians had left the remnant of their army in the fortresses of Lombardy. Notwithstanding his noble fidelity to Napoleon, Prince Eugene flattered himself that he would be able to retain a part, at least, of his viceroyalty. For this he had counted on the influence of his father-in-law, the King of Bavaria, and the personal consideration enjoyed by himself in Europe. The wisest among the Italians would have desired him for their prince, and the Lombard Senate was considering how the object might be effected, when the Milanese populace, weary of the abuse of the French among them for eighteen years, and also excited by some members of the nobility and clergy, revolted, attacked the

Senate, and massacred Prina, the Finance Minister. They were about to murder the War Minister, when their violence was checked. General Pino, having placed himself at the head of the public forces, a kind of regency was formed of intelligent patriots, who demanded a sovereign from the Congress of Vienna. The reply to this demand was, as may be expected, the occupation of the country by Austrian troops. Marshal Bellegarde, at the head of fifty thousand Austrians, invaded Lombardy as far as the Po, dissolved the provisional regency, and took possession of the country, in the name of the imperial court of Austria. Although it was not yet announced to what Power these countries were to be subjected, it was easy to foresee that they were about to become Austrian provinces.

The Austrian rule was harsh, but conducted with legal forms, in Lombardy, whilst from the very first day it was exercised with disorderly severity in Piedmont. The old King of Sardinia, having passed the period of his exile in Rome, and assisted at the Pope's return, at whose feet he had prostrated himself, returned to Turin and took possession of his dominions, which the English proposed increasing by the addition of Genoa. He governed after the fashion of the most short-sighted of emigrants. He not only re-established absolute power, but employed it in punishing all who had served under France, and persecuting those who did not abstain from flesh-meat on Fridays and Saturdays, and in all things acted with the most violent intolerance, in a country which during twenty years had been imbued with the French spirit. A great number of Piedmontese officers fled to Murat, who received them with delight; and those who remained, either refusing to serve, or detesting the new Government, were very little suited to support it. A general insurrection would certainly have broken out but for the neighbourhood of the Austrians on the Tessino and the Po.

Genoa thoughtlessly yielded to the English, and was promised her independence by the implacable and liberal Lord Bentinck, but she was thrown into despair when she saw the fate that was being prepared for her. It was remarkable that at first all the seaport towns of Europe stretched forth their arms toward England, that is, to the sea, but now drew them back in anger. Genoa acted like Marseilles, Bordeaux, Nantes, Antwerp, &c. &c.

The Legations, which under the Empire had been included in the viceroyalty of Lombardy, were occupied by Murat, who had invaded them in the name of the Coalition. In conformity with the opinions of the day, that each prince should recover what he had formerly possessed, the Legations ought to be restored to the Pope, and he was justified in expecting that they would. But the Pope at his return having refused to recognise Murat's title, the latter avenged himself by continuing to occupy these provinces, not indeed ill-treating the inhabitants, but leaving them in a painful state of uncertainty as to their future destiny.

At this period—September and October, 1814—Tuscany was the only country in Italy,

and perhaps in Europe, that was at rest. Under the Empire, Tuscany had been restored to the Archduke Ferdinand, Duke of Wurzburg, and, after being tossed about for twenty years from one sovereignty to another, found herself at last under the government of a wise and moderate prince, who did not seek to deprive her of the privileges she had obtained from the French, nor persecute those who had served under Napoleon, but, on the contrary, placed MM. Fossombroni and Corsini, the most distinguished members of the French administration, at the head of his Government. Thus Tuscany, fully aware of the advantages of her position, was the only Italian state that neither regretted nor desired any thing. The turbulent Leghorn, having obtained the freedom of the sea, and, unlike Genoa, not being threatened with a foreign ruler, was as contented and peaceful as the rest of Tuscany.

The Romans had got back the Pope, whom they received on their knees on the *Place du Peuple*. Among those prostrated before him might be seen poor Charles IV., his wife, and the Prince de la Paix, sad remains of the Spanish family, collected at Rome like the waifs of some great shipwreck. Pius VII., generally so mild and moderate, seemed to have flung aside these qualities the moment he was restored to his own sacred domain, and put into practice the most unwise and least humane rigours of the Church. He immediately annulled all the improvements that the French had introduced into the administration, he persecuted most pitilessly all those priests or laymen who had served under them, he annulled the sales of Church property, and proclaimed the re-establishment of the Jesuits, which caused no little inquietude to all enlightened men. These imprudent resolutions were not suggested by Cardinal Consalvi, who was gone to solicit the support of the European courts in the affair of the Legations, but by his temporary substitute, Cardinal Pacca. Cardinal Maury had been banished to his diocese of Montefiascone, and was forbidden to appear before the Holy Father. Why? Because he was a bishop appointed by Napoleon, who had been crowned by Pius VII. All the cardinal's relations had been deprived of their appointments. Things were carried so far that Pius VII. began to be ashamed of proceedings so contrary to the usual generosity of his disposition.

We have already explained the relations existing between the Pope and the Bourbon Government concerning the revocation of the Concordat. At the same time that Pius VII. asked the support of the Bourbons in the question of the Marshes and the Legations, he demanded the restoration of Avignon and Benevento. He requested Louis XVIII. not to accept the Charter because of the liberty of worship therein guaranteed; he also demanded the abolition of divorce—a change in the law of marriage which would restore to the religious ceremony its superiority over the civil; he also demanded a dotation in land for the Church. In return, the old Bishop of Saint-Malo, ambassador of Louis XVIII., had presented the demands of his court, which consisted in the unconditional abolition of the Concordat, and the restoration of the French

clergy to the same position they held before 1802. Whilst the Bishop of Saint-Malo presented this demand with all the respect due to the Holy See, he yet gave Pius VII. to understand that the Bourbons were far from approving of his reign, and would even blame its weakness, had they dared to utter a reproach against the representative of God on earth.

On his side, the Pope, who saw nothing strange in his demanding the restitution of Avignon or opposing freedom of worship, thought it both astonishing and offensive that he should be asked to undo his own work by the re-establishment of the ancient French Church, or that it should be insinuated that he had done wrong in signing the Concordat. The doctrine held by him and his negotiators was, that the Holy See could not err. Had the Bourbons been consistent, they would not have disputed this; but, as in this case everybody was inconsistent, the minister of Louis XVIII., to obtain the abolition of the Concordat, asserted that the Pope could err, and thus declared himself a Gallican; whilst the Pope asserted ultramontane principles in order to defend the Concordat, the least ultramontane of his acts.

However, as both parties needed each other's assistance, they endeavoured to come to an understanding, and Pius VII. appointed a congregation of cardinals to examine the important question of the revocation of the Concordat, and resolve the numerous difficulties dependent thereon. Among the demands of the court of France there was one very agreeable to the court of Rome, which was an increase in the number of episcopal sees. This measure was therefore admitted, not as a revocation of the Concordat, but as a simple increase of the number of bishoprics—a demand which the Church has not refused to grant at any time. As far as individuals were concerned, the Pope was equally ready to yield, and made no objection to reinstate all the ancient titulars that were still in existence, numbering about twelve or thirteen, notwithstanding the self-contradiction of re-appointing prelates whom he had deposed. But at the same time he demanded and obtained well-secured pensions for the prelates he was about to depose, after having appointed them himself. However, these negotiations, as often happens at Rome, proceeded very slowly, which on this occasion was very fortunate both for Pius VII. and the Bourbons, neither of whom suspected the benefit conferred by this delay in the accomplishment of their wishes.

Naples still remained with what wrecks of the Imperial dynasty still existed in that kingdom. Murat's astonishment at finding himself on the throne of Naples could only be equalled by that which Europe felt at seeing him there. In the first days of 1814, whilst the Allies were still doubtful of their victory, Austria, in order to detach Murat from Napoleon, had guaranteed him the throne of Naples, and England confirmed the act. Now that the Allies were completely victorious, they repented of having bound themselves so early and so formally. The Powers that had not taken part in the negotiation blamed the precipitancy of England and Austria, who, indeed, were ashamed of what they had done,

and, though they could not venture to undo their work themselves, were very well disposed to allow it to be undone by others.

All the princes of Italy, and the Pope in particular, had refused to recognise Murat, who avenged himself on the latter, as we have seen, by occupying the Legations and the Marches. Whilst this neighbour, so morally powerful, refused to recognise Murat, another, Ferdinand IV., King of Sicily and Palermo, regarded him as an adventurer, whom the confusion of European affairs had allowed to continue on a usurped throne. As might be expected, the legitimate heir of the Neapolitan Bourbons made every exertion to recover his patrimony. Murat could now estimate at Naples, as Marmont at Paris, what one gains by abandoning a course to which he is naturally allied, whatever excuse unjust treatment might furnish for such conduct. Regret is the commencement of remorse; and Murat already regretted deeply having abandoned his true interest when he abandoned Napoleon. His sister-in-law, the Princess Pauline, aided by the queen, did all she could to make him feel what he only felt too deeply already. He then left for Porto Ferrajo, to bring about a reconciliation between the brothers-in-law.

But Murat was determined not to give the Powers assembled at Vienna a pretext for dethroning him, by appearing unfaithful to his engagements; and whilst he sent messages of repentance to the island of Elba, he avoided any act that might compromise him, and always addressed the Allies as a member of the Coalition, who rejoiced at having aided in conquering the tyrant of Europe. But he gave a most friendly reception to the Piedmontese and Lombard officers who sought refuge in his dominions. He acted in the same manner toward the French officers who came to offer him their services, although an order of Louis XVIII. recalled the latter to France; and he paid them all well, for his finances were in excellent condition. He made every exertion to increase his army, which already amounted to 80,000 men; for he knew that a large military force would constitute his very best title with the negotiators of Vienna. He had many partisans among the nobility and citizens of Naples, who dreaded all the return of Ferdinand IV. would entail. If the better-educated classes, whom he did not offend, were on his side, it was not the case with the lazzaroni, who had a lively remembrance of their ancient masters, although they often applauded him because of his noble person, which he frequently displayed by riding through the streets of Naples. He was not altogether unpopular; but he was no longer the hero of Italy, as he had been for a few months. No: the real hero of Italy was elsewhere: he was in the isle of Elba. Having at first wished to free themselves from his conscription and the *droits républicains*, the affections of the Italians soon returned to Napoleon, and they saw in him the ideal representative of their cause conquered, and Prometheus-like, chained to a rock. With the exception of Tuscany, the constant wish, from the Alps to the Straits of Messina, was that the sovereign of Elba should quit his island, put himself at the head of the Neapolitan army.

and march on Milan. There was very little probability of such an event; for Napoleon would not leave his island, in order to attempt, with the assistance of the Italians, what he had failed in when aided by the French; or, in other words, to undertake a desperate struggle against victorious Europe, to do battle for the unity of Italy, a cause in which he had never taken any great interest. However, it is certain that, had he appeared, all who were disgusted with the military *régime* of Austria, with the pious tyranny of Piedmont, and the domination of the Sacred College, would certainly have risen at his voice, and repeated one of those attempts so often made by the Italians, but in which they have not yet succeeded.

Italy, like the rest of Europe, after having desired and invoked what was called their common deliverance, was now very little satisfied with it. But there was one country more dissatisfied than any other—a country justly indignant at the deceptions that had repaid her efforts: this country was Spain. Spain had shed torrents of blood and supported a heroic struggle for the restoration of her king, and for all this blood and all these efforts she had only obtained a stupid and sanguinary tyranny.

Ferdinand VII., who, as we have seen, had by Napoleon's orders been conducted to the frontiers of Spain and restored to the Spanish troops, had entered Gironne on the 24th of March. From Gironne he proceeded to Saragossa, where he found deputies from the regency and the Cortes, who, before restoring him the royal authority, required that he should swear to observe the constitution of Cadiz, a proceeding similar to that adopted by the Senate with regard to Louis XVIII. Let us imagine how the Bourbons would have acted at Paris, had they been unrestrained by public opinion and by the presence of the imperial army at Fontainebleau; and instead of depending exclusively on the support of foreign armies, obedient to the will of Alexander, had they rested on a Vendean army, we shall easily understand the conduct of Ferdinand VII. in Spain. This prince refused at first to enter into any explanation with the deputies from the regency and the Cortes, and proceeded from Saragossa to Valencia, greeted as he passed by the homage of the people, who were delighted at his return and the restoration of peace. At Valencia he was received with transports of delight. The army even came voluntarily to take the oath of allegiance, and this general good feeling, which his presence inspired, continuing to increase, he considered himself sufficiently strong to enter into explanations with the authorities at Madrid. Enlightened men were indeed of opinion that he could not, without some modifications, accept the constitution of Cadiz—a constitution still more defective than ours of 1791. General Castanos, the conqueror of Baylen, and the most distinguished man at that time in Spain, together with M. de Cevallos, the most enlightened of the ministers, advised him to negotiate, and confine himself to demanding modifications of the constitution, and not to break off with men who had defended his throne with their blood. Nothing would induce him

to adopt conciliatory measures; for he felt more indignant against men who sought to limit his royal authority after having conserved it for him, than against those who had sought to deprive him of it forever by shutting him up at Valency. Unfortunately, the heads of the Cortes, unwise as he, were quite as unwilling to make concessions, and the unity, whose result might have been the establishment of rational institutions in Spain, was become an impossibility.

The Cortes having commissioned the Archbishop of Toledo to go to the king, and request him to declare his decision concerning the constitution, his majesty said he would not accept it, and sent back the archbishop to Madrid, resumed the plenitude of his authority, annulled all the acts of the Cortes, and ordered the troops to march upon the capital. The people and the army, who only saw in him the king for whom they had fought so long, and understanding nothing, or almost nothing, of the theoretic dispute between the sovereign and the Cortes, and even feeling astonished that the royal authority could be refused to him for whom it had been preserved at the expense of such exertions, had encouraged him by their enthusiastic submission to dare every thing, and he entered Madrid as an absolute monarch, that is to say, free to pursue those measures that might lead to his ruin. Scarcely was he settled in his palace, when he exiled or imprisoned those who had struggled hardest to preserve his crown; sent to his diocese the Archbishop of Toledo—the head of the regency, the man who had supported the royal prerogative with all his might; he re-established the Inquisition with all its consequences, and thus added to what was ridiculous in an impossible restoration, the odium of the blackest and basest ingratitude. There were, however, men in Spain who, without entirely participating in the liberal opinions of the Cortes, were yet impressed by them, and who, considering the present reaction absurd, were determined to oppose it. These men abode chiefly in Catalonia. They were joined by several members of the Cortes, and it looked as if an organized resistance were about to commence in that quarter. When these men saw in what manner the son of Charles IV. behaved, they thought of recalling the old king, whose want of intellectual power was compensated by the gentleness of his temper.

The difficulties of the position increased visibly, and Ferdinand VII., attributing the present movement to the intrigues of the Prince de la Paix, who was staying at Rome with Charles IV., preferred a request to the Holy See that this old minister of his father should be exiled to Pesaro. Charles IV., whose affection for his favourite had never wavered, was indignant at hearing this, and seemed inclined to go to Barcelona or to Vienna and appeal to Spain or to Europe to restore his throne and avenge him on an unnatural son. It was with difficulty that he was pacified, and it needed all the Pope's sacred authority to restrain him.

Such was the spectacle that Spain presented, and in contemplating it we cannot but feel inclined to thank the Senate for having drawn

up a rational constitution for us; nor can we refuse our gratitude to the foreign sovereigns who supported it, and Louis XVIII. who accepted it, and thus spared us the disgraceful reaction which recompensed the devotion of the Spaniards. Although the Bourbons who reigned over us did not imitate the odious conduct of Ferdinand VII., they still committed faults that sufficed to open a new career of adventures to Napoleon and a fresh source of misfortunes to France.

We shall complete this picture of Spain by a short explanation of its relations with the cabinet of the Tuileries. The treaty of peace was signed in July, the bulwark of the Pyrenees being no unimportant argument in its favour; and nothing now remained to be done but to make a reciprocal exchange of prisoners. But France had secretly promised to assist Spain in getting a double restitution from Vienna, that of Parma for the Queen of Etruria and Naples for Ferdinand IV., who during the past eight years had no territory but Sicily. It did not require much entreaty to induce France to support these demands, as indeed she would have made them herself. At this very time, Spain contracted a secret engagement with England, by which she bound herself not to renew the family compact with the Bourbons, and abruptly broke off her engagements with us, for a very strange reason. The guerrilla chief Mina, from whose enterprises we had suffered so much, and to whom Ferdinand VII. was so much indebted, was one of those whom the restored monarch persecuted for opposing his assumption of absolute power. This celebrated man had taken refuge at Bayonne, where he was arrested by the Spanish consul, with the concurrence of the French authorities, who had the weakness to consent to his arrest on French ground. Louis XVIII. and the Duke de Berry were indignant at such an insult to the French crown, and demanded that Mina should be set free; that the French agent who had assisted in this illegal act should be deprived of his place; and that reparation should be demanded from the Spanish court. Ferdinand VII., instead of granting satisfaction, demanded that reparation should be made to him, and consequently all diplomatic relations ceased between the two courts. Thus Ferdinand VII. first quarrelled with the Spaniards who had saved his crown, and then with the Bourbons of France, his only relatives, his only allies in the whole world, and sacrificed the family compact to England without being assured of her support—for she blamed him loudly for the injurious reaction, of which indeed he was as much the instrument as the author.

Such was the state of Europe, freed from Napoleon's power, but exposed to a species of universal counter-revolution; nor were these the sole evils with which Europe was threatened! After fifteen years of suffering caused by the exorbitant ambition of Napoleon, the fall of this insatiable conqueror might have served as a lesson, and taught moderation to all. But it had no such effect, and the victorious Powers seemed, from their boundless avidity, more inclined to justify Napoleon than to cause the world to bless his fall. This

was the painful spectacle they presented at Vienna, where they had appointed to meet on the 1st of August.

The allied sovereigns, on leaving Paris, had all, with the exception of the Emperor Francis, who was no lover of tumult, gone to pay a visit to the Prince Regent of England, and received in London such an ovation as the English know well how to bestow when their passions are inflamed and their interests satisfied. Rome, Madrid, Vienna, Berlin, had echoed to loud acclamations, but all were surpassed by the enthusiastic delight exhibited in London when the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia appeared. Their reception verged on folly. Not wishing to disturb these magnificent fêtes by discussions on business which might have marred the universal joy, it was decided that they should remain good friends, and, if necessary, even make reciprocal sacrifices, and maintain, at any cost, the alliance of Chaumont, by which they had rid themselves of the tyrant of Europe. France, it was said, though restored to the Bourbons, was not resigned to her fate, nor was Napoleon forgotten, though banished to the isle of Elba, and unforeseen events might arise which could only be overcome while the Allies remained united. Without entering, therefore, into any explanation concerning European arrangements, the monarchs swore an eternal friendship, and promised to meet at Vienna with the same sentiments.

According to the 32d article of the treaty of Paris, which fixed the meeting of the approaching Congress within the next two months, the representatives ought to meet on the 1st of August. But as this date would not allow sufficient time for all that was to be done, the meeting was therefore deferred to the month of September.

After the fêtes in London, the King of Prussia, notwithstanding his modesty, went to receive the congratulations of his subjects. On the other hand, the Emperor Alexander had gone to Warsaw to excite the foolish imagination of the Poles in favour of a pretended reconstitution of Poland which he meditated, and, consequently, the two monarchs could not meet at Vienna before the 25th of September. They made a brilliant entry into the Austrian capital, worthy of their joy and their success. The Emperor Francis, who took part in these displays rather for the sake of his allies than from any feeling of personal gratification, went to meet the two monarchs, embraced them in the presence of his people, and then returned with them into his capital amidst the enthusiastic applause of the inhabitants. The Kings of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Denmark arrived successively, and after them all the German, Italian, and Dutch princes who had their interests to defend in the approaching negotiations. Princesses were as abundant as princes at Vienna, and among the former none was more conspicuous than Alexander's sister, the Grand Duchess Catherine, widow of the Duke of Oldenburg, an active-minded and intellectual woman, who possessed a certain amount of influence. To these crowned heads were joined the generals and diplomatists of the Coalition, anxious to compliment each other on their military and

political successes. Some came merely to receive felicitations, and rejoice in the common triumph, whilst others came to represent their Governments, but all alike greedy of rewards, fêtes, pleasures, news, and forming, with the sovereigns, the most dazzling and tumultuous assembly that ever was seen. But from this brilliant meeting of monarchs two personages were absent—the unfortunate King of Saxony, imprisoned at Berlin for having been the last to break his alliance with the French, and Maria Louisa, buried in the palace of Schoenbrunn, whence she heard with a sort of envy the noise of the festivities, and where she was occupied, not in preparing to join her husband in Elba, but in disputing her duchy of Parma with the two houses of Bourbon, under the guidance of M. de Neipperg, who was appointed her adviser. He was an experienced officer, acquainted with war and diplomacy, and capable of informing her of all that was necessary for her to know, and, in the profound isolation into which she had fallen, the Count was becoming daily more her counsellor, advocate, and friend.

After some days devoted to amusement of every kind, it was time to think of matters of more serious import,—a change of occupation unwelcome to all. Whilst the sovereigns always declared that unanimity ought to be maintained, they had not entered into explanations on any subject, with the exception of some points already decided in the treaty of Paris. Written documents had already been drawn up, by which England was to get Belgium and Holland, and therewith form the kingdom of the Low Countries, as a protection against France; Austria was to have Italy as far as the Tessino and the Po; Prussia was to be reconstituted, and put in the same position with regard to territory as she had been in 1805; whilst Russia, freed from the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, (Napoleon's attempt at a French Poland,) should share its wrecks with the neighbouring states. But there was so little desire to disturb the general happiness, that no arrangement had been made as to the disposition of the vacant territories, all debates on this difficult and doubtful point being referred to the autumnal meeting.

There could be no dispute as to Italy, which, as far as the Po and the Tessino, was given to Austria, nor the Low Countries, where the French frontier of 1790 was accepted as a definite boundary; but ample subject, not only of debate but of contention, would be found in the centre of Europe, in the territories touching on Russia, Prussia, and Austria.

The Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia were each secretly determined to have entire possession, the one of Poland, the other of Saxony.

These two princes, equals in age and rank, though very different in disposition, had in the commencement of their reigns been firm friends. But their friendship was destroyed by the events of 1807, when, both being conquered, they experienced such very different treatment. Provinces were bestowed on Alexander, whilst Frederick William was deprived of half his dominions; in 1813 they renewed their alliance under the harsh oppression of

Napoleon, and on the battle-fields of Lutzen and Leipsic their ancient friendship revived, and they vowed that nothing thenceforward should disunite them. They had, consequently, no secrets from one another; each felt perfect confidence in his friend; they were of the same opinion on every subject, and whenever Alexander spoke it was pretty certain that Frederick William would echo his sentiments. As Alexander not only spoke but thought first, he guided the opinions of his friend, though not to the disadvantage of Prussia, for they were as closely united by political interest as by personal affection. These two princes esteemed each other highly, looking upon themselves as the honestest men of their age, whilst they considered England the most egotistical of all Powers, and Austria the most astute. If they were to be believed, the whole civilized world would be still in a state of bondage if Alexander had not given the signal of resistance in 1812, and if Frederick William had not joined him in 1813, or if, when they had reached the Oder, they had not pressed forward, carrying all Europe in their train, until they reached the Elbe, the Rhine, and even the Seine. They esteemed nobody so highly as themselves, and this esteem was not altogether ill founded, for though Frederick William sometimes exhibited a duplicity not uncommon in weak-minded men, and though Alexander's fickleness made him sometimes appear false, still the former was upright and modest, and the latter generous in disposition and fascinating in manner. But, as often happens to honest people who pique themselves on their honesty, these two monarchs believed they were impeccable, and even looked upon their ambition as a virtue. If the one desired to obtain possession of Poland, and the other of Saxony, it was, according to them, from the purest and noblest motives. Alexander desired to get Poland that he might reorganize the country. And, indeed, in his youth he had often thought and said that the division of Poland by Catherine, Frederick the Great, and Maria Theresa was an odious crime, and ought by all means to be repaired. But he was very much annoyed at Napoleon's attempts at this reparation from 1807 to 1812, and did all he could to prevent him. But, thinking the moment was now come when he could undertake the task himself, he commenced his preparations with the ardour that characterized all his movements. He possessed many facilities for carrying out his project, for he was master of the greater number of the Polish provinces. By joining to these the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, comprising Warsaw, Thorn, Posen, and Kalisch, he might compose a magnificent kingdom, extending from the Niemen to the Crapach range. On this kingdom he intended to bestow free institutions, and assume the crown himself, remaining at the same time Emperor of all the Russias. He would thus assume the double title of emperor and king—the very summit of human power—and would be in the eyes of Russia the equal or even the superior of Catherine and Peter the Great, since in the course of a single reign he should have added to Russia, Finland, Bessarabia, and Poland. These dreams of ambition seemed

to him but schemes for the benefit of humanity. Many Poles, who considered France too distant to befriend Poland, which they believed could only be efficaciously done by Russia, together with many others who had adopted the same views since our misfortunes, now collected round Alexander, and contributed not a little to excite his ambitious views. He determined to become the restorer, the liberal restorer, of Poland; for though he meant to place his new kingdom under the Russian sceptre, he did not mean to subject it to Russian despotism; the government should somewhat resemble the English. By acting in this manner, Alexander did not look upon himself at all as a conqueror; on the contrary, he said that he would deprive himself of Lithuania and Volhynia in order to create this new kingdom, of which, if it would give less offence to European jealousy, he would make his brother Constantine king, and he himself only suzerain. In his opinion, the Congress of Vienna, by assisting in this plan, would put the acmé to the glory of victorious Europe, and would be in a position to say it had reconstituted the world on the bases of justice, liberty, and true political wisdom. We must pardon such illusions, for it is something gained when ambition thinks it necessary to assume the appearance of honesty, a point on which so many are indifferent, satisfied if they can obtain what they desire, without seeking to give their conduct even the semblance of justice.

There was, however, one objection to this fair vision, to which Alexander did not blind himself, but for which his reply was prepared. The territories of which the Grand Duchy of Warsaw had been composed had been formerly divided between Russia, Prussia, and Austria. The principal part had belonged to Prussia, whose rule extended as far as the Vistula, including Warsaw. This large portion, then, was to be taken from Prussia, who would certainly demand compensation somewhere; and this extension of the Russian frontier from the Vistula to the Oder should be sanctioned by Europe—an extension which would be a real subject of alarm to the entire continent, and would be also contrary to the treaty of Kalisch, (24th of February, 1813,) to the treaty of Reichenbach, (15th of June, 1813,) and to the treaty of Tœplitz, (9th of September, 1813,) treaties which had successively formed the bonds of the Coalition. By the conditions of these treaties the Grand Duchy of Warsaw was to be distributed between the co-sharers of Poland, agreeable, or very nearly so, to the old partition that had been made of it; besides, Prussia should get ten thousand additional subjects, and Illyria was to be restored to Austria. This was what they had promised each other when they formed the European coalition against France in 1813; but the unexpected success of this coalition had permitted them to extend the sphere of these restitutions, for Austria, instead of getting Illyria alone, was to get back the Tyrol and the north of Italy, with the addition of Venice, that she had never possessed before. England, that would have been very well satisfied to deprive France of the seaports of Hamburg and Bremen, and

still happier if she could deprive her of Holland, was now, in addition to these, about to rob her of Belgium, which she intended for the house of Orange. If all these Powers had in this manner enlarged their original demands, was Russia alone, asked Alexander, to confine herself within the narrow views she had formed at a time when the utmost the Allies hoped was to reach the Elbe, but had no expectation of touching the Rhine? Certainly not; and Russia's share should, as well as that of the others, be proportioned to the unhopd-for success of the Coalition.

Saxony, Prussia's compensation, was ready; the possession of this kingdom would be the realization of all her wishes. This Power, since Frederick the Great, by the united genius of policy and arms, had put it together in bits and scraps, had always presented a kind of geographical deformity. On the map of Europe it appeared as a state of disproportioned length, extending from the Niemen to the Rhine, with many long intervals, and, above all, wanting solidity in the centre. If Dresden were added to Berlin, this awkward configuration would be partly remedied, and Prussia would obtain possession of that field for military operations, whose importance had been proved by Napoleon in the nineteenth and by Frederick in the eighteenth century. And by this arrangement Prussia, instead of disaffected Poles, would have honest German subjects, and, still better, she would thus become one of the chief German Powers, and be placed in a position to bring about that Germanic unity, the bare mention of which is sufficient to excite the Prussian mind. While Alexander believed that he was performing a duty to the human race in remodelling Poland, Frederick William believed it was a duty he owed Germany to make this first great step toward her unity, and flattered himself that he would thus pay for all the blood she had shed in the common cause, never permitting himself to perceive that it was more for Prussian than for German unity he was working; that the lesser German States would be seriously alarmed by such a move; that Austria would be offended, and that all Europe would be terrified at the prospect of paying for German unity by abandoning Poland to Russia. Like Alexander, he had answers for all the objections that could be made to his projects, for the prism of desire always shows objects as we wish to see them. Prussia had been promised, he said, ten thousand subjects without mentioning the locality, and she would not exceed this number in taking possession of Saxony; she would merely choose what suited her best. The King of Saxony's interests could not be alleged against this measure, for he was a traitor who had deserted the cause of Europe. Besides, when Russia and Prussia were united they need fear no opposition. Austria and England were so much occupied in satisfying their avidity—the one in Italy, the other in the two hemispheres—that neither would take notice of what was going on. France deserved no consideration. In short, Europe was under so many obligations to both Russia and Prussia that she could not refuse them the gratification of such honest and legitimate desires.

So did Frederick William argue with himself, and he thought his reasoning excellent. Alexander and Frederick William had pledged their word to each other, and they came to Vienna persuaded that they should have Poland and Saxony.

Was it possible that England and Austria entertained no suspicion of these projects, and, if they suspected that, they made no opposition? This certainly looks very strange, when we reflect on the violent opposition that soon burst forth. But, as we have said, the fear of disturbing the general harmony had prevented all explanations. The re-constitution of Poland had been often spoken of, as well as the deserved punishment of the King of Saxony; and the partition of the Duchy of Warsaw was provided for by the treaties. The re-constitution of Poland had even been mentioned as one of the questions that might be submitted to the Congress. But so many places had been parts of Poland for the last fifty years, that in speaking of the country no precise boundaries were understood. This bred a vagueness over the subject, which was very agreeable to all parties; besides, the all-absorbing interests of the present excluded all thought of the future. England could not yet forget how the continental ports had been shut against her, and it was to prevent the recurrence of such an event that she formed the kingdom of the Low Countries; that she ought to give Hanover more importance, and endeavoured to make Prussia the ally of both, or which reason she was ready to make every concession to Frederick William to induce him to adopt her views. Austria, more clear-sighted than England, had more quickly detected the views of Russia and Prussia, for it was a serious consideration for her that Prussia should take possession of Saxony, and that the Slavonic race should extend to the foot of the Crapach Mountains. But these were not her only cares, and in the midst of her present prosperity she was oppressed by greater and more serious anxieties than she had ever known before. In the west and north she had to apprehend Prussia and Russia; she had to watch over the re-constitution of Germany, and fix her own position among the Germanic Powers; she had to organize Italy, to restrain Murat, to watch over the prisoner of Elba, to keep an observant eye on France, and at the same time be cautious that in treating these different interests she did not allow one to mar the other. Austria was, therefore, determined to employ all the means at her disposal—patience, tact, vigilance, and, if necessary, force. Of the three hundred thousand soldiers at her disposal, she had assembled two hundred and fifty thousand in Bohemia and Hungary, and left but fifty thousand in Italy, where she was exposed to be attacked by Murat, the Italians, and perhaps the prisoner of Elba. Austria had, consequently, silently made her preparations in the direction of Poland and Saxony, but the more her difficulties increased the more she desired to overcome them by the union, by the good understanding of the Four—that is, of England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia; for, in her opinion, were France and the lesser German States allowed to interfere, all would

be plunged into a real chaos, whence would spring the modern Lucifer—that is to say, Napoleon, who was not yet forgotten, and who certainly was determined not to allow himself to pass from men's minds, although he affected to slumber in that profound sleep that might naturally be supposed consequent on his long fatigues. Under the influence of these impressions, the first words spoken at Vienna were the last that had been pronounced at London—that the Allies should remain united in opinion, at any sacrifice; and this was the oftener repeated, as they felt that the day of disunion was approaching.

Such were the dispositions of those that formed the Congress; all were extremely anxious to maintain unity, and all were filled with a boundless avidity, little compatible with such union. If ever the fault that France had committed in signing the Treaty of Paris with so much precipitation was evident, it was at this moment, when destiny decreed that Europe should be disunited, for it was impossible that Austria would consent that Prussia should take possession of Dresden, or Russia of Cracow, or that the lesser German Powers would allow Saxony, the most respectable among them, to be suppressed because of her alliance with France—a fault that was common to them all—or that England would sanction the execution of these ambitious projects in the face of the British Parliament. If, amid these divided interests, France had come to Vienna, unrestricted by a treaty which marked out her frontiers, there can be no doubt but that her position would be better than it was in Paris in the month of May. Whilst, on the one hand, Russia and Prussia were determined to have Poland and Saxony at any price, and, on the other hand, England and Austria were determined that they should not get them, France would have been able to give so decided a preponderance to whichever party she joined, that certainly no concessions would be spared to gain her support. Russia and Prussia were the two Powers most inclined to make concessions to France, for their interests were connected with the Elbe and the Vistula, and not with the Rhine and the Scheldt. It is evident that, had we joined these Powers, we should have got very different frontiers to those assigned us by the Treaty of Paris. Had we only gained the line of fortresses demanded by our negotiators, it would have been a great advantage, and, being gained by diplomacy alone, would have obtained for the Bourbons that popularity of which they stood so much in need. It was indeed a misfortune that we came to Vienna clogged by the Treaty of Paris. However, the evil was not altogether irremediable, and it was still possible to profit of the new state of things. It was evident that the discussion would be warm, for both Russia and Prussia seemed prepared to proceed to every extremity in order to obtain Poland and Saxony. If it went so far as the forming of new alliances, or preparing for war, it is not likely that the Treaty of Paris would prove a greater restraint than that of Chaumont had been. Of course, we could not ourselves proclaim an intention of not abiding by the Treaty of Paris, but by prudence in

our expressions, and giving hope of our support, whilst we lingered in according it, Russia and Prussia were both so ardent that they would probably pronounce the words we dared not utter, and offer us what we could not venture to demand. We cannot say how much our condition may have been improved, but undoubtedly it would have been ameliorated, and that in proportion to the seriousness of the conflict. We may add that, united with Russia and Prussia, we should have nothing to fear from the dispute, however violent it may be. It is even probable that England and Austria, not daring to venture on war, would have yielded, and we should have become the arbitrators, the well-recompensed arbitrators, of the contention. Consequently, the treaty of Paris was not an insurmountable difficulty, but only an obstacle that may be overcome by a little address: and it must be allowed that address was quite permissible against adversaries who had both used and abused force in dealing with us.

This line of conduct supposes our consent to the wishes of Russia and Prussia; and what loss would be incurred by these concessions? Had Russia obtained Poland, of which she already possessed the greater part, she would have advanced from her long-established position on the Vistula as far as the Wartha. Prussia, in getting Saxony, would have come nearer to Austria. By these movements, Russia would occasion more uneasiness to Germany, and Prussia more jealousy to Austria. Ought France to become uncomfortable at such results? Was it our duty to guard the union of the three Continental Powers that had helped to conquer us, and after our defeat had imposed on us the treaty of the 30th of May, and that for forty years has held our policy under the yoke of a permanent coalition? If the Prussians were to be an inconvenience to any one, was it not better that they should be so to Austria by getting possession of Dresden, than to us by getting Cologne and Aix-la-Chapelle? It is true that had the house of Saxony been removed from the banks of the Elbe to the left of the Rhine, as Alexander and Frederick William proposed, the Germanic equilibrium—a component part of the European balance of power—would have been shaken. But what was the use of this Germanic equilibrium, which had been so largely encroached on during our century? What was its use either to us or the rest of Europe? It was only interposing small states between greater, in order to break the shock of their collision. Would it not be more to our interest that German States should be interposed between us and Prussia in order to prevent collision between us, than that they should be placed between her and Austria to spare the latter a shock? And Saxony having abandoned us on the field of battle, and Europe having lost all sense of moderation in her dealings with us, were we not justified now more than at any other time, or under any other circumstances, in thinking of ourselves, and of ourselves alone?

These questions contain their own reply; and now, at the end of half a century, one is surprised at the strange view that was taken of them at the period of which we are relating

the history. Unfortunately, at that time our foreign was as defective as our home policy, and these questions were not even raised in the royal council. In the same manner, as it was not even asked whether it would not be better to defer for two months that convention of the 23d of April, by which we surrendered such important pledges without hastening the departure of the Allied armies by a single day, so it was not asked whether it were not better to put off the treaty of Paris for six months—that is, to a time when the Powers assembled for our spoliation should quarrel over the division of the spoil—nor was it even decided what line of policy should be adopted at Vienna. The defective organization of the royal council was the cause of this, and not a want of intelligence in the men who composed it. This council consisted, as we have already seen, of a confused mixture of princes and of ministers, with and without portfolios, acting under a literary king, who was both inattentive and idle, quite willing to allow himself to be governed, but not to allow a head to his cabinet whose active vigilance would extend to every subject: such a council could only produce results as disconnected as itself. In any department provided with a special minister, gifted with a real capacity for business, every thing went on well. The finance department, which enjoyed this advantage, was admirably well administered. In the other departments, and particularly that of the interior, every thing was left to chance, and was governed by the passions of the dominant party. As to foreign affairs, they were given up to the king, as king, and to M. de Talleyrand, who enjoyed the reputation of being more conversant in such matters than any man in France. We shall soon see what was the result of this state of things.

The views of Louis XVIII. with regard to foreign policy were, as in all things else, moderate, and tolerably wise, but as limited as his wishes.* Happy at finding himself again in the kingdom of his fathers, which he got back not alone entire, but increased by

* There does not, perhaps, exist any subject within the history of our times on which both French and foreign historians are more informed than the Congress of Vienna: nor is there one more important, since it was in the Congress that modern Europe took its present proportion, and that state of things was established which has lasted nearly fifty years. While the most authentic documents together with the private correspondence of M. de Talleyrand. The latter the personal anecdotes of this tall that could interest an intellect was fond of scandal, and free what regarded his own descent, prior to any other upon earth, correspondence were furnished by M. de Bernardière, who put them in Talleyrand then copied them, his own replies, though he as Blancs. Business, properly so the Duke Dalberg, who corresponded this correspondence was directed M. de Talleyrand's absence. The less piquant but more serious thing to be desired with respect which are set forth with clear remarkable knowledge of things, stood, from that point of view tion was placed. I cannot quote from which I have drawn inform authentic, and justify me fully ing recital as true and complete.

the addition of two or three fortresses, and a magnificent museum, in which he took little interest, he felt no desire to increase his dominions, and did not make the very simple reflection that if France remained the same as she had been in 1792, whilst the other States extended their possessions, she became relatively less, and that if she succeeded in recovering her superiority she would be indebted for it to the Revolution, the benefits of which he was far from appreciating. Louis XVIII. possessed a certain dignified self-respect, but no ambition, and would not lightly risk the public peace, which his age, infirmities, and misfortunes, added to the exhausted state of France, made him value dearly. Besides, the desire of interfering in foreign affairs, being an imperial tradition, was not agreeable to him, and he desired that the attitude of France at Vienna should be dignified and pacific. There was only one point about which he felt anxious: it was that Murat should be removed from the throne of Naples. To allow a lesser usurper to hold possession of a European throne after the greater had fallen, was, in his eyes, an inconsistency, a disgrace to all the Powers, and a real danger for France. *Flagitio addit damnum*, said he, in his usual fashion of expressing himself in Latin adages. He considered Naples as a stepping-stone on which Napoleon might descend at any moment, and march to the Alps with eighty thousand Italians, and thence excite all those elements that still fermented in France. As he attributed the difficulties he met in the internal government of his kingdom to Napoleon's intrigues and money, he refused to pay him the income of two million francs which had been stipulated by the treaty of the 11th of April, and even demanded that Napoleon should be transported to the Azores. Besides this removal of Napoleon, and dethronement of Murat, he wished that the Duchy of Parma should be taken from Maria Louisa, as he considered her holding it another source of danger and another inconsistency of the European policy. He wished that the duchy should be given to the house of Parma, an ally of the Bourbons. As the son of a Saxon princess, he considered it becoming his crown to save the King of Saxony. But this last consideration yielded precedence to all the others. He would not venture on a war, nor even incur a disquietude, for the accomplishment of any of these objects, but he desired that every thing should be done that diplomacy could effect. He thought alliances admissible for political reasons, but he would not ally himself too closely with any Power, for he considered that close alliances often entailed war. Among the four great European Powers with whom he could seek an alliance he preferred England, for he found in each of the others something that displeased him. In Russia, he disliked the imprudence of the sovereign; in Prussia, the too-liberal opinions of the nation, and in Austria, her relationship with Napoleon. He carried this prejudice so far as to refuse an alliance with Russia, which might have had the most beneficial results. As he had no heirs but his nephews, and one of these, the Duke d'Angoulême, being married and having no children, it was necessary

that the Duke de Berry should marry, in order to keep the crown in the elder branch of the family. Count Pozzo di Borgo proposed that the Duke de Berry should espouse the Grand Duchess Anne, the same whom Napoleon was once about to marry, and, entering into this project with all his wonted ardour, he extolled the services that Russia had already rendered, and could still render, to France, and dilated upon all the advantages that would result from such a union. But Louis XVIII. considered an alliance with the Romanoffs a degradation to the house of Bourbon, and would not bind himself either to Russia or Alexander: he therefore made some objections on the score of religion, about which he cared little, required that the princess should abjure her faith before coming to France, and, in fact, put a thousand obstacles in the way. He would have preferred an alliance, as we have said, with England, but even with that, Power he would not form an unreserved alliance. His whole policy was limited to being on good terms with England, without being too closely united to her, and by her help to get rid of Murat and the prisoner of Elba, to obtain Parma for the house of Etruria, and ameliorate in some sort the King of Saxony's fate. But for the accomplishment of none of these projects, except, perhaps, for the dethronement of Murat and the removal of Napoleon, would he have consented to brave any serious difficulties. Having explained his moderate wishes to his negotiator, he left him free to do as best he could, and hardly bestowed a glance on a voluminous memoir drawn up at the Foreign Office, entitled "Instructions," in which the political position of Europe was minutely detailed. He signed almost without reading it.

It was M. de Besnardière who drew up this memoir, and, being intimately acquainted with all the details of European affairs, he had added to the wishes of Louis XVIII. the desires of France on a few points. As the fortresses of Luxembourg and Mayence had passed from our possession, it was necessary to take care that they should not become the property of Prussia or Austria. They could only be left with safety in the hands of Holland or Bavaria. With regard to Italy, there was a more important question to be resolved than dispossessing Murat in favour of Ferdinand IV., or Maria Louisa for the ancient Queen of Etruria; and this question was the regal succession in the house of Savoy. The old King of Sardinia had no children, neither had his heir. It was therefore necessary that the succession should be secured to the Carignan branch, lest by marriage Piedmont should fall under the yoke of Austria. In fine, it was necessary to see that the French donees, the principal of whom were marshals, should not lose their emoluments in the general wreck. These were the secondary but very important points added by the framer of the instructions to the task of our negotiator.

This negotiator, so fashioned by circumstances that no other could possibly be chosen, was M. de Talleyrand. Associated with him was the Duke de Dalberg, who, from his vast connections in Germany and great sagacity, was very well suited for the office. Indeed,

the moderate wishes of Louis XVIII. made the task of his two representatives at Vienna very simple. If, abiding by the treaty of 30th of May, they only demanded Murat's deposition, the concession of some lands to the house of Parma, and that the King of Saxony should retain some part of his dominions, every thing was in their favour, and they were almost certain to succeed. It was evident that Murat,—whose position was a monstrous anomaly in the actual state of Europe,—unsupported except by Austria, whose protection he forfeited on the commission of a single fault, would soon free her from her engagements with him, and he would consequently sink beneath the combined influence of the two houses of Bourbon. In a congress in which Francis II. held a preponderating influence, it would indeed be more difficult to dispossess Maria Louisa in favour of the house of Parma. But it was not impossible that Italy, in its vast extent, would offer some compensation to her; and as for Saxony, it was certain that Austria would never consent that the Prussians should take possession of Dresden, or that the Russians should establish themselves at the foot of the Bohemian mountains. It was equally certain that the secondary Powers of Germany would rise at the mere suggestion of suppressing a State like Saxony; that England would not be deaf to their complaints; and that, above all, the British Parliament would become indignant at the idea of seeing Russia take possession of all Poland. And if to all this opposition France should join hers, Russia and Prussia would certainly be obliged to yield. It was therefore only needed to let things take their own course, and the moderate wishes of Louis XVIII. would be fulfilled. On the other hand, if France wished to annul the treaty of Paris by joining Russia and Prussia, the task would be more laborious and difficult, though not very dangerous, and almost certain of success: for, in truth, Austria and England would never venture on war if in addition to Russia and Prussia they had France to contend with. In adopting either course, that of tranquil resignation to the treaty of Paris, or seeking a change of frontier through the disunion of the other Powers, there was every prospect of success. Still, whichever line of policy we adopted, a difficulty would be found in Europe's repugnance to reveal her internal disunion to us, or to allow us to interfere in her affairs; for it would be unwise to acknowledge her divisions and allow us to assume the important part of arbitrator. So long as this feeling lasted, there was but one course to be pursued at Vienna: to wait patiently, without putting ourselves forward, until the other Powers, becoming disunited, should have recourse to us: in fact, to let our intervention be sought, not offered. Should we offer to interfere, we should only awaken distrust, and obtain less remuneration afterward. Patience mingled with pride was the attitude best suited to us, and that most likely to produce a good result: for two things were certain, the division of interests, and the necessity the three Powers would feel of France's aid; and, considering these two inevitable results, our expectant policy would inevitably succeed.

If ever man was eminently fitted for this task, it was M. de Talleyrand. Noble by birth, and eminent by the position he had held for thirty years, distinguished by his style of living, and by the imposing and disdainful grace of his demeanour, he had almost transformed inertia into a virtue, and even an epigram, under a prince who seemed to consider activity a vice; and if an error should ever result from over-eagerness in action, that error would certainly not be committed by M. de Talleyrand at Vienna. But, however, temperament will yield to passion; and he who appears the most phlegmatic of men becomes the most impetuous, when goaded by self-love or ambition. Of this truth M. de Talleyrand was about to give an extraordinary proof.

During the last fifteen years, M. de Talleyrand had played the principal part in all European assemblies; and those very men who were now to appear before him as the ministers of the victorious Powers of Europe had always held a rank inferior to his, and yielded to his opinion. Under the Empire, M. de Metternich had come to Paris as the modest minister of a vanquished and oppressed court; M. de Nesselrode was a simple secretary to the embassy. It must have been painful to M. de Talleyrand not to find himself at least on a level with these men, formerly so submissive and so deferential; and the result of this consciousness was an uncomfortable feeling, which could not fail to produce an injurious effect upon his deportment at Vienna. Averse to the trouble of reflecting or anticipating events, he had not paused to consider whether the divisions among the European Powers might not afford an opportunity of ameliorating the condition of France. He only thought what attitude that long-dominant country would assume at Vienna, now that she was herself conquered, and in what position he would appear as her representative. He said to himself that, to represent justice—which he defined by a happily chosen word, "legitimacy," and which was universally adopted—would be a very dignified and becoming part, and by no means inferior to that he had already acted as the representative of all-powerful genius.

He set out for Vienna, determined to assume himself a suitable position by means of the talisman of legitimacy, which, though powerful for many purposes, was not equal to all. It would be very efficacious in the dethronement of Murat, or in exciting sympathy for the King of Saxony, but could not be so universally applicable: for were legitimacy adopted as a principle, it would not be possible to treat with Bernadotte, whom the Allies were anxious to flatter: negotiations should be entered into with Gustavus IV., who was wandering through Europe as a fugitive. Nor, were legitimacy admitted as a principle, could the representative of Ferdinand VII. be received at the Congress of Vienna, for he was king only in prejudice of his father, Charles IV., who, far from renouncing his rights, was quite ready to assert them. The admission of this principle would also necessitate summons to the representatives of Genoa, Venice, Malta, to the ancient electors of Cologne.

Preves, and Mayence, and many other victims, whose spoils were about being divided. The Congress would, under such circumstances, be filled with phantoms, to the exclusion of actual and powerful existences. This word "legitimacy," therefore, however true and respectable, was not at this moment sufficiently powerful to defend the more serious interests of France; it awakened a smile on the lips of the practical men who were about to assemble at Vienna, and who used or rejected the word as suited their purpose. But this assertion of legitimacy entailed one inconvenience—it placed us in the same category with England and Austria, and bound us to their policy, and, in presence of the two great parties that were about to divide Europe, deprived us of our principal strength—freedom of choice.

With incontestable superiority as a negotiator, M. de Talleyrand arrived at Vienna in a frame of mind not the best suited to profit of the circumstances arising from our new position. That he would assume a dignified position, there could be no doubt; that he would act prudently was not quite so certain. In any case, France was certain, when represented by M. de Talleyrand, not to play the part of a conquered, and, far less, of a humiliated Power.

Be this as it may, M. de Talleyrand left Paris on the 15th of September, and arrived at Vienna on the 23d. It was two days before the arrival of the sovereigns, but their chancellors and staffs had arrived some days before, and from the time of their arrival their tongues had been very busy. Many points that had hitherto been left in doubt now began to be cleared up. The Russians and Prussians, who were informed of their masters' designs, were by no means anxious to conceal them. The Russians boastfully declared that they would have all Poland; and the Prussians, with equal lack of modesty and prudence, said that they should have Saxony. Both seemed to think that these concessions could not be refused in return for their important services.

These desires, announced with so much confidence, had from the very first day excited the greatest commotion in the Congress. The lesser princes of Germany, and other countries, were offended that a State of their own rank should be suppressed to gratify an ambitious neighbour, and for a fault that was common to them all—an alliance with imperial France. The representatives of the other States were alarmed at seeing Russia, with the connivance of Prussia, boldly advancing from the Vistula—her boundary at the commencement of the century—to the Wartha and the Oder. They spoke openly on the subject, and said that it was not worth the trouble of overturning the power of Napoleon, if it were to be replaced so quickly and so completely by another equally dangerous tyranny. This ambitious design, so boldly announced, was not less offensive than the avowed design of leaving the entire management of affairs between the four legations of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and England, to the exclusion of all others. The French legation was, consequently, expected with the greatest impatience; and although so love was felt for France, especially in a place abounding with Germans, all were ready

to place themselves under her direction, provided that, putting forth no pretensions for herself, she lent her aid to the oppressed, the excluded, and the offended. The aggrieved were, in short, willing to be defended, saved, and avenged, gratuitously, by France.

The exercise of a little of M. de Talleyrand's habitual phlegm would have allowed these desires time to ferment until they became converted into passion; but from the moment of his arrival at Vienna he yielded to the influence of the scene of which he was witness. The ministers of each court received him with all the attention due to one of the most illustrious personages of Europe—the representative of legitimacy, as he had once been of victory; and, besides, the last type of the elegant dignity of the past, so much admired at that time. His house was frequented by diplomats of every grade, by whom he was treated with profound respect; but when business came to be discussed, a different line of conduct was pursued toward him. The Four,—that is, the representatives of England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia,—whilst they treated him with the greatest deference, conversed very little on business, and showed only too plainly that his influence was not as welcome as himself, and that they intended to arrange every thing themselves, though there was less unity in their interests than in their intentions. The representatives of the lesser courts, generally restless, well informed of passing events, and accustomed to excite the ministers of the greater courts against one another, because they derived advantage from such disunion,—all these assembled round M. de Talleyrand, and, either directly or through M. de Dalberg, revealed to him the project which the Four had formed of retaining the direction of affairs in their own hands, and of giving Saxony to Prussia, who would deliver Poland to Russia. These revelations were accompanied by malicious commentaries on the good understanding subsisting between the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Russia; the incompetency of Lord Castlereagh, and the want of firmness of M. de Metternich, both of whom were ready to allow the most violent outrages on public justice—the one because he had not the ability, and the other because he had not the courage, to prevent them.

M. de Talleyrand need only to have waited a few days, and he would have seen the project of the Four disappear before the general disapprobation. But the resolution, which the greater Powers had formed, of excluding him from their councils, and which had been revealed to him by the lesser States, piqued him to the quick. He immediately declared, that as France was now under the rule of true equity, she would at Vienna, if necessary, be its disinterested and only representative; that there were improprieties she would not suffer and iniquities which she would not sanction. These resolutions, being publicly proclaimed, produced a great sensation, delighted the lesser German Powers, irritated Russia and Prussia, and very much embarrassed England and Austria, who, though they were undoubtedly dissatisfied at the eagerness shown to seize on Poland and Saxony, still were alarmed at the prospect of the storm which France, at

the head of the inferior German States, seemed about to raise.

The diplomatists, especially the Prussians, who were offended by the position we had so suddenly taken, began to say that France had already thrown off the mask; that at first she seemed resigned to her new condition, though she was not so in reality; that she still wished her frontier to extend along the Rhine—a boundary which she sought to recover by exciting disunion among the Allies, and that if a strong combination were not formed against her, she would still do great harm. These calumnies were answered by our legation, and by its most active member, M. de Dalberg, who was on the best terms with the Germans, by saying that France desired nothing for herself; she was no longer ambitious; that she was not thinking of her own aggrandizement, but of checking the excessive ambition which threatened the safety of all Europe. It was very annoying to be obliged to make such protestations thus early at Vienna, and be forced to declare ourselves satisfied, after the manner in which we had been treated in the negotiations at Paris. If, on the contrary, we had waited a little, and not revealed our plans so soon, each Power, in order to gain our support, would rather have fomented our ambition than blamed it, and offers would have been made us, instead of our being obliged to make protestations of disinterestedness, which bound us to our existing condition even more than did the Treaty of Paris.

Be this as it may, before the lapse of a week, the secret project of each Power was bruited about Vienna. It was well known that Russia wished to get the whole of Poland, that Prussia demanded Saxony, that the second-rate States of Germany were indignant, and eagerly sought the support which France as eagerly offered, and that Austria and England, embarrassed by this tumult, were still determined, although suspecting the designs of Russia and Prussia, to transact all business with these latter, to the exclusion of all the other Powers. The splendour of public fêtes only threw a veil over agitation the most intense, and anxiety the most profound.

It would be impossible to describe the Emperor of Russia's irritation and astonishment. He was so convinced of Europe's great obligations to him, that he could hardly understand his wishes being opposed. In his anger he considered every one ungrateful: the Germans, because they would not allow him to advance as far as the Oder; the Bourbons, because they refused to give him up their cousin, the King of Saxony; and even England and Austria, because by their silence they seemed to approve the clamour that was raised against him. All this had such an effect on Alexander, that he, who was usually so mild and affectionate, became all at once cold, haughty, and severe. His anger was strongest against us. He had, he said, saved France as far as he could from the hands of the conquerors, he had placed the Bourbons on the throne, and M. de Talleyrand at the head of affairs. He had bestowed innumerable favours upon the country, king, and prime minister, and had met with ingratitude from all. Louis

XVIII. had shown as little personal respect for him as consideration for his advice: he had not followed his counsels; he had not even thought of offering him the "Cordon bleu," which he had so eagerly offered to the Prince Regent of England; had even refused him to raise M. de Caulaincourt to the peerage, and had put almost offensive obstacles to the marriage of the Duke de Berry with the Grand Duchess Anne. The Emperor Alexander recounted these offences with great anger and very little discretion, and he considered them even exceeded by the attitude which M. de Talleyrand had so suddenly assumed at Vienna. The prudent Count Nesselrode, constantly occupied in extinguishing the flames that others kindled, sought to calm the Emperor's feelings toward everybody, but more especially toward France, for whose alliance he was extremely desirous. He advised M. de Talleyrand to ask an audience of the Emperor. This was almost a duty incumbent on M. de Talleyrand on his arrival at Vienna, and one by no means disagreeable to him, for he was most anxious to extend than limit his sphere of action. He did ask this audience, but Alexander made him wait several days for an answer. At last the Czar replied, and received the representative of France at the imperial palace of Schoenbrunn, where he was staying. Instead of receiving M. de Talleyrand in his usual affectionate and familiar manner, he treated him with the greatest haughtiness, which, however, did not at all embarrass the illustrious diplomatist, an accomplished master in the art of preserving his self-possession in the presence of the highest earthly potentates. The Czar questioned him rudely and rapidly about the state of France, like one who did not expect to hear a good account of what was doing there, and who almost doubted whether Europe had acted wisely in recalling the Bourbons. M. de Talleyrand replied respectfully, but firmly, to all the Emperor's questions, and the following sententious conversation took place between them:—"In what state is your country?" "Very good, Sire; as good as your Majesty could desire, and better than could be hoped." "And the public mind?" "Becomes calmer every day." "And the progress of liberal opinions?" "These opinions do not make a more regular or truer progress anywhere." "And the press?" "Is free, with the exception of a few restrictions which are necessary at first." "And the army?" "Excellent: we have thirty thousand men under arms, and can raise our numbers to three hundred thousand within a month." "And the marshals?" "Which, Sire?" "Oudinot." "He is most loyal." "Soult?" "At first he was a little out of humour, but he got Brittany, and is satisfied, and expresses the greatest loyalty." "Ney?" "He is depressed from the loss of his emoluments, but he depends on your Majesty to redress his grievances." "Your Chambers? It is said that they are not on good terms with the Government." "Who could have said such a thing to your Majesty? As in every commencement, we have met some difficulties, but after twenty-five years of revolution, it is miraculous to have attained such a state of calmness as we enjoy at pre-

sent." "Are you content with your position?" "Sire, the king's confidence and goodness exceed my hopes." As Alexander heard each of these replies, which he scarcely allowed M. de Talleyrand time to finish, an expression of ironical incredulity played over his features. But he soon discontinued these inquiries as to the state of France, inquiries that might have become offensive had not M. de Talleyrand's respectful haughtiness sustained him in the difficult part he had to play. The Emperor then said, quickly, "Let us speak of our affairs. Shall we finish them?" "It depends on your Majesty to terminate them to your own glory and the advantage of Europe." The Czar could scarcely restrain himself, and expressed as much surprise as displeasure at the resistance he met from France; he said to M. de Talleyrand, "I think the Bourbons owe me something." Without disputing his master's obligations to Alexander, M. de Talleyrand spoke of the rights of Europe, which ought to be respected, especially after the fall of a man who was accused of trampling them under foot. "These European rights," said Alexander, "that you raise up to oppose me, I know them not; between sovereigns, right means that which suits each, and I recognise no other." M. de Talleyrand turned away his face, and, raising his hands above his head, cried, "Hapless Europe! hapless Europe! what will become of you?" The Emperor was more irritated than restrained by this significant exclamation, and said, in a tone that M. de Talleyrand had never before heard him use, "If that be the case, war! war! I have two hundred thousand men in Poland, come and expel me from it. Every Power has consented to my holding it: you alone oppose, and break an agreement that was nearly universal." M. de Talleyrand had, under the Empire, sustained the attacks of a more formidable lion than Alexander. He appeared more afflicted than disturbed by the Emperor's violence, and replied that France neither desired nor dreaded war, but if unfortunately she should be forced to it, she would support the rights of all, aided by the sympathy of all, and the assistance of many allies, for he was certain that the universal agreement, the thought of which was so flattering to the Emperor, did not exist. At the termination of this painful conversation, M. de Talleyrand bowed coldly, but respectfully, and proceeded toward the door of the imperial cabinet. Alexander then advanced toward him, took his hand, and pressed it with a convulsive movement, which revealed both his excitement and irritation. It was in such situations, as the representative of one great Power before another, that M. de Talleyrand was unrivalled. And had the true interests of France lain at that time in the direction of the Elbe and the Vistula instead of the Rhine and the Alps, never could they have been more proudly asserted, or more thoroughly served.

The end of September was devoted to *fêtes* and desultory discussions. But it was time that the Congress should assemble officially, under some form or another, either fully or in part. The representatives of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and England—that is, MM. de Nes-

selrode, de Hardenberg, de Metternich, and Lord Castlereagh, the Four, as they were called—arrived first. The more complicated matters became, the more anxious were they to keep the management in their own hands. They proceeded to debate the conditions that should regulate the proceedings of the Congress, whilst they secretly agreed upon what they considered the best mode of proceeding.

The most celebrated Congresses of past times offered contradictory precedents, none of which was wholly applicable to actual circumstances. Never before had representatives from every nation assembled to decide the fate of almost the entire civilized world, not alone with regard to its territorial but its legislative interests. The plenipotentiaries who composed the Congress of Westphalia had only to decide on the affairs of Germany, whilst those assembled at Vienna were called upon to arrange not alone the affairs of Germany, but of Europe, and even of the two hemispheres. It would seem that nothing could be easier and simpler than that the ministers of the several States should assemble and deliberate in common. But how could they deliberate together on subjects that concerned some directly, and others indirectly? How, for example, could Berné decide on the affairs of Portugal, or Portugal on those of Norway, or both on the Constitution of Germany and Italy? How attach the same value to the vote of those who represented fifty millions of men, as to the vote of those who represented but a million or less? If all these difficulties were taken into consideration, how could they be calculated with sufficient precision? It was evidently impossible to define such distinctions, and the plenipotentiaries of the different Powers could not be assembled in a kind of *constituent* European assembly; for if there were some like Austria, Prussia, France, England, and Russia, who were interested in all the questions, great and small, the greater number represented interests either too exclusively local, or too trifling, to give their votes either the disinterestedness or weight that could influence the assembly. Besides, there were plenipotentiaries whom some would admit and others reject. Prussia and Russia refused to admit the minister of the King of Saxony, having already declared that this monarch ought to be deprived of his crown; the two houses of Bourbon rejected the envoy of the actual King of Naples, as the representative of an usurper; and none would admit the representative of the ancient republic of Genoa, whose existence was not recognised. A general assembly was therefore impossible, and it was more natural that those who had signed the Treaty of Paris, and who had adjourned their meeting to Vienna, should now assume the part of the mediating Powers of former Congresses, and constitute themselves mediators, or, if necessary, arbitrators, between the interested parties. Therefore the eight Powers that had signed the Treaty of Paris could open the Congress, examine credentials, form committees of the interested parties to discuss individual questions, reserving to themselves the right to decide all difficult points, and thus establish a kind of unity. Special treaties being drawn up on each point, all should be afterward combined into one

general treaty, which should be signed by all the States, without exception, to render it binding upon all Europe. It is true, that among the eight States that had signed, two—Portugal and Sweden—found themselves called upon to play the part of first-rate Powers, a part by no means due to their real influence, but which arose from the accidental circumstance of their being authorized as belligerents to sign the Treaty of the 30th of May with France. But this was a very trifling inconsistency, and was compensated by the advantage arising from the apparent legality of the mediation of the eight who had signed the Treaty and convoked the Congress.

This was the only good and practicable form of holding the Congress, provided, however, that certain Powers did not take advantage of it to arrogate all authority to themselves; and this mode was adopted by the plenipotentiaries of England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, who were secretly occupied in arranging the mode of proceeding. They therefore agreed to do all they could to make this arrangement acceptable to the numerous representatives of Europe actually assembled at Vienna. The question of formalities being decided, there still remained two important questions unsettled—the partition of the immense territories lately vacated, and the definite constitution of Germany. Italy and Switzerland gave rise, of course, to important considerations, but of restricted interest, as concerning only France, Austria, and Spain. It was agreed that this question could be decided later, when the two more important had been arranged. It was then agreed by the *Fora* that the eight States that had signed the Treaty of Paris should take the initiative in opening the congress, and that two committees should be afterward formed, the one to regulate the division of territory and the general affairs of Europe, and the other to fix the condition of Germany. The first, which was to be the great European committee, was to include the *Fora*; but it would be impossible to exclude France, the representative of the elder branch of the Bourbons, and with her Spain, the representative of the younger,—Spain, on whose support the Allies reckoned, because that she was Spain; because that she was under the sway of Ferdinand VII.; and because that they knew that the two houses of Bourbon were disunited. It was agreed at last, that whilst, for form's sake, these six Powers were to constitute the great European committee, all important questions should be secretly decided beforehand by the *Fora*; by which means, whilst apparently dividing authority, they should retain it all to themselves.

The affairs of Germany were to be intrusted to Austria and Prussia, who would play the same part in this question that the *Fora* did in European matters: that is, they would, after deciding all the points between themselves, submit them as a matter of form to the inferior German States, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Hanover. (The latter had been formed into a kingdom for the advantage of the reigning house of England.) Saxony, being more or less condemned by the *Fora*, and lightly esteemed by all, was to have no part in this

German committee; nor the two Hesses, which were not yet re-established; nor Baden, considered too unimportant to be taken into account.

Such was the result of the first Conference, at the opening of the Congress, between the ministers of the four great courts, as to the mode of dividing the authority. It was strange, and even ridiculous, to see these *Fora* arrogate to themselves universal sovereignty, in virtue of a union which their rapacity made impossible, and which was sure to be violently dissolved at the bare announcement of their reciprocal pretensions. There was, therefore, no reason for serious alarm at their intrigues. However, a general commotion was excited in a few days by the first glimpse of their projects. All those excluded from the deliberations, and who considered their exclusion only as preparatory to their ruin, complained loudly; and asked why every question should be decided by four, by six, or even by eight Powers; and why the Congress was not formally assembled. The French legation, highly offended at being excluded from these preliminary and secret arrangements, propagated the idea of a general assembling of the Congress,—an idea very acceptable to all the excluded, that is, to almost every one. This idea was warmly supported by the Spanish representative, M. de Labrador, a very sensible man, who, notwithstanding the bad feeling existing between the courts of Paris and Madrid,—which he did not consider right to assume at Vienna,—was most anxious that, as the two houses of Bourbon had the same interests to support, they should adopt the same attitude, conduct, and language. He followed M. de Talleyrand in every thing, adopted his ideas, and repeated his words. Thus, under the influence of the French legation, but more especially under the influence of self-interest, but one question was heard in the saloons of Vienna—"When will the Congress assemble! when will it be summoned?"

The *Fora* were alarmed at the idea of assembling the entire Congress in the present state of the public mind. However, they must show some symptom of life, and communicate with the many diplomatists assembled for some weeks past at Vienna, and who waited vainly for some communication. The *Fora*, therefore, conformably to their private arrangement, resolved that the eight who had signed the Treaty of Paris should, at least apparently, take the initiative in the operations of the Congress, and publish a declaration announcing that, conformably to the 32d article of this treaty, which convoked the assembly of the representatives of Europe at Vienna, they had now assembled there, and were occupied in a preliminary examination of the important questions that were to be decided, but had not yet come to perfect understanding: that, consequently, they would adjourn for a month, and employ that time in endeavouring to assimilate the general interests, and reconcile contending opinions; that, afterward, the Congress should be assembled after whatever fashion was judged most suitable, in order to give an authentic and official form to the resolutions previously decided on.

Pursuant to this arrangement, M. de Met-

ternich determined to assemble at his house, not the eight who had signed the Treaty of Paris, but the six principal plenipotentiaries—that is to say, the representatives of Austria, England, Russia, Prussia, France, and Spain, who, according to the plan previously arranged in secret, were to form the European committee, and to these he resolved to submit the proposed declarations. This *réunion*—for, the invitations having been sent in confidential notes, the character of the assembly was strictly private—seemed to imply no other desire than that the invited guests should come to a private understanding about a manifestation that had become indispensable. The invitations were issued on the 29th for the 30th of September, in order that the declaration may be dated the 1st of October, and the meeting be adjourned to the 1st of November.

M. de Talleyrand, having previously come to an understanding with M. de Labrador, repaired to this meeting, which instead of eight only comprised six of those who had signed the Treaty of Paris. He was the last that arrived, and entered with his wonted air of haughtiness and indifference; on his habitually inexpressive countenance a slight shade of irony was discernible. Around M. de Metternich's table were assembled M. de Nesselrode, the representative of Russia; Lord Castlereagh, of England; M. de Metternich, of Austria; MM. Hardenberg and Humboldt, of Prussia; M. de Labrador, of Spain, and De Gentz, the celebrated pamphleteer, who was to draw up the resolutions. M. de Talleyrand took his place between Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich, as though he were at home, and then, with a careless air, demanded what was the object of the meeting, and in what character the persons present were summoned. M. de Metternich undertook to reply to the French plenipotentiary, and said that he wished to assemble the members of the cabinet in order that they might come to an understanding concerning a declaration that was not only necessary, but indispensable. "The heads of the cabinet?" said M. de Talleyrand, as he looked at those present: "M. de Labrador is not one, nor is M. de Humboldt." M. de Metternich, a little embarrassed, replied that as Spain had no other representative than M. de Labrador at Vienna, they had been obliged to summon him, and that M. de Humboldt was there to assist M. de Hardenberg, who was very deaf. "If infirmities confer a right," said M. de Talleyrand, "I, too, might have brought some one to aid me." He then asked why their number was but six and not eight; if it were those who had signed the Treaty of Paris that were to meet, why he did not see assembled around this table all those interested in the questions that were to be decided at the Congress; and, in a word, why were six to decide upon the interests of all? He was told that the point about to be considered was merely a preliminary declaration, which especially concerned those who had signed the Treaty of Paris, because they were the originators of the Congress, and that to judge of the merits of the declaration it should be read. The declaration was then read.

In this document the word "allies" was re-

peated several times, and employed so that it evidently referred to the belligerent Powers that had concluded the treaty of Chaumont against France. When this word was pronounced, M. de Talleyrand interrupted the reader, and said, "I know of no allies here, for allies imply war, and the war ended on the 30th of May, 1814." He listened to the remainder like one who did not comprehend what he heard, and yet could not be accused of want of intelligence. He disconcerted all present by his expressions of surprise, by his numerous questions, and at last succeeded in throwing them into indescribable confusion. "I do not know," he repeated, "in what character we are here, or by what right we represent all the European Powers. I do not know who these are that call themselves 'allies,' who take upon them to adjourn the Congress for a month, instead of assembling it immediately, in order at least to examine credentials, and afterward decide on matters of form and the time for commencing deliberations." M. de Metternich replied that a word was of no consequence, and that "allies" had merely been used from custom. "It is a custom that must be changed," interrupted M. de Talleyrand. M. de Metternich resumed, and said that a deliberative assembly could not be convoked without first deciding who were to be summoned, by what title members were to be admitted, and the amount of influence that was to be allowed to each; that the power of deciding on the interests of Russia, which possessed fifty millions inhabitants, could not be confided to a prince who had but as many thousand subjects; and, besides, that this declaration was merely to announce the opening of the Congress, and to ask a month's delay, in order to make amicable arrangements between the interested parties, by means of friendly and confidential communications.

These reasons, which were extremely good, if they did cover the intention of restricting all power to four, did not seem to make the least impression on M. de Talleyrand, whom no argument could move. "But we cannot," said M. de Hardenberg, "allow the affairs of Europe to be decided by the princes of Lippe and Liechtenstein." "Nor can we," replied M. de Talleyrand, "allow them to be decided by the representatives of Russia and Prussia." Somebody happening to mention Murat as a proof of the difficulty of deciding who should be admitted to the Congress, "We do not know that man," replied M. de Talleyrand, with a peculiar expression of contempt, and the air of one who was not much inconvenienced by the remembrance of his past career. In fact, he threw all present into the greatest embarrassment, and the conference broke up without coming to any decision.

It was undeniably a success to prevent the chariot of the four great allied Powers from rolling unimpeded over the soil of Vienna. But this success ought not to be carried too far, for whatever policy France might adopt, whether she joined Russia and Prussia in the hope of ameliorating her own condition, or sided with Austria and England to save Saxony, there were two Powers of the four whom it was important to separate from the others, and whom it would not be prudent to

irritate, or even embarrass too much. There would have been sufficient publicity given to this scene by the eagerness of those who feared being excluded from the Congress, and who were delighted at seeing the project of the exclusives defeated. They told everywhere of the attempt that had been made to defer the assembling of the Congress, and to restrict the entire direction of affairs to four Powers, and the resistance which had defeated these designs. The Four, Prussia especially, were most active in repeating what they had already said, that it was useless for France to try to conceal her secret wishes; that she only affected to be satisfied with the treaty of Paris; that she regretted the Rhine frontier, and sought to regain it by causing general disunion; a most unmerited calumny, which necessitated fresh declarations of disinterestedness, which were a new engagement neither to desire nor demand any thing beyond the terms of the treaty of Paris.

This state of excitement was increased by a note drawn up by M. de Talleyrand, of which the reasoning was most logical, and such as could not easily be answered. In this note he proved that six Powers were no better qualified than eight to decide for all, that of course as these Powers had, by the treaty of Paris, appointed Vienna as the place where the Congress was to be held, it was only natural that they should take the initiative in the first declaration, but that this declaration should be conformable to the claims and rights of all the States; that to fulfil this condition the plenipotentiaries of all the States ought to be summoned, were it only that their credentials might be examined, and the Congress constituted according to the proper formalities. The different members might afterward be divided into committees to examine questions individually interesting to the different Powers, or the Congress might be adjourned were confidential communications needed to bring about a better understanding; that this first meeting would not present the difficulties that were apprehended, for the lesser States did not pretend to decide on the affairs of the greater, and were only anxious to protect their own interests; that even did these alleged inconveniences exist, they would present as great obstacles at the close as at the commencement of the Congress; that, consequently, all the plenipotentiaries ought to be assembled, were it but once, in order that their credentials might be examined, if even the Congress should be adjourned next day; that the prerogative of the eight who had signed the treaty of Paris, consisted exclusively in the right, 1st, to convoke this first meeting; and, 2d, to determine by what title members should be admitted.

The entire aim of this logically irrefutable declaration was contained in the last proposition. M. de Talleyrand's object was, that the right of admission should be determined in such a manner that the King of Saxony's representative should be admitted, and Murat's rejected. England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia made a terrible outcry upon reading the French note. In the first place, they desired that every thing should be done in a friendly quiet manner, for fear of warning or exciting

the interested parties. Secondly, the very idea of assembling the Congress terrified Prussia, who expected a storm, should only two Germans be present, at the proposal to suppress Saxony. But this was doing more than speaking on the subject, it was solving the question by admitting to the Congress the representative of King Frederick Augustus, as it would be solving the Neapolitan question to reject Murat's representative.

Though nobody felt an interest in the last-named sovereign, his interests were carefully considered by M. de Metternich, on account, it was maliciously said, of this statesman's great friendship for the Queen of Naples; but that was a mistake; his real motives were very different. M. de Metternich had used his personal influence at the court of Naples to induce Murat to join the Coalition, and he considered himself morally bound to protect him, unless Murat compromised himself by some crime against the general interest of Europe. It was not difficult to foresee that Murat would commit some error, and M. de Metternich waited the event, to avoid doing what might seem an act of treachery. Besides, having assembled two hundred and fifty thousand men in Bohemia, Galicia, and Moravia, in order to support his policy against the pretensions of Russia and Prussia, and having but fifty thousand in Italy, where the public mind was in a state of ferment, and where Murat had eighty thousand men, principally commanded by French officers, M. de Metternich did not wish, as he very sensibly said, *to set fire to both ends of the house*. However anxious the members of the French Legation might be to gratify the wishes of Louis XVIII. with regard to Naples, they might have adopted the policy of the Austrian minister; for it was not because his views were so different from ours that he sought to gain time, but because he knew better than we how to attain his object.

Though M. de Gentz was very violent when he wielded his pen, he was very moderate in action. In his efforts to bring about a conciliatory state of feeling, he hurried from one embassy to another—to the French especially, for he was convinced, as was everybody else, that it was necessary to soothe the discontented parties, if an outbreak was to be avoided. Another meeting was agreed to, and the six plenipotentiaries assembled at M. de Metternich's. The first thing asked of M. de Talleyrand was to withdraw his note, as it would be difficult to avoid answering it, and still more difficult to answer it without touching on very delicate questions. Whilst M. de Talleyrand was alleging reasons for not complying with this demand, M. de Labrador said that the suppression of the note was no longer possible, as he had sent a copy of it to his court. In a momentary burst of ill-humor, M. de Metternich, turning to M. de Neudorode, said, "I think we should have done better by arranging our affairs among ourselves."—"As you please," said M. de Talleyrand; and when M. de Metternich pressed for a farther explanation, he added, "I shall not again attend any of your meetings, but, as a member of the Congress, I shall await the convocation of that assembly." This was announcing

that France, heading the dissenting party, would demand the general assembling of the Congress, by refusing to recognise all that should be decided without its precincts. This was a serious threat. Therefore, all present, anxious to avoid coming to extremities, endeavoured to restrain themselves and conduct the deliberations with more moderation. M. de Metternich remarked to M. de Talleyrand, as was very true, that nothing was yet prepared; that not a single question had as yet been touched on; and that it would be very embarrassing to meet the Congress in such a state. M. de Talleyrand replied that he was quite willing to yield as to the time for assembling the Congress, and concede the three or four weeks that were thought necessary for preparation, but on condition that this general assembly should be decided on, and that the terms of admission should be pretty nearly the following:—"That the representative of every prince should be admitted whose territories had been involved in the late war—territories of which he had been anteriorly and universally recognised as sovereign, and which he had not abandoned either by cession or abdication."

This was coming back to the old difficulty, for this principle excluded Murat, who had not been universally recognised as sovereign, and admitted the King of Saxony, who had not yielded his territories either by cession or abdication. This was deciding by a question of form a fundamental principle, with regard to the two most difficult questions that were to be brought before the Congress. The plenipotentiaries could not agree, and the meeting consequently broke up. As the members were retiring, Lord Castlereagh endeavoured to bring M. de Talleyrand to reason, by insinuating that his obstinacy was unwittingly injuring those interests that he had most at heart. Unfortunately, not wishing to avow that England and Austria were ready to abandon Russia and Prussia, and unskilled in that art which expresses much in half a word, he did not succeed in making himself understood. On the other hand, M. de Talleyrand had committed himself too far to draw back easily.

However, all parties felt the necessity of coming to an understanding, for the Four saw how impossible it was to realize their project of transacting all the business themselves, even though, for form's sake, they should increase their number to six or eight, whilst so many interests were arrayed against them; and M. de Talleyrand, although more excited than usual, felt that by constantly piquing Lord Castlereagh, and more particularly M. de Metternich, whom he did not like, he would end by uniting the Four more closely, who, driven to extremities, would, perhaps, end by sacrificing all those interests which the French Legation was commissioned to defend. All were, therefore, disposed to make concessions, and, after three or four days' negotiations, they finally came to terms, making use of the skilful pen of M. de Gentz, and deducting something from the declaration of each party. A document was drawn up, couched in very general and evasive terms, which conceded one important point to M. de Talleyrand—the assembling the Congress within a month; and yielded one equally important to

MM. de Metternich and de Hardenberg—that the principle of admission should be passed over in silence. This document declared that the representatives of the eight Powers that had signed the Treaty of Paris, having promised to meet again at Vienna, had kept this promise and were come there; that they had already conferred with the representatives of the different courts interested in their proceedings, but that to come to an amicable understanding longer confidential communications were needed; that they, therefore, deferred the opening of Congress for a month, when they would be in a position to accomplish their task in a manner more suitable to the interests of Europe, the expectation of contemporaries, and the esteem of posterity.

This declaration being drawn up, it was agreed that the plenipotentiaries should again assemble on the 8th of October, at M. de Metternich's house, their number increased from six to eight by the addition of the representatives of Sweden and Portugal to those of Russia, France, Prussia, Austria, England, and Spain. M. de Metternich invited M. de Talleyrand to come an hour before the others, in order to decide about the final form of the declaration. M. de Talleyrand kept the appointment, and M. de Metternich told him that he had desired this *tête-à-tête*, in order to concert with him concerning the declaration that was about being proposed, and which he was certain would satisfy him. M. de Metternich looked for the document, but, not finding it, M. de Talleyrand said, with the ironic smile that sometimes enlivened his hueless countenance, "Probably the declaration is being discussed by the allies." "Let us make no further mention of allies," replied M. de Metternich. He then exhorted his interlocutor to act with confidence, and putting all bickerings aside, seek by their common efforts to secure the common interests. M. de Talleyrand replied by asking how it happened that M. de Metternich left to him the task of defending Dresden from Prussian and Cracow from Russian cupidity. M. de Metternich might have replied that it was quite as strange to see M. de Talleyrand so anxious to espouse the interests of Austria, and not leave her to take care of herself. But his purpose was to come to terms, and not to offend. M. de Metternich endeavoured to persuade M. de Talleyrand that were he allowed to act, he would defend those interests that seemed most in danger. M. de Talleyrand sought, by being more explicit himself, to induce M. de Metternich to explain himself further; he declared that France desired nothing for herself, that she was quite ready to sign the declaration, but that there were some things to which, considering the common interest, she could never consent. For example, she would never consent that Prussia should have Luxembourg and Mayence, that she should get Dresden, or that Russia should extend her frontier beyond the Vistula. He added, that the King of Saxony should be satisfied to make some sacrifices, but that France would never consent to his being deprived of all his dominions. Here M. de Metternich interrupted him, and, taking his hand, said, "We are nearer to coming to an understanding than you think.

Prussia shall have neither Luxembourg nor Mayence; we shall do our best to preserve the greater part of his dominions for the King of Saxony, and to keep Russia as far as possible from the Oder; but have patience, and do not raise useless obstacles." He then spoke of that which M. de Talleyrand had not mentioned, although it was his essential interest. "I know," he said, "your principal aim," (he alluded to Naples:) "every thing is in your favour, but do not be in a hurry; you would only involve consequences that neither you nor I, nor indeed any of us, could control."

M. de Talleyrand affected a perfect indifference about Neapolitan affairs: it was a question of principle, and not of family interest; and he felt assured that Europe, for her own honour, would no longer support a state of things in Italy that was at once a scandal and a danger.

This short explanation had a very mollifying effect on M. de Talleyrand, who from that time showed a greater inclination to negotiate. The other plenipotentiaries having arrived, MM. de Talleyrand and de Metternich joined them. M. de Nesselrode represented Russia, M. de Talleyrand France, M. de Metternich Austria, MM. de Hardenberg and Humboldt Prussia, Lord Castlereagh England, M. de Labrador Spain, M. de Palmella Portugal, and M. de Loewenhielm Sweden. M. de Gentz acted as amanuensis. The two declarations were read, that first proposed by M. de Talleyrand, and that drawn up by M. de Metternich, in which he adopted part of the French note. The latter was generally preferred, because, whilst it announced the general assembling of the Congress at the expiration of a month, it did not decide as to the right of admission. M. de Talleyrand felt that he must yield, since he had gained the most important point—the promise of assembling the Congress; but wishing to gain another advantage before giving up, he declared that he was ready to adopt the proposed project, if to the phrase, which declared that by the delay of a month the proceedings of the Congress would be more conformable to the *expectation of contemporaries*, these words should be added, and to *European international law*, a phrase which he believed to possess a most useful significance without particularizing any thing.

These words raised a storm. The Prussians saw in them an allusion to Saxony and its preservation, and were filled with fear and anger. It is true that international law was invoked as a shield for Saxony. Evident as the allusion was to some, others were quite unconscious of it, and, indeed, in any case the question could not be decided by allusions. M. de Hardenberg rose, and in that excitement usual to persons who do not comprehend clearly either their own meaning or that of others, he exclaimed, "What need is there to speak of international law? Nothing, of course, will be done contrary to it. There can be no doubt of that." "If there is no doubt of it," replied M. de Talleyrand, "it will be still better to declare it." "But what influence has international law here?" persisted M. de Humboldt. "It is owing to international law that you are here," replied M. de Talleyrand;

"you and the other plenipotentiaries." This tumult lasted some minutes, and three ten grave diplomatists made as much noise as the most numerous assembly. Lord Castlereagh, anxious to put an end to this scene, took M. de Talleyrand aside, and said to him, "Will you be more compliant, if this point is added to you?" "I will," replied M. de Talleyrand: "but you must do me one service. You have influence with M. de Metternich: promise me to use it against Murat." "I promise you," replied Lord Castlereagh. "Give me your word." "I give it." After this short dialogue, the British minister returned to his colleagues, and said that it would be difficult to refuse the insertion of so inoffensive and respectable a phrase as international law. M. de Gentz and M. de Metternich said the same to the others, and the phrase was accepted. The following form of declaration was then adopted, dated October 8:—

DECLARATION.

The plenipotentiaries of the different courts that signed the Treaty of Paris on the 30th of May, 1814, have taken into consideration the 32d article of that Treaty, which says that the Powers engaged on both sides in the late war should send plenipotentiaries to Vienna, in order to regulate, in a general Congress, the arrangements for carrying out the designs of the said Treaty; and, after mature deliberation on their position and duties, they feel that they cannot better fulfil their obligation than by establishing in the first instance free and confidential communications between the plenipotentiaries of the several Powers. They are also convinced that it will be to the advantage of all parties concerned, to defer the general meeting until the questions to be decided on shall be so matured as that the result shall correspond with the principles of national law, with the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris, and the just expectation of contemporaries. The formal opening of the Congress is, therefore, deferred until the 1st of November; and the aforesaid plenipotentiaries flatter themselves that the labours to which the intermediate time will be devoted, by determining views and conciliating opinion, will essentially advance the great work which is the object of their common mission.

VIENNA, 8th October, 1814.

Nobody at Vienna misunderstood the import of the words *principles of international law*, which were looked upon by all as a first step gained in the cause of Saxony. It was a source of great joy to the Germans, who all, perhaps with the single exception of French, were most anxious for the conservation of this State. And even among the Prussians there were many who considered that Saxony would be dearly bought should the acquisition be paid by abandoning Poland to Russia. Great gratitude was felt to the French legation, for having checked the ambition of certain Powers, and having established the principle that each State had a right to be heard at the Congress. France ought to have rested satisfied with a success which had only been obtained at the expense of very great inconveniences, espe-

cially the being obliged to repeat to absolute weariness that we were satisfied, that we had nothing further to desire, and we besides ran the risk of embarrassing and offending England and Austria, of whom we were in absolute need in the limited policy we were forced to adopt.

Undoubtedly, had we boldly joined Russia and Prussia—a measure that policy suggested, and which, as far as we were concerned, was not forbidden by justice either toward Saxony or Europe—we should not have been forced to take so many precautions; for both Russia and Prussia were so eager and unreserved, that we needed not to be more cautious than they; and, besides, prudence might have been thrown aside, were the swords of France, Prussia, and Russia united. But, by taking the other side, and merely seeking to save Saxony, or at the utmost to dispossess Murat and Maria Louisa, we were obliged to accommodate ourselves to all the susceptibilities and weaknesses of the over-fastidious party we had joined, and even to avoid causing embarrassments by showing too great a disposition to be of use. Both Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich feared to compromise themselves by uniting their interests to ours. M. de Metternich especially, dreading that we should advance too rapidly, and having, as we have said, left but 50,000 men in Italy that he may be able to keep 250,000 in Moravia, Bohemia, and Galicia, he would not allow the question concerning Murat to come on until the fate of Saxony had been decided. And even the Germans, spite of their gratitude, had to be treated with great precaution; for, owing to their old mistrust of France, they soon took the alarm if they saw us very much interested or very busy. The fear of co-operating with us was such, that both Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich reproached M. de Labrador severely for having modelled his policy on ours, and told him that such conduct on the part of Spain was the blackest ingratitude to Europe. Now that M. de Talleyrand had so skillfully succeeded in outwitting those who wished to make such offensive exclamations, he ought to have proceeded cautiously, for fear of anticipating persons who dreaded almost as much being saved by us as being swallowed up by Russia and Prussia. It is often in politics as in commerce, where an offer lowers the price of an article which a demand will cause to rise, if the owner has patience to wait. Had we delayed giving our assistance in the affair of Saxony, in which we were but slightly interested, we should have been more certain of carrying our point in the concerns of Naples and Parma, which were of essential importance to us, at least according to the views of the French cabinet. The most dignified and most profitable policy for us would have been to follow, instead of anticipating, the interests of the German policy.

These German interests had not, however, slumbered. The German States of the second rank opposed with great animation what they called the avidity of Prussia, the tyranny of Russia, the incapacity of England, and the weakness of Austria. These States were headed by Bavaria, the most excited of them

all. This latter State had many reasons for opposing the sacrifice of Saxony, whose existence was necessary to preserve the equilibrium of Germany, and whose only crime was having suffered the alliance of France, which Bavaria, instead of suffering, had actually sought. It is quite certain that were Saxony suppressed, Bavaria and the other States would be too weak to resist the influence of Austria and Prussia, that were always ready to unite when an opportunity arose of bringing the Germanic body under their domination. Bavaria had not only good reasons for defending Saxony, but she also possessed the means of doing so. She was well represented at Vienna. Besides that the king had come there in person, she had as minister at Congress the Prince de Wrede, who, spite of more than one military fault, was one of the most esteemed generals of the coalition, and possessed considerable influence.

The Prince de Wrede did not hesitate to say—and he was not contradicted by his king—that Saxony should be saved even at the expense of a war; nor ought any objection be made to accepting aid from France, in order to keep Prussia within the limits of Brandenburg, and Russia on the other side of the Vistula. He offered 50,000 Bavarians to support his views, and visited M. de Talleyrand and the Duke Dalberg constantly, urging them to bestir themselves more than they did. But whilst the King of Bavaria sent the most affectionate and pressing messages concerning their common interest to M. de Talleyrand, he did not dare to meet him personally, lest it might give offence on account of his old intimacy with the French.

This policy was also supported by another German State—Hanover—which had become independent again in 1813. The King of England, with universal consent, had assumed the title of king, instead of Elector of Hanover, because he did not wish to bear in Germany a title inferior to that of the sovereign of Wurtemberg, who had been created king by Napoleon. Hanover was represented at the Congress by M. de Munster, who formally declared himself on the side of Saxony. But, though the two countries had been united for more than a century, the Hanoverian minister did not find that his views always coincided with those of the representative of England, who was guided exclusively by the interest of his own country, and that of his Cabinet with the Parliament. Still, Hanover could be of great service to Germany by inducing the Prince Regent of England to use his influence with the British ministers, and induce them to adopt views more favourable to Saxony; and this influence, as we shall presently see, was of great utility. Hesse, Baden, and almost all the lesser German States, were ready to join Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Hanover, and only waited for a signal from the more important ones to make a decisive manifestation in favour of Saxony. In order to occupy the German princes during the suspension of the Congress and the adjournment of public business, a committee was formed of Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Hanover, for the purpose of drawing up the plan of a German constitution. Bavaria presided in this com-

mittee, a privilege accorded to her as a compensation for her exclusion from the great European committee. This German committee, in which the lesser princes had a preponderating influence, manifested on every occasion a strong determination to defend the existence and independence of German States against the cupidity of their too powerful and too ambitious confederates.

To all this Germanic fervour was added Austrian zeal, which, dissimulated for reasons we have already mentioned in the Cabinet of Vienna, was openly declared by the nation, the court, and the army. The Austrian staff, especially, felt and expressed the greatest indignation at the twofold project of Russia and Prussia, each of which was equally alarming to the country. The military men of Austria asserted that the cause of Europe had at least been as much advanced by them as by the other allied armies; for they said that but for them the Russian and Prussian armies, after the defeats of Lutzen and Bautzen, would have been driven back upon the Vistula; and they now demanded whether all the blood they had shed was to be repaid by placing them in a worse position than they had been in under the rule of Napoleon; and whether it was really intended to surround the Bohemian mountains with Russians and Prussians—the one on the left, the other on the right, and thus abandon to the common enemy those defiles, whose importance had been proved both by Napoleon and Frederick the Great. Little inclined as they were to recommence the war, they declared that as they were prepared for it, it was better to have it now than later, and thus prevent a disastrous and twofold usurpation. Austria had 250,000 men ready for action, in Bohemia, Moravia, and Galicia; the other German States could add 100,000; and though England, on account of the American difficulties, could furnish no assistance, still they were sure of 150,000 from France, making altogether 500,000 men, and with this force, they said, there could be no doubt of success.

By leaving all these feelings to ferment, and by not interfering too much ourselves, we should have been certainly soon called on to play an important and decisive part, according to the policy adopted by France. The two men to whom were committed the task of unravelling the tangled skein of European politics,—Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich,—the one simple-minded, sensible, and firm, though sometimes deficient in tact; the other profound and deeply versed in German politics—though anxious to untie the Gordian knot, did not wish to employ the sword of Alexander, for this sword would be that of France; such a line of conduct would be to conduct the French armies again into Germany,—a proceeding that seemed to them to present a singular contradiction and be fraught with serious peril. But, though agreed as to their ultimate object, they were not agreed as to the means to be employed in attaining it. M. de Metternich would not yield either to Russia or Prussia, but wished to avoid a rupture by employing the greatest patience in his opposition. Lord Castlereagh, on the other hand, was willing to gratify Prussia, win her over to his

views, and make use of her against Russia, which would be to save Poland at the expense of Saxony. These opinions of Lord Castlereagh arose from a mode of viewing British interests, peculiar to the ministers of that time, and which must be explained to be understood.

The Continental blockade had caused so much terror to the English, that they were in constant fear of seeing it renewed by the Bourbons, if not by Napoleon; an apprehension as irrational as the suggestions of terror generally are. It was this apprehension that induced them to give Holland and Belgium to the house of Orange; and lest the new kingdom should not be sufficiently strong, the English secured it as allies—Hanover, which they intended to strengthen, and even Prussia, whom they had in some measure forced to accept the Rhenish provinces, in order to render her of necessity our enemy. And still fearing that Prussia was not thoroughly won, they were anxious to give her Saxony, and hoped to justify the abandonment of this country to their parliament by pleading the usual system of Britannic alliances. But as they saw that there was no possibility of inducing the parliament to agree to abandoning Poland, they resolved to oppose Russia, and on that account wished to alienate Prussia from her by the cession of Saxony. They hoped by these means to isolate Russia so completely that she would be obliged to abandon her prey.

This intricate policy was very displeasing to M. de Metternich, who was equally anxious to save Poland and Saxony. But as it is not easy to change the English when they once see their interests in a certain light, M. de Metternich, seeing that nothing but experience would convince Lord Castlereagh, let him go on, convinced within himself that defending one of the threatened States would be sufficient to save both. In fact, Alexander and Frederick William had promised each other Saxony and Poland, and the King of Prussia would be a traitor both to honour and friendship, if he occupied Saxony when Poland was not given to Russia. Add to this, that Frederick William being allowed to retain Posen, if all Poland were not given to Russia, he would lose the only specious argument he could adduce for demanding Saxony. Therefore, refusing to abandon Poland was refusing to abandon Saxony, and the safety of the one was the safety of the other. Perfectly conscious of all this, M. de Metternich offered no opposition to Lord Castlereagh, but let him act as he thought fit, knowing that he could not oppose a more formidable rival to Alexander. Independent of his own obstinacy of temper, Lord Castlereagh had the advantage of representing the Power that had least interest in the dissolution of Continental States, and the one besides that paid all the others. The superiority which the giver has over the receiver was always evident in the intercourse of England with her allies. Lord Castlereagh, in pursuance of his policy, demanded an interview of Alexander, and immediately obtained it.

The Czar had, at that time, overcome his first feeling of surprise and anger. He was impressionable, though wily as an Asiatic, and at the same time amiable and good, and so in-

sed by his desire to please, that he could possibly long sustain the part of an irritable man. Yielding as much to his natural nation as to circumstances, he was most libeal in his manner to every one at Vienna, but more especially to military men. He visited the scenes of all the battles that had been fought during the campaign of Waterloo; and though conversing with the conquerors, he paid them many a compliment. He was to be seen almost constantly on foot, sometimes on the arm of a diplomatist, sometimes on the arm of an officer. He appeared as a private individual in all the saloons of Vienna; made himself acquainted with persons of every grade, and by every means sought to avoid obtruding his rank upon the great princes who thronged to the Congress. In a word, he sought in every way to please, and succeeded; for nobody possessed more power of doing so in an equal degree. No one noticed his intimacy with Prince Metternich, whose mother and sister he had profited at Paris, and who was come to solicit his principality that had been promised him by the treaty of the 11th of April. Alexander visited him everywhere, praising his fidelity to Napoleon,—which, indeed, he did not find great an obstacle as the difficulty of obviating a small portion from the universal curse. Alexander exerted all his powers to make himself agreeable, and these exertions were needed to counterbalance the bad effects of his policy.

He replied to Lord Castlereagh's demand of audience by immediately repairing to the residence of the British minister. The latter was surprised by this, and testified all the gratitude and respect that such a proceeding was calculated to inspire; but, at the same time, he remarked to an Englishman,—that is to say, fixed his determination; and though he wished to conciliate all parties, he did not conciliate

endeavoured, in the first instance, to please the Czar that England had always endeavored to please him. In 1812, she had asked him to conclude the peace of Bucharest with the Turks, and to obtain Bessarabia; that had induced Persia to yield him a better price in the direction of the Caspian Sea; in short, notwithstanding her repugnance to abandon Norway to Sweden, she had consented to the measure, in order to secure the peace of Finland to Russia. Having thus secured his claim to the gratitude of Russia, he went on by one, the treaties of Kalisch, Reichenbach, and Toplitz, which had been concluded in the February, June, and September of 1813, and showed how they formally preceded the partition of the duchy of Warsaw among the three Continental Powers, which ceremony did not imply that one should have it. He then passed on to general considerations; showed what anxiety Russia caused all parties; spoke strongly of the fears she had excited among the Allies; and did not hesitate to say that the Congress of Vienna, which it had been hoped to date the reign of justice and moderation among civilized nations, would soon, if care were not taken, present a scene of ambition sufficient in itself to make Napoleon regretted. Lord Castlereagh

said all this in that simple and positive manner which neither exaggerates nor softens anything, and which, by representing things as they really are, makes their importance more evident.

Unfortunately, not one of the four Powers, who were disputing the remnants of the European continent, could read the others a lesson of morality without running the risk of retaliation; and Alexander might have seriously embarrassed the British minister by tracing the chart of English ambition from the occupation of Malta to that of the Cape and the Mauritius. He restrained himself, although very much excited. However, he did not wish to lie under the weight of England's pretended services; and, with much tact and railery, showed Lord Castlereagh that, if the peace between Persia and Russia, and between Russia and Turkey, had been facilitated by England, it was that the Russians may be free to turn their arms against France; and that if Norway was ceded to Bernadotte, it was to win him from his engagements to Napoleon; and that, consequently, in considering the motives of her benefactor, Russia might feel herself justified in lessening the amount of her gratitude. Then, passing to the treaties of Kalisch, Reichenbach, and Toplitz, he showed how they were drawn up under conditions that no longer existed; that at the time these treaties were formed, the utmost that had been hoped was to offer some opposition to Napoleon's then almost unlimited power, but that no expectation was entertained of driving him back to the Rhine, much less of hurling him from his throne; that by the unexpected success of the common efforts, Austria had gained the Inn, the Tyrol, and Italy; England, Holland and Belgium; and that it was not just that Russia and Prussia, that had encountered greater dangers than England, should have no part in this unexpected increase of good fortune; and besides, that as to what concerned Saxony he was pledged to his friend the King of Prussia, and for Poland to the Poles themselves. Alexander declared that, in his opinion, the partition of Poland was a crime, whose moral effects were still felt in Europe,—a crime, for which it was both honest and politic to make atonement. Russia alone, he said, possessed the means of making this reparation, for she possessed the greater portion of the Polish provinces, which was not the case with France, that had vainly sought to reconstitute Poland, nor of Prussia nor Austria, neither of which Powers had ever conceived such a project. Russia, by stripping herself of the provinces she possessed, could, by a slight sacrifice on the part of Prussia,—a sacrifice for which the compensation was already provided,—establish a separate kingdom, endow it with liberal institutions, whose operations she could moderate, and accomplish a work which would be the glory both of Europe and of the Congress of Vienna. This was the noble aim he had proposed to himself; he was on the eve of attaining it, and he did not intend to turn aside from his purpose. Besides, on entering Poland, he had made promises to the Poles in order to detach them from Napoleon, and these promises he was determined to keep. He was not one of those sovereigns ready to make pro-

mises in time of need, and retract them when the emergency had passed. He had made a promise, and would keep it: and he considered that he had rendered sufficiently important services to Europe to expect some concession on her part.

The Emperor Alexander possessed both subtlety of understanding and romantic exaltation of feeling, a combination which prevented his pursuing at once the paths of ambition and sincerity. It is true that his nobler feelings were flattered by the glory of re-establishing the kingdom of Poland, and he almost persuaded himself that he was making a sacrifice in giving up Lithuania and Volhynia for its formation, as though the new kingdom were not to belong to him but to another. The indignation he expressed at the resistance offered to his project was not altogether insincere.

His indignation had very little effect on Lord Castlereagh, who returned to the charge armed with all the reasons good and bad that his position afforded. He could make no valid reply with respect to the three treaties of 1813, for they had been concluded when but a small success was expected, and Russia had as good a right as the others to a share of the unhopd-for spoils. Lord Castlereagh could only meet Alexander on this point by adducing motives of moderation and justice; most excellent reasons, indeed, but which could have but little weight coming from him, unless Austria should resign Italy, and England give up her claim to Belgium. But many reasons could be adduced in favour of the reconstitution of Poland, and on these he expatiated with all imaginable emphasis.

The partition of Poland, he told the Czar, was a crime, and it was not England, who had always opposed it, that would now assert the contrary. She was therefore prepared to consent to the restoration of Poland if it were done completely, honestly, and with suitable conditions. If, for example, Austria, Russia, and Prussia gave up the Polish provinces they held, and that an independent kingdom was formed, with a Polish king, and if not a Pole, at least somebody not under the control of either of the three sovereigns who now shared the country between them, and if, in addition, the new kingdom should be endowed with liberal monarchical institutions, England was ready to approve, and even to assist in the work, at any expense to herself. But would the three co-divisionists consent to such sacrifices? Would a suitable king be found? And, finally, would the reunited Poles live together in amity, and comport themselves like a rational people, worthy of the liberty conferred on them? This was not only doubtful, but almost impossible, and the much-talked-of reconstitution of Poland was a nullity—a mere dream. And if instead of this truly moral and European reparation, a false and incomplete kingdom was to be formed, called Poland for the sake of increasing its extent as much as possible, whilst in reality it belonged to Russia, this would be a mere illusion, to which Europe would never submit.

Lord Castlereagh then spoke to Alexander of the alarm his project had excited; he told him that but for his well-known principles of

honour, these alarms would have already dissolved the Congress, and he implored him, for the sake of his own fame, as well as for the general tranquillity, to give up a project that could never be permitted to succeed. It was with great difficulty that Alexander restrained himself during this conversation, for with all his power of pleasing he could not produce the least impression on the solid English minister, who, on his side, with his personal awkwardness, was as incapable of influencing the plastic and mobile disposition of the Czar. They parted, with no other result arising from their interview than mutual dissatisfaction.

Lord Castlereagh, fearing that he had not said all that he had to say, and desirous to impress the memory of his august interlocutor, at the same time that he was anxious to take every precaution for his own justification before Parliament, drew up a long note on the following day and sent it to the Czar, together with a confidential letter, making a formal declaration of his opposition to the pretensions of Russia. He was not satisfied with this, and, notwithstanding the system of secrecy that had been resolved on with regard to France, he sought to obtain her approbation for his firmness, and informed M. de Talleyrand both of the conversation and note. The latter was delighted to see Lord Castlereagh, although he was very little pleased by England's indifference in the cause of Saxony. The singular tactics of England inspired him with the idea of adopting a similar policy, though in an opposite sense. Desiring to restore as far as possible the balance in favour of Saxony, which had been disturbed by Lord Castlereagh's desertion, he profited of the frequent visits of Prince Czartoryski to the French legation, to inform Alexander, through him, that France would never yield Saxony, but was quite willing to give up Poland. This was a skilful manoeuvre; for while one party refused what the other was willing to concede, the unity of opinion which would be needed to satisfy both Russia and Prussia was impossible.

All this time, the lesser German princes continued their opposition. In the committee, where they were assembled to decide on a constitution for Germany, they opposed all Prussia and Austria's efforts to secure the domination in the Confederation. It would be impossible to revive the ancient title of Emperor of Germany, which the House of Austria had so long borne, and which Francis II. had abdicated in 1806, when Napoleon instituted the Confederation of the Rhine. Austria would certainly have accepted the title, were it made hereditary in the House of Hapsburg; but she would never consent to make it elective, for that would subject her to a disagreeable dependence on the electors, and perhaps expose her to the possibility of one day seeing a Prussian prince styled Emperor of Germany. The last consideration would be sufficient to make her reject such an offer. As the title of emperor, to which the direction of the Confederation naturally belonged, was to be given up, it was necessary that there should be directing States, as in Switzerland, and in this Prussia was quite willing to agree, provided that the authority alternated between herself

Austria. Austria did not approve this arrangement, and Bavaria, Hanover, and Wurtemberg declared that they would not agree to it unless the directing authority was limited to the two great German Powers. It was thus the condition of German affairs was commenced which continues still,—a simple presidency of the Diet given in perpetuity to Austria, as an emblem of the old imperial authority resident in her house, lessened, however, by the suppression of the title, but ended by the condition of perpetuity. But this arrangement still left undecided the serious question of the military command.

no less important question than that of direction of the Germanic body was the situation of the confederate States, and the nature of their relations with the European powers. Up to the present time, the confederate States, although united by a federal bond, enjoyed an independent sovereignty,—that is, they possessed the power of sending ambassadors to foreign courts, and of raising armies and employing them as they pleased. This twofold privilege had often led to the formation of alliances contrary to the interests of the two predominating German Powers, if not to the Confederation itself; and if this had sometimes induced foreign intervention, it also secured the safety of their common independence. Prussia would have the confederate States deprived of these advantages. But she alone, in her opinion, and met with the strongest opposition in the committee. On the last every occasion, the three kingdoms of Austria, Wurtemberg, and Hanover declared that they would give no opinion on the points in dispute until Saxony's fate should be decided. They even threatened to draw up a declaration, signed by all the German States, in which the projects attributed to certain powers with regard to Saxony. The committee broke up, resolved not to meet again unless a great question should be decided.

At the adjournment had been signed on the 1st of October, the 1st of November was not very distant. It was to be feared that the appointed day would arrive before the different powers should come to an understanding. Austria, the most important and the most powerful of the lesser German States, had declared her intention of taking up arms in defence of Saxony. Her army had been recruited, and now amounted to 75,000 men; she urged M. de Metternich, whom she denounced for his weakness, and offered to furnish 25,000 men for every 100,000 furnished by Austria. From M. de Metternich, ambassadors hastened to M. de Talleyrand, who certainly needed no urging, and begged him not to confine himself to mere words, but to make threats, and effective threats, by declaring, for example, that the King of France was determined to use force if necessary. They told him that if M. de Talleyrand acted according to this advice, neither England nor Austria would have an excuse or motive for subtlety, and would formally declare themselves in favour of the independence of Germany and Poland. M. de Talleyrand replied that France was ready, but that it did not become her to take alone what should be done by all the powers more interested in the question, and

who should at least explain their intentions, and express some desire on the subject; that then France would answer their first cry for assistance, but that hitherto scarce a word was addressed to the French legation, that was excluded from all negotiations, and that, in fact, France could not force her assistance on persons who did not seem to desire it.

Bavaria was not slow to repeat these remarks to M. de Metternich, who did not refuse to act, but would not come forward immediately, alleging as an excuse for his dilatoriness, the strange policy of England, who wished to save Poland by sacrificing Saxony, together with the intentions of France, whose ambition, in his opinion, ought always to be distrusted. This was strange reasoning, when France was the only one among the Powers assembled at Vienna that did not show any symptoms of ambition! M. de Metternich added, that it would be assuming a most serious responsibility to introduce a French army into Germany, especially as Frenchmen had been so recently despotic and detested there; and he added that a French army did not exist, at least for the Bourbons, who were incapable of assembling or conducting one; that France spoke a great deal, but neither could nor would act; that she only wished to cause disunion and dissension, and recover her position by promoting a misunderstanding between the Allies who had conquered her. These replies were made to the Prince de Wrede, who immediately communicated them to us; and these remarks had not only been made by the minister, but by the emperor and several of the archdukes, with the evident intention that they should be transmitted to us, and provoke us to come to an explanation. This tone, which was unwillingly assumed by the Austrians in their own defence, took the form of raillery and boasting when uttered by the Prussians, who wished to impress every one with the idea of the impotency of France; nor was it less offensive in the Russians, who were no less anxious to propagate a belief in the weakness of the Bourbons.

Such language could not be heard with indifference, and it was become necessary to put an end to it by some decided and convincing manifestation. M. de Talleyrand declared that France was both able and willing to act, which she would prove when occasion required, but that, in any case, she would soon show both her determination and her resources. He wrote immediately to the king, and desired the Duke Dalberg to write to the cabinet, and proposed to both the double resolution of taking arms, and publicly announcing why. Knowing that neither Louis XVIII. nor the council had any wish for war, though the Duke de Berry was well inclined thereto, he told them that there was no probability of war, (which was true,) but that the terror of war was such, that whichever Power would make a demonstration would be sure to rule the others; that at Vienna, things would not go beyond a simple declaration, but that it was necessary to be in a position to make these demonstrations, and to make them after a serious fashion; that the consideration in which France would be held depended on this, as also her influence and the accomplishment of

her wishes; that, for example, what she desired in Italy depended on what would happen in Germany, and that she would possess no power on one side if she did not strengthen herself on the other.

To speak of Italy—that is, of Naples and Parma—was attacking the king on his weak side, and the surest way to gain his attention. The council was sensible and sincere, although by a strange chance, as we shall presently see, these qualifications did not render it profitable to the Bourbons.

When these despatches, written about the middle of October, reached Louis XVIII., they did not fail to excite him greatly. As we have said, he was very anxious for peace, of which France was in great need, because it was his family's principal title to popularity, and because it was the condition best suited to his age, his infirmities, and his turn of mind. He was grateful to his representative at Vienna for so loudly asserting the principle of legitimacy, and for having defeated the project of excluding France from the common deliberations; he saw, with delight, that there was a possibility of Murat's downfall, and felt a certain pleasure at the prospect of saving his cousin of Saxony; but he thought the French Legation had been too busy, and feared it would lead him further than he wished to go. He deliberated on what was proposed him, first in his family circle, and afterward in full council. There could be no doubt as to the resolution to be taken,—a resolution in favour of which were combined so many reasons, great and small, good and mediocre. In the first place, France's position at Vienna was in question, and it would not be wise, either for her sake or that of the Bourbons, to allow the opinion to gain ground that she had become powerless since the restoration of the old dynasty. Such an opinion would be as injurious to the country as to the reigning family. Secondly, on our influence at Vienna the favourable solution of the Italian question depended,—a solution to which Louis XVIII. attached so much importance, and which ought to be as dear to his ministers as to him; for the security of France depended on that of the Bourbons. Thirdly, the safety of the Saxon monarchy had a certain importance for France, once she had renounced the pursuit of territorial possessions at Vienna. The King of Saxony was considered, whether justly or unjustly, as the victim of his attachment to us, and saving him would, doubtless, do us honour in the eyes of all those who piqued themselves on their patriotism. Success would, therefore, secure popularity, without taking into account the rights of legitimacy. Finally, it was absolutely necessary to increase the army, which had been allowed to fall below the contemplated proportions, in consequence of the financial restraints imposed on the War Minister, and the accessory expenses unwisely added to the budget. The different regiments were no more than skeletons, incapable of effective service. How this happened will be better understood if we consider that the army of two hundred thousand men, which had been expected to be supported with a budget of two hundred million francs, had been first reduced to one hundred and fifty thousand, and after-

ward, from want of resources, to one hundred and thirty thousand men. Limiting France to such an effective force in the existing state of European armies, was consenting to her annihilation. These reductions had also caused great discontent among military men, and it would be advantageous both to the domestic and foreign policy to put the army on a better footing. For all these reasons, the proposals of the French Legation were taken into serious consideration, and presented, with strong recommendations, to the king's council.

The difficulties of this question had never been other than financial. When the council was assembled, the king appealed to the patriotism of the Minister of Finance. The latter, though most rigorous in the expenditure of money, and perhaps in consequence of it, had always declared that, in case of necessity, he could place a hundred millions of francs at the king's disposal. He had, indeed, secured a vast resource by the restoration of public credit, and by the firmness of his financial policy. His *reconnaissances de liquidation* had had immense success on the exchange, bearing an interest of seven or eight per cent. Besides, thanks to his perseverance, the indirect taxes began to come in, and he was, consequently, not embarrassed by having to meet an unexpected demand of fifty millions.

M. Louis, however, was astonished at being so quickly taken at his word, and called on to prove the extent of his resources. But he was no less skilled in diplomacy than finance; and the War Minister having declared that fifty millions would suffice, he said that he was prepared, and would give them as needed. There was an immediate recompense for the good sense shown by the Government in following the advice of the upright and vigorous mind that directed the financial department.

The funds for military expenses being secured, it only remained to consider how they should be employed. General Dupont, who was still War Minister, wished that this money should be spent on the two hundred thousand old soldiers who had returned from abroad and been dismissed on leave of absence, pursuant to the system of forming a reserve, by allowing the soldiers to remain at their own homes and exercising them from time to time. The introduction of this system would be facilitated by the existence of thirty thousand officers on half-pay, who thus obtained a means of employing their energies, whilst they received additional pay. This system had not yet been well tried, nor was its nature understood even in Prussia, where it was an administrative *ruse*, employed to exceed the limits assigned by Napoleon for the Prussian army. Still, the Bourbon Government dreaded to employ so many men—officers and soldiers—of suspected opinions, and whose operations would be slow, when immediate and certain results were required. Influenced by all these reasons, and by the wise advice of the Duke de Berry, it was thought better to recall twenty thousand soldiers, a measure that would increase the army from one hundred and thirty to two hundred thousand men, and put the regiments on a better footing. To raise the number, it was not necessary to employ conscription, which was nominally suppressed.

but merely to call out some of the men considered on leave of absence, which had either been given them, or had been taken by themselves in deserting.

In addition to the official despatches in which M. de Talleyrand was informed of the resolutions of the Government, the Ministers of War and Finance were to send him private letters, that he might show in confidence, and in which they informed him of the flourishing state of the finances and army. The War Minister was commissioned to tell him that he was about raising two hundred thousand men, and, if necessary, could raise three hundred thousand, all old soldiers, and well inclined to fight, which was true, provided it was against a foreign enemy. The king wrote to M. de Talleyrand to express his personal feelings. He said that, notwithstanding his desire for peace, he would not have France sink below her natural position, or appear unable to support the cause of legitimacy, but he recommended him expressly not to enter into any coalition in which he would have but Austria and the lesser German States as allies. He was desirous that England should be included in the alliance, for he wished to continue on good terms with that country, as with such an ally the result of a war would be more certain, should so disagreeable a necessity arise. He again directed his attention to the two essential objects of his mission,—the expulsion of Murat from the throne of Naples, and the translation of the prisoner of the Isle of Elba to one of the Azores.

Whilst these replies were coming from Paris to M. de Talleyrand, the excitement continued at Vienna, as did also the debate between the Emperor Alexander and Lord Castlereagh, the latter persisting in his efforts to save Poland at the expense of Saxony. It was well known that the Prince Regent of England, as future king of Hanover, did not approve of this sacrifice, and was even very much opposed to it; and great exertions were made to induce him to demand a modification of Lord Castlereagh's instructions. Meanwhile, Lord Castlereagh pursued his plan, in the hope of detaching Prussia from Russia, and by this isolation inducing the latter to yield. Although it was so difficult to detach Frederick William from Alexander, the Prussian ministers were not as inflexible as their king, and some of them were disturbed by the idea of Russia's advancing into the centre of Europe, and by the bad effect produced in Germany by the annexation of Saxony to Prussia. In a word, they did not admire the Russian alliance as much as their master did. Lord Castlereagh perceived the difference of opinion that existed between Frederick William and his ministers, and flattered himself that he could induce an alliance between Prussia and Austria, and make use of these two Powers to force Russia to remain at the other side of the Vistula, without having recourse to France, that would be thus still excluded from participation in all the great European affairs. He hoped that, with England, Austria, Prussia, and all the German States, he could form a central Power in Europe which would restrain Russia, be independent of France, and become the supreme arbitrator in European questions.

M. de Metternich, compelled by the cries of Germany and the Austrian army, declared his intentions sooner than he wished; but abandoned by England on the Saxony question, he had been compelled, in a certain degree, to yield to Lord Castlereagh's policy, and send a despatch to Prussia, in which he announced the intentions of the Emperor Francis and his Cabinet. In this despatch, dated the 22d of October, some days before the official opening of the Congress, M. de Metternich, addressing Prussia with the greatest cordiality, recalled how, in the commencement of 1813, even before Frederick William had broken with Napoleon, Austria had advanced the principle of the complete reconstitution of Prussia, and made it an essential condition of her policy; and that consequently she could not be considered as affected by the old jealousy which had formerly divided the Cabinets of Berlin and Vienna. He then requested Prussia to consider whether it would not be for her own interest to give up the idea of adding Saxony to her dominions, since it should be purchased at the expense of allowing Russia to establish herself on the Oder—a project that was blamed by every German, and so hateful that Austria, by merely consenting to the measure, would perhaps become as unpopular as Prussia, who would effect the deed. M. de Metternich asked whether it would not be better, by punishing King Frederick Augustus by depriving him of some of his territories and allowing the nucleus of the kingdom of Saxony to exist, to get rid of the unwise promises that had been made to Russia concerning Poland, and thus gratify the wishes of all Germany, and at the same time act in conformity with the spirit of political reparation, which had been so boastfully promised to Europe, but which had not as yet been put in practice. Having thus expressed his opinion in the form of an advice, M. de Metternich added, that if, contrary to his inclinations, he should be induced to sacrifice Saxony, it would be only on conditions from which Austria would not recede. First, Prussia should promise to break her engagement with Russia concerning Poland, and join Austria and England when this question was to be decided on. Secondly, That notwithstanding the desire to preserve the most perfect cordiality between the courts of Berlin and Vienna, it would be necessary to maintain a certain equilibrium between them, by establishing a just proportion between the mass of States in the North and in the South, which constituted their dependencies. Austria desired that the Main on the right of the Rhine, and the Moselle on the left, should constitute the territorial boundaries of the northern and southern States, in order that Mayence should not belong to the North—that is, to Prussia.

M. de Metternich could not have extricated himself more skilfully from the embarrassing position in which Lord Castlereagh's strange policy had placed him than by this note; though the conditions proposed to Prussia relative to the boundaries of the northern and southern States might be accepted, Frederick William could scarcely agree to that which required his abandoning Russia on the Polish question; and so whilst M. de Metternich pur-

sued the path traced out for him by England, as was not the less likely to gain his own ends and save both Poland and Saxony.

The Emperor Alexander was greatly irritated by the position Austria had taken; for he saw that everybody was turning against him, and endeavouring to separate him from Prussia. With the intention of striking his opponents with awe, he determined on a decisive step that would prove that his and Prussia's determination was irrevocable. Saxony was still occupied by Russian troops, and he advised the King of Prussia to replace them by Prussians, and immediately commence the administrative and political organization of the country. On his side, he sent the Russian troops which had evacuated Saxony into Poland, so as to concentrate all his forces on the Vistula, and present an iron barrier to all who should seek to deprive him of his prey. At the same time he sent into Warsaw his brother, the Grand Duke Constantine, who, report said, was to be made King of Poland, in order to commence the organization of the new kingdom. He could not more boldly defy the opinions and dignity of the Powers assembled at Vienna: for, without waiting for their decision, he had taken possession of States of which they alone could confer the sovereignty.

There was a universal outcry against such daring and arrogant conduct. All the Germans blamed the weakness of M. de Metternich; but he replied that, instead of an annoyance, it ought to be a subject of rejoicing to see the Russians return to the north, and free Germany from their presence. This excuse was not well received in the diplomatic circle, and it was said that France was right in demanding the assembling of the Congress; for had it been assembled, such audacious conduct would not have been attempted. Even Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich almost admitted the same. Many persons who were discouraged by this state of affairs asserted that there was but one way of acting with the two usurpers, which was to abandon them to the public opinion of Europe, and convoke a new Congress, which, authorized by a special mandate, would become the organ of the universal feeling. More determined spirits declared that there was no occasion to retract, that the only course that remained was to fulfil the declaration of the 8th of October, and assemble the Congress on the 1st of November, when it would be seen whether these two august monarchs would retain their hardness before the assembled Congress. The latter was the prevailing opinion. The 1st of November was at hand, and the efficacy of this plan would soon be tested.

The Emperor of Russia, who, though very simple in his own person, always kept up great state, which added not a little to the expense that Austria incurred for her guests, determined to go to Ofen, in Hungary, to assist at the funeral solemnities of his sister, the deceased wife of the Archduke Palatine of Hungary. He wished to appear in Hungarian costume, and for this purpose summoned many Greeks, both lay and clerical, from the adjoining provinces; for at this time his attention was as much directed to the East as to the

West. The Emperor of Austria and several princes promised to accompany him, and as the journey would take up four or five days, they would be thus brought to the end of October. Before he left, he had two conversations with M. de Talleyrand and M. de Metternich, which caused a great deal of excitement, and contributed not a little to bring definitely the opening of the Congress for the 1st of November.

We have already seen how M. de Talleyrand, in order to counterbalance Lord Castlereagh's policy of saving Poland at the expense of Saxony, had insinuated to Alexander, through Prince Czartoryski, that France attached more importance to Saxony than to Poland, and was willing to sacrifice the latter to him, provided the former could be saved. In fact, this was not yielding any thing to Russia, for the destinies of Saxony and Poland were indissolubly united. However, it was a new point of view that had struck M. de Nesselrode, and which became the subject of a conference between Alexander and M. de Talleyrand. It was only for mere form's sake that M. de Talleyrand consented to demand an interview; for, in truth, it was made at M. de Nesselrode's evident insinuation. This was the second interview that the French plenipotentiary had with the Czar during the month and a half they were at Vienna; he had, of course, met him in public, but had not had a private audience since the interview we spoke of before.

The Emperor Alexander was more complaisant on this occasion to the representative of France. He regretted that he did not see M. de Talleyrand oftener, to which the latter replied with gratitude and dignity, and then, without loss of time, entered on the important subject that occupied all minds. The Czar wished to discover what the French really thought, and why they were so indifferent to the fate of Poland. "At Paris," he said to M. de Talleyrand, "you expressed yourself favourable to the restoration of Poland." "Certainly, Sir," replied M. de Talleyrand, in a firm and respectful tone; "both I and every Frenchman would rejoice at the restoration of Poland, but it should be really Poland. But the restoration now contemplated interests us very little. It is now only a frontier question between you and Germany, and it is for Prussia and Austria to consider whether it suits them that you should advance as far as the Oder. In this state of things, we the constant defenders of public justice in Europe, can only espouse the cause of Saxony." Alexander, who had restrained himself at first, replied in bitter terms, quite unworthy of him, that justice and treaties were mere words that every one used as suited him; that he was not deceived by them, and the question was not one concerning principles or justice, but of different interests, which each State interpreted in its own fashion. Alexander added, that he had promised Saxony to Frederick William, and would not break that promise, for he esteemed his word more than treaties, which were mere falsehoods; that the King of Saxony was a traitor to the cause of Europe, and would end his days a prisoner in Russia; nor would he be the first Saxon prince who had thus expiated his previous

to Poland. M. de Talleyrand expressed as much horror at the announcement of such principles as respect would allow. "The epithet of traitor," he said, "should never be applied to a king, (for in any case he could only be a vanquished enemy,) nor should such an expression ever be uttered by lips so august as your Majesty's. Justice is something very definite and very sacred, and is what preserves us from a state of barbarism, and I hope that your Majesty will reflect more before you thus offend the unanimous opinion of Europe." Then Alexander replied abruptly, that both England and Austria gave up Saxony to him, and that his friend the King of Prussia should be King of Prussia and Saxony, and himself Emperor of Russia and King of Poland. M. de Talleyrand bowed respectfully, and said that he doubted it, for nothing could be more uncertain than the consent of Austria and England. Then Alexander, interrupting the conversation, said, "You have come here to advocate interests that you hold very dear, (he meant Murat,) and my complaisance toward France shall depend on her complaisance to Russia." "France," replied M. de Talleyrand, "does not need complaisance: she only asserts principles at Vienna." This was equivalent to saying that he would not seek the assistance of the Czar.

Alexander met with so much opposition on every side, that his resentment toward us abated. He spoke with less asperity to the French plenipotentiary, but he expressed himself in a more decided tone than on the former occasion, and affected in his manner the curtneß and harshness of an unchangeable will. This inflexible will was met by M. de Talleyrand in his usual skilful manner, by mingling with his respectful tone a slightly ironical doubt, which seemed to imply that Alexander did not speak seriously.

The interview with M. de Metternich was also very violent, though in another fashion. The Prussians had informed Alexander of M. de Metternich's despatch containing the intentions of Austria, and which plainly showed the efforts of the Anglo-Austrian diplomacy to isolate Russia by gratifying Prussia. The Czar, though he had determined to be calm, could not control his excitement. As his conversation with M. de Metternich could only refer to Poland, Saxony being conceded for the time, he expressed himself at great length, repeated his former remarks upon the shamefulness of the original partition of Poland, and the utility and morality of restoring this kingdom, as if the reconstitution of Poland, subject to the most dangerous of her co-partitionists, could be considered a reparation made to Europe. When Alexander repeated that Russia, by the extent of her Polish possessions, was called upon to make this reparation, M. de Metternich very simply remarked that Austria also possessed a great many Polish provinces, and would undertake as well as any one to make a reparation that would cost so little. At these words, Alexander could contain himself no longer, and did not hesitate to apply the terms false and unbecoming to the minister's remarks. He forgot himself so far as to tell M. de Metternich that he was the only man in Austria who would dare to assume so rebellious

a tone in addressing Russia. Excepting the absence of genius, M. de Metternich might have thought himself in the presence of Napoleon, when at Dresden he threatened him during several hours with the exercise of all his power, after having sought to overwhelm him by the force of his intellect. M. de Metternich was not to be moved, but, deeply offended by the language of the Czar, he said that, if such were the terms which in future were to exist between the cabinets, he would request his emperor to appoint another representative for Austria at the Congress. He parted from Alexander in a state of excitement such as he had never before exhibited.

When this strange scene became known it caused loud murmurs. "Why," it was said, "did we cast off the yoke of Napoleon, if we are to submit to another as harsh as his, and far more humiliating? for Alexander does not possess that prodigious ascendancy which had been Europe's excuse for her ten years' subjection." On the same day, the Emperor Francis set out to join Alexander at Ofen. He felt himself in a very strange position with regard to him. The Czar, as well as the other sovereigns who had come to Vienna, had been the Austrian emperor's guest for more than a month. He was, consequently, bound to him by all the duties of a host, and had often been obliged to meet him with a smiling countenance, that was far from expressing his real feelings. However, the Emperor Francis, with great tact, gave the Czar a well-deserved lesson, with all the appearance of the greatest simplicity. "After long experience," said he to him, "I think it better to leave the management of business to my ministers. I consider it a good plan, for our ministers can act with more freedom, perseverance, calmness, and possess more knowledge of business than we ourselves. Mine act under my orders, according to their own fashion, of course, but always according to my intentions, and at all times you may consider their will as mine." He could not have chosen a better mode of confirming what had been done by M. de Metternich, or reproach the Czar in a more delicate manner for the impropriety of his conduct. In general terms, but with the greatest tact, he then spoke to him of the state of affairs. He was bound, he said, to his people. He had sacrificed every thing to them, even his very daughter, and whenever he found them disturbed, he was obliged to attend to their anxieties, and endeavour to remove the cause. Alexander remarked that the known and tried sincerity of his character ought to be sufficient security for the Austrian people. "Yes," replied the Emperor Francis, "the sincerity of a prince is an excellent guarantee, but a good frontier is still better."

Whilst these monarchs continued their travels in Hungary, mingling worldly festivities with funeral solemnities, and whilst Alexander lavished not altogether disinterested caresses on the Hungarians and Greeks who thronged to meet him, the diplomatists at Vienna were occupied in fulfilling the engagements they had made for the 1st of November. Each day public opinion declared itself more decidedly in favour of the assembling of the Congress, though great disunion prevailed on the most

important questions. But the sovereigns of Russia and Prussia had exhibited so much audacity in their actions, as well as in their words, that it was absolutely necessary to make them feel the authority of Europe, which could not be done in a better, more natural, or more regular manner than by assembling this same Europe in the persons of her representatives. It certainly would not be possible, as we already remarked, to summon them to a kind of European constituent assembly, for they did not possess an equal right to inquire into and decide on each other's affairs, but there were some questions on which the advice of all should be taken, whilst there were other special questions on which it was necessary to hear, and, if possible, to conciliate those interested in them. In short, since an assembly had been appointed at Vienna to regulate the affairs of Europe, it was necessary, in whatever manner the conference was to be carried on, that the representatives of Europe should be assembled, their credentials examined, and the mode of proceeding arranged, and this was, in fact, to assemble the Congress, and proclaim the existence at Vienna of a legitimate, incontestable, and European authority, whose moral influence might, under certain circumstances, avert dangerous disturbances.

On the 30th of October, M. de Metternich assembled at his house the eight representatives who had signed the Treaty of Paris, in order to consult as to the execution of the engagement contained in the declaration of the 8th of October. He said that the important questions which divided certain cabinets had not yet been solved, though their solution had been an object of incessant consideration, but that they would yet be arranged, that the important question of the Germanic constitution was already far advanced, and that it was hoped that a Germanic equilibrium would be established, which would contribute not a little to fix the balance of power in Europe, but that, meanwhile, there was no reason why the representatives assembled at Vienna should not be convoked, their credentials examined, and committees formed, to whom might be submitted the questions on which they were to decide.

This opinion was universally adopted. But as M. de Metternich took, perhaps, a little too much pains to impress on those present that it was not intended to form a single assembly, where all, on the mere authority of being present, as in the British Parliament, should deliberate in common on the universal interests, and that the committees were only intermediate powers, meant to conciliate the interested parties, M. de Talleyrand, who felt no affection for the Austrian minister, and thought him too desirous of restraining the sovereignty of the Congress, replied with asperity, and some harsh words passed between them, which was to the advantage of Russia and Prussia, and by no means to ours, for, having adopted a policy opposed to that of these two countries, it was our interest to conciliate Austria. Fortunately, these personal misunderstandings went no further. It was agreed to call successively the plenipotentiaries of the several Powers, demand their credentials, and submit these to a committee of three Powers, chosen

by lot. Chance favoured England, Russia, and Prussia. Should any doubt arise about the credentials of a plenipotentiary, the matter was to be referred to the eight Powers that had signed the Treaty of Paris, and who, having convoked the Congress at Vienna, would naturally consider themselves the directing authority, and accept the responsibility of such a position.

M. de Talleyrand did not again refer to his principle of admission, which was no longer of importance, as the preservation of Saxony and the expulsion of Murat had become subjects of serious negotiation, and could no longer be resolved incidentally by the decision on a mere question of form. It was then agreed that those plenipotentiaries whose credentials would not be admitted should, however, attend the conferences, and be summoned on committees, to give information, or express the wishes of their sovereigns, but should not be permitted to vote.

As the question of precedence among the different courts might give rise to embarrassing difficulties, it was agreed that every question of this nature should be deferred to the end of the Congress, and that during the sittings there should be no distinction, except that Prince Metternich, as representative of the monarch in whose capital the Congress was held, should exercise the functions and prerogatives of president.

The succeeding day's meetings were held to decide the manner of proceeding on each subject. In all that concerned convocations, the distribution of labour, the arrangement of committees, and their mode of deliberation, it was evident that the eight who had signed the Treaty of Paris, as they had taken the initiative in assembling the Congress, would be the directing authority; but on fundamental questions, where the decisions might become the subject of public or private treaties, the unrestrained agreement of the interested parties should be the only deciding power. As the eight who had signed the Treaty of Paris were universally accepted as an authority in all that referred to matters of form, it only remained to appoint committees for fundamental questions, and which were to be composed not only of those immediately interested, but of mediators, who might reconcile the adverse parties.

The questions relative to the future constitution of Germany were still confined to the committee that represented Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Hanover, with the proviso that the representatives of the eight sovereigns of Germany should be admitted when their presence became necessary.

The great territorial questions of Europe were of two kinds—those that referred to the North, and those that related to the South. Those of the North, concerning Holland, Germany, Saxony, and Poland, were the most important and the most complicated. The consideration of these questions could only be confided to the principal of European Powers, some having a direct territorial interest in them; the others, being interested in the preservation of the balance of power, were, consequently, in a position to exercise a mediatory authority. These questions were, there-

did before the five greatest European—Russia, Prussia, Austria, England, France. These were to decide on the affairs of Saxony and Poland, besides referring to the Low Countries, Hanover, Bavaria, &c. &c. Theirs was, evidently, the most difficult task; and, they agree among themselves, nobody had the right or power to dispute their decision.

The affairs of the South referred almost exclusively to Italy. The two Powers most interested in Italian affairs were Austria and France. The latter demanded the patrimony of Parma from Maria Louisa, and from Murat. France also felt an interest in Italy, principally on account of Napoleon were the other great European Powers altogether indifferent. It was, therefore, better to join France, England, Russia to Austria and Spain: the three being free from all territorial pretensions less inclined to dispute, and better to act as mediators.

Europe felt the greatest interest in the land. A committee that represented France, Russia, and England was called to hear the cantons and endeavour to reconcile them. Another committee that represented Prussia, France, Austria, and England was appointed to consider the free navigation of rivers; and, finally, one exclusively composed of maritime States, to decide on the slave-trade.

The division of labour once effected, the discussions concerning Saxony and Poland, had been commenced with so much interest, were still continued; and negotiations proceeded about the affairs of Italy and the land, which had been already talked of so fully, but not formally debated.

The affairs of Italy presented difficulties of no small kind. There was Genoa to be reunited to France, as had been promised to the King of Sardinia; there was the house of Parma, ceded by Spain, to be reconciled with Maria Louisa, who was supported by her mother and the Emperor Alexander; there were the Legations, that had been occupied by the French and which were to be restored to the Pope; and, lastly, there were the two houses of Bourbon to be satisfied concerning Naples—especially, who almost considered her fate depended on the downfall of Napoleon's son-in-law.

The last subject was very important; M. de Talleyrand felt an extraordinary interest in it, and had received a special mission on that point from Louis XVIII., and was every day stimulated by that monarch's pressing desires.

Every State wished the fall of Murat, Austria no less than the others, for she felt early that he would never remain quiet, and in his constant excitement seek the aid of the liberal party in Italy, and thus create a perpetual source of disquietude. It was, as M. de Metternich was personally to the court of Naples, he wished to be freed from his promises by the errors of Murat, and besides, as he had thought of assembling two hundred and fifty thousand men in Bohemia and Galicia, he did not wish to be obliged to keep one hundred

and fifty thousand more in Italy. He, therefore, constantly repeated to the representative of Louis XVIII., who was become the most impatient among the diplomatists, "Wait a little: many months will not pass before your wishes are accomplished. You support the cause of Saxony even more warmly than we: let us decide that question, and do not oblige us to solve too many at once." This advice was certainly very wise, for in the existing state of Italy, and the discontent that reigned there, from the Julian Alps to Calabria, (Tuscany excepted,) and having to do with so rash a man as Murat, who had been lately reconciled with Napoleon, and had 80,000 soldiers at his disposal, 50,000 Austrian troops were not sufficient in Italy, and yet that was all she could send at the moment. M. de Talleyrand took no heed of these reasons, and declared that a few thousand Frenchmen would suffice to terminate the affair. M. de Metternich replied that French soldiers would be faithful to their standards beyond the Rhine against Russia and Prussia, but that their fidelity could not be relied on when fighting against Murat, and perhaps against Napoleon. M. de Talleyrand only replied by complaining of M. de Metternich's weakness, and by filling Vienna with unpleasant remarks upon that minister himself and the motives of his leniency to the court of Naples, remarks which were very offensive to the Austrian premier, and very injurious to the interests of the French legation, and even to the success of her fondest wishes.

M. de Talleyrand's zeal was greatly excited on another point, because of the importance attached to it by Louis XVIII., and this was, the translation of Napoleon to the Azores. M. de Metternich, bound by no engagement here, agreed as fully with M. de Talleyrand's opinions and wishes on this question as he did on that of Naples. He had always considered it highly imprudent to send Napoleon to the Isle of Elba, where he was within four hours' journey of Italy, and but forty-eight hours distant from France. But, if uncontrolled by any engagements, he was shackled by the essential difficulties of the affair itself. The Emperor Francis had not allowed his policy to be restricted by any ties of relationship, but he was not altogether insensible to family affections: and, although he did not love his son-in-law, he would not consent to become his executioner by sending him to a climate acknowledged to be fatal to human life. He might not, perhaps, have resisted a prudential measure resolved on by his allies, but he would not take the initiative. England also considered that Napoleon could not be safely left so near the coasts of Europe, and Lord Castlereagh had unhesitatingly said so; but he considered the treaty of the 11th of April an obstacle, because of the British Parliament, an assembly that could not be easily brought to approve a breach of faith. He, therefore, wished to wait some act of Napoleon, or of those who were supposed to be his accomplices, which would justify the precautions that might be taken against him. He frequently demanded from France the payment of the two millions stipulated by the treaty of the 11th of April, in order that the European Powers may not be the first

to infringe this treaty. His colleagues at Vienna addressed the same entreaties to M. de Talleyrand, who transmitted them to Louis XVIII., but without effect. Prussia had no objection to any personal violence that may be offered to Napoleon. The true obstacle was elsewhere: it lay in the generosity, honour, and, if the truth must be told, in the calculations, of Alexander. This prince was the real author of the treaty of the 11th of April, with which he was too often reproached to be able to forget it. Regardless of reproaches, he considered it a point of honour to insist on the execution of this treaty, and daily urged its observance, sometimes by demanding a princely allowance for Prince Eugene, sometimes by supporting Maria Louisa in Parma, and sometimes by bitterly blaming the French exchequer for not paying the subsidy of two millions. Besides, he was not so well pleased with Austria as to be desirous of freeing her from the redoubtable neighbour he had given her when he placed Napoleon in the Isle of Elba. His language, even on this subject, had been most imprudent since his late irritation against M. de Metternich. "If it is necessary," he said, "we must only unchain this monster, who terrifies Austria and the others so much." This expression was soon repeated, and with bad effects, through all Vienna. But it would be calumniating one of the noblest characters of modern times to suppose this Alexander's sole motive in opposing any violence offered to the prisoner of Elba. It was so well known that both his honour and generosity would prevent his ever consenting to such a proceeding, that nobody ever ventured to address him on the subject. It was a measure of prudence that was contemplated, but not spoken of, lest its publication should prevent its accomplishment, but to which all the Allies, with the exception of Alexander, were very much inclined, though they had not yet come to a decided resolution. It was one of those numerous points which M. de Metternich said should be left to time.

Murat's deposition, and the removal of Napoleon to the Azores, were the most delicate of the Italian questions. M. de Metternich was very much embarrassed when the representatives charged with the consideration of Italian affairs first introduced this subject. He alluded to the complications that he dreaded in Italy, and which great prudence alone could avert, a remark that elicited more than one disagreeable observation from M. de Talleyrand. In following a geographical order, Naples would be the last Italian question to be decided; and the only concession that could be obtained from the French plenipotentiary was, that this classification should be made. By following this order, the question of Genoa and Piedmont took precedence of all the others. It was, consequently, the first taken into consideration.

It was generally agreed to carry out the Treaty of Paris, and abandon Genoa to the King of Sardinia as a compensation for Chambery. But the Genoese did not approve of this. Their representative at Vienna was the Marquis de Brignole, a person distinguished both by birth and by his personal qualities, to

whom the greatest respect was paid at Vienna, but whose credentials had not been recognised, because such a recognition would be admitting the political existence of the republic of Genoa, which the other Powers had determined to ignore. This ancient republic was told, "You gave yourself up to France in 1805; France accepted you and became your sovereign, and in right of the power thus obtained she bestowed you on Piedmont in 1814. You could only claim existence as a French province—a province which France resigned—as at which we both approved and confirmed." Genoa objected to this mode of reasoning; said that she had given herself to France and not to Piedmont; and added, what was perfectly true, that she had admitted the English only on Lord Bentinck's express promise that her independence should be restored. Lord Castlereagh took great pains to bring the Genoese to reason, but the committee, musing little whether the inhabitants were satisfied or not, decided that Genoa should be united to Sardinia, with a promise that her liberty and commerce should be guaranteed. As the Treaty of Paris spoke only of the city and not of the territory of Genoa, new difficulties arose; but these were soon settled in virtue of the authority which had been assumed over all European States; and the committee charged with the consideration of Italian affairs finished the Genoese question in two or three sittings.

Next came on the question of the order of succession in the house of Savoy. It was evident that this throne would become vacant unless the succession were secured to the branch of Savoy-Carignan, as all the princes of the elder branch were childless. Austria alone, influenced by the hope of gaining this crown by marriage, could be expected to raise objections to the proposed arrangement. But she would not dare to put forth such pretensions at a moment when she was taking possession of the greater part of Italy. As the objection was made, France carried her point, and the succession was fixed in the Savoy-Carignan branch.

The third question in the adopted order was that of Parma. Spain, supported by France, demanded, as a consequence of the universal restoration going on in Europe, that the house of Parma should get back its ancient duchy of Tuscany, which, under the title of the Kingdom of Etruria, it had obtained from the First Consul, at the request of Charles IV., whose daughter married the Prince of Parma. No objection could be made to so well-founded a demand. As Etruria, in virtue of the principle of universal restoration, had been given back to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, it would only be just to restore Parma and Placentia to the Queen of Etruria. In that case, what would become of the Treaty of the 11th of April, or of Maria Louisa, whose revenue depended on it?

This princess, as we have already mentioned in the commencement of this book, was residing in the Palace of Schoenbrunn, where, from the apartments she occupied, she could hear the noise of the *fêtes* that celebrated her downfall; and—can it be believed?—she almost felt annoyed that she could not per-

to participate in these festivities, so completely was her weak and frivolous mind already a prey to *ennui*.

Flung, without her own consent, into the chasm of revolution, in the expectation that her marriage with Napoleon would close the gulf, in this fearful trial her memory, consciousness, and strength gave way. The poor creature was exhausted; she retained but two sentiments—her affection for her son, and the desire to obtain the Duchy of Parma, whither she wished to retire and fulfil her maternal duties in peace.

For a moment she thought of going to Elba, but she quickly abandoned the intention on being told that her son should not accompany her. It would have been too great a risk to leave that child in the hands of Napoleon. Compelled to choose between her duties as a mother and a wife, she unhesitatingly preferred the former, and whatever regret she may have felt decreased daily beneath the influence of M. de Neiperg, who, as we have said, was become the recipient of her entire confidence. As the reward of her submission to the wishes of her father and the allied sovereigns, she only asked the patrimony promised to her son, where she begged to be allowed to live in peace, forgetful of the brilliant dream that for a moment had dazzled her youth. We might certainly wish that Napoleon's wife had exhibited more energy of character, but, if the consort he chose from political motives abandoned him through weakness, he had little right to complain, and we ought to deal mercifully with this victim whom kings and peoples immolated to their repose, at one time elevating her to the noblest of thrones, and then flinging her from it, to secure themselves momentary advantages, without caring to inquire what she thought or suffered; like the worm on whom man heedlessly tramples, and on which he does not even bestow a glance. She was at Vienna, interceding with her father, who demanded, in her name, the execution of the promises contained in the treaty of the 11th of April.

Who would not experience an emotion of pity for this unfortunate creature? And when M. de Metternich told Russia, England, France, and Spain that Francis II., who had already sacrificed so much to the common interest, could not be expected to rob his own daughter, all present, even the representatives of France and Spain, were embarrassed. Russia—that is, Alexander—wished that the promises which had been made should be fulfilled. England thought it would be difficult to annul them altogether. As to France, Louis XVIII. would have yielded every thing provided he was promised the expulsion of Murat, and it was rather from a feeling of family respectability that Ferdinand VII. of Spain demanded a portion of the Italian States, however insignificant, than from attachment to a sister for whom he had never felt any affection. In this state of feeling, an accommodation was proposed, which consisted in giving Parma and Placentia to the Infanta, the former Queen of Etruria, and one of the Legations to Maria Louisa, reversible to the Pope, who would thus be obliged to wait the death of the archduchess to obtain the sove-

reignty of a territory that legally belonged to him. However, the Catholic feeling of the time, and the desire of securing the prosperity of the Holy See, to whose financial prosperity the Legations were indispensable, prevented the adoption of this plan. Still, every thing tended toward an arrangement of almost all the Italian questions, even that of Murat, who had always been suspected, and now began to appear guilty, and was about to become a political criminal in the eyes of Europe.

The committee charged with the consideration of the affairs of Switzerland found them in the state we have already described. Ten cantons, of which some were modern, and formed from what had been once independent territories, and others of ancient date, but influenced by a spirit of equity, demanded the maintenance of the nineteen cantons, and the confirmation of the liberal principles contained in the act of mediation. These were opposed by the nine other cantons, partisans of the old *régime*; among which were found the aristocratic canton of Berne and the democratic cantons of Schweitz, Uri, and Glaris; for democracy does not always imply justice, and is often as conservative as aristocracy itself. These nine cantons, at first, refused to acknowledge the Diet of Zurich, but afterward admitted its authority, and demanded that the territories they had formerly possessed should be restored to them, by which the cantons of Vaud, Argovia, and Tessin would become dependent. Both parties had continued in arms, Berne as well as Vaud, Argovia, and Thurgovia.

At first the other Powers wished to exclude France from this complicated negotiation, as well as from every other, because they wished to annihilate her influence in Switzerland as well as in Germany and Italy. But, by a strange peculiarity of the existing state of affairs, Berne, an essentially aristocratic canton, together with Fribourg and Lucerne, where the spirit of reaction was strongest, were, at the same time, those who felt most attachment to France—that is, to the Bourbons. This was principally owing to the great number of Swiss that had formerly served in France, and who felt sincere gratitude for the rank, honour, and emoluments they had gained there. They had consequently demanded most decidedly that a French plenipotentiary should take part in the consideration of Helvetic affairs, and this it was found impossible to refuse. The Duke de Dalberg was appointed to represent the French Legation in this committee.

This French intervention produced most excellent results. When Berne, Uri, Schweitz, Lucerne, and Fribourg saw that however warmly MM. de Talleyrand and de Dalberg might espouse their cause, they still dared not demand that Vaud, Argovia, and Tessin should be flung back into a state of dependence, and that distinctions of class should be revived in a republican State, these cantons, the most desirous of the restoration of the old system, lost all hope of gaining what they sought. The Emperor Alexander, faithful to his liberal sentiments, also insisted that the nineteen cantons and the act of mediation should be maintained, with the exception of

some slight alteration, and as France did not contest the justice of this resolution, Berne and her associate cantons began to yield, and a pacific arrangement of the affair was almost certain. It was decided that the nineteen cantons should be preserved; that the principles of civil equality should be maintained in the confederacy; that four or five of the principal cantons should be alternately invested with the federal authority, and that Berne should be compensated either in Porentruy or the bishopric of Basle (both of which had been taken from France) for the sacrifices required from her. Pecuniary compensation was to be made to the other cantons for the territories which they demanded, but which it was impossible to reduce again to a state of dependence.

The Italian and Swiss questions were in a fair way of being arranged: the greater number was even decided, except that of Naples, which it was expected Murat himself would solve. In this state of things, Saxony and Poland were the only subjects of abiding anxiety; but the interests involved were so serious that a universal commotion was dreaded.

Lord Castlereagh had not relaxed in his endeavours to detach the Prussian ministers from their king and the Emperor of Russia. He was unwillingly assisted by M. de Metternich, who, obliged to adopt Lord Castlereagh's tactics, regretted the sacrifice of Saxony, although conditional on his part, for it was extremely displeasing to the Austrians, who considered the sacrifice of Saxony as even more dangerous than that of Poland. However, Lord Castlereagh's warm entreaties and M. de Metternich's bold counsel had a certain degree of success. The Prussians were told that the abandonment of Poland would be a misfortune for all Germany, and a serious risk for Prussia, lying so near Russia; that the last partition of Poland had not been so dangerous, as it had at least left the Vistula as a barrier between Germany and Russia; that to allow Russia to pass the Vistula, and, above all, allow her to take possession of Warsaw, the head and heart of Poland, would be to furnish her with the means of reconstituting that country; not, indeed, as an independent, but as a subject, Poland, that would be in the hands of the Czars a valiant slave, fighting bravely for her masters, who would not fail to restore her scattered members by taking Galicia from Austria, and Dantzic, Graudentz, and Thorn from Prussia. They were told that if Frederick the Great had eagerly taken possession of a portion of the Polish provinces at the time of the first partition, it was with the intention of uniting Old Prussia with Silesia, which would otherwise remain separated and resemble the two sides of a right angle, only joined at the apex; that Russia once established on the Netz and Wartha, between Thorn, Bromberg, Posen, and Kalisch, she needed to take but one step and divide Prussia in two, leaving Old Prussia and Pomerania on one side and Silesia on the other, like two branches of a tree separated from the parent stem; that all that Prussia could gain on the Elbe, from Wittenberg to Dresden, would not compensate for the danger of having the Rus-

sians at Posen; and that the Prussians ought, for their own sakes, to oppose the Czar's designs on Poland. The Prussians were moreover told that the territories they desired on the Elbe would not be refused; that England, and even Austria, would abandon Saxony to them, but on condition that they should join the European cause and separate from the ambitious ally to whom they were so unfortunately bound. They were lastly reminded that this bond consisted only in their king's friendship for the Czar, but that the destiny of States ought not to depend upon the affection of princes, and that it was the duty of the Prussian ministers to enlighten Frederick William as to the interests of his kingdom, and to oppose if they did not convince him.

These considerations had great weight, particularly with military men, who considered the establishment of Russia on the Lower Wartha as extremely dangerous, and also produced a certain impression on the Prussian ministers, who, in their turn, did not fail to influence their king a little. At least Alexander thought so, and was very much affected by it; for if Prussia abandoned him he would be left alone in opposition to all Europe, without being able to count on the assistance of France, who had adopted the German policy, and whom there was no longer time to gain over. Thus reduced to the limits of the old partition, he would be humbled in the eyes of Poland, and obliged to hear his own subjects say that he had gained nothing by the late wars, although he had run such risk in undertaking them. It is true that he had gained Finland and Bessarabia, but as these conquests were due to his alliance with France, they would only be a condemnation of his policy in joining the Allies, and would afford no greater satisfaction to the national ambition than what a hungry man feels in the recollection of a dinner eaten in by-gone days.

In this disagreeable position of affairs, Alexander brought about an explanation with the King of Prussia, by means of a 24-hour dinner, on which occasion he gave vent to his feelings with the greatest vehemence. He reminded Frederick William of the mutual vows of friendship they had made in 1813, at the time of their meeting on the Oder, when, after some years of coolness, again united by a common danger, they had promised to fall together, or, united, save at the same time their own dominions and Europe. He reminded him of the devotedness with which he (Alexander) had held out his hand to free the Germans at a time when his most faithful subjects advised him to remain on the Vistula and treat with Napoleon. He told him that but for this devotedness on his part, Germany would be still enslaved, and Prussia reduced to five million subjects; that to their union alone so favourable a change was due; that the allied Powers wished to profit of their improved position to exclude Russia, to whom they were indebted for the advantages they enjoyed; that confining the Russians to the Vistula would be to leave them uncompensated for all the blood they had shed from the Oder to the Seine; for Napoleon, after the disaster of Moscow, had offered them the

entier of the Vistula, and they might have turned to their homes without exposing themselves to new dangers, without sacrificing 60 or three hundred thousand soldiers to continue the war of 1813, having rid themselves of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw and assessed themselves of Bessarabia and Finland; but now nobody seemed to remember the heroism of their determination in passing the Vistula, in opposition to the prudent Kutusoff; that some of the Allies, Austria in particular, who had been compelled to join this European crusade, and who had not shed one drop of the blood lost by the Russians, seemed to enjoy the fruits of victory alone; they who had not had a single village burned, refused compensation to Russia for the ruins of Moscow; that it was very well for diplomats to act in this way,—it was their trade,—that princes, like Alexander and Frederick William, actuated by principles of honour, and by similarity of age, and the vicissitudes of their lives, by their common reverses and successes, should not allow themselves to be disunited by the ingratitude of others; that they who were always fortunate when united, and unfortunate when separated, might be allowed to entertain a superstitious belief in the necessity of being allied, and, for their own happiness as well as for that of their peoples, ought to live and die united.

There was a great deal of truth in all this, at least when seen from the Russian or Prussian; but not from the European point of view; it is certain that if Prussia separated from Russia, Alexander would be forced to remain on the other side of the Vistula, and would have no reason to regret having passed it at the end of the year 1812, and not treated with Napoleon in the beginning of 1813, except that he had the glory of having entered Paris and having there as a generous and courteous conqueror.

Frederick William was sensitively alive to his duties of honour and friendship, besides that he was perfectly conscious of all the obligations that Germany was under to Alexander; for very different would have been the course of events if the latter, after the passage of the Berezina, had followed Kutusoff's advice and treated with Napoleon. He was also moved by Alexander's vehemence, which (according to M. de Hardenberg's account) was extraordinary. Touched to the very heart, and entertaining a kind of superstitious belief in the potency of the Czar's friendship, he flung himself into his arms, and swore to be faithful to him. But Alexander told him that the king's fidelity was of little value without that of the ministers, of which he had every reason to doubt. To make sure of this, M. de Hardenberg was called, and the explanation that he commenced with the king was concluded in his prime minister. The Czar exhibited much vehemence of manner with the latter, he had done with the sovereign himself. When the minister alluded to the reasons adduced by the English and Austrians for opposing the approach of the Russians to the Prussian frontier, he was fiercely contradicted, and, after a vain attempt at resistance, was compelled to yield, and promise to support the policy to which Alexander and Frederick Wil-

liam had again most solemnly engaged themselves.

The project which both agreed to defend was, that the greater part of the Polish provinces should be delivered to Russia, on condition that Prussia should get all Saxony. In pursuance of his ambitious and romantic plan of reconstituting Poland, Alexander was most desirous of getting possession of Warsaw, which in the last partition had been allotted to Prussia, in order that the head may be severed from the body, and that this hapless country may forever remain deprived of existence.

In fact, the three partitions of Poland, which had taken place in 1772, 1793, and 1795, had successively disjointed that country in such a manner that a re-combination of the parts was impossible. In the first partition (that of 1772, devised and carried out by Frederick the Great) each of the co-partitionists took the part that suited him best. Prussia took the mouths of the Vistula, and both banks of that river as far as Thorn, (exclusively,) in order to unite Old Prussia and Pomerania by the suppression of the intervening Polish territories. Austria took Galicia, lying at the foot of the Crapach Mountains; Russia seized the territory so warmly disputed in the middle ages by the Muscovites and the Poles—that is, the country opening between Smolensko and Vitebsk, between the sources of the Dwina and the Dnieper, and a territory farther on between Jacobstadt and Rogaczew, forming the eastern part of Lithuania.

In 1793 and 1795, the entire country was portioned away, each spoiler, in seizing what suited himself, taking especial care so to dismember hapless Poland that a reunion of the scattered parts would be impossible. Thus, Prussia took the Grand Duchy of Posen, in order to unite Silesia to Old Prussia, to which latter she also added all that part of Lithuania which extends to the Niemen from Drogitchin to Kowno; and, lastly, Warsaw itself, which was refused to Prussia, because as she was to have the greater part of the body, it was not thought advisable that she should also have the head. Austria had descended the left bank of the Vistula as far as the Pilica, and the right as far as the Bug. Russia had all the rest—that is, all Lithuania, Volhynia, Podolia, &c. When, in 1807 and 1809, Napoleon thought of reconstituting Poland under the name of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, being under the necessity of conciliating Austria and Russia, but not Prussia, he deprived the latter of the mouths of the Vistula, of Dantzic, which he erected into a so-called free city, of the Duchy of Posen, the territory to the left of the Niemen, and, above all, of Warsaw. He next deprived Austria of both banks of the Upper Vistula, as far as the Pilica and the Bug, leaving her only Galicia; but he took nothing from Russia, because having made her the pivot of his policy, he was still more anxious to conciliate her than Austria. From these different acquisitions he formed the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which comprised the basin of the Vistula from its source, near the Carpathian Mountains, to its embouchure in the Baltic, and almost touched the Oder on one side, and extended to the Niemen on the

other, but it did not comprise Lithuania, Volhynia, Podolia, and Gallicia, that is, more than two-thirds of the Polish territory.

When Russia, in 1814, thought, in her turn, of re-constituting Poland, she had a great advantage over Napoleon, inasmuch as she possessed a far larger portion of the Polish territory; but should Alexander be compelled to pause in his progress at the Vistula, he could have but one shore of this river; nor could he have Warsaw if the partition made by the treaties of Kalisch, Reichenbach, and Teplitz was rigorously adhered to. But Alexander was vigorously of having both banks of the Vistula: in the first place, that he might get possession of Warsaw, which was the head and heart of the body he sought to resuscitate; and next, that on the left bank he may have sufficient territory to prevent the capital of his new State from being a frontier town.

On this account he wished to obtain possession of the Duchy of Posen, by which he would become master of both banks of the Wartha. He also wished to be master of both shores of the Vistula, as far as Cracow inclusively. But this would be asking Germany, and especially Prussia, to allow Russia to advance to the Oder, which would bring her very near Dresden and Berlin; and it would be asking Austria to let her approach the Carpathians, a movement by which Austria would entirely lose her portion of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which it had been agreed to divide as formerly. It is true, as Alexander said, that when the partition of this duchy was agreed on, neither the Tyrol, Italy, Holland, nor Belgium had been re-conquered; and, as Austria had gained so much by these acquisitions, she may very well leave him her share of the Grand Duchy.

As Russia had now renewed her alliance with Prussia, it was again decided that she should cross the Vistula, and get possession of the left bank as far up as possible. Her progress toward the Wartha should be regulated by what Prussia should obtain in Central Germany—that is to say, in Saxony. This was a point to be decided after the settlement of the Saxony question, and would be dependent on the success of that negotiation. With regard to Austria, Alexander meant to leave her Gallicia, which she had possessed since the first partition, but he intended to take those portions of Poland which fell to Austria in the second and third partitions,—that is, the left bank of the Vistula as far as the Pilica, and the right as far as the Bug; and in this he was right, for without these territories Warsaw would be on the east a mere frontier town. But this was, in plain terms, asking Austria for her entire portion of the Grand Duchy, which, according to agreement, was to be restored to the ancient co-partitionists. It was possible, indeed, by insisting on the acquisition of the Tyrol and Italy, which had not been anticipated in 1813, to mollify the sacrifice required from Austria, and by giving her the salt-mines of Wieliczka, upon which she set great value. If Cracow could be made a free city, as was intended to do with Thorn and other disputed towns, to Austria might also be given the rich and populous district of Tarnopol, constituting eastern Gallicia, and which had been given to Russia by Napo-

leon in 1809. Besides, necessity might be adduced as a reason for the contemplated changes, as Warsaw would have no suburbs without the annexation of the territory situated between the Pilica and the Bug.

In the negotiations between Austria and Russia, Prussia was to act as intermediary in the concessions offered by Russia to Austria, in exchange for the Upper Vistula, and would thus fulfil, as far as possible, one of the conditions which M. de Metternich attached to the sacrifice of Saxony,—that of joining the Western Powers in the question of Poland. We have already said that M. de Metternich, forced to co-operate in Lord Castlereagh's policy, had consented to give up Saxony to Prussia, but on certain conditions, which he hoped would not be complied with. These were, that Mayence should belong to the Confederation; that the Main and Moselle should separate the northern from the southern States of Germany; and, lastly, that Prussia should join England and Austria in the Polish question. As Prussia was determined to yield the points concerning Germany, by affecting to assist Austria in tracing the Polish frontier in the direction of Gallicia, she might say that she had fulfilled the conditions required for obtaining Saxony, and consider the Cabinet of Vienna pledged to her. The success of this comedy was of great importance to Alexander; for Russia's progress into Posen would be measured by Prussia's acquisitions in Saxony.

Alexander and Frederick William, having renewed their friendship, were become more fixed in their ambitious views, and more determined in their language. However, Prince de Hardenberg, whom Lord Castlereagh had hoped to win over by yielding Saxony to Prussia, on the above-mentioned conditions, could not conceal from the English representative the new bonds that bound Russia and Prussia. He related the scene that had taken place between Alexander and Frederick William, declaring that he had never witnessed the like, and that it would be impossible to withstand its influence. Lord Castlereagh saw all his calculations disappointed, and M. de Metternich saw his hopes realized; for he had only affected to consent to the sacrifice of Saxony under the conviction that Prussia would not fulfil the proposed conditions. Lord Castlereagh reproached Prince de Hardenberg most bitterly, and told him that he ought rather to have resigned office than yielded, but he did not induce him to take this step, and Prussia continued more closely bound to Russia than ever.

Meanwhile, an unexpected event contributed to show the fallacy of the English policy, and even brought about a crisis. We have already seen how Russia and Prussia had ventured to take possession of the disputed provinces: Russia by evacuating Saxony in favour of Prussia, and concentrating her forces on the Vistula, and by sending the Grand Duke Constantine to Warsaw to organize the new kingdom of Poland,—Prussia, by ostensibly occupying all Saxony, and sending thither civil officers empowered to establish the Prussian rule. This double occupation had given great offence, and had not a little contributed, as we have already said, to the immediate accom-

bling of the Congress. An accidental announcement, the inevitable consequence of Russia and Prussia's imprudence, completed this ill feeling, and excited their adversaries to the highest degree of exasperation.

When Prince Reppin, the Russian governor of Saxony, and who had fulfilled the duties of his office with great prudence, was about to leave, he thought he ought to take a formal leave of the Saxons, and, in a declaration that was afterward published, told them that, in consequence of an arrangement with England and Austria, they were about to pass under the rule of Prussia. He added that their country would not be divided, but should remain entire, as had been promised, under one sovereign, and this sovereign, Frederick William, well known for his virtues, would insure their rights and happiness as he had done that of his other numerous subjects. He said that undoubtedly the Saxons ought to regret their old king, who during forty years had secured their happiness, but now the fiat of a superior destiny had gone forth, and after having paid a just tribute of regret to Frederick Augustus, they would be faithful to Frederick William, and prove themselves worthy of his benefits by their submission and loyalty.

The sincerity of this declaration, and the excellent sentiments it contained, heightened the effect it produced, because they showed how far things had advanced. It produced an extraordinary effect on all the Germans assembled at Vienna. Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich were assailed with questions. They were asked whether it was with their consent that Saxony was become a Prussian province, and whether the Congress so solemnly assembled at Vienna had only been summoned to consummate an usurpation no less odious than those for which Napoleon was so much blamed. The general excitement was fearful, and Lord Castlereagh feared that a policy which had been willing to sacrifice Saxony to save Poland would not be understood in England, whilst M. de Metternich was quite certain of the bad impression it would produce upon the Austrians: consequently, both hastened to contradict Prince Reppin's assertions. They denied the truth of what he said, both verbally in private, and in public through the medium of the press, asserting that the Russian governor had announced as done what had not even been resolved on, and which depended on very difficult negotiations that were far from being completed. The Russians and Prussians replied with much asperity that this was only playing on words, that certainly no document had been signed, but that in a formal note Austria had approved of the annexation of Saxony to Prussia, and that England had made no opposition. In reply to these assertions, the Austrians said that they were only calculated to mislead the legations assembled at Vienna, that Austria had always considered the sacrifice of Saxony a misfortune for Germany, and consequently for Europe, and had constantly advised Prussia to renounce her designs on Saxony, as eventually inimical to her own interests, and that, in any case, Austria's consent to this sacrifice had been fettered with conditions, the chief of which was yet unfulfilled, namely, that the

Prussian cabinet should abandon Russia on the Polish question. The public mind was still more exasperated by a new event that occurred in the midst of these contradictions and denials. This was a proclamation which the Grand Duke Constantine addressed to the Poles, and in his brother Alexander's name called on them to rally round the old standard of Poland to defend their existence and threatened rights.

This last manifestation completed the general indignation. Those who were opposed to the views of Russia and Prussia considered that such effrontery ought to be met by something else than newspaper-articles and remarks made in the drawing-rooms of Vienna, and they did not hesitate to say that it was imperatively necessary to summon a military force and prepare to restrain those ambitious men, who sought to parcel out Europe as they pleased. The Bavarians and Austrians were the most excited of all,—the former, because that the suppression of so important a State as Saxony was a terrifying example for all the princes of the Confederation, the latter, because that the intimate union of Russia and Prussia, and their establishment at the foot of the Bohemian and Carpathian Mountains, were calculated to endanger the security of Austria. The Austrians, in particular, were most indignant at the arrogance of Russia and Prussia, and asked what would have become both of the one and the other if the Austrian army had not come to their assistance after the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen, or if the Austrians had not borne the principal burden of the war at Dresden and Leipsic. "If," they said, and with perfect truth, "if the safety of Europe, as some insolently assert, was exclusively the work of one portion of the Allies, would it not be more just to attribute the good work to those who in 1813 had, at the risk of their existence, declared themselves, and who, breaking the bonds of family affection, had decided every thing, than to those who, when left to themselves, were not able to defend either the Saal, the Elbe, or the Oder?"

Prince Schwarzenberg was generally esteemed, and, though not in the habit of arrogating to himself the exercise of authority, he was rough, and even harsh, when urged too far. He had several conversations with Alexander, by whom he was always treated with consideration and courtesy. He did not spare the emperor, and was so excited by the general complaints as to say that he almost repented the blind confidence he had felt in the emperor's personal sincerity. He added that, had he foreseen what had occurred, he would neither have advised his sovereign to unite the Austrian forces with those of Russia or Prussia, nor would he have accepted the command of these armies, nor have so freely shed his blood, borne so many affronts, or assumed so much responsibility to secure the success of the common cause. He recalled the entreaties and supplications employed by the Allies to win the support of Austria, and the ingratitude with which she had been afterward treated; he pointed out the bad effects of these audacious pretensions, pretensions that fully justified Napoleon's conduct; he also pointed out the danger of letting Europe see that she had

only made an exchange of masters. "Napoleon," continued Prince Schwarzenberg, "though secluded in his island, is still all-powerful in his influence over the public mind; and what would be the consequence if, whilst the European courts present so scandalous a spectacle of disunion and cupidity, he suddenly appeared in either camp?"

The Austrian generalissimo was violently excited, and embarrassed the Czar by the vehemence of his language. Alexander endeavoured to exculpate himself, denied the ambitious designs of which he was accused, again appealed to his well-known sincerity and generosity, said that he was bound both to the Poles and Prussians, and expressed his surprise at the indignation exhibited against an arrangement that he considered quite natural. He expressed some regret that things had proceeded to such extremities, or that he had gone so far. Still, notwithstanding his apologetic tone, it was evident that he had not renounced his plans.

However much the Allies might desire to avoid war or have recourse to the interference of France, which would be inevitable in case of a rupture, they began to think of such a necessity. Lord Castlereagh found his position changed by instructions he had just received from England, and which modified his conduct not a little. Hitherto he had acted like all British ministers, and made little account of Hanoverian interests, which were dearer to the reigning family than to the English nation. He had taken little heed of the wrongs of German princes, and in the question of Saxony seemed to forget that he was minister of the King of Hanover as well as of the King of England. The true motive of his conduct was, that he believed a stronger sympathy existed in the English Parliament for Poland than for Saxony. However, it was not possible that he would be long allowed to follow such a policy. A number of letters, principally by the Coburg princes, had been addressed to the Prince Regent of England from Vienna. Although these princes had, during the late wars, espoused the cause of Russia and served in her armies, they had not forgotten their duty to the King of Saxony, the head of their house, who had always protected them against Napoleon, and they now pleaded his cause, with a most honourable fidelity. One of these princes was at Vienna, daily braving the rage and threats of Alexander; the other was at London, making preparations, it was said, for his marriage with the Princess Charlotte of England. Both, aided by the Austrian ministers, had impressed on the Prince Regent, the future monarch of Hanover and of England, the danger of sacrificing Saxony, and the prince, in his turn, had insisted that the British Cabinet should formally command Lord Castlereagh to defend the interests of Saxony. The order was issued, and arrived at Vienna in the beginning of December.

This order could not have come more *à propos*. It obliged Lord Castlereagh to change his policy, and, at the same time, furnished him with a most natural excuse for this change. Had these instructions arrived a few days earlier, he might, perhaps, have been annoyed;

but, now that he saw himself the dupe of his complaisance to the Prussians, he was very well pleased to receive them. He consequently agreed perfectly with M. de Metternich in his absolute refusal to sacrifice either Saxony or Poland, and showed the two allied sovereigns that he was determined to oppose them by every means. Prince de Wrede, the ever-active and useful representative of Bavaria, was constantly advising the adoption of energetic resolutions. He offered, in the name of his court, twenty-five thousand men for every hundred thousand furnished by Austria, and also advised a good understanding with France, for without her aid the balance of strength would be uncertain. Austria had three hundred thousand men, of whom she could employ two hundred thousand against Russia and Prussia; Bavaria could furnish about sixty thousand, though she promised to raise more; and the other German princes, who were removed from Prussian and Russian influence, could furnish about forty thousand, and the Low Countries, perhaps, as many more; but a greater number could not be reckoned on, as all England's forces were still engaged in the American war. The whole thus collected would not amount to more than three hundred and fifty thousand men, a number not exceeding the combined armies of Russia and Prussia, as the one could easily assemble two hundred thousand, and the other one hundred and fifty thousand men. The numbers being equal, and their valour and resources assumed to be so, the event would be most uncertain, and they might continue slaughtering each other for years, without any result, while France would be a mere spectator of a conflict so beneficial to her. To secure a certain result, France should be engaged in the quarrel, and furnish one hundred thousand men, who would attack Prussia either in the Rhenish Provinces or in Franconia. Certainly the price of this assistance might be something alarming, were it solicited, but here it was freely offered by the French Legation, and not only offered, but urgently pressed upon them who needed it.

These reasons, adduced principally by Bavaria, were decisive, and had risen spontaneously in everybody's mind. It would have been folly to refuse the proffered aid of France, which would be most valuable, though some had affected to doubt it. Intelligence of our warlike preparations, instigated by M. de Talleyrand, was now noised in every direction, and Vienna was filled with letters from Paris relating all that was going on there. These letters spoke of the internal state of France, and the discontent felt at the proceedings of the Bourbons, but, whilst mentioning the discontent that prevailed among the military, the writers added that the army was increasing daily, that it had never been composed of better soldiers, and that employed on foreign service the French soldiers would regain the glory they had already acquired. The letters received by the Russians and Prussians were less flattering to France, and still less to the Bourbons; but those written by the Duke of Wellington and M. de Vincent, the English and Austrian Ambassadors at Paris, though they admitted the political errors of the re-

stored dynasty, agreed in admiring the French army, and admitted the advantages that such a force could offer. These letters also mentioned the flourishing state of our finances, whose prompt re-establishment appeared inexplicable, though, from the ease with which each department was carried on, there could be no doubt of their good condition.

There was no longer any reason to doubt, as Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich had appeared to do, of the efficacious assistance that France could offer. Nor could there be any doubt of her willingness to furnish aid, since M. de Talleyrand's entreaties to be allowed to take part in this European crusade in favour of Saxony, and the constant communications exchanged between the French and Bavarian legations, left no doubt on this point. However, no anxiety was felt to take France into confidence, or let her know that the Allies were making warlike preparations against each other. Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich were restrained by a certain party feeling, and did not wish to make advances to M. de Talleyrand, who they knew would come forward on the slightest hint. Besides, they knew that he would learn sufficient from Bavaria to hold himself in readiness. A plan was drawn up, to be put in execution in the month of March, 1815, in which the French forces were disposed of as though their aid was certain. In virtue of this plan, proposed by Prince Schwarzenberg and Marshal de Wrède, three hundred and twenty thousand Austrians, Bavarians, Wurtembergers, Badenese, Saxons, &c. were to be divided into two armies, and sent into Moravia and Bohemia. One of these armies, consisting of two hundred thousand men under the command of Prince Schwarzenberg, was to proceed through Moravia to the Upper Vistula; and the other, consisting of one hundred and twenty thousand, under Marshal de Wrède, was to pass through Bohemia to the Oder, whilst fifty thousand French, entering Franconia, would prevent the Bohemian army from being outflanked; and another force of fifty thousand men was to proceed to the Rhenish Provinces, to act in concert with the Hollando-Belgians. There was no doubt but that Prussia would be overwhelmed by such a mass, and Russia forced to retreat beyond the Vistula. No soldiers were to be required from England until the end of the American war, but she was to subsidize the new Allies, with the exception of France, that no longer needed either the purse or sword of strangers. These plans, which were to be further matured before being put into execution, were to remain a secret between England, Bavaria, and Austria, and not communicated to the French, except through the officious indiscretion of Bavaria. As a preliminary precaution, Austria sent a reinforcement of twenty-five thousand men into Galicia, where she already had forty thousand.

On the strength of these arrangements, M. de Metternich entered into a categorical explanation with the Russians and Prussians, and, in a note dated 10th of December, declared that, in consequence of the unanimous opinion of Germany, and the definite resolutions of England, announced in Lord Castlereagh's late

instructions, and the opinion of all the great European Powers, France in particular, and in consequence of the non-compliance with the conditions imposed on Prussia at a time when her wishes were about being complied with, Saxony was to be maintained in her actual state, with the exception of some territorial sacrifices deemed necessary for defining more accurately the Prussian frontier, and which, in any case, would be the punishment of the faults committed by King Frederick Augustus.

This positive declaration of Austria produced a great effect at Vienna. She would never have used such language without having taken a decided determination to proceed to extremities, without having calculated her resources, prepared the means of executing her plans, and formed new alliances. Besides, even a superficial glance seemed to show that Austria, England, and France were united and determined to act in common. The union of all the other European Powers had scarcely sufficed to conquer France, and what was now to become of Russia and Prussia alone against united England, Austria, and France? The two northern Powers would not be able to hold their ground. The Prussians, against whom this manifestation was principally directed, were violently indignant. King Frederick William, then at Vienna, was surrounded by the principal Prussian generals, among whom Marshal Blücher was conspicuous, and who besieged him with their haughty demands, asserting in the loftiest terms that they were the sole conquerors of Napoleon, the sole saviours of Europe. If they were to be believed, nothing ought to be refused them, and whoever opposed their pretensions should be prepared to feel the temper of their swords. Influenced by the same sentiments, the Prussian ministers prepared to reply immediately, and in the same tone, to the Austrian despatch. They were about to embody in their reply all the vehemence of the Prussian staff, and intended to retort upon Austria the charge of faithlessness, when the Emperor Alexander, who, although much excited, was not inclined to urge things so far, prevented them from yielding to their first emotions of anger, or using such violent language in their reply. He restrained them, and proceeded to act with all that tact that was natural to him when not thrown off his guard. He first visited the Austrians, commencing with Prince Schwarzenberg and the Emperor Francis. He found the former, not indeed excited like the Prussians, but severe and determined, and was so dissatisfied with him that he complained to M. de Metternich, whom he accused of inspiring the commander-in-chief of the Austrian army with false ideas. He next visited the Emperor Francis, who treated him with all the urbanity due from a host to his guest, but with a calm determination that often produces a greater effect than anger. His next interview was with M. de Talleyrand. This was their third meeting, for since Alexander had come to Vienna he was chary of his interviews with the illustrious diplomatist, at whose house he had not hesitated to take up his abode at Paris. He now almost solicited an interview, for, meeting M. de Talleyrand in a drawing-room of the Austrian capital, he took

his arm, and made an appointment with him. When M. de Talleyrand appeared on the appointed day, the Czar received him, if not with the seductive charm of former times, at least with a gracious friendliness which invited intimacy; the Emperor now spoke with the greatest moderation on subjects whose discussion a little before deprived him of all self-command. He asked M. de Talleyrand how it happened that he, who at Paris had expressed himself in favour of the restoration of Poland, was now so much opposed to it. M. de Talleyrand replied that he was still favourable to the project, but it should be the restoration of a free and independent Poland, — a European and not a Russian Poland. The French diplomatist, in conformity with the policy already employed, added that Poland no longer interested France; that since it was not Poland that was to be restored, but a frontier to be decided on between Russia and Germany, he left the business to those interested in it, and that, as far as this question was concerned, Russia would meet with no opposition from France. This was certainly a concession, but it was no advantage to the Czar to gain Poland unless he got Saxony at the same time. M. de Talleyrand appeared inflexible on this latter point, and, no longer adducing arguments based on the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe, he endeavoured to prove to Alexander that the peace of the world, and the glory of Europe, depended on the recognition of the principle of legitimacy under all circumstances and in every place. Such opinions had little influence with the Czar, especially coming from the lips of M. de Talleyrand. He did not seem to attach much importance to these professions of faith uttered by the ancient minister of the usurper, and repeated to him that he was bound to the Prussians, that his policy was to be faithful to his word, but that if M. de Talleyrand could induce the Prussians to release him from his promise, he would yield. M. de Talleyrand replied that some other than he should be employed to influence the Prussians, and that Alexander himself possessed the means of doing so, by restoring them their portion of Poland. "You wish, then," replied Alexander, "that I should despoil myself to satisfy you. That would not suit me. But," he added, "let us make a bargain. I know your secret; I know your principal object here: you are seeking to dethrone Murat. Well," he said, extending his hand to M. de Talleyrand, "let us form a contract: I will take your side on that question, and it will be soon decided according to your wishes, provided that you yield Saxony to me." At this moment the expression of Alexander's countenance was animated and insinuating, showing how anxious he was to gain his end; and it is quite evident that had France pursued a different policy at Vienna, and not confined herself to seeking the safety of Saxony, she could have obtained every concession from Russia. But, as M. de Talleyrand's course was marked out for him, he remained unmoved by Alexander's seductive proposal, and said he could not entertain such a proposition, which was no other than to tolerate usurpation in one quarter of Europe in order to se-

cure the triumph of legitimacy in another; that, for his part, he desired to see the rights of legitimacy universally maintained. M. de Talleyrand delivered these sentiments with a pontifical air, which unfortunately made Alexander smile.

This proposal not having succeeded, the Czar, wishing to derive some advantage from the interview, sought to learn from M. de Talleyrand what were those warlike preparations going on in France so much spoken of at Vienna, and for what they were intended. Without seeming to attach much importance to these questions, though he turned his good ear to M. de Talleyrand, (he heard badly in one,) he asked him in what condition was the French army, and whether it had been considered necessary to reorganize it, as was reported at Vienna. Then, with all that ardour which he possessed in so high a degree, and with an expression of the greatest indifference, M. de Talleyrand related what had been and what was still being done to reform the French army, to attach the soldiers to the new Government, and, above all, to render the army as fit as ever for foreign service. He said, quite carelessly, that at present France had 200,000 soldiers, and would have 300,000 in March, all veterans who had returned from abroad, and taken the place of the conscripts drafted for 1815. He gave those details like one who was neither desirous nor conscious of producing an effect. Alexander could not conceal his feelings as well as M. de Talleyrand, and they parted with formal politeness, the Czar deeply impressed by what he had heard, for he had no doubt but that these newly-raised French troops would be at the service of England and Austria should a war arise on the Polish and Saxon question.

However, in order to be still more certain, Alexander sent Prince Czartoryski to M. de Talleyrand. This prince was deeply interested in the fate of Poland, for whose sake he was most anxious to bring about a union between France and Russia. The motive of this visit was a phrase in M. de Metternich's despatch, in which he alleged that all the European States, and France in particular, were opposed to the sacrifice of Saxony. Prince Czartoryski was commissioned to discover the true meaning of this phrase, which seemed to indicate a formal compact between France and Austria. As M. de Talleyrand divined this motive, he persisted in his tactics of making a greater show than the reality justified, and of seducing Alexander by the idea of a union existing between France, England, and Austria, but took care, at the same time, that of the three Powers France should appear the least opposed to Russia. He expressed a decided preference for the latter Power, and an extreme desire to be on good terms with her, but, at the same time, he did not deny that, with regard to Saxony, France would be those who defended her, even to the shedding of blood. He boasted, indeed, a little, for Prince Czartoryski was led, by this conversation, to believe that M. de Talleyrand cared more of England and Austria's confidence than was really the case. But the desired effect was produced, and this was the essential point considering the policy that was adopted.

Every species of opposition now rose against the projects of Alexander and Frederick William. The German princes of the North and South, most of whom were assembled at Vienna, were desirous of making a protestation in common against the annexation of Saxony to Prussia. One prince alone dissented,—the son of the King of Wurtemberg, who had served with the French in Russia, and who, whether fighting with or against us, always distinguished himself by his bravery and brilliant daring, and who, now captivated by the charms of his affianced bride, the Grand Duchess Catherine, was entirely devoted to the Russian policy. This prince, who seldom agreed in opinion with his father, used all his influence to prevent the intended declaration. He succeeded in restraining the lesser princes by threatening them with the anger of Prussia if they signed the declaration. However, the result was the same; and the members of the committee intrusted with the consideration of German affairs declared that they would suspend their labours until the fate of Saxony should be decided, which meant that their resolutions would entirely depend on the decisions made with regard to this kingdom, in whose fate the German States felt as much interest as in their own.

Opposed by so many difficulties, both moral and physical, Alexander felt that he should make some concessions, and he reluctantly yielded to necessity. In the first exaltation of his feelings, he had intended to demand the entire territory of ancient Poland. But these pretensions he was obliged to renounce in consequence of the resistance he met on every side. Still, he was determined to demand, and obtain at any price, all the territory that essentially constituted Poland,—that is, the basin of the Vistula from Sandomir to Thorn.

He would thus have Warsaw, surrounded on every side with sufficient extent of territory. And, in possessing Warsaw, he might boast of having reconstituted Poland, and in such a position he would have, so to speak, won the wager he had laid against all Europe, as much through self-love as from ambition or chivalrous feeling. He was ready to make some concession, the fundamental point of his project being gained.

The principal concession was to be made on the Prussian side in the grand duchy of Posen. Had Alexander taken all the territory of ancient Poland on this side, he would touch the Oder, as these possessions extended nearly to the confluence of the Wartha and Oder, and terminated not far from Custrin, Frankfort-on-the-Oder, and Glogau. There remained, consequently, but a very narrow strip of territory on the right of the Oder to constitute the country of Silesia. Alexander would have thus penetrated through the junction of the angle formed by Old Prussia and Pomerania with Silesia, and would have made an angular advance into the heart of the Prussian monarchy, which would be most alarming to the Germans and even to the Prussians; for, among the latter, those who were more influenced by rational geographical considerations than by self-love considered that their country was in more need of being strength-

ened from Thorn to Breslau than extended from Wittenberg to Dresden. By leaving the actual duchy of Posen—that is, the greater part of the basin of the Wartha—to the Prussians, they would get a fine territory more populous than that nearer to Warsaw; nor would it be impossible to trace a good frontier between Poland and Prussia. By following the Prosna to its confluence with the Wartha, a little below Konin, and by drawing a line from this point to the neighbourhood of Thorn, Prosna would form a first point of separation; and then from Konin to Inowracław the succession of lakes whence the Netze takes its rise would present a line of obstacles of real importance as a frontier. This formidable point, being directed toward Prussia, would not injure the Polish frontier, for the country around Warsaw would be still sufficiently extensive. Of the two millions and a half of Poles that Prussia might claim as her portion of the grand duchy of Warsaw, if this grand duchy were restored to its ancient co-partitionists, she would get one million, and as many more in the centre of Germany. Therefore, if an arrangement could be made in Germany, as in Poland, by detaching a portion of territory from Saxony, Prussia might be restored to the position she held in 1805, which was what had been promised her.

The arrangements with Austria would not be so easy, as more was to be demanded than conceded. But here the demands of Russia were really well founded at least, if the principle of reconstituting Poland as a separate kingdom were admitted. Austria had always held Galicia since the time of the first partition, nor had even Napoleon thought of depriving her of it, except, indeed, in 1812, when he flattered himself for an instant to be able to overpower Russia and create a French Poland. This enterprise failed: Galicia still belonged to Austria, and not the most impassioned Pole, not even Alexander himself, would have thought of demanding it from the cabinet of Vienna. But there were provinces on both banks of the Vistula, extending to the Pilica on one side and to the Bug on the other, which Austria had acquired in the last partition, and of which Napoleon had taken possession when about to create the grand duchy of Warsaw. Were these territories restored to Austria, she would possess the country on each side of the Vistula, even to the very gates of Warsaw, in which case it would be impossible to say that Poland was reconstituted. Austria saw this; and, besides, she might be told that if the treaties of Kalisch, Reichenbach, and Tœplitz, which were concluded when but a limited success was hoped for by the Allies,—if these treaties required that the different portions of the grand duchy should be restored to their old possessors, still, Austria had been benefited so much in the Tyrol, in Italy, and in Bavaria, by the unexpected success of the Allies, that she could not deny the justice of Russia's claims to an equal advantage. Now, this latter State could only pretend to acquisitions gained on the banks of the Vistula; therefore no very serious opposition was to be dreaded on the part of Austria. Besides, other concessions, of a certain value, were to be offered

to Austria: she would be allowed to retain the salt-mines of Wieliczka, by erecting Cracow into an independent city, (as Alexander thought to do with Thorn,) and Galicia would get back the beautiful district of Tarnopol, of which Napoleon had deprived her in 1809, to punish Austria for having declared war against us at that time.

Russia, therefore, resolved to yield the important duchy of Posen to Prussia, a concession which would render the latter Power less exacting in Germany, and induce her to come to an amicable arrangement with Austria relative to the Polish frontier. M. de Hardenberg was, consequently, desired to address a very moderate reply to Austria, and endeavour to attain the principal objects of the Prussian policy without coming to a rupture, which might be fatal to Russia and Prussia, and would certainly entail general disgrace.

Whilst Alexander, in consequence of these conciliatory resolutions, sought to come to an understanding with Austria concerning the frontier that was to separate them, M. de Hardenberg, pursuant to the instructions he had received, replied on the 20th of December to the note of the 10th, by a note whose tone was exceedingly conciliatory, and the arguments, ably supported, considered from the Prussian point of view. In this document the Prussian minister expressed his surprise that, after the formal consent of England and the conditional approbation of Austria to the incorporation of Saxony with Prussia, a discussion should now be resumed on a subject that had been in some sort decided. The excuse founded on the non-fulfilment of the conditions imposed by Austria was not valid, he said; for Prussia agreed to all that she required concerning the limits of the northern and southern German States, to the destiny contemplated for Mayence, and to every thing connected with the balance of power in Germany. As to the Polish question, Prussia had interfered, and would continue to do so, in order that every thing might be arranged as far as possible according to the desires of the Austrian cabinet. M. de Hardenberg asserted that there was as little foundation for the principle of sovereignty, which was brought forward in favour of the King of Saxony. Saxony had been conquered in nine pitched battles, especially at Leipsic, where he did not hesitate to say that Prussia had borne the entire burden of the days of the 16th, 17th, and 18th of October, and that, consequently, the right of conquest, recognised by all publicists, might be confidently appealed to. The application of this right to the King of Saxony was founded on incontestable principles, and no less so on equity. Frederick Augustus, though pledged to the cause of Europe by the intervention of the Austrian cabinet, and received at Prague by the Emperor Francis, had left that retreat where he was in safety, abandoned the cause which he had promised to serve, and embraced that of the common oppressor, to whom he gave up Torgau, the Saxon army, and the Upper Elbe. He might, therefore, be punished without any scruple of conscience, and his punishment would serve as a good example. Besides, his chastisement would not be very severe; he would not be de-

throned, but merely transferred from one country to another. A new State could be given him on the left bank of the Rhine, a State peopled with Catholics, an arrangement which would terminate the disagreeable disunion existing in Saxony between a Catholic Government and a Protestant people. Prussia herself would furnish the materials for this new kingdom, by yielding a part or even the whole of the provinces destined for her on the left of the Rhine, for she attached little importance to possessions that brought her into such close contact with France, and had accepted them only for the public good and in conformity to the wishes of Great Britain. The renunciation on the part of Prussia would put the King of Saxony in a position equal, if not superior, to that of the princes of Baden, Nassau, and Hesse. He should also have a voice in the Diet; and all these arrangements would tend to the maintenance of the German equilibrium. Such transfers of sovereignty were not rare in history. Charles V. furnished an example in his dealings with this very house of Saxony, by transferring the actual reigning branch from a simple duchy to the throne of Saxony. Austria and France afforded an example in the last century, when the house of Lorraine was transferred to Tuscany. The arrangement now proposed with regard to Saxony would be much better than cutting up that kingdom, which would be done were the design put into operation of only punishing Frederick Augustus by a diminution of territory. In the first place, this dismemberment would afflict the Saxons, who had been promised that they should not be separated; besides that, Saxony, reduced to the third or the half of her proportions, would not be in a position to support royal state, or her beautiful capital, the centre of art in Germany. A nest of malcontents would remain in the country, who, discontented with the new order of things, would be ever plotting the reconstitution of a revolutionary Poland governed by a Saxon prince. Considered in any light, the worst possible arrangement would be to partition Saxony, instead of giving it entire to Prussia and transferring Frederick Augustus to the left of the Rhine. Nor would there be any reason why Austria should take offence at Prussia's closer neighbourhood, for Saxony is her actual state would form but a feeble barrier between the two great German Powers. This had been proved by Frederick the Great; for in his different wars one step was sufficient to bring him to Dresden and enable him to establish himself at Koenigstein, and also was recently by Napoleon; and it was then that the Prussian Government would always be should it unfortunately happen that war broke out between Austria and Prussia. In order that Austria may feel less anxiety on this point, her wish that Dresden should remain unfortified should be gratified. Finally, M. de Hardenberg recapitulated all that Europe owed to Prussia for contributing so much to the common welfare, and the promise made to her of reconstruction, which, in securing her the same amount of population she possessed in 1805, would afford her a better geographical configuration. This latter point had been formally stipulated, for every one admitted

her defective configuration, which would be only increased were she compelled for interests not her own to stretch from Königsberg to Aix-la-Chapelle, unless she were permitted, at the same time, to strengthen her centre by extending her possessions as far as Dresden. Acting otherwise would be treating Prussia with ingratitude, besides breaking a solemn promise, and neglecting the interests of Europe, which were involved in the well-being of Prussia. It should also be admitted that the ambition of which she was accused was the result of a desire to correct her defective geographical conformation; and, were her present demands gratified, she might be tranquillized for a long time, if not forever.

Doubtless, more than one reply might be made to these assertions, some well founded, others specious; and they were put forth in a tone of moderation that showed more inclination to conciliate than to quarrel.

The question having assumed this form, a pacific arrangement was to be hoped for. Austria, on her side, determined to make some concessions. Having recovered the Tyrol and Italy, of which she had no expectation when the treaties of Kalisch, Reichenbach, and Tœplitz were concluded, it would ill become her to dispute any advantage that Russia might obtain; and where could Russia gain territorial advantages except in Poland? Had Austria been less apprehensive of war, or were she better supported on this point by France, she might have disputed the reconstitution of a Poland which would necessarily be only a Russian Poland. But as Prussia had promised to support Russia on this point, and France had only shown a disposition in favour of Saxony, Austria was not in a position to dispute a proposal which Alexander made an absolute condition, and, in some sort, a point of honour. The principle being conceded that Poland should be reconstituted as a vassal of Russia, Austria could not pretend to retain the country on each side of the Vistula as far as the Pilica and the Bug, which would be extending her dominions to the very gates of Warsaw. She consequently consented to negotiate on this subject, only claiming the Vistula as far as Sandomir. At Sandomir, the San should become the boundary of Galicia, which would be restoring the old Gallician frontier. Disputes arose touching Cracow, Tarnopol, and the salt-mines of Wieliczka, but Russia, delighted at becoming mistress of the basin of the Vistula as far as the Pilica and the Bug, was most accommodating on these points. She yielded a portion of territory lying round Cracow, and, still more, recognised the independence of this city, so famous in Polish annals. Russia looked upon Cracow as a floating remnant of Poland, which might be at a later period absorbed into the new Russian Poland. Russia also gave up the salt-mines of Wieliczka, and, lastly, she voluntarily surrendered the district of Tarnopol to Austria, as a compensation for provinces which she had been promised but did not obtain.

The more yielding Austria was in the direction of Poland, where, however, by the annexation of Galicia to her dominions, she secured a long strip of territory along the

Carpathian Mountains, the more firm she could and would be with regard to Saxony.

She persisted in asserting that the principal condition imposed on Prussia, that of joining England and Austria on the Polish question, had not been fulfilled, that she had not been bound concerning any particular frontier, but on the fundamental question, and that, consequently, Austria was freed from her engagements. She reminded Prussia that it was against her will she had ever consented to the sacrifice of Saxony, and had only yielded through complaisance and a desire for concord, and had always advised Prussia not to take advantage of this sacrifice, for the suppression of Saxony would be a severe shock to the political equilibrium of Germany and be a grave offence to the moral sentiments of her people. She added that England, having maturely reflected, had retracted her consent to the suppression of Saxony, and that, consequently, the idea of incorporating that country with Prussia could no longer be entertained. Austria declared herself formally on this point, and said that she would only consent to some slight dismemberment of Saxony, which, in punishing Frederick Augustus for the faults he had committed, would serve to define the Prussian frontier, and, at the same time, fulfil the promise made to Prussia to restore her the position she held in 1805.

Details being entered into, Austria took great pains to show that, in order to restore Prussia to the position she held in 1805, it would not be necessary to sacrifice Saxony. Out of less than ten million subjects, Prussia had lost, through Napoleon, 4,800,000, that is, nearly half of what she possessed. Since the Allies had victoriously crossed the Elbe and the Rhine, she had, by the recovery of Dantzic, Magdeburg, Westphalia, &c., got back about 1,500,000. She still required 3,300,000 in order to be fully indemnified. She might claim as her share of the grand duchy of Warsaw, 2,500,000 subjects; 500,000 for the principalities of Anspach and Bayreuth, which had been given to Bavaria in 1806, and were still held by that State; 300,000 for an addition that was promised to Hanover at the expense of Prussia; 50,000 for a recompense promised to the house of Saxe-Weimar, making altogether 3,350,000, which, added to the 1,500,000 she had already recovered, would amount to 4,850,000, being a little more than she had lost. By getting the duchy of Posen from Russia, she would gain one million souls; the provinces on the left of the Rhine, and the grand duchy of Baden on the right, contained at least 1,600,000, and it was only necessary to find 750,000 more. These might by management be procured from the lesser princes, and the deficient 200,000 made up in this way: Hanover was willing to give up the 300,000 that had been promised to her. There were, therefore, but 200,000 or 300,000 more to be found in order to satisfy Prussian ambition, and by demanding these from Saxony, whose population amounted to 2,100,000, she would still retain her position, for she would not influence the Germanic balance less with 1,800,000 subjects than with 2,100,000.

These calculations, which were certainly

true, excited great indignation among the Prussians, and gave rise to the reproach, so often repeated since, that the Congress of Vienna portioned out human beings as though they were flocks of sheep. The Prussians denied the correctness of these calculations, and adduced others, as difficult to admit as to contest. Without a competent authority, invested with the power of giving a final decision on these estimates of men and territory, it was not possible to come to an agreement, for differences arose not alone as to the quantity, but the quality, of these human beings. It was said that a Pole from the neighbourhood of Posen, given by Russia to Prussia, was of greater value than one from Klodawa or Sempolno, which were still under her sway; and that an old Frenchman from Aix-la-Chapelle or Cologne was infinitely superior to a Pole from Kalisch or Thorn, for whom he was to be given in exchange. Consequently, the quality as well as the number of the subjects apportioned to each Power was to be taken into consideration.

It was determined that, besides the great Committee of Five empowered to deliberate upon the most important questions, a special committee should be formed to examine and pronounce upon the estimates brought forward on each side.

Toward the close of December, Lord Castlereagh called on M. de Talleyrand to speak with him on the subject, and suggested this committee as an excellent means of settling aside the difficulties resulting from these contradictory calculations, and saving Saxony by reducing the question to one of arithmetic. M. de Talleyrand made no objection to this committee of valuation, but he told the British plenipotentiary that it would be degrading the subject to treat it so; that it was better to discuss principles than figures; and then, introducing his favourite theme of legitimacy, he proposed that England, Austria, and France should conclude a short but precise convention, by which these Powers would bind themselves to maintain the existence of Saxony on principle, though yielding some of her territory to Prussia. Lord Castlereagh recoiled some steps, like one taken by surprise. "You propose an alliance," he said; "and an alliance implies either certain or possible warfare. We do not desire war, and would only have recourse to it at the last extremity. Should we be compelled to make war, we shall then think of the means of carrying it on, and of the best alliances to form."

M. de Talleyrand, thus repelled, did not persist. It was agreed to form a committee of valuation, where France should be represented. The suggestion of this committee was well received by the parties most interested; but the proposal of admitting a French commissioner met with great opposition. This was considered an infraction of the promise made by the allies to each other that France should have no voice in the disposal of the territories taken from her, a promise renewed at Paris on the 30th of May, and again at Vienna during the first days of the Congress. It is true that since then they had been compelled to act conjointly with France, for the idea of deciding definitely on European ques-

tions without her participation was soon perceived to be as ridiculous as impracticable. But though she had been consulted on all important territorial questions, still the secret and formal engagement subsisting between the Four, of settling every thing themselves, had not been revoked.

M. de Metternich and Lord Castlereagh ought to have acknowledged that, in their great anxiety, they had initiated France into the Saxony question, and could not decently reject her further interference. This avowed they had not the courage to make; and as Prussia showed an extreme repugnance to admit a Power avowedly inimical to her to form one of a tribunal empowered to decide definitely on her claims, the others did not insist; and France was excluded from the committee of valuation.

Lord Castlereagh did not dare to carry this intelligence to M. de Talleyrand: he sent to M. de Talleyrand his brother, Lord Stewart, the English ambassador at Berlin, who presented himself at the French embassy with many excuses and embarrassed explanations. As M. de Talleyrand was not to be trifled with when the interests of the French legation at Vienna were at stake, he asked Lord Castlereagh's brother, very drily, who those were that opposed the admission of France to the committee, and added, with bitter irony, that doubtless it was the *Allies* who did not deem her presence. Lord Stewart ingeniously admitted it was, and M. de Talleyrand, transported with rage, exclaimed, "Since you are still the *Allies* of Chaumont, settle your affairs among yourselves. This very day the French embassy shall leave Vienna, and your future acts shall be invalid in her eyes, as in those of the kingdoms whose interests are sacrificed. Europe shall learn what has occurred. France shall be informed of the part she was expected to play, and England shall be told of the weak and inconsistent conduct of her representative. She shall be told that, after abandoning Saxony and Poland, he rejected the aid by which he might have saved them." These words contained serious threats against Lord Castlereagh, and implied that his position with regard to the British Parliament would be rendered very embarrassing. Lord Stewart was very much alarmed, and lost no time in informing his brother of the storm that was gathering. Though M. de Talleyrand's menaces were not taken literally, still the dread of their consequences not only on the tranquillity of Europe, but still more on the British Parliament, when it should become known that Saxony and Poland might have been saved, and were not, because of admission to a ridiculous system of exclusion carried out against France, influenced Lord Castlereagh so powerfully that he spoke to the *Allies* in a tone he had never before assumed. He assembled them immediately, and pointed out the danger of provoking an explosion that might set Europe in flames, and declared that, for his part, he would not assume such a responsibility in the eyes of England. He was warmly supported by M. de Metternich, and, in spite of the Prussians, it was decided that France should be represented in the committee. This intelligence was communicated to M. de Tal-

leyrand, the same evening, in a polite note from Lord Castlereagh.

The Duke de Dalberg was chosen to represent France in the committee of valuation. The members met on the 31st of December. The Russian representative was appointed to state the Russian and Prussian pretensions, and he was in a position to do so with propriety, as Russia, by her arrangements concerning the frontiers of Galicia with Austria, and her abandonment of Posen to Prussia, appeared as a disinterested party in the question. He consequently spoke in the names of both countries, and made the following proposals: that Prussia, besides the duchy of Posen, which Russia had resigned in order to smooth away the newly-arisen difficulties, should also get the entire of Saxony as a compensation for the losses she had sustained. According to the Russian commissioner, less could not be done to restore Prussia to the position she held in 1805, or to fulfil the promise made to her that her geographical configuration should be improved. The King of Saxony was to be transported to the banks of the Rhine, where Prussia would give him a territory containing seven hundred thousand inhabitants and with the pretty town of Bonn as a capital. He should also have a voice in the Diet. This prince, surrounded by a Catholic population, placed on the frontiers of France, would prevent all contact between that country and Prussia. As to Poland, the Russian Government would bestow on her a separate existence and government, and would ultimately enlarge her dominions by the addition of the ancient Polish provinces in the actual possession of Russia, subject, however, to the will of the Emperor, who would organize the kingdom of which he was the head, according to his own views. The Emperor would henceforth bear the title of Czar of Russia and King of Poland. The other Powers, co-partitionists of Poland, who in virtue of the present peace would retain certain Polish provinces, should pledge themselves to give these provinces local governments calculated to secure them a certain civil independence, a *régime* conformable to their national customs and favourable to the development of their commercial and agricultural interests.

This project, supported by the most specious reasoning, was a last effort attempted by Alexander to gain Saxony for his ally the King of Prussia. But it was very evident that, his own wishes being gratified, he would not proceed to extremities to support his proposition.

The further consideration of these propositions was adjourned to the 2d of January.

On the 1st of January, Lord Castlereagh received important intelligence, which produced a very great change in his position. England had just signed articles of peace with the United States, and was henceforth at liberty to employ all her forces on the European continent. She had been very much occupied by this American war, in which she had employed all the troops that the protection of the kingdom of the Low Countries left at her disposal. Being freed from this anxiety, she was now in a position to assemble eighty-four thousand men in Holland in the spring of 1815, and thus furnish a large contingent should it be necessary to form a new coalition against Prussia and Russia.

The committee of valuation reassembled on

the 2d of January to discuss the propositions presented in the Emperor Alexander's name. The Prussians had left the exposition of the common project to the Russians, but now undertook its defence themselves. This was an important juncture for them. It was their last attempt to get possession of Saxony; and, should the verdict of a diplomatic tribunal decide against them, no resource was left but an appeal to arms. Their agents, assembled in great numbers at Vienna, united great zeal to the wonted animation of the military men of their nation, and were constantly boasting that it was they alone who had saved Europe, and that, consequently, they could not expect a refusal; that Saxony was their special conquest, won at Leipsic on the fearful days of the 16th, 17th, and 18th of October, 1813; that refusing to give them possession of it was depriving them of their own property, but that, supported by their companions in arms, the Russians, they would not allow the price of their blood to be wrested from them; that, besides, they were not alone working for Prussia, but for Germany, as every territorial aggrandizement of the latter was a step toward German unity, which could only be accomplished by Prussia. It was M. de Stein, especially, seconded by many German patriots, who repeated these assertions, and constantly recapitulated what he and those who shared his opinions had suffered in the cause of Germany.

Under the influence of this excitement, the Prussian legation exhibited in the committee all the ardour of the national feeling. Perfectly conscious of the opposition that these bold assertions and pretensions would meet, they became angry instead of calm, and even went so far as to say that, should what they asked be refused, they would, if necessary, obtain it by force. Lord Castlereagh, who possessed all the pride of an Englishman, and who was surprised at meeting such treatment from persons to whom he had shown so much favour, proudly met the declaration and threats of Prince de Hardenberg, and told both Russians and Prussians that England was not of a temper to submit to dictation, nor would she do it, but would meet force by force. He left the assembly in a state of excitement very unusual to him, and immediately hastened to the French embassy, where he was sure to find a response to his resentment. Forgetting now the *Allies* of Chaumont, he told M. de Talleyrand all that had passed, and again declared that England would not suffer such insolence. Freed from the incubus of the American war, Lord Castlereagh had recovered his firm bearing, and showed a determination to brave the worst rather than submit to the arrogance of the Russians and Prussians. His adroit interlocutor skilfully flattered all his opinions, and reminded him of what he had said a few days before, that a few written words binding England, Austria, and France would put an end to the boasting of Russia and Prussia. "Put your ideas on paper," replied Lord Castlereagh; and M. de Talleyrand, without waiting for a second invitation, took up his pen. Between them, they drew up a project, by which Austria, France, and England bound themselves to furnish 150,000 men each, to act in common should the defence of the balance of power in Europe expose them to the attacks of

enemies. These enemies were not named, but very plainly indicated. Lord Castlereagh took this plan with him, promising to return the following day, when he should have seen and consulted with M. de Metternich.

M. de Talleyrand had attained the great object of his wishes. He came to Vienna apprehensive that the existence of the French embassy might be ignored, instead of which the French legation was called upon to play an important part in the dissolution of the alliance of Chaumont, and, by the formation of a new alliance, was destined to support the principle of legitimacy. An important point was certainly gained by placing France in such a position, and it was no less a gain to dissolve the coalition of Chaumont and substitute another in its stead; but it would have been well to consider what was the object of this new alliance; for if it were to support equivocal or inimical interests, there would be less reason for congratulation, and the advantages gained might have been waited for a little longer, if by patience they could have been made more profitable to France.

Lord Castlereagh lost no time, for he seemed to hear already the cries of the British Parliament, reproaching him with having passed under the Russian and Prussian yoke. He sought M. de Metternich, whom he found quite as ready as himself to throw aside his ancient alliance-prejudices and accept the assistance of France against ungrateful and exacting allies. Having arranged all these points with the Austrian minister, he returned to M. de Talleyrand on the morrow,—the 3d of January, —and brought with him the plan of the previous day, now skilfully elaborated. Lord Castlereagh and M. de Metternich had taken great pains to give the project a pacific, and, above all, a defensive, character. In fact, no attack was to be made. But should one of the contracting Powers, in all sincerity, and without any interested views, support a plan in conformity with the balance of power in Europe, and thereby incur the displeasure of other Powers, in that case France, England, and Austria bound themselves to furnish 150,000 men each in defence of the party attacked. Lord Castlereagh wished to add to these stipulations, which were drawn up at great length, another, which in his opinion was indispensable and not to be disputed by any one. It was as follows:—

“As it was not now a question of ambitious projects, but rather of plans of conservation, and the maintenance of a sacred principle,—the preservation of legitimate princes on their thrones,—there could be no objection to announcing beforehand that in case of war—which God forbid!—each Power should consider itself bound by the Treaty of Paris, according to whose principles and text all States and frontiers were to be portioned out.”

Now was M. de Talleyrand taken in a terrible snare. If in the commencement he had been less forward and less decided in declaring himself for Saxony,—if, instead of eagerly offering his aid, he had waited to be asked,—he would not have been obliged to submit to these conditions, and probably they would not have been proposed. A profound silence would have been observed, and war should have borne its own expenses according to the issue, and the

services rendered by each Power. But, having so hastily declared his opinion in the case of Saxony, and blamed the different cabinets for their indifference, it was not possible for him to draw back, now that he was taken at his word, nor avow that France could, in certain cases, seek her own interests, having previously asserted that she only sought the maintenance of a principle. Had he sought any advantage for France, his proffered assistance would have been rejected, and England and Austria would have come to an understanding with Russia and Prussia, by yielding to their demands. In truth, this would have been no great evil, for the policy supported by these two Powers was the most disadvantageous for us; the house of Saxony might have been transferred to the Rhine, and she would have been a neighbour instead of Prussia.

And we might have done as well by striving to attain such a result in conjunction with the Russians and Prussians, who would have paid us in some way, and not asked us to make war for the sole honour of being their allies. But, having so long supported the English and the Austrians, whom we were constantly urging and imploring to act, we could not now raise an objection, and reject the proposed condition; and yet this condition was very bad. Now, at the end of twenty years of desolating warfare, when we had hardly entered upon the enjoyment of peace,—a peace that constituted the Bourbons' best title to popularity,—to compromise that peace, and run the risk of again pouring forth French blood in torrents, merely that Germany might have less cause of uneasiness from Russia, or that Prussia might give less umbrage to Austria, and to act thus whilst those very Powers for whom we were about to combat retained our spoils the more securely because of our aid, and we recovering nothing of what we had lost, should be reduced to the honour of fighting gratuitously for the very conquerors who had contributed most to bring us back to our frontier of 1792—this was, indeed, a sad fate! But, we repeat, it was now too late to draw back, for, after all that we had said and done, we could not refuse the convention of the 3d of January, nor the condition which, in case of war, bound us to make the Treaty of Paris the basis of a future peace. M. de Talleyrand signed without making a remark, and he was right, for it was only in silence that such a condition could be accepted. It should either be rejected with indignation and flung back to those who proposed it, or signed without a word of observation. So it was M. de Talleyrand acted. He did not even think of asking in return, a promise of Murat's dethronement, or an event that interested Louis XVIII. much more than the fate of Saxony. He feared to retreat for one moment the accomplishment of a result he had laboured so hard to bring about; and this treaty, so much desired by M. de Talleyrand, because of the importance it added to the French legation, was signed on the night of the 3d-4th of January, and dated the 3d. It must be confessed, this treaty was of little advantage to the reigning French dynasty, whose prejudices at most it could be said to flatter. The contracting parties pledged themselves to profound silence, to avoid furnishing the Russians and Prussians with an excuse for a quarrel and

perhaps, for war. Nor did they wish that the enemies of the coalition should enjoy the triumph of seeing it so scandalously divided. An exception, however, was made in favour of Prussia, Hanover, the Low Countries, and Sardinia, whose adhesion was worth seeking, and was indeed almost certain. The Prince de Reiche, on the part of Bavaria, and the Count of Münster, as the representative of Saxony, immediately gave their sanction to what had been done. The Low Countries and Sardinia joined a few days later. The secret was still preserved intact. A plan of military operations was to be concerted between Austria, Bavaria, and France, as the Powers most likely to take an active part in the war; and a wish was expressed at a skilful and friendly-disposed French general should come to Vienna to take part in the arrangement of this plan. M. de Talleyrand sought out General Ricard, who had fallen into disgrace under the Empire at the time of the unsuccessful attempt to obtain the sovereignty of Portugal for Marshal Soult. He was a man of talent, as well as a distinguished officer, and very well calculated to figure at a Congress composed of the highest personages of Europe. M. de Talleyrand immediately informed Louis XVIII. of the treaty he had concluded, and requested that General Ricard should be sent to Vienna.

Though the secret of the new coalition was apparently kept, still, from the similarity of sentiments expressed by the Courts of England, France, and Austria, it was evident that they had come to an understanding, and were resolved to support their views to the last extremity. The attitude assumed by Bavaria was no less significant symptom. Though the German States, including those of the North, shared in her opinions, she alone—thanks to the strength she had acquired during the last fifteen years, and to her geographical position, which removed her from Prussian interference—dared to speak as she felt, or hint the possibility of war. It was all in vain that the Prussians, both publicly and in the committee, exclaimed and threatened; they were allowed to talk, but nobody swerved from the central point,—the preservation of Saxony,—excepting the loss of some territory, to be applied to improving the configuration of Prussia, and meant, as was said, to punish King Frederick Augustus. It was a mere concession to the passions of the moment to say that this fortunate prince should be punished; for everybody knew that the fact of joining Napoleon for self-aggrandizement was a very general one, which had been committed by the greater as well as the lesser German princes; and it was equally well known that the unfortunate King of Saxony had only acted on compulsion; that the duplicity of his conduct in his dealings between Europe and Napoleon was the result of weakness of character, and, could his conduct be compensated by defection from France, the Prussian army had seceded with sufficient *éclat* to gain the pardon of its sovereign.

But, though it was agreed that the King of Saxony should lose a certain portion of his states, nobody would consent that all the conquered territory should be given to Prussia, and it was evident that on this subject a determination was come to that could not easily be

shaken. The imprudent chiefs of the Prussian army were disposed to make the attempt, but their king did not wish it, nor would Alexander have sanctioned such temerity, which would be nothing less than a pursuit of the impossible. When Alexander asserted in the committee of valuation that all Saxony ought to be given to Prussia, and consented at the same time to resign the duchy of Posen, he did all that his friend Frederick William could expect; nor would this friend have dared to ask him to engage in a war against France, England, and Austria and almost all the German States. The state of opinion was soon evident in the committee itself, from the attitude assumed by the different legations. Although Russia and Prussia still persisted in demanding Saxony, they did not hesitate to discuss arithmetical calculations when introduced by Austria. The latter Power undertook to prove that, considering what Prussia had already obtained in Poland, Westphalia, and the Rhine provinces, she could not claim more than three or four hundred thousand inhabitants from Saxony to recover the position she held in 1805, and to which it had been promised she should be restored.

The Prussian diplomatists took part in this controversy, and, opposing valuation to valuation, asserted that they ought to get more than half Saxony in territory as well as in population. Taking up this position was equivalent to admitting they were defeated, for they accepted the principle of their adversaries,—the conservation of Saxony,—with the exception of some sacrifices of greater or less extent. The treaty of the 3d of January, though kept secret, had, by combining the antagonists of Russia and Prussia, contributed not a little to solve the fundamental question. And, in fact, once the discussion was reduced to an arithmetical calculation, there could be no doubt of a good understanding being come to.

The month of January was devoted to discussions of this kind. One circumstance in particular contributed to bring about a definite result. The British Parliament was to assemble, as usual, in February. Lord Castlereagh had been recalled by his colleagues, in order to justify his conduct, which was not understood by the general public, and was, in the opinion of the better-informed, subject to the charge of inconsistency, for, though at the close he defended the cause of Saxony, he had at the commencement consented to sacrifice her. The Duke of Wellington was to leave Paris, and replace Lord Castlereagh at Vienna. The illustrious British Secretary of State, now certain of making Prussia submit on the fundamental question, was anxious to compensate her by smaller concessions, and so win her back by his favourite system of alliance, and at the same time facilitate the termination of the Congress by this compliance in ancillary points. He did not wish to leave Vienna until the principal questions should be decided and until he had something positive to communicate to Parliament. The desire to return to home was universal. The sovereigns, both those who received and he who gave hospitality, (it had already cost the latter twenty-five million francs,) were weary of this *mélange* of frivolous festivals and bitter discussions. They had passed two entire years—1813 and 1814—

in all the anxieties of a fearful war and of an armed and agitated diplomacy. They were impatient to return home, to look after their own affairs and enjoy the peace with their subjects. It is weariness, rather than reason, that terminates long disputes. Now every thing tended to concord, when for two months past every thing seemed to threaten a serious rupture, and a new war to determine the partition of the fruits of victory.

M. de Talleyrand, who was as anxious about appearances as essentials, even whilst he despised the former, had, in order to flatter the imprudent party that preponderated in France, persuaded the assembled sovereigns to mingle a funeral ceremony for Louis XVI. in the almost uninterrupted course of their festivities. This would naturally take place on the 21st of January. M. de Talleyrand attached great importance to this, on account of the double effect it would produce at Vienna and at Paris. At Vienna it would be an act of marked deference to the French legation, whilst it would please the royalists at Paris, and prove how much influence M. de Talleyrand exercised over crowned heads. Such a proposition, whether opportune or not, could not be rejected, for none could refuse a tribute of homage to the august victim of the 21st of January; nor could it be unwelcome to the sovereigns, as it was a new malediction pronounced upon the French Revolution. The Emperor Alexander, though he offered no opposition, made a simple observation. He said that nobody could doubt the sentiments that all Europe entertained for the unfortunate Louis XVI., but that this was a display of party feeling which, impolitic at Paris, could only obtain a bad and unworthy imitation at Vienna. He added that, should the ceremony be performed, he would of course attend, as the members of the French legation must best understand the feelings of their Government.

This assemblage of crowned heads, that had a little before incurred such ridicule by the excess of their amusements and luxury, now suddenly donned habiliments of woe, and repaired in a body to the beautiful cathedral of St. Stephen, on the 21st of January, to assist at a solemn service in honour of Louis XVI. Nothing was wanting to the pomp of this ceremony. All the sovereigns came, accompanied by their courts, a French priest pronounced the funeral oration of Louis XVI. and Marie Antoinette, and, after a few hours of political mourning, they returned to the festivities and business of the Congress, of which, indeed, the former are as celebrated as the latter.

MM. de Metternich, de Talleyrand, and Lord Castlereagh, seeing Prussia nearly conquered, concerted, under the direction of Prince de Schwarzenberg, the representative of Austrian military interests, how they could best divide Saxony and satisfy the cupidity of her neighbour without entirely destroying her existence. It was at first agreed to deprive her of her territories on the right of the Elbe, particularly of Upper and Lower Lusatia. Saxony proper was more on the left of the Elbe, the possessions on the right being only annexed provinces. However, though deprived of Upper and Lower Lusatia, she would retain the territories that bordered on Bohemia, that is, Bautzen and Zittau.

It was next decided to diminish the Saxon territories on the left of the Elbe, in the direction of Misnia and Thuringia,—that is, toward the extensive and level but least populous portions of the country, leaving her the mountainous districts, inhabited by an industrious race, and interesting to Austria, whose frontier they touched. It was at first intended to take but four or five hundred thousand souls from the hapless monarchy thus exposed to the specula of the geographers of the Congress; but, in compliance with Lord Castlereagh's entreaties, who was anxious to recover the friendship of the Prussians, and, above all, to bring things to a speedy termination, it was decided to take seven thousand inhabitants out of the two millions one hundred thousand that the old Saxon territory contained. She was thus deprived of a third of her population, and of very nearly the half of her territory. The places she held on the Elbe possessed a value far greater in proportion than the extent of territory. Ossa-Torgau—was very warmly disputed. Having given up Wittenberg, it would be a serious loss to abandon Torgau, which, in Napoleon's opinion,—an opinion supported by his acts,—was become the principal fortress on the Upper Elbe. Prince de Schwarzenberg and M. de Talleyrand resisted this demand, but, being abandoned by Lord Castlereagh, they were obliged to yield. A plan was finally arranged by which Prussia, in addition to the important fortress of Torgau and Wittenberg, obtained one-half of the Saxon territory and a third of her population. It is true that Frederick Augustus retained the principal cities and the richest territories of Saxony.

This plan, decided on by Austria, France, and England, whilst the members of the committee were disputing, and often disputing violently, was presented to the committee of valuation in the beginning of February. This was evidently a concerted plan, and it was plain that the Russians and Prussians would not obtain much more, even if they proceeded to an open rupture. The promises made to Prussia were more than fulfilled, for she was restored to the position she held in 1805, and a better configuration was given to some of her frontiers. From a second Saxony was become a third rate German State. Russia, having resigned Posen and run the risk of war for Prussia, could not be expected to do more. Prussia saw this, and determined to yield. But there was one point which touched her nearly, because it involved the self-love of her army and the commercial interests of her merchants; and this was the possession of the celebrated city of Leipzig. The acquisition of Leipzig would be an indemnification to the pride of the Prussians for the humiliation of being obliged to evacuate Saxony, which, they said, they had been allowed to occupy, which was equivalent to a promise of permitting them to keep the country forever.

Consequently, on the 5th of February, Prussia presented a note in which she, for the first time, consented to the proposed arrangement, but demanded the city of Leipzig, in consideration of having received the poorest and least populous portion of Saxony,—a portion that did not contain a single important city. She insinuated, though in very moderate terms, that, whilst she was restored to the position she

in 1805, Austria gained, in addition to the possessions at that period, fifteen hundred souls directly, and at least two indirectly, in her collateral branches Venice, Modena, Parma, &c.

It generally happens, the last day of disaster was one of the most stormy. King Frederick William had an interview with Lord Castlereagh, and told him that there was a disposition to dishonour him, and render his visit to Berlin impossible by depriving him of it after having been allowed to occupy it, at the possession of Leipzig could alone make the bitterness of such a sacrifice. It was his reply that it was his own fault if evading Saxony was so disagreeable, for he had possession of it by a kind of *coup de tête*, it was impossible to support, and he had to blame himself for the consequences. Castlereagh communicated Frederick's overtures to his allies; but, besides that, for commercial reasons, would prefer Saxony should belong to a small rather than a large State, the British minister met with resistance that he yielded the point. It was agreed that some further concession should be made to Prussia, who disputed only, thousand by thousand, the souls in contested territory. England, on Hanover's side, gave up seventy thousand souls out of the hundred thousand she was to get from Prussia, and fifty thousand in the Low Countries. Alexander, in his desire to satisfy Prussia, made a still greater sacrifice. He wished that Cracow from its moral, and from its military importance, should be free and neutral cities. He abandoned Cracow, and consented that Thorn should be given to Prussia, who would thus be put in possession of all the fortresses on the Lower Rhine, Thorn, Graudenz, and Dantzic, after already obtained all the fortresses on the Upper Rhine, Torgau, Wittenburg, Magdeburg, &c. It was at this price that Leipzig was restored to Saxony, and that Prussia agreed, at the proposed arrangements. She certainly had no cause to complain; and yet the Duke of Brunswick, giving way to an exaggerated expression unworthy his well-known moderation, exclaimed that no soldier could wear a Prussian uniform with honour. He had, however, and was fated to prove again, that it was worn with honour.

The principal difficulties of the Congress were removed; and if the questions still left were called for exertion and even sacrifice, still none were of a nature to excite passions of war, of which the sovereigns were convinced that they showed a disposition to return to their homes and leave their subjects to settle the remaining business.

There was a final difficulty to be overcome in regard to Saxony, and one not to be deceived even by the allies, powerful as they were, this was to obtain the consent of King Frederick Augustus. This gentle and affable monarch, a prisoner at Berlin, had resolved never to give his sanction to any act inimical to his country, and especially to any attempt to reduce the seat of his power from Saxony. Now, according to the principle laid down then and at other times, no territorial possession could be lost and irrevocably acquired without the

free and voluntary consent of the lawful sovereign. This principle, which had been constantly asserted by M. de Talleyrand with the intention of employing it afterward against Napoleon, gave great moral strength to the King of Saxony at an epoch when the *definite* was the passion of the moment, and, when the common desire was to exchange the instability of the revolution for the stability of monarchy, all acquirers of new States were most anxious to obtain the consent of the old possessors. To obtain the King of Saxony's consent, it was determined to set him at liberty and bring him to Austria,—not indeed Vienna, where he would find his despoilers as well as defenders, but to Presburg, whither the three principal ministers of the courts that had espoused his cause, M. de Talleyrand, M. de Metternich, and the Duke of Wellington, (he had replaced Lord Castlereagh,) should repair, and use all their influence to induce him to resign.

With the exception of Italy, almost all the European questions were solved. The formation of the kingdom of the Low Countries, which had been stipulated by England at Chaumont and Paris, was definitely agreed on at Vienna. It was decided that the Prince of Orange, the representative of this house, should receive the united sceptres of Holland and Belgium, with the title of King of the Low Countries. Some other territorial arrangements were added to this. It would not be allowed that Luxembourg and Mentz should become Prussian fortresses. The duchy of Luxembourg was given to the future King of the Low Countries, together with the fortress of that name, which was to remain federal, and Prussia, who was already mistress of all we had possessed on that side, was to be compensated by the hereditary states of the Prince of Orange, which she could exchange with the house of Nassau. By these arrangements France would touch but a very small part of the Prussian frontier, that is, from Sarreguemines to Thionville, instead of from Sarreguemines to Metz.

Many changes were made to give a better configuration to the Prussian territory. Under the title of the Rhenish provinces she got the old ecclesiastical electorates of Cologne and Treves, together with the duchy of Juliers, all which, since 1803, had composed a large part of the French territory on the left of the Rhine. There still remained of our possessions on this shore the old Palatinate, called the Palatinate of the Rhine, comprising the country between the Rhine and the Moselle, from Lanterberg to Worms, and from Bohrbach to Kreuznach. There was no great difficulty on this subject, as Austria and Prussia had agreed that the Moselle should be the line of demarcation between their dependencies. The Rhine Palatinate was given to Bavaria, and what remained of the territories of the Elector of Mayence was given to Hesse-Darmstadt, which had been restored together with Hesse-Cassel. Mayence, which had been given to Hesse-Darmstadt, was to be a federal fortress, in which the German States were to keep a common garrison. In return for these acquisitions, Hesse-Darmstadt gave Prussia the ancient duchy of Westphalia, by which Prussia, that was already in possession of the grand duchy of Berg, which we had held on the right of the

Rhine, acquired a continuation of territory from the Rhine to the Elbe, and only interrupted by the territories of minor German princes dependent on her. Besides the principality of Hildesheim, Prussia gave Hanover Ostfriesland, which England ambitioned, because it lay contiguous to the sea, and Hanover gave her the duchy of Lauenburg on the right of the Elbe, of which Prussia intended to make a very important use by giving it to Denmark in exchange for Swedish Pomerania.

The unfortunate King of Denmark was little better treated than the King of Saxony. He had been faithful to France, because his maritime principles united him to her against England. He had acted honourably throughout, and when our defeat obliged him to abandon us, he did so without any duplicity. But, badly recompensed in these days of violence for his honourable conduct, he was deprived of Norway, which was given to Bernadotte and Finland, both as an indemnity for Finland, in order to procure him a degree of popularity that might compensate for his want of birth. When these territories were taken from Denmark, she was promised Swedish Pomerania, containing the fortress of Stralsund and the island of Rugen, trifling remnants of the old Swedish possessions on the German continent; she was also promised further indemnities. The king had come to Vienna to demand the fulfilment of this promise; but, though he conducted himself with the greatest discretion and dignity, and defended his incontestable rights with the greatest moderation, and though his claim was fully allowed, still, no notice was taken of him, nor were his ministers admitted to the Congress. The celebrated phrase, *Vae victis*, was never more completely verified; and out of the thirty-two million inhabitants taken from the French Empire a small number could not be found to compensate this prince for what had been taken from him; and this for the sake of the general good, as was said, which good consisted in giving Norway to Bernadotte. Besides, it was not even certain that he should get the miserable indemnity of Swedish Pomerania, as Bernadotte refused to give it up, under the pretence that the Allies had not fulfilled their engagement to give him Norway, as the Norwegians had resisted by force of arms.

The measure of iniquity which, in all probability, have been filled, but that Prussia wished to get Swedish Pomerania. In fact, the Prussian territory, which had not been formed by nature, but by the ambition of its princes, who had put it together by scraps and morsels, was now undergoing a general remodelling; and the time was well chosen, for, after the short opposition that had been made to the Prussians, they were now allowed to do as they pleased; by England because she wished to recover their alliance for the sake of the Low Countries, by Russia through complaisance, and by Austria that she may not be disturbed in Italy. Prussia was, consequently, seeking exchanges that would secure her a continuity of territory from the Rhine to the Niemen. It was for this reason that she gave Luxembourg, as we have said, to the house of Orange, in exchange for its hereditary possessions, in order that she might exchange these with Nassau for different places in Hesse. For the same reason, she

had demanded a portion of the old electorate of Mentz, which she meant to give Hesse-Darmstadt for the duchy of Westphalia. Lastly, she wished to get Swedish Pomerania, that she may have all the mouths of the Oder, and the shores of the Baltic, from Mecklenburg to Memel. In return, she offered Denmark the duchy of Lauenburg, which she had just got from Hanover, and which was contiguous to Holstein. But Denmark did not consider this as an equivalent for Swedish Pomerania, and any thing but a fulfilment of the solemn promise made her of a full indemnification for Norway. Prussia thought to supply the deficiency by some millions of crowns; for territory she would have by purchase, if she could not succeed by force. The King of Denmark, seeing the hopelessness of his case, and considering that a territory contiguous to his state in Holstein was better than one so distant as Pomerania, (which, besides, he was not anxious of getting, as Sweden refused to give it up,) yielded at last to the wishes of Prussia. Denmark deserved better treatment, as well in consideration of the personal qualities of her sovereign and people and the honourable manner in which she had acted, as for the guardianship of the Sound, which made her of more importance to the balance of power in Europe than many others. But she was conquered; and if when the victor is one man, like Napoleon, the conquered have some chance of touching his generosity, they have none when subdued by many, as was now the case; for all, except with their individual interests, and seizing what they could, had neither feeling nor shame, because that in a corporation each member casts upon the entire body the responsibility of acts for which the individual would blush.

In order to complete her projects of exchange, Prussia was obliged to submit to the recognition of Bavaria's claim to the principalities of Anspach and Bayreuth, in Franconia, and which had formerly belonged to Prussia, that she may in return obtain the grand duchy of Berg, which had formerly belonged to Bavaria.

Thanks to all these arrangements, Prussia was now as well circumstanced as she could expect. Her territories extended without interruption from the Meuse to the Niemen, and expanded a little, though not as much as she desired, in the direction of Saxony, and by the restitution of Posen she was better enclosed by the provinces of Silesia and Old Prussia, at the same time that she got possession of the different fortresses on the rivers that watered it, — Thorn, Graudenz, and Dantzic, on the Vistula, Breslau, Glogau, and Stettin, on the Oder, Coblenz and Cologne, on the Rhine. She had but one thing to regret, which was being placed on the left of the Rhine, — not because of the neighbourhood, which, fortunately, is not an infallible cause of hostility, but of the distrust she must feel in the possession of a territory that had belonged to France for twenty years. To the honour of her good sense, it must be admitted that she had never wished, and had only accepted it through complaisance to England, who wished to keep her at unity with France as long as possible. Had Saxony been ceded to Prussia, she would willingly have abandoned the left bank of the Rhine, even though France should get the better part of what she left.

Now that the reconstitution of Prussia and the re-establishment of the two houses of Hesse were effected, and the account with Denmark was unjustly closed, the most important business of the Congress was the arrangement of the Bavarian territory. This had been commenced even in Paris. It was understood that Bavaria should restore the line of the Inn, the Tyrol, and Vorarlberg to Austria, who would give her in return the grand duchy of Würzburg, which was become vacant by the return of the Archduke Ferdinand to Tuscany, the principality of Aschaffenburg, which had been taken from the Prince Primate, the deposed head of the Confederation of the Rhine, and the greater part of the ancient Rhine Palatinate, which had formerly belonged to Bavaria. This, under the pretext of restoring each State to its old position, was a new plan of the Allies of Chaumont for keeping Bavaria as well as Prussia at enmity with France. Once that the question of Saxony and Poland, by which a new war had been threatened, was decided, it would seem that a spirit of compliance had taken possession of all, and through the mediation of France the courts of Austria and Bavaria, with both of whom she was allied since the 3d of January, were on the eve of coming to an understanding. The sole remaining cause of disagreement was the old bishopric of Salzburg, which was necessarily to be divided, as the line of the Inn and La Salza was taken as a frontier. Bavaria was desirous of retaining at least Berchtesgaden, which had been formerly so contested on account of its salt-mines. To avoid giving a decision in this case, France urged the disputants to come to an arrangement; and they were about to do so.

Every question relating to the north of Europe was now settled. The principles of the new Germanic constitution were decided on. Austria, who had acted with great prudence throughout, had refused the revival of the Germanic crown, which would have been willingly conceded; nor would she accept the Belgian provinces, where her sovereignty was preferred to that of Holland, and which England would have willingly accorded in order to bring her, as well as Prussia and Bavaria, into contact with France. Though Austria was very well satisfied that others should commit themselves, she had no desire to compromise herself by taking possession of the Belgian provinces, which, though rich, beautiful, and well situated, were remote from her capital and too near France. The Venetian and Milanese provinces, less industrial, but equally fertile, and better situated with regard to her, suited her better. She had already felt the weight of the Germanic crown, and did not desire to possess it again, should it be elective. But, as Prussia, in hope of obtaining it one day herself, insisted on this condition, Austria had the good sense to refuse a cumbersome crown, which each successive emperor could only obtain by flattering the electors at the commencement of his reign, and which might possibly be transferred to Prussia. She preferred having this crown abolished, and converted into what was more useful to her,—the perpetual presidency of the German Diet. It is true that by this arrangement a most important question—the military command of the Confederation—was left undecided, and would become a future difficulty. At this moment peace was the absorbing thought,

for it seems that the public mind is capable of entertaining but one idea at a time.

The ancient Diet, simplified with Austria as perpetual president, was the system generally preferred. Instead of the divisions into different orders, and a large number of voters, it was determined to yield to the spirit of the time and concentrate the votes as well as the sovereignty. An ordinary assembly of seventeen members was established, of which each had but one vote, however extensive his possessions, be it Austria or Baden, Prussia or Mecklenburg; whilst the inferior princes were to be united in different groups, with a vote to each group. The free cities—which were reduced to Hamburg, Bremen, Frankfurt, and Lubeck—were to have but one vote between them. Besides this ordinary assembly, established in perpetuity at Frankfurt, for the arrangement of current business and for the decision of cases of competency, another assembly was established, called the General Assembly, consisting of sixty-nine voters, in which each member should have votes proportioned to his possessions when fundamental laws on the great interests of the Confederation were in question.

It must be admitted that this new constitution of the Germanic Confederation was in conformity with the annihilation of social distinctions, and with the decreased number of petty princes, and, in a word, with the simplification of modern society. The confederates preserved their independent sovereignties, could have their separate armies, and send representatives to the different courts of Europe; but they could not contract any alliance inimical to the federal compact or the safety of the confederation, and were bound to furnish, each according to his possessions, a contingent in defence of the general interest.

These were healthy ideas, and, though capable of misapplication under certain circumstances, may be considered as some of the best decisions of the Congress. When the month of February arrived, these different resolutions were either reduced to writing or agreed on; for all these minor questions had been under consideration during the discussion of the important interests which seemed to threaten a universal conflagration. When the results obtained by the particular treaties contracted between the interested parties had been approved, it was determined to draw up a general treaty, composed of all that these minor treaties contained of a general and permanent interest, and which was to be signed as arbiters and guarantees by the eight Powers who had subscribed the treaty of Paris, and which the other States represented at Vienna were also to sign, as interested and personally engaged parties. This is what was afterward published under the title of "Final Act of Vienna."

The drawing up of these different acts was commenced in February, 1815, but could not be finished for several weeks. Meanwhile, the last doubtful questions were taken into consideration. That of Switzerland was of the number. This question had been a subject of serious consideration to the special committee intrusted with its arrangement, and also to the three Powers who interfered privately, Russia, Austria, and France. The Emperor Alexander, influenced by liberal principles, did not wish to

appear in Switzerland as the author of an extravagant counter-revolution; Austria, who cared little about liberal sentiments, sought only what was practicable and reasonable; whilst France, who had adherents both in Berne and in the small democratic cantons, was anxious to bring about a decision that would not offend either. From this general spirit of moderation nothing could result but what was rational and conformable to the spirit of the times. We have already seen that the three principal Powers were opposed to the new cantons being again reduced to a state of dependence, and had laid it down as a principle that the nineteen cantons, constituted by the act of mediation, should be maintained. France, whose aid against this decision was implored by the inhabitants of Berne, Uri, Lucerne, Schwitz, and Unterwalden, was happily represented by an enlightened man, the Duke Dalberg, who succeeded in making those cantons understand that no other principle was admissible; for it would be impossible to reduce Vaud, Argovia, Saint Gall, &c. to their ancient state of dependence, without a civil war,—an idea revolting to Europe. The principle of the nineteen cantons was, consequently, definitely admitted. However, as Berne had been formerly so extensive and rich a canton, and was now become so small, it was only just and prudent to make her some compensation. Imperial France, whose spoils were used to satisfy every demand, had left some fragments of territory (Porentruy and the ancient bishopric of Basle) vacant on this side of the Jura. These were offered as an indemnification to Berne, and were finally accepted. It was also decided that the new cantons should make a pecuniary compensation to the old that had been injured by their separation. The new cantons, happy to secure their existence at this price, consented to make this compensation, and thus all difficulties were smoothed away. It was also required in the federal compact that the principle of civil equality, both between the cantons and the different classes of citizens, should be proclaimed and approved. Finally, Switzerland was presented with some gems that had fallen from the imperial crown of France; for Neuchâtel, which had been given to Prince Berthier, Geneva, which had been lately restored to its primitive state of a free city, together with Valais, which was vibrating between France and Italy, were formed into three new cantons and added to the nineteen.

The plan of transferring the federal government alternately to the different cantons, which had been suggested by the act of mediation, was continued in operation. Alexander, still under M. de la Harpe's influence, wished to exclude Berne. But France, from a sense of justice, and in consideration of her Swiss adherents, objected to this; as did also Austria through sympathy with the aristocratic party: therefore Berne, Zurich, and Lucerne continued to be the three cantons between which the government of the Swiss Confederation was to alternate.

By these arrangements the act of mediation was almost renewed, whilst some reparation was made to the interested parties, and three cantons were added that had been taken from France. These resolutions, being communicated to Switzerland, and having received the

approbation of the different cantons, were about to receive the sanction of Europe with the usual guarantee of perpetual neutrality.

Italy still remained; and here were two questions of great importance, those of Naples and Parma, which had been deferred, hoping that time would bring about a solution. As we have already said, the Sardinian question had been decided by giving Genoa to Piedmont, and by securing the succession to the Carignan branch. Austria did not allow any one to decide in her affairs, but, having adjudged Lombardy as far as the Po and Tessin to herself, she had put the collateral branches of the imperial family into immediate possession of the duchies of Tuscany and Modena. There remained to be decided only Parma and Naples, which the two houses of Bourbon demanded for the Queen of Etruria and Ferdinand IV. M. de Talleyrand, who in the commencement had been so anxious about the Neapolitan affairs, had allowed himself to become so involved in the Saxon question that he had hardly spoken of Italy to M. de Metternich, and had not stipulated that Austria should support France on the Naples question, as a reward for the assistance he had given in the affairs of the North. He had contented himself with the unimportant reservation that all votes on Italian affairs should be provisional until the question of the Two Sicilies should be decided. This precaution was of no great use, for the only question that could have been decided was that relating to Sardinia, and we were more interested than any other Power in rendering these decisions definite.

M. de Talleyrand left all to the good feeling of the Congress, until the very last day, and in the desire that every one felt to leave, it was very much to be feared that the Congress would break up without coming to a decision, which would save Murat, who, being in possession, needed only silence to gain his cause.

However, Louis XVIII. did not cease to urge his plenipotentiary on this subject, which interested him much more than Saxony. The monarch, whose views in foreign policy were narrow though sensible, had no desire that his legation should play an active part at Vienna. He was proud, as we have said, of being a Bourbon, he was happy at being placed on the throne of France, and thought himself sufficiently great if he could only hold his position. He only wished to get rid of Murat, whom he regarded as the secret accomplice of Napoleon, ready to provide him with the means of coming again into action either in France or Italy, in which views it must be admitted that he showed more foresight than M. de Talleyrand, who concentrated all his energies on Saxony. However, now that the Saxon question was decided, M. de Talleyrand, urged on by Louis XVIII., began to speak of Italy to all the members of the Congress; but he was now powerless, in consequence of not having taken his precautions beforehand with England and Austria. That he should have given time to M. de Metternich for the Neapolitan question, which required time for its full solution, was very proper; but that he should ally himself gratuitously to England and Austria for the sole pleasure of signing a treaty, without making any stipulation with regard to Murat, was a mode of proceeding for which he might

have paid dearly and which did eventually cost him dear. The Emperor of Russia, to whom he spoke on the subject, listened as though he had fulfilled all his obligations toward France. Lord Castlereagh listened like an ally who wished to make himself agreeable, but who took no interest in questions of legitimacy, and was, besides, embarrassed by the promises made to Murat. M. de Metternich listened to the French ambassador like a wily diplomatist, who, having made use of France, did not trouble himself about being grateful, and was constantly apprehensive of exciting a commotion in Italy.

Happily for M. de Talleyrand, he found a support in the Duke of Wellington, who had lately arrived at Vienna. Louis XVIII. had, during his residence in England, acquired much of the English habits and manners, and had adroitly flattered the British generalissimo and won him over to his interests. When Lord Wellington arrived at Vienna, he rendered important service to Louis XVIII. by the manner in which he spoke of him and his Government. "Many faults are committed at Paris," he said, "but the king, who has more sense than any of his family, is generally esteemed. The army is more formidable than ever. It might be dangerous to employ the soldiers at home, but abroad they would be both faithful and terrible. The finances are re-established, and even flourishing. A Government alone is wanting; there are ministers, but no ministry; but that can be provided for. Of all the European Powers, France is the best prepared for war, and would be the least embarrassed were warfare renewed. She must not be neglected." These words were of more service to us than all the exertions of the French legation, and, being uttered when the Russians and Prussians were called upon to come to a decision, had a very marked influence upon them.

Lord Wellington had fully adopted M. de Talleyrand's ideas with regard to Naples. And this for more practical reasons than the principle of legitimacy; for, as M. de Talleyrand wittily said in one of his letters to Louis XVIII., the English had formed their moral notions on this subject in India. The Duke of Wellington believed that, the Bourbons reigning at Paris, at Madrid, and at Palermo, whilst Murat remained unsupported at Naples, it would soon become impossible to remain at peace with him, and that within six months all Europe would be thrown into confusion, which would give Napoleon an opportunity of again coming into action. This he explained to the Emperor Alexander, to the King of Prussia, to the Emperor Francis, and more especially to M. de Metternich, who was the least inclined of all to interfere. These observations were met by an objection quite as true,—that the execution of the project would be most hazardous, as it would certainly involve all Italy in war. M. de Talleyrand replied that France and Spain would become responsible for the risk, and, provided that a simple declaration were made, importing that the Powers assembled at Vienna would only recognise Ferdinand IV. as King of the Two Sicilies, France would promise to bring the affair to a conclusion. To this was objected the engagements that had been made with Murat, and also some doubts as to the means of execution,—not

that any one supposed it would be difficult for the French troops to beat the Neapolitans, but it was doubted whether the French army, when led on against Murat, and probably against Napoleon, would remain faithful to the Bourbons.

Nobody at Vienna felt any interest in Murat. On the contrary, all wished his dethronement. But, now that the Saxon-Polish question was decided and the wishes of the different Powers gratified, they were only anxious to leave, and scarcely listened to what was said about Naples: in fact, all were resolved to subscribe on the last day to whatever determination France and Austria should arrive at. In the midst of this universal indifference, an accidental circumstance came to M. de Talleyrand's assistance. Lord Castlereagh wanted his help on the question of the slave-trade, in which the English people took the greatest interest, but about which the continental cabinets cared little, who only took part in that, as in the Neapolitan question, through complaisance. Lord Castlereagh was returning to England to announce the conclusion of peace, and the long-wished-for humiliation of France, with the establishment of the kingdom of the Low Countries, the definite possession of Malta, the Cape of Good Hope, the Isle of France, and many other magnificent gifts; but still he needed something else to gratify the popular feeling, which, though most noble in its object, (for it was the abolition of slavery,) exhibited the characteristics of most popular wishes,—want of reflection, and impatience. Excited by the speeches of popular orators, the English people were seized with an absolute passion for the emancipation of the blacks, and this passion was sincere; but we must be permitted to say that, though sincere, this passion was not wholly disinterested. If the abolition of slavery involved a political convulsion in India, the English might have been less anxious for its success. But, as it only endangered America, they were free to indulge their feelings without risk to their interest. The English were, consequently, passionately anxious for the abolition of the slave-trade, and as Louis XVIII. was aware of the intensity of their feelings on this subject, he very craftily advised M. de Talleyrand to have no scruple in drawing what advantage he could from their sentiments.

As the continental Powers had neither interest nor opinion on a question that only concerned the maritime States, which were France, Spain, and Portugal, and as of these France had most authority, M. de Talleyrand would necessarily have great influence, which he promised to use in Lord Castlereagh's interest, provided that, in return, the latter would assist him in the affair of Naples. These two questions, which were left for last, were on the part of the Congress mere acts of politeness toward the cabinets interested in them.

Lord Castlereagh first demanded the absolute and immediate abolition of the slave-trade on the shores of Africa, and even required that the maritime States should have the right of watching each other, that is, the right of search, to be certain that none took part in the slave-traffic; and he further demanded that the colonial goods of nations that refused to join this humane league should be refused admission to the other markets.

This was asking a great deal, for the right of search could only be exercised by England, who alone took an active part in the pursuit of slave-dealers. This negotiation was at first confined to the maritime Powers; but, as Lord Castlereagh felt himself isolated among them, he had induced the continental States to take part in the debate,—a measure which gained him some support. He endeavoured to prove to France, Spain, and Portugal that the slave-trade was injurious to them, that it was dangerous to have a great number of blacks in their colonies opposed to a small number of whites, and that it would be much better to content themselves with the negroes they had, and the posterity they would have when better treated. He was told, in reply, that in all probability he was right, but that in Spanish and Portuguese colonies the number of blacks and whites was nearly equal, whilst in the English dependencies there were about twenty negroes to one white,—which made his advice very applicable to his own countrymen, who had taken their precautions and filled their colonies with blacks during the maritime war, which neither the French, Spanish, nor Portuguese had been able to do; that, consequently, they would not for some years have a sufficient number of hands, and would not until then be in a position to abolish the slave-trade. After a good deal of discussion, France for herself was satisfied with a term of five years, and had induced Spain and Portugal to be content with eight, at the termination of which period the slave-trade was to be abolished.

This was not exactly what Lord Castlereagh desired; but his arguments produced no result. The reciprocal right of search, which was now brought forward for the first time, surprised and displeased every one. It had been maintained, as a principle, that each nation should have the jurisdiction of her own flag in time of peace. As to a repressive commercial measure against the maritime nations who would not join in the English system, the difficulty was avoided by referring its decision to the time when the slave-trade being abolished, a penalty might be attached to its infringement. In order to satisfy Lord Castlereagh, who wished to have something definite to present to the British Parliament, a declaration, addressed to all nations, was drawn up in the names of the Powers assembled at Vienna, condemning the slave-trade as a moral enormity, declaring it a crime against civilization and humanity, and expressing a wish for its speedy abolition. In this the Allies of Chaumont, supported by the representative of the French Restoration, put forth a declaration which, though essentially true, equalled in style the most declamatory emanations of the Constitutional Assembly. MM. de Nesselrode, Metternich, and Talleyrand supported Lord Castlereagh in terms at which they smiled in secret, for the interest they felt in the emancipation of the blacks might be easily divined from the manner in which they disposed of European peoples.

Now that the Congress was approaching its close, and that questions of self-interest had been so largely cared for, it was thought proper to bestow some consideration on questions of a moral nature; and many excellent regulations for the free navigation of large rivers were

adopted. It was decided that all should be open, and that the States on their shores could refuse any merchandise they did not wish to accept, but could not prevent their transit to other States; that only a duty on tonnage could be enforced, and that independent of the quality or value of the cargoes; that these dues should be always expended for the maintenance of the navigation of the rivers; and, lastly, that these dues should furnish sufficient means of towing. These noble principles, dictated by justice and good sense and announced in perfect sincerity, have done lasting honour to the Congress of Vienna, and are, with the neutrality of Switzerland and the abolition of slavery, the sole among its decrees which have been enrolled among the laws of nations.

All was now finished at Vienna except the questions of Parma and Naples, which were still in suspense, and all that M. de Talleyrand could obtain from Lord Castlereagh, whom he had so ably assisted on the slave-question, was that on the very day of his arrival in London he would lay the Neapolitan question before the British cabinet. The question as to whether Napoleon was to be left at Elba or transferred to the Azores was considered involved in that which touched Murat; and all discussion on that subject was avoided, in consideration of the treaty of the 11th of April, by which Alexander considered himself personally bound. But, it was said, would he arranged the same day, but it would be difficult to come to an immediate decision. It was insisted that the two millions promised by the treaty of the 11th of April should be paid to Napoleon, and M. de Talleyrand was told that it was not only mean, but dangerous, to refuse, as the non-payment would give Napoleon a legitimate excuse for considering himself freed from his engagements in Europe.

The Congress was about to close, and no decision had been come to on those questions that were most important to the Bourbons. Lord Castlereagh was to leave on the 15th of February, and Alexander, after many delays, on the 20th, when Murat, as was his wont, came to the aid of those who desired his ruin but who could not accomplish it. His minister at the Congress, the Duke de Campo-Claris, had been excluded for the same reason as the representatives of Saxony, Denmark, and Genoa. From this gentleman he received constant information of the efforts of the two houses of Bourbon against him, and of the possibility of an explosion on the question of Saxony. For Murat, thinking this a good opportunity, sent a note through the Duke de Campo-Claris in which he detailed all that had been done contrary to his interests in the Congress of Vienna, and demanded whether he was to consider himself at peace or war with the two houses of Bourbon, and insinuated that in case he should be forced to defend himself he would be obliged to pass through several Italian States. Now flattered himself that this declaration arriving at the very moment of a rupture between the greater Powers would furnish him both the right and the opportunity of acting against the enemies of his crown. Thus was M. de Metternich's prophecy fulfilled, that the allies need only wait a little while, and they would have a specious pretext for considering them-

reed from their engagements to the Murat. Besides, the papers that had and on Lord Oxford, whose arrest we ready mentioned, together with other ted documents, proved that Murat had all the troubles that threatened Italy. ere, therefore, sufficient reasons now to inst those who still considered them- bound to Murat.

the Duke de Campo-Chiaro received re-mentioned note, he at once saw how unely it arrived; for the question of and all others that had threatened the e cabinets had been definitely de- He immediately waited on M. de Met- showed him the document he had re- but begged him to consider it as non- , for that he would take upon himself res it. This did not prevent M. de ch from telling of its arrival to the Wellington and Lord Castlereagh, who o M. de Talleyrand, who told every- This document, a seasonable arrival to who sought a cause of complaint, pro- much effect as though it were officially ed; for persons are never more power- cited than when they wish to be so. eternich, in concert with M. de Talley- d the Duke of Wellington, decided Austria was now free from all anxiety ard to Saxony and Poland, she should : one hundred and fifty thousand men 'o, and declare that these precautions en to protect her territory and that of rian princes established in Italy. This ost a decided declaration of war against nd at the same time gave Lord Castle- opportunity of revealing all the intri- this affair to Parliament. It was re- r France to strike the last blow. M. de nd was satisfied with a measure which ost the solution he had desired, and : had almost despaired of obtaining. rma question was decided at the same The question had undergone many des. At the earnest entreaties of nd Spain, the committee appointed to into Italian affairs had admitted that, : universal restoration of hereditary It would be difficult to refuse the re- ment of the house of Parma. But the f the 11th of April, constantly de- y Alexander, was a restraint, as was ilderation for Maria Louisa's father. It ost impossible to get out of this em- ent. At one time it was thought to e question at the Pope's expense, by aria Louisa one of the legations, which eath should revert to the Holy See. Pope's representative asserted, very at his master had as much right to the s as the other restored monarchs had dominions, and that these provinces, est belonging to the States of the e were absolutely needed for the sup- he Pope's finances. As this could not d, M. de Metternich thought of an- pendent, that of giving Parma to the f Etruria, and Lucca to Maria Louisa, h she would be nearer the sea and the f Elba, together with a pension, of France and Austria should pay half ia Louisa's death, Lucca, instead of

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descending to her son, should revert to Tus- cany, and spare France the offence of seeing a descendant of Napoleon on an Italian throne. However, when Austria consented that Parma should pass out of her family, she stipu- lated that she should be allowed to keep Plai- sance, on account of the bridge across the Po.

This arrangement was accepted by France and Spain, but had not been yet proposed to Maria Louisa. M. de Metternich was chosen to make the communication to her. He had an interview with the princess, and, speaking in the name of the European Powers and of her father, endeavoured to make her under- stand the difficulties of this affair; but, to his great surprise, he was very badly received. Though this princess was not naturally en- dowed with much strength of character, she obstinately refused to resign Parma, which she defended as her son's patrimony and her own dowry.

Her skilful counsellor, the Count de Neiperg, had advised her to appeal to her father and to the Emperor Alexander, and embarrass them by the steadiness of her opposition, assuring her that this was the only way to succeed. She followed this advice, and succeeded in arousing her father's affection and piquing Alexander's pride, which gave her so much courage that, when M. de Metternich returned, she decidedly refused the offer that was made her, alleging, to M. de Metternich's surprise, what it would have been much more to her own honour to conceal, that she was more repelled than attracted by the neighbourhood of Elba, as she was determined never to join her hus- band. She had evidently sought in other ties that domestic happiness which she preferred to rank, grandeur, and even to her own dignity.

It was now necessary to inform the commit- tee appointed to consider Italian affairs that the proposed arrangement was rendered im- possible by Maria Louisa's resistance. The case was embarrassing, when M. de Metternich asked M. de Talleyrand for a few days' delay, assuring him that this last difficulty should be decided before he left Vienna. As the more important affair of Naples was about being ar- ranged, M. de Talleyrand thought he could afford to wait the decision of the Parma ques- tion, and he did so. Here is the solution of the difficulty devised by M. de Metternich, and of which he made a mystery to the French representative.

Lord Castlereagh had left Vienna for London, and intended to pass through Paris on his way. He was to see Louis XVIII.; and, as he pos- sessed great influence over this prince, as head of the British cabinet, it was hoped that he could induce him to agree to certain arrange- ments, a concession that could not be expected from M. de Talleyrand, who considered the affair of Parma as exclusively dynastic, and felt an almost personal interest in having it decided exactly as the Bourbons desired. As the cabinets of London and Vienna were more united than ever, Lord Castlereagh undertook to perform this service for Austria, and ask Louis XVIII., in the name of the Emperor Francis, and in consideration of the domestic sacrifices he had already made, to leave Parma to Maria Louisa during her life; that mean- while the Queen of Etruria should have Lucca

with a pension, and that at Maria Louisa's death Parma should revert to the Queen of Etruria or her children, and Lucca to Tuscany.

This, which was not in itself an unacceptable arrangement, being directly proposed to Louis XVIII. by his Britannic Majesty's chief Secretary of State, and in the name of two courts on whose decision the Neapolitan question depended, had every prospect of success. This was the cause of its being concealed from M. de Talleyrand, and his being requested to wait a few days.

When Alexander was about leaving Vienna, he wished to know what was to be done concerning a family project that interested him very much,—the marriage of his sister the Grand Duchess Anne with the Duke de Berry. The acute Count Pozzo considered that this marriage would be serviceable to France by procuring her a powerful alliance, and to Russia, that would thus obtain a higher matrimonial connection than she had yet made. This latter consideration had very little weight with Alexander, who was only desirous of a political union of the two countries; and certainly, had this alliance been accepted, and had we joined the Russian and Prussian policy on the Saxon and Polish question, there were few advantages that Alexander would have refused to France. His mother, a most respectable princess, entertaining all the sympathies of a French emigrant, was most anxious for an alliance that would be so flattering to her pride. The French court, less eager for the connection, would have acted like those noble families who consent to form advantageous marriages in an inferior rank, but the Bourbons were restrained by the question of religion, and demanded, as we have already said, that the princess should change her faith before coming to France. Alexander, dreading lest he should seem to purchase this alliance by an act of apostasy, required that the princess should remain a member of the Greek Church until she had quitted the Russian dominions, but that she might change her faith anywhere else that was decided on. These were very trifling objections on both sides, when the union was recommended by so many important political reasons. But this question had lost much of its interest at Vienna, since M. de Talleyrand had so openly quarrelled with Alexander. However, this marriage was not altogether impossible, and before the end of the Congress Louis XVIII. desired his minister to free him from the demands of the Russian court, if he should think it necessary to reject them definitely, in which case he wished to have reasonable cause for drawing back.

M. de Talleyrand, convinced that by the treaty of the 3d of January he had procured France better and more solid allies, and anxious to lessen the importance of a marriage to which he had raised so many obstacles, wrote a long letter to Louis XVIII. which is perfectly characteristic of the policy of the time. If the court of France, he said, in the early days of the Restoration, when she was still weak, had attached importance to a closer union with Russia, she was no longer in the same position. She had contracted the highest and strongest alliances, and was again become the centre of European policy. It was others who should

now seek her support: she stood in need of none. The Russian alliance was of very little importance at present. Alexander was a very thoughtless prince, imbued with the wildest ideas, and with whom it would be impossible to act in concert. Besides, the reigning family of Russia was far inferior in point of birth to the Bourbons, to whom it would be a sort of degradation to accept its alliance. Austria would be more worthy of such a union; but, as the marriages contracted with that house had been unfortunate for both countries, he unhesitatingly advised taking a princess in the house of Bourbon itself.

When Louis read this letter, he considered that his minister's opinions on those subjects were very just, that he entertained very sound ideas on the different gradations of crowned heads, and that his advice ought to be adopted. He consequently gave up all idea of the Russian alliance, and left M. de Talleyrand to free him from it with the tact which this great diplomatist exhibited on all occasions.

As long as any thing remained to be done at Vienna, M. de Talleyrand avoided entering into any explanation on the projected marriage. However, on the eve of the general departure he was obliged to put aside his reserve. In his last conversation, Alexander said to him, with an indifference that was only assumed, "I have been asked for my sister's hand; but I will not dispose of it without entering into definite explanations with the court of France. My mother would be very much pleased by this marriage, and I would consider it a very honourable connection; but I wish to have every thing decided. I have refused some offers, and," he said smiling, and in a tone of humility the most natural, "I have also met with refusal. Ferdinand VII. asked for my sister in marriage, but finding she belonged to the Greek Church, he withdrew his demand." M. de Talleyrand smiled in his turn, and replied, with as much ease as his august interlocutor, "The conduct of His Catholic Majesty must explain to you the embarrassment of His Very Christian Majesty." Then, turning this serious subject into a jest, he told the Czar that the most pious Louis XVIII. was inflexible on the question of religion. Alexander did not insist, and did not seem to attach much importance to an affair that offended him deeply, for the Russian court was most anxious for the marriage of the Grand Duchess with the Duke de Berry. It was the fate of this princess to be disappointed in two alliances that would have made her a participant in the vicissitudes of our revolution, and to be finally seated on the throne of the Low Countries, where she felt their reverberations.

This was the last question of importance that M. de Talleyrand had to consider; and the manner in which he conducted this and all others in which he was engaged is characteristic of the man, his time, and his court.

The Congress had now brought its great work to a conclusion, and the sovereigns were about to take their departure, leaving to their ministers the less important part of drawing up their decisions in proper form, when, in the beginning of the month of June, a sudden burst of intelligence, which, however, did not surprise any one, had a most powerful effect on the sentiment of its own people.

Austrian consul at Genoa announced that Napoleon had escaped from Elba and disembarked at the Gulf of Juan. Whither was he going? What was his object? were the questions asked in terror. According to M. de Metternich, he would go to Paris; and this was the most natural supposition. M. de Talleyrand, anxious to deceive himself, said that Napoleon was gone to Italy. All were in the greatest excitement, and for some days public opinion hovered between these two fears, of which, indeed, one was far more probable than the other. The first feeling of terror was succeeded by anger. All were indignant with Alexander, as the author of the treaty of the 11th of April, by which Elba had been assigned to Napoleon as a residence. Alexander sincerely admitted his fault, but promised to repair the injury into which his generosity had betrayed him, by gigantic efforts against the common enemy. All departures were immediately countermanded, and it was arranged that the sovereigns should not separate until this new danger should be past.

All the resolutions that had been decided on were to be maintained, and, although their sanction by the final act of Vienna was delayed for six months, they were no less definite, and their existence was to be dated from the six last months of the year 1814, whose events we have recorded. We may, therefore, consider the Congress of Vienna as terminated at this period, at least as far as concerned the limits and constitution of States; and this is the fittest moment to pronounce an opinion on the European arrangement that has resulted from it, and which has been one of the most permanent recorded in history, having endured for nearly half a century.

In considering the Congress of Vienna under the double aspect of justice and policy, this is in our opinion what may be said of it; and in delivering this opinion we lay aside all national prejudices, for the historian ought not to identify himself with any country or century, that so he may the more freely approach the eternal springs of truth.

In hearing the complaints of those who are suffering from the crimes of others, and in listening to the generous indignation they pour out against these vices and against those who abandon themselves to their influence, we are tempted to say that these men could never become guilty of the like crimes. But, alas! the generous maxims of the eve are not always the guide of the morrow's conduct. Every Power in Europe had suffered from the boundless ambition of Napoleon, and had so execrated its excess that the world might be justified in believing that should these oppressed sovereigns ever become the arbiters of Europe, justice and moderation would be the characteristics of their reign. We have just seen how their acts corresponded with their words. The only difference of conduct discernible between Napoleon and the Allies is, that they were four instead of one, and that the ambition of each was restrained by that of the three others. As to France, she was treated as a conquered nation, which was natural, if not just. France, or rather he who governed her, had tyrannized in the hour of victory, and our conquerors did the same in their turn. It is childish to com-

plain in such circumstances, and ridiculous to assert one's dignity at a rival's tribunal. It is on ourselves, on our own courage and prudence, and not upon others, that our dignity depends; and, if we wish to avoid the consequences of errors, we should neither commit them ourselves, nor allow others to do so in our name.

However, we may, without subjecting ourselves to the accusation of national prejudice, be permitted to say that though the Allies justly blamed the ambition of Napoleon, they fell into the same excesses themselves, that after the different partitions of Poland and the Germanic secularizations, which so much extended the dominions of the continental Powers, after having seized those colonies which gave such unlimited extent to the naval rule of England,—having done all this, we say, it was neither just nor conformable to the general balance of power to reduce France to the position she held at the end of the eighteenth century. We may be permitted to say that if France had not outstripped all calculations by the fertility of her genius, of her soil, and of her Revolution, and had not become as great in peace as she had been in war, Europe would have felt a want,—Europe, that cannot without risk be deprived of one of the States of which she is composed, and of France less than of any other, for England sometimes needs her against Russia, Russia against England, Prussia against Austria, Austria against Prussia, Germany against the two latter; and, finally, there is one cause that can never progress without the aid of France,—the cause of civilization.

But a truce, we repeat, a truce to useless complaints against treatment that we drew upon ourselves. Let us speak of others! All that did not belong to the Four or did not directly interest them was shared like booty found in a sacked city. The lesser German princes, the free cities, the property of the Teutonic knights, the property of the knights of Malta, ecclesiastical principalities and old republics, were absorbed, without pity, into the territory of the conquerors or their dependants. Were it necessary to calm the jealousy of a neighbour, to subsidize a useful ally, to give a better contour to the frontier of one of the Four or give another a more extended sea-board or a more convenient boundary, a German prince was immediately sacrificed, a free city was incorporated, an old republic suppressed, or a German ecclesiastical State secularized. No objection was raised when Austria took Venice, or Piedmont Genoa. Woe to any State in which one of the Four did not take an interest! Denmark, that represented no other interest than that of the freedom of the seas, at that time regarded as an entirely French interest, was deprived of Norway, to increase Bernadotte's popularity in Sweden. In return, Denmark got Swedish Pomerania; but Prussia wished to have this province in order to continue her line of coast from Stralsund to Memel, and Denmark was deprived of this weak indemnity, which was replaced by one still more illusory,—the duchy of Lauenburg, and some million crowns. Unfortunate Saxony, that had abandoned us at the battle of Leipsic, for which she deserved some reward from the conquerors, was defended,

because her preservation was of importance to Austria and Germany, but though she found advocates, still half her territory was sacrificed to Prussia, that during ten years had not ceased to complain of the spoliation of German States. Poland found protectors, because of the jealousy that England and Austria felt toward Russia, but it was finally given to Alexander under a pretext which veiled the ambition of the one and the weakness of the others,—namely, that this country was again to become a kingdom and be placed under one master; a sad illusion, that could not last, for the semi-independence thus bestowed on Poland would awaken the desire and supply her with the means of throwing off the Russian yoke. She would naturally revolt and entail upon herself the punishment of being reduced to a Russian province, and Europe would then learn that she had enlarged Russia by the addition of all Poland. As France, whose feelings were little regarded, could alone take an interest in Italy, the country was given to Austria, to Austrian princes and Austrian influence,—a ponderous gift, whose weight the cabinet of Vienna would one day feel and regret. No restraint was imposed on England. In addition to Gibraltar, she wished to have the Ionian Isles, the Cape, the Isle of France, and some of the Antilles; and she met with no opposition. She also wished to have the mouths of the Scheldt and Rhine, in order to form the kingdom of the Low Countries in opposition to us; and this wish was gratified without the least consideration for the dislike of the Belgians to the Dutch. Sometimes, indeed, one or other of these four co-partitionists of the world, amazed, not at his own cupidity, but at that of his three associates, felt inclined to blame; but the words of reproof faltered on his lips, so ill qualified was any of the Four to pronounce a lesson on moderation.

It is no vulgar resentment that leads us to these reflections, but, having exposed the faults of Napoleon, we possess the right to point out the faults of those who succeeded to his rule, and who, under pretence of avenging Europe, had only divided it among themselves. It is the duty of a historian to lay bare the faults of all without distinction; and we may be permitted to remind the reader that our errors were those of a man, and not of France, and that when the allies crossed the Rhine they solemnly promised that this distinction should be remembered,—a promise, alas! that was soon forgotten, as the Treaty of Paris proved.

Having considered the Congress of Vienna with reference to equity, we shall now look upon it from a political point of view. The whole policy of that assembly had but one design,—to accumulate precautions against France. Instead of being ruled by the Bourbons, France should have been still in the hand of the dreaded conqueror on whom they wished to be avenged, when so many precautions were taken against her. And in that case England should have been allowed to act, and she would have neglected no precaution. Still mindful of the continental blockade, she was determined to prevent us from ever approaching the shores of the North Sea or the Mediterranean, and she could not bear the idea of our ever again visiting Antwerp or Genoa. It was on this account that she founded the kingdom of

the Low Countries, and favoured the revival of Piedmont. She chose well when she selected the houses of Orange and Savoy to oppose us, for, besides the recent injuries endured by both, the one had acquired its glory in fighting against France, the other by making use of and then betraying her.

She, therefore, intrusted them with Antwerp and Genoa. She did not stop there, but, acting on an idea of Mr. Pitt, she compelled France to accept the Rhenish provinces, in order to establish an enduring animosity between the Power and us. But even these precautions did not satisfy her. In order to place Bavaria in the same position as Prussia, she, together with Austria, restored her the Palatinate of the Rhine. It was not from hatred, but policy, that Austria adopted the views of England; but, though she was willing to compromise often with France, she would not compromise herself, nor would she ever listen to the proposal of resuming the sovereignty of Belgium. France, though very indignant with us, understood very clearly the part that was forced upon her, complained of it to England, and insisted that she should get Saxony instead of the Rhenish provinces, but in the end was compelled to accept what she was offered. Alexander saw through all these plans, at which he often smiled, and would willingly have helped us, but, seeing us so obstinately and incomprehensibly allied to England and Austria, he drew back, expressing his contempt for our foolish policy.

In thus accumulating distrustful interests and inimical States around us, the Congress of Vienna originated the policy of the Holy Alliance, which has ruled Europe for nearly half a century,—a policy which its authors meant to be eternal, but which, like every thing else, has yielded to the influence of time; for the kingdom of the Low Countries, founded on the union of two hostile peoples, has been dissolved, and England, the obstinate enemy of revolutions, has learned to look upon them in another light, Savoy, after forty years of blind hostility to France, has suddenly returned to her old policy of making use of her, while Austria, oppressed by the burden of her Italian possessions, has resigned a part of them; a policy that has nearly passed away, as a natural consequence of its weakness, but which the jealousy of Europe and the imprudence of France might revive at any time, and which it is the interest of both to terminate, for with regard to Europe this policy has the bad effect of making her neglect all her interests for one,—that of checking us,—and has made her in some sense the adversary of human progress, the patroness of antiquated abuses, and not unfrequently the protectress of bad Governments, and, above all, by this policy she promotes the demagogic and powerful aid of France; a policy no less injurious to France, whom it isolates, whom it condemns to permanent opposition to Europe, by seeing her most legitimate plans rejected merely because they are hers, whom it leaves without allies either in peace or war, and makes the accomplice of demagogues, and the terror instead of the admiration of the world; a policy which it would be as mad in her to retort, by alarming Europe and compelling all nations to seek their safety in uniting against us.

Indeed, this policy was quite natural at the epoch of which we speak. It was the necessary result of a long and fearful struggle, and we must not be too severe in reproving the diplomatists, who believed they were only using a legitimate means of defence when they built up this antagonistic policy against France. Nor must we forget that those who directed the Congress, though enemies of France, and especially of the Revolution, against which they had struggled for twenty-five years, were now carried away by a violent reaction, which, however, they endeavoured to restrain within certain limits. In many things they had acted very wisely, for, after all, they were the greatest of their age, the most skilful and the most enlightened, and, though at the head of the counter-revolution, they were much more rational than the counter-revolutionists of Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, or France. As it was in their power to restrain the counter-revolutionists of Switzerland, they did so, and, not being able to do more than advise those of Spain and France, they gave them excellent counsels. In fine, though each of the *voués* listened only to the dictates of national ambition when boundaries were to be traced, still they have left, in the treaties on the abolition of slavery, and the freedom of river-navigation, principles worthy of the French Revolution, of which they were by birth and duty the inflexible opponents.

Now that we have spoken of victorious Europe, and of the manner in which she acted at Vienna, let us speak of ourselves and of our Government, and endeavour to pronounce a just judgment on both.

Three opportunities occurred by which the fate of France might have been decided,—the armistice of the 23d of April, the treaty of peace on the 30th of May, and at the Congress of Vienna.

Unpopularity has long lain, and still lies, heavily upon the armistice of the 23d of April, when the French negotiator abandoned, as was said, with a *stroke of his pen*, all the great fortresses of Europe, and an immense war *matériel*. This unpopularity, whose weight fell on M. de Talleyrand and the Count d'Artois, we consider quite undeserved. A wild and unanimous cry demanded the evacuation of the French territory; this cry, extracted by suffering, was uttered without reflection. Whatever might have been done, the allied troops could not retire in less than two months, and in that time peace might be signed, and in fact was signed. The armistice ought to have been deferred until the conclusion of peace,—an arrangement that might have been easily effected, as warfare had ceased, and then some compensation might have been obtained for the surrender of the European fortresses. But the cry that demanded the evacuation of our territory was so natural and so strong that it was not in human nature to resist, and more than excusable to yield to it. Now, demanding the evacuation of our territory necessarily originated the demand that we should evacuate the foreign territories, of which we were still in possession. The one naturally induced the other. It may be answered that in giving up Magdeburg, Hamburg, Texel, Breda, and Berg-op-Zoom, we might have kept Antwerp, Luxem-

bourg, and Mayence. Had we made the attempt, the negotiators on the other side would have considered it a proof of our secret intention of preserving the line of the Rhine, to which they never would consent. The passionate desire for the evacuation of the French territory naturally induced the evacuation of foreign possessions, and the armistice of the 23d April was the inevitable consequence. The popular cry which condemned this armistice, after having imperatively called for it, is utterly unjust, and in equity we are bound to absolve the prince and the negotiator who signed it.

The armistice once signed, there was no need of treating immediately of peace even at Paris, nor of adding the precipitation of a definite treaty to the precipitation of the armistice. At Paris our adversaries were united for our spoliation; at Vienna they might quarrel over the spoils. We ought, therefore, to have awaited the opening of Congress before deciding our fate. There was no occasion to hurry, as the armistice had made every one's position bearable. Blood no longer flowed; the Powers had got possession of the fortresses they had so much desired; the Prussians had Magdeburg, the English Antwerp, and the Germans Luxembourg and Mayence. We were restricted to the frontier of 1790; and therefore this delay could not arouse any prejudice in our favour. Besides, as the Powers could not decide separately on the fate of any of their colleagues, they could not adopt a different conduct with regard to us. This so-much-blamed armistice restored us 300,000 men, which gave us a power of action, and our refusal to sign would have stopped all further proceedings. What we now assert is proved by the fact that once the fortresses were restored the coalition negotiators were no longer so eager to conclude. Alas! it was we who were eager, and that from want of foresight, General Dessoles being the only person in the council who saw the advantage of our coming to Vienna free of all engagements; and, in the second place, we erred through impatience,—impatience to sign, announce, and celebrate a peace which constituted the essential title, glory, and merit of the Bourbons.

It was through these combined causes—want of foresight and impatience—after the first excusable error of too hastily signing the armistice of the 23d of April, that we committed a second, which was wholly inexcusable. We concluded a treaty of peace at Paris, whilst our adversaries were still united, instead of signing it at Vienna, where they would have inevitably been divided.

The peace of Paris being signed, it would have been very difficult at Vienna to make any change in our fate. Still, every chance was not lost, provided we did not side too hastily with either of the two parties who were about to portion out Europe, and not add to the weighty chain of the Treaty of Paris the still heavier shackles of immature decisions. There was no need of haste in the choice to be made between those Powers, whose dissensions were already evident. On one side we had Russia and Prussia eager to get Poland and Saxony at any price, and even willing to relinquish their hostility to us, provided we forwarded

their views; and on the other, England and Austria, whose only object was to shackle us and unite all Europe in opposition to us. Under these circumstances, it is evident that we ought not to have hesitated in our choice; for if Posen and Dresden involved European interests, the Scheldt, the Rhine, and the Alps presented an interest exclusively French. The conduct of Saxony at Leipsic, and of Europe at Paris, justified us in preferring our own interest to that of others. And, supposing that we ought to have been equally distrustful of all these opposing ambitions, that very circumstance ought to have rendered us more cautious in coming to a decision. Had M. de Talleyrand been less impatient, when he arrived at Vienna, to make a choice, whose merit was very doubtful, or to announce the principle of legitimacy so dogmatically,—had he not been so eager to assume a part in important affairs, which was eventually sure to fall to him,—had he contented himself with saying, with all that disconcerting phlegm which he possessed in so high a degree, that as France had been treated without any consideration, or rather deceived, in the May of 1814, when she had been promised an increase of territory and population, that was afterward refused, she was now at liberty to seek only her own interest: that her ambition should no longer disturb the world, but that when the world should be disturbed by the ambition of others she would choose the part consonant with her own policy. And having declared these sentiments, France might have waited until her assistance should be sought (as it infallibly would have been) by the divided parties. France's position would have been thus considerably changed. Alexander and Frederick William were so earnest and so anxious, they would have offered any thing; and as the Rhine, the Scheldt, and the Alps involved only English and Austrian interests, they would have made any concession we desired in that direction, and the largeness of their offers would have been proportioned to our slowness in coming to a decision. Had the dispute led to war, there is no doubt but that we might have got a part, at least, of the left bank of the Rhine. (On the other hand, if matters did not go so far as war, Austria and England, alarmed at seeing us united to Russia and Prussia, would have been obliged to yield to the pretensions of the latter, and we should have thus obtained, without war, a better result than we did; for Saxony, instead of Prussia, would have been our neighbour on the Rhine, where she would have succeeded the complainant, accommodating, and much-regretted ecclesiastical electors of Mayence, of Treves, and of Cologne, who were formerly our neighbours, and whose place is now occupied by the most military Powers of the Confederation,—Bavaria and Prussia. Thus, whatever followed, war or peace, our fate would have been better. Had war been the result, we should have had a chance of a better frontier; had peace succeeded, more tranquil neighbours. But it was not so. The cabinet of Paris, without unity or foresight, considered only what was immediately before its eyes; whilst Louis XVIII., intellectual, but absent-minded, and quite indifferent to foreign policy, looked upon intervention in foreign affairs as

a sad legacy bequeathed by Napoleon. He consequently left M. de Talleyrand full freedom of action, having perfect confidence in his skill, experience, and the influence he exercised in European diplomacy. When the latter arrived at Vienna, determined to support the principle of legitimacy, he found the *Fora* determined to decide every thing between themselves, which so irritated him that he placed himself at the head of the small German Courts, who flattered him by the eagerness with which they sought his aid, and he was thus compelled to become the defender of Saxony. He joined England and Austria, who were firmly resolved to confine us to the terms of the Treaty of Paris, against Russia and Prussia, who would willingly have made us some concessions; whilst he loudly declared that France wanted nothing for herself,—nothing but the triumph of principle, that is, of legitimacy.

Henceforth there was no chance of making any important alteration in our fate. We were undoubtedly, in very good company when we joined England and Austria; but the society of Russia and Prussia was not to be despised. But the greatest advantage we could hope from this alliance would be to commence a fresh war with Russia and Prussia; and this, that Austria should obtain the entire of Italy; that England should have Malta, Corfu, the Cape, and the Mauritius; that the kingdoms of the Low Countries and Piedmont should stand like great fortresses at our very gates; that Prussia and Austria, separated by Saxony, might have less cause of mutual jealousy; that Russia should be less contiguous to Germany; and if we conquered in the service of our masters, we should enjoy the advantage of still remaining bound by the treaties of 1815! Truly, considering the benefits to be obtained, it was not worth while to risk the advantages of the inter-concluded peace.

But this is not all; even taking the part we did, which assuredly was not the wisest, we ought not to have been so eager in offering our aid: we ought at least to have waited until we were asked. But, stung to the quick, M. de Talleyrand committed the error least consistent with his character:—he was too precipitate. It is certain that had he waited he would soon have been admitted to the discussion of the most important affairs, and, in short, enjoyed all the consideration due to the representative of France. But he became a solicitor, instead of being solicited, as he ought to have been, and, whilst offering the aid of 150,000 French, he appeared in the light of one who was asking instead of conferring a favour. And he presented, unconditionally, that in case of war France should remain bound by the Treaty of Paris. In his impatience to acquire importance in the eyes of the great Powers, he forgot to stipulate for the expulsion of Murat, the only question in which Louis XVIII. took an interest; and, had not Murat himself furnished an excuse for his dethronement, the sovereigns would have quitted Vienna without coming to a decision on the Neapolitan question. M. de Talleyrand was an able negotiator; dignified, haughty, and endowed with admirable readiness of reply when called upon to reprove the sallies of pride-swollen conquerors; but he was less a far-seeing politician than a shif-
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negotiator; and M. de Talleyrand committed the error, after having too hastily signed the peace at Paris, of forming his resolves too quickly at Vienna, and having come to a determination, he decided in favour of the Powers from whom we had nothing to hope, and against those who might have ameliorated our condition; and in making this choice, he asked no other recompense than the honour of gratuitously serving his new allies, to secure the triumph of what was at that time called the principle of legitimacy. Undoubtedly, if under ordinary circumstances, and in the normal state of things, with Europe in a state of profound tranquillity, when each sovereign would have found himself in a position consonant with the spirit of the times and of existing treaties,—if, under such circumstances, it was proposed to suppress a kingdom like Saxony, even though that suppression insured the greatest advantages to France, justice and sound policy would have induced us to oppose such an act; for every political convulsion which is not inevitable, every territorial dispossession which is not counselled by the strictest equity or by the irresistible course of events, is inhuman, imprudent, and dangerous; and M. de Talleyrand, in defending the cause of Saxony, would have served at the same time the cause of justice and sound policy.

But amid the wreck of the ancient order of things, at a moment when the fate of no kingdom of Europe was decided, when all were in suspense, and each sought aggrandizement in the spoils taken from France, at a moment when the Continental Powers, after having swallowed up Poland, felt no scruple in devouring Venice, Genoa, the free cities, the intermediary German princes, a moment when England seized upon every important maritime position on the globe, when the lesser States were not less eager for spoils than the great, a moment, in short, when self was the predominant thought, it was surely at such a time lawful for France to think of herself, and not limit her entire policy to the conservation of a German State, in which no other Power took an interest, and which had forfeited all title to France's protection. Under other circumstances, the policy of defending Saxony would have been not only the most generous, but the most prudent. But at an epoch when all established rights and treaties suc-

cumbed during a fearful war of two-and-twenty years' duration, and when all were about to be re-established on a new basis, M. de Talleyrand neglected the interests of France too much in advocating the cause of Saxony, and his conduct, which would have been otherwise inexplicable, can only be attributed to his impatience to play an important part and loudly defend a principle. But the sovereigns assembled at Vienna could not believe him serious, for the Austrian, English, and French diplomatists who so warmly defended this principle at Dresden sacrificed it at Vienna, Genoa, Malta, Stockholm, and in a hundred German principalities.

Thus, twice within two years the fate of France was decided by the most frivolous motives. At Prague in 1813, Napoleon had it in his power to secure to France an extent of territory greater than was even desirable for her solid greatness. But, blinded by an insensate ambition, he neglected the opportunity! And the Bourbons in 1814 neglected an opportunity of recovering some fragments of our lost greatness, and this through impatience to proclaim a peace, on which they based their principal title to popularity, as well as through want of reflection, want of experience, and a desire to uphold and see others uphold a principle that flattered their pride of birth. Sad fate of our country, after having been tossed by the storms of a fierce revolution, to find herself sometimes dependent on the whim of one man, sometimes on the blunder of a faction. Fortunately, material greatness is not every thing, and France has by her moral greatness recovered the position of which events had deprived her. But, in casting a glance over the desolating scenes we have described, let us pour forth a prayer that there may be at length established in France a political system of government, which, regardless of dynastic or party interests, unmoved by the passion of the hour, without a dominant taste for either peace or war, in short, free from all predilections, guided solely by state reasons, and having no other object in the direction of public affairs than the safety and prosperity of the country. May the Almighty deign to accord us this blessing, and France will then enjoy what she has never possessed, at least enduringly,—a position proportioned to her intelligence, to her valour and the torrents of blood she has shed.

BOOK LVII.

THE ISLAND OF ELBA.

DEATH of Lord Castlereagh at Paris—He obtains from Louis XVIII. the concession of Parma for Maria Louisa, and promises in return that Murat shall be expelled from Naples—Austria sends 100,000 men into Italy, and France sends 80,000 into Dauphiné—Internal state of France—Increased anxiety of the holders of national property, and increased vexation among military men—Discovery of the remains of Louis XVI., and funeral ceremony of the 21st of January—Changes in the Magistracy: M. Muraire is replaced by M. de Bèze, and M. Merlin by M. Moreau—Popular commotion on the occasion of Mademoiselle Raucourt's funeral—General Exelmans's trial is resumed—The Generals acquitted—The French army for the first time shows a disposition to interfere in politics—Some young Generals conceive the design of overthrowing the Bourbons—Conspiracy of the brothers Lallemand and de Lefebvre-Desnoyes—Aversion of the great personages of the Empire to take part in these designs—M. Fouché, less scrupulous, becomes the focus of every plot—M. de Bassano, who, as yet, has had no communication with the Isle of Elba, commissions M. Fleury de Chaboulon to inform Napoleon of what is going on, but does not venture to offer advice—Abolition of Napoleon at the Isle of Elba, and his manner of living there—Organization of his little army and a navy—What he does for the improvement of the island—State of his finances—It would be impossible for Napoleon to support the troops he had brought with him for more than two years—This circumstance and the information he receives from the continent, render him disinclined to remain at Elba—His reconciliation with Murat, and the advice he gives him—At the commencement of the year 1815, Napoleon learns that the sovereigns assembled at Vienna are about to resolve, that there is some idea of sending him to a more remote island, and that parties in France are in the highest excitement—He forms the resolution of immediately quitting Elba, wishing to profit by the long nights so favourable to his escape—The arrival of M. Fleury de Chaboulon confirms him in this resolution—Secret preparations for his enterprise, the execution of which is fixed for the 26th of February—His last message to Murat, and his embarkation at the evening of the 26th of February—Different occurrences during his voyage—Peculiarities at the Gulf of Genoa on the 1st of March—Surprise and uncertainty of the inhabitants on the coast—Failure of an attempt on Anthon, a bay of some hours at Cannes—Choice of two roads, the one leading to Grenoble across the mountains, the other to Marseilles, along the sea-coast—Napoleon determines to take the road to Grenoble, and by this choice secures the success of his enterprise—He leaves on the evening of the 1st of March for Grasse—Long and fatiguing march across the mountains—Arrives on the second day at Sisteron—Reasons why this place is not guarded—Occupation of Sisteron, and march on Gap—What takes place at Grenoble—Sentiments of the nobility, the *bourgeoisie*, the people, and the military—Determination of the Prefect and the Generals to do their duty—Troops are sent to La Mure to take possession of the Grenoble route—Napoleon, after having occupied Gap, advances on Grenoble, and meets at Le Mon the 5th battalion of the Line, which was sent to oppose him—He advances in front of the battalions and gives the breast to the soldiers—The latter reply by loud cries of *Vive l'Empereur*, and rush toward Napoleon—After this successful movement, Napoleon continues his march to Grenoble—On the way he meets the 7th of the Line, commanded by Colonel de la Boissière: these also join him—He arrives the same evening at Grenoble—The gates being closed, the people of Grenoble force and open them to Napoleon—He addresses the civil and military authorities in a liberal and pacific terms—Napoleon passes the 8th at Grenoble, sending on the troops that have joined him, amounting to about 8000 men—On the 9th he sets out for Lyons—Intelligence of his disembarkation arrives on the 16th at Paris—Effect it produces—The Count d'Artois and the Duke d'Orléans are sent to Lyons—Marshal Ney is dispatched to Besançon, the Duke de Bourbon to Vendée, the Duke d'Angoulême to Nîmes and Marseilles—The Chambers are immediately summoned—Uneasiness of the middle classes, and profound vexation of enlightened men, who foresee the consequences of Napoleon's return—The moderate Royalists, headed by MM. Lainé and de Montebello, wish to come to an understanding with the Constitutional party by inducing the Ministry and Administrative Bodies to adopt more liberal opinions—The Ultra-Royalists, on the contrary, regard the present misfortunes as the consequence of too much conciliation, and refuse to make any concession—Louis XVIII. is extremely perplexed, and remains in determination—Consequences of the events that occurred between Grenoble and Lyons—Arrival of the Count d'Artois at Lyons—He is received with coldness by the people, and with ill will by the troops—Fruitless efforts of Marshal Macdonald to induce the military of every grade to do their duty—The aspect of affairs becomes so alarming that Marshal Macdonald makes the Count d'Artois and the Duke d'Orléans set off for Parma—He remains engaged to organize a resistance—Napoleon's vanguard arrives on the evening of the 10th of March at the Bridge of La Guillotière, the soldiers that guard the bridge cry out *Vive l'Empereur*, open the city to the Imperial troops, and wish to seize Marshal Macdonald and effect a reconciliation between him and Napoleon—The Marshal sees all in gallipoli, in order to remain faithful to his duty—Triumphal entry of Napoleon into Lyons—Here, as at Grenoble, he endeavors to persuade every one that he wishes for peace and liberty—He issues decrees for the dissolution of the Chambers, for the convocation of the Electoral body in the Champ-de-Mai at Paris, and for various measures necessary to the success of his enterprise—Having remained at Lyons only as long as was indispensably necessary, he leaves on the morning of the 13th by the Burgundy route—He is received with enthusiasm at Mâcon and Chalon—Message of the Grand Marshal Bertrand to Marshal Ney—The latter is sincerely inclined to do his duty, but is embarrassed at finding himself amid a people and troops intensely attached to Napoleon—Marshal Ney resists during two entire days, but, seeing the surrounding cities and troops rising, he yields to the torrent and joins Napoleon—Triumphal march of Napoleon through Burgundy—Arrives at Auxerre the 17th of March—Formes the design of remaining there two days to concentrate his troops and march in military fashion on Paris—State of the capital during the past days—The efforts of the moderate Royalists to effect an amalgamation with the Constitutional party having failed, the only changes made are the dismissal of the War Minister, because he is disaffected, and of the Director of Police, because he is not considered competent—Installation of the Duke of Feltre as War Minister—Attempt and failure of the brothers Lallemand—This circumstance inspires the court with some hope, and a *grand conseil* is held, where Louis XVIII. is much applauded—Design of forming an army before Metz, commanded by the Duke de Berry and Marshal Macdonald—Stay of Napoleon at Auxerre—His interview with Marshal Ney, whom he with great tact prevents from imposing any condition—He leaves on the 19th, and arrives the same night at Fontainebleau—On receiving intelligence of his approach, the royal family resolve to quit Paris—Departure of Louis XVIII. and all the princes on the night of the 19th and 20th—On the morning of the 20th the public is still ignorant of the departure of the royal family—Half-pay officers who had assembled in crowds on the Place du Carrousel learn at length that the palace is empty, and order the tricolor flag to be hoisted on the royal residence—All the great personages of the Empire flock to the spot—Napoleon leaves Fontainebleau in the afternoon, and arrives in the evening at Paris—Excitement on his entrance into the Tuilleries—Causes and character of the extraordinary revolution.

LORD CASTLEREAGH, having left Vienna on the 15th of February, 1815, arrived at Paris on the 26th, and remained a few days, being impatiently expected in London by his colleagues, who dared not venture in his absence on a dis-

cussion of the acts of the Congress. He had seen Louis XVIII., had been received by the prince with great courtesy, and had succeeded in the negotiation he had undertaken, which consisted in leaving Parma to Maria Louisa

uring the life of this princess, and placing meanwhile at Lucca the heiress of Parma, that is to say, the Queen of Etruria. Louis XVIII. consented to this arrangement to please England, and especially to secure the assistance of this Power in the affair of Naples. As to the rest, the reports circulated about Murat's remnants simplified the difficulty to the English Ministers, and it had become easy to represent the King of Naples as unfaithful to his engagements, as a disturber of the peace of Europe, and as consequently deserving to be hurled from the throne upon which he had been for a short time suffered to sit. Austria was preparing to add 100,000 men to the 60,000 she already had in Italy, and Louis XVIII. had already decided in his Council that 60,000 men should be assembled between Lyons and Grenoble to assist by land and sea in the projected operations against Murat. Every thing was prepared to destroy, in Italy, the last vestige of Napoleon's vast empire.

But the destiny of the Bourbons had decreed that they should fall before Murat himself into the ever-open gulf of the revolutions of the century, but they were to reissue, more enduring and unfortunately less innocent. Their position, unhappily, was not more improved than their conduct. About the end of December 1814 that had been wished from the chambers having been obtained, they had been adjourned on the 1st of May, 1815, and the crown in throwing off an apparent yoke had flung away a best support, for the Chamber of Deputies was in an especial manner, in its timid but prudent progress, the faithful expression of public opinion, which, though declaring the Bourbons imprudent, and often even offensive, was still willing to maintain and support them. The Chamber of Deputies, which was only, we must remember, the ancient *Corps Législatif* under another name, though it sometimes severely blamed the folly of the emigrant party, gave a certain satisfaction to public opinion, and served as a salutary warning to the Government, and thus acted as a kind of mediator, but on one side prevented irritation from arising to an excess, and on the other checked suits that might be carried too far. The absence of the chambers was therefore much to be regretted at this moment, for the breach between the nation and the emigrant party was gradually becoming wider, whilst there was no mediating power capable of reconciling and restraining them.

Thus errors and the consequences of errors increased every day. The priests from the pulpit preached incessantly against the usurpation of Church property; among the laity, the former proprietors of the property that had been sold, worried the new possessors, trying to induce them to restore the property which they had acquired at a low price, and which the others sought to wrest from them at a still lower valuation. The article of the Charter which guaranteed the inviolability of the national sales ought to have been a sufficient security to any of the new holders capable of understanding the question, but they were told that the Charter was a momentary concession, forced by circumstances, and in the constantly-changing state of public affairs it was no wonder that the actual possessors of

national property should feel alarmed. Besides, the tone in which the most influential of the royalist journals spoke on this subject was calculated to excite alarm, and when they were answered by citing the fundamental law, the reply was that the law could guarantee the sales in a material sense, but could never justify their morality, and make that which was evil appear good to the public conscience. "The law," they said, "justified the national sales, public opinion condemns them. Nothing can alter the fact; and this universal moral reaction against crime and spoliation merits the highest applause." This language, had those who uttered it been consistent, would have been followed by aggressive measures, but they dared not venture so far, but offered this species of moral violence to the holders of the property in question, in the hope of forcing them to surrender the contested possessions. Here was a verification of the truth of what M. Lainé had said in committee, touching this article of the Charter, when he declared that it was of course right to guarantee the sales, but not too firmly, in order to oblige the new proprietors to negotiate with the former.

It was with the design of illustrating these views that a very significant fable was put into circulation. It was asserted that the Prince of Wagram,—Berthier,—who possessed the estate of Grosbois, had laid his title-deeds at the feet of Louis XVIII. and begged him to accept the restitution. The king, it was said, received the papers, kept them an hour, then sent for the marshal, and said to him, "Resume the possession of the Grosbois estate: I cannot make a better use of these lands than bestow them on you in recompense of your long services."

This anecdote was propagated with inconceivable rapidity even into the remote provinces. It was in vain that the Prince of Wagram, on being questioned, declared it to be an invention, the story was not the less believed nor less widely circulated. He endeavoured to obtain a retraction in the royalist journals, but did not succeed.

M. Louis, fearing the effect that the uneasiness experienced by the holders of national property might produce on the public credit, had forced Louis XVIII. in full council, and not without great resistance on the part of the king, to sign an ordinance for the sale of a portion of the State forests, in which was comprised a considerable quantity of timber formerly belonging to the Church. The ordinance being signed, M. Louis had, without delay, commenced his adjudications, in order to tranquillize the purchasers; for it was not to be supposed that new sales would be made if the titles of the former could be disputed. The moderate price asked had attracted speculators, who found that the sale of the timber would nearly liquidate the purchase-money, and that the land would become theirs for a mere trifle. With such inducements they did not hesitate to purchase. Still, this measure did not restore public confidence, and the proprietors who had purchased during the Revolution, and who were very numerous in the country districts, continued to experience serious alarm. To throw a doubt on the security of such interests is equivalent to ruining them, for the apprehension of evil produces as great

and sometimes a greater influence on men than the evil itself.

Manifestations against the French Revolution had not ceased. The anniversary of the 21st of January furnished a new opportunity for these exhibitions, and was eagerly taken advantage of. A pious man had purchased in the Rue de la Madeleine, at Paris, the ground in which Louis XVI., Marie Antoinette, and Madame Elizabeth had been buried. As the 21st of January drew near, he began to dig, hoping to recover the remains of these august victims. He thought he had found them, and, according to all appearances, he was justified in believing so. In consequence of this discovery, the Government ordered a funeral ceremony for the translation to Saint Denis of these remains, so worthy of respect; but, unfortunately, this ceremony was accompanied by an outpouring of maledictions of all kinds against the French Revolution, to which men connected by their acts or their opinions with this revolution replied by doubts and railleries about the discovery made in the Rue de la Madeleine. The royalists replied by fresh insults against the Revolutionists, and repeated that if, in a legal sense, they pardoned them, and by a great favour did not send them to the scaffold, it was all they had a right to expect in compliance with the promise of oblivion contained in the Charter; but that the public conscience could not be stifled nor prevented from judging their execrable crime. As if to secure a repetition of these painful recriminations, an annual ceremony was appointed to expiate the crime of the 21st of January.

To these proceedings were added others, still more significant, with regard to individuals. In recognizing as a principle the permanency of magistracies in their office, the king had reserved to himself the right of giving or refusing the investiture to those who were actually in office, and of revising in this way the entire *personnel* of the magistracy. Consequently, magistrates of every rank were anxiously expecting to hear their fate pronounced, and they remained in a state of dependence which might be prejudicial to those who sought justice, and especially to the holders of national property. The chambers, before separating, demanded that an end should be put to this state of uncertainty; and in January, 1815, the Government commenced, in the highest court, the so-much dreaded charges. M. Murraire was dismissed from the office of Premier President on account of his private affairs, and M. Merlin lost the post of Procureur-Général on account of his vote on the trial of Louis XVI. These gentlemen were replaced by M. Sèze and M. Mourre. These changes were only natural, but it was quite as natural that the Revolutionists should regard them as evidence of the feeling entertained for them, especially as these acts were followed by most acrimonious language. To pardon such things would have required a spirit of justice with which partisans are not endowed.

It was just at this time that the clergy, yielding in this instance not to passion, but to sincerely conscientious scruples, were very near exciting an insurrection among the Parisian populace. Mademoiselle Raucourt,

a celebrated actress, died. Her coffin was brought to the Church of Saint Roch, in order that prayers for the dead might be said, but without previous intimation being given to the vicar. It would have been prudent in the vicar to have avoided a commotion, and taken for granted that all those manifestations of repentance had been made which are required before a tragedian can be looked upon as restored to the Catholic communion. The vicar obstinately refused to admit the coffin. The crowd soon increased, and the public, seeing in this scene a fresh proof of the intolerance of the clergy, burst open the gates of the church. The coffin was carried in by force, and it would be hard to say what might have happened, if a royal order, despatched from the Tuileries, had not commanded the vicar to grant the deceased funeral honours.

Judging by canonical rules, the vicar was right, and as the clergy no longer keep the civil registers, as their refusal has no longer any influence upon the social position of the people, and entails no consequence but the privation of honours which the Church has the right to accord or deny according to its belief, the view of Saint Roch was justified in refusing the solicited prayers, and the friends of the deceased ought to have carried her remains to the cemetery, without presenting them to the Church. But the abuse of power often prevents its most legitimate exercise. The incendiary sermons of the clergy had so irritated the public mind, that even the legitimate exercise of their functions was now considered unpardonable, and it is probable that had the vicar not yielded to the royal order the excited crowd might have committed some deplorable profanation, which the army and even the National Guard might have shown little anxiety to repress.

Of all the events of this period, the most vexatious, and that which most excited the public mind, was the suit commenced against General Exelmans.

We have already made our readers acquainted with the charges brought against this illustrious general. Among the letters found on Lord Oxford, and addressed to the court of Naples, there was one in which General Exelmans again assured Murat—from whom he had received many services and marks of friendship—that, should his throne be threatened, there were many French officers whose swords were at his service. It was publicly known that the court of France was making every effort at Vienna to procure the expulsion of Murat from Naples, but war had not been declared against him, and consequently there was nothing in the detected letter contrary to military discipline. It might indeed be said that General Exelmans, having been kept on active service, had subjected himself to the reproach of showing little regard to the feelings of a Government from which he had received many marks of attention. But the strongest charge that could be brought against him only amounted to an infraction of conventional rules, and could by no means be considered a violation of duty. General Dapont had taken this view of the case, and had contented himself with reprimanding General Exelmans and advising him to be more circumspect in future.

But the minister Dupont had been replaced in the War Department by Marshal Soult, and we have seen how this marshal, who was at first very ill-disposed toward the Restoration, but afterward accepted office under the Bourbons, had promised to re-establish discipline in the army, and, with discipline, fidelity to the reigning dynasty.

One of the means he thought proper to employ was to revive the forgotten affair of General Exelmans, and, by making one of the most popular generals feel his authority, intimidate the rest. In fact, it was at this period the custom to say and to believe that it was the weakness exhibited by the Government that encouraged the disaffection of the army. The Duke de Berry, irritated at finding that the feelings he exhibited toward the army were not responded to, adopted this erroneous idea, and supported it with all the natural violence of his temperament. Marshal Soult, who was most anxious to please this prince, had put General Exelmans on half-pay, and ordered him to repair to Bar-sur-Ornain, his birthplace, which was ordering him into a species of exile. At this time, half-pay officers questioned the right of the War Minister to appoint them a place of abode. They said that, being unemployed, and consequently having no duties to perform that might require their presence in a particular locality, they were free to choose their residence, and that, not enjoying the advantages of active service, they ought not to be burdened with its responsibilities. On the other hand, the War Minister maintained his privilege, and he was right in persisting, for in the actual state of things, with the desire exhibited by the unemployed officers to repair to Paris, it was of the first importance to be able to disperse them by a simple order of the administration. Such orders had been repeatedly issued, but remained unexecuted, and the half-pay officers continued to flock to Paris, where their language was not only offensive, but seditious. But there was great want of tact in seeking to solve the question in the person of so distinguished an officer as General Exelmans, and for the ridiculous fault with which he was reproached.

General Exelmans, around whom had congregated the most excited spirits that Paris contained, showed little inclination to obey an order which he pronounced to be a sentence of banishment, but for the moment he contented himself with asking for a delay, alleging the state of his wife, who had just given birth to a baby, and who needed his personal attentions. It would have been prudent to accept this demi-obedience, and not provoke an open resistance by persevering obstinacy in the exercise of a contested right. But Marshal Soult persevered, and insisted on the immediate departure of General Exelmans. The latter, urged on by his young friends, peremptorily refused to obey. The marshal then, without consideration for the state of the general's young wife, sent an order to his house to arrest him. The general was arrested and conducted to Soissons. He contrived to escape from his guards, and wrote to the minister, demanding that his case should be brought before competent judges, and promising to yield himself prisoner as soon as a legal tribunal

should be pointed out before which he could appear.

This event produced among military men, and among a great portion of the public, an intense sensation. A strong feeling of irritation prevailed against Marshal Soult, who, from having been a zealous servant of the Empire, was become a not less zealous agent of the Bourbons, and persecuted his ancient companion-in-arms more than General Dupont had ever done. People began to talk of the insults offered to one of the most distinguished military officers; and, above all, they expatiated on the annoyance caused to his young wife, and all that for a questionable fault,—merely for a token of remembrance given to Murat, his former commander, his benefactor; and the disaffected denied—whether right or wrong—that the minister had a right to appoint a residence for unemployed officers. Public opinion was excited in the highest degree, and that, too, by stimulants the most calculated to produce such an effect.

This unfortunate commotion being once excited, it was impossible for the authorities to draw back and allow General Exelmans to remain at large with no judges appointed to try his case. It was absolutely necessary to take some steps. Marshal Soult, consequently, presented to the royal council a badly-drawn-up report that embarrassed even the least moderate members of the Government. It would have been sufficient to accuse the general of disobedience, and much might have been said in favour of the right claimed by the War Minister. In fact, the State, in granting half-pay to a considerable number of officers,—not as a retiring pension, but for the purpose of keeping them on what may be called demi-active service,—certainly retained some authority over them, and it was not assuming too much to fix their abode; for the Government might need them in certain localities, and ought to possess the power of sending them there. But the minister did not limit himself to this charge of disobedience, which might have been plausibly supported: he proposed to arraign General Exelmans before the *conseil de guerre* of the 16th military division, then sitting at Lille, on a charge of corresponding with the enemy, of acting as a spy, of disobedience, of a want of respect to the king, and violation of his oath as Chevalier of Saint Louis. Though the Government began to be very much irritated against him, still, this long list of accusations excited great surprise. General Dessoles deplored the necessity of proceeding against so distinguished an officer as General Exelmans, and thought the charge of espionage very strange. However, he said that it was necessary to condemn one as an example; but he, at the same time, intended that pardon should be granted immediately after the sentence was passed. The Count d'Artois, with a severity unlike his ordinary kindness of feeling, exclaimed that it would be dangerous to pardon, that, on the contrary, the sentence should be put into force, in order to show the military that they must obey. The Duke de Berry spoke in the same tone, but could not help admitting that the charge of espionage was ill placed. The king himself, and M. de Jaucourt, who were both in the

secret of foreign affairs.—M. de Jaucourt had temporarily replaced M. de Talleyrand,—thought there was a risk, not alone in making a charge of espionage, but in accusing the general of correspondence with the enemy. They knew how difficult it had been at Vienna to contest Murat's title; they knew that, up to the period of his last acts of imprudence, the title of king had not been refused him; the assembled sovereigns at Vienna had even spoken of him as "an ally," and had not yet qualified him as "enemy," though they threatened to treat him as such the moment he should put his troops into motion. The king and the temporary Minister of Foreign Affairs could not dissimulate the fact that it would be difficult to apply officially to Murat the title of enemy, which was incontestably implied in the accusations made against General Exelmans, against whom no other fact was alleged than the letters addressed to the court of Naples.

But Marshal Soult's self-love was touched, and he obstinately persevered in retaining the original terms of his report. *The General who reigned at Naples*—it was so he styled Murat—was, according to him, only the usurper of one of the thrones belonging to the house of Bourbon, and consequently the enemy of France, and whoever had written to him *had corresponded with the enemy*. The crime of espionage was, in his opinion, fully established by the simple fact of the general's having informed Murat of the willingness with which many French officers would draw their swords in his service. As to the crime of disobedience, that was flagrant, for the general had contested the right of the minister to determine the abode of half-pay officers, and had not only contested the right as a principle, but had refused, in fact, to submit. As to the want of respect to the king, and to the violation of the oath of Chevalier of Saint Louis, the proofs adduced by the minister were insignificant, and these charges were, besides, unimportant. The marshal persevered so obstinately in urging this system of accusation, that the king, as much through complaisance as through indolence, permitted him to draw up his report as he liked, reserving to himself, in case of condemnation, the right of pardon. The Duke de Berry, though entertaining some doubts as to the validity of certain accusations, exclaimed against the indulgent feeling exhibited by the king, and repeated that it would be unwise to grant a pardon, "for," he said, "it is indulgence that has ruined the army." The king, somewhat annoyed, replied, "My dear nephew, do not anticipate the decision of the judges: wait until they shall have pronounced sentence."

The War Minister was consequently allowed to draw up a list of accusations against General Exelmans, of which, as we have seen, the most probable were not very serious. When General Exelmans learned that his case was referred to the *conseil de guerre* of the 16th military division, he immediately yielded himself a prisoner, by the advice of his numerous friends, who justly believed that no military officer, nor even civil magistrate, could be found, who would condemn him.

The general repaired to Lille, and appeared

on the 23d of January before the *conseil de guerre* of the 16th military division. The list of accusations drawn up by Marshal Soult having been read, the general replied simply and clearly, and with a tone of moderation not habitual to him, but which he had been advised to adopt. As to the accusation of corresponding with the enemy, he replied that, France being then at peace with every State in Europe, it was impossible to maintain that he had corresponded with an enemy, and that if France happened to have one, this secret enemy could not be reputed such, until a declaration of war had been made, or decided hostilities commenced. As to the charge of espionage, he declared, with a feeling of dignity that was understood and approved by all present, that he would not even reply to the accusation. As to the charge of disobedience, he maintained that the minister, not requiring, in the actual state of things, any service from the half-pay officers, assumed the right of sending them into exile when he asserted the privilege of making them change their abode at his bidding. With regard to the offence to the king, he declared that, entertaining the most profound respect for His Majesty, he was certain of having never written any thing contrary to that feeling. Lastly, touching the reproach of having transgressed his obligations as a Chevalier of Saint Louis, he replied, carelessly, that possibly he did not understand these obligations, for he could not discover any thing contrary to them in what he had done.

These replies were so natural, and so truthful, that they rendered any defence nearly useless. The debate was short, and, almost without consultation, the *conseil de guerre* unanimously acquitted the general. We may easily imagine the joy, and, above all, the manifestation of this joy, among the military men, numbers of whom had accompanied the general. He was brought back to his own house in triumph, and in a few days the impression experienced at Lille spread throughout France among the numerous enemies of the Government. The more enlightened friends of the reigning dynasty regretted a proceeding by which so many serious questions were all at the same time so awkwardly asserted, and solved after so dangerous a fashion. The evident consequences of General Exelmans's trial were, that the army did not consider Murat as an enemy, and did not recognize the War Minister's right to fix the residence of half-pay officers; and it proved that all the military, whether as judges or accused, did not hesitate to put themselves in determined opposition to the established authority.

No circumstance had yet shown in so striking a manner the weakness of the restored dynasty. Upon whom could the Bourbons now rely, against the many enemies they had so unwisely provoked, when the public force was manifestly hostile? There was, indeed, the National Guard, composed of the middle classes, who wished to see the Bourbons on the throne, restrained, however, by the proper intervention of the public bodies. But, at Paris, the insolence of the household troops in the provinces, that of the landed nobility, and the intolerance of the clergy on every side, the threats against the holders of national pro-

perty, the sufferings of the manufacturing classes, who were ruined by the introduction of English produce, the loss of territory unjustly imputed to the Restoration, and lastly, the revival of that liberal spirit of which the Bourbons made an enemy, instead of making it an ally,—all these circumstances had changed the disposition of the middle classes, and there were now to be found among them only a few rarely sage minds, who believed that the Bourbons ought to be supported and, at the same time, restrained. But would this opinion, entertained by a small number, be sufficient to sustain the Bourbons against so many and such varied hostilities? Nobody could believe it, and the thought of an approaching change, a thought which often induces what it foresees, had taken possession of the public mind. In fact, when this fatal opinion, that a Government cannot last much longer, is spread abroad, the indifferent and the cold become more careless and colder, the interested turn their eyes in another direction, alarmed friends commit greater faults than ever, and the public functionaries, upon whom the responsibility of defending the Government is thrown, hesitate to compromise themselves for a power which will not be able to recompense either the efforts they make or the dangers they incur. It was the latter especially who, in the circumstances of which we treat, exhibited the worst dispositions. They belonged, for the most part, to the Empire, for the royalists, nobles or plebeians, emigrants, or those who had remained at home, notwithstanding their willingness to take places, had not been able to obtain them from the Government, because of their complete ignorance of public business. Many, as we have seen, had directed their ambition to military posts, which produced the most deplorable effects on the army. Others had sought employment in the financial department; but M. Louis, who was a fanatic in financial affairs, repelled them without pity. Some, again, aspired to places in the Administration, but the Abbé de Montesquiou, no less haughty with his friends than with his adversaries, said that the mere fact of having emigrated did not imply that men were thoroughly acquainted with the interests of France, or qualified to administer her laws, and, through pride, as well as through indolence, he had not changed twenty out of eighty-seven prefects. Lastly, with regard to those who aspired to the magistracy, the Government was determined to admit them, but the long-announced changes in the magistracy had scarcely commenced, and the new candidates had not yet found places; whilst the deposition of MM. Muraire and Merlin had caused the magistrates, still in office, serious alarm. The army was intensely hostile; the public functionaries, who had been originally appointed under the Empire, were distrusted by the reigning dynasty, to which they bore no affection; they were undermined by the royalists, who coveted their places, and wearied of the hypocrisy to which they were condemned; the middle classes, at first favourably disposed, had afterward grown cold; the people of the country districts were completely alienated, on account of the disputes concerning national property; the inhabitants of the

towns were inclined to favour the revolutionists, both through taste and habit, and there remained to the Bourbons a few friends among enlightened men, whose counsels were little heeded, and who foresaw the danger of the re-establishment of the Empire. Such was, in a few words, the position of French society with regard to the Bourbons, a position which each succeeding event, as it hurried rapidly along, rendered more conspicuous.

Among these different classes, whether indifferent or hostile, the most formidable, that is to say, the military men, entertained the belief that the Government was wholly dependent on them, and would be overthrown when they willed it. This disposition had never before been manifested by our army, and, happily, has never since reappeared; for there is nothing more dangerous than an army that seeks to take any other part in the revolutions of a State than that of maintaining order in the name of the laws. An army soon becomes the most fearful and the most abject instrument of revolution, for soldiers become rapidly licentious, insatiable, and sometimes cowardly, well suited to oppress a State at home, but powerless to defend it abroad, dishonouring their country, and dishonouring themselves, until they are ultimately destroyed by fire and sword, as in the case of the Prætorian Guards of antiquity, of the Strelitz, the Mamelukes, and the Janissaries of modern times. Up to this period, in fact, the revolutions that had taken place in France had had no reference to the army, for the army had neither caused these revolutions, nor been their object nor instrument. But the Revolution of 1814, effected by armed Europe, against a military chief who had abused his own genius, and the valour of his troops, seemed to be especially directed against the French army, by whom its effects were particularly felt. Flattered for a moment by the Bourbons in the person of their chiefs, the military soon perceived that there was between them and the Government all the difference that may be conceived between those who had defended their native land and those who had been willing to invade it, and on this occasion—and only then, we repeat, during our century—the military conceived the idea of playing a political, a revolutionary part. “Let us drive out these emigrants,” was the remark of all the youthful military that crowded Paris. Whether Napoleon came to head them, which they ardently desired,—without understanding, alas! what they wished,—or whether he did not come, they were determined to overturn the Government with their own hands, and that, too, as quickly as possible. The unemployed officers openly avowed their intentions, and when they spoke in this fashion, they found, in the officers on active service, either silent or open approvers of their sentiments, with a perfect willingness to second their efforts. As to the soldiers, there could be no doubt about their sentiments, for the younger had quitted the service in the general desertion of 1814, and, having been replaced by the old soldiers, who had returned from imprisonment or from remote garrisons, the army was, especially in the lower ranks, as hostile to the Bourbons as it was devoted to Napoleon.

No War Minister, whosoever he might be, could have overcome such difficulties, and Marshal Soult, who had been chosen in the hope that he would accomplish this feat, had failed in the attempt. His severity toward General Exelmans had occasioned alarming excitement. It was not possible that officers of every grade, from the generals, colonels, and brigade-majors, down to the simple sub-lieutenants, who were on half-pay, and thronged Paris in thousands, it was not possible, we say, that these men could incessantly repeat that the emigrants ought to be driven out of the country, without thinking of passing from words to action. Though they were sufficiently numerous to attempt a *coup de main*, they were conscious that the result would be more certain could they secure the co-operation of some of their comrades who were in command and could at a beck bring with them bodies of troops. In this respect they were highly favoured by circumstances, for some of the most hot-headed general officers commanded troops within a short distance of Paris. The brilliant Lefebvre-Desnoëttes had remained in command of the Cavalry of the Guard, then stationed in Le Nord. The brothers Lallemand, officers of great merit, and determined foes to the Restoration, commanded, one the department of Aisne, and the other the artillery of La Fère. Lastly, one of the principle *divisionnaires* of the Empire, Drouet, Count d'Erlon, son of the ancient postmaster at Varennes, was at the head of the 16th military division at Lille. These four officers could assemble from fifteen to twenty thousand men, lead them to Paris, and join some thousands of half-pay officers who were collected there. In the capital they had only to fear the household troops, and these they felt assured they could overcome. Still, notwithstanding the threatening aspect of affairs for the Government, the success of the malcontents was less certain than they believed, as the result soon proved, for fortunately the sentiment of obedience is so strong in the French army that it is not easy to seduce the troops to follow even the dictates of their own passions, when opposed to their duty. Nevertheless the discontented officers were full of confidence, and it must be said that never had conspirators more reason to hope for success. The unemployed officers, and those who were on active service, took council together, and, fully conscious that in enterprises of this nature a great name is an important condition to success, they turned their thoughts to the only great military man who was left in disgrace. This was Marshal Davout. This grave and stern man, a strict observer of military discipline, was ill suited to take part in a conspiracy. He was deeply offended at the treatment he had received, and which was really unjustifiable, for he was banished at the request of the enemy for his defence of Hamburg, one of the most memorable recorded in history. It was on this account he did not refuse to listen to the young and hot-headed generals who applied to him. Inclined like them to look upon the Bourbons as strangers, and flattering himself that by a word despatched to Elba he could bring back Napoleon and place him again at the head of the

Empire, the proposed enterprise appeared to him only the substitution of a national for an anti-national Government that had been forced on France by Europe. The marshal, without actually pledging himself to the young framer of this project, still sympathized with them so much as to induce them to believe that he would become their leader, and, quite joyous at this accession to their party, like all persons under the influence of joyous feelings, they made no secret of the hopes they entertained.

But, in working thus for Napoleon, it was necessary to work in unison with him, to have his consent and his assistance, and consequently to be in communication with those who were supposed to represent him. Though those who sought to get rid of the Bourbons showed a special anxiety to strengthen their party by the acquisition of great military names, they were not less anxious to reckon among their members distinguished civilians, in order to commence negotiations with Napoleon by their intervention. They dared not address themselves to the prudent Cambacérès, whose timidity and gravity rendered him inaccessible; neither could they apply to the reserved Caulaincourt, who shunned all communication with strangers, nor to the Count de Rovigo, who was too much suspected by the Government and too closely watched not to render any communication with him equivalent to a self-denunciation to the police: they consequently turned to the two men who were reputed to possess Napoleon's personal confidence, MM. Lavalette and de Bassano. M. Lavalette had received from Napoleon during the late campaign a deposit of sixteen hundred thousand francs in specie, a sum that constituted the entire personal fortune of the late Emperor, and which M. Lavalette had carefully kept, ready to restore it at the first demand. But, in the excess of his fidelity, fearing to betray a deposit upon which his master might be one day dependent for bread, he had hidden it with many precautions in his own house, and, in order to conceal it better, he concealed himself by not receiving anybody. It was therefore to the faithful and over-credulous Duke de Bassano that the authors of the projected enterprise had recourse. They at the same time charmed and alarmed him, charmed by proving that they still remembered Napoleon, and alarmed by informing him of a project that compromised so many persons, particularly Napoleon himself, who, in the hands of Elba, was still in the hands of the Allied Powers, and liable to suffer from any weakness they might be made to experience. What contributed to intimidate M. de Bassano was that since Napoleon's departure for Elba he had not received any communication from him, and had not dared to address any to him. Those who served under Napoleon were accustomed to wait until he had taken the initiative that they never ventured to anticipate him, and since his fall they had pursued the same course. They were committed by the Bourbons had Napoleon's friends with hope, without any possibility of success. M. de Bassano, who was personally acquainted with the young ge-

conspicuous at this time, assured them that he kept up no communication with Napoleon, and that consequently he could neither give them his advice nor approbation, still less the authority of his name; he then begged them not to compromise their former leader, who, still at the mercy of his enemies, at a word despatched from Vienna, might be forcibly transported to remote regions and a climate destructive to his health. But this reserve of manner had only been considered as the ordinary prudence of politicians, and these hot young heads, so anxious to restore the Empire, had been neither discouraged nor rendered doubtful by the manner in which the Emperor's ancient confidant had expressed himself.

There was another aid which it was quite as natural to desire and hope,—that of the revolutionary party. Even had the Bourbons exhibited toward the Revolutionists, and especially toward the voters, a spirit of conciliation which they certainly did not feel, it is not probable that they would have found favour with them. But if to this fundamental difficulty we add the bitter insults lavished by the royalist press on the Revolutionists, it is easy to understand that their antipathy to the Bourbons was converted into violent hatred. Under the influence of these feelings, Carnot had written and allowed to be published the famous *Memoir* of which we have spoken; Sièyes had laid aside his disdainful moderation of tone and given way to an outburst of feeling, in which he seldom indulged, and several persons of the same party had followed his example. Barras was not of the number, for he felt no desire to find himself again under the rule of the ungrateful general of whose fortunes he had laid the first foundation. He was desirous of dying peaceably under the Bourbons, to whom he gave prudent advice that met little attention. With this one exception, the Revolutionists were highly exasperated. Pleased at first at Napoleon's downfall, they now deplored it, and openly expressed their desire of his return. M. Fouché, as usual, figured at their head. It was his constant endeavor to make himself conspicuous, and he did so by meddling in every thing. Whilst he was, as we have seen, in close relation with the agents of the Count d'Artois, and with the Count d'Artois himself, promising to save the Bourbons if they confided in him, he was writing to Vienna to M. de Metternich to express his views upon the manner of arranging European affairs,—information which M. de Metternich certainly never asked. And he was writing to Napoleon, advising him to flee to America; and no doubt he was sincerely anxious to deliver Europe and himself from the presence of his former master. He was thus perpetually meddling with the different parties; and after having excited the Revolutionists against the emigrants, he made of the agitation, thus raised, a scarecrow to the emigrants, in the hope that he would be called on to allay the alarm. But the last ministerial changes, by which Marshal Soult was made War Minister, and M. d'André head of the Police Department, having deprived him of all hope of a speedy return to power, he had, like all the men of his party, but from different motives, transmuted his previous good will toward the Bourbons into anger, and he

was ready to join any party that would overthrow them. It would be difficult that any plot could be laid against them with which he was not acquainted and in which he did not play the chief part. But the Bonapartists held him in profound distrust, and preferred Count Thibaudeau, an old Conventionalist and regicide, and formerly a prefect under the Empire. He was a talented and harsh man, and was living retired at Paris, whither he had fled to avoid the resentment of the Marseillais, who were exasperated against his administration. A Revolutionist upon principle, and a Bonapartist through ambition, he was still trustworthy, and had been the connecting link between the Revolutionists and the Bonapartists until M. Fouché appeared and meddled in every plot, for the purpose of directing men after his own fashion and to his own advantage. M. Fouché presented himself to the Revolutionists as a regicide, to the Bonapartists as the oldest minister of Napoleon, and offered to all parties the essential qualifications of his well-known activity and business capabilities. He soon became an important personage, and endeavoured to carry out his own views. His leading principle was to expel the Bourbons, but not to replace them by Napoleon. He said that a new state of things, a new prince, would be needed, a prince liberal in his ideas as the existing generation, a prince who would not inspire Europe with the hatred of which Napoleon was the object, and who would not, like him, be exposed to see six hundred thousand men cross the Rhine to dethrone him. He said that France, wearied of war and despotism, was as little inclined to Napoleon as to the Bourbons, and that there remained only two princes who could be thought of: the Duke d'Orléans, or Napoleon II. under the regency of Maria Louisa; but the Duke d'Orléans, bound by family ties, could not sever them to aid revolutionary principles; that the friendly dispositions he exhibited were limited to being more polite than the other branch of his family to the army and the Revolutionists, but that it would be impossible on such a foundation to effect a change of government; consequently the only solution of existing difficulties was to accept the King of Rome under the Regency of Maria Louisa, and that avowing this intention would secure the support of Austria, and, through Austria, Europe, and, with Europe, peace. Besides, the army would be glad to see the Empire revived, and Napoleon would be indemnified in the person of his son for his lost throne; and, lastly, the Revolutionists and the Liberals would be perfectly satisfied, for seeing in the son the glory of the father without his despotism, and freed at the same time from the insults of the emigrant party, they would have every possible reason to support a *régime* which offered all the advantages of the Empire without any of its drawbacks.

These reasons, though very rational in many respects, erred in a fundamental point, like all those adduced in support of a fresh revolution, which was to suppose that any but Napoleon could replace the Bourbons. The regency of Maria Louisa was a mere dream; for Austria would not have given up either Maria Louisa or her son, and this princess was as little desirous as capable of filling such a position.

The Duke d'Orléans, who might be some day induced, were the throne vacant, to yield to the unanimous wishes of the public, would neither anticipate nor excite these wishes, which were at that time very vague. The rule of Maria Louisa and the Duke d'Orléans being, from different reasons, impossible, either Napoleon ought to have been proposed, which would be a mad and disastrous provocation to Europe, or the Bourbons, their errors corrected, ought to be retained,—which indeed was at that time the only honest and rational course. M. Fouché, though apparently more prudent, was in reality as rash and less innocent than the giddy heads he pretended to direct. Still, his observations produced some effect upon the former servants of the Empire, who remembered the despotism and ambition of Napoleon, and who dreaded his resentment; for nearly all had abandoned him, and apprehended the effect that his presence would produce on the European Powers. But it was difficult to persuade the young generals, who were ready to risk their lives, to think of any one but Napoleon; and this question was accordingly laid aside to give place to the former, the overthrow of the Bourbons. Those who wished to overthrow the Bourbons saw only one means of accomplishing their object, which was to assemble the troops commanded by some among them, lead them to Paris, and join the half-pay officers, and by these means effect a *coup de main*.

During the months of January and February, 1815, the originators spoke of this plan with an amount of indiscretion that shocked Marshal Davout, who was too serious-minded for enterprises conducted so lightly, and alarmed M. de Bassano, who was ever fearful of compromising Napoleon without having consulted him. And so M. de Bassano repeated to these young military men that he had no communication with the Isle of Elba, and consequently could not promise them any support; but he begged them not to compromise Napoleon, whom a single act of imprudence on their part would expose to be transported to the extremities of the earth. M. Lavalette, spite of his efforts at concealment, had ultimately been brought into contact with the young men, and conversed with them about their project. He begged them to remain quiet and not seek to anticipate Napoleon's wishes; and they replied that they wanted neither the consent nor assistance of any one to overthrow a Government as odious to the nation as to them, and whose existence was entirely in their hands. They consequently persisted in their designs, and kept up a constant intercourse with M. Fouché, who endeavoured to win their confidence, because he saw in them an additional puppet that he might put into motion; and in order to succeed in his object he adopted the simple means of listening without contradicting what they said.

If we regard as a conspiracy every desire to overturn the established order of things, accompanied too by threatening words, there certainly was a conspiracy in what we have narrated. But if we only consider as a conspiracy a well-planned project, and that by serious-minded men firmly determined to attain their object, even at the risk of their

lives, and who have arranged their means with prudence and precision, it would be impossible to assert that there was any thing of the kind here. These young officers were certainly anxious to get rid of the Bourbons even at the cost of their own lives, which they were now wont to consider. Some of them, on active service, held powerful means of action in their own hands, and it cannot be denied that among these there was a conspiracy. But it was far otherwise with the pretended leaders. Marshal Davout had listened, but without pledging himself to projects that flattered his resentment but were repugnant to his good sense and habits of discipline. M. Lavalette had rejected all confidence. Although M. de Bassano was more complaisant than M. Lavalette, he took care not to compromise Napoleon in the slightest degree, declaring that he had neither told nor would tell him any thing of the project; and as for the Dukes of Vicenza and Rovigo, and Prince Cambrésis, it had not even been mentioned to them. Marshal Ney and the other principal military men who were suspected of being discontented were quite ignorant of what was going on, and were even distrusted by their old comrades because of the royal favours they had accepted, and only knew with the public in general that Paris was crowded with half-pay officers who were ready for the most desperate attempts. M. Fouché was the only person of note that, from his desire to have a hand in every thing, had entered into these plans, of which he was in reality become the true head, since that, far from discouraging the authors of the enterprise, he became their confidant, their adviser, and very rarely sought to moderate their sentiments. Indeed, if there was a conspiracy, it was between him and these military men, whose passions he flattered and whose projects he countenanced. But this was all that could be asserted of them or of him, for nothing was decided on,—neither time, nor plan, nor place, nor who were to be the co-operators in the enterprise. Though the police were willing to see plots in every direction, they could not discern the only one that had an appearance of reality. All the military were objects of suspicion to them, but those we have mentioned the least of all. As for M. Fouché, he was far from being thought a dangerous person whose every act ought to be watched. The official police pointed him out as a suspicious man that ought to be distrusted; but the officious police of the Count d'Artois described him as the most skilful and powerful of men, to whom the safety of the dynasty and of France ought to be intrusted. Were these police to be believed, the real conspirators were Prince Cambrésis, who sometimes invited a few friends to dinner, M. de Bassano, and M. Lavalette, who, as we have said, avoided every serious enterprise, the Duke de Rovigo, who was so compromised that everybody avoided him and he avoided everybody, having met with such ingratitude from his friends, and finally Queen Hortense, who had accepted Alexander's protection and the polite attentions of Louis XVIII., and who was now occupied in defending her children's property against her husband, and who, though still much attached to Napoleon, was too much

dispirited by his fall to suppose his return possible. This police, called the police of the Château, asserted that Prince Cambacérès, M. de Bassano, M. Lavalette, and Queen Hortense were in secret correspondence with Napoleon, from whom they received money to support the plots that were on foot, and whose ramifications were even more extensive; for M. de Metternich, who had quarrelled with the Northern Powers, had been brought into correspondence with Napoleon by the Queen of Naples, and was now thinking of replacing him on his throne in order to be avenged of the ungrateful allies who wanted to seize Saxony and Poland.

The facts already quoted in this history are sufficient to show how much reality there was in these suppositions. It is very true that M. de Bassano, M. Lavalette, and Prince Cambacérès were possessed of Napoleon's confidence; and, because they were worthy of the trust, they would be very careful not to talk of his affairs to every chance-comer. Queen Hortense was most devoted to her step-father, but at this moment the feelings of the adopted daughter were absorbed in those of the mother. M. de Metternich was discontented with Russia and Prussia, and had with difficulty separated himself from the court of Naples, but we have seen whether he thought of using Napoleon as an instrument to check the pretensions of Russia and Prussia; and as for Napoleon, we shall soon see whether he had money to employ in such enterprises, or whether he had any part in those that were being formed in France. The real risk resulting from such extravagant inventions, to which Governments too willingly listen when not guided by cool and solid judgment, is that their attention is turned from real to imaginary dangers, or, in hunting phrase, that the false scent is followed instead of the true. No notice was taken of M. Fouché, who was not only treated with attention but even lauded by the police, nor of those young generals who commanded in Le Nord, and whose daring might soon become dangerous, whilst attention and hatred were directed toward men who were indeed disaffected, but of whom not one was inclined to raise his hand against the Government. The Count d'Artois was besieged by a thousand alarming reports, which increasing terror made him believe, whilst Louis XVIII., wearied by these perpetual alarms, believed nothing, and the Government, for want of a firm and intelligent head, hovering between a blind credulity and absolute unbelief, overlooked all these perils, lost through the absence of fear, but the want of ability to discern them.

M. de Bassano, at once disturbed and pleased by what he heard, trembled at the idea of such an enterprise as the one in question being undertaken without Napoleon's knowledge, with whose views it might interfere, whom it might expose to severe treatment, and which, were it carried on without his knowledge, might prove more advantageous to others than to him. This faithful servant was consequently desirous of informing Napoleon of what was going on; and the opportunity he sought was soon offered him by the zeal of a young man with whom he had had no previous acquaintance.

M. Fleury de Chaboulon, an auditor of the Empire, endowed with intelligence, vigour of mind, and ambition, and weary of being nobody at Paris, had determined to go to the island of Elba and offer his services to the de-throned Emperor; but he wished to take with him an introduction that might secure him a favourable reception. He applied to M. de Bassano, who treated him with reserve, but became more communicative when he recognized the young man's sincerity, and finally commissioned him to inform Napoleon verbally of the true state of France, that is to say, of the increasing unpopularity of the Bourbons, the coldness with which they were looked on by the middle classes, the irritation of the holders of national property, the exasperation of the army, the inclination of the young officers to risk every thing, and lastly the general opinion that the present state of affairs could not last, but must change either to the advantage of the Bonaparte or Orleans family. M. Fleury de Chaboulon pressed M. de Bassano to be more explicit, and send some advice to Napoleon, such as that he ought to leave Elba and embark for France. M. de Bassano replied, and with justice, that he could not undertake such a responsibility, and that advice, especially such advice, could not be given to such a man as Napoleon. M. Fleury de Chaboulon was merely instructed to bear to Elba an exact account of the state of affairs, with the express recommendation not to say any thing that might influence one way or the other. M. de Bassano refused to give any written document, but furnished him with a token that would prove to Napoleon whence he came. M. Fleury de Chaboulon left in January, passed through Italy, fell sick on his journey, and did not reach Elba until the month of February.

Before speaking of the result of this mission, we must first describe how Napoleon lived in Elba since he had passed from the government of the world to the sovereignty of one of the smallest isles of the Mediterranean. It is indeed a strange spectacle, and one worthy the attention of history, to contemplate a mind whose wondrous activity once filled all Europe, now confined within the space of a few leagues, and occupied with twelve or fifteen thousand subjects and one thousand soldiers! We should but badly fulfil our task did we not sketch this picture.

Transported to Elba on board the English frigate "The Undaunted," Napoleon anchored opposite Porto-Ferraio on the 3d of May, 1814, and landed on the 4th. A few days before his arrival he had been burned in effigy by the inhabitants, for the same reasons that had turned all the nations of Europe against him,—war, conscription, and the *droits réunis*. When told of his arrival, their anger was forgotten, and all, impelled by intense curiosity, hastened to meet him. They now manifested tumultuous delight, remembering that they would be freed from the Tuscan yoke, and, believing that their new monarch brought vast treasures, they fancied that he would introduce a large commerce, and that his creative genius would soon effect wondrous changes in their island. He was conducted in triumph to the church, where a Te Deum was sung. He graciously yielded

to their wishes, as if he could, in any way, share in the childish joy of his new subjects.

Yielding submissively to present circumstances, and not seeming to note their insignificance, he set to work the day after his arrival, and made the tour of his island on horseback. When in the course of a few hours he had gone over its entire extent, he decided on a system of government, and exhibited as much energy in undertaking his new task as he had displayed fifteen years before, when he commenced reorganizing France.

His attention was first directed to the city of Porto-Ferrajo, which is situated on an eminence commanding a beautiful gulf that looks toward the mountains of Etruria. This city had been formerly fortified, and might still be made a place of considerable strength. Napoleon immediately applied himself to getting it in a complete state of defence. By bringing a detachment of his Guards to the Isle of Elba, he had secured to himself some hundreds of devoted men, either to defend him against violence, or to serve as the basis of some daring adventure, should he ever attempt one. These companions of his exile, in number about a thousand, being shut up in a good maritime fortress, with provisions and ammunition, could defend themselves for some weeks, and give him time to escape, in case the sovereigns, regretting that they had left him so near Europe, should think of transporting him to the ocean. He therefore hastened to repair the fortifications of Porto-Ferrajo, and to bring thither the artillery that had been distributed along the shores of the island during the late war. The guns were mounted on the walls, the forts that commanded the harbour were finished and fortified, and the magazines were furnished with provisions and ammunition. Within a few weeks Porto-Ferrajo was so strengthened that a considerable force would be required to seize the place. By these precautions, Napoleon gained, besides the means of actual defence, the advantage of being able to ascertain more certainly the existence of any plans that might be formed against him, by the extent of the forces that would be needed to attack him. But his forethought did not stop here. The very small island of Pianosa, dependent on his sovereignty, and at three leagues distant from Elba, offered many conditions favourable to the execution of his designs. This island, flat and covered with pasture-land, which is most valuable in these climates, was overlooked by a pyramidal-shaped rock, and a fort, in which a garrison of fifty men would be almost impregnable. This fort he put into a state of defence, and supplied with provisions and a small garrison, and, without imparting his secret to any one, he arranged so that it would be possible to descend from the fort at night to the shore, embark and put to sea, which would be easy, as the island was not on the Tuscan side but in the open sea. Therefore, if any attempt were made to seize him, Napoleon could take refuge in this island during the night, and thence embark for any region he pleased. In order to make use of the pastures, he sent his horses and cattle thither, and thus, whilst he profited by the advantages of the island, he removed all suspicion of his being about to form a military establishment.

After having provided for the defence of Elba, Napoleon organized a most vigilant police. The only landing-places were to be at the capital, Porto-Ferrajo, or at Ilia, Porto-Longone, and Campo, small ports situated some on the east and some on the west coast, the former intended for the benefit of the island, the latter for the exportation of the productions of the country. Guards of gendarmes were to prevent any person landing at any other port, and a well-organized naval police subjected all comers in the open ports to a strict investigation. Within four or five hours after the arrival of a stranger in any port, even the most distant from Porto-Ferrajo, Napoleon was informed who he was and whence he came. He had grave reasons for these precautions. The French Government had placed General Brulart, an old friend of Georges, in the island of Corsica, and had raised him to a rank and command beyond his position, evidently for the purpose of keeping watch on the Isle of Elba. Nothing could certainly be more reasonable on the part of the French Government than this surveillance; but Napoleon, from information he received, was tempted to believe that to observe his proceedings was not the sole object in view, but that an attempt upon his personal liberty was contemplated. But it must be said that no documents since produced contain any evidence tending to criminate General Brulart. Still there can be no doubt that intrigues were kept up a correspondence with what was called "la police du Château" boasted of being able to get Napoleon assassinated, and even said they were making arrangements for the purpose; it is also undeniable that Corsican levies were arrested in the Isle of Elba, and could give no satisfactory explanation of their presence there. Napoleon sent them away, assuring them that the first of their class whom he again caught in Elba should be shot, and he added that on good proof of any such act he would despatch fifty determined men to the city of Ajaccio to seize General Brulart, upon whom in the face of Europe he would execute signal justice. We must add that, whether through fear, or because he really harboured no evil design, General Brulart remained quiet, and no act of his went beyond a legitimate surveillance.

Napoleon had now taken precautions both against an attempt at assassination or abduction, for, owing to the arrangements he had made, a large force would be needed to attack him, and could not come upon him unawares.

As to the personnel of his force, he showed as much skill in the management of a thousand men as he had formerly displayed in directing the disposition of a million. Before leaving Fontainebleau, Drouot had selected from among the soldiers of the Old Guard—who were all willing to accompany Napoleon—about six hundred grenadiers and chasseurs à pied, one hundred cavalry, and twenty marines, making in all seven hundred and twenty-four picked men. Having marched from Fontainebleau to Savone, they embarked on board English vessels, and landed at Porto-Ferrajo about the end of May. For a time Napoleon had feared they might be forcibly detained; and great was his joy at seeing them arrive,—a joy excited so much by

rudence as pleasure at again meeting his old companions-in-arms. He gave them as good quarters as he could, and sent the horses to the pastures of Pianosa. As in his island he had no need of the cavalry soldiers, he converted them into gunners, and employed the leisure hours of his exile in instructing them. Sixty Poles that were at Parma having got permission to embark at Leghorn, Napoleon aided their passage, and so obtained an additional reinforcement of devoted men. He was so joined by some French officers, who had been reduced almost to a state of starvation, and had travelled across Italy as best they could. His troops now amounted to about eight hundred men, though of the original number he had lost some by death and sickness.

To these eight hundred men Napoleon found the means of adding some daring and intrepid soldiers. During his reign, the guardianship of the islands had been confided to battalions of light infantry, into which the conscripts who had shown a disposition to desert had been drafted, and all of whom were brave and active, though somewhat insubordinate. Two of these battalions, belonging to the 35th Light Division, and consisting of Provençals, Ligurians, Tuscans, and Corsicans, were in garrison at Elba in 1814. When they were about to embark for France, Napoleon told them that he would retain such as would enter his service. About three hundred, chiefly Corsicans, remained, and, with the exception of a few deserters, were faithful to him to the last. He, consequently, had at his disposal eleven hundred men of the very best regular troops. To these he joined four hundred natives, organized in the following manner:—

The island of Elba possessed a battalion of four companies of militia, tolerably well disciplined, and quite as good soldiers as the Corsicans. Napoleon ordered that each of the companies forming the battalion should every month have twenty-five men under arms, while seventy-five were left at their usual employments, by which he had a hundred men in active service, and three hundred ready at the shortest notice. Only the hundred men in active service were paid, and of these the interior and marine police were formed. Napoleon's army thus amounted to fifteen hundred men, who being mingled with the Old Guard were almost equal to that celebrated corps.

These were not the meaningless occupations of a maniac, amusing himself with toys that reminded him of his former state, but were, as we have said, a means of defence against assassination or transportation to some distant land,—which could never happen unexpectedly if he were in a position to defend himself some days; and should a new future present itself, these arrangements secured him the means of landing on the continent and commencing a new career, without running the risk of being arrested by a few *gens-d'armes* shot on the road.

With the same extensive views, Napoleon took care to form a navy. At Porto-Ferrajo he found a brig, "The Inconstant," in tolerably good condition, that might be manned by fifty men, and a goelette, "The Caroline," that would require a crew of sixteen. At Leghorn he had bought a felucca, "L'Etoile,"

that could be managed by fourteen men, and two avisos, "La Mouche," and "L'Abeille," which, together, would require a crew of eighteen men. These vessels—for which about a hundred sailors would be needed, together with two or three feluccas, that might be easily procured—could embark the eleven hundred men of whom Napoleon's regular army was composed. This was all that he needed in case he should ever think of leaving his island,—an event he considered very doubtful, though not impossible. These hundred and odd sailors he counted among his indispensable expenses, and, by adding to them a small number of native seamen, he could complete the equipment of his flotilla in twenty-four hours. In the mean time, by the help of the two advice-boats, he corresponded with the ports of Genoa, Leghorn, and Naples, whence he procured provisions, letters, and newspapers. By means of the "Caroline" he maintained a strict police in the harbour of Porto-Ferrajo; he occasionally displayed from the "Inconstant" the flag of his little State, which was white, striped with purple, and studded with stars, and thus accustomed the English, French, Genoese, and Turkish sailors to see its colours in the Tuscan sea.

Having thus provided for his personal safety, and, as far as he could, for his future prospects, Napoleon next turned his attention to embellishing his residence, and making it comfortable for himself, his family, and soldiers, also to developing the prosperity of his little State, and, finally, to arranging his finances in such a way as to secure their duration. On his arrival he took up his abode at the Hotel de Ville of Porto-Ferrajo, and afterward removed to the dilapidated and confined palace of the former governors. This building he determined to enlarge and improve by the addition of a *corps de bâtiment*, so that he might be able to receive his mother and sisters, and even his wife, if—which was very improbable—she would decide on coming. He purchased furniture at Genoa, and made his home quite habitable. He also erected a building for the officers of his battalion, that they might be always at hand, and a little better lodged than in the town. Besides the dwelling at Porto-Ferrajo, he built a simple but elegant summer residence in the Vale of San Martino, a charming valley opening on the harbour of Porto-Ferrajo, and looking toward the mountains of Italy. He commenced by cultivating and planting, and made the simple-minded mayor—who was little accustomed to flatter—laugh, by pretending that he would soon sow the spot with five hundred sacks of corn. "You laugh, Mr. Mayor," he said; "but you have no idea how things develop and increase. The first year I shall sow fifty sacks, a hundred the second, two hundred the third, and so on." This agricultural enterprise, like his great empire, needed, alas! but time. Having completed his town and country residences, he turned his attention to his capital, Porto-Ferrajo, a town containing three thousand inhabitants. He had the streets paved and cleaned, and erected a pretty fountain, which scattered refreshing showers around. He made the two main roads which crossed the whole island practicable for carriages. One of these ran

from Porto-Ferrajo to Porto-Longone, the principal port of communication with Italy, and the other from Porto-Ferrajo to Campo, a small port looking toward Pianosa and the open sea.

As his finances would not allow him to spend more than six or seven thousand francs on these works,—a sum whose importance must not be estimated by the present value of money,—he employed his soldiers, to whom he paid a small stipend, whilst he furnished the stone, marble, brick, cement, and wood. He spent a part of each day on horseback, directing to these trifling works that powerful mind whose attention was once fixed on the world at large, and which was as correct in its estimate of small as of great objects. Nor was he less mindful of all that could ameliorate the soil or advance the commerce of the island. He wished to cover the whole country with mulberry-trees, in order to encourage the rearing of silkworms, and commenced by planting some of those valuable trees along the two roads he had constructed. He ordered that the marble-quarries near Campo should be worked. The salt-mines and tunny-fisheries formed two of the principal sources of the revenue of the country; he turned his attention to the improvement of both; and lastly the iron-mines, which constituted the principal riches of the island, attracted his consideration. These mines had long produced an excellent ore, containing more than eighty-four parts of pure metal in every hundred; but, for want of fuel, the inhabitants were not able to smelt the ore, and sold it to Italian merchants. The smelting of iron had dwindled down to almost nothing, but Napoleon sought to revive that branch of industry on a large scale, and to attract workmen he promised to support them at his own expense.

The corn employed for this purpose was to be purchased in Italy. But the execution of all these enterprises was checked by the smallness of his finances. If the inhabitants of Elba, his soldiers, the European public, and especially the Bourbons were to be believed, he had carried immense treasures with him, for, excepting his stature, none could believe that any thing connected with him could be small. The very idea of these treasures made his enemies tremble, and his unsophisticated subjects bound with joy. But these treasures were a vain chimera; for he, the most ambitious of men, was the most heedless of what concerned himself personally. Until the very day of his abdication, he had never asked on what he had to live should he descend from the throne. The one hundred and fifty millions that he had economized out of the civil list were not spent on himself, but on extraordinary war expenses; and when, at the moment of quitting Fontainebleau, he for the first time inquired into the state of his finances, he found that he had but the few millions sent on to Blois, and of which the greater part had been carried off from the Empress by M. Dudon, the envoy of the Provisionary Government. It was fortunate that before the commission of this act of rapine the Emperor had had time to send for 2,500,000 francs which the Lancers of the Guard had escorted. He desired the Empress to take 2,500,000 for her own use, and out of this she had been able to send him 900,000 francs, by

which his finances were raised to the sum of 3,400,000 francs when he left for Elba. The sum, in gold and silver, followed his carriage, and was received by him at Porto-Ferrajo. This was the sole means of support for himself and his soldiers were he content to end his days in Elba. The annual subsidy of two millions that had been stipulated by the Treaty of the 11th of April had not been paid, and he had no other revenues but those derived from his island. These revenues were very small. The town of Porto-Ferrajo contributed about one hundred thousand francs by harbour-dues and other taxes, and the island itself about another hundred thousand by direct taxation. The fisheries, mines, and salt-pits in their actual state produced about 320,000 francs, being altogether 520,000. Of this sum at least 200,000 francs were consumed by the municipal expenses of Porto-Ferrajo and the other small towns, and by the cost of maintaining the roads in the state to which Napoleon had brought them, which left a net product of about 300,000 francs per annum. Now, Napoleon would not require less than fifteen or sixteen hundred thousand francs to support his household, his army, and his navy. There was therefore a deficiency of 1,200,000 francs to be drawn annually from his private treasury, which the expenses of building had already reduced from 3,400,000 to 2,800,000 francs. He could not, therefore, live long at Elba if the appointed subsidy were not paid, unless he dismissed his guard; that is, deprived himself of the faithful soldiers that had followed his fortunes, which would be to leave himself without defence against the first band of assassins that should attack him, and give up the nucleus of an army with which he could not dispense. In any enterprise he might be induced to undertake at a later period. Consequently, though he had not yet formed a project of any kind, he paid such minute attention to the smallest expenses, that he astonished even those accustomed to his love of order, and made many accuse him of avarice. After six months' residence in the island, he ceased to require the service of the native militia, of which, as we have mentioned, a fourth part was always under arms. There were, thus, one hundred men less to be paid. He changed the organization of the battalion of his Old Guard, by reducing it from six to four companies. His stables were reduced to what was absolutely necessary, only the carriages needed by his mother, his sister, and himself being kept, and a few saddle-horses for himself, Drouot, and Bertrand to ride over the island with a small escort.

The pay of his principal officers was fixed at a moderate but sufficient sum. Drouot could not be induced to accept any pecuniary remuneration, as he had, he said, all that he needed when he shared the roof and table of his old general.

Such were Napoleon's arrangements for the present and the future. His life was calm and occupied; for it is the privilege of great minds to be able to submit to the decrees of destiny, especially when deserved, and to take an interest in the smallest things, because that in themselves they have as profound a meaning as the greatest. His mother, a kind

superior woman, but faithful in the performance of her duty, considered it due to her dignity to share the destiny of her son, and was at Porto-Ferraio the object of respect to the exiled court. The Princess (the Borghese, whose friendship for her father was almost carried to passion, had also and her presence was most soothing to her son. She took great pains to reconcile him to his fate, which, indeed, was not very difficult. Napoleon understood human nature too well to allow resentment long. He knew that Murat's thoughtless and vain, and consumed by the desire of retaining his kingdom, but he also knew that he was both kind-hearted and brave, and pardoned him for succumbing to extraordinary circumstances. When Murat reflected on the deceitfulness as well as the ingratitude of his conduct, he sent a declaration of renunciation to Elba, and Napoleon, in recompense, desired his sister Pauline to bear his daughter to Murat at Naples, and, at the same time, advised him to be prudent and hold himself ready for any unexpected event that might occur. The princess had carried this message to the delighted Murat, and then returned to take her place beside her brother, as the centre of a small society composed of the most respectable inhabitants of the island, crowded around Napoleon as their sovereign.

A theatre was arranged, into which Napoleon admitted this little society, and very few of the soldiers of his guard. He was gentle, calm, and as attentive to the performance as though he had not formerly seen the *œuvre* of the French theatre represented by the first actors of the age. When the duties of a modest sovereignty were fulfilled, he spent his time with Bertrand and Drouot in turning the works of the island, on horseback on foot, or sometimes in a boat. He occasionally embarked on board a half-decked vessel with some of his officers, and remained at sea for two or three days, where he was recognized and saluted by the sailors of every nation. During these long trips he conversed as freely or as reservedly as the subject demanded, sometimes talking with the liveliness of a young man, and more frequently with the gravity of profound and vast genius. He was continually engaged in writing the history of his reign, and considered the darker points of his career with frankness, frequently speaking of the terrible mistake of refusing peace at Prague. "The only fault that he freely admitted, was wrong," he said; "but let any one place himself in my place. I had gained so many victories, and had just re-established my empire by the two battles of Bautzen and Austerlitz! I had so much faith in my soldiers, myself, that I would throw the dice once more. I lost; but those that blame me have drunk of fortune's intoxicating cup." He listened with downcast eyes, not daring to say how unwise it was to risk one's own empire, how culpable to venture the wellbeing of one's children, and how criminal to the safety of a nation! The honest man silent, and justified his silence to his own conscience by remembering that his master was dethroned and exiled.

In this tranquil mode of existence, whilst he dreamed of raising an immortal historical

monument, Napoleon was almost happy because that a gleam of hope was mingled with its calm. He read the journals carefully, and with a penetration that made him divine the truth as clearly amid the thousand assertions of the journalists as though he had been present at the deliberations of the different cabinets. He said that the French Revolution had been arrested for a moment, but would resume its irresistible course. The old *régime* and the Revolution would have some terrible struggles, and in the consequent confusion an opportunity would assuredly offer for him to appear upon the stage. He did not know whether he should reign again, though he was certain that he could not reign in the same manner as before, for the minds of men, which had been paralyzed for a time by the terrors of the Revolution, had resumed their vigour and independence. What should he be? what should he become? what part would he have to play? Considering the awkwardness of the Bourbons at Paris, and the ambition of the Powers at Vienna, he felt convinced that the world was far from being about to subside into a state of tranquillity, and he knew that in a politically-tossed world he would be sure to find a position eminent as his genius. Such were his dimly-seen views of the future; and they sufficed to prevent the energy shut up in his soul from destroying him. His repose was thus enlivened by a ray of hope. He was sometimes annoyed by the outrageous language of the public papers. One day he found a journal, among a number he had received, which said that he was become mad, and that Bertrand and Drouot, his most faithful servants, together with his mother and sister and the most devoted of his family, had been obliged to leave him, not being able to endure his violence. He repaired to the drawing-room, where his mother, sister, Bertrand, and Drouot were assembled, and, flinging a number of papers on the table, he exclaimed, "You did not know that I am mad. None of you can bear my violence: you, mother, you, Drouot, and you all have left me." He then gave them the papers to read, whilst he exclaimed, "I am mad, I am mad." He sat down and avenged himself by discussing the state of the world, and pointing out the faults of all parties with wonderful sagacity. "Europe and the Bourbons shall find," he said, "that the present state of things will not last six months."

His life at Elba was rendered tolerable by the fact that he saw every day more clearly that the great theatre of the world would be soon accessible to him. This made him eager for intelligence, and for intelligence different to that contained in the journals. He had sent agents to Italy, and learned that the whole country would rise at his appearance; but this did not tempt him, as it was not at the head of the Italians that he could flatter himself to oppose Europe. It was of the state of France that he wished to be informed, but he would not write to the men of rank who had served under him, lest he should compromise them, and they, through fear of compromising him, were equally reserved. He was better informed of what was going on at Vienna. He was not indebted for this information to his wife, but to M. Meneval, whose

fideliety and zeal had never failed, and who through Genoese merchants had sent him frequent accounts of his son and of the Congress. M. Meneval had his information from Madame de Brignole, a Genoese lady of high birth and rare intelligence, who was most devoted to France, and who in her office of lady of honour had vainly sought to make Maria Louisa listen to the dictates of duty. Madame de Brignole received her information from the principal persons of Vienna, and particularly from her son-in-law, the Duke Dalberg, Minister of Louis XVIII. She carefully watched the course of events, and discovered the project of sending Napoleon to an island in the Atlantic. M. Meneval had not failed to inform Napoleon of this project, at the same time that he exaggerated the probability of its execution, for, as we have said, the sovereigns were about to quit Vienna without having come to any determination on this subject. To this M. Meneval added the information that the Congress was about being dissolved, and that the sovereigns would leave on the 20th of February, at the latest.

These several pieces of information produced a great impression on Napoleon, and made him reflect deeply on his present and future position. He had said more than once that he could not die upon this island, and that a tragic end even would be better suited to him, and more consonant with his glory, than an effeminate old age in the tranquil prison of Elba. The evident weariness of his companions in misfortune encouraged such thoughts. Marshal Bertrand felt the pains of exile a little less, since he had been joined by his family. Drouot was as ever occupied, in all simplicity, with the fulfilment of his duty. It was not so with others. The first excitement that follows self-sacrifice having passed away, both officers and soldiers were profoundly wearied of their want of occupation. They often let Napoleon see this, as they said to him, in their familiar way, "Sire, when shall we set out for France?" He only replied by silence and a friendly smile, but he perceived what was passing in their minds, and foresaw that their patience would not last to the end of his exile. He tried to occupy them by employing them, for a small addition to their pay, in working on his roads, in his garden, and allowed those who would not work to plunder the vineyards on his domain at San-Martino, whilst he laughed at their innocent depredations. "We are coming from St. Cloud," they said, when he met them on the road eating the grapes they had stolen. "Very good," he replied; but he comprehended the *ennui* that oppressed them, and from which he suffered more than they. About twenty, no longer able to bear this state of inaction, demanded their *congé*, which he gave in the most honourable terms. It is true that in return he was reinforced by some officers from the continent, men who fled from the *ennui* of France, but had not yet experienced that of Elba. Besides the too evident disposition of his soldiers, which made him fear that he would not be long able to retain them, he saw that it would soon be impossible to support them, since when his present works would be finished there would remain but

2,400,000 francs of 3,400,000 that he had brought to Porto-Ferrajo, a sum that would exactly pay his army and navy for two years. These reasons, without taking the indomitable energy of his mind into consideration, would have made him resolve on again appearing on the great theatre of the world. Still, Napoleon had not formed any decided plan, when he received the twofold intelligence we have recorded, that is, the project of transporting him to some isle in the ocean, and the intention of the sovereigns to leave Vienna as soon as their labours should be terminated. It needed nothing more to inflame his ardent spirit. Two powerful considerations struck him immediately. First, if the sovereigns were about to separate, they must have decided his fate, and the decision once made would be immediately put into execution. Secondly, the sovereigns being about to leave Vienna and repair to their respective dominions, it would be a good opportunity to attempt a revolution in France; for, having once quitted the Austrian capital, it would not be easy to assemble the Powers again, and all arrangements between distant cabinets must necessarily be slow, imperfect, and wanting in vigour. These were weighty considerations, and, as Napoleon was in the habit of looking to the immediate means of executing his project, he found in the season itself a motive for immediate action.

It was the middle of February, and long days would soon succeed long nights. The long nights were more favourable to Napoleon's escape from Elba, and to embarking on board his flotilla with his soldiers. This last consideration almost decided him, and, in order to be ready for any event, on the 16th of February he ordered the "Inconstant" to be put into dock to be repaired, painted like an English vessel, and provided with provisions for some months. The same day he ordered his agent for the mines at Rio to hire two large transports for the ostensible purpose of sending ore to the continent. He did not speak of his plans to any one.

Whilst he was thus thinking of escaping from his prison, and had been for two or three weeks deprived of all communication with Europe, he received a number of journals at once. He read them with the greatest eagerness, and it was with the liveliest satisfaction that he found in them new indications of the excitement that prevailed in France, for they contained an account of Erelmann's trial, of the disturbance at Mils, Rancourt's funeral, and proved that the soldiery and inhabitants of Paris were ready for a revolt. The *Journal des Débats* especially, being correctly informed by the Duke de Dalberg of what was going on at Vienna, confirmed the intelligence of the approaching separation of the sovereigns; and this concordance with M. Meneval's report confirmed Napoleon's resolution to prepare for his departure.

It was at this very time that he was informed of the arrival of a young stranger at Porto-Ferrajo, who announced that he was charged with an important message to him. This was M. Fleury de Chaboulon, of whom we have spoken. Immediately on his landing, he asked to be conducted to General Bertrand.

himself as an envoy from M. de Bassano admitted him at once, with a slight feeling of distrust, inspected him from head to foot, but soon perceived he was a young man of integrity and listened to him with profound attention. Then he was informed of a circumstance only to himself and M. de Bassano was the means employed by M. de Bassano to obtain credence for M. Fleury de la Rivière.

"They think of me still in France," said Napoleon, in a discontented tone. "M. de Bassano has not forgotten me?" reproachfulness passed away as M. Chaboulon informed him why his faithful servants had been so reserved, and listened attentively to the earnest and honest count of his informant. Although M. de Chaboulon told him nothing but what he already divined from the public opinion, he was delighted to find his opinions confirmed by an ocular witness, and especially who quoted M. de Bassano's own words and ought to touch him with the positive announcement of the success of the army, and the evident impatience of the military to escape from the authority of the Bourbons. Here were good reasons for believing that at the first appearance of the old general the feelings of the army would declare themselves, and for a young man as Napoleon the mere hope of success was sufficient to induce him to act. M. de Bassano's emissary to the island decided to leave immediately. How could he produce a more minute explanation, and did the following question. "Now," said Napoleon, "and tell me whether M. de Bassano advises me to embark for France." M. de Bassano, by that piercing glance that none but the young man dared neither to resist nor impose so great a responsibility on himself, and timidly replied that M. de Bassano gave no opinion, and requested him to confine himself to the statement of facts. Napoleon did not object, for he saw that nobody could have grave a responsibility with respect to the decision he dismissed M. de Chaboulon, leaving him of his plans, though he was anxious to divine them. Fearing that the consent of a young man admitted for me to the knowledge of important matters might lead to some imprudence, he had an imaginary expedition to Naples, and at its termination to return to France for fresh instructions from M. de Bassano. This period Napoleon ought either to have returned the Bourbon dynasty or to have attempted.

M. de Chaboulon, in his work on the Hundred Days, "Memoirs of Napoleon's Private Life," a truthful work, which had the honour of being by Napoleon at St. Helena, has somewhat of a part played, and which he relates under the name of M. de Bassano. In his recital, he seems to think that he induced Napoleon to decide on quitting the island. But, like all those who know but one event, he has referred everything to his personal view and to what he saw. Napoleon's orders to have been preserved, his own account to the Emperor and Marshal Davout at Paris, which are the manuscript memoirs which we have referred to with Napoleon's notes on the work in which he clearly states the facts were not quite as M. de Chaboulon relates, but exactly as we tell them here.

Reserved as Napoleon was with others, he told his mother of his plans. "I cannot," he said to her, "die on this island and terminate my career in a repose unworthy of me. Besides, want of money would soon leave me here alone, exposed to the attacks of my many enemies. France is excited. The Bourbons have roused against them all the convictions and interests connected with the Revolution. The army wishes for me. Every thing inclines me to hope that the moment I appear the soldiers will hasten to meet me. I certainly may meet some unexpected obstacle in my path; I may meet an officer who, faithful to the Bourbons, would restrain the impetuosity of the troops; and then a few hours would end my career. Such an end were better than a long residence in this isle with the future that awaits me there. I will leave, and tempt fortune once more. What is your advice, mother?" This energetic-minded woman experienced an emotion of terror on receiving this confidence, for she saw that her son, notwithstanding all his glory, might die as a common malefactor on the shores of France. "Let me," she said, "be a mother for a moment, and then I will give you my opinion." She reflected for some time in silence, and then, in a firm and inspired tone, she said, "Go, my son, go and fulfil your destiny. You will fail, perhaps, and your failure will be soon followed by your death. But I see with sorrow that you cannot remain here; but let us hope that God, who has protected you amid so many battles, will save you once more." This said, she embraced him with deep emotion.†

Napoleon was now more confirmed in his design than ever. It was at the very last moment that he told the delighted Bertrand, who had some merit in enduring his exile, since it was painful to him though surrounded by his family. Drouot was greatly disturbed when Napoleon admitted him to his confidence. This hero, the most upright of men, asked himself whether the duty of sharing Napoleon's sufferings involved the obligation of accompanying him in an enterprise that might bring such frightful misfortunes on France. Napoleon sought to combat these doubts by depicting the state of France, divided, and rent by parties, condemned to suffer from the attempts of one or the other, and treated with the greatest indignity by Europe; whilst, on the other hand, she had still a chance of rising, by the aid of that vigorous arm that had organized her resources in 1800. Besides, the new ideas with which Napoleon would return to France after ten months of profound reflection, his determination not to sink again, of his own free will, into the abyss of war, to

One circumstance alone—the date of the order for the repairs of the "Inconstant"—puts all doubt at an end. These orders, preserved in the correspondence of the island of Elba, which has been preserved, are dated February 16. Now, although M. de Chaboulon, in relating his journey under a borrowed name, has not mentioned the precise date of his arrival at Elba, still certain indications prove that he had not arrived there before this order was issued. This is an important point, as will be seen hereafter; for it proves that it was not by advices from Paris that Napoleon was led to this enterprise. M. de Chaboulon's information certainly hastened the execution of his project, but was not the primary cause of his determination.

† This is Napoleon's own account in his manuscript memoirs.

fideliety and zeal had never failed, and who through Genoese merchants had sent him frequent accounts of his son and of the Congress. M. Meneval had his information from Madame de Brignole, a Genoese lady of high birth and rare intelligence, who was most devoted to France, and who in her office of lady of honour had vainly sought to make Maria Louisa listen to the dictates of duty. Madame de Brignole received her information from the principal persons of Vienna, and particularly from her son-in-law, the Duke Dalberg, Minister of Louis XVIII. She carefully watched the course of events, and discovered the project of sending Napoleon to an island in the Atlantic. M. Meneval had not failed to inform Napoleon of this project, at the same time that he exaggerated the probability of its execution, for, as we have said, the sovereigns were about to quit Vienna without having come to any determination on this subject. To this M. Meneval added the information that the Congress was about being dissolved, and that the sovereigns would leave on the 20th of February, at the latest.

These several pieces of information produced a great impression on Napoleon, and made him reflect deeply on his present and future position. He had said more than once that he could not die upon this island, and that a tragic end even would be better suited to him, and more consonant with his glory, than an effeminate old age in the tranquil prison of Elba. The evident weariness of his companions in misfortune encouraged such thoughts. Marshal Bertrand felt the pains of exile a little less, since he had been joined by his family. Drouot was as ever occupied, in all simplicity, with the fulfilment of his duty. It was not so with others. The first excitement that follows self-sacrifice having passed away, both officers and soldiers were profoundly wearied of their want of occupation. They often let Napoleon see this, as they said to him, in their familiar way, "Sire, when shall we set out for France?" He only replied by silence and a friendly smile, but he perceived what was passing in their minds, and foresaw that their patience would not last to the end of his exile. He tried to occupy them by employing them, for a small addition to their pay, in working on his roads, in his garden, and allowed those who would not work to plunder the vineyards on his domain at San-Martino, whilst he laughed at their innocent depredations. "We are coming from St. Cloud," they said, when he met them on the road eating the grapes they had stolen. "Very good," he replied; but he comprehended the *ennui* that oppressed them, and from which he suffered more than they. About twenty, no longer able to bear this state of inaction, demanded their *congé*, which he gave in the most honourable terms. It is true that in return he was reinforced by some officers from the continent, men who fled from the *ennui* of France, but had not yet experienced that of Elba. Besides the too evident disposition of his soldiers, which made him fear that he would not be long able to retain them, he saw that it would soon be impossible to support them, since when his present works would be finished there would remain but

2,400,000 francs of 2,400,000 that he had brought to Porto-Ferrajo, a sum that would exactly pay his army and navy for two years. These reasons, without taking the indomitable energy of his mind into consideration, would have made him resolve on again appearing on the great theatre of the world. Still, Napoleon had not formed any decided plan, when he received the twofold intelligence we have recorded, that is, the project of transporting him to some isle in the ocean, and the intention of the sovereigns to leave Vienna as soon as their labours should be terminated. It needed nothing more to inflame his ardent spirit. Two powerful considerations struck him immediately. First, if the sovereigns were about to separate, they must have decided his fate, and the decision once made would be immediately put into execution. Secondly, the sovereigns being about to leave Vienna and repair to their respective dominions, it would be a good opportunity to attempt a revolution in France; for, having once quitted the Austrian capital, it would not be easy to assemble the Powers again, and all arrangements between distant cabinets must necessarily be slow, imperfect, and wanting in vigour. These were weighty considerations, and, as Napoleon was in the habit of looking to the immediate means of executing his project, he found in the season itself a motive for immediate action.

It was the middle of February, and long days would soon succeed long nights. But long nights were more favourable to Napoleon's escape from Elba, and to embarking on board his flotilla with his soldiers. This last consideration almost decided him, and, in order to be ready for any event, on the 16th of February he ordered the "*Inconstant*" to be put into dock to be repaired, painted like an English vessel, and provided with provisions for some months. The same day he ordered his agent for the mines at Rio to hire two large transports for the ostensible purpose of sending ore to the continent. He did not speak of his plans to any one.

Whilst he was thus thinking of escaping from his prison, and had been for two or three weeks deprived of all communication with Europe, he received a number of journals at once. He read them with the greatest eagerness, and it was with the liveliest satisfaction that he found in them new indications of the excitement that prevailed in France. One contained an account of Exelmans's trial of the disturbance at Mlle. Rancourt's dinner, and proved that the soldiery and inhabitants of Paris were ready for a revolt. The *Journal des Débats* especially, being correctly informed by the Duke de Dalberg of what was going on at Vienna, confirmed the intelligence of an approaching separation of the sovereigns; and this concordance with M. Meneval's report confirmed Napoleon's resolution to prepare for his departure.

It was at this very time that he was informed of the arrival of a young count at Porto-Ferrajo, who announced that he was charged with an important message. This was M. Fleury de Chaboulon, of whom we have spoken. Immediately on his landing he asked to be conducted to General Sebastiani.

announcing himself as an envoy from M. de Bassano. Napoleon admitted him at once, and, from a slight feeling of distrust, inspected him minutely from head to foot, but soon perceived that he was a young man of integrity and zeal, and listened to him with profound attention when he was informed of a circumstance known only to himself and M. de Bassano: this was the means employed by M. de Bassano to obtain credence for M. Fleury de Chaboulon. "They think of me still in France?" said Napoleon, in a discontented tone. "M. de Bassano has not forgotten me?" This slight reproachfulness passed away as M. Fleury de Chaboulon informed him why his most faithful servants had been so reserved, and he listened attentively to the earnest and agitated account of his informant. Although M. Fleury de Chaboulon told him nothing but what he had already divined from the public papers, he was delighted to find his opinions confirmed by an ocular witness, and especially by one who quoted M. de Bassano's own words. What did and ought to touch him most was the positive announcement of the feelings of the army, and the evident impatience of the military to escape from the authority of the Bourbons. Here were good grounds for believing that at the first appearance of their old general the feelings of the soldiers would declare themselves, and for a man so daring as Napoleon the mere hope of success was sufficient to induce him to act. Having heard M. de Bassano's emissary to the end, he resolved to leave immediately. However, to induce a more minute explanation, he proposed the following question. "Now finish," he said, "and tell me whether M. de Bassano advises me to embark for France." Interrogated by that piercing glance that none could resist, the young man dared neither to assume himself nor impose so great a responsibility on M. de Bassano, and timidly replied that M. de Bassano gave no opinion, and recommended him to confine himself to the simple statement of facts. Napoleon did not insist further, for he saw that nobody could assume so grave a responsibility with respect to him, and he dismissed M. de Chaboulon without telling him of his plans, though he gave him reason to divine them. Fearing that the excitement of a young man admitted for the first time to the knowledge of important secrets might lead to some imprudence, he sent him on an imaginary expedition to Naples, with orders at its termination to return to France for fresh instructions from M. de Bassano.* At this period Napoleon ought either to have overturned the Bourbon dynasty or fallen in the attempt.

* M. Fleury de Chaboulon, in his work on the Hundred Days, entitled "Memoirs of Napoleon's Private Life in 1815," a very truthful work, which had the honour of being spoken of by Napoleon at St. Helena, has somewhat magnified the part he played, and which he relates under an assumed name. In his recital, he seems to think that he had induced Napoleon to decide on quitting the island of Elba. But, like all those who know but one of an event, he has referred every thing to his personal experience and to what he saw. Napoleon's orders in Elba, which have been preserved, his own account to Hortense and Marshal Davout at Paris, which are contained in the manuscript memoirs which we have reviewed, together with Napoleon's notes on the work in question, prove clearly that the facts were not quite as M. de Chaboulon relates, but exactly as we tell them here.

Reserved as Napoleon was with others, he told his mother of his plans. "I cannot," he said to her, "die on this island and terminate my career in a repose unworthy of me. Besides, want of money would soon leave me here alone, exposed to the attacks of my many enemies. France is excited. The Bourbons have roused against them all the convictions and interests connected with the Revolution. The army wishes for me. Every thing inclines me to hope that the moment I appear the soldiers will hasten to meet me. I certainly may meet some unexpected obstacle in my path; I may meet an officer who, faithful to the Bourbons, would restrain the impetuosity of the troops; and then a few hours would end my career. Such an end were better than a long residence in this isle with the future that awaits me there. I will leave, and tempt fortune once more. What is your advice, mother?" This energetic-minded woman experienced an emotion of terror on receiving this confidence, for she saw that her son, notwithstanding all his glory, might die as a common malefactor on the shores of France. "Let me," she said, "be a mother for a moment, and then I will give you my opinion." She reflected for some time in silence, and then, in a firm and inspired tone, she said, "Go, my son, go and fulfil your destiny. You will fail, perhaps, and your failure will be soon followed by your death. But I see with sorrow that you cannot remain here; but let us hope that God, who has protected you amid so many battles, will save you once more." This said, she embraced him with deep emotion.†

Napoleon was now more confirmed in his design than ever. It was at the very last moment that he told the delighted Bertrand, who had some merit in enduring his exile, since it was painful to him though surrounded by his family. Drouot was greatly disturbed when Napoleon admitted him to his confidence. This hero, the most upright of men, asked himself whether the duty of sharing Napoleon's sufferings involved the obligation of accompanying him in an enterprise that might bring such frightful misfortunes on France. Napoleon sought to combat these doubts by depicting the state of France, divided, and rent by parties, condemned to suffer from the attempts of one or the other, and treated with the greatest indignity by Europe; whilst, on the other hand, she had still a chance of rising, by the aid of that vigorous arm that had organized her resources in 1800. Besides, the new ideas with which Napoleon would return to France after ten months of profound reflection, his determination not to sink again, of his own free will, into the abyss of war, to

One circumstance alone—the date of the order for the repairs of the "Inconstant"—puts all doubt at an end. These orders, preserved in the correspondence of the island of Elba, which has been preserved, are dated February 16. Now, although M. de Chaboulon, in relating his journey under a borrowed name, has not mentioned the precise date of his arrival at Elba, still certain indications prove that he had not arrived there before this order was issued. This is an important point, as will be seen hereafter; for it proves that it was not by advices from Paris that Napoleon was led to this enterprise. M. de Chaboulon's information certainly hastened the execution of his project, but was not the primary cause of his determination.

† This is Napoleon's own account in his manuscript memoirs.

treat the French people as a free nation, by allowing them to have a large share in the Government; all these were reasons for hoping that France would obtain peace, unanimity of opinion, well-regulated liberty, and a firm position, all that she might have had, had Napoleon restrained himself during his former reign. Devotedness to his master did the rest; and Drouot, yielding to his wishes, commenced secret preparations for the approaching expedition. Napoleon had, under specious pretences, brought the Corsican battalion, stationed in the island, to Porto-Ferrajo, and ordered new clothes for the men. But he left the horses of the Polish Lancers in the meadows of Pianosa, as it would be difficult to remove them, nor could he easily have found an excuse for doing so. About eleven hundred soldiers were collected, of whom eight hundred belonged to the Guard, and three hundred were Corsicans, Piedmontese, or Tuscans, belonging to the 35th Light Infantry that Napoleon had found in the island. None of these men had an idea of the projected enterprise, and, the ordinary works going on as usual, they might have supposed they were about to be reviewed. One circumstance in particular was very favourable to the projected attempt. In order to watch the proceedings in Elba, the English had retained in the neighbourhood Colonel Campbell, one of the commissioners that accompanied Napoleon from Fontainebleau to Porto-Ferrajo; and, in order to conceal the object for which he was really sent, this officer received an ostensible mission to the Tuscan court. Colonel Campbell went backwards and forwards from Florence to Leghorn, from Leghorn to Porto-Ferrajo, and was in reality a spy without seeming so. He had at this moment left Porto-Ferrajo and gone to Leghorn. The eye of English policy was consequently closed, and there only remained the cruisers, that were easily deceived or avoided. In order to keep his preparations a profound secret, Napoleon, two days before embarking, laid an embargo on all the vessels in the harbours of Elba, and cut off all communication with the sea. He ordered his ordnance-officer, Vantini, to seize one of the large vessels lying in the port, which with "L'Inconstant" of twenty-six cannons, the goëlette "La Caroline," the felucca "L'Etoile," the advice-boat "La Mouche," and two other transports, freighted at Rio, making in all seven vessels, he secured the means of embarking his eleven hundred men and four pieces of field artillery.

Having meditated seriously on his determination and project, having considered that he could not remain in an island so near France, where he would be soon alone for want of money to pay his troops, and where he would be exposed to the dagger of every common assassin if he were not thence transported by the European Powers,—considering, too, that in the present state of France others might make a similar attempt, without the same success as he, since his mere presence would suffice to attract the army and put the Bourbons to flight,—that as the sovereigns were on the eve of separating, as the latest accounts showed, and that it would not be easy to assemble them again, and they, seeing the weakness of the Bourbons, would not be so ready

to take up arms in their cause, and finding him pacific, (as he was determined to be,)—he considered that he had every chance of re-establishing the Imperial throne as by the touch of a magic wand, and that, in short, he ought to execute his project whilst the nights were still long. Having again weighed all these considerations, he resolved to commence his romantic enterprise on the 26th of February.

Before leaving, he sent a message to Naples by one of the vessels with which he communicated with the coasts of Italy. At the same time that he announced his departure to Maria, he desired him to send a courier to Vienna to inform the Austrian court that he would be soon in Paris, but with the firm resolution to maintain peace and confine himself within the terms of the treaty of the 30th of May, 1814. He also traced for him the part he was to act as King of Naples. He particularly recommended him to prepare his troops, and hold them in readiness in the Marches where they were already partly assembled, but not to take the initiative in hostilities, but patiently observe what would occur at Paris and Vienna before making any movement, and, should he be obliged to fight, to retire rather than advance until the enemy should come within his reach, for the nearer he was to Naples the stronger he would be, and the weaker the Austrians.

On the 26th Napoleon allowed his soldiers to remain at their usual employments until the middle of the day. They were suddenly summoned in the afternoon, regaled with soup, and then assembled with arms and baggage on the pier, where they were informed that they were to go on board the vessels. Though they had not been told that France was their destination, they entertained no doubt on the subject, and gave utterance to the wildest expressions of joy. To emerge from their wearying inactivity, to quit Elba, to be called into action, to behold France again, and remount the summit of power and glory,—such were the prospects that filled them with joy as they made the harbour of Porto-Ferrajo resound with cries of *Vive l'Empereur!*

But the inhabitants of the island regretted Napoleon's departure, for they thought that the prosperity of their island left with him, and in mournful silence they surrounded the noisy and animated group about to embark. Many who had become intimate with the officers and soldiers bade them a sad farewell, wished success to their enterprise, and consoled themselves in thinking that should Napoleon's star again rise radiant in the firmament—and of this they entertained no doubt—some of its rays would fall upon their isle. Napoleon soon appeared, accompanied by Bertrand, Drouot, Cambronne, and the entire staff that had accompanied him in his exile. He had just dined with his mother and sons, and, embracing them several times, sought in vain to dry their tears, reminding them how miraculously he had been preserved during twenty years amid the artillery of all Europe. He left them, his heart touched, but his resolution unshaken, and descended to the shore, his brow radiant with hope. His presence excited new bursts of enthusiasm, and soon

the little army of eleven hundred men that was about to conquer the empire of France against all Europe was embarked. The staff and about three hundred men embarked on board "L'Inconstant;" the remainder were distributed between "La Caroline" and the other vessels of the flotilla. At about seven in the evening, the crowd being assembled on the quay, and Napoleon's mother and sister at the windows of the palace, the Imperial flotilla weighed anchor, directing its course toward Cape St. André. It was to coast along Elba, proceed northward between the Isle of Capria and Italy, and keep as far as possible out of the latitudes frequented by the cruisers. The wind was from the south, as though fortune wished to favour the daring expedition, and for the last time protect the extraordinary man whom she had so often transported beyond the Alps, whom she had carried into Egypt and restored safe and sound again to France, whom she had aided in all his enterprises from the Tagus to the Borysthenes, and never abandoned but at Moscow! Would she grant him one more of those favours with which she had filled his wonderful career? That was the doubtful point; but neither Napoleon nor his soldiers, in their boundless confidence, could entertain any doubt.

But soon difficulties arose, as they will even in the most successful enterprises. The favourable south wind fell sensibly, and when the flotilla arrived at St. André it was becalmed. It was with difficulty that a little progress was made northward toward Capria, and on the morning of the 27th the flotilla had advanced only seven or eight leagues. The vessels were now in the waters of the French and English cruisers, whom they might meet at any moment. The danger was great. The captain of the frigate "Chautard," who had joined Napoleon at Elba, Captain Taillade, of "The Inconstant," and several sailors advised returning to Porto-Ferrajo to await a more favourable wind. This would be avoiding one danger by seeking another, for, notwithstanding the embargo laid on all vessels in Porto-Ferrajo, the English might have heard of what was going on, in which case a British force suddenly appearing might shut Napoleon up in Porto-Ferrajo, detected in the very act of disturbing the public peace, and thence he might be transported to some island, not as a sovereign, but as a prisoner. It was better, therefore, to lie to and await this much-desired south wind. Napoleon, who was unequalled in his experience of the caprices of fate, knew that the various phases of fortune must be viewed with calmness, and a favourable change awaited with patience. Indeed, the greatest danger lay in the possibility of falling in with the French cruising-party, consisting of two frigates and a brig. The sentiments of the crews were well known, and it was possible to seize these vessels without firing a shot, by suddenly boarding them with the eagles and the tricolour flag. Napoleon therefore determined to wait the course of events, and extricate himself by a *coup d'audace* should he fall in with the French cruisers.

At noon the wind freshened, and the vessels advanced as far as Leghorn. A frigate was perceived in the direction of the Genoese coast,

and another in the open sea to the left, whilst a ship of the line was seen in the distance coming with a favourable wind in full sail toward the flotilla. These were the dangers to be braved in trusting to fate. Napoleon's vessels continued their way, when suddenly "L'Inconstant" came deck to deck with a French brig of war, "Le Zéphire," commanded by Lieutenant Andrieux, a good officer, that had often met the little navy of Elba. An attempt might have been made to seize this brig, but Napoleon opposed the design, not wishing to incur unnecessary risk. He ordered the grenadiers to keep out of sight, and desired Captain Taillade to speak to the commander Andrieux, with whom he was acquainted. Captain Taillade saluted Andrieux by the aid of his speaking-trumpet, and asked whether he was going. "To Leghorn," was replied. "And you?" "To Genoa," said Captain Taillade, and offered to take charge of any commission that "Le Zéphire" might have for that port; but there were none. "And how is the Emperor?" asked the officer of the royal navy. "Very well," replied Captain Taillade. "So much the better," added Andrieux, and went on his way, without suspecting whom he had met, and the immense importance of what he had passed unnoticed.

During the night, the two war-vessels which had caused so much uneasiness some hours before, disappeared, and the flotilla shaped its way toward France.

The 28th was employed in crossing the Gulf of Genoa, where only a frigate was seen, which was at first believed to be a cruiser belonging to the enemy, but which soon ceased to notice the flotilla; and on the 1st of March, an ever-memorable though fatal day for Napoleon and for France, the French coast was discernible, to the infinite joy of Napoleon and his troops. At noon they came in view of Antibes and the St. Marguerite isles. At three o'clock they anchored in the Gulf of Juan; when Napoleon, having surmounted the first difficulties of his enterprise, felt as though his ancient good fortune was returning, and his soldiers, sharing his belief, made the air resound with cries of *Vive l'Empereur!*

At an appointed signal, and amid the roar of cannon, each vessel hoisted the tricolour flag, and the soldiers, displaying cockades of the same colours, prepared to disembark in the boats. Napoleon ordered Lamouret, a captain of infantry, to take twenty-five men and seize a battery that was in the centre of the gulf. Captain Lamouret went in a boat, but found the battery occupied only by some custom-house officers, who were delighted to hear of Napoleon's arrival, and most anxious to join him. The joy with which all landed may be easily imagined; and whilst the boats were going backward and forward to bring the men ashore, Captain Lamouret conceived the design of seizing the fortress of Antibes, which would have been an important acquisition.

This rash officer proceeded to the fort, and entered into conversation with the guard at the entrance, by whom he was very well received. The commander, General Corsin, was on a visit at the St. Marguerites. Colonel Cuneo d'Ornano was in command, and, anxious to fulfil his duty as a soldier, he allowed the

twenty-five grenadiers to enter, and then, ordering the drawbridge to be raised, he made them prisoners. But they, entering into conversation with the soldiers of the 87th, then in garrison at Antibes, influenced them so far that they, crying *Vive l'Empereur*, insisted on the place being given up to Napoleon. Colonel Ornano succeeded in calming them, whilst he ordered that the twenty-five grenadiers should be disarmed, promising to return their arms when every thing should be explained.

These too-venturesome twenty-five men were thus lost to Napoleon, and this might be considered as an evil omen, but that at the same time a number of the soldiers of the 87th, letting themselves down from the ramparts, hurried to Cannes,—to join their Emperor, as they said.

At five o'clock all were landed. Napoleon's eleven hundred men, with their baggage and four pieces of cannon, had established their bivouac in a field of olives on the road between Antibes and Cannes. When the inhabitants saw several ships crowded with soldiers and firing cannon, they were terrified, thinking that the Moors had come to seize the fishermen. But, when they learned the truth, they hurried to the shore to gratify their curiosity, but did not express an opinion one way or the other, for the inhabitants of the coast were not in general favourable to the Emperor, who had involved them in fifteen years of naval warfare. Napoleon sent Cambronne at the head of a vanguard to Cannes, to order provisions and buy horses, and pay ready money, knowing that if he wished men to favour his cause he must not commence by hurting their private interests. The provisions were prepared, and some mules and horses bought. Notwithstanding the order that no person should be allowed to leave Cannes, particularly by the Toulon road, an officer of gendarmerie from whom Cambronne had proposed to buy some horses, pretending that he would sell, set off at a gallop for Draguignan to tell the Prefect of Var of the great event that had occurred. Fortunately for Napoleon, this officer, having seen the artillery on the Toulon road, was deceived, and announced that the expedition was advancing in the direction of Provence, that is, toward Toulon and Marseilles.

But he was much mistaken, as we shall see. A table and seat having been prepared in the olive-field where Napoleon had encamped, he opened his maps. He had the choice of two roads, one level, leading to Toulon and Marseilles, the other leading to Dauphiné over steep mountains, at that time covered with ice and snow, and intersected by narrow defiles, where fifty determined men could arrest the progress of a whole army. This latter road, passing across the French Alps, was in some places inaccessible to wheeled vehicles; consequently if Napoleon chose this route he should leave his artillery behind. Notwithstanding these difficulties, which at first sight appeared so formidable, Napoleon did not hesitate, and, by the choice he made, assured the success of his adventurous enterprise.

The physical difficulties of the Alpine route consisted in steep and ice-covered roads, in ufeles to be forced or avoided by a détour; but these obstacles could be surmounted by patience,

perseverance, and daring. Napoleon was accompanied by eleven hundred men capable of any thing, and quite equal to overcoming any opposition that might be met in these parts, where there could be none but small garrisons commanded by a captain or a *chef de bataillon*. On the other hand, the moral difficulties to be met on the other route were much more to be dreaded. Had Napoleon chosen this route, which passes through Toulon, Marseilles, and Avignon, he would meet with none but violent royalists, who might possibly check the march felt by the troops for him. Besides, he would meet on that route authorities of high rank. There were admirals at Toulon, and a Marshal of France at Marseilles, (Masséna commanded in this town.) In Napoleon's position, his greatest danger was to be apprehended from those high in authority. In the army the soldiers—almost all veterans who had come from prison or foreign garrisons—were all fanatically devoted to Napoleon. The officers shared their sentiments, though with more reserve, as they were restrained by their oath and sense of duty. The generals—the marshals especially—were still more influenced by these considerations, and could better appreciate the danger of re-establishing the Empire, and would, consequently, be less inclined than the officers to share the enthusiasm of the troops. It would therefore be more difficult to seduce a marshal at the head of eight or ten thousand men, than a captain or colonel in command of some hundreds.

For all these reasons, the higher authorities, whether civil or military, ought to be avoided, and even the worst routes preferred if only officers of inferior rank were to be met there. On the Dauphiné road, as we have said, Napoleon would only meet with small garrisons feebly commanded, and peasants who liked neither nobles nor priests, and who were almost all holders of national property. The largest town Napoleon would meet, did he choose the mountainous route, was Grenoble. Now, Napoleon knew well that the *Grenoblois*, like all the inhabitants of the frontiers, animated with a most warlike spirit and faithful to liberal traditions, were, since the famous assembly of Vizille, totally opposed to the Bourbons. He had in his guard a surgeon, Dr. Emery, a native of Dauphiné, who had kept up a secret correspondence with his native city, and was ready to answer for his compatriots. Napoleon therefore chose the mountainous route, leaving to his left the beautiful sea-side road and the Marseillais royalism, and thus gave another proof of the excellency of that *coup-d'œil* which had so often procured him the greatest military triumphs, and which now secured him his greatest political success that ever the head of an empire or the leader of a party had obtained. He took all his measures accordingly.

He determined to leave his artillery behind, which he did not really need, as he had no intention of fighting with cannon. His seven hundred men would suffice to defend him against the *gens-d'armes*, or the opposition of the leader of a battalion; all other resistance he expected to overcome by the mere effect of his presence. The moment he appeared in his redingote and celebrated cocked hat, the first detachment sent to oppose him would fall at

is feet, an example that would be followed by the entire army; or he should die on the high-road the death of a common malefactor: this was a question that cannon could not decide. As he left the artillery behind, he ordered that a small sum—about seventeen or eighteen hundred thousand francs—which remained of what he had taken to Elba, should be placed upon the mules. The remainder had been partly spent at Elba, and a part was left to his other. He determined to leave Cannes about midnight. At the same time he sent emissaries to Grasse, to order provisions and to have proclamations printed, of which his officers had already made several copies on board *L'Inconstant*. Of these proclamations one was addressed to the people of France, the other to the army. The proclamations were usually or substantially as follows:—

"Frenchmen," he said in the first, "the stories of Champaubert, Montmirail, Châteauderry, Vauchamp, Mormans, Monterau, Aonne, Rheims, Arcis-sur-Aube, Saint Dizier, the insurrection of the brave peasantry of Lorraine, Champagne, Alsace, Franche-Comté, Burgundy, and the position I had taken in the enemy's rear by separating them from their transports, magazines, and ammunition, had placed them in a desperate situation. France is on the eve of being more powerful than ever, and the chosen troops of the Allies would have found a grave in the vast countries they had so cruelly ravaged, when the Duke of Ragusa's treachery gave up the capital and disorganized the army. At the same time, our ruin was completed by the defection of the Duke of Castiglione, to whom I had confided a sufficient force to beat the Austrians, and who, had he appeared at the rear of the enemy, might have perfected our triumph. Thus was the destiny of war changed by the unexpected conduct of these traitors, who were at once traitors to their country, their prince, and their benefactor. In these painful circumstances, my heart was rent, but my soul remained immovable. I consulted the interests of the country alone. I flung myself to a rock in the sea, and preserved an existence that might still be useful to you..."

Having given this explanation of his reverses, Napoleon sought to illustrate the spirit of the emigrants, who depended, as he said, upon foreign aid, and were seeking to re-establish the abuses of the feudal system. He added,—

"Frenchmen, in my exile, I heard your sighs and prayers. I have crossed the sea amid perils of every kind; I am come to you to assert my rights, which are yours. All that has been said, done, or written by individuals since the taking of Paris, I shall ignore, and remember nothing but their important services; for events sometimes occur which the weakness of human nature cannot resist. ... Frenchmen, there is no nation, however small, which is not the right and which ought not to seek deliverance from the dishonour of obeying a prince imposed on it by the momentary victory of an enemy. When Charles VII. returned to Paris and overturned the ephemeral throne of Henry VI., he declared that he was indebted to his throne to the valour of his soldiers, and to the Prince Regent of England. And I consider and ever shall consider it a glory to

owe every thing to you and my brave soldiers."

Napoleon said to the army,—

"Soldiers!

"We were not conquered; two men from our ranks betrayed our glory, their country, their prince, and their benefactor.

"Shall those whom we have seen during twenty-five years traversing Europe, seeking to raise up enemies against us, who have passed their lives in fighting against us in the ranks of foreign armies and cursing our beautiful France, shall they pretend to command or enchain our eagles, they who have never been able to gaze steadily upon them? Shall we suffer them to inherit the fruit of our labours, to seize our honours, our property, and to calumniate our glory? Should their reign continue, all would be lost, even the memory of our greatest deeds.

"Your general, who was called to the throne by the choice of the people, and raised upon your bucklers, is restored to you. Come and join him. Tear down those colours which the country has proscribed, and which for twenty-five years have served to mark the rallying-point of France's enemies. Display the tricolour cockade that you wore in the days of your greatest glory. We must forget that we have been the masters of nations, but we must not suffer strangers to interfere in our affairs. Who will pretend to be our master? Who shall have the power? Take possession again of those eagles that you bore at Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, Eylau, Wagram, Friedland, Tudela, Eckmühl, Essling, Smolensk, at the Moskova, Lützen, Wurtchen, and Montmirail. Come take your place beneath the standard of your chief. His existence is part of yours; his rights are yours and the nation's; his interests, his honour, and his glory are identical with yours. Victory will advance in full gallop; the eagle with the national colours will fly from steeple to steeple, even to the towers of Notre Dame. Then you may with honour show your wounds, then you may boast of what you shall have done; you will be the liberators of your country."

Thus in these fiery proclamations, imbued with the passions of the time and adroitly touching all the essential questions of the day, Napoleon, not over-scrupulous as to the justice of the proceeding, gave up Marmont and Angereau to all the fury of the soldiers, by whom he knew they were detested. He opposed the rights of the people to the rights of the Bourbons, and thus touched the masses in their most sensitive point. He adroitly promised to forget certain weaknesses, imputing them to the overpowering might of revolutions, appealed to the tricolour cockade, which he knew every soldier had concealed in his knapsack, told them how their immortal glory had been tarnished by the ill-placed hatred of the emigrants, and in a striking and still popular figure of speech promised victory to his partisans. These proclamations were not the least thoughtful, neither were they the least efficacious, of his profound calculations.

Before commencing his land-journey, he sent the fortunate flotilla back to Elba to announce to his mother and sister the success of the first part of his enterprise, and ordered that they should be taken by "*The Inconstant*" to Naples, and remain there in safety until the end of the crisis.

Toward evening he reached Cannes, and, in consequence of an order he had given that all carriages should be stopped, the Prince of Monaco, who had, like many men of the times, changed his party, turning from the Empire to the Restoration, was arrested on his road, and brought before him. Napoleon immediately ordered that he should be set free, relieved him gayly, and asked whither he was going. "I am going home," replied the prince. "So am I," said Napoleon. He then left the petty sovereign of Monaco, wishing him a pleasant journey.

At midnight he set out for Grasse, following Cambrouze, who had gone before with a detachment of one hundred men. The battalion of the Old Guard was in the centre, escorting the treasure and ammunition, and was followed by the Corsican battalion, that formed the rear-guard.

Just outside Cannes commenced the mountainous road which the troops were to follow for eighty leagues, until they should reach Grenoble. About daybreak on the 2d of March they reached Grasse. The few hours they had spent in the neighbourhood of Cannes had been employed in preparing rations and getting the two proclamations printed. From this moment Napoleon was determined not to lose an hour, in order that he might reach Grenoble earlier than any orders that might be sent from Paris. He breakfasted standing, surrounded by his staff, a short way outside the city of Grasse, within sight of the inquisitive but perplexed inhabitants, who exhibited no trace of the enthusiasm with which he hoped to be soon greeted.

He set out at eight in the morning, still preceded by his vanguard, and was several hours engaged in climbing, by a narrow pathway covered with ice, the steep mountain-chain that separates the sea from the basin of the Durance. The greater part of the journey was made on foot. The men who had been able to procure horses walked beside their beasts; the others followed, carrying their kit. The cold was intense, and Napoleon was frequently obliged to dismount to warm himself by walking,—a species of exercise to which he was little accustomed. He sometimes stumbled in the snow, and on one occasion stopped a few minutes in a hut occupied by an old woman and some cows. Whilst he warmed himself before a brushwood fire, he entered into conversation with the old countrywoman, who little imagined what guests she entertained beneath her humble thatch, and asked what news from Paris. She seemed surprised at a question to which she was little accustomed, and replied, very naturally, that she knew of none. "You don't know what the king is doing, then?" said Napoleon. "The king!" answered the old woman, still more astonished, "the king! You mean the Emperor: he is always *power*." This dweller in the Alpine regions was wholly ignorant that Napoleon had been hurled from his throne and replaced by Louis XVIII. All present were struck with astonishment at witnessing this extraordinary ignorance; Napoleon, who was not less surprised than the others, looked at Drouot, and said, "Well, Drouot, of what use is it to disturb the world to fill it with one's name?"

He left the hut, plunged in thought and reflecting on the vanity of earthly glory. The march was resumed, and the little army stopped that night at Seranon, a small hamlet consisting of a few farms. The soldiers lay in the out-houses, and Napoleon found a good bed in the country-house of an inhabitant of Grasse. The little army had in their first day's march advanced a distance of fifteen leagues without encountering other obstacles than those presented by the ice and the rocks. The men were exceedingly fatigued, but, sustained by the enthusiasm of their feelings, they seemed ready to fulfil the prophecy of the eagle *flying from sterile to sterile*.

Early on the morning of the 3d of March they again set out. The paths were still mountainous and covered with snow, and the same evening, after a march equal to that of the preceding day, the troops took up their lodgings for the night at Barrême, in the valley of the Durance, but at a distance of twelve miles from the banks of the river.

Notwithstanding the increasing fatigue, the troops set out at an early hour on the morning of the 4th; they halted at Digne to breakfast, and afterward advanced as far as Mâjaj. They had now nearly reached the banks of the Durance, and it was necessary to ascend by Sisteron and Gap, and cross a narrow neck of land in order to reach the basin of the lake. Here an alarming obstacle presented itself. At Sisteron the route passed from the left to the right bank of the Durance by a bridge, which the artillery of the fortress, if defended, would render inaccessible. An officer devoted to the Bourbons could, by merely closing the gates of this little fortress, arrest the progress of the advancing column. In this case the troops would be obliged to descend the Durance to cross lower down, and so, losing some valuable hours, allow the military command in the neighbourhood time to take precautions and afford the infuriated populace of Marseilles an opportunity to track Napoleon. The danger was imminent; but Napoleon, confiding in the influence of his name, advanced without hesitation on Sisteron.

He had divined justly; and those who were opposed to him, instead of accumulating difficulties on his route, in their alarm, removed them. In fact, according to the information received from the officer of gendarmerie of whom we have already spoken, the Prefect of Var, believing that Napoleon was advancing on Toulon and Marseilles, had placed in the forest of Esterel, that is to say, on the shore route, all the National Guards and regular troops he could assemble. The former could be depended on, but the sentiments of the latter were doubtful. Having taken these precautions, he despatched to Marshal Massena at Marseilles an express which could not arrive before the 4th. At the same time he had endeavoured to inform all the commanders of the Alpine fortresses of what had occurred,—without, however, giving them any instructions, which indeed, spite of his soul, he was incapable of doing. In this state of things, each commander, struck with a kind of terror on learning the alarming intelligence, had only thought of retiring within his walls, without daring to venture forth to dispute the pas-

age with Napoleon. General Loverdo, who commanded in the Department of the Lower Alps, had drawn up the few troops at his disposal on the Lower Durance and Aix; on their side, the commanders of Embrun and Mont-Dauphin, anxious to retire into the fortresses confided to their honour, recalled all their forces to the Upper Durance, so that Sisteron, which was situate midway, was left undefended. This species of contraction, natural to surprised and alarmed people, had left the way open to Napoleon without the intervention of treason. His name alone had produced these imprudent resolves, which he was about to turn to his advantage.

Cambronne presented himself before Sisteron at the head of one hundred men, and entered the place without difficulty on the 5th, Napoleon breakfasted there, after having seen one of the greatest obstacles on his route fall as if by enchantment. He now came in contact with the spirit of the mountaineers of Dauphiné. These brave mountaineers, highly sensitive to military glory, hated foreigners and detested what was called the nobles and the priests, and were alarmed beyond measure by the sermons of the clergy about national property and tithes; and, influenced by all these motives, they were enthusiastically devoted to Napoleon. They rushed in crowds from their mountains when they heard the cry of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" vied with each other in offering provisions and horses and every thing required; these they gave willingly gratis and still more willingly for money.

Spite of his friendly reception at Sisteron, Napoleon did not delay there, but passed the night at Gap, in order to seize the defiles that lead from the basin of the Durance to that of the Isère. His troops were worn out, for they had marched from ten to twelve miles a day, sometimes even fifteen, and many of the men had fallen behind. But the peasants received them hospitably, lent them wagons, and after a few hours' repose the laggards were able to join their ranks. Napoleon arrived on the evening of the 5th at Gap, after having traversed nearly fifty leagues in four days, over mountainous roads. And yet this extraordinary rate of progress was surpassed in the succeeding days.

Napoleon was very well received at Gap, at he there learned intelligence that forbade protracted stay. He had sent an emissary to learn the sentiments of the garrison of Embrun, and this emissary reported that the soldiers were ready at the first signal to assume the tricolour cockade, but that the officers, restrained by a sentiment of duty, were far from wishing to deliver up the fortress, and were, on the contrary, thinking of occupying the defile called Saint-Bonnet, which led from the valley of the Durance to that of the Isère, an affluent of the Isère. This defile commences immediately outside Gap, crosses a high mountain along the peak known as Saint-Guignes, and then descends on Saint-Bonnet. Napoleon, fearing to be forestalled in a dangerous a passage, sent his vanguard hither early on the morning of the 6th, and followed in person, after having waited until noon at Gap for the remainder of his column. The defile was not guarded, and he was able to

sleep that night at the borough of Corps, situated on the boundary of the Department of Isère. Hitherto, success had crowned all his efforts. He was in the centre of Dauphiné, and already began to be sensible of the emotion that his approach caused at Grenoble. If he succeeded in taking this city, which was important on account of its site, its fortifications, its arsenal, its large garrison, and the political and moral strength of its inhabitants, Napoleon would be almost master of France, for Grenoble would be a guarantee for Lyons, and Lyons for Paris. Careful not to neglect any precaution, he sent forward Dr. Emery, who had connections in Grenoble, and who might be able to dispose the public mind in his favour.

The express sent from Draguignan by the Prefect of Var had reached Grenoble on the evening of Saturday, the 4th of March. An illustrious savant, M. Fourier, was Prefect of Isère. General Marchand, one of the most distinguished Imperial officers, commanded at Grenoble, where the 7th military division was stationed. The prefect and the general were very disagreeably surprised by the intelligence they received, for, besides its importance for France in general, it increased a thousandfold their personal responsibility. In fact, the Prefect of Var, thoroughly well informed, named the direction of Grasse, Digne, Gap, and Grenoble as that which Napoleon was most likely to take. The storm was, then, advancing directly toward them. Influenced by a feeling natural to all Governments upon learning a disagreeable event, they concealed the intelligence, which besides gave them the advantage of a few hours of quiet, to deliberate upon the best course to pursue. M. Fourier was one of those savants that public disturbances annoy, and who only require from the Governments they serve time to pursue their studies in peace. He would therefore naturally have desired that Providence had averted this terrible trial from him. Attached to Napoleon by recollections of former glory—he had accompanied him in the expedition to Egypt—and to the Bourbons through personal esteem and love of repose, he had no decided preference for either dynasty, and was much inclined to entertain ill will toward any one who disturbed the tranquillity of his life. Add to this an honest sentiment of duty, and we can easily understand that he wished in the first instance to be faithful to the Bourbons, without, however, incurring the risk of martyrdom in their service. As to General Marchand, though largely associated with the Imperial glory, he was a strict observer of military discipline, and, though he disapproved the conduct of the emigrants, he was too intelligent not to comprehend the dangers to which Napoleon's return exposed France. His resolution was much firmer than that of the prefect; but at this moment a little more or less energy did not procure the means of resistance. There was no want of troops. The concentration of troops in the direction of the Alps, induced by Murat's imprudence, had commenced, and there were in Franche-Comté, in Lyonnais, and in Dauphiné, more soldiers than the emergency called for. But, unfortunately, when Napoleon was in question, it was not the number of the

troops, but their fidelity, that became a matter of consideration. Would they resist the influence of his name? and, still more, could they resist the influence of his presence? General Marchand knew the army too well to entertain a doubt on the subject. He summoned the *chefs de corps* to a private conference, and these declared that they were ready to do their duty, but that they had doubts as to the fidelity of the officers, and could by no means answer for the soldiers. It happened that the choice of regiments stationed at Grenoble was unfortunate. With the 5th infantry, which was well disciplined and well officered, there was the 4th artillery, in which Napoleon had made his first essay in arms, and into which several companies of the artillery of the Imperial Guard had been draughted after the dissolution of that body. There was also the 3d Engineers, a corps by no means attached to the Bourbons, and whose influence over the rest of the troops was much feared. General Marchand became very uneasy, and awaited the arrival of General Mouton-Duvernet, who commanded the subdivision of Valence, before coming to a determination. The 7th military division, consisting at that time of four departments, was divided into two subdivisions, that of Grenoble, comprising Isère and Mont Blanc, and that of Valence, comprising Drôme and the Upper Alps. From this arrangement it naturally resulted that General Mouton-Duvernet, in going to give orders in the Upper Alps,—that is to say, at Gap,—was obliged to pass through Grenoble.

This general, upon learning recent events, had hastily taken precautions for the defence of the Roman bridge on the Isère, in case that Napoleon should advance along the banks of the Rhone; he then left hurriedly for the Upper Alps, and arrived at Grenoble on the morning of Sunday the 5th. A meeting, consisting of Prefect Fourier, General Marchand, General Mouton-Duvernet, and some staff-officers, was held, to deliberate upon the measures most proper to take under existing circumstances. It would not be easy to fix on any that could satisfy the well-founded anxieties of thoughtful men.

To send the troops against Napoleon was running the risk of giving them up to him, for, notwithstanding the fidelity of the leaders, it was not very probable that the soldiers would resist the influence of his presence. To summon the soldiers to their quarters would be to leave the country empty and give it up to Napoleon, as well as the most important posts, like that of Sisteron, for example. Thus, whatever measures were determined on, there was a risk of abandoning to Napoleon either men or territory. However, the occupation of Grenoble by the enemy was so serious a consideration as to admit of no deliberation. This capital of Dauphiné, besides being of vast moral importance, was a fortress of great strength in former times, and contained *une école d'artillerie, une école de génie*, and an immense *matériel*, consisting of 80,000 muskets, 200 cannon, and all the accompaniments attendant on such a military dépôt. A post of so much importance could not be abandoned. It was agreed that all the troops scattered through Dauphiné and that portion of Savoy

that still belonged to France should be concentrated at Grenoble. Orders were sent to Chambéry for the two infantry regiments stationed there, and to Vienne for the 4th hussars, who were greatly needed at Grenoble, when there was a want of cavalry. Unfortunately, the 4th hussars, though commanded by an excellent and honourable officer, was so little to be relied on that during the recent visit of the Count d'Artois the men could not be prevented from crying "*Vive l'Empereur!*" But the authorities were obliged to make use of the means within their reach, and they flattered themselves that by assembling a considerable mass of troops they could revive the military spirit among them, and with the military spirit the sense of duty attached to this noble profession. These resolutions being adopted, General Mouton-Duvernet set out for the Upper Alps, pursuing the Gap route, along which Napoleon was advancing. The general hoped to anticipate his arrival at the important pass of Saint-Bonnet and take measures to arrest his progress.

The intelligence, which at first had been known only to the principal authorities of the city, was soon spread abroad, and on Sunday afternoon was become public. The prefect and general then thought it their duty to announce the intelligence officially, and they published a proclamation in which they invited the functionaries of every class to fulfil their duty, promising to give them the example. Grenoble was a perfect sample of France at this period. There were to be seen some of the ancient nobility openly proclaiming their hopes and their wishes, but fully conscious, since the trial of Exelmans and the funeral of Mademoiselle Raucourt, that it would be better to restrain their feelings, if they did not wish to expose themselves to fresh misfortunes. There was also a numerous *bourgeoisie*, rich and intelligent, who had participated neither in the excesses nor the sudden revival of the revolutionary spirit, a *bourgeoisie* who, admiring the genius of Napoleon and detesting his facts, were deeply offended by the conduct of the emigrants, but were at the same time sensitively alive to the danger of re-establishing the Empire in opposition to Europe in arms. There was also a lower class, industrious, well-to-do, and brave, less fluctuating in their sentiments than the *bourgeoisie*, because less intelligent, passionately fond of military glory, and detesting what they called the nobles and priests, sympathizing, in a word, with the sentiments of the peasants of Dauphiné, though, unlike them, they had no interest in the question of national property.

It is easy to divine, without description, what must have been the feelings of these different classes upon learning the intelligence of Napoleon's approach. The nobles uttered exclamations of anger, and hurriedly sought the authorities, urging them to do their duty, and uttering angry threats if they showed the least hesitation. But, though they exclaimed and made great oaths, they did not offer to do any thing for the national defence. There was one means only at their disposal, which was to furnish reliable men who would fire the first shot, and which was the best way to im-

They promised to find such men; but their power to do so was doubted, and they doubted it themselves, too. The *bourgeoisie* were restless and divided in opinion, for, though they condemned the political conduct of the Bourbons, they saw clearly the perils inseparable from their overthrow. As to the people, in whose ranks were many half-pay officers, they were transported with joy, and made no attempt to disguise their desires and hopes. The public functionaries dissimulated more than ever their real sentiments, but they were in reality favourable to Napoleon; they were weary of the hypocritical part they were obliged to act toward the Bourbons, which humiliated them without affording any certainty that they would be continued in office. A population divided in this manner offered no great resources. Had there been in Grenoble a united and well-organized National Guard, these might, if mingled with the regular troops, have restrained them by the influence of good example. But the nobles had there, as throughout France, assumed the privilege of forming the cavalry of the National Guard, allowing the infantry to consist of the *bourgeoisie* alone. The latter, having on many occasions opposed the proceedings of the Government, had been, under diverse pretexts, deprived of their muskets, and were, at the time of which we speak, disarmed and disorganized. Consequently, there only remained for the defence of the city the troops of the line, whose fidelity was the great problem of the day.

The entire afternoon of Sunday the 5th, and all the forenoon of Monday the 6th, were passed in intense uneasiness, and a quick succession of hopes and fears, making what was joy to one party grief to another. It was at one moment asserted that Napoleon was pursued, arrested, and shot. Then the royalists walked about the streets in joyous, even insulting, triumph, and afterward returned home to communicate the happy intelligence to their friends at Lyons and Paris. The next report declared that Napoleon had overcome every obstacle, and was even then close to the gates of Grenoble. It was then the turn of the royalists to be sad and silent, and the people, in a delirium of joy, ran through the streets exclaiming, "*Vive l'Empereur!*" The half-pay officers, whose influence was much dreaded, sought the society of the troops. They found the officers reserved and silent, but the men were demonstrative and joyous, and had the tricolour cockade hidden within their schakos. The general officers, knowing the danger of such intercourse, endeavoured to prevent it, and for that purpose kept the men either in their barracks or under arms; but they only succeeded in creating discontent among the soldiers, without being able to hinder those electric-like communications which result from a perfect community of sentiment.

About the middle of the day on Monday the 6th, intelligence was received of General Mouton-Duvernet. Having advanced rapidly along the Gap route by Vizille, the general met a traveller whom he caused to be arrested. This was Dr. Emery, whom Napoleon had sent on to Grenoble. The general questioned

the traveller, who declared he knew nothing, that he had left the island of Elba several months previously, and was returning quietly to Grenoble, his native place, to take up his abode there. Deceived by these declarations, General Mouton-Duvernet dismissed Dr. Emery and advanced on his way. He soon learned that Napoleon, after having passed the previous night at Gap, was advancing that very day on Corps, where he would soon arrive, after having passed through the defile of Saint-Bonnet. It was too late to offer any opposition, and to retrace his way to Grenoble was the only course left to General Mouton-Duvernet. *En route*, the general remembered what had taken place with Dr. Emery, and sent some soldiers in pursuit with orders to arrest him. But the doctor was too quick, and had already reached Grenoble, where he was sheltered by his friends, whom he commissioned to spread abroad Napoleon's proclamation and intelligence of his approach.

The agitation became fearful when it was known at Grenoble that it had been impossible to anticipate Napoleon's passage through the defiles that separate the basin of the Durance from that of the Isère, that he would that evening arrive at Corps and perhaps the next day at Grenoble. One party declared that nothing could resist him, and that the troops sent against him would only augment his forces; another party announced that an army commanded by the Count d'Artois and several marshals was assembling at Lyons to arrest the fugitive from the island of Elba and punish him in a signal manner. The royalists, who put the report into circulation in order to raise their own courage, did not succeed in their design. They beset the authorities, scolded them, accused them of doing nothing—whilst they did nothing themselves—and reproached them bitterly with shutting themselves up passively in Grenoble. According to the royalists, this was opening every issue to Napoleon and abandoning France to him. They mentioned another point, where it would be possible to arrest his progress by blowing up a bridge. This was the Ponthaut bridge, thrown across a small river—the Bonne—which falls into the Drac, an affluent of the Isère, and intersects the Gap route. The royalists said that were this bridge blown up, Napoleon would be obliged to take refuge in the mountains, or descend to the plain, that is to say to the banks of the Rhone, where the forces assembled at Lyons would not fail to destroy him. They insisted so much on this point with the civil and military authorities, that the prefect and the general resolved to send to this bridge of the Bonne a company of artillery, a company of engineers, and a battalion of the 5th of the line, troops in whom confidence was placed on account of their perfect discipline. This battalion was commanded by a very distinguished officer, named Lessard, who had formerly served in the Imperial Guard, but was strict in the discharge of his duties and resolved to keep his oath. The people of Grenoble accompanied these troops to the Bonne gate of the city, the royalists confiding in their excellent discipline, the Bonapartists, on the contrary, saying that the looks and gestures of

the soldiers left no doubt as to the part they would act on meeting Napoleon.

The column left in the evening: consequently intelligence, which was eagerly expected, could not be received until next day. On the morrow—Tuesday the 7th—the 11th and the 7th of the line arrived from Chambéry, and the 4th hussars from Vienne. Preparations for strengthening the town were being actively carried on, cannons were brought from the arsenal and hoisted on the walls. The royalists placed great confidence in one of the two infantry regiments that came from Chambéry. This was the 7th, commanded by Colonel de la Bédoyère, a young and highly distinguished officer, who had served in the most severe campaigns of the Empire. He was a gentleman of high birth, and connected through his wife with the Damas family: he was in high favour at court, and appeared to be devoted to the Bourbons. It was said that on entering Grenoble he had distributed among his soldiers a sum of money, drawn from his private resources, and it was supposed he had done so to gain the affection of his soldiers and make them more faithful in the discharge of their duty.

This young colonel, with the officers of the garrison, dined the same day with General Marchand, who had invited them for the purpose of ascertaining with greater certainty the state of their feelings. The greater number, in the presence of their commanding officer, displayed considerable zeal, but some, more sincere, declared that, though they were willing to do their duty, it would cost them a severe pang to do so against Napoleon. Amid these different manifestations, Colonel de la Bédoyère remained silent, and this silence, on the part of an officer who was believed to be a staunch royalist, appeared strange, but no ways alarming, as to doubt him was impossible. The company rose from table about two o'clock, and as it was calculated that at that hour the troops sent to the Ponthaut bridge would be face to face with Napoleon, and as the crisis was approaching, each retired to attend to his respective duties.

The troops that had left on the previous evening had advanced through Vizille, La Frey, and La Mure on Ponthaut, the two companies of engineers and artillery strewing the way with their white cockades and uttering insubordinate language, whilst the men of the 5th battalion, on the contrary, gave no indication of their sentiments. The two companies of engineers and artillery stopped at the village of La Mure, situate at a short distance from the bridge of Ponthaut on the Bonne. The mayor and inhabitants of La Mure, on learning the object for which the military had come, became greatly excited, and opposed the destruction of a bridge which was their principal means of communication with Provence. They gave as a reason for their resistance that a little above Ponthaut the Bonne was fordable, and that the only inconvenience that could be inflicted on the Imperial column would be to make the men walk through some cold water. The two companies of engineers affected to think the reasons adduced by the inhabitants of La Mure satisfactory, and, without persevering in their design, they

asked for quarters, which were quickly procured, and here they waited the arrival of the 5th of the line.

Napoleon, as we have said, had passed the night at Corps, in his eagerness to seize the defiles between Gap and Grenoble. He passed through without interruption, and advanced with confidence, as the disposition of the people became manifest in the cries of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" But he knew that the morrow would be the decisive day, for he should then meet for the first time a large body of troops, and upon the manner in which these troops should act depended the success of his undertaking. Whilst he remained at Corps to take a few hours' repose, he sent forward Cambronne with an advance-guard of 200 men to take possession of the bridge of the Bonne and prevent its destruction. The Polish Lancers, who had procured horses when they advanced into the interior, had outside Cambronne, and, having crossed the Bonne, had asked quarters from the Mayor of La Mure. At the same hour, that is to say, about noon, the battalion of the 5th arrived. The lancers endeavoured to fraternize with them, and found the soldiers well disposed but embarrassed by the presence of their officers. But communications were kept up, and the soldiers of the 5th showed strong symptoms of friendly feeling toward the lancers, when Lessard, the commander of the battalion, suddenly arrived, and, dreading the influence of the soldiers from Elba on his troops, he determined to make a retrograde movement, and accordingly fell back on the village of La Frey. Cambronne arrived too at La Mure, and fearing that in the intercourse between the different parties some drunken soldier might provoke a collision—which Napoleon had given express orders to avoid—he collected his troops, so to speak, one by one, in order to concentrate them on this side of Ponthaut. And so both parties spontaneously abandoned La Mure, Cambronne holding possession of the bridge of Ponthaut.

The night passed in this manner, the opponents as well as the followers of Napoleon filled with the most intense anxiety. Meanwhile the commander of the 5th battalion had made a retrograde march of some hours, in order to cut off all communication between his soldiers and those of Napoleon, and had taken up a good position, with the mountains on his right and the marshes on his left. He could defend himself there and allow his troops a little repose. He waited until noon, and seeing no enemy approach, he began to flatter himself that Napoleon had changed his route, which would have relieved him of an immense responsibility. About one o'clock some lancers appeared: several of them advanced close enough to be heard by the soldiers of the 5th, and told them that the Emperor was coming up, begged them not to fire, but to join him. The brave commander of the battalion ordered the lancers to withdraw, threatening to fire on them if they persevered in advising his soldiers to desert.

These horsemen fell back upon a large column that was advancing, and which seemed to consist of several hundred men. This was the Elba column, led on by Napoleon himself.

he had slept at Corps, and then marched to La Mure, where he was informed he would find a battalion of the 5th of the line, with some artillery and engineers that seemed prepared to make a defence. The lancers who had fallen back told him that the officers seemed disposed to resist, but that probably the soldiers would not fire. Napoleon took his glass, and looked for some time at the troops before him, in order to observe their bearing and position. At this moment some half-pay officers, disguised as *bourgeois*, arrived, and informed him of the sentiments of the troops sent to oppose him. They assured him that the artillery and the engineers would not fire. As to the infantry, the officers who commanded them would certainly order them to fire, but it was doubtful whether they would obey. After hearing this, Napoleon determined to advance and decide by an act of personal daring a question that could not otherwise be determined.

He placed the vanguard under Cambronne on the left of the route, on the right the mass of his column, and in advance the fifty cavalry leaders for whom he had been able to procure horses. Then, in a distinct voice, he commanded the soldiers to put their muskets under the left arm, with the muzzles pointed downward, and ordered one of his aides-de-camp to advance in front of the 5th and tell them that he was coming up, and that those who fired would have to answer to France and to posterity for the consequences of their conduct. He was, alas! right; and those to whom he appealed were about to decide whether Waterloo should or should not be inscribed on the bloody pages of our history.

Having given these orders, he put his column in motion and marched at the head, followed by Cambronne, Drouot, and Bertrand. The aide-de-camp who had been sent forward addressed the battalion, repeated the words of the Emperor, and pointed him out as he approached. At this sight the soldiers of the 5th were seized with an extraordinary emotion, and, looking alternately at Napoleon and at their commander, seemed to implore the latter not to impose upon them a duty impossible to fulfil. The commander of the battalion, seeing the soldiers so agitated, perceived very clearly that they could not resist the influence of their master, and in a firm tone ordered them to retreat. "What would you have me do?" he said to an aide-de-camp of General Marchand who was with him *en mission*: "they are pale as death, and tremble at the idea of firing on this day."

Whilst they were retreating, Napoleon's fifty peers galloped up to the 5th, not to charge them, but to overtake and speak with them. The brave Lessard, believing he was about to be attacked, ordered his soldiers to stop and present bayonets to the assailants. The lancers rode close up to the bayonets of the 5th, with their swords still in the scabbards, and exclaimed: "Friends, don't fire: the Emperor is coming up." At the same moment Napoleon gives orders and pauses in front of the battalion at speaking-distance. "Soldiers of the 5th," said he, "do you recognize me?" "Yes," responded hundreds of voices. Then, raising his redingote and presenting his

breast, he added, "Which among you will fire on his Emperor?" Overpowered by these words, the artillery and foot soldiers, waving their schakos on the end of their swords, cry out, "*Vive l'Empereur!*" Then, breaking the ranks, they surround Napoleon, kiss his hands, and call him their general, their Emperor, their father. The commander of the 5th battalion, thus abandoned by his soldiers, knows not what to do, when Napoleon, freeing himself from the thronging soldiers, steps toward him, asks his name, his grade, his services, and then adds, "My friend, who made you *chef de bataillon*?" "You, sire." "Who made you captain?" "You, sire." "And you would fire upon me?" "Yes," replied this brave man, "in the performance of my duty." He then gives his sword to Napoleon, who takes it, presses his hand, and, in a tone of voice free from the slightest irritation, says to him, "Meet me at Grenoble." Napoleon's manner and voice show that he accepted this worthy officer's sword with the intention of restoring it. Then, turning to Drouot and Bertrand, he said, "All is decided: within ten days we shall be in the Tuileries." And, indeed, after this significant event there could be no doubt that he would reign again. But for how long, nobody could say.

The first emotion of joy having subsided, the troops won over at La Mure fell into the ranks with those that came from Elba, and all marched in a body toward La Frey and Vizille. As they advanced they met enthusiastic partisans of the Empire, who hastened to meet Napoleon, and announced that an entire regiment, headed by the colonel, was coming from Grenoble in the direction of La Mure. The narrators seemed to think that, from the manifestations made by the soldiers, there was nothing to fear. And, in effect, a regiment was seen at a distance, advancing in column; and newcomers brought further intelligence. It was the 7th of the line, commanded by Colonel de la Bédoyère, whose silence at General Marchand's table had appeared strange and in contradiction to his supposed sentiments. The young De la Bédoyère was, as we have said, closely connected by his wife's family and his own with the house of Bourbon, to whose interests he was naturally believed to be devoted. But he nurtured in the depths of his heart sentiments antagonistic to his birth and family ties. He had conceived an intense attachment for Napoleon and the glory of the French arms. Sharing the prejudices of the greater number of his comrades, he looked upon the Bourbons as the creatures of foreigners, and did not wish to remain longer in their service. Nevertheless, yielding to the entreaties of his family, he had consented to take service again, and had accepted the command of the 7th, flattering himself from the vague rumours of war circulated during the Congress of Vienna that the latter misfortunes of France might be avenged on Austria. Sent, by a terrible destiny, into Dauphiné, and finding himself in Napoleon's path, he was not able to resist the impulse that impelled him toward the Emperor. But, unable to delay the expression of his feelings until fortune should have declared in favor of Napoleon, he had, on leaving General Marchand's table, assembled his regi-

ment in one of the squares of Grenoble, ordered the eagle of the 7th to be taken from a case, and cried, "Vive l'Empereur!" Then, waving his sword, he said to his soldiers, "Those who love will follow me."

Nearly the entire regiment followed him, and took the road to La Mure, amid the enthusiastic cheers of the people of Grenoble.

Such were the accounts brought to Napoleon, and they were of a nature to dissipate his uneasiness, if he could feel any after what had passed at La Mure. The 7th was now within sight, and La Bédoyère was seen to throw himself from his horse and hurry toward Napoleon, who had alighted. He embraced the colonel and thanked him warmly for the unselfish affection with which he joined him at a moment when his fortunes were still involved in uncertainty. La Bédoyère replied that he was influenced by a desire to lift up humiliated France; then, in an outburst of unrestrainable emotion, he told Napoleon that he would find the nation much changed, that he would be obliged to renounce his former mode of governing, and could only keep the throne on condition of commencing a new reign.* "I know that," said Napoleon; "I return to revive the glory of France, to establish the principles of the Revolution, and to secure to the nation a degree of liberty which, though difficult at the commencement of my reign, is now become not only possible but necessary."

Napoleon then passed through Vizille, where his reception was highly demonstrative, and continued his route toward Grenoble, where he arrived about nine o'clock on the evening of the same day, the 7th. He had performed in six days a journey of eighty leagues at the head of a body of armed men,—a march, as he said himself, unexampled in history. The people in their zeal had provided the soldiers with horses and carts, and had wonderfully assisted in accomplishing this prodigy of rapid movement.

Meanwhile all Grenoble was thrown into confusion. When the general learned that the 7th had left, he ordered the gates to be closed and the keys given up to him, which did not prevent some soldiers of the 7th, who had remained behind, to let themselves down from the ramparts in order to join their comrades. The terrified nobles had retired to their houses. The *bourgeoisie*, divided between the pleasure of being revenged on the nobles and the apprehension of the misfortunes that threatened France, scarcely showed themselves. The people, free to do as they pleased, traversed the streets *pêle-mêle* with the half-pay officers,

crying out, "Vive l'Empereur!" The enthusiasm of the people was excited to the degree by intelligence of what had occurred at La Mure, and which they learned from horsemen. They immediately ran to the gates, and, finding them closed, they fled to the ramparts, awaiting with anxiety the appearance of the Elba column.

When Napoleon appeared within sight, people of Grenoble burst into transports. The people on the ramparts rushed forward to endeavour to open it, whilst, on the other hand, of peasants tried to force it. Yielding to this double effort, fell at a moment that Napoleon appeared at the head of his soldiers. It was with considerable difficulty that he made his way through the throng that pressed round him, and alighted at the hotel of the Trois Dauphins.

No sooner had the principal authorities learned his approach than they disappeared. The general retired into the *Département* of Mont Blanc to assemble the remaining troops, and endeavour to fulfil to the last some military duties. The prefect, embarrassed by his former connections with Napoleon, should he see him, of being induced to deviate from the line of duty, took his departure, after sending an apology to his superior for his precipitate departure. Napoleon would not lodge either at the prefectural *Hotel de la division militaire*, but remained at the inn of the Trois Dauphins where he alighted, in fulfilment of a resolution made to pay his expenses everywhere, *à la distinction* to the Bourbon princes whose journeys had been very burdensome in the provinces they visited.

Napoleon was no sooner established in his humble apartments at the Trois Dauphins than he prepared to give audience to all who appeared, and passed the evening in the company of the municipal authorities, the military commanders, and in showing his time to time at the window to satisfy the patience of the people. He deferred till the next day the reception of the official authorities, as well as of the troops.

On the following day—the 8th—he employed the early morning in giving orders for the organization of his government in the provinces he had conquered: he received the civil, judicial, and military authorities. All, in congratulating him on his return and prophesying for him a triumph in his march to Paris, congratulated him on seeing him return to defend the principles of the French Revolution amid these protestations of dereliction declared to him boldly that he should begin for a new reign, entirely different from the former,—a reign at once liberal and free. Though the respect for Napoleon's established authority was very strong, in which he was addressed as a master, but in a free State. The faces that looked at him, though still, in his presence, curiosity and admiration, no longer looked of humble submission forms when he appeared.

Napoleon gave no evidence of

* Napoleon denied at St. Helena that La Bédoyère spoke in that fashion. Napoleon was certainly justified in denying that La Bédoyère used the violent language attributed to him; but he could not deny the general character of the sentiments expressed by the letter, and of which we have given the path. As to the rest, I can answer for all the circumstances described in the text. As authority for what occurred at Elba, Cannes, Grasse, Gap, La Mure, Grenoble, and Lyons, I have had a number of highly interesting manuscripts, some written by military men, others by civil magistrates, who were all ocular witnesses of the events they describe, and worthy of implicit confidence, both from their character and social position. The most curious and most satisfactory document regarding his exile in the isle of Elba is the register of Napoleon's orders and correspondence; and it was with this document before my eyes that I wrote these pages.

ce or discontent. Tranquil, serene, fashioned, it were, to the new part he was called upon to perform, he said to all whom he received, whether in private or in public, sometimes in familiar, conversational tone, sometimes in a measured language of an official reception, that he had employed ten months in reflecting

the past, and had endeavoured to draw useful lessons from his reflections; that the tragedies of which he had been the object, far from irritating, had taught him; that he saw at France needed, and would endeavour to effect it; that peace and liberty were, if he understood aright, a craving want of the times, and should, from thenceforth, be his rule of conduct; that he had certainly loved power, but allowed himself to be too far led away by his thirst of conquest; but he was not the sole criminal, for the Powers of Europe, by their omission, the constituted bodies, by their readiness to place at his disposal the blood and treasures of France, and France herself, her approbation, had contributed to an illusion that was general at the time; that, besides, the attempt to make France the governing power in Europe was excusable, it was an error that deserved pardon, and should never recur again; that he would not have signed the Treaty of Paris, for he had not hesitated to descend from the throne, rather than deprive France of that which he had not given her, but that a respect for treaties was a principle of every regular Government, and he would therefore accept the Treaty of Paris, and would make it the basis of his policy; that, having made this declaration, he had no doubt as to the maintenance of peace, for he had made his mother-in-law acquainted with his sentiments, and had reason to hope that this communication would obtain him the aid of Austria; that he was then about to write to Vienna, by Turin, expecting to see his wife and son at Paris.

to the home Government of France, Napoleon, borrowing the language of the ruling passions of the day, said that he was come to the peasants from tithes, the holders of real property from imminent spoliation, away from insupportable humiliation, and, to maintain the principles of 1789, to deliver the Bourbons, even had they possessed intelligence and strength, of which they were wholly destitute, could never have acted more than they had done, because, being representatives of a feudal royalty, and looking for support to the nobles and the priests who lived in foreign lands with them, they could not keep the throne without their aid, without depreciating or being unjust to the Bourbons, there could be only one conclusion drawn from their errors, which was, that they were incompatible with France, and that to protect the new interests that had arisen, a new Government would be needed, the offspring, so to speak, of the new interests, formed by and for them; that it was to whom he was preparing the way, the true representative of this Government, that he was come to prepare his reign, that it might be dignified and tranquil, and moreover, even had he not come, the Revolution would not the less inevitably have been bed amid the convulsions they

would have necessarily provoked; whilst he, on the contrary, by giving stability to the new interests, and satisfying the spirit of liberty, would avert future commotions by suppressing their cause; that he would himself propose a revision of the imperial laws, in order to raise from them a true representative monarchy, the only form of government becoming a nation so enlightened as France; that whoever would aid him in this patriotic work would be well received, as from late events he wished to draw salutary lessons, and not make them subjects of resentment; that his arms were open to all who would espouse the national cause; that as it was wise to have received the Bourbons, and tried once more their mode of governing, he could not entertain an ill feeling toward any who had aided in the attempt, for on leaving Fontainebleau he had advised his most faithful followers to do so; but the trial had been made, and the conclusion to be drawn from it was, that the Bourbons were an impossibility, and he would therefore await with confidence, and receive with cordiality, those patriotic Frenchmen who would return to the cause of the Revolution, liberty, and France, a cause of which he and his son were the true and only representatives.

Napoleon spoke simply and frankly, and with tact. He avowed his faults, and by this self-condemnation appeased the wrath of others. But he expressed himself with dignity, attributing both his own faults and those of others to the force of circumstances, which, he said, were stronger than human nature. He even excused the Bourbons, by endeavouring to show them rather incorrigible than guilty, and never mentioned the claims of his dynasty but as the rights of the nation. He spoke of his son more frequently than of himself, in order to indicate that he only reappeared on the scene to prepare for his child—who would be the child of France—a tranquil, liberal, and prosperous reign. These explanations produced a very good impression even on those who dreaded this attempt at re-establishing the Empire in opposition to Europe in arms, and who also feared Napoleon's confirmed habits of arbitrary and absolute authority. But they flattered themselves, or, at least, the die being cast they found a pleasure in flattering themselves, that, with this mode of thinking, and his genius regenerated by repose, by deep reflection, and by his late experience, he would be able to surmount the difficulties of his new task and give France all he had the good sense to promise her.

Napoleon, always master of his thoughts even in the most perplexing circumstances, talked with M. Berry at Saint-Prix about some of our codes concerning which the juriconsults were divided in opinion, and he promised to make the examination, and, if necessary, the change, of these acts one of the legislative reforms with which he intended to occupy himself when a profound peace should be established, which, he said, he would never again think of breaking.

After having given audience to the different authorities, he reviewed the troops, by whom he was naturally received with transport. The 5th of the line, quartered at Grenoble, the 7th and 11th, that had come from Chambéry, the

4th hussars, that had arrived from Vienne, the 3d engineers, and the 4th artillery, gave utterance to almost frantic exclamations of delight. Two or three military commanders, influenced by professional scruples, had quitted their regiments, but the greater number remained, considering themselves freed from the obligations of their oath by the authority of a revolution. The tricolour cockades which the soldiers had kept concealed in their knapsacks had sprung forth with magical celerity. The eagles even, hidden nobody knew where, again appeared at the top of the tricolour flag, and it could scarcely be believed that the Imperial reign had been interrupted for a year. Napoleon said a great deal to the soldiers about their glory, dimmed by the emigration. He then told them that he was desirous of peace, and was sure of establishing it, for he was determined never again to meddle in the affairs of others, neither would he suffer strangers to interfere in the affairs of France; and if, unfortunately, they should interfere, he had no doubt of finding his soldiers as valiant and as successful as formerly. He added that, having marched on Grenoble, escorted by his companions in exile who had accompanied him from Elba, he was now, accompanied by the brave soldiers who had rallied round his standard, about to march on Lyons and Paris, and so complete the conquest of France, which would be accomplished, as that of Provence and Dauphiné had been, not by force of arms, but by the irresistible pressure of opinion represented by the army and the people. He said that every moment was precious, for the Bourbons ought not to be allowed time to prepare and call foreigners to their aid. It was therefore necessary to set out without delay. Rations were already prepared, and by the Emperor's order were distributed among the troops. About four in the afternoon he gave them orders to march, directing their course to Lyons through Bourgoin.

Napoleon on leaving his soldiers said that he would soon join them,—that the next day, at farthest, he would be at their head, and would open the gates of Lyons, as he had opened those of Grenoble, by merely displaying the tricolour flag. The 6th, 11th, and 7th of the line, the 3d engineers, and 4th artillery, furnished with a park of thirty field-pieces, the 4th hussars at their head, set out for Lyons amid cries of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" Here was a corps of seven thousand men fanatically devoted to their chief, able to conquer the soldiers that had remained faithful to the Bourbons should they encounter them, but more likely to seduce them through the influence of the sentiment that had seduced themselves.

Napoleon, resuming his old campaigning habit of working whilst his soldiers were *en marche*, returned to the Trois Dauphins, intending to leave next day, escorted by the soldiers from Elba, who, thanks to this arrangement, would have enjoyed a day's rest. He would consequently arrive the next day but one, the 10th, at the gates of Lyons, at the head of a much larger body of troops than could be sent against him.

He was much displeased with the prefect, Fourier, who had not awaited his arrival, and who had fled from Grenoble to avoid his pre-

sence. "He was in Egypt with us," he said "he was deeply involved in the Revolution, he even signed one of the addresses sent to the Convention against the unfortunate Louis XVI."—(Napoleon was deceived on this point—"what then can there be in common between him and the Bourbons?")

In the first moments of his anger Napoleon was about ordering the arrest of M. Fourier; but he just then received the explanation sent through an indirect channel by the prefect on leaving Grenoble. Napoleon was appeased, and sent an order to M. Fourier to join him at Lyons. He despatched a similar order to General Marchand, and then wrote to Maria Louisa announcing his entrance into Grenoble and the certainty of his speedy entrance into Paris. He urged her to join him and bring his son, and requested her to present to the Emperor Francis the assurance of his pacific intentions. He sent this letter to General Bubna, commander of the Austrian troops at Turin, the same with whom he had treated amicably at Dresden in 1813. He requested the general to send on his letter to Maria Louisa, and wished that the courier should publicly take the road of Mount Cenis, in order to induce a belief that communications had been established with Austria. On Thursday the 9th, having previously issued all his orders, he left Grenoble at noon, bearing with him the good wishes of the people of Dauphiné, and took his way toward Lyons.

Whilst Napoleon was thus advancing through France, winning over in succession all the troops sent against him, the rumour of his appearance had everywhere excited profound emotion. This intelligence, despatched from the Gulf of Juan on the 1st of March, had spread as rapidly as the means of communication then in existence would permit. The news arrived at Marseilles on the 3d, and threw the excitable population of that city into extraordinary agitation. It was known at Lyons on the morning of the 5th. The inhabitants of this city were divided in opinion and much excited against each other. Lastly, the intelligence was transmitted by telegraph to Paris, where it arrived in the afternoon of the same day, the 5th. M. de Vitrolles did not lose a moment in informing Louis XVIII. This prince, who generally viewed things with a considerable share of indifference, appeared at first more astonished than alarmed, and seemed to inquire in the eyes of those around what was to be thought of this great event. But the frantic delight of some, who thought nothing easier than to seize and shoot the fugitive from Elba, and the terror of those who already, in imagination, saw him master of all the troops sent against him, showed the gravity of what had occurred, and he sought to discover in the contradictory advice of his habitual counsellors what was best to be done. Helpless from his youth, accustomed to very little exertion during his exile, and frequently mocking his brother's inactivity, he had become inert as much by habit as by nature. He was averse to any prompt and decisive resolution, and was as usually in mind as in person, and was as usually in mind as in person.

Like his p... of the intelligence as possible. It

ot at first allow this formidable mystery to be communicated to any but the War Minister—a personage whose name under such circumstances was indissoluble—M. de Blacas, who was always in the midst of whatever occurred, and M. de La Fayette, who, of the wrecks of the ancient *d'Etat*, had retained the direction of the government. The princes were greatly disconcerted, called by their rank to head the army, they felt more than any one the difficulty of their position. As for Marshal Soult, War Minister, who had attached himself to the Bourbons, as if there were no possibility again beholding the terrible face of Napoleon, he was confounded at the complication which he was involved. However, he showed a great display of zeal. The first idea naturally presented itself to every mind—that the princes in command of the divisions of troops that were about being ordered to put the largest of these divisions under the orders of the Count d'Artois, the fifth member of the royal family and most popular with the ultra-royalists, who offered an opportunity of rendering signal aid if their devotedness was as active as

Napoleon being *en marche* since the 1st of March, and being under a necessity of adopting Lyons whichever route he chose, Grenoble or that of Marseilles, it was decided that he ought to be met at Lyons, and that there that the strongest means of opposition ought to be accumulated. The Count d'Artois immediately offered to go there, his offer was so agreeable to the general that it was at once accepted. It was well to give him as lieutenants his two brothers, the Duke de Berry on the left, and the Duke d'Angoulême on the right. The latter was at this moment at Bordeaux. Both were sent out for the provinces they were in the habit of visiting, and bring up their forces on Napoleon's flanks. It was arranged that the Duke de Berry, who was known in the military provinces of the east, should repair to Franche-Comté, and assemble at Besançon the troops of the line, those of the National Guard armed well inclined, and lead them from Lons-le Saulnier to the left of Lyons. The Duke d'Angoulême, who was well acquainted with the people of the south, was to go to Bordeaux immediately and repair to Toulouse, and so take Napoleon in flank with the forces he should have assembled. These combinations, which the War Minister regarded as very profound, supposed three conditions: firstly, that there would be no concentration of the troops on these difficult points; and secondly, that the troops should be faithful. These arrangements were completed on the evening of the 5th. Orders were sent on the 6th would not arrive at the various places until the 7th, the 8th, the 9th, the 10th, according to the distances; and, of course, time would be required for the execution of these orders; and we have already seen that Napoleon would reach Lyons on the 11th. As to the fidelity of the troops, what the War Minister already narrated shows what hopes he entertained on that point.

The War Minister made a great show of

zeal and activity, and very seriously proposed the measures we have enumerated as infallible means of safety. He was allowed to do as he pleased; for, after all, he understood better than the men by whom the Bourbons were surrounded the best mode of proceeding with the soldiers. Ignorant of what had occurred at La Mure and Grenoble, the royalists did not despair of the fidelity of the troops. As an additional security, it was determined that the princes should be accompanied by popular military chiefs respected in the army. Marshal Ney, who commanded in Franche-Comté, was chosen to accompany the Duke de Berry. Marshal Macdonald, who commanded at Bourges, received orders to set out immediately for Nîmes to aid the Duke d'Angoulême. These two marshals, who had acted at Fontainebleau as Napoleon's negotiators, seemed proper persons to oppose to him. No doubt was entertained as to the rigid probity with which Marshal Macdonald would fulfil his duties. As to Marshal Ney, though he was known to be discontented with the court, and had on that account retired to his country residence, it was believed that he would be annoyed at Napoleon's return, especially in remembering the scenes that took place at Fontainebleau, and it was hoped that at the sight of this terrific apparition all his passions would be aroused.

Lastly, in order to procure the Count d'Artois an additional lieutenant, and one of great importance, the Duke d'Orléans was appointed to the post. This selection, apparently malicious, was in fact very innocently proposed by the Count d'Artois himself. The Duke d'Orléans, though he conducted himself with great reserve, was become an object of distrust to the Emigration. He received many visitors at his house, for he was popular with military men, who remembered with pleasure his services in the republican armies, and was no less liked by those who held constitutional opinions, and who were glad to find their sentiments shared by a member of the royal family. This species of popularity, which the Duke d'Orléans had no intention of abusing, offended the court, and Louis XVIII. was not sorry to get rid of him by sending him with the Count d'Artois, who was glad to be supported by a military Bourbon. This measure was as well received as the others, and the War Minister was desirous to give immediate orders for the movement of troops and matériel necessary for carrying into effect the proposed combinations. It was agreed that the Count d'Artois should leave for Lyons on the night of the 5-6th of March. The Duke d'Orléans was summoned to the Tuilleries to be informed of the intelligence, that was still kept secret, and to receive from the lips of the king himself the orders that concerned him personally. The duke lost not a moment in appearing at the palace. "Well," said Louis XVIII., with wonderful nonchalance, "*Bonaparte* is in France!" The Duke d'Orléans, perceiving with his ordinary sagacity the danger that threatened the dynasty, did not conceal his apprehensions. "What would you have me do?" replied Louis XVIII., evidently impatient: "I should be better pleased if he were not here; but he is here, and we must get rid of him as well as we can." The Duke d'Orléans, convinced that

the measures taken for the defence of Lyons would be slow and inefficacious, felt little inclination for the mission that was offered to him, and endeavoured to persuade the king to keep him at Paris, where there would be no prince of the blood should his majesty leave, and where the duke's popularity, of which he did not boast, but which was an acknowledged fact, might be useful. But in asking to remain, he asked precisely what was least agreeable to the king, and he was obliged to leave. The sole result of his advice was that the Duke de Berry was retained at Paris. Indeed, it was considered necessary to leave one of his nephews with the king, and it was, besides, thought unsafe to invest the fiery-tempered Duke de Berry with uncontrolled authority. It was consequently decided that Marshal Ney should go alone to Besançon. This marshal, who was staying at his country residence, was immediately summoned to Paris by telegraph.

These military measures being determined on, the other ministers were summoned to provide for the political emergency. All were profoundly disturbed by what they heard: some, with a consciousness of past errors, felt penitent, whilst others only regretted having been too gentle, or, as they understood it, too weak. The latter wished to compensate for their recent weakness by an extraordinary display of energy under existing circumstances. Without reflecting, without taking into account the gravity of the act they were about to commit, or the terrible law of retaliation to which they were about to render themselves obnoxious, they issued a proclamation, founded on the 14th article of the Charter, exhorting every citizen to pursue Napoleon and take him dead or alive. If alive, he was to be delivered to a court-martial that would put the existing laws into immediate execution,—that is to say, order him to be shot. This proclamation was not only issued against Napoleon, but against the companions and abettors of his enterprise. To prove the identity of the accused person was sufficient to procure his immediate execution.

To this dictatorial act, the first use made of the 14th article, which was afterward so fatal to the dynasty, there was added another, both legitimate and necessary: the chambers, that had been adjourned to the 1st of May, were summoned. Nothing could be wiser than to summon the chambers to the king's aid, in order that he might, in concert with them, adopt those measures of defence that existing circumstances required, and so oppose to Napoleon—the representative of military despotism—legitimate royalty surrounded with all the appurtenances of constitutional liberty. The chambers were accordingly summoned with the least possible delay, and the members actually in Paris were invited to repair to their respective halls of assembly, in order to commence deliberations when a sufficient number of members should have arrived.

These resolutions, adopted on Monday the 6th of March, and published on Tuesday the 7th, the very day that Napoleon entered Grenoble, revealed to the public the mighty intelligence which had been kept secret as long

as possible, but which had gradually escaped from the Tuileries, and had caused a profound sensation among those to whom it had become known. The published details somewhat allayed the first feeling of alarm. The Government as yet only knew of Napoleon's disembarkation at the Gulf of Juan, at the head of eleven hundred men, of the attempt on Antibes, which had failed, and the march toward the Upper Alps. The prefects, in sending intelligence of these events, had dwelt on the most favourable circumstances, and the Government endeavoured to infuse into the public mind the tranquillizing impression that the despatches sought to convey. As great importance was attached to the first manifestation of the sentiments of the army, much stress was laid on what had taken place at Antibes, and *Bonaparte*, as he was then called, was represented as repulsed by the troops he met on disembarking, and obliged to flee to the mountains, where he would ere long sink beneath the pressure of want, or the arm of justice.

This cowardly brigand, it was said, unworthy to die the death of a hero, should soon die the death of a malefactor; and it was a matter of thankfulness to Heaven that he had left the retreat where his adversaries were weak enough to allow him to remain, and put himself within reach of the punishment he so well deserved. This mode of viewing the question was adopted by the ultra-royalists, who, having recovered from their first emotion of terror, only saw in the great event of the day a subject of hopefulness.

The remainder of the public thought differently. They did not rely on the official version of what had occurred, and did not believe Napoleon so irrevocably lost as some people were pleased to say. The mass of the people, feeling an instinctive preference for the man who so powerfully excited their imagination, felt a secret joy at the news of his return. The military, touched to the depths of the soul, uttered wishes, of which they made no secret, for the success of their ancient general, though the heads of the army professed a rigid adherence to their duty. The revolutionists, after having ten months previously applauded the return of the Bourbons, who revenged them on Napoleon, now applauded the return of Napoleon, who revenged them on the Bourbons. The holders of national property, and they were innumerable in the country districts, considered themselves saved from imminent spoliation. The *bourgeoisie*, on the contrary, tranquilly disposed, and having no interest in the question of national property, of which they had purchased much less than the inhabitants of the country districts, anxious for peace and moderate liberty, were filled with intense alarm. Though offended at the partiality exhibited by the Bourbons for the nobles and priests, they preferred to support and at the same time restrain them constitutionally, than to run the risk, under Napoleon, of fresh war and very little liberty. These sentiments were peculiarly those of the *bourgeoisie* of Paris, the most prudent in France, because they are the most just and less influenced by those provincial interests

which often mar the honesty of men's opinions. Thus in the maritime cities, whose commerce had been ruined by the continental blockade, the *bourgeoisie* were in a kind of frenzy, whilst in the manufacturing towns, whose trade had been created by Napoleon, and which had suffered much by the communications established with England, the *bourgeoisie* experienced sincere delight, damped, however, by the apprehension of war.

Among enlightened men, only one feeling prevailed,—that of grief. These men, who were small in number, but influential without seeking to be so, expected from Napoleon's return only fearful calamities. To all, war seemed inevitable. The Congress, which was believed to be on the eve of dissolution, had prolonged its sittings, and it was evident that the Powers would not separate, but would endeavour to overthrow, without leaving him time to collect his resources, the man who was endeavouring to undo all they had done at Vienna. There would be then another death-struggle between France and the European Powers. This imminent danger ought to be sufficient to put every good citizen in opposition to Napoleon's enterprise. Indeed, Napoleon was not alone in fault: the Bourbons had, by their errors, suggested the idea, and prepared the success of his undertaking. But, whether the fault lay with the one or the other, the misfortune was the same for France.

With regard to the home policy, the causes of regret, without being so serious, were still considerable. The Bourbons had alienated every Frenchman who entertained an affection for his country, or for the principles of '89, but these men were resolved to oppose a constitutional resistance to the reigning dynasty. The elections of the current year would bring in a contingent of moderate oppositionists, who would reinforce the independent majority that existed in the Chamber of Deputies; and this assured a legal victory, slow, perhaps, but, sooner or later, certain, over the dangerous tendencies of the Emigration. In this way, the true principles of the French Revolution might be established, combined with a wise, legal, and practical liberty, similar to that which constitutes the happiness of England. Besides, the work was commenced, and it would be better to carry it out than to undertake another, and so continually recommence without ever coming to a completion.

Another consideration presented itself. Would there be with Napoleon, even when taught by adversity and reflection, equal chances of success? This was problematical. There could be, of course, no doubt with regard to the principles of '89, which formed, so to speak, his political philosophy, but with regard to constitutional liberty there would be, probably, a sharp struggle. Even supposing that he had been rapidly instructed by misfortune, did there not still remain his powerful will, his formidable genius, and could they be made to bend to all the exigencies of a constitutional *régime*? Under Napoleon there might therefore be anticipated certain war, and doubtful liberty, and these considerations were more than sufficient to

prevent enlightened men from wishing his return.

There is neither exaggeration nor partiality in saying that the men who thought thus were to be found almost exclusively in the ranks of the constitutional party. That party was known as "constitutional" that sought to establish legal liberty under the Bourbons, gradually subjecting them to its yoke, by victories legally obtained over their evil tendencies. Both in the chambers and outside their walls, this party unanimously exhorted all to rally round the Bourbons and endeavour to support them. It cannot be denied that private interest alloyed the generosity of this resolution. The members of both chambers knew they were compromised, some for having pronounced Napoleon's deposition, and others for having sanctioned the decree. Certain writers, such as M. Benjamin Constant, had employed against the Imperial *régime* a violence of language which, to say the least, would render them incompatible with the sovereign of Elba, should he again become ruler of France. But, independently of any private motives, the greater number were animated by a sincerely honest desire to observe their oath to the Bourbons, and to complete, conjointly with them, the edifice of constitutional liberty which was commenced, and spare France a fresh and fatal struggle with all Europe. The leaders of the constitutional party thought themselves bound, in honour, to prove that their opposition, manifested either in their speeches or writings, was not directed against the dynasty of the Bourbons, but against their political proceedings. Such conduct on the part of these gentlemen was at once honourable, rational, and prudent.

The members of the chambers hastened to take their seats. They were anxious to see each other, to converse about public affairs, and give vent to their sentiments in conversation, whilst awaiting an opportunity of enunciating them in their public speeches when a sufficient number should be assembled to proceed to business. It was around M. Lainé, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, that the largest group collected. M. Lainé had, through hatred of Napoleon, become an ardent partisan of the Bourbons, and entertained the principles without the prejudices of the royalists. He began to perceive the errors that had been committed, of which he was not himself wholly innocent, and he was not a man to conceal what he felt. He avowed, without hesitation, these faults. His opinion was shared by the moderate royalists, and even by some of the ministers.

The latter, as we have already said, did not really constitute a real cabinet. In order that a cabinet should exist, under the form of government then attempted in France, it would be, in the first place, necessary that the king should consent to it by suffering another will to exist coequal with his; secondly, the ministers should have a leader recognised as such by his colleagues, and accepted, at the same time, by the chambers and the king as an intermediary and connecting link. Louis XVIII., though less alarmed, as we have said, than any of our previous monarchs, by the spectacle of free assemblies,—a feeling result-

ing from his long residence in England,—had not yet made all the sacrifices of authority that a representative Government requires, and if, in practice, he yielded much of his royal power, it was as much through a dislike to business as through an effort of good sense. Be this as it may, he did not seek to provide a leader for his cabinet, and, indeed, there was not among the ministers any one competent to discharge the duties of such a position. M. de Talleyrand, absent-minded and habitually indifferent, was unsuited to the post, though the most distinguished statesman of the day. M. de Montesquieu, next in importance to M. de Talleyrand, and the only minister capable of addressing a public assembly, might have become chief of the cabinet, had the chambers enjoyed a higher degree of importance than was accorded to them, and had he possessed the pliancy, firmness, and business-like habits required in such a position. There were then, as we have seen, ministers, but no ministry. These ministers were divided into men of sense, conscious of the errors that had been committed, and even inclined to acknowledge them, and others, either members or flatterers of the emigration, who believed that if they had committed a fault it was that of being weakly indulgent to the adverse party. Among the former was Baron Louis, who was exclusively occupied with the finances, and who had displayed in his *spécialité* the qualities of a great minister. Among the men of sense we must also rank M. Beugnot, who was unjustly attacked by the emigrants, whose intervention in the police department he would not suffer, nor was he less disliked by the ultra-royalists, who bitterly reproached him with having facilitated the escape from Elba, which, as Minister of Marine, he could have prevented by employing more vigilant cruisers. In the same class was M. de Jaucourt, M. de Talleyrand's temporary substitute, an honest, intelligent, and moderate-minded man. And lastly there was M. de Montesquieu, who saw clearly how much the ministers had gradually deviated from the current of the national sentiments; he frankly acknowledged these errors, and, discontented with all parties, but more especially with his own, to whom he unhesitatingly imputed all the evils that had occurred, in soreness of spirit, took a pleasure in saying that he and his colleagues could not do any thing better than give up their places to men who were more popular and more competent to save the monarchy.

M. de Dambray and Ferrand, through blind obstinacy, and Marshal Soult, in consequence of his connection with the ultra-royalists, supported the opinions of the emigration. They asserted that it was necessary to be a little more royalist than they had been, especially more vigorous, and strike right and left when the opportunity occurred, and perhaps revoke some of the concessions of the Charter, (this was said in a low tone,) and endeavour by these means to save the monarchy. M. de Blacas gave no opinion. He was too clear-sighted not to perceive that errors had been committed, either in one way or another, but he looked upon himself as so identified with the monarchy that he did not suppose that either

public censure or change of ministry could ever touch him.

The penitent ministers thronged round M. Lainé, and M. de Montesquieu did not hesitate to say that it would be better to sacrifice three or four members of the cabinet, including himself, for he was ready to close the chamber by throwing himself in. M. Lainé highly applauded these sentiments, and sought to win the support of the leaders of the moderate opposition, both in the chambers and outside their walls.

There were two of those in particular whom he had induced to join him, M. Benjamin Constant, who had excited a great sensation by his writings, and M. de Lafayette, who, after having visited Louis XVIII. at the time of the promulgation of the Charter, in order to show that he was ready to accept liberty under the Bourbons, had returned to his estate of La Grange, where he lived retired, awaiting a formal summons from the electors to take part in public affairs.

M. Lainé, M. de Montesquieu, and other leaders of the constitutional party, adopted the idea of changing three or four ministers, such as M. de Montesquieu, who offered himself as a sacrifice, and MM. de Blacas, Soult, and Ferrand, who were not so generous, and replacing them by more popular men. It was also thought good to increase the Chamber of Peers, by elevating to the peerage men distinguished either by great civil or military services, and completing the Chamber of Deputies by replacing the two sets, whose terms had expired, by men of liberal opinions, leaving the selection to the chamber, in consideration of the shortness of the time. It was also proposed to reorganise the National Guard, selecting them from among the *bourgeoisie*, who were for the most part well disposed, the command to be given to M. de Lafayette. The Government would explain their views concerning national property in such a way as to appease the anxiety of the purchasers, and, finally, those measures that had given offence to the army were to be annulled.

M. de Montesquieu did not consider any of these concessions, even the appointment of M. de Lafayette, as too high a price to pay for saving the monarchy. The ministers, especially those who were to be dismissed, exclaimed loudly against them, whilst M. de Blacas, who estimated things as they concerned Louis XVIII., who gave no opinion, was silent and immovable. It was in vain that M. Lainé, foreseeing that Napoleon would advance with his usual rapidity, insisted that some determination should be immediately adopted. M. de Montesquieu, disavowed by the court since he had adopted such radical opinions, could not give an answer which he had not received himself, whilst Louis XVIII., worried by the remonstrances of the violent portion of the royalists, and by the enthusiasm of the enthusiasts, not knowing to whom to listen or whom to be persuaded in this state of doubt not to leave his old habits and resolved to retain de Blacas, and not to dismiss anybody.

In this state of peril the court did not confine itself to consult the constitutionalists, who were the

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animated by the desire of preserving unity by correcting its errors, but relations with the principal revolutionaries as M. Fouché, Barras and others, men, who are generally more inclined to quacks who flatter them, than to physicians who prescribe disagreeable. It must be added that when the aged and unwise members of any party tried to make a choice from among their rivals, they more easily pardon those to themselves, hold extreme opinions, moderate men whom they no more regarded in disposition than in opinions.

Persons employed to negotiate with M. de Bassano held out hopes of the Ministry, but long waiting had disgusted him, was more evasive and less anxious than before, which plainly showed his sought too late. M. d'André, the wise moderate director of the Police department, to win over the Duke of Rovigo, his advice, but the duke told him, with irritation, that the adherents of the Emperor, particularly military men, had been so created that there was no chance of any of them.

The royalists were thus exerting themselves without any result, the Bonapartists and revolutionists were not less active, were equally unsuccessful in attaining their object. Both had been thunderstruck on Napoleon's return.

M. de Bassano, who alone had had any communication with Elba, and that merely to send information, was no less surprised than the others, for M. Fleury de Chaboulon, who had yet returned, had not sent him any information. Dreading the result, Napoleon's faithful minister regretted the information as it was, which he might have inducing his master to take his resolution.

The young officers, the instigators of the plots of which we have spoken, and who had communication with Elba, nor even M. de la Bédoyère, were more ardent than ever, and wished to act immediately to second Napoleon. The civic Bonapartists, M. Regnaud de Saint-Jean d'Angély, M. de la Meurthe, Thibaudeau, and others, as little as M. de Bassano of the real things, were equally disinclined to any inaction; for if they should make a move in favour of Napoleon in the north, they dreaded lest they should derange his plans by a movement that he had neither foreseen nor ordered. Accustomed to waiting and anticipating the Emperor's orders, they were strangely perplexed how to act.

At all the revolutionists were satisfied. Their leader, M. Fouché, though fond of exciting events, so consonant to his restless nature, was greatly annoyed at Napoleon's return, as it deranged all his plans. He thought he held the Bourbons in check, and could support or destroy them at pleasure, for he was implicated in every move of the time, even those concocted by the royalists. "We could have formed a republic," he said to his confederates, "composed of such regicides as Carnot, Garat, and others, and of inflexible soldiers like Davout, who would have ruled or dismissed the Bourbons

at pleasure. But this terrible man has come to bring us war or despotism. In the present state of affairs we must support him, that our services may give us some claim upon him; but we shall wait until he arrives, when, in all probability, he will be as much embarrassed by his triumph as ourselves."

More daring than such Bonapartists as M. de Bassano, with less faith in the Emperor's infallibility, and willing to risk, if not his own life, at least those of others, he advised immediate action and to give the young officers their own way. Generals Lallemand, Lefebvre-Desnoëttes, and Drouet d'Erlon were come to Paris, and he encouraged them in their plan of immediate action. Drouet d'Erlon commanded at Lisle under Marshal Mortier, and had several regiments of infantry at his disposal. Lefebvre-Desnoëttes had the Chasseurs of the Guard, now called Chasseurs Royaux, at Cambrai, and the mounted grenadiers, now Royal Cuirassiers, quite near at Arras. Of the Lallemands, one brother was commandant at Aisne, and the other general of artillery at La Fère. It was decided that Lefebvre-Desnoëttes, the most daring of all, and he that could count most on his men, should leave Cambrai with the Chasseurs of the Guard, and proceed to Aisne and La Fère, where he could be joined by the Lallemands and what troops they could induce to come with them; and then the combined troops should advance along the Oise to Compiègne, where Drouet would join them with the infantry from Lille. Placed thus at the head of twelve or fifteen thousand men, they would exercise no small influence on the course of events, perhaps induce the whole army to join them, or, at the very least, cut off the Bourbons' retreat, and deliver them (in every other respect safe and sound) into the hands of Napoleon, to do with them as he pleased.

The plan was to be put into execution immediately, with only the necessary delay of proceeding from Paris to Lisle, for it was now the beginning of March. Napoleon had landed on the 1st, and though his friends knew as little as the Government what direction he had taken, they considered it necessary to make a diversion in his favour as early as possible. The insurgents had always hoped that Marshal Davout would take the command of this army, as soon as it should be collected, and thought that so great a name at the head of veteran troops would decide those that still wavered to join the movement. But this plot had been so hastily got up, that the marshal, either from repugnance to an enterprise that accorded so little with his ideas of discipline, or through fear of being compromised by giddy-headed young men, or perhaps dreading to anticipate Napoleon's orders, came to M. de Bassano, and told him that he was not to consider him as a sharer in what he looked upon as a very flimsily concocted enterprise. The young generals, greatly displeased, said they could do without him, and, without further delay, set off to attempt, without their illustrious chief, their long-projected adventure.

Whilst the enemies of the House of Bourbon were acting with all that activity and daring that was natural to them, the Bourbons themselves, perplexed by conflicting councils, hesi-

tated which of the proposed plans to adopt, and confined themselves to some military preparations, which might have been of use could they count on the army. We have said how the Duke de Berry, who was to have been sent to Franche-Comté, was afterward kept near the king at Paris, and how Marshal Ney had been ordered to repair to Besançon alone. The marshal, summoned by a telegraphic message, had experienced much pain on learning an event which again opened to Napoleon a path to the throne. Less guilty toward his former master by the faults he had actually committed than by those of which he had groundlessly accused himself, he had no wish to fall again into his power; but to his honour it must be said that, with his military good sense, he foresaw that the re-establishment of the Empire would give rise to a war against all Europe. It was, therefore, no less from patriotic than from personal feeling that he experienced both fear and anger at Napoleon's return. Never accustomed to restrain the expression of his sentiments, he loudly proclaimed his opinion when he arrived at Paris. This was most agreeable to the royalists, who overwhelmed him with attentions, and conducted him to the king, who received him in the most flattering manner, and to whom he promised to bring Napoleon, conquered and a prisoner. The courtiers even asserted that he said, *a prisoner in an iron cage*,—an expression which, whether true or false, was only the thoughtless and pardonable phrase of a soldier little accustomed to choose his words. Marshal Ney left, giving the court hopes which, on his part, were sincerely uttered,—more sincerely than received, for there was more confidence expressed in his fidelity than was really felt. Without acknowledging it even to themselves, the royalists had a presentiment of that universal impulse that would soon lead all minds and hearts toward the man whom, by their own fault, they had made the representative of all the moral and material interests of the French Revolution.

The Count d'Artois, who had left on the night of the 5-6th of March, arrived on Wednesday, the 8th, at Lyons, where he found the inhabitants in a state of extraordinary excitement. We have already explained the moral position of this great city. A small but violent party of bigoted royalists had completely alienated from the Bourbons the affections of the Lyonnais, who always considered themselves indebted to Napoleon for the exertions he had made to repair their misfortunes, and because he had opened the continent to their commerce. This ill feeling had been excited to the highest degree by the assassination of a patriot by a royalist, a crime that, besides, was left unpunished; and when it was announced that the column from Elba was approaching, the entire population, with the exception of a few rational-minded men, were transported with joy. When an account of the proceedings at Grenoble arrived, there was no doubt of what would happen at Lyons.

The royalists, irritated and terrified, declared that the Government did nothing; but here, as elsewhere, they did not say what ought to be done. Count Roger de Damas, the Governor of the division, was not wanting

either in good will or courage; but he had not the command of a force on which he could count. The National Guard—the most faithful expression of popular opinion—was, at the best, lukewarm, with the exception of the cavalry, few in number, who, as elsewhere, were formed of the nobility of the locality. The troops in garrison, consisting of the 24th of the line, the 13th dragoons, stationed at Lyons, and the 20th of the line, that had arrived from Montbrison, made no secret of their feelings, and appeared ready to open their arms to Napoleon as soon as he would appear at the gates of the town. There was not a single piece of artillery. Marshal Soult had very strangely ordered that artillery should be sent for to Grenoble, that is, the very place which, in all probability, would be invaded by the time the orders arrived from Paris. Indeed, this was no great loss, for men would be needed to work the guns, and the artillery were as little to be depended on as the infantry.

Such was the state of affairs at Lyons when the Count d'Artois arrived. He soon saw that the honourable but thoughtless zeal that had brought him thither could only tend to involve him in a disagreeable affair. He was very sorry for having come, not because of the personal risk he incurred, but because that his presence would make the almost certain loss of this large city still more important.

He exerted himself very much, and, as was his wont, he talked to and flattered everybody, but gained none but those who came into personal intercourse with him, whom he convinced both by his goodness and amiability. He wanted money to distribute among the troops, and, the treasury not being supplied in time, he received excuses instead of loans. The Duke d'Orléans arrived at Lyons twenty-four hours after the Count d'Artois, and they deliberated as to what was best to be done. The difficulty here was the very same as at Grenoble. To send the troops against Napoleon would be to deliver them up to him; to order retreat would be to abandon the city to him. The latter was the only alternative, for, as in all probability Lyons would be in the enemy's power within two days, it would be better to retire with the troops than to supply Napoleon with a reinforcement of some thousand men. The Duke d'Orléans endeavoured to convince the Count d'Artois that the wisest course would be to retreat; but the latter, disinclined to abandon so important a city as Lyons, wished to consult Marshal Macdonald, who was about to pass through the town on his way to Nîmes to join the Duke d'Angoulême. It was nine o'clock at night when the marshal arrived, his carriage having broken down on the road. He was immediately conducted to the Count d'Artois, who was impatiently awaiting his arrival, and who desired him to remain with him, as the road to Nîmes was intercepted. The marshal manifested the most loyal disposition, but was by no means pleased with the situation of affairs. However, he did not consider it advisable to evacuate Lyons until forced by the course of events. He proposed to cut off the bridges of the Rhone, if possible, or at least to barricade them; to review the troops, speak to them, and seek to influence them in favour.

some zealous royalists, who, dressed as soldiers, should fire the first shots, and, perhaps, induce the others to oppose Napoleon. These proposals did not delude the Duke d'Orléans; but he made no objection, as this was no time to dispute about means, when they had so few at their disposal. The Count d'Artois adopted the marshal's plan for want of a better, and desired him to give the necessary orders, and then retired to take some repose whilst awaiting the following day; for it was indeed on the next day, the 10th, that, according to calculation, Napoleon would present himself before the gates of Lyons.

Marshal Macdonald passed the night in ordering the cutting down or barricading of the bridges, in bringing the boats from the left to the right bank of the Rhone, and in receiving the commanders of the different regiments, who from a principle of honour, but not of affection, were ready to do their duty, though they were unanimous in the doubts they had conceived of the soldiers' sentiments. He also recommended them to give the Count d'Artois a suitable reception; but, as he was giving these directions, General Brayer, the commandant at Lyons, arrived, and said it would be better that the prince should not present himself to the troops, as it was doubtful what reception he might experience. The marshal immediately hastened to the prince, awoke him, and related this sad news, which did not surprise the Count d'Artois much, and they agreed that it would be better to commence the review without him, but that he could be sent for in case things assumed a more favourable aspect. Early in the morning, under heavy rain, the marshal assembled the 20th and 24th regiments together with the 13th dragoons, who, in the present state of disorder, had received no rations, which added ill humour to their hostile feelings. He collected them in a circle around him, reminded them of the twenty years' warfare during which he had served in their ranks, how loyally he had behaved at Fontainebleau, of the faults which had occasioned the misfortunes of France in 1814, and told them of the still greater misfortunes that threatened if they should give up the country to Napoleon, since they would be again opposed to all Europe, now more powerful, more united, and more irritated than ever. He spoke with sincerity and warmth, but without success. Wishing to bring his discourse to a conclusion, he seized his sword and cried, in a loud voice, "*Vive le roi!*" Not a voice replied. A little disconcerted, he thought of trying what effect the Count d'Artois' presence would produce, feeling certain from the aspect of the troops that nothing disagreeable would occur. The prince came and presented his amiable and attractive countenance to the troops, who received him respectfully but coldly. When he came before the 13th dragoons, the marshal called an old sub-commissioned officer from the ranks, whose long services were attested by his gray hairs, and the cross displayed upon his breast. He spoke to him of his campaigns, and, in the prince's presence, desired him to cry "*Vive le roi!*" The old soldier was stunned, but remained immovable and silent, and then, sal-

uting the Count d'Artois, returned to his place without repeating the desired cry.

The prince, deeply moved, turned pale, but said nothing, and retired to his residence leaving the marshal on the ground, who, to make a last attempt, invited the officers to his house. They accompanied him to about the number of a hundred, and then, without failing in the respect due to the experienced warrior to whom they spoke, they bitterly complained of the wrongs they had suffered. In order to calm them, the marshal admitted their wrongs, promised that they should be redressed, but could produce no effect, even when he showed them in perspective the certainty of a fatal strife with all Europe. They were seriously irritated against the household troops, and those they called the Chouans: they were offended at the disdain exhibited for the Legion of Honour, for even at this very moment Count Roger de Damas did not wear it; and, though they were convinced that there would be a new struggle with Europe, they were determined to run the risk, and die to free France from the emigrants, Chouans, Austrians, English, all of whom were alike objects of their hatred.

Nothing was to be expected from minds so prejudiced. The marshal went to the Count d'Artois, whom, although he ran no greater personal risk than that of becoming Napoleon's prisoner, he advised to leave at once with the Duke d'Orléans. He determined to remain himself and make a last effort to induce the troops to fight, and take part with the Restoration against the Empire.

Having accompanied the princes to their carriage, Marshal Macdonald returned to the bridges of the Rhone, to see if his orders had been executed. The bridges had not been cut down, for the people would not allow it, nor had they been even barricaded. Of all those royalists who had done so much to alienate the Lyonnese populace, not one had assumed the schako or offered to fire the first shot. The marshal had the bridges barricaded as well as he could, and ordered a trench to be opened in order to commence a kind of *tête de pont*. Whilst he himself was presiding at these works, a foot-soldier, whose zeal he was trying to stimulate, said to him, with great coolness, "Marshal, you are a brave man, and have passed your life in our ranks, and not in those of the emigrants. You would do better by leading us to our Emperor, who would receive you with open arms." Neither argument nor punishment could influence men so disposed, and the marshal waited with intense anxiety the approach of the enemy, who, he was told by some officers he had sent to reconnoitre, was near. It was three or four o'clock in the afternoon of Friday the 10th, and he was assured that Napoleon was not far from the Faubourg de la Guillotière.

Napoleon, whom we left going out of Grenoble at noon on the 9th, had lost no time, but hastened to join his troops, who were proceeding toward Lyons. His progress from Grenoble to Lyons had all the appearance of a triumph, as the open carriage in which he travelled could proceed but slowly in consequence of the numbers of farmers, holders of national pro-

perty, that surrounded it, all curious to behold this extraordinary man. On all sides were heard cries of "*Vive l'Empereur! à bas les nobles! à bas les prêtres!*" and he was frequently obliged to stop and receive the addresses of the mayors and make them suitable replies. He supped at Rives, slept at Bourgoin, and on the 10th continued his route toward Lyons, which he hoped to enter before the end of the day.

About four o'clock his advance guard, composed of the 4th hussars, appeared at the entrance of the Faubourg de la Guillotière, where a detachment of the 13th dragoons was posted to make observations. No sooner did these two bodies of cavalry come within sight of each other than they fraternized with the cry of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" they then traversed the faubourg, where the people received them with the same cry. Soon both people and cavalry poured together toward the bridge of Guillotière. When Marshal Macdonald heard the tumult, he ordered two battalions to follow him, and directed his course toward the bridge, ordering his officers to draw their swords, in order to stimulate the soldiers and induce them to fire that first shot from which he expected the safety of the royal cause. Whilst he was executing this movement, the 4th hussars and 13th dragoons appeared in a mingled crowd, exclaiming, "*Vive l'Empereur!*" which excited an irresistible movement among the infantry on the bridge. These responded with "*Vive l'Empereur!*" and, rushing on the batteries they had helped to raise, began pulling them down as fast as possible. The hussars and dragoons, assisted by the people, also set to work, and in a short time the passage was clear. At this spectacle the marshal thought only of escaping from the zeal of his soldiers, who wanted to conduct him to Napoleon and effect a reconciliation. Putting spurs to his horse, he set off at full gallop, accompanied by General Digeon and his aides-de-camp. He passed through Lyons at full speed, closely followed by some horsemen, who, without intending any personal harm, were anxious to seize and make him join the Imperial cause. But the marshal, obstinate in the accomplishment of his duty, from a sense of honour and a consciousness of the real interests of France, wished to avoid a reconciliation, which Napoleon would have accompanied by the most brilliant marks of favour. He was followed for some leagues, and then, as the soldiers said, "*abandoned to his evil star,*" that he was determined to follow.

A very different scene was at the same moment being enacted at the bridge of Guillotière. The bridge had been cleared as quickly as possible, and an immense crowd of citizens offended by the royalists, and of patriots stigmatized for the last six months as revolutionists, had hastened to meet Napoleon, and, mingling with the soldiers, saluted him Emperor. As for him, he calmly received their greetings like a master returning to his patrimonial domain, and replied by affectionate salutations to the enthusiastic cries that met him on every side.

He was to stop, not at an hotel as at Grenoble, but at the archiepiscopal palace, which was for him a family mansion. The civil, judicial, and military authorities hastened to present their felicitations and homages. To all

he repeated what he had said at Grenoble, but now couched in terms less popular and more imperial. He told them that he was come to save the interests and principles of the Revolution endangered by the emigrants, to restore France to her former glory, but without war, which he hoped to avoid; that he would accept the treaties that had been signed with Europe, and would live at peace with her provided she did not interfere in the affairs of France; that times were changed, that we must content ourselves with being the most glorious of nations, without seeking to rule all others; that both at home and abroad he would take into account the changes that had taken place, and would accord France all the liberty of which she was worthy and which she was fit to receive; that, if extensive power was needed when he entertained vast projects of conquest, a wisely-restricted prerogative would now suffice to rule over happy and pacific France; that he would be soon at Paris, where he would convoke the nation itself in order to modify the laws of the Empire and adapt them to the new state of things.

This language was as successful at Lyons as it had been at Grenoble, and it seemed so impossible to hold other opinions that nobody thought of asking whether Napoleon were sincere. When the receptions and harangues were ended, his first care, as at Grenoble, was to hurry toward Paris without losing an hour. He resolved to do as before,—that is, to keep the troops that had accompanied him near his person, that they might enjoy some repose, and send forward those that had joined him, and who had not yet experienced any fatigue. He intended to follow with those he had brought from Grenoble, who after one day's rest would be ready for the road. By the addition of the garrison of Lyons he would have twelve thousand men, and a park of artillery that would be completed in passing through Auxerre. It was doubtful whether the Bourbons would have time to assemble an equal force, and still more doubtful whether they could induce the men to fight. However, Napoleon could not send to Paris the Brayer division, which had given up Lyons to him, without seeing and addressing the men. He ordered a review of the National Guard and the troops for the following day. The next day, 11th of March, he reviewed the soldiers from Elba, Grenoble, Lyons, and the Lyonnaise National Guard, on the Place Bellecour, which he had rebuilt. The *bonapartes!* chimerical—of seeing at the head of the government a great man devoted to the Revolution, who, from reason as well as from necessity, was ready to accept the principles of legitimate liberty, and who consequently combined the threefold advantages of genius, glory, and popular birth, and that without war or despotism,—this hope seduced all imaginations, and won back to Napoleon the hearts of the Lyonnais, which he had lost by his errors of the last three years.

He rode along the front of the Brayer division, thanked the men in a dignified manner, like a general who knows how to address his soldiers, and bade them set out immediately and win him new regiments and new cities.

When he returned to the palace, he immediately occupied himself with the cares of the

administration, whose scattered threads he sought at every step to gather up. The young Fleury de Chaboulon, now on his return from Naples, came to throw himself at his feet, intoxicated with joy at seeing him safe after having incurred so many dangers by land and sea. Napoleon received him most graciously, and immediately gave him a place in his cabinet. He next thought of choosing a prefect for Lyons. As has been seen, he was displeased at Grenoble by the sudden departure of M. Fourier. He was, however, soon calmed by his explanations, and told him to join him at Lyons, whither M. Fourier came, as incapable of resisting a rising as of betraying a falling power. Napoleon received him with cordiality, and, considering it both suitable and piquant to appoint to the prefecture of Lyons the very prefect who had sought to prevent his entrance into Grenoble, he gave him the prefecture of the Rhône, which M. Fourier accepted without hesitation.

Napoleon proceeded to more serious acts of legislation. Since his arrival at Lyons he considered himself as already in possession of sovereign authority, and he resolved to use it in such a manner as to strike terror into those powers that were opposed to him. He pronounced the dissolution of the two Chambers of Louis XVIII., alleging against them such reasons as were most likely to render them unpopular. He said the Chamber of Peers was composed of old Senators of the Empire who had come to terms with a victorious enemy, and of emigrants who had returned in the train of foreigners. As to the Chamber of Deputies, he said that the term for which the members, or at least of two-thirds of them, had been elected, had expired, that the members had communicated with the enemy, and by a scandalous and anti-national vote had expended, under pretext of paying the king's debts, a sum of thirty million francs, destined to pay the expenses of twenty years of civil warfare.

Though he uttered these fulminating denunciations against the two Legislative Chambers, he took care not to renew the idea of that gigantic despotism that for fifteen years had sought to exist alone and alone decide the destiny of France. The royal chambers being denounced, Napoleon prepared the way for the formation of the Chambers of the Empire. He ordered that the entire electoral body should assemble within two months at Paris in the Champ de Mai, to assist at the coronation of the Empress and the King of Rome, and to make such changes in the Imperial laws as would be consistent with the state of public opinion and the demands of a well-regulated freedom. This was an indirect announcement, though not an actual promise, of the speedy arrival of Maria Louisa and the King of Rome, and an intimation that the new institutions were to originate with the people themselves, and that he assumed the national sovereignty as the base of imperial power, and did not, like the Bourbons, appeal to divine right.

Napoleon did not confine himself to attacking the great legislative bodies of the Bourbon Government, and to announcing the approaching formation of his own. He also sought, by some other measures, to gain the assistance of the principal functionaries. The

Bourbons had announced the reconstitution of the magistracy, but by deferring it had kept the magistrates in a state of continual anxiety. Napoleon declared all dismissals and appointments made since the April of 1814 to be null, and ordered the old Imperial magistrates to resume their functions. Thus was the entire magistracy gained by a stroke of his pen. He made no arrangement concerning the prefects and the sub-prefects, who were almost all Imperialists who had retained office under the Restoration, and about whom it would be impossible to legislate at a distance, besides that the greater number would probably join him as soon as they should have an opportunity of making a choice. To these politically justifiable measures he added others less excusable, some meant to satisfy the army and revolutionary party, others to win over or restrain certain powerful enemies who were to be intimidated but not directly attacked. He decreed that all emigrants who, without permission, had returned before 1814, should be obliged to evacuate the country immediately, and that such as had obtained military rank should quit the army. This measure, though rigorous, was inevitable, for without it the soldiers would have expelled with violence the emigrant officers that had been forced upon them; but this measure was surpassed in severity by another, which could not be excused on the plea of necessity, and which, from the rank of those attacked, would be certain to produce a bad effect. Napoleon was highly displeased with MM. de Talleyrand, de Dalberg, de Vitrolles, Marmont, Augereau, &c., some of whom had invited the enemy into France, and others treated with them. He drew up a decree by which he commanded the future trial and present sequestration of property of MM. de Talleyrand, de Dalberg, de Vitrolles, and M. Lynch, Mayor of Bordeaux, together with Marshals Marmont and Augereau, asserting that all of them had connived with the invaders of the country. As the greater number of these were absent, and the others would soon leave, this decree could only affect their properties, and might be annulled should these personages join Napoleon's party. But still it was an act of violent reaction in Napoleon, which contrasted forcibly with the clemency promised in his proclamations, and which might be more injurious to his cause by exciting alarm, than to those who being absent were threatened, but were beyond reach of personal harm. These in some sort military decrees were to be countersigned by the Grand-Marshal Bertrand, in his quality of major-general. But his generous nature revolted from such acts, and he made strong objections. He asserted that such a measure would be enough to destroy all confidence in Napoleon's promises, and would give his enemies an opportunity of saying that he returned to France inflamed with resentment and as rooted as ever in his despotic habits. Napoleon told the grand-marshal that he understood nothing of diplomacy, that clemency would be unavailing unless accompanied by a dose of severity, especially toward dangerous and some of them implacable enemies; that in reality he had no idea of acting with rigour, as he had proved by appointing M. Fourier,

who had so loudly declared himself against him, to the prefecture of Lyons; that besides it was necessary to act differently toward those who had yielded to circumstances, and those who had treated with the enemy while honest Frenchmen were shedding their blood upon the frontier; that this appearance of severity would be most agreeable to his party in France, and, besides, he repeated that he only wished to intimidate, and not to punish, that he was ready to receive with open arms all those that were willing to return to him. However, Napoleon allowed himself to be influenced by the grand-marshal, who said that he ought not to close the road to an accommodation, and that threats would rather repel than attract the men in question. The execution of the measure was therefore adjourned, but not abandoned.

Before quitting Lyons, Napoleon wrote again to Maria Louisa, informing her how far he had advanced, and that he would make his triumphal entry into Paris on the 20th of March, the anniversary of the King of Rome's birth, and ended by requesting her to return to France. He sent this letter to his brother Joseph, who was in the canton of Vaud, with directions to have it sent to Vienna to Maria Louisa, informing him at the same time of his immense success, and desiring him to declare officially to all foreign ministers residing in Switzerland, that he was determined to preserve peace according to the conditions of the Treaty of Paris.

Having arranged every thing, he determined to leave Lyons on the morning of the 13th of March, having remained there but two days, that is, only the time absolutely necessary for assembling the troops that arrived successively from Grenoble, giving them one day's rest, and then sending them on to join the Brayer division, which had left Lyons on the 11th. He determined to choose of the two roads that led from Lyons to Paris, the one that passed through Burgundy, and which the feeling of the people made safer than that through Bourbonnais.

Every thing seemed to promise Napoleon as prompt and complete a success for the remainder of his journey as he had met with from La Mure to Lyons. There was, however, great excitement both in his flank and rear. The Marseillais were greatly irritated when they heard of his landing. They saw in imagination their port again closed, and their misery assured for years to come, and all eagerly asked to be led in pursuit of him whom they called the *brigand of Elba*. Marshal Massena, destined, despite his glory, to suffer from the injustice of the two dynasties, had no more reason to be grateful to Napoleon than to Louis XVIII. Weary of every thing but repose, he judged the present state of affairs from the elevation of his rare good sense and sincere patriotism. Sincerely attached to the Revolution, but dreading a fresh struggle with Europe, he saw in Louis XVIII. the personification of counter-revolution, and in Napoleon that of war, for neither of which did he feel inclined. These opinions made him feel rather pain than pleasure in the present attempt of his old Emperor, and he was determined to confine himself to the strict

performance of his military duty. Yielding to the wishes of the Marseillais, he had allowed twelve or fifteen hundred to leave, escorted by two regiments of infantry, who had their tricoloured cockades concealed in their knapsacks. This column proceeded toward Grenoble, in order to attack Napoleon in the rear, but certainly could not do him much injury, being more than a hundred leagues distant from him. Massena had also taken precautions for the defence of Toulon, fearing that, amid the conflict of parties, this important town might fall into the hands of the English, and he kept some forces at Marseilles, that he might not be at the mercy of a furious populace.

Some troops of the line began to assemble at Nismes, and were to be commanded by the Duke d'Angoulême. But these preparations, though made in Napoleon's rear, were not, by reason of the distance, much to be feared. Marshal Ney, who had been sent to Franche-Comté, was more to be dreaded, as he was to advance through Besançon and Lons-le-Saulnier on Napoleon's flank. He might overtake the Imperial army, but could not assemble more than six thousand men, who would fight unwillingly, if at all, against Napoleon's twelve or fifteen thousand, filled with enthusiasm, and determined to march over the bodies of all that should oppose them. This latter danger was not, therefore, of a nature to cause much alarm, but a collision would be most disagreeable to Napoleon, who hoped to get to Paris without shedding blood. He therefore avoided a meeting, but was determined not to owe either to Ney or the other marshals, preferring to owe every thing to the soldiers, to whom he had no objection to be under an obligation, but he would not owe any thing to their commanders, with whom he was not pleased at the time of his fall, and from whom he would not accept conditions. The Grand-Marshal Bertrand did not follow this example. He wrote to Ney, describing the triumphal march from Cannes to Lyons, and predicting a continuation of the same success to Paris. He wrote thus, to make him feel the importance of the resolution he was about to take, and its danger to himself and instability to the Bourbons should it be contrary to the Imperial cause.

He sent some old non-commissioned officers of Elba to communicate with Ney's soldiers and inflame them with the same ardour as the others. It was also very probable that they would have passed beyond Maçon and Châlon, the only places where they could be attacked on the flank, when Ney would be in a position to act. Napoleon left Lyons on the morning of the 13th, announcing publicly that he would be in Paris on the 20th. It seemed, indeed, likely that the rapidity of his eagle *flew from steeple to steeple*, as he expressed it, would be as great from Lyons to Paris as it had been from Cannes to Lyons.

As Napoleon approached Burgundy he met populations inflamed in the highest degree with these sentiments, which had announced his triumph in the commencement of his expeditions. The country about the Saône had prospered greatly under the Empire, because that at that period civil communication had

replaced maritime, and the Saône had become the medium of continental commerce. Independently of this circumstance, the presence of the enemy, so feebly combated by Augereau in 1814, had greatly exasperated the inhabitants, who, like all those along the frontier, were very patriotic. The imprudence of the nobility and clergy had done the rest, and Franche-Comté and Burgundy were as well disposed as Dauphiné to open their arms to Napoleon. The cities of Maçon and Châlons, in particular, were greatly excited when they heard of the proceedings at Lyons and Grenoble. Napoleon stopped for some minutes at Villefranche, and then proceeded through enthusiastic crowds to Maçon, where he was to pass the night. When the inhabitants heard of his approach, they assumed the functions of the magistracy, and effected the revolution themselves. So great was the excitement, that Napoleon's mere approach was sufficient to effect now what his presence would have been needed to accomplish but a few days before. He was received with unheard-of enthusiasm at Maçon, the people hurrying long pêle-mêle, with the soldiers who either abandoned their commanders or forced them to do as they did. "*A bas les nobles! à bas les prêtres! à bas les Bourbons!*" such were the cries of this multitude of mingled peasants, soldiers, and sailors, all inflamed with the national and revolutionary sentiments which the Bourbons had so unwisely shocked.

Napoleon gave audience to the municipal authorities, and conversed familiarly with each of the inhabitants as addressed him; told them why he had left Elba, in almost the same words he had used at Lyons and Grenoble, spoke to them of peace and liberty, and charmed them by that friendliness of manner which he could so well summon to his aid whenever he wished to give himself the trouble. He asked one of the municipal officers how it had happened that, while the feelings and courage of Châlons and Maçon were the same, the former had defended itself so well, and the latter so ill, against the Austrians. "It was your fault," bluntly replied the Maconnais: "you gave us bad magistrates, and left us without arms or leaders, and our hands alone were useless." The Emperor smiled, and said, "That proves, friend, that we have all erred, but we must not do so again. For the future we shall only trust in true patriots; we will not go to seek strife with foreigners, but, if they come to us, we shall receive them in such a manner as to deprive them of all desire of coming again."

Having exchanged some words with these good people, he took some repose, intending to continue his route to Châlons next day.

Napoleon was now approaching the second decisive event of his expedition,—his meeting with Marshal Ney. He did not exactly dread it, for he had already been joined by twelve or fifteen thousand men, that is, by more than half the troops that the Bourbons had stationed in the east of France. From the accounts that had reached Napoleon, the marshal could not have more than six thousand soldiers, and those probably ill disposed, and surrounded by a population devoted to the Empire and the Revolution. It was impossi-

ble, notwithstanding, to foresee what the obstinate-headed marshal, as was generally said, might do, and Napoleon would have deeply regretted a collision, of whose success there could be no doubt, but which would have lessened the prestige of the pacific conquest of France, effected without bloodshed. Marshal Bertrand, as we have said, had written to Marshal Ney, hoping to induce him to reflect seriously. Napoleon had contented himself with sending him orders, as though he had never withdrawn from his command. He ordered him to proceed with his troops to Autun and Auxerre, where he expected to meet him. Besides, he was very near the marshal, who, it was said, was at Lons-le-Saulnier, and, if some prudent men felt anxious, the people considered Ney and his soldiers as completely won as those that Napoleon had already met between La Mure and Maçon.

The moment was in fact approaching when one of the most extraordinary scenes of our long and wondrous Revolution was about to be accomplished. Marshal Ney, ignorant of the proceedings of Generals Lallemand and Lefebvre-Desnoëttes, long on bad terms with Marshal Davout, believing that Napoleon regarded him with animosity on account of his conduct at Fontainebleau, and being consequently wholly unconnected with the Bonapartists, felt all his resentment against the Bourbons vanish when he heard of the disembarkation at the Gulf of Juan, which, with his simple good sense, he considered as the precursor of a foreign and perhaps of a civil war. He had, consequently, promised Louis XVIII. that he would oppose Napoleon's progress by every means in his power.

When he arrived at Besançon, he did all that the circumstances required with zeal, intelligence, and resolution. Either through the fault of the War Department, or the effect of existing difficulties, scarcely any thing necessary for the organization of a *corps d'armée* was prepared. He did every thing in his power, at the same time that he complained to the minister with his usual bluntness. Finding the royalists dejected, and no longer supported by that arrogance which had been so injurious to the Bourbon cause, he was indignant with them, but soon revived their energy by the vivacity that revealed itself in his looks, his words, and every motion of his heroic person. The royalists of the locality, without participating in the confidence he felt, were charmed by his sentiments and the attitude he assumed.

Having ordered that some pieces of artillery should be mounted and cartridges prepared, he determined, in order to supply the difficulty in *matériel*, to divide his troops into two divisions under two generals in whom he could confide. He had five regiments of infantry under his command, the 15th light infantry at Saint-Amour, the 81st of the line at Poligny, the 76th at Bourg, the 60th and 77th already assembled at Lons-le-Saulnier, and three cavalry regiments,—the 5th dragoons stationed at Lons-le-Saulnier, the 8th chasseurs on their way to the same place, and the 6th hussars, sent on to Auxerre to protect the artillery dépôt. He had also been promised the 4th of the line, and the 6th light infantry, but these could not arrive before a lapse of ten days.

He had chosen Generals Bourmont and Lecourbe to command his two divisions. General Bourmont, commandant at Besançon, was at hand. An old Chouan leader, he should, of necessity, be agreeable to the royalists, and could not be disliked by the troops, who remembered his distinguished services under the Empire. He combined in his person all that was required, and could not refuse service when the cause of the Bourbons was in question. This was not the case with General Lecourbe. This officer, the most distinguished of his time in mountain-warfare, was an old republican, disgraced by Napoleon, and living in retirement on his estates, as unnoticed by the Bourbons as he had been by the Emperor. Ney sent for him, and found him free from all ill feeling toward Napoleon, but alarmed lest his return should cause a foreign and a civil war: he reminded him of their former companionship in arms on the Rhine, of their mutual aversion to the Imperial despotism; he told him of all the evils that Napoleon's ambition had caused France, and succeeded in inducing him to accept the command of one of the two divisions that the royalists were trying to form in Franche-Comté.

These arrangements being finished, and his artillery harnessed in haste, the marshal set out for Lons-le-Saulnier, with Generals Lecourbe and de Bourmont. He arrived in that town on the morning of the 12th of March, and found there the 60th and 77th regiments of the line, together with the 5th dragoons. The 8th chasseurs were expected. He had a choice of two alternatives. He could throw his troops into Lyons, if there were still time, to prevent Napoleon's entrance into that city, or he could make a movement to the right, advance to the Saône, and take possession of the route that led to Paris through Burgundy.

Scarcely had Ney entered Lons-le-Saulnier when he learned that Lyons was evacuated, and he began to comprehend the immense agitation produced in the country by Napoleon's approach. The troops said nothing; but, spite of their silence, the intensity of their emotion was discernible in their eyes. The restless and inquisitive population, seeking for news, and hoping to hear what was favourable to Napoleon, took no trouble to conceal their sentiments. The clergy had taken refuge in the churches. The nobility, in distraction of mind, flocked round the marshal, hoping he would restore the feeling of confidence they had lost. The Count de Grivel, an old soldier, inspector of the National Guard, and a devoted royalist, had come to offer his services in support of the royal cause, so imminently imperilled.

Marshal Ney was fully conscious of the difficulties of the position in which he had placed himself, but the more he felt himself inclined to yield to the influences that prevailed around him, the more resolutely did he resist the inclination. When the royalists spoke to him of the dangerous position of affairs, he said he was quite aware of it, that it was no slight undertaking to resist Napoleon, but that it was necessary to call up courage equal to the occasion. He added that he did not wish for the company of *tremblers*, that those who were afraid were at liberty to retire, for, were he left alone, he would resist; he would take a

musket, fire the first shot, and force his soldiers to fight. The terrified royalists pressed his hand on hearing him speak in this fashion, uttered words of gratitude, even of admiration, but did not express great hopes of success, for, indeed, they entertained very little.

Some hours after his arrival, Marshal Ney reviewed his regiments. The 60th and 77th of the line deployed before him, with the 5th dragoons, and 8th chasseurs that had joined. After having carefully inspected his troops, he assembled the officers, and spoke to them with great warmth and determination. He reminded them that he had accompanied Napoleon to Magdon and to Fontainebleau, that he had, consequently, served him to the last moment, but that, after Napoleon's abdication, he had, like them, taken an oath to the Bourbons, and he intended to keep it. He represented to them that the re-establishment of the Empire would inevitably involve France in a deluge of war, that it would draw upon her the anger of all Europe, and occasion the recommencement of a disastrous struggle; that every honest Frenchman ought to oppose such an event; that, for his part, he was decided to do so, without, however, wishing to constrain any person; and if there were among those who heard him any whose affections were opposed to their duty, they had only to declare their sentiments, and he would send them home without exposing them to any other inconvenience than that of quitting the ranks, but that he did not intend to keep with him any but trustworthy men determined to do their duty.

Notwithstanding the ascendancy that he in general exerted over the troops, the marshal's address was followed by a glacial silence, which proved that, if he wished to retain only those who shared his opinions, he would be obliged to send home nearly all his officers. No sooner was the meeting broken up, than the aides-de-camp of the marshal heard angry remarks on every side. "Where was the necessity," murmured the greater number of the officers, "for what the marshal said to us? Does he not know our opinions? Ought he not to think as we do? We are in the rank: we shall await there, in good order, whatever fate shall determine. Let him wait as we shall do. He may allow the royalists that surround him to indulge their frenzy, but he ought not to give utterance to opinions that do not become him."

These remarks, when repeated to the marshal, displeased him less than the disguised language of the royalists. "Let them go," he said, with a kind of nervous irritation, "let them go if they are afraid; let them leave me alone, and I will take a musket from the hands of a soldier and fire the first shot."

The more powerfully the general impulse invaded his strong heart, the more resolutely did he defend himself, and by this lonely struggle he touched the feelings of the most clear-sighted royalists, without encouraging them; but he afflicted the Bonapartists, who grieved to see him become so entangled in a labyrinth from which he could never issue. Several officers belonging to the army, among the first to join Marshal Ney, complained that they were only sent

he begged the Count d'Artois not to re-farther, but to make a movement to the and so reach the Saône, whilst he, by a ment to the right, would join him, and he ained that by combining their forces would possibly succeed in arresting the /s progress. He promised, and with t sincerity, to take the initiative in the at, and added that as soon as his artillery d, which would be probably the next e would advance on Maçon or Châlons to the Count d'Artois. The unhappy man ot know that it was not the Count d'Ar- ho had returned to Paris, but Napoleon lf who would be at the Saône.

next day, the 13th, whilst Napoleon dvancing toward Maçon, the aspect of e became very sombre. Every moment, gence arrived that revolts had broken sometimes at one point, sometimes at er, so that the royalist forces were as it enveloped on every side. The Prefect n arrived about the middle of the day, ed by the inhabitants of Bourg, who had revolted. The 76th, who occupied this ad joined the inhabitants, and unfurled colour flag. Nearer still, at Saint-Amour, 5th light infantry threatened to do the

About ten in the evening, an officer Maçon brought intelligence that the city on had risen and expelled the royalist ities. At midnight, a despatch from ayor of Châlons announced that a bat- of the 76th, employed to escort the ry that the marshal was so impatiently ting, had revolted and gone off with the ry to Napoleon. An hour after, an who had travelled by the Burgundy elated that the 6th hussars, commanded e Prince de Carignan, had set off in full e for Dijon, for the purpose of raising y, and an hour later a despatch from al Heudelet announced that this city, apital of Burgundy, yielding to the im- e communicated by neighbouring towns, ust proclaimed the re-establishment of mpire.

ese diverse messages, reaching the mar- in succession, during this fatal night, to him like so many poignard-stabs. ls to resume a sleep that had been inter- ed by so many violent shocks, he rose walked distractedly about, expecting e moment still more terrible intelligence. ew that some of the Elba soldiers had from Lyons and mingled with his troops, avouring to imbue them with the spirit of rection.

e was in this state of agitation, when, t the middle of the night, two merchants ad left Lyons in the afternoon were ght into his presence; what they related e a profound impression on him. They with what facility the revolution in favour e Empire had been effected at Lyons, and e there were good reasons to believe that a lar revolution had taken place at Paris. y added something about the uselessness hedding blood in opposing such a move- t. At the same moment, the officers atched with Marshal Bertrand's letter ed. They were personally known to shal Ney, and empowered to add verbal Vol. V.—29.

explanations to the letter they brought. These officers, mingling falsehood with truth, and repeating what they had heard among Napoleon's followers, made a fatal commentary on the words of Marshal Bertrand. They declared that every thing had been long previously concerted between Paris, the Isle of Elba, and Vienna; that at Paris a vast conspiracy, comprising the entire army, and even the War Minister, had already overthrown, or was about to overthrow, the Bourbons; that Napoleon, who was the focus of this plot, was in correspondence with his father-in-law, that Kohler, the Austrian general, had made arrangements with him at Porto-Ferrajo, that the English vessels even had withdrawn to allow the Imperial flotilla to pass, that the European Powers, tired of the Bourbons, had resolved to accept Napoleon if he promised to preserve peace and observe the treaty of the 30th of May, which he had, in fact, solemnly promised to do; that thus every thing had been previously arranged, that it would be a folly to resist a revolution so deeply planned between the highest potentates, and whose most alarming consequences had been foreseen and prepared for.

The reader can judge, from what we have narrated, how much truth there was in these assertions. They furnish another proof of the plausible falsehoods which, during a political crisis, may be constructed on a slight basis of facts and a few remarks imperfectly examined and foolishly interpreted. In fact, Napoleon had allowed those about him to believe, though he did not assert it, that he was in correspondence with Austria. M. Fleury de Chaboulon had related to the officers of the staff some of the lightly-laid plots of Generals Lefebvre-Desnoëttes and Lallemand, who, as we have seen, had had no communication with the Isle of Elba, and with these slight materials the tissue of falsehood narrated to Marshal Ney had been composed. "Now," said Ney, "I understand the meaning of Bertrand's words, when he says that measures are taken with infallible certainty, and so I was sent alone to fight against a revolution that was wished for by France and even by Europe." Reckoning from this moment, the marshal looked upon himself as a dupe, the victim of his own ignorance, sacrificed to sustain a cause already lost, and which did not leave him in a position even to attempt to combat, for his soldiers would not fight, and even could he induce a few to do so, it would be only a useless shedding of blood, for which he would have to give a serious account to Napoleon and to France. The idea of advancing almost without soldiers to encounter his former companions in arms in order to defend a court that had inflicted more than one humiliation upon him and his wife, and to avert calamities in which the marshal no longer believed, for Napoleon appeared to be in correspondence with the principal European Powers, such a project seemed to him extravagant and one that ought to be abandoned.

But what was to be done, after having pledged himself so deeply, after having promised to fight à outrance against Napoleon! The unfortunate marshal was sorely perplexed. The Bonapartists endeavoured to per-

suade him that there was but one safe mode of acting, which was to act openly, declaring, for example, in a proclamation to his troops, that, France having formally declared for Napoleon, he, the faithful servant of France, did not wish to provoke a civil war in defence of a dynasty antagonistic to the glory of France and irrevocably condemned by its errors. A proclamation to this effect was drawn up, which Ney appeared disposed to publish, and perhaps read in person to his soldiers. If, in the present time, after forty years' experience of liberty, interrupted indeed, but not forgotten, after having adopted certain principles, professed them openly and identified himself with them, if any man, whether civilian or soldier, had, under such circumstances, been asked so abruptly to change his party, he would express considerable astonishment and look upon such a proposition as an insult. But the education of public men in France was at that time based upon the doubtful morality of revolutions and despotism, and, seeing the government pass so rapidly from the hands of one party to those of another, they had no idea of following a steady line of conduct unmoved by the fluctuating character of the times; and it soon happened that politicians, who in general are more cautious in their proceedings than military men, showed themselves quite as unscrupulous. The marshal, whose principles were those of the times in which he lived, was, besides, of a fiery and irritable temperament that never allowed him to adopt a middle course. Having abruptly joined the Bourbons in 1814 because he was tired of war, and as abruptly alienated himself from them when he became discontented with the court, he as suddenly returned to them when he learned the disembarkation at Cannes, which had renewed in his mind the images of civil and foreign war, and he expressed his intention to resist Napoleon, with characteristic violence of language. And now, seeing the probability of a civil war disappear in the affection exhibited by the soldiers for Napoleon, and that of a foreign war in the pretended concert with Europe, he did not think that he ought to desire other than what France desired, and he changed without scruple, with the mobility of a child; for a man governed by his impressions is always a child. Another, on discovering that he had been deceived, would have stepped aside and allowed the train to pass, whose approach he had not foreseen. But the marshal, influenced by personal interest as well as by temperament, had no idea of sheathing his sword because he had committed a political error in not foreseeing Napoleon's triumph. Yielding besides to some of his secret causes of ill feeling, he said within his own breast that if Napoleon entailed upon France neither a civil nor a foreign war, he was much better than the Bourbons, and that in getting rid of the Bourbons France would get rid of their prejudices, their arrogance, and their counter-revolutionary tendencies. Before taking an ultimate resolution, he wished to consult Generals de Bourmont and Lecourbe, his two generals of division. One was, as we have said, an old royalist, the other, an old republican. Both were sensible men, strongly opposed to Napoleon, but they saw clearly how irresistible was the movement that was being accomplished around them. General Bourmont, gentle and astute, though an energetic soldier, kept a mournful silence, as if in acknowledgment of the irresistible force of circumstances, but did not recommend any line of conduct, leaving the marshal to take care of his own dignity. Lecourbe, who had not lost the frankness of an old officer of the army of the Rhine, said to Ney, "You abandon all thoughts of resistance, and I think you are right. It would be useless on our part to attempt to oppose this torrent. But you would have done better had you followed my advice and not mixed yourself in this affair, and left me to till my fields."

With the exception of these few unpolished remarks, Ney met with no opposition, and suddenly determined that, as he could not resist the torrent, he would go with the current. Without further delay, he called his aides-de-camp, who were not aware of his design, and ordered them to assemble the troops in the principal square of the city. He then advanced in front of the soldiers, surrounded by his staff, among whom were several royalist officers whom he had frequently reproached for their want of zeal. He drew his sword in a convulsive manner, and, amid an anxious silence, read the celebrated proclamation that had been drawn up for him, and which cost him his life. "Soldiers," he said, "the cause of the Bourbons is lost forever. The legitimate dynasty that France has adopted is about to reascend the throne. It is the Emperor Napoleon, our sovereign, who is henceforth to reign over our glorious country!" At these words, which occasioned unspeakable surprise to those by whom he was surrounded, frantic expressions of joy, loud as a peal of thunder, burst from the ranks of the soldiers. Hoisting their schakos on the end of their muskets, they uttered cries of "Vive l'Empereur! vive le Maréchal Ney!" then, breaking from the ranks, they rushed toward the marshal, and, some kissing his hands, others the skirts of his coat, they thanked him, after their fashion, for having gratified their fondest wishes. Those who could not get near the marshal surrounded the aides-de-camp, who were rather embarrassed at receiving a homage that they did not deserve, for they had no part in the sudden change in the marshal's opinions had undergone. The soldiers, thronging round them, pressed their hands, and said, "You are honest fellows: we always reckoned on you and the marshal, and we were very sure that you would not remain long with the emigrants." The inhabitants, not less demonstrative in the expression of their feelings, had joined the soldiers, and Ney returned to his house escorted by a noisy and joyous multitude.

However, on returning to his residence, the marshal found an expression of embarrassment, and even of disapprobation, on the countenances of several of his aides-de-camp. One of them, an old emigrant, broke his sword, saying, "Marshal, you ought to have let us know what was about to occur, and not make us witnesses of such a scene." "And what would you have me do?" replied the marshal: "can I stop the in-coming flood with my hands?" Others, while admitting the impossibility of

Napoleon, regretted that the marshal had thought proper, within so short an interval, to play two parts so diametrically opposite. "You are babies," replied the marshal: "I was obliged to choose either one party or the other. Could I hide like a coward, shunning the responsibility of events? Marshal Ney cannot sink into obscurity. Besides, there is only one means of diminishing the evil, which is to take a decided part at once, in order to avert civil war and get hold upon the man who is about to become again our ruler, and prevent his committing new follies; for," he added, "I do not pretend to give myself to a man, but to France, and should this man wish to lead us again to the Vistula, I shall not accompany him."

After having thus roughly replied to those who condemned his conduct, Ney received at dinner, besides his generals, all the commanding officers, with the exception of one who refused to go. Notwithstanding a slight feeling of restraint, induced by the consciousness of an infraction of military duty, the entire time of the repast was occupied in a long recapitulation of the errors committed by the Bourbons, who without wishing, or in wishing it—each edged according to his own fashion—had given himself up to emigration, to foreigners, and had announced anti-national sentiments. There was also a unanimous protestation against the former faults of the Emperor, against his mad passion for war, his despotism, and his refusal to listen to the representations of his generals in 1812 and 1813; in short, there was manifested a determined resolution to tell him the truth, and to require on his part guarantees for liberty and sound policy. "I am going to see him," said Ney, "I am about to speak with him, and shall declare to him that we will not allow ourselves to be led again to Moscow. It is not to him that I give myself, it is to France, and, if we join him, it is because we regard him as the representative of our glory, but we do not wish a restoration of the Imperial régime."

Generals Lecourbe and de Bourmont, who were at the dinner, took little part in the conversation, but admitted that the revolution that had just taken place was inevitable, and in a great measure induced by the errors of the Bourbons.

The marshal quitted his guests for the purpose of executing the orders he had received from Lyons, written, as we have said, as if Napoleon had never ceased to reign, and directing him to bring his troops to Autun and Auxonne. He wrote a letter to his wife, in which he related what he had done, and finished with these characteristic words:—"My dear, you shall not again have reason to weep on leaving the Tuileries."^{*}

Marshal Ney's determination to join the Emperor removed all doubt as to the success of the extraordinary enterprise of conquering France by his personal influence alone, which Napoleon had commenced at La Mure and almost accomplished at Grenoble. Napoleon passed the night of the 14th at Châlons, and continued his route through Autun and Aval-

lon, marching at pretty much the same pace as his troops, whom he sometimes followed, or sometimes outstripped, according to the position of any respectable house where he chose to pass the night. Journeying in this way, he arrived on the 17th at Auxerre, surrounded by the people of Burgundy, who, in concert with the troops, rose to proclaim the re-establishment of the Empire. Napoleon repeated everywhere what he had said at Lyons, declaring that he brought peace, liberty, and the definite triumph of the principles of '89. M. Gamol, brother-in-law of Marshal Ney, came to Ver-manton to meet him. Napoleon received him in a friendly manner, and took up his abode at the prefecture, where he began to make preparations for his last march, that which was to conduct him to Paris.

Whilst Napoleon was thus advancing to Paris, M. Lainé, stimulated by events, had not ceased to make the most honourable efforts to reconcile the reigning dynasty with the constitutional opposition. As the members of the Chamber of Deputies continued to arrive at Paris, he prayed them to forget past errors, and to seek, even in these errors, an opportunity of doing good, by requiring reparation, which he said the Government was disposed to grant, such as modifying the ministry, increasing the number of peers, renewing two-thirds of the members of the Chamber of Deputies, all which changes were to be effected upon liberal principles. An electoral law was also contemplated, which, recognising the influence of property, would also recognise the influence of the liberal and industrial professions, and a law upon ministerial responsibility—a guarantee to which much importance was at that time attached—a new legislative act touching the press, and, lastly, a tariff that would protect French manufactures against British competition. To the promises he enumerated M. Lainé added, but with good intentions, an officious lie. He said the Government was reflecting on these concessions, and even preparing to make them the work of the session, when the *genius of evil* put his foot again on the soil of France. But M. Lainé did not confine his rational observations to private conversations: he conducted the deputies who arrived at Paris to the foot of the throne, and repeated, in the presence of the king, that it was necessary to acknowledge and forget past errors, and repair them by a combination of measures conformable to the necessities of the times and the wishes of the nation.

The leaders of the constitutional party, as well those who were members of the chambers as those who were not, and among the latter MM. de Lafayette and Benjamin Constant, gave their warmest support to M. Lainé, and publicly advocated his conciliatory principles. So far things were going on very well: but it was necessary that the court should adopt these ideas, and M. Lainé insisted that the Government should put a hand to the work, and commence at the commencement; that is to say, by changing three or four of the ministers. Of the necessity of this measure he had convinced M. Montesquieu, who had offered himself as a sacrifice; but he was the only convert M. Lainé made. The court, whose royalist fervour was excited to the highest

^{*} I have learned these details from an old artillery colonel of the Imperial Guard—a member of several of our public assemblies, and a sincere royalist: he was a man of great understanding, perfectly trustworthy, and had seen the letter in the hands of Madame Ney.

degree by the sense of danger, far from being disposed to make concessions, was rather inclined to be severe, declaring that the only faults committed were the result of too great indulgence. Louis XVIII. was placed between the moderate and the violent royalists, not knowing with which to side, and, half inclined to favour the former, only that he would have been obliged to make M. Blacas the first sacrifice in the proposed change of ministers,—for ill-informed liberals looked upon M. Blacas as the agent of the emigration at court,—he consequently came to no determination, and lost, in deplorable vacillation of opinion, the time that Napoleon employed in advancing with lightning-like rapidity toward Paris.

As to concessions, the court had not thought of making any, except to the army, and these were ill devised, for, besides being undignified, they possessed the disadvantage of rather multiplying dangers than preparing means of safety. The War Minister had turned his attention to the half-pay officers and old soldiers who had returned to their homes, and recalled both to active service. The half-pay officers received orders to join their regiments immediately, in order to form the *cadre* of new battalions to be composed of the recalled soldiers. Those who could not find a place in these battalions, which were called "a reserve," were to be drafted into battalions of the National Guard that were to be mobilized. Others were to increase the number of the household troops, in whose honours and advantages they were to share. All were immediately put on full pay. There are, undoubtedly, difficulties to which no remedy can be applied; but still it was a strange illusion on the part of the War Minister to imagine that the half-pay officers, with the feelings that had been allowed to grow and spread among them, could be induced to support the Bourbons at the very moment that they learned Napoleon's arrival in France. Even the National Guards, though animated by a *bourgeoisie* spirit, opposed to the re-establishment of the Empire, and who ought, consequently, to be reliable, were really not to be depended on. Had they been summoned in time, and prepared long beforehand, for the twofold defence of the throne and the public liberty, they might have been able to restrain the army, and prevent the soldiers from throwing themselves into Napoleon's arms. But the National Guard was almost everywhere divided into cavalry, composed of the ancient nobility, and of infantry, formed from the middle classes. The latter, offended, irritated, and discontented, had been disbanded in the greater number of the cities. Much advantage could not, therefore, be expected from this force. Nevertheless, the prefects were ordered to organize battalions of the "mobile," National Guard, and half-pay officers. They were, at the same time, authorized to convoke the *Conseils Généraux* to vote contributions for this purpose. Remedies whose utility was doubtful were multiplied in this way, as is sometimes done in the case of a patient in the last extremity, whose friends do not like to witness his agony without prescribing something. To all these measures the War Minister had added a violent proclamation, little calculated to

conciliate the army, and of a nature those laugh who remembered his long conduct at Toulouse.

Such were the measures taken. Napoleon's march. But when the progress he had made was ascertained, it was known that he had entered Grenoble, Lyons,—what the royalists had at first declared to be false and impossible—were then obliged to admit on evidence ceased to assert that Napoleon had not to France to be shot. But if they perceived the necessity of action, they did a whit more clearly in what way they acted. It is usual with political men to have committed errors to believe they are guilty, but that they have not. The royalists of every class, the defections that had taken place at Lyons, (they were still ignorant of Ney's,) were seized with a kind of distrust of everybody, without exception. They saw traitors on every side, treason, even in presence of the army, whom they had a short time before caressed. Those among the latter not haughty-minded—and there were among the bravest—only replied to offensive allusions by excessive professions of sincerity, and were not the more so that account. Others were indignant, but one desire, that of quickly and fully and arrogantly punished. As it happened a few months previously, the Ministry of War and Police were the special objects of distrust. After having been first seen doing nothing, they were now accused of too much, when they took the measures have narrated. The royalists believed a vast conspiracy existed, comprising officers of the army, from the marshals down to sub-lieutenants. Our account has demonstrated that nothing of the kind—that at Grenoble the General Mouton-Duvernet had sincerely endeavored to fulfil his duty; that at Lyons Brayer had not yielded until he had opened the gates of the city to the army; that La Bédoyère was acquainted with the plots of the brothers and Lefebvre-Desnoëttes; that Napoleon had acted independently and giddy Parisian conspiracy-history which, by dint of passion and impartial inquiry, establishes this nature, long after the events, truths of which the different parties were wholly ignorant at the time. The royalists, believing in the vast conspiracy, comprising the army, began to ask themselves what was not of the number. The army, of the royalists, whom Mouton-Duvernet in Brittany and his Quiberon army charmed, remained faithful to him, that he alone could save the country from the others, who were now seen reasons for distrust. They expressed their fellow-royalists in the language of the marshals, and in their eyes, only a faint hope of a new dynasty, and give it up to Napoleon. The pro-

Paris, and placing about the king's half-pay officers, who should not in the new battalions,—a late and prudent measure, but devised in good faith, in their eyes, only an act of perfidy; it was a most erroneous notion; for Soult, who was not incapable of doing people upon whom fortune came frown, was wholly incapable of doing them; and, far from being a deep man, was rather a shallow mind. And indeed for an astute Italian of the 15th century, and though, three months previous there was a question of dismissal of Dupont, it was said that all war-marshal were not made War Minister, and, on the contrary, asserted that all war-marshal were he allowed to retain the

remarks, but not so violent, were made regard to M. d'André, Director of Police. This functionary, who, as we said, was an ancient constituent, and the king, with whom he had co-operated during fifteen years, ought to have given the royalists full satisfaction, the score of fidelity. But there are when the spirit of party, like a horse, no longer recognises the friends. Having succeeded M. d'André had been obliged to follow the line of conduct, and reject the absurd of all the officious police that the king encouraged by suffering, and by paying them. Henceforth M. d'André reported at court incompetent, if not so. "He will not believe any thing," was the principal charge brought against him. We shall here narrate a circumstance which would be unworthy a place in history, but not truthfully paint the bewildering spirit. Very little intelligence was in the capital, because the prefects who followed Napoleon's route, terrified and dismayed at his approach, had scarcely time for his arrival, and did not think of afterwards. Still the telegraph was in incessant motion, either to transmit orders, or to question the king, whose tone was not sufficiently favourable to the Government, or to ask them for assistance, which they had not sent. It was lately fancied that, if the telegraph were kept actively employed, it must be in the service of Napoleon, and not of Louis. The director of the telegraph was

He was much surprised at the fact that had been conceived, and gave as so simple and convincing, that the facts were satisfied after having propagated most ridiculous terrors. The facts prove how great was the terror of the royalists. M. de Blacas, though he did not participate in the exaggerated fears of the king, could not help sympathizing in their and, in his profound alarm, he too asked himself whether Marshal Soult might be a traitor and M. d'André an incompetent. Driven to despair by the news that he conceived the idea of subjecting Soult to an examination in full council, though he were a criminal; and, in his distress, he provided himself with a pair of

pistols, ready, as he said, to proceed to extremities if he found the marshal a traitor. As a matter of course, the king was not to be present at such a scene, for it would not be desirable that his majesty should witness the violence that might arise. But M. de Vitrolles, who had not lost his temper, remarked to M. de Blacas, that, in his opinion, the suspicions entertained against the marshal were unfounded; that he appeared to him to be a man powerfully agitated by the circumstances in which he was placed, but that he was not a traitor. He added that there was evidently a false estimate made of his capacity when he was chosen to succeed General Dupont; that it might be necessary to elect another minister, a proceeding in itself quite sufficient to meet the exigencies of the case, without the addition of a political scandal.

The marshal, as we have said, did not betray anybody, but he had fallen into an agitation of mind which did not add to the clearness of his perceptions. Annoyed by the suspicions of the royalists, he endeavoured to tranquillize them by means of a proclamation, whose violence only added to their alarm; and thus, whilst he did not succeed in winning their confidence, he saw advancing, with giant strides, the man whom he had so terribly insulted. Here were causes sufficient to shake a stronger head than his. And though the measures he had taken in recalling the half-pay military to active service, and ordering certain military movements, might be efficacious, yet they contained no taint of treason; and should the soldiers, on seeing Napoleon, abandon the royal cause, the fault could not be attributed to the marshal. What was needed was a guarantee for the fidelity of the army; but Napoleon, to whom the army was to be opposed, possessed the affections of the soldiers: consequently, Marshal Soult did neither better nor worse than another might have done in his position. His sole error was having promised too much to the court, and raised too great expectations of what his energy and capacity could effect.

Being summoned before the council, his demeanour was conformable to his position, that is to say, very embarrassed. He was questioned almost in the same manner as if he were arraigned as a criminal, and replied without manifesting any indignation at the suspicions of which he was the object. He enumerated in detail the measures he had taken, several times protested the purity of his intentions, and ultimately almost established a belief in his innocence; but if his auditors thought somewhat better of his fidelity, they thought less of his talents, and having often repeated, when he did not know what else to say, that if a doubt were entertained of his loyalty he was ready to give in his resignation to the king, he was in some sort taken at his word, and without further delay conducted to Louis XVIII. This prince understood nothing of the administrative measures then under consideration; but, with a clear perception of the truth, he saw that the War Minister had certainly not performed miracles, neither had he been guilty of treachery. He also saw that it was necessary to sacrifice somebody to the anger of the royalist party. He allowed

the marshal to speak as long as he pleased; then, the offer of his resignation being renewed, the king profited by the opportunity, told him that he esteemed his services highly, that he would always retain a favourable recollection of them, but, as the cares of office seemed at the actual time to press too heavily upon him, he would relieve him of the burden, and appoint his successor. The marshal, surprised at being taken at his word when he expressed a wish to retire, showed a disposition to retract what he had said, but the king took no notice, and the marshal was obliged to consider as definite a resignation that was only offered for form's sake. The marshal quitted the king's cabinet very discontented at leaving his portfolio behind him, and was re-conducted to the gates of the Tuileries by MM. de Blacas and de Vitrolles, still making protestations of loyalty. He found around the gates a terrified crowd, that uttered cries of "*Vive le roi!*" when any person of distinction issued from the palace; when the marshal appeared, this cry was repeated. He replied by waving his hat, adorned with white plumes, and exclaiming, "*Vive le roi!*" He then threw himself into his carriage and drove to the war office. He thus found himself dismissed, after having continued three months in office, and accused of treason by the very persons for whom he had sacrificed his past career, and compromised himself with Napoleon, whom he had so violently insulted in his last proclamation, and only too happy would it have been for him had he been wholly compromised with the latter, for he would not then have incurred the weighty responsibility of acting as major-general on the fatal day of Waterloo.

Less ceremony was used with M. d'André. His fidelity was undeniable, though some fools affected to doubt it, and he was dismissed with the simple explanation that the king's interest required it. These proceedings took place on the 11th of March, and it was necessary to fill the two high posts thus left vacant. Here was an opportunity of profiting by the sage advice of M. Lainé, and satisfying public opinion. But M. de Montesquiou, who acted for M. Lainé, was only looked upon as a timid man,—a doubtful merit,—since he had advised concessions, and had, consequently, very little influence. As the danger augmented, the ultra-royalists acquired greater ascendancy, and, unwilling to acknowledge that their great error was having alienated public opinion from their party, they fancied that their safety could be secured by the exertions of talented men, endowed with that diabolical skill which they acknowledged Napoleon to possess, even whilst they questioned his genius, and they sought such men in every direction. There was an old War Minister who, during ten years, had received, transmitted, and got the Imperial orders executed, and who, since his return from Blois, had not ceased to address to the court his most humble assurances of fidelity. This was General Clarke, Duke de Feltre. Hitherto his humility, but not his services, had been accepted. The royalists resolved to have recourse to him, for he ought to know, if anybody did, how Napoleon might be beaten with his own weapons. He was sent for, and was so anxious to accept office, that he forgot the

danger he incurred. As he did not refuse to compromise himself at such a time, his fidelity was put beyond doubt, and he was immediately sent to the war office to replace Marshal Soult.

As no desire was entertained of conciliating public opinion, and as the royalists only saw in what was going on a struggle in which whoever possessed the largest share of those dark talents attributed to Napoleon would gain the ascendancy, it was no wonder that they thought of making M. Fouché Minister of Police. Hopes had always been held out to him of obtaining this post, but he had never got the appointment, and was even at last harshly refused. The frequently interrupted communications were again resumed. M. Fouché replied with great protestations of respect for the Bourbons, but declared that he could not accept any office, and that in the actual state of things it would be impossible to avoid a serious crisis. Disappointed in their efforts to obtain the services of one so experienced in police affairs, the royalists made a great descent, and cast their eyes on one much lower in social importance, in intellectual endowments, and in reputation: but they found in the new candidate, to compensate for all these deficiencies, an intense hatred of Napoleon. It was to M. de Bourrienne that the royalists now turned their attention. He had long before lost Napoleon's confidence, and had on that account been made Postmaster-General. The direction of the police was now confided to him, with the title of Director-General, for it would be impossible to give him the title of minister. The royalists felt assured that this man would pursue the Imperialists without mercy, and neither spare them

The two changes we have just related were a strange mode of replying to the advice of MM. Lainé and de Montesquiou, who powerfully demanded that four ministers should be dismissed, and replaced by four respectable and popular men. But the violence of party feeling increased as the public danger became more imminent; and, with the violence of party feeling, the blindness of party spirit became greater. The royalists did not believe that the impending danger could be averted by inspiring the public with confidence; on the contrary, they believed that the general safety could only be effected by the exercise of profound craft, and the most skilful plots, however despicable his character, was the man whom they were willing to confide. Republican blindness, which proves, not the perversity of the Bourbons or the emigrants, who, for the most part, were honest folk, but the perversity of party spirit, which is always great in proportion to the want of sound sense.

This change of officials took place on the 11th and 12th of March, and a partial session obtained at the same time called up a transient gleam of hope. Generals Lallemand, Lefebvre-Desnoëttes, and d'Erlon had, as we have said, set out for Le Mans in order to put their useless and impotent arms into action. Lefebvre-Desnoëttes, in his arrangements with the Count d'Artois, was to bring the infantry from Liège, and with the horse to bring them from the department of the Moselle. These all the troops

they could induce to accompany them. Having come to an understanding on these points, he left Cambray on the morning of the 9th with the Royal Chasseurs, formerly Chasseurs-à-cheval of the Guard, leaving orders with the Royal Cuirassiers—formerly Cavalry Grenadiers—to follow. The horse chasseurs, accustomed to obey blindly a general who during ten years had led them to battle, followed as they were accustomed to do, and on the morning of the 10th of March appeared before La Fère, whose gates were opened, as might be expected, to the French troops. The brothers Lallemand had already endeavoured to seduce the artillery regiment that was stationed at La Fère, by saying that a revolution had been effected at Paris in favour of the Empire, that the Bourbons were dethroned and thrown into prison, and that the time was come to make a movement in favour of Napoleon. The regiment of artillery would have been only too happy to listen to the brothers Lallemand and follow them, but General Aboville, who was in the town, and a strict observer of military duty, resisted, and Generals Lallemand, fearing to lose time, had set out for Compiègne with Lefebvre-Desnoëttes, hoping to meet the Cavalry Grenadiers, and especially the Lille infantry, led by Count d'Erlon. Having arrived at Compiègne at the head of the former Chasseurs of the Guard, consisting of a thousand splendid horsemen, Lefebvre-Desnoëttes and the brothers Lallemand attempted to seduce the 6th Chasseurs, whose officers hesitated and finally refused. Having failed in their attempt on this regiment, they were still obliged to await Count d'Erlon, of whose coming there was yet no indication. The latter, at the very moment when he was putting his infantry into motion, had been surprised and completely paralyzed by the arrival of Marshal Mortier from Paris. The marshal told him to keep quiet, and allow revolutions to take place without compromising himself, and in fact to retire for the moment from public life, lest he might become the object of legislative severity. The Count d'Erlon had consequently been rendered powerless to act, and had even been obliged to conceal himself to escape legal punishment.

This intelligence confounded Generals Lallemand and Lefebvre-Desnoëttes, who perceived but too late that in such serious circumstances where the minds of men fluctuated between duty and passion, the appearance of any other than Napoleon to influence their opinions would embarrass rather than persuade them. They consequently did not know what to do, when Lion, the second in command, seeing them in this perplexity, questioned them sharply, and forced them to declare their intentions with regard to the compromised corps. They acknowledged every thing, and proposed to him to accompany them to Lyons, the only alternative left them. The Commandant Lion, alarmed at such an enterprise, refused to take part in it, and in some measure extricated them from their difficulty by taking the command of the corps, whilst they attempted to escape. He sent instantly to Paris in the name of the Chasseurs an act of submission and repentance, alleging their ignorance of the intention of the generals who had tried to mislead them.

Intelligence of this abortive attempt being

circulated at Paris on the 12th of March, served to counterbalance the effect produced by the disastrous news from Grenoble and Lyons. It is only at the last extremity that political parties despair, of safety, and if an unexpected gleam of hope glimmers for a moment before their eyes they cling to it with tenacity, as a dying man does to life when his strength seems for a little restored. The hope awakened on this occasion was of a nature to deceive the wisest, for though the troops who had remained faithful had only resisted giddy-headed men and not Napoleon, still those who were inclined to flatter themselves might conclude that under energetic leaders they would resist Napoleon himself. The reports from Franche-Comté, and in particular from the staff of Marshal Ney,—his defection was not yet known,—were also favourable. The royalist officers that surrounded the marshal gave the most flattering accounts of his conduct. Marshal Oudinot, who had set out for Metz, declared that he had everywhere found the infantry of the Old Imperial Guard animated by the best sentiments. Of all this intelligence a tranquillizing combination was formed, which people began to believe and to make others believe. It was said that from Cannes to Lyons Bonaparte had taken everybody by surprise, that no preparations had been made for resistance, and that he had triumphed, as he had so often done, by taking his enemies unawares and confounding them. But henceforth he would meet an energetic and invincible resistance. He was to be attacked in flank by Marshal Ney, and he would not be able to overcome the bravest of the brave. Marshal Oudinot was to march from Metz to attack him in the rear. Lastly, the troops assembled at Paris and in the environs were to compose an army of 40,000 men, commanded by the Duke de Berry in person, with Marshal Macdonald as head of the staff, and, under the eyes of the prince and the worthy marshal appointed to assist him, every one would do his duty. There was at this time great talk about the firing of the first shot, which was looked upon as the decisive remedy that was to save the monarchy; for, were the conflict once commenced, the troops, it was said, would be obliged to fight. At Paris the means of firing the first shot was afforded by the household troops, consisting of 5000 brave men devoted to the royal cause, and who there could be no doubt would fire. The royalists flattered themselves that they would have 30 or 40,000 men, whilst Napoleon would be at the head of only 8 or 10,000, and, however great a general he might be, he could not conquer with numbers so disproportionate.

These were specious reasons, and party spirit is often satisfied with less valid. The Duke de Berry was nominated commander of the army of Paris, which was to encamp before Villejuif. Marshal Macdonald, who had just performed prodigies of valour at Lyons and given unquestionable proofs of fidelity, was appointed his major-general. The Duke d'Orléans was sent to Le Nord to organize an army of reserve, with the troops who in that department had lately shown such good dispositions; he was to lead them to Amiens or St. Quentin, and, after having provided the necessary *matériel*, to bring them to Paris to form

the Duke de Berry's left wing, and fight at his side. Marshal Oudinot received orders to put the infantry of the Old Guard in motion if he still retained his faith in them, and to direct his course so as to traverse the road leading from Lyons to Paris: he was authorized to promise the rank of officer to every soldier that pledged himself to fire.

At the same time, registers were opened at Paris for the enrolment of volunteers. Ardent royalists were to be seen every day parading the streets of the capital, waving white flags, and uttering cries of "To arms," against the usurper, the tyrant, who was to bring upon France the double scourge of despotism and war. Though these demonstrations did not make a very great impression, still, "Le Censeur," which had appeared as a volume to evade the censorship of the press, endeavoured to point out all the dangers resulting from Napoleon's return, exercised a certain influence over the young liberals, who, though they were not violently attached to the Bourbons, preferred them to Napoleon and were ready to support their opinions by force of arms. The law-students had enrolled themselves in large numbers. It was hoped that the National Guard, as anxious for peace as the young students were for liberty, would serve the royal cause with the same zeal. The royalists endeavoured to encourage each other and recover from the dejection created by the intelligence received from Grenoble and Lyons.

In order to propagate these sentiments more effectually, a meeting of the chambers was convoked. This meeting took place on the 13th of March. The Duke de Feltre, the new War Minister, and M. de Montesquieu, Minister of the Interior, were the most conspicuous personages on this occasion. The War Minister proposed a motion declaring that the garrisons of Antibes, La Fère, and Lille, and the Marshals Mortier and Macdonald, deserved well of their king and country. He also proposed that the soldiers who distinguished themselves under existing circumstances should be recompensed by the nation. He related on this occasion the attempt of General Lefebvre-Desnoëttes and the brothers Lallemand, which he stigmatized as infamous; he declared that the troops showed the most excellent dispositions, that they would fulfil their duty, and that he would be himself the first to set them the example. He added that if Lyons had not resisted, it was solely for want of artillery.

These explanations, hopes, and promises of devotion were warmly applauded, because of the great need there was of believing them. One member proposed that the Charter should be put under the special protection of the army and National Guards; another, that the arrears of the Legion of Honour should be immediately paid up. All these propositions were almost unanimously voted. The almost childish address of the War Minister was succeeded by the wise and dignified discourse of the Minister of the Interior, who, though he could not give office to the heads of the constitutional party, still thanked them for their noble conduct on this occasion. He particularly praised the liberal writers, who, forgetful of their dissensions, had written in defence of

the king and liberty, that is, of the common good.

As this scene appeared to produce a good effect, a still more solemn one was prepared. It was announced that on the 16th the king and the princes would meet the Chamber of Deputies, in order to renew their alliance with the nation and to give formal assurance of their fidelity to the Constitutional Charter. As the king's indecision and the perverse tendencies of the princes prevented them from joining the constitutional party, M. de Montesquieu and M. Lainé were anxious that by repeated demonstrations they should convince public opinion, the only force that could be effectively opposed to Napoleon.

The king prepared a speech, which he drew up himself carefully and learned by rote, so that he might deliver it with more effect. This speech was considered a masterpiece by the council, and was, indeed, couched in terms dignified as they were skillfully chosen. Encouraged by the approbation of the council, Louis XVIII., wearing the insignia of the Legion of Honour and surrounded by the princes, passed from the Tuilleries through a double line of National Guards and soldiers of the line. The Duke of Orleans was in the royal carriage, and the king did not forget to draw his attention to the fact that he wore the medal of the Legion of Honour. "I wish," said the duke, "that it were for the first time." As the king passed along, he was affectionately greeted by the crowd, chiefly composed of Parisian citizens. The National Guard cried, "Long live the king!" but the regular troops were silent. The Duke de Berry and the Duke d'Orléans observed what passed; but the king took no notice, still repeating to himself the speech he was about to deliver.

Having arrived at the Bourbon palace, Louis XVIII. entered the hall and ascended the steps of the throne, supported by MM. de Bass and de Duras. As the monarch entered, the members of both chambers rose quickly, and cheered him warmly. The deputies to the left were the most enthusiastic in their applause. All wished for peace, the Charter, and the king; and all wished to prove to him that if he were true to them they would be faithful to him. Three or four times they rose and cried, "Vive le roi!" These exclamations, which were warmly seconded by the royal deputies, moved Louis deeply, and might almost have made him believe that his crown was secure. Unfortunately, there were but the cries of enlightened and truly patriotic citizens. The rest of the nation, carried away by the indignation of which the Bourbons were the involuntary cause, was hurrying toward newly-created abysses!

When the king had recovered his composure, he delivered the following address in a clear and well-modulated voice:—

"Gentlemen:—

"At the present crisis, when the public enemy has advanced into one portion of my kingdom and threatens the liberty of the rest, I come among you to bind more closely those bonds which, by uniting us, constitute the strength of the State. I come to express to you, and through you to all France, my feelings and my wishes.

"I have returned to my country, and reconciled her to all foreign Powers, who, you may be assured, will be faithful to those treaties by which we have won peace; I have laboured for the happiness of my people; I have received, and do every day receive, the most touching proofs of their affection; can I, in my sixtieth year, do better than finish my career by dying in their defence?"

Fresh acclamations broke forth at this. "It is not you," cried the deputies, "it is we who ought to die for the throne and the Charter!" The king resumed,—

"I fear nothing, therefore, for myself; but I fear every thing for France. He who comes among us to light up the torch of civil discord brings with him, also, the scourge of foreign war; he comes to impose an iron yoke upon our country; he comes to destroy the constitutional Charter that I have given you, the Charter that will constitute my noblest title in the eyes of posterity, that Charter so cherished by Frenchmen, and which I again solemnly swear to maintain. Let us rally around it; let it be our consecrated standard! The descendants of Henry IV. will be the first to take their places, and they will be followed by all good Frenchmen. And now, gentlemen, let this assembly of the two chambers support authority efficiently, and this truly national war shall prove, by its successful issue, what a great people can do, when united in love for their king and for the fundamental laws of the State."

These words were scarcely spoken, when the Count d'Artois rose, and, respectfully seizing the king's hand, said, "Permit me, sire, in the name of your family, to unite my voice to yours, and assure you of our frank and cordial union with your majesty, at the same time that we swear to be faithful to you and the constitutional Charter." "Yes, yes," cried the Duke de Berry and the Duke d'Orléans, "we swear it." At this unexpected scene, the two chambers rose to applaud a unanimity of sentiment that would have been most salutary had it been manifested earlier, and to thank royalty for seeking from the nation that support which they most warmly promised him, but which, alas! was not at their disposal; and the chambers, in their excessive prudence, had not sufficiently opposed royalty to gain for themselves that popularity by which they could now defend and save it.

Louis XVIII. retired amid the general emotion, deeply moved by the success both of his own discourse and that of the meeting; a success whose utility a few days before might have been most useful, but which was now more than doubtful.

After the meeting, the National Guard was reviewed by the princes, in order that trustworthy men might be chosen from its ranks to form the *mobile* battalions. The Count d'Artois used all the art he was master of to win the favour of the armed citizens of Paris, but when the well-disposed were summoned, very few appeared. Indeed, the feelings of the citizens had been too deeply wounded to allow them to feel very ardent devotion for the royal cause. They dreaded him that was approaching, but did not love those that were about to

leave. However, they preserved an appearance of loyalty, and the princes were tolerably well received, though not as they had been by the Chamber of Deputies. These different manifestations, and the unsuccessful attempt of the brothers Lallemand, inspired a little hope, while confidence was felt in the numbers and fidelity of the troops that were to be assembled at Melun, under the Duke de Berry, Marshal Macdonald, and Generals Belliard, Maison, Hayo, &c. &c. The Bonapartists, on the contrary, disheartened by the adventure of the Lallemands,—which they looked on as an alarming proof of the feelings of the army,—kept themselves concealed, their timidity increased by the mere name of Bourrienne, the new Prefect of Police.

In the mean time, Napoleon had arrived at Auxerre on the 17th, and was preparing to march to Paris. The troops from Grenoble and Lyons, together with those brought from Franche-Comté by Marshal Ney, amounted to about twenty thousand men, with sixty pieces of ordnance. His forces had also been increased by the 14th regiment of the line, which, sent to Auxerre to oppose, had joined him with cries of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" Intelligence had reached Auxerre that an army was being formed at Melun. There were rumours of forty thousand troops of the line, of the household troops, of the National Guard, under the immediate command of the Count d'Artois and several marshals, and it seemed probable that the combat so desired by the royalists and so dreaded by Napoleon would take place beneath the walls of Paris. It seemed very possible, indeed, that among the five or six thousand men composing the household troops a sufficient number would be found to commence the conflict, which would give a more serious aspect to the whole affair. Napoleon was not much disturbed by these rumours. He said, in his own mind, that the troops would not be more faithful to the Bourbons at Paris than they had been at Grenoble and Lyons, that his approach would confound the Government, and that the king would take flight, as those prefects had done who had wished to remain faithful to him. Besides, emissaries who had come from the neighbourhood of the capital said that they had not met any soldiers on their way, and that at Melun they had only seen some half-pay officers, not very well disposed toward the Government they were called on to defend. Napoleon did not attach much importance to the reports in circulation, but he was too experienced a commander to despise them, and, consequently, determined to remain two or three days at Auxerre to concentrate his forces, and then to advance *militairement* on Paris. He waited the arrival of Marshal Ney with the corps from Franche-Comté, and, perhaps, with the Old Guard, which was said to have escaped from Marshal Oudinot, and he would thus be able, in these two days, to give the necessary stamina to his army. That his infantry might not be too fatigued, he determined to embark them on the Seine at Auxerre, and send them by water to Montereau. He did the same for the artillery, having hired all the vessels on the Seine. He sent the cavalry by land to Montereau, and so

prepared every thing, that his assembled troops might enter the forest of Fontainebleau on the 19th.

Having arranged all this with his usual promptness and precision, he employed the remainder of his time in receiving mayors, sous-prefects, and commanders of divisions, all of whom he addressed in the same terms he had used in other places. In the evening, at the prefect's table, and in a smaller circle composed of Drouot, Bertrand, Cambronne, and the prefect himself, he expressed himself in that concise, expressive, and caustic style which was peculiar to him. "I have allowed it to be reported," he said, "that I am leagued with the European Powers; but I am not. I am not leagued with any one,—not even with those who are accused of conspiring for my cause at Paris. Whilst in Elba, I saw the errors that were committed, and determined to profit by them. My enterprise seems an act of extraordinary daring, whilst it is, in reality, the result of rational reflection. There could be no doubt but that the soldiers, peasantry, and middle classes, from the insults they had received, would welcome me with delight. The gates of Grenoble would have opened had I but knocked with my snuff-box. Louis XVIII. is certainly a wise prince, whom misfortune has enlightened; and had he been alone, I should have had much more difficulty in wresting France from his grasp. But his family and friends destroy any good that he can do. They fancy they are returned to their paternal inheritance and can do as they please, and they do not see that they have entered on my domains, which cannot be ruled like theirs." The prefect having remarked that the Bourbons had restricted themselves to the strict observance of the law, Napoleon replied that it was the spirit, and not the letter, of the law that ought to guide a Government. "The laws of the present time," he said, "are framed in the spirit of the past, which must necessarily revolt the present generation. That is the sole cause of my success. Last year it was said that I recalled the Bourbons; this year they recall me: so we are equal."

Napoleon passed the evening thus, conversing with his accustomed vivacity, showing plainly the faults the Bourbons had committed, and cheerfully acknowledging his own, but declaring that he was changed, that he would be no longer found either an absolute master or conqueror; for, he said, he could correct himself, and was not like the Bourbons, who, during twenty-five years, had *neither learned nor forgotten any thing*.

Marshal Ney arrived the next day, the 18th. Napoleon expected him with impatience, and was even surprised that he had not come earlier. The marshal was, indeed, late, for he had been detained by the issuing of some necessary orders, and he felt not a little embarrassed as he approached headquarters. There were two reasons for this,—his conduct formerly at Fontainebleau, and lately at Lons-le-Saulnier. The manner in which he had acted at Fontainebleau, except for its harshness, might be excused, in consideration of the force of circumstances; but his late change, though it might be explained in the same

manner, had been so very abrupt, that it embarrassed him, even in the presence of Napoleon, who had profited so much by it. The marshal, in his own justification, said everywhere what he had already said at Lons-le-Saulnier,—that he had yielded to the wishes of France, which had been so unanimously declared at Grenoble, Lyons, Magon, Chalons, &c., but that he had not yielded to an individual man, to one especially that had led the French to Moscow: that times were changed, and France now needed peace and liberty, which he meant to tell the Emperor at their next meeting; and that if his words were not heeded, he would immediately retire to his estates, and shut there for the remainder of his life. Such were the sentiments that Ney had expressed on his route, which he had repeated, on his arrival, to his brother-in-law, and which he was about to address to Napoleon himself. However, as he came nearer, his courage failed by degrees: and fearing that he would not dare, would not know how, to say all he thought, he drew up a written statement of his opinions and conduct from the time at Fontainebleau to the even at Lons-le-Saulnier. He read this to his brother-in-law, who found nothing in it to correct, and then repaired, paper in hand, to Napoleon, a few minutes after his arrival.

Napoleon's profound sagacity had divined all that the marshal would feel inclined to say; and what he had already heard from many lips was sufficient to warn him that Ney would meet him both with excuses and remonstrances. He wished to dispense with the first and avoid the latter. He met him with open arms, exclaiming, "Let us embrace, my dear marshal." Then, as Ney was unfolding his paper, he would not allow him to read it, but said, "You need no excuse: your justification, as well as mine, is to be found in the force of circumstances, which are stronger than men. Be let us speak no more of the past, and only think of it in as far as may guide us to do better for the future." Then, without giving the marshal time to speak, he explained to him the actual state of affairs, and his own intentions, which left nothing to be desired, for he admitted the necessity of peace and moderate liberty, and was willing to grant both. He said that he accepted the treaty of Paris, and had caused it to be made known at Vienna, and he expected that this communication, and Maria Louisa's intervention, would prevent a fresh struggle with Europe. He intended, when he arrived at Paris, to assemble the most enlightened men of the capital, and consult with them as to the changes to be made in the Imperial code. It was unnecessary that the marshal should add any thing to these declarations, as they contained all that he desired, and showed the wants of the actual time more clearly than he could express them. However, he repeated all he had just said, that he might be able to boast of having said it, and Napoleon listened with patience to what was only the repetition of what he had just expressed. The marshal then said, "I have said all that it ought to." Ney was not as plain as that; he was bound by still more clear

entertained to fetter his actions. Both were, consequently, less satisfied than they affected to be. When Ney retired, he told the officers and his brother-in-law that he was very well pleased with the Emperor, who had been most friendly and reasonable. His companions applauded loudly, and declared they had nothing more to desire, since they had got back their Emperor, and got him back improved by experience. Though Napoleon, on the other hand, divined from Ney's looks and words that he sought to excuse the violation of his military duty by the loudly proclaimed intention of restraining the imperial power, he affected to be unconscious of it, and pretended to be perfectly satisfied with the marshal. However, after the first outburst of feeling was past, he gradually began to treat Ney with a somewhat imperial haughtiness, and made an appointment to meet him at Paris, as though he did not need his assistance to enter the capital.

Every thing being arranged, Napoleon left Auxerre on the morning of the 19th, to put himself at the head of his troops, that had received orders to march to Montereau. Toward night he was on the borders of the forest of Fontainebleau, surrounded by his soldiers. Great rumours were afloat there concerning the movement of troops before Paris, but Napoleon thought little of the intelligence, and advanced into the forest, accompanied by a few horsemen. At four o'clock on the morning of the 20th of March, he entered the court-yard of the castle of Fontainebleau, where eleven months before (on the 20th of April) he had spoken his farewell to the Imperial Guard. He was received by a group of cavalry that had escaped from the army at Melun. His countenance gleamed with satisfaction as he entered this palace, where the first Empire had ended, and where it seemed the second was about to commence. This was certainly a brilliant compensation made him by fortune, and for a moment joy usurped the place of prudence in that great mind, which, as we shall soon see, had been cured of all its illusions in the island of Elba.

Meantime, the greatest confusion reigned at the Tuileries. The hopes with which the royalists had flattered themselves had not lasted long; and though it had required three months to deprive Marshal Soult of all influence, the War Minister, Clarke, needed but eight days to lose the confidence that had been reposed in him. When, in addition to Napoleon's triumphal march through Burgundy, news arrived of Ney's defection, it was plainly seen that it was folly to hope for safety from any Minister of War whatever, and the royalists abandoned themselves to the most profound despair. The ultra-royalists saw no resource but to emigrate again to those countries where they had always found shelter. But if affairs wore a gloomy aspect in France, the accounts from Vienna were most consolatory; for it was announced that the Congress, assembled anew at Vienna, had fulminated a literal sentence of death against Napoleon. Unfortunately, the royalists were compelled to seek abroad that most dangerous support,—foreign aid,—which, whilst it procured them some material strength, deprived them of all moral force.

In justice to M. Lainé, M. de Montesquiou, and all those who thought the royal cause might be saved by uniting the Bourbons with the liberal party, it must be admitted that they did not despair of their policy, and that even to the very last day they had struggled, at the risk of falling into Napoleon's hands, before they had been able to accomplish the desired reconciliation. M. Lainé and M. de Montesquiou insisted, in order that the coalition might be complete, that the ministers should be chosen from among the constitutionalists, and M. de Lafayette put at the head of the National Guard, by which the liberals, armed with the Charter, might be opposed to Napoleon. The constitutionalists ratified these proposals by showing a willingness to unite at the last moment, and, on the 19th, M. Benjamin Constant published a very violent article in the *Journal des Débats* against Napoleon, and declared a formal and irrevocable preference for the Bourbons and the Charter.

At this time, the ministers' council could scarcely be regarded as the king's council, for, as is usual at a political crisis, a crowd of busy-bodies had surrounded the members of the Government, forced their way into the assemblies, took part in the debates, and assumed as much authority in public affairs as those who were responsible for them. These are the last moments of power, when all command and none obey, and which may be looked on as the commencement of its death-agony. Royalists of every political shade had invaded the two or three first floors of the Tuileries, where they might be seen moving about, talking and declaiming against M. de Montesquiou and M. de Blacas, to whom all existing troubles were attributed. The first was become an object of aversion, since he had counselled moderation. He was now described as a fickle-minded man, whose reputation for talent was solely due to women's prattle, but that he was in reality incompetent to discharge the duties of office. The second was obnoxious to the ultra-royalists as the king's favourite. They believed him to be the cause of the king's inertia and vacillation of mind. The moderate royalists blamed him as much as the others, because he would not listen to them, and said that he was like a wall raised around the king to prevent his hearing good advice; and indeed his chilling haughtiness favoured the idea, though in reality he never failed to inform Louis XVIII. of all he heard. It must be added that in times of danger the royal favourites, or those who seem to be so, are blamed for all public misfortunes; they are punished for the favour they enjoy by being accused of every misdeed that occurs, even of those they seek to prevent.

The outcry against these two personages was, therefore, extreme. M. de Montesquiou, without being in the least disconcerted, persisted in advocating the system of concession, whilst M. de Blacas maintained a haughty, cold silence. The ultra-royalists, who persisted in seeing no fault in the Government but its too great indulgence, considered these concessions as an augmentation of this weakness, which would sink the Government in public estimation, without producing any sensible amelioration in the actual state of things. In

their opinion, nothing remained to be done but to leave Paris, and retire to foreign countries, where their cause would receive the support of the European Powers, the only support on which they could count for the future. They said, with ill-concealed satisfaction, that the Coalition would punish this ungrateful nation, which they had not been able to rule, because it could only be held in check by the iron hand of Napoleon or of Europe. They added that it would be an advantage to get rid of the Charter, which they considered as an essential cause of the new dangers with which legitimacy was threatened. The error committed was, in their opinion, not that the conditions of the Charter had not been observed, but that it had been ever granted.

However, even the ultra-royalists did not agree among themselves. Some, with M. de Vitrolles at their head, felt the greatest repugnance to applying for aid to foreigners. They had recently experienced the oppression of foreign influence, for it was this influence that had prevented them from giving free scope to their passions; and they were by no means desirous of coming under it again. To escape this dilemma, they proposed that on leaving Paris (which all considered inevitable) they should not retire to the north toward Lisle or Dunkirk, but to the west, toward Angers, Nantes, and Rochelle, which would bring them to Vendée, into the midst of the old royalist soldiers, who had again taken up arms during the last ten months. They hoped to assemble fifty thousand soldiers in that quarter, and, supported by Nantes, Rochelle, and Bordeaux, and getting assistance in money and war matériel from England, they would be able to hold out there for a long time, win over a part of the usurper's forces, and give Europe, without being apparently leagued with her, time to solve the fundamental question between the Rhine and the Seine. The Duke de Bourbon had already left for Angers and Tours, and there was no doubt but that he would raise Vendée.

The accounts from Bordeaux announced that the Duke and Duchess of Angoulême had excited the greatest enthusiasm there, and on the whole the west was considered the safest place of refuge, for, even were they forced to leave, they were nearer the sea, and could return to England whence they came.

Many specious reasons could be adduced in favour of this plan; but, as assistance from the Chouans would be as unpopular as from foreigners, there was some difficulty in choosing between two unpopular courses. M. de Montesquieu, who was become the habitual opponent of M. de Vitrolles, said, with the air of one weary of silly advice, "Well, sir, the King of the Chouans will never be King of the French." To which M. de Vitrolles replied that the king chosen by the Austrians, English, and Russians had just as little chance. These two men disliked each other to such a degree that they could never meet without mutual insults, M. de Vitrolles calling M. de Montesquieu a thoughtless and impertinent court abbe, for which in reply he was told he was a tiresome and dangerous intermeddler.

As the plan of concessions was abandoned, M. de Montesquieu saw no other resource

than for the Bourbons to retire toward the northern frontier, to Dunkirk or Lisle, and await on French ground the issue of the conflict between Europe and Napoleon, without themselves taking any part in it. This was the advice that the Duke d'Orléans, Marshal Macdonald, and all sensible men had given to Louis XVIII. in case, as seemed most likely, that the capital should be abandoned to Napoleon. But this project was not more agreeable to the old monarch than that of going to La Vendée. The habitual indolence of Louis XVIII. made the idea of leaving Paris insupportable, and every plan beginning with a removal was disagreeable to him. To go and fight in Vendée like an adventurer, did not seem to him suited to his age, health, and dignity. He did not consider it possible to take refuge in a fortress, for, in the first place, it would be necessary to find a fortress where devotedness to the royal cause prevailed, and, secondly, it would require a sufficient garrison for its defence, which could not be found in the three or four thousand horsemen to which the household troops would be reduced should the king be obliged to abandon Paris, and such a town as Lisle would require twelve or fifteen thousand chosen infantry for its defence. And to be besieged in a fortress when he would be ultimately obliged to yield would be, he considered, rather a grotesque termination of his career.

To remain at Paris was the project most consonant with his wishes, and, if he could do that, to retire to London. His natural indolence induced him to form a secret resolution of remaining at Paris till the last moment, for he hoped but little from a second emigration. "We were well received the first time," he said, "because our misfortunes were looked upon as the inevitable consequences of the Revolution; but now our misfortunes would be attributed to our want of tact, we should be reputed men of little sense, and importunate guests." He was, consequently, determined to remain to the last, listening to every proposal and agreeing to none, whilst he left M. de Blacas the ungracious task of objecting to all that was displeasing to himself.

In the midst of this tumultuous scene, where the framers of projects were sometimes met by the king's indifferent and ironic glances, or the curt objections of M. de Blacas, there was one man—Marshal Marmont—who could not possibly keep quiet in so serious a state of things. Thoughtless, vain, restless, and, as usual, mischief-making, he commanded at the juncture the household troops, a post which was indeed due to his extraordinary bravery. He too was anxious to save the king and asserted that he had found the means. He had conceived an intense hatred against M. de Blacas, because of the freezing reserve with which this minister met his views, and though he did not join his most violent enemies, he still echoed their cries, and accused him of all the evils that had befallen the monarchy. He had even carried his impudence so far as to propose to M. de Vitrolles that M. de Blacas should be carried off forcibly, that he might no longer influence the king, and that they should then seize on the Government, and save the monarchy without M. de

Blacas, and, if necessary, without the king. When he and M. de Vitrolles should have placed themselves at the head of the Government, they were to fortify the Tuileries, lay in a supply of provisions and ammunition, shut themselves up there with all the faithful royalists, and await the coming of Napoleon, who would be not a little embarrassed by the prospect of besieging an old king in his palace, a proceeding that would excite the indignation of Europe. M. de Vitrolles told him that the time for carrying off favourites had passed away with favourites themselves, that M. de Blacas was not one, and that his abduction would only make them hateful and ridiculous, without being of any service to the king. When he imparted the second part of his plan to Louis XVIII. in confidence, the monarch replied, in any thing but a flattering tone, "You propose that I should ascend the curule chair, as antiquated an idea as any of those of which my poor emigrants are accused."

As in all desperate situations the aid of quacks is willingly sought, the royalists betook themselves again to M. Fouché, for his advice if not his aid; for, as we have said, when the choice lay between having recourse to a regicide or making concessions to the constitutionalists, they always preferred the former.

M. de Dambray was, therefore, commissioned to call on M. Fouché, and received the royal authority to make him certain proposals. M. Fouché was endowed with a genius for intrigue, which had carried him so far against the Bourbons as to urge the brothers Lallemand to their foolish enterprise, and he was now glad to see the king's chancellor and discuss his propositions. When M. Dambray had in the king's name asked his opinion and advice, which was equivalent to saying that they were still willing to accept his aid, he said, what everybody knew, that it was too late, that the fatal impulse had been given, and that the army would desert to the last man; that Napoleon would be in Paris in a week, and that nothing remained but to abandon the capital, place the king in safety, and wait the issue of events. M. Dambray exclaimed against such dreary forebodings, and insinuated that perhaps M. Fouché would not indulge in such dreary prophecies, only that he desired to see the events accomplished which he foretold; but the latter replied, with unparalleled impudence and vanity, that he was disliked by and disliked Napoleon, and was as little desirous of his return as the royalists themselves, but that he was resigned to what could not be avoided; that, had the Bourbons taken his advice a little earlier, he would have spared them and France this new and dangerous crisis, which could no longer be avoided, and in which it would be necessary to aid to get through it successfully; nor need any one be surprised to hear within a few days that he, the Duke d'Otranto, had become Napoleon's minister; that he would become his minister to escape his tyranny and accelerate his fall; that this was the mode of escape which he proposed to himself, and that perhaps when disembarassed of this dangerous madman, he would be able to do more for the Bourbons than he could at the actual time.

One scarcely knows whether to be more surprised at the cynical impudence of such declarations, or at the imprudence of confiding them to any one, or at the childish vanity that flattered itself to be able to foresee and rule such distant events. M. Dambray allowed himself to be entrapped by this seemingly profound policy, and retired surprised and overpowered by the affected superiority of his interlocutor. He told the king and the Count d'Artois of what had passed, and both, particularly the latter, were annoyed at having sought the aid of M. Fouché's genius so late. However, his repelling the advances of the court seemed suspicious, and it was thought that he would not reject offers made in all sincerity, were he not engaged with the enemy. As his assistance could not be had, it was resolved to render him harmless by securing his person. Neither M. de Bourrienne's good sense nor scruples could prevent the police-agents being sent to arrest the Duke d'Otranto. It was a useless piece of folly, which, at least, ought not to have been attempted without a certainty of success. But if M. Fouché took part in every commotion, he had the tact to be prepared for every event, and had secured a retreat in the mansion of Queen Hortense, which was next to his, and, when the police-officers arrived, he, under pretence of wanting to withdraw for a few minutes, made his escape through the garden.

This would have been a laughable adventure had it occurred at a less critical time. On the morning of the 19th, news arrived that Napoleon was approaching Fontainebleau, and now the inevitable moment had arrived when Louis XVIII. should come to some determination. A man of his habits and tastes had not much to choose between. It was too late to seek the constitutional party, with whose leaders he was but slightly acquainted, and whom he could not summon to his aid without exciting the anger of his friends, to a degree exceeding his power of resistance. Marshal Marmont's proposal of enduring a siege in the Tuileries he looked upon as folly; and that of M. de Vitrolles, to retire into Vendée, he regarded as worthy of the Count d'Artois, which, on the king's part, was saying enough. No alternative remained but to retire toward the north, without crossing the frontier. This plan, which had been suggested by the Duke d'Orléans and Marshal Macdonald, was more in unison with the king's ordinary prudence, and he consequently preferred it to the others. The Duke d'Orléans had gone to Flanders. Louis XVIII. felt the greatest esteem for the prudence, loyalty, and coolness shown by Marshal Macdonald, who was still in Paris, though appointed to command the army at Melun under the Duke de Berry. He sent for him to ask his advice. The marshal told the king that he felt no confidence in the army that was being assembled at Melun; that though the household troops were brave and devoted, they were inexperienced, and would not be able to stand against the Imperial troops for two hours; that the number of volunteers in the National Guards was too insignificant to be taken into account, whilst the troops of the line would certainly pass over to the enemy as soon as they came within

range of the cannon. So little confidence, indeed, did the marshal feel in the soldiers, that he had not ventured to assemble them at Melun, lest, when congregated together, they might give utterance to their sentiments. For this reason, he had only sent the half-pay officers thither, who were formed into battalions *d'élite* by Marshal Soult, but who already gave vent to alarming expressions, and threatened every moment to revolt. These things being told in all sincerity, the marshal advised the king to retire to Lisle, and there await the issue of the struggle that was about to commence between Europe and the revived Empire. The king considered the marshal's advice excellent, and fully coincided in his opinion, but he did not think it would be easier to make an effectual resistance at Lisle than at Paris, and his wish was simply to retire to his asylum at Hartwell, where he had enjoyed perfect repose during six years, and where, thanks to the errors of his brother and friends, he feared he would be obliged to end his days.

But Lisle was on the road to London, and as it would be better to remain at the frontier, if possible, he agreed to the marshal's plan, and desired him to see to its execution. But there was one thing that made him feel anxious, and this anxiety was shared by the marshal. Memory, that dangerous faculty of the Bourbons, told him that Louis XVI., in seeking to escape, had been arrested at Varennes, and brought back by force to Paris. He dreaded that, in a popular tumult excited by the inhabitants of the faubourgs and the half-pay officers, his carriage might be stopped, and his departure prevented. The marshal, who participated in his fears, arranged with him that the troops should be sent to Villejuif, under pretence of forming them into *corps d'armée*, and, these out of the way, the household troops should be assembled in the Champ de Mars, under pretext of being reviewed, but in reality to escort the royal family: that then they should suddenly cross the Seine, and proceed toward the north by the road of La Revolte. The king arranged all these details with Marshal Macdonald, but said nothing of his plans to Marshal Marmont, whose indiscretion he dreaded: he simply ordered that the household troops should be kept ready to march at a moment's notice.

On the morning of the 19th, things had come to such a state that nobody thought of making any further objection or suggestion, but only looked forward to Napoleon's arriving within the next twenty-four hours, and of escaping from the effects of his ferocity, which each pictured to himself in accordance with the amount of his own hatred. Louis XVIII. was thus freed from all opposition: for even his brother, the Count d'Artois, and his nephew, the Duke de Berry, did not, in presence of the impending danger, advance an opinion opposed to his. On the morning of the 19th, therefore, every thing was prepared in secret for the departure of the royal family, either during the day or night, when there would be no longer a doubt about Napoleon's approach.

In conformity with the adopted project, Marshal Macdonald ordered the immediate

departure of the troops for Villejuif, and sent the royal volunteers, commanded by M. de Viomesnil, to Vincennes, announcing, at the same time, that the princes and he would proceed to Villejuif to take the command of the army. This was only meant to deceive the mass of the people, but every one at court was aware of the preparations for leaving Paris. Consequently, many private individuals took their departure the same day. Money was wanted, but could not be easily procured from so scrupulous a minister as M. Louis. However, it was got in the most regular manner possible. The *domaine extraordinaire*, which was appropriated to defray the expenses of the civil list, had not yet been touched. It consisted of exchequer bills to the amount of 22 million francs, and these were cashed some days before the king's departure. The civil list became debtor to the *trésor extraordinaire*, and converted the bills into specie. As it was the beginning of the year, the civil list, which was large, might take an advance of several millions, by which five or six millions more might be raised, making, in all, from eleven to twelve million francs. Of these, four millions were given to the treasurer of the household troops, and about three millions to M. de Blacas, for the expenses of the king's household. Some millions were divided between the princes, the principal gentlemen of the court, and those generals that were to accompany the royal family.* The next proceeding was not so regular. The crown jewels were packed up, and placed among the baggage of the royal fugitive. In a political sense, the Bourbons considered they had no orders to give, and gave none. They contented themselves with telling the ministers to follow the king, but gave no intimation of their design to the chambers. As the Duke and Duchess d'Angoulême were in the South, where great zeal was shown for the royal cause, and the Duke de Bourbon in Vendée, it was decided that M. de Vitrolles, who had always felt great confidence in the Western provinces, should proceed thither, to act as responsible minister to either the Duke d'Angoulême or the Duke de Bourbon, and try, under the authority of these princes, to form a special government for these countries. He was to take with him letters of authority from the king, and was to leave for the South at the same time that the royal family set out for the North.

During the entire day of the 19th, an anxious, curious, and evidently well-meaning crowd filled the Place du Carrousel, looking at the carriages that entered and left, and suspecting, from the numerous departures from the Faubourg Saint-Germain, that a more important one would soon proceed from the Tuilleries. Although there were many half-pay officers in this crowd, come to watch what was going forward, a general feeling of shame interest was felt for the royal family, and cries of "*Vive le roi*," were commonly heard. In the course of the day, M. Lefebvre came, in the name of the constitutional party, to renew, once more, the offer of making arms opposition to the enemy, by giving M. de La-

* The account of these sums, regularly presented, is to be found in the archives of the Empire.

fayette the command of the National Guard. He was received politely, and, though he was not told of the approaching departure of the court, it was intimated to him that it was now too late to attempt anything. In the afternoon, the king arranged with Marshal Macdonald that he would drive out for a little while, in order to try the disposition of the populace, and see whether he would be permitted to leave his capital. Marshal Marmont had received orders to assemble the household troops in the Champ de Mars, which he was only able to do partially, as the orders had been issued so unexpectedly. However, the greater number were brought together, and it was arranged that the king, under pretence of reviewing them, should leave the Tuileries, to which he would return if all seemed quiet; but if the populace appeared hostile, he was to cross the Seine by the Jena bridge, traverse the wood of Boulogne, and reach the Saint-Denis route, ordering his body-guards to follow.

He left the palace between three and four o'clock, and found the crowd assembled on the Place du Carrousel inquisitive, but quiet, and even affectionate. They made way respectfully for his carriage. He proceeded to the Champ de Mars, found tranquillity everywhere, and then returned to the Tuileries, intending not to leave until the evening, which would give him a little more time to prepare.

Toward evening, Napoleon's arrival at Fontainebleau was announced, and there was no doubt but that he would be at Paris the next day. It was, therefore, determined not to delay the departure any longer. At eleven o'clock, when the crowd had somewhat dispersed, the gates of the Tuileries were closed, and the royal family got into their carriages. They proceeded toward Saint-Denis without meeting resistance or inquiry, for the streets of the capital were quite deserted at that hour. Marshal Macdonald ordered such troops as had not yet left for Villejuif to proceed toward Saint-Denis, but without the least hope of saving them from the contagion of desertion, or securing their fidelity to the king. It was midnight when the royal fugitives passed through Saint-Denis, without meeting any other accident than some unseasonable cries from a battalion of half-pay officers proceeding in the same direction. Thus, after a Restoration of eleven months, the unfortunate Bourbons became again exiles, a consequence less of their own errors than of those committed by their friends.

The next morning, the 20th of March, as soon as day dawned, anxious crowds assembled round the Tuileries to observe what was going on. Servants in livery were visible, but not a single officer, or one member of the Body-Guard: as usual, some of the National Guards were stationed outside as sentinels. The white flag still floated from the principal dome, and some few cries of "*Vive le roi!*" were heard, but not one ventured to say, "*Vive l'Empereur!*" although there were a great many half-pay officers among the crowd. Soon the fatal secret was declared, and spread through Paris in a moment. The heads of the different parties were the first that learned the intelligence, and hastened to talk it over together. The royalists were in despair, the con-

stitutionalists were deeply annoyed at having been entrapped into compromising themselves without necessity, and the Bonapartists were delighted, because since the unsuccessful attempt to arrest M. Fouché they had lived in constant alarm, nor could they believe themselves safe until Napoleon should be settled at the Tuileries. Some called on old Cambacérès, to ask what was to be done. He advised them not to anticipate Napoleon's wishes, as he would not be pleased with any one that would act without or before him. When they mentioned the public treasury, the post-office, and all that ought to be saved from the general confusion, "Don't you interfere," he said; "any thing is better than to assume the authority that belongs to the Emperor." He spoke in the spirit of the old Empire; but the new was to be entirely different.

Still M. Lavalette would go to the post-office, which he had directed so long, merely to get information, not thinking that he was thus preparing that sentence of death that was to be pronounced against him at a later period. The moment he arrived there, the clerks surrounded him, begging him to resume his former place as their *chef*, and even M. Ferrand, the director appointed by Louis XVIII., requested him to take his place, and give him an order to get horses. This old royalist was convinced that it was by a conspiracy, and not through their own fault, that the Bourbons had fallen, and M. Lavalette's appearance, though the result of accident, confirmed this opinion. M. Lavalette had had no part in any conspiracy, not even in the silly attempt of the brothers Lallemand, and did nothing more than send a courier to Fontainebleau to inform Napoleon of the evacuation of the Tuileries.

The moment the king's departure was known, the Place du Carrousel was thronged with thousands of young officers, who for the last year had filled Paris with their position in word and deed. General Exelmans was one of the first that appeared. For some time they contemplated the silent and deserted palace, over which the white flag was still floating; they entered, the servants obsequiously opening the doors, and ordered the white flag to be lowered, and the tricolour to be hoisted in its stead, to the great joy of all present. They then traversed the city, seeking the ancient ministers and dignitaries of the Empire, MM. de Bassano, De Rovigo, Decrès, Mollien, Gaudin, Queen Hortense, and Joseph's wife, the former Queen of Spain. In an instant the palace was filled with Napoleon's old officials, all impatiently awaiting the arrival of their master. A great number of military men of every rank had gone to meet him on the Fontainebleau route.

In fact, Napoleon had arrived during the night at Fontainebleau, and rested there for some hours while awaiting his cavalry; he then received M. Lavalette's courier, and soon after saw M. de Caulaincourt hastening to him in the first post-chaise he could procure. Napoleon clasped that faithful servant in his arms, and held him for some time pressed to his heart. He determined to set out on the spot, and enter Paris on the same day, that there might be no delay in placing himself at the head of the Government. Besides, the 20th

of March was the birthday of his son, and he had a superstitious feeling concerning anniversaries, which is very common among those who have made large and successful demands on Fortune.

Having given some orders about the marching of the troops, he left Fontainebleau at two o'clock, in a post-carriage, accompanied by M. de Caulaincourt and his faithful companions Bertrand and Drouot. He was joined at Villejuif by the greater number of the troops destined for the army at Melun. The staff of this army had, as we have already said, been sent to Saint-Denis. The soldiers were, consequently, without commanders, and could the more easily follow their own inclinations. When Napoleon had received their enthusiastic congratulations, he continued his journey, escorted by a number of officers from different regiments, on horseback. His progress being retarded by this crowd, it was nine in the evening when he arrived at Paris. In order to avoid the narrow streets of the centre of the capital, he drove along the outer boulevard, and then along the quays to the Tuileries. The people of Paris were not aware of his arrival: so that this strange and extraordinary imperial restoration had no other witnesses than the few idlers and the crowd of officers assembled on the Place du Carrousel.

His carriage had entered the palace-yard before it was known whom it contained. A moment was sufficient to spread the intelligence. Then Napoleon, snatched from the arms of MM. de Caulaincourt, Bertrand, and Drouot, was borne forward in the arms of the half-pay officers, who exhibited a frantic joy. A combined and intense cry of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" had carried the important intelligence to the throng of high functionaries that filled the Tuileries. They immediately rushed toward the staircase, where they formed an opposing current to that of the officers, who were ascending, and an almost alarming struggle followed, for both parties were nearly stifled, and so was Napoleon himself. He was borne in this manner to the top of the staircase, and for the first time in his life, overcome by his emotion, he shed tears. Placed at length upon his feet, he walked straight forward, not looking on either side, abandoning his hands to those who pressed, kissed, and bruised them with the testimonies of their affection.

After a few moments he recovered himself, recognised his most faithful servants, embraced them, and, without taking one moment's rest, retired with them to organize a government.

Thus in twenty days, from the 1st to the 20th of March, that strange prophecy was fulfilled which said that the Imperial eagle "*would fly without pause from steeple to steeple even to the towers of Notre Dame.*" Nothing in Napoleon's entire career was more extraordinary, nor apparently more difficult of explanation, though in reality capable of being easily explained. The unfortunate Bourbons, who fled, imputed this revolution not to their faults, but to a vast conspiracy, which, according to their report, was spread throughout France. But, as we have seen, there was no conspiracy. There had been, indeed, an insignificant plot, devised by some young officers, the dupes of M. Fouché;

but this project, when put into execution, was aided by the powerful stimulant of Napoleon's disembarkation, failed completely. But this was wholly unconnected with the Isle of Elba, for M. de Bassano, who was aware of its existence without being mixed up in it, had informed Napoleon of the public discontent, without offering any advice. Napoleon, upon whom this information produced very little effect, was expecting to be quickly carried off by force from the Isle of Elba, to see his companions in exile die of weariness or want before his eyes, and, believing that the Congress was dissolved, he had determined to set out, moved thereto especially by his intense activity of mind and by his extraordinary daring. He trusted to his good fortune to traverse the sea in safety, and he hoped to march triumphantly through the interior of France, sustained by sentiments that the Bourbons had deeply wounded. His profound discernment had erringly foreseen that the national sentiment, represented by the army, and the principles of '89, represented by the peasantry and the inhabitants of the towns, would burst forth at his appearance, and that, having overcome its first difficulty, he would win over the people and the army, and advance with rapid strides to Paris, accompanied by the soldiers that had been sent to oppose him. He had, therefore, embarked, confiding, as usual, in his predestined star, crossed the sea without opposition and disembarked, without encountering any impediment, upon a coast along which were stationed a few excise-officers; then, having chosen between two routes, that of the Alps, beset with physical impediments, and that of the sea-shore, rendered difficult by moral obstacles, he selected the former: meeting at La Morte a battalion that hesitated, he turned the scale in his favour by boldly presenting his bare breast to the men. On that day France was reconquered, and Napoleon virtually remounted his throne.

Thus an act of foresight that coincided with a reading distinctly the heart of France, and sentiments were insulted by the emigration, and an act of daring that won over a band that vacillated between duty and feeling, was combined with the errors committed by the Bourbons, the true causes of this extraordinary and yet we must say commonplace revolution, however extraordinary it may appear. And it, in fact, be possible that the old regime and the Revolution could find themselves again brought face to face in 1814, without immediately grappling with each other and engaging in a formidable and decisive struggle? Certainly not; and a fresh struggle between these two powers was inevitable. Napoleon was true, by engaging in the contest, gave to Europe, that is to say, gigantic proportions. But for him, this struggle would not, perhaps, have occurred so soon; it would not, perhaps, have provoked foreign intervention; and in this sense, being inevitable, it is deeply to be regretted that it was aggravated by his presence. But this is a doubtful point, and it is probable that foreigners, on seeing the Bourbons defeated by the regicides, would not have been less tempted to interfere than on beholding the provoking countenance of the emperor of Austria.

Be this as it may, amid the delirious joy of one party, and the natural consternation of the others, enlightened patriots, who were desirous of moderate liberty, intermediate between the old régime and the Revolution, limited their last contest to peaceful and legal struggles; and it must ever be a cause of regret that this conflict was not allowed to decide the deadly conflict between France and Europe. Consequently, the *bourgeoisie*, understanding the sentiments of these patriots better than those of any other

class, without regretting the emigrants, without rejecting Napoleon, whose great deeds they admired, were restless and disquiet. No tears were seen in their eyes, neither were there any traces of joy on their faces; they scarcely exhibited any curiosity, so clearly did they foresee a repetition of the sad events they had already beheld, and which excited in their minds a sentiment of profound alarm. Events soon justified these sad presentiments!

BOOK LVIII.

ADDITIONAL ACT.

PACIFIC and liberal language of Napoleon in his first conversations—He chooses his ministers on the very evening of the 20th of March—Prince Cambacérès is provisionally invested with the administration of Justice—Marshal Davout is appointed War Minister—The Duke d'Otranto has the direction of the police—General Carnot is made Minister of the Interior, and the Duke de Vicenza Minister of Foreign Affairs—Count de Lobau is appointed commandant of the first military division, with orders to re-establish discipline in the regiments, nearly all of which were to traverse the capital—On the morning of the 21st of March, Napoleon sets to work, and seizes the different branches of the Government—Would he take advantage of the impulse communicated by his late success, and advance immediately to the Rhine?—Peremptory reasons against such a determination—Napoleon resolves to pause and organize his forces, offering peace to Europe on the basis of the Treaty of Paris—Orders given to General Exelmans to pursue the fugitive Court of Louis XVIII. at Lille—Cold but respectful reception of the troops—A council is held, at which the Duke d'Orléans and several marshals are present—The Duke d'Orléans advises the King to repair to Dunkirk and take up his abode there—Louis XVIII. at first approves this advice, then changes his opinion and retires to Ghent—The troops and the Marshals accompany him to the frontier, but refuse to go farther—Dismissal of the household troops—The north and east of France become tranquil—Brief appearance of the Duke of Bourbon in Vendée, and hasty retreat into England—The policy of the Vendean chiefs is to await the general war before taking up arms—The Duchess of Angoulême stops at Bordeaux, where the populace seem disposed to take her part—General Clausel is commissioned to recall Bordeaux to the Imperial authority—M. de Vitrolles attempts to establish a kingly government at Toulouse—Journey of the Duke d'Angoulême to Marseilles—This prince assembles some regiments for the purpose of marching on Lyons—The disturbances in the south cause no uneasiness to Napoleon, as he believes that France has been definitely pacified by the departure of Louis XVIII.—Though always expressing the most pacific sentiments, Napoleon, certain of being engaged in war, commences his military preparations on a large scale—His plan is conceived and arranged between the 24th and 27th of March—Formation of eight *corps d'armée*, under the title of *corps d'observation*; of these, five which were intended to be brought first into action are stationed between Mauberge and Paris—Reconstruction of the Imperial Guard—To avoid having recourse to the conscription, Napoleon recalls the *zouaves*, the soldiers who were absent on unlimited leave, and flatters himself to be able by this means to assemble 400,000 men in the *cadres* of the regiments on service—He defers to a later period to put the conscription of 1815 into execution, for which he believes he does not need the passing of a new law—The half-pay officers are employed to form the fourth and fifth battalions—Napoleon mobilizes 200,000 of the *dile* of the National Guards, intending to confide to them the defence of the fortresses and some portions of the frontier—Creation of extra workshops for the fabrication of arms and clothes—The dépôt is re-established at Versailles—Arming of Paris and Lyons—The navy is called upon to contribute to the defence of these important points—Having given these orders, Napoleon sends some troops to General Clausel to subdue Bordeaux, and sends General Grondy to Lyons to repress the attempts of the Duke d'Angoulême—Reception on the 28th of March of the great bodies of the State—Renewal under a more solemn form of the promise to maintain peace and make radical changes in the Imperial institutions—Prompt repression of the attempted resistance in the south—Entry of General Clausel into Bordeaux, and embarkation of the Duchess d'Angoulême—Arrest of M. de Vitrolles at Toulouse—Campaign of the Duke d'Angoulême on the Rhone—Capitulation of this prince—Napoleon makes him embark at Cette—General submission to the Empire—Continuation of Napoleon's preparations, and formation of a 9th Corps—State of Europe—Refusal to receive the French couriers, and extraordinary excitement of the public at Vienna—Declaration of the Congress on the 13th of March, by which Napoleon is outlawed—This declaration is sent by extraordinary couriers to all the French frontiers—The King of Rome is taken away from Maria Louisa, and she is obliged to choose between Napoleon and the Coalition—Maria Louisa renounces her husband, and consents to remain at Vienna under the guardianship of her father and the allied sovereigns—On learning the definite success of Napoleon, and his entry into Paris, the Congress renews the alliance of Chaumont by the treaty of the 25th of March—The Duke of Wellington, though he has not received instructions from his Government, does not fear to pledge England to the proposed conditions, and signs the treaty of the 25th of March—Plan of the campaign, and design of marching 800,000 men against France—Two great junctions of the troops, one in the east, under Prince de Schwarzenberg, and another in the north under Wellington and Blücher—Departure of Lord Wellington for Brussels—The Treaty of the 26th of March is sent to London—State of the public mind in England—The mass of the English nation, disgusted with war, displeased with the Bourbons, and impressed by Napoleon's repeated declarations, wish that his pacific dispositions should have a trial—The Cabinet, determined to ratify the engagements contracted by Lord Wellington, but embarrassed by the state of public opinion, resolve to dissimulate with the Parliament, and send the members a false message, announcing simple precaution, whilst they secretly ratify the treaty of the 25th of March, and thus pledge themselves to war—Discussion and adoption of the message to Parliament, in the belief that precautions alone are contemplated—Two members of the British Cabinet are sent to Belgium to make arrangements with Lord Wellington—State of the Court at Ghent—Violence of the Germans, and threats to partition France—Lord Wellington endeavors to calm the excitement, and, spite of the impatience of the Prussians, succeeds in preventing hostilities before the concentration of all the allied forces—Napoleon, confronted by the declarations of all Europe, having no further motive for dissimulation, determines to tell the entire truth to the nation—M. de Caulaincourt's report is published on the 13th of April, and in it are fully exposed the offences offered to France—Review of the National Guard, and energetic language of Napoleon—Napoleon redoubles the activity of his military preparations, and causes decrees relative to France's arming to be inserted in the "Moniteur," proceedings which had hitherto been carried on in secret—Sadness of Napoleon and the public—Napoleon resolves at length to keep the promise he has made, of modifying the im-

peril laws—He does not hesitate to grant a constitutional monarchy—His opinions on the different questions connected with this serious matter—He does not wish to convoke a Constituent Assembly, for fear of having, in the midst of war, to contend with a revolutionary assembly—He resolves to draw up, or cause to be drawn up, a new Constitution, and present it for the acceptance of France—Having learned that M. Benjamin Constant has remained concealed at Paris, he sends for him, and commissions him to draw up a new Constitution—Napoleon appears to arrive on every point with M. Constant, except the abolition of the act of confiscation, the hereditary peerage, and the title of the new Constitution—Napoleon insists on calling it "An act added to the Imperial Constitution"—The bill is sent to the Privy Council, and M. Benjamin Constant is appointed Privy Councillor, for the purpose of supporting his own work—Completion and promulgation of the new Constitution, under the title of "An additional Act"—Character of this act.

THE palace of the Tuilleries, on the evening of the 20th of March, presented a scene of confusion and noisy delight, which respect, diminished by revolutionary principles, no longer restrained. Here were fortuitous meetings between persons who had not seen each other for a year, and who never expected to meet in that palace again. As soon as anybody appeared who had been long forgotten, or who possessed the rare merit of not having sought the favour of the Bourbons, he was received with loud applause, reverence for the place and the master who had returned there being no check on these demonstrations. The crowd of lookers-on exhibited a profound feeling of interest as the Queen of Spain and Queen Hortense passed between their serried ranks. The latter, as we have said, had remained at Paris, protected by the Emperor Alexander; she had obtained for her children the province of Saint-Leu. The Emperor, who had been most amiable in his manner to all comers, was harsh to her. "You in Paris?" he said, on perceiving her: "you are the last person I should have expected to meet there." "I remained," she replied, "to take care of my mother." "But after the death of your mother?" "After her death, I found in the Emperor Alexander a protector for my children, and I endeavoured to secure their future prospects." "Your children! poverty and exile would have become them better than the patronage of the Emperor of Russia." "But have not you, sire, allowed the King of Rome to owe the duchy of Parma to the generosity of this prince?"

Not being able to reply to so strong an argument, Napoleon resumed: "And your lawsuit! who advised you to that proceeding?" (The princess had instituted a suit against her husband in the French courts, to obtain the guardianship of her children.) "You have been persuaded to make an exhibition of family misfortunes, which ought to have been kept secret, and you have lost your suit." But Napoleon, quickly regretting this severity, opened his arms to his adopted daughter, whom he loved, embraced her, and said, "I am a good father, you know it. Let us say no more on these subjects. And you have been present at poor Josephine's death. Amid our many misfortunes, her death pierced my heart."

This short explanation being finished, Napoleon became again, for the Queen Hortense, the most affectionate of fathers, and continued to show himself such during his abode in France.

The Prince Cambacérès next appeared, broken down under the weight of years, and scarcely capable of experiencing an emotion of joy; with him came M. de Bassano, far more delighted at again beholding his master than at the prospect of recovering his former position. Napoleon received the former with the consideration that he had always accorded

to his profound good sense, and the latter with expressions of the warmest friendship. He conversed a long time with both. Then came the Dukes de Vicenza, de Gaète, de Rovigo, Decrès; the Counts Mollien, Regnaud de Saint-Jean d'Angely, Lavalette, and Deferment. A murmur of approbation, always proportioned to their recent conduct, greeted these diverse personages. When Marshal Davout appeared, whose memorable defence of Hamburg and his proscription had rendered him dear to the Bonapartists, uproarious acclamations burst forth, when it became necessary to remind the applauders that they were not in a public assembly.

Napoleon had not seen the marshal since their sad separation at Smorgoni in 1812, when he left the Russian army. The marshal had retired first to the Lower Elbe; he was afterward shut up in Hamburg, where he had kept the tricolour flag flying to the end of April, in opposition to all the armies of Europe, and when he returned to Paris Louis XVIII. had already occupied the throne two months. Napoleon embraced the marshal, complimented him on his glorious defence of Hamburg, spoke of his justificatory memoir, which he prized very much, and added, pointedly, "In reading this memoir, I saw with pleasure that my letters had been useful to you."

The marshal had, in fact, quoted in his justification some passages from the terrible letters that Napoleon had written to him from Dresden, omitting those parts that commanded excessive severity, which, indeed, had never been put into execution. "I only quoted," replied the marshal, "a very small portion of your majesty's letters, because you were absent: I shall now quote the entire." Napoleon smiled at this reply, and testified the highest esteem for the marshal.

There appeared soon after a personage of a very different caste, whom stupid-minded courtiers hurried to present to the Emperor as one whose adhesion was of vast importance: this was the Duke d'Otranto. By dint of asserting himself to be a person of great importance, M. Fouché had actually become so in the eyes of the public, and he was believed to be the author of that pretended conspiracy whose triumph seemed now to be accomplished; a ridiculous chimera, in whose existence the Bonapartists had the folly to believe, which the fugitive emigrants determined to punish by the shedding of blood, and for which the heads of illustrious men were destined to fall. The courtiers had boasted to Napoleon of M. Fouché's services, and even of the danger he had incurred, and, on seeing him appear, they exclaimed, "Allow the Duke d'Otranto to pass," as if this gentleman were about to be chained, to the feet of the man who was the mover of all the common keeping on going

ceived M. Fouché as an old friend of the Revolution and the Empire; but there was a shade of difference between his present manner and that of former times; he was, at the same time, less familiar and less severe. M. Fouché told Napoleon that he had done wisely to return, for France desired his presence. He then related, in a certain careless way, that it was he, the Duke d'Otranto, who had made the troops march from Flanders to operate a diversion in his favour, and, if this movement had not succeeded, the failure was attributable to the giddiness of those who had undertaken to execute it.

Napoleon listened complacently to all that M. Fouché and others said to raise their own importance. "I see," he said, "that there has been a conspiracy, and," he added, smiling, "I am willing to believe that it was in my favour. As for me, I have not conspired with anybody. My sole correspondents have been the public journals. When I learned through the press how the army and the holders of national property were treated, and, in fact, all those whose interests were bound up in those of the Revolution, I had no longer a doubt about the sentiments of France, and I resolved to come and deliver her from the influence of the emigrants. Besides, I was certain that my enemies intended to carry me off to some tropical clime. I selected the moment when the Congress was about to be dissolved, and when the nights were still sufficiently long to favour my escape. Having crossed the sea, I presented myself before the soldiers, and asked would they fire upon me. They replied by exclaiming, *Vive l'Empereur!*" The peasantry caught up the cry, adding, *à bas les nobles! à bas les prêtres!*" They accompanied me from city to city, and when they could go no farther, they confided to others the duty of escorting me to Paris. After the Provençaux the Dauphinois, after the Dauphinois the Lyonnais, after the Lyonnais the Bourguignons, have formed my *cortège*, and the real conspirators who have won me all these friends are the Bourbons themselves. We must now profit by their errors and by our own," he added, bowing his head with a modest smile. "We do not intend to repeat the past. I have dwelt a year in the Isle of Elba, and there, as in a tomb, I have heard the voice of posterity. I know what ought to be avoided; I know what ought to be desired. I had dreamed a magnificent future for France: on the morrow of Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland, such dreams were pardonable. There is no occasion to tell you that I have abandoned these ideas. Alas! it would be no longer excusable in me to frame such bright illusions, after the experience I have had. I wish for peace; and I, who would never have consented to sign the Treaty of Paris, I pledge myself, now that it is signed, to execute it faithfully. I have written to Vienna, to my wife, and my father-in-law, to offer peace on these conditions. The hatred of the allies against us is, unquestionably, very great; but, by allowing each to keep what he has taken, interest will, perhaps, silence the voice of passion. Austria has powerful motives for dealing gently with us. England is overwhelmed with debt. Alexander, through vanity, the Prussians, through

hatred, will be alone tempted to recommence hostilities; but it is not certain that they will do so. We shall, however, be ready, and if, after appearing before Europe with the Treaty of Paris in our hand, we are not listened to, we shall beg the aid of Heaven, and I hope we shall be once more victorious.

"But," continued Napoleon, "it is not peace alone that I wish to bestow on France: I wish to give her liberty. Our duty is to do firmly and thoroughly all that the Bourbons have not been able to accomplish. They have sapped the security of the legitimate interests of the Revolution, and have insulted our glory, whilst affecting to court the chiefs of the army: we must re-establish these interests, and revive this glory. We must do more: we must give freely that liberty which they gave by compulsion, and which whilst they gave with one hand they withdrew with the other. I wished for unlimited power, and I needed it, when I sought to reconstitute France and to found an immense empire. But I do not want it now. Let me only be allowed to pacify or conquer our foreign foes, and I will content myself with the authority of a constitutional king. I am no longer young; I shall soon have lost the vigour of youth; besides, the measure of authority wielded by a king of England will be sufficient for my son. But we must avoid blunders, we must not stumble in our attempts at liberty; for that would revive in France the necessity and desire of absolute power. As for me, the sole glory to which I aspire is to uphold the principles of the Revolution, to secure our independence by policy or victory, and then to prepare a constitutional throne for my son. I shall consider myself sufficiently powerful if I succeed in this twofold task. After having given my first cares to the reorganization of our army, and the re-establishment of our relations with Europe, I will, with you, apply myself to the revision of our laws, and seek to accommodate them to the state of public feeling. And, without further delay, we shall to-morrow restore the liberty of the press. The liberty of the press!" exclaimed Napoleon: "why should I henceforth fear it? *After what the journalists have written during the last year, they can have nothing more to say of me; but something still remains to be said of my adversaries.*"

These remarks—which we have condensed—were addressed sometimes to one person, sometimes to another, always with infinite tact, a perfectly natural manner, and a convincing air of sincerity. These observations were so suitable to the position of affairs, and so consonant with the feelings of the listeners, that no person thought of questioning their sincerity. The more clear-sighted would no doubt, had the emotion called up at the moment permitted them to reflect, have asked themselves whether it would be possible for Napoleon to endure submissively the sharp shocks of liberty. But even the most clear-sighted, stunned by the events that were passing around them, and by Napoleon's miraculous return, thought more of enjoying the present than of penetrating the future to seek their cause of grief.

Be this as it may, though Napoleon was eloquent and fond of talking, he was not in the

habit of wasting his time in empty speeches. What he had said was necessary, in order that the opinions he entertained might be generally known. But there was an affair quite as necessary and as pressing, which was to form a ministry. In former days, when Napoleon was every thing, both the aggregate and the detail of the Government, it was easy to construct a ministry. But now, when the country was to be associated in his acts, when it was necessary to prove to the people his intentions by the choice he made, it was needful that he should exercise much reflection and discernment in the appointment of ministers who were not to be mere clerks.

After having had a conference the same evening with Prince Cambacères, whose good sense he had always appreciated, and with M. Bassano, whose fidelity had never faltered, Napoleon filled up the list of his ministers with his accustomed promptitude. There were several gentlemen, whom it was merely necessary to restore to their former places, for they were competent to fill them under any régime. These were the Duke Decrès, who was appointed Minister of Marine, the Duke de Gaète, Minister of Finance, Count Mollien, First Lord of the Treasury, and, lastly, the Duke de Vicenza, who was made Minister of Foreign Affairs. About these appointments there could be no hesitation. It was not so for the departments of War, the Interior, the Police, and the Administration of Justice. The appointments in these departments should be new and characteristic. The Duke de Feltré had followed the fortunes of the Bourbons: he was, therefore, out of the question. But his place could be advantageously filled by one whom the voice of the public would have nominated had a moment of doubt intervened. This was the defender of Hamburg, Marshal Davout. He was an upright dispenser of justice, unbending and unremitting in the discharge of his duties, as well as an intrepid warrior; and to all these high qualifications he added the singular merit of being the only marshal that the Bourbons had proscribed. Napoleon determined to offer and make him accept the War portfolio.

For Minister of the Interior, Napoleon would have wished M. Lavalette, whose rectitude of feeling equalled the perspicacity of his intellect, and to whom during twenty years he had been in the habit of speaking without reserve. But it was remarked to Napoleon that to so important a post he ought to appoint a more distinguished person, one who would seem to indicate the changes he proposed; and the illustrious Carnot was named. He was the type of honest revolutionists, and joined to his anciently-acquired merit of having organized the victory of Fructidor, for which he was afterward proscribed, the additional claim of defender of Antwerp, and author of the "Mémorial to the King." No sooner was he named, than Napoleon acquiesced in the choice. Carnot had won his heart by asking service in 1814, and by boldly resisting the Restoration; but he feared the republican memories attached to his name; "for," he said, "France is now enamoured of a constitutional monarchy, but she has not ceased to fear a republic."

But, as Napoleon was desirous of appointing Carnot to the ministry, he devised a means of avoiding the difficulties attached to his name, by giving him the title of count, a recompense well deserved for his noble conduct at Antwerp.

The Police Department was not less important than that of the Interior, and Napoleon would willingly have reinstated the Duke de Rovigo in his former office, though he had been often importuned by his frankness. But no sooner was his name mentioned than there arose a universal cry, not against the Duke de Rovigo personally, but against the ancient imperial despotism of which he was the living representative. Napoleon did not persist, but received with a very bad grace the name of the Duke d'Otranto, which rose simultaneously to the lips of all present. He considered M. Fouché as something more than a restless intriguer: he saw in him a secret enemy, capable of the most dangerous machinations. He was told, in reply, that M. Fouché, besides being a regicide, had become still more incompatible with the Bourbons since he had run the risk of imprisonment. "It is possible," replied Napoleon, "that he has quarrelled with the Bourbons, but it is not certain. In any case, he has not quarrelled with the Duke d'Orléans, nor with the republic, nor with some fanciful regency of Maria Louisa that he has devised, and the plan of which he has been hawking about for the last year." In reply to this, it was said, that, as the Duke d'Otranto was irrevocably separated from the Bourbons by the blood of Louis XVI. and by the late attempt to arrest him, he might be firmly attached to the Empire by the portfolio of Police; besides that he alone possessed sufficient address to guide and restrain the newly-awakened parties without offending them; in short, that he was a necessity.

This last merit, the offspring of chance alone, was the only one that Napoleon admitted, and he yielded; but, however, without hoping to receive such important services from M. Fouché as were promised. He felt that it would be dangerous to change him into a declared enemy by refusing him the post he so ardently desired. However, he determined to give him an overseer, by appointing his enemy, the Duke de Rovigo, chief of the gendarmerie. He thus rewarded a faithful servant, at the same time that he placed him as sentinel on a minister on whose fidelity he could not depend, but whom he was forced to accept.

The Chancellor was still to be appointed. Napoleon wished to give this post to Cambacères, at least for a time, as he alone possessed sufficient tact and authority to influence the magistrates, who, whilst they were divided, divided, and discontented by the retrograde policy of the Bourbons, were alarmed by the enterprising genius of Napoleon, and were still hesitating between the different means to whom they had been subject during the last year. Such a choice was sure to be approved, provided that Napoleon could induce the still High Chancellor to take any part in the government.

The persons whose consent was necessary were at that moment within reach of Napoleon: they were actually in the saloon of the Tuileries. He took advantage of the opportunity.

and, with one exception, did not allow them to leave till they were appointed. MM. Decrès, de Gaëté, and Mollien consented to return to their former posts, where every one expected to see them. The Duke de Vicenza, who was even more than usually inclined to augur badly of the future, had not sufficient confidence in the continuance of peace to undertake to maintain it. He consequently resisted Napoleon's entreaties, and left the Tuileries without accepting the direction of Foreign Affairs. Prince Cambacérès, disgusted with men and things, had no inclination to enter the ministry, which, indeed, for an ancient grand dignitary, was a lowering of position. It is true that under the constitutional government that was announced, a responsible minister would be superior to even the ancient dignitaries of the Empire. These were not considerations calculated to influence the prince, but he nevertheless yielded, through a spirit of obedience and devotedness to Napoleon, and received the title of Prince High-Chancellor, *provisional administrator of justice*.

Napoleon next took Marshal Davout aside, and told him his intentions. The marshal declared himself anxious to be again on active service at the head of the troops, and, as a further objection to a ministerial appointment, adduced the little sympathy that existed between him and the soldiers, with whom his severity was proverbial. "It is exactly that severity," said Napoleon, "joined to your well-known probity, of which I have need. For the last year the army has been deteriorated by gifts. The Bourbons have lavished promotion. All those, and they are not few, who have adopted my cause, will expect to be favoured in their turn, and will be no less avaricious than the others. I must have an inflexible minister, whose impartial justice, influenced alone by zeal for the public welfare, cannot be accused of any tendency to royalism. Your position places you above suspicion, and you can render me important services that I cannot expect from any one else." As the marshal still objected, Napoleon added, "You are a man on whom I can depend: I may tell you every thing. I have allowed it to be believed that I am in treaty with some of the European Powers, and, above all, that I have secret communication with my father-in-law, the Emperor of Austria. There is nothing of the kind. I am alone,—alone against all Europe. I expect to find the entire continent united and implacable. We must fight to the death, and, consequently, make formidable preparations within the next three months. I must have a minister as indefatigable as honest; and, besides, when I set out for the army, I must leave in Paris a man to whom I can safely intrust unlimited authority. You see that we cannot consult our tastes, but only conquer or die. Our very existence depends on it." After hearing these frank and energetic words, Marshal Davout obeyed, in a soldier-like spirit, and accepted his appointment as minister, exchanging with Napoleon a warm clasp of the hand.

Napoleon then entered into conversation with the Duke de Rovigo, and, with his wonted tact, spoke of the Ministry of Police in such a manner as to induce him to refuse it. In fact,

this faithful servant saw that he could no longer undertake the office, and stated the reasons himself which would prevent his accepting it. Napoleon, affecting to yield to his wishes, gave him the command of the gendarmerie, and put himself, consequently, under the surveillance of M. Fouché. Lastly, Napoleon spoke in private with the Duke d'Oranto. And will it be believed that the latter did not wish to become Minister of Police, an office for which he was so well suited, but wished to be appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs? M. de Talleyrand had acted as intermediary between the Bourbons and Europe; M. Fouché wished to fill the same post with regard to Napoleon. He had the presumption to believe that he would be able, by his intrigues abroad, either to reconcile the European Powers with Napoleon, or, if that were impossible, induce them to accept some one that he would choose, Maria Louisa, the Duke d'Orléans, or somebody else. He imagined that this would be the surest path to the high position to which he aspired ever since the era of revolutions had recommenced. He had, therefore, the boldness to insinuate that he would be more useful abroad than at home. Napoleon read M. Fouché's boundless vanity at a glance, but did not laugh, for misfortune had taught him self-restraint. He excused himself for not being able to place him at the head of Foreign Affairs, by mentioning the Duke de Vicenza, before whose claims all others should withdraw. He then spoke most graciously of the services that he could render in the Ministry of Police, which post M. Fouché accepted when he saw that he could not obtain any other.

It only remained to obtain the consent of the future Minister of the Interior. But the eccentric Carnot was not at the Tuileries. As he lived alone in one of the suburbs of Paris, and had no knowledge of public events but from common report, he was still ignorant of Napoleon's arrival. It was late, and Napoleon desired that he should be summoned for the next morning.

Thus ended the 20th of March, a day that had commenced in the Forest of Fontainebleau, and ended at Paris with the formation of a ministry in the midst of the old Imperial court. It was decided that the "Moniteur" should announce on the following day the appointments that had been made, with the exception of those of M. Carnot and M. de Caulaincourt. M. de Bassano, ever devoted to the Emperor, resumed his old position of Secretary of State, M. Lavalette returned to the post-office, and the former presidents of the Council of State were restored to their posts.

The following day,—the 21st,—after a few hours' repose, Napoleon resumed that active correspondence by means of which he imparted such vitality to the springs of government. He first traced out for Marshal Davout the plan by which he could discharge the functions of an office which approaching events would render so important. He ordered him to proclaim throughout France, either by telegraph or express, the events of the 20th of March, in order that the troops and local authorities that had not yet declared their opinions might come to a decision. He desired him to send

active and intelligent officers into those departments where the prefects were likely to resist the re-establishment of the Empire, that the troops might be used against them; to despatch orders to the governors of frontier fortresses to hoist the tricolour flag, and close the gates against the enemy who might be tempted to take them by surprise. He ordered the Minister of Police to turn his attention immediately to the prefects and sub-prefects, and retain them in their office, or dismiss them, according to their behaviour; and the Duke de Rovigo, the new commander of the gendarmerie, was ordered to assume, as soon as possible, the command of a troop so valuable by its intelligence, vigilance, and devotion to its duties. He sent for the Count de Lobau, whose good sense, tact, and influence with the army were well known, and conferred on him the command of Paris and of the troops that would pass through it. This was an arrangement worthy of Napoleon's vast intelligence. The revolution that had replaced him on the throne was a strictly military one. The greater number of regiments had declared for him in presence of officers, some of whom, though devoted to his cause, were undecided how to act, and others, though but few, who were hostile to his cause. Against the latter the soldiers were in a state of revolt, which it was necessary to terminate at once, in order to avoid falling into a state of absolute anarchy. The Count de Lobau was admirably well chosen to put an end to such a state of things. Besides the command of the first military division, Napoleon gave him dictatorial authority over the troops passing through the capital, with permission to change the officers or reconcile them with their soldiers, and to restore order and discipline in the army. Napoleon's plan was to bring almost every regiment successively to Paris, at least for some days, that they might all pass under the gentle but firm hand of Lobau. He advised him to commence the revision at once, for out of the fifteen or twenty thousand actually in the capital, and the almost equal number about to arrive, it was necessary to select twenty thousand to send to Lille to oppose either any royalist attempt on the part of the fugitive princes, or any possible though improbable attack of the Anglo-Dutch army quartered in Belgium.

The precautions which it was necessary to take in this direction gave rise to a question, which, though of no weight with Napoleon, he discussed on this morning with the new Minister of War. Ought he, as some critics* have since asserted, to have continued his triumphal march toward the north, and carry even to the banks of the Rhine the revolution that he had effected from the Loire to the Seine, and thus at a single blow recover the ancient frontiers of France, at the same time that he recovered France herself? The plan looked alluring, for, amidst the prevailing enthusiasm, he was certain to meet no obstacle as far as

* This remark is directed against Marshal Marmont, who, with his usual thoughtlessness, has asserted, in his Memoirs, that Napoleon ought not to have stopped at Paris, but, profiting by the general enthusiasm, have advanced to the Rhine. It will be seen, by what follows, that his opinion was rash, and void both of reason and knowledge of the existing state of things.

Lille, and might flatter himself to be able to overcome all that he should meet from Lille to Cologne. But, however dazzling such a project might be, it could not for an instant shake his newly-acquired but deep-rooted prudence.

In the first place, as Napoleon was advancing toward Paris, he had received information from the south which, though not alarming, deserved attention. He was told, as was true, that Marseilles was in a state of excitement, and that the people of Lower Provence were advancing toward Grenoble and Lyons under the command of the Duke d'Angoulême. On the morning of the 21st, news came from Bordeaux and the west. It was announced that, under the influence of the Duchess d'Angoulême, Bedenx, imitating the example of Marseilles, was attempting to excite the departments beyond the Garonne to revolt, and was not unlikely to succeed; that the Duke de Bourbon, who was at Angers, was encouraging a rising in la Vendée; that Marshal Saint-Cyr, endowed with extraordinary powers by Louis XVIII. had hastened to Orleans, whence he had banished the tricoloured cockade assumed by the troops at the instigation of General Fajol, that he had caused this general to be arrested, and had again hoisted the white flag on the banks of the Loire. And lastly, he was told, what was of more importance, that he could as trust the Parisian National Guard. This guard, composed of citizens of the capital, were as glad to see the fall of the constitutional throne of Louis XVIII., and dreaded war beyond every thing else. If the disposition of the Parisian National Guard could be deduced from the expressions of some of the officers, there was every reason to suspect them of hostile intentions.

In all this there was no cause of serious uneasiness to a mind so firm as Napoleon's. He was well acquainted with the good sense of the National Guards of Paris, and knew that, though discontented at the first moment, they would soon join him when told of his pacific and liberal intentions, especially when he would have removed some officers, who wished to make a noise and render themselves of importance. As to the royalist attempts in the west and south, he was convinced they would be counteracted by the effects of his entrance into Paris; but, in any case, he could not believe that the Bourbons, who were not able to resist him when masters of Paris, could see fugitives at the very extremity of the kingdom influence troops that failed them when in possession of the entire sovereign authority. However, it would have been giving them too great a chance, to withdraw from the capital before taking firm hold of the reins of government, or to hasten rashly through Belgium and the Rhenish provinces with the only armed troops that were at his disposal, and leave at Paris only ministers that had been appointed but the day before, and some disorganized and disorganized regiments, and expose himself to the risk of seeing his authority, which he had overthrown on one way, recover influence in his rear. But then there was still more important objections to be made to such a project.

In the first place, it would not be possible in collecting all the disposable troops from

Paris and Lille, to assemble more than twenty-five or thirty thousand infantry, four or five thousand cavalry, and fifty or sixty pieces of badly-mounted artillery. Was it known in what state Belgium would be found? The people would be certainly well disposed toward us, but the troops would be faithful to their sovereign, and three or four times more numerous than those we could bring with us. There were, in fact, in the environs of Brussels twenty thousand Hollando-Belgians, thirty thousand English and Hanoverians, whom we in marching on Liege would throw back on thirty thousand Prussians. We would thus find ourselves in presence of eighty thousand enemies, whilst our troops amounted to only thirty or thirty-six thousand. A little farther on were twenty thousand Prussians, eighteen thousand Bavarians, twenty or thirty thousand Wurtembergers, Badeners, Hessians, &c. &c.; and on arriving at the Rhine we should have found ourselves opposed by one hundred and forty or one hundred and fifty thousand enemies. This would be going a distance to seek a defeat, which, only possible on the Meuse, was almost certain on the Rhine. Our forces would become more scattered, when they were only too much so already; the difficulty of reorganizing the army, already very great, would be increased, by carrying its empty *cadres* from Lille, Mézières, and Nancy to Cologne, Coblenz, and Mentz. Besides, throwing the allied forces back one upon the other would be to defeat the plan on which Napoleon founded his greatest hopes, and which consisted of profiting by the dispersion of his adversaries, to throw himself into the midst of them and conquer them in detail. And lastly, and above all, by commencing hostilities at once, he would lose those three months, which he was certain of having at his disposal, by not taking the initiative, three months of more importance to us than to the enemy, for they had something whilst we had nothing, and these three months, employed as Napoleon knew well how, would serve to compensate for the immense disparity between the French forces and those of allied Europe.

As yet we have not spoken of Napoleon's new position with regard to France, which was, indeed, one of the most difficult imaginable, and absolutely forbade all immediate operations beyond the frontiers.

In what character did Napoleon appear when he landed at Cannes? As a liberator who was come to free France from the emigrants, but not to attack either her liberty or peace. Peace and liberty were the two words that pervaded his speeches from the time he left Grenoble. It was easy to pronounce the words, but not so easy to gain credence for them. To attain this, he had constantly declared, and even written to Vienna, from the different towns through which he passed, that he accepted the Treaty of Paris, and would observe it faithfully, though he had not signed it. This declaration was most agreeable to all who heard it, for they saw that if there were any chance of preserving peace, it was by the immediate announcement of his readiness to accept the arrangement of the Powers, that is, the old frontier of 1789, a little extended toward Landau and Chambéry. Now, if on the very day

after his arrival at Paris he had advanced at one bound to the Meuse and the Rhine, he would necessarily be looked on as the same man who had led the fortunes of France to Moscow, and brought them back by Leipsic to the heights of Montmartre; he would be again looked on as the conqueror, and, if the conqueror, the despot, who had destroyed the country and her greatness. Morally speaking, not one would take his part; and as for material aid, he would be supported by some skeleton regiments stationed on the remote Rhine, where the difficulty of recruiting them would be tripled.

If, therefore, to military and administrative motives be added political reasons, it may be affirmed that there was not only good cause, but even an absolute and indisputable necessity, for his remaining at Paris.

Napoleon's determination was, therefore, taken. Having arrived at the capital of the Empire, he resolved to seize the reins of government, and make proposals of peace to the Powers, proposals based on the Treaties of Paris and Vienna; he was resolved to endure the humiliating refusals to which in all probability he exposed himself, which refusals, far from concealing, he would announce publicly, in order to enlist the national pride on his side; he would profit by the delay caused by these conferences to collect troops with his usual activity; he would keep his forces between the capital and the northern frontier, to facilitate his operations; then, while he affected the most perfect inaction, he would suddenly descend on the enemy, and appear unexpectedly in the midst of their dispersed cantonnements. These were sensible, solid ideas, worthy of the military and administrative genius of Napoleon.

Having intrusted the Count de Lobau with the task of assembling the troops actually in Paris or that were to arrive there, he ordered him to inspect them rapidly, and to restore union and discipline in the regiments. He ordered him to raise immediately a body of twenty thousand men, to be commanded by the brave and sensible General Reille, who was to advance to Lille, where it was said that Louis XVIII. intended to fix himself with his household troops and perhaps a reinforcement of foreign soldiers. Fortunately, Marshal Mortier commanded at Lille under the superior command of the Duke d'Orléans. There was no doubt but that the marshal, though he would receive Louis XVIII., as was his duty, would refuse admittance to Prussian or English forces, and that the Duke d'Orléans would be guided by Marshal Mortier, and that consequently Lille, though it might afford a temporary resting-place to Louis XVIII., would not be given up to the enemy. However, not only this fortress, but all those along the northern frontier, should be watched; and this General Reille could do with the twenty or thirty thousand men that would be successively placed under his orders. As General Reille could not be ready for three or four days, Napoleon ordered General Exelmans to collect all the available cavalry at once, and follow the fugitive court with three thousand horse. General Exelmans's orders were merely to use every possible means of getting this court out of the

kingdom, with as little violence as possible, except perhaps getting possession of the little treasury of Louis XVIII., and the crown diamonds, that were packed in his travelling-wagons. It was certain that General Exelmans, notwithstanding his personal wrongs, would not use unnecessary rigour in the execution of his orders, and this was what Napoleon wished, as he considered it due to himself that his conduct should contrast strongly with that of those who had set a price upon his head.

Before deciding any thing with regard to the south, he wished to know the exact state of affairs in that quarter. Besides, he would require time to collect other troops independent of those that were to be given to General Reille, at the same time that the state of public feeling at Lyons and Grenoble gave him full security as to any thing that would be attempted on that side. As to the west, he sent an officer to Orleans with orders to Marshal Saint-Cyr to restore the command to General Pajol, under threats of the most severe punishment, and he sent General Clausel to Bordeaux, with orders to proceed thither with all the troops he could collect on his route, and expel the Duchess d'Angoulême from the town, who, all respectable as she was, could not become a very important enemy.

The morning of the 21st being spent in these necessary arrangements, he employed the remainder of the day in reviewing the troops that were in Paris, together with those that had followed him from Grenoble, and those that had time to come from Fontainebleau. This afforded him an opportunity of showing himself to the Parisians, who had not seen him yet, and to give utterance to sentiments which, not being restricted to the circle of his private conversations, might be re-echoed from Paris throughout Europe.

On the Place du Carrousel were assembled about twenty-five thousand men, consisting of those troops that had come from Grenoble to Fontainebleau, those of the camp of Villejuif, and especially of the battalion from the Island of Elba, which in twenty days had achieved the prodigious march of two hundred and forty leagues on foot. The Parisian National Guard had not been summoned, because some of the officers should be changed before the Guard could appear on an occasion that celebrated the re-establishment of the Empire. But the populace hastened thither, and of course among the most zealous were to be found those who hated the emigrants, those who always admired the Imperial glory, and many prompted by curiosity, whom the wonderful expedition from the Island of Elba had roused from their indifference. Indeed, any Government, however poorly supported, can get up a brilliant festival, for every Government has its partisans, who will be present on such occasions, whilst its adversaries are absent, and partisans applaud so loudly that one may be induced to believe it the universal cry of the citizens. Besides, in the present case, the events which had just taken place were sufficient to excite the coldest-hearted people. The inhabitants of the suburbs came to the Place du Carrousel to applaud the man who possessed in a higher degree than any other the power of influencing their imaginations,

and especially to cheer those eight hundred Grenadiers and Chasseurs of the Guard who, having accompanied their general into exile, had brought him back triumphant, to place him on the throne of France. These old soldiers, covered with wounds, exhausted from fatigue, and with their shoes in tatters, produced the most lively impression on all present, and many among them replied, not with cheers, but tears, to the applause of the crowd. The earnest gaze of the spectators was turned from them only to seek the popular *redoubt* of that wondrous man who had just accomplished a miracle worthy of his former fame. They perceived that he had become fatter, but his complexion was embrowned, which counteracted the effect of his increased stoutness; and his genius-lighted eye still glanced, as ever, keenly round.

He ordered the troops to form a *serried man* around his horse, with the officers in front, and then, with his sonorous voice, addressed to them a few passionate and energetic words. "Soldiers," he said, "I have returned to France with eight hundred men, because I calculated on the love of the people and the recollections of the army. I have not been mistaken. Soldiers, I thank you. The glory we have won is yours and the people's. Mine is to have known and understood you. The throne of the Bourbons was illegitimate, because that, having been overturned twenty years ago by the nation, it was restored by the hands of foreigners, and only offered the guarantees of an arrogant minority, whose pretensions were opposed to your rights. The Imperial throne can alone guarantee the interests of the nation, and the noblest of them interests, your glory. Soldiers, we are about to march for the purpose of expelling from France those princes who have been the accomplices and instruments of our enemies, and, having arrived at the frontier, we shall pause there. We do not wish to meddle in the affairs of other nations, and woe to those who would attempt to meddle with ours!"

Then, calling forward the soldiers of the Elba battalion, Napoleon resumed:—"Soldiers, behold the officers who accompanied me in my misfortunes! They are all my friends: they are dear to my heart! Every time I looked at them, I fancied I beheld the entire army: for among these eight hundred heroes each regiment finds a representative. Their presence reminded me of those immortal victims that can never be effaced from your memory or from mine. In loving them, it was you I loved! They have brought back to you *honor*, and still glorious, those eagles that *triumphed* had for a moment veiled with a funeral *cap*. Soldiers, I restore them to you. Swear that you will follow whithersoever the interests of France may call them."

"We swear!" replied the soldiers, waving their bayonets and brandishing their swords.

The emotion excited was great, because the sentiments to which Napoleon appealed were deep-seated in the breasts of the men who listened to his impassioned discourse. Napoleon returned to the palace, attended by a multitude of persons. His looks were estimated, and he seemed, as it were, *imbued* by a new prestige. The high functionaries who

did not presented themselves the previous evening, either because they were not aware

Napoleon's arrival, or because they still hesitated as to the line of conduct they should adopt, appeared on the 21st; and the Emperor, in some sort, universally recognised and proclaimed. Carnot, torn from his retreat, had arrived at the Tuileries, and, influenced by a sentiment shared in by all his friends,—that of combining with Napoleon to defend in common the cause of the Revolution,—had accepted the office of Minister of the Interior. He did not like the title of Count; but the gravity of public affairs did not allow him to make a difficulty about it. The Duke of Vindobona accepted, in like manner, the office of Minister of Foreign Affairs. Napoleon's ministry now formed, he immediately set about his immense task.

Whilst Napoleon was engaged in these primary cares, Louis XVIII. had continued his retreat to Lille. As we have seen, the ultraroyalists had endeavoured to draw him into England, whilst the moderate royalists, anxious to conciliate the feelings of France, had wished to bring him to Lille, in order that he might remain, without passing the frontier, the struggle that was about to take place between the old empire and the revived Empire. Having no great faith in the shelter that a French city might afford him, and disliking an abode in Belgium, Louis XVIII. preferred the country here, during six years, he had enjoyed perfect repose. Finding himself, as soon as he had passed Saint-Denis, freed from fools and intrigues, he had followed his inclination, and taken the route to Abbeville, which led to Calais, and from Calais to London.

Meanwhile the Count d'Artois and the Duke of Berry, who remained at the head of the household troops, had marched at the head of the infantry toward Beauvais. Nothing could more mournful than the picture presented the household troops at this moment. Composed of men devoted to the royal cause, but, for the most part, unaccustomed to military duty and inadequately equipped, the household troops formed a long line of stragglers, and, for want of horses, had placed themselves with their baggage on carts. The company of mousquetaires, commanded by Marshal Marmont, alone properly organized. This company composed of carefully-selected old soldiers, well fed and well clad, as the troops confided in the marshal generally were. The others presented a most sad and desolate appearance. The troops assembled at Saint-Denis presented a still more mournful aspect.

As we have already said that, in order to counter the approaching departure of the royal family, the troops intended for the army at Lille had to be sent on to Villejuif; but, the king having left without encountering any opposition, the troops had received orders to march back upon Saint-Denis. They had not yet, as we have seen; and only a very small number of those who had been sent to Saint-Denis appeared there. Among those were a great portion of the artillery, a battalion of half-pay officers, and some young students, who had followed Louis XVIII. Under the name of royal volunteers, and who represented the virtuous youth of the country,

that hoped for liberty from the Bourbons and did not expect it from the Bonapartes. Marshal Macdonald had repaired to Saint-Denis to collect these *debris* and conduct them to Louis XVIII.; but, having arrived on the afternoon of the 20th, he found the battalion of half-pay officers in open revolt and endeavouring to induce the artillery to join them, and even pillaging the baggage of the royal cortege. The marshal tried to stop this scandal, but, though personally respected, he was obliged to withdraw and rejoin the household troops, whom he met *en marche*, and in the state we have described. He afterward left the Count d'Artois and the Duke de Berry, to join the king, and try to persuade him to follow the advice he had constantly given, of retiring to Lille.

Having arrived on the evening of the 21st at Abbeville, he presented himself to the king, with whom he found M. de Blacas and Prince Berthier. His majesty was perfectly calm, and seemed to feel more sensibly the inconveniences attendant on his abrupt removal from his home comforts than the loss of the throne. Entertaining but little hope, attributing his fresh misfortunes to his brother and the other emigrants, and convinced that Europe would take very little interest in people who had not known how to take care of their own affairs, Louis XVIII. was more anxious to return to his asylum at Hartwell, than solicitous by a prudent line of conduct to redeem a future that promised so little. He spoke only of the fatigue he experienced, of his gout, of the annoyances to which the loss of his baggage exposed him, and listened with an absent air to all the marshal said to induce him to return to the Lille route.

This brave and prudent soldier, who combined with great personal bravery and vast military experience, sound political sense, reminded the king of the bad effect produced by the compliments he had paid the Prince Regent on leaving London, and the reproach universally addressed to the Bourbons, of preferring foreign countries to France, and particularly England to every other country. He pointed out the disadvantage of justifying these prejudices by showing so great a desire to cross the frontier, and to cross it in order to reach London. He insisted pertinaciously that the king should retire to Lille, and should remain at least on the extreme verge of France. At Lille he would be in safety, and, in case of necessity, need only travel two or three leagues to get outside the limits of the French territory.

Louis XVIII. replied, very apologetically, that he would not be safer at Lille than elsewhere, because there was need of a garrison, and that every garrison would act as the troops whose services he had endeavoured to secure had already done, and that to summon the English or the Prussians to Lille would be, in the eyes of France, the worst of all proceedings. But the king set a proper value on the remarks of so loyal a servant as Marshal Macdonald, and consented to follow his advice. He only asked time to take a little refreshment, and requested the marshal to precede, promising to join him in a few hours. During this interview the marshal alone had spoken. M. de Blacas, who thought each alternative

equally objectionable, had scarcely made an observation, though it was evident that he preferred the proposal of going to Lille. The unfortunate Berthier, as astonished to find himself where he was as the public was to see him there, betrayed, in his dejected and mournful countenance, the perplexity of his mind. Thus was an honest man bitterly punished for his desire of being on good terms with every *régime*, and, spite of his antecedents, wishing to hold office under every Government.

Marshal Macdonald immediately took the road to Béthune, in order to announce the approach of the royal family at Lille. He arrived on the morning of the 22d of March before this town, which was occupied by the Duke d'Orléans, who had ordered the gates to be closed. We have said that this prince had been put in command of the troops in the north, with directions to form a reserve of them, and support the Duke de Berry's left, should an engagement take place before Paris, and to cover the retreat of the royal family, should they be obliged to abandon the capital. This prince, the only member of the royal family who was at all popular with the troops, had found them quiet, but evidently ill-disposed toward the royal cause. He had taken the precaution to keep the soldiers separated, in order to retard the manifestation of their sentiments. He had sent to Lille those whose sense of discipline seemed least shaken, and had shut himself up in this town with six or seven thousand men and Marshal Mortier, who was also determined to give the king shelter at Lille, but to refuse access to the Prussians and English. Having learned on the morning of the 21st, by telegraph, that Napoleon had entered Paris, he had forbidden all external communication, with the twofold intention of preventing Bonaparte's emissaries from entering the city and the soldiers from deserting.

The orders of the Duke d'Orléans had been so punctually executed that the keys of the town had been deposited with the staff, and, the keepers of the keys being absent, there was no one to answer a summons. Marshal Macdonald, not knowing how to make himself heard, was obliged to write a note with a pencil, fasten it to a stone, and fling it to the sentinel that guarded the rampart. As the marshal announced himself on the superscription, the sentinel sent the note to the nearest post, whence it was forwarded to the staff. The gates were soon opened, and the marshal was conducted to the Duke d'Orléans, who informed him of the true state of things, and told him that the king would receive a short but respectful hospitality from the troops, on the express condition that he would not attempt to introduce into the town either the English or the household troops.

Louis XVIII. arrived in the afternoon, and was received with all the honours due to a sovereign. The pious and loyal population of Lille uttered loud cries of "*Vive le roi!*" whilst the troops, drawn up in line, and presenting arms, observed a sullen silence.

No sooner had Louis XVIII. arrived at Lille, than he wished to learn from the prince and the marshals the line of conduct he ought to follow. In presence of the king, M. de Blacas,

Prince Berthier, and Marshals Macdonald and Mortier, the Duke d'Orléans, with perspicacity of thought and language, shewn the exact position of affairs. He very much commended Marshal Macdonald for having advised the king to remain as long as possible on French soil; but he showed, at the same time, that the city of Lille would not be habitable more than a few hours, and that the spectacle before their eyes, of a population clamorously sympathetic and troops coldly respectful, was the true expression of the position of affairs. He added that the troops were masters of Lille, and would not permit the slightest annoyance to be offered to the king; that it was a point of honour with them; but that they were impressed with the idea that the royalists were inclined to give up the war to the English; and that, influenced by the feeling of distrust, they would never consent to allow the household troops to enter, unless would they submit to leave the city, supposing that a wish were entertained to guard of them. And even if the royal party succeeded in removing the troops, it was not with twelve hundred men of the National Guard and three or four thousand limping cavalry of the household troops that a fortress could be defended where at least twelve thousand of the best infantry would be required to make a proper defence. Besides, the troops would, for some days, be content to form the guard of the king, but would not wish to fill the office long: that the wisest determination would be to go to Dunkirk, whose population was as loyal as that of Lille; that a small garrison would suffice there, which the household troops, converted into infantry, would supply; that at Dunkirk there was the neighbourhood and proximity to England in case of need. Another advantage resulting from this choice, independent of being still on French soil, was, that the king would be farther removed from the theatre of war, and would probably retain in his party Calais, Ardres, Gravelines, which would furnish an opportunity of supporting a few ships; that, in this way, a little maritime kingdom would be formed, where the white flag would continue to float, without any appearance of complicity with the foreign flag that was about to invade France.

Marshal Mortier warmly supported these prudent counsels. Prince Berthier offered no opposition, and M. de Blacas approved. Marshal Macdonald, in adopting the project, raised an objection on only one point—the precipitation of the movement, which would give the king the appearance of a fugitive, either a prey to fear, or expelled from Lille. The Duke d'Orléans replied that they were twenty-five leagues distant from Dunkirk, and that what was very easy of accomplishment on the day might be difficult on the next: whereas the counsel that advised immediate departure seemed to prevail; but the extreme weakness of the king called for some hours' rest.

Orders were given that preparations should be made for the departure of the royal family; but the king, fatigued and perplexed, deferred it to the morrow. The Duke d'Orléans and the marshals employed the remainder of the day in visiting the troops and speaking to them. "The king is safe among us."

plied the officers; "but we know that the emigrants by whom the king is surrounded intend to deliver up the place to the enemy. And if the household troops appear before the town, we will fire upon them."

Spite of every assurance to the contrary, it was impossible to dispel these prejudices; and what contributed to enroot them still more in the minds of the troops were the remarks of the king's attendants, who said it would be better to put an end to the comedy of an affected respect for the sovereign's person, which only covered an approaching treason, and that the simpler proceeding would be to introduce a thousand English into the place. These prudent observations obtained credence, and the assertions of the Duke d'Orléans were regarded as the offspring of his credulity. It became evident that the royal party could scarcely pass a day or two in this equivocal position.

The following day, the 23d, there was a false alarm. Some couriers having appeared within sight of the Lille ramparts, a report was circulated that it was the king's household troops that were approaching. The troops in the town became immediately very much excited, and declared that they were determined to fire on the new-comers. The Duke d'Orléans and the marshals found great difficulty in appeasing them, and they appeared well convinced that the place was about to be given up to the English. In a town where such feelings prevailed, it was impossible for the king to remain longer. The Duke d'Orléans, M. de Blacas, and Marshals Berthier, Macdonald, and Mortier, with whom the king had consulted on the previous evening, were summoned in the morning, and unanimously recognised the necessity of quitting a city guarded by troops who treated Louis XVIII. with respect, but who were devoted to Napoleon, and who were ready, at the first opportunity, to proclaim the Imperial authority. There was no difference of opinion, except as to the place whither the king ought to retreat. The Duke d'Orléans, supported by the three marshals, again strongly recommended Dunkirk. The king did not reject this advice, but said that, in the actual state of things, he thought it would be dangerous to travel twenty-five leagues on the French frontier, and announced his intention of first taking the Belgian route, and, perhaps, journey to Dunkirk through Belgium. The Duke d'Orléans advanced many reasons for not abandoning, even for a moment, the native soil; but, these producing no effect on the king, Marshal Macdonald, in a respectful but firm tone, declared that, to his great regret, he would be obliged to leave his majesty; that he would never emigrate,—especially to a country filled with the armed troops. He added, that he had been faithful to the king so long as his majesty remained in France; but that he could not accompany him beyond the frontiers; neither could he offer his sword to the man who had come to disturb the public peace, but that he would await in retirement the dawn of happier days. Louis XVIII. listened with perfect politeness to this frank declaration, thanked the marshal for his noble conduct, freed him from his oath, and bade him an affectionate adieu. Marshal Mortier spoke in the same

tone, received the same reply and the same testimonies of regard, and announced that, with Marshal Macdonald, he would accompany the king to the frontiers. Prince Berthier was silent; but, taking Marshals Macdonald and Mortier aside, he told them that, as captain of a company of the body-guards, he was obliged to accompany the king to the place of his retreat, and that when he should have fulfilled his duty he would return to France. He even desired them to announce his intention at Paris. The king, turning to the Duke d'Orléans, asked him, in a pointedly sarcastic manner, what he intended to do. The duke replied, coolly, that he entertained the same opinion as the marshals, but that, as prince of the blood, he could not pursue the same line of conduct; that is to say, he could not remain in France: that he would accompany the king to the frontier, and then ask permission to leave him, as he did not wish to go into Belgium, where the adverse armies were assembled. The king, in a tranquil tone, said he did well, and gave orders for his immediate departure.

On the afternoon of the 23d, Louis XVIII. left Lille, and directed his course toward Belgium. The populace expressed intense regret; the troops observed a respectful demeanour, but appeared much relieved at being freed from so embarrassing a deposit. The Duke d'Orléans and the marshals escorted the carriage of the king on horseback to the frontiers, a distance of about two leagues. There they received his thanks, made their adieux, and returned to Lille for the purpose of surrendering their command. The Duke d'Orléans wrote to all the generals under his command, releasing them from their military obligations, and restoring them to themselves and their country. Marshal Mortier then informed him of a circumstance which he had had the delicacy to keep secret, which was, that he had received from Paris powers and orders to act as he should think most advisable for the defence of the frontier, for the expulsion of the Bourbon princes, and even for their arrest should it appear necessary. The marshal had not wished to embarrass the princes, nor even to hasten their departure, by declaring the new duties that had been imposed on him by one who was again become master of France, and he only made the announcement when their determination was taken, and even being put into execution. The Duke d'Orléans set out for England, Marshal Macdonald for his country-seat, and Marshal Mortier sent intelligence to Paris, by telegraph, that Louis XVIII. had left Lille, and that the place was not, and never had been, in danger. He transmitted the command to General the Count d'Erlon, who had been obliged to conceal himself since the affair of the brothers Lallemand. Amidst these sudden revolutions, which disturb and often mislead the most upright, it becomes a pleasing task to the historian to record scenes where everybody, princes, marshals, soldiers, all, fulfilled duties that appeared almost conflicting, with delicacy and exactitude.

Meanwhile, the king's household troops, worn out with fatigue, had dragged themselves as far as Abbeville, having at their head the Count d'Artois and the Duke de Berry;

and, close on their heels, General Exelmans, with three thousand cavalry, who watched their progress without attempting to molest them. From Abbeville they advanced toward Lille; but, having on the way learned the king's departure, they directed their course to Béthune. There the princes became fully aware of the impossibility of leading these troops into a foreign land and supporting them there: they therefore resolved to dismiss them. Three hundred men, fit for service, were retained. The support of these was not beyond the means of the royal family; they accordingly accompanied Marshal Marmont into Belgium, where they were to form the body-guard of Louis XVIII. The others took their way in different directions. The princes crossed the frontier with the intention of joining the king.

Whilst Louis XVIII. thus evacuated France, and put a term to the very slight uneasiness that was felt at Paris concerning the northern provinces, affairs wore an equally tranquil aspect in the east. Marshal Victor, who had been ordered to organize a *corps d'armée* in Champagne and Lorraine, had been obliged to abandon the undertaking. Marshal Oudinot, abandoned by the grenadiers and chasseurs royaux,—the ancient Imperial Guard,—had also abandoned his command, and had seen, in every direction, the tricolour flag waving. The old Imperial Guard had advanced spontaneously toward Paris. In Alsace, Marshal Suchet, bowing before the revolution that had taken place, had hoisted the tricolour flag throughout the province, and put our frontier fortresses in a state of defence against external foes. We have already described what had occurred between Grenoble and Besançon; consequently any uneasiness that might be felt about the fortresses was nowhere realized, and the enemy, spite of their desire, had not been able to surprise any.

In the interior, the progress of the Imperial authority was neither less general nor less rapid. Marshal Saint-Cyr, who had left Paris on the 20th of March with M. de Vitrolles, had repaired to Orleans, where General Dupont commanded. Finding the troops in a state of demi-revolt, he had ordered the gates to be closed, the tricolour flag to be pulled down, and General Pajol, the author of the movement, to be thrown into prison. But some officers, who had been sent from Paris, having found admission into the city, and entered into communication with the 1st cuirassiers who were garrisoned at Orleans, that regiment spontaneously mounted their horses, attacked the prison, set General Pajol at liberty, and put to flight Marshal Saint-Cyr, who retired in great haste toward the Lower Loire. General Pajol then took the command, and ordered the re-establishment of the Imperial authority to be proclaimed at Orleans and in the environs.

This important portion of the Loire was thus reconquered. At Angers, the Duke de Bourbon, after a conversation with M. d'Autichamp and the principal Vendean chiefs, had arrived at the conclusion that if the ancient agitators of Vendée were disposed to resume their former practices, the inhabitants of the country districts, though royalists, no longer possessed

the ardour that would induce them to brave the horrors of a civil war, of which they retained a painful recollection. Feeling that his presence was more embarrassing to the party than useful to the royal cause, the prince had followed the advice unanimously given to him, and withdrew. Commandant Noireau, as officer of gendarmerie, having learned the state of affairs, offered him passports, on condition that he would make use of them immediately. The prince, without hesitation, accepted the offer. He embarked at Nantes, and left the district, not restored to Napoleon, but in a peaceful disposition.

General Clausel, who had been sent to the Gironde, had stopped at Angoulême, and there, in the Emperor's name, received the submission of the neighbouring departments; then, calling together a portion of the gendarmes, he marched to the Dordogne to assemble the troops, and fulfil his mission with regard to the city of Bordeaux. This city was in a state of terrible agitation, owing to the presence of the Duchess d'Angoulême and of MM. Lamoignon and de Vitrolles. The population, roused through interest and through conviction, were plunged in grief by Napoleon's return, which implied a fresh blockade of the ports. They consequently rose at sight of the Duchess d'Angoulême, who had come with the prince, her husband, to celebrate the 12th of March, and promised to support the Bourbon cause. These warm demonstrations of feeling took place in presence of two regiments,—the 73d and the 62d of the line, then garrisoned at Bordeaux, and who witnessed this scene in a rather alarming silence. There was every reason to believe that at the first appearance of the tricolour flag, displayed on the right bank of the Gironde, the troops would declare their sentiments and suppress a vapoury insurrection.

M. de Vitrolles, having communicated the king's intentions to the princess, took his departure for Toulouse, in order to make that city the centre of the royal government in the south. He had effected levies of men and money, and, acting on his own authority, had placed Marshal Pérignon at the head of the royalist troops, and endeavoured to keep up a correspondence between Bordeaux, where the Duchess d'Angoulême was staying, and Marseilles, whether the Duke d'Angoulême had hurried. The prince arrived at Marseilles, and we may divine from the spirit that prevailed in that city, to what vehement demonstrations the population gave expression. They had always hated the Empire, and now, seeing themselves again threatened with starvation, after having fancied rather than enjoyed abundance, they abandoned themselves to a species of fury, and received the Duke d'Angoulême with an almost delirious joy.

Marshal Masséna exercised his military command in the midst of this excited people, with the disdainful coldness of a soldier who had formerly succeeded in subduing the Celibrians, and who took little heed of the passions of a mob. As he accompanied the prince on the day of his arrival, a crowd of women of the humbler classes, with children in their arms, flung themselves on their knees before his horse, and cried, in the unsophisticated

phraseology of the district, "Marshal, don't betray this good prince." He took no notice of these demonstrations, for, not liking either the dynasty that was departing nor that which was returning, and deploring all the French blood that would flow in consequence of these new convulsions, he was determined to confine himself to the strict observance of his military duties. He had given two regiments, the 83d and 58th, together with a column of volunteers, to the Duke d'Angoulême, and with these the prince was to endeavour to recover Grenoble and Lyons, as he ascended the course of the Rhone. Marshal Massena did not accompany him in this expedition, but remained to preserve order at Marseilles, and more especially to watch Toulon, determined to show no mercy to any one that should attempt to give up that great military arsenal to the English.

Such was the state of things in the different parts of France on the 23d and 24th of March. Napoleon, having learned the retreat of Louis XVIII., and the submission of the northern and eastern provinces, became quite satisfied as to the safety of the frontier fortresses; and having no doubt but that La Vendée would submit, at least for the present, he was not at all alarmed by the insurrection in the south, although it extended from Bordeaux to Marseilles. He had only been anxious about the fortresses; for it would have been a great misfortune if such places as Lisle, Metz, or Strasbourg had fallen into the enemy's hands. Now that he was reassured on this important point, and freed from the king's presence, which at worst would be nothing more than an inconvenience, he considered that he had recovered entire possession of the Empire. Could he accommodate his authority to the newly-acquired spirit of independence in the people, and could he appease or conquer Europe, he was certain of recommending a new reign, less brilliant perhaps, but not less prosperous, than the former, and certainly more deserving of praise should he be able to substitute the sanguinary magnificence of war for the salutary enjoyments of peace. But he had always entertained doubts, though he did not give them utterance, as to the pacification of Europe; and in reality he reckoned on a short and vigorous campaign, carried on with the resources which restored France, and three hundred thousand soldiers returned from abroad, offered to his powerful genius.

He had been but a few days in Paris, when he found his presentiments correct; for, while he submitted at home, abroad every thing assumed an aspect of unprecedented violence. As the Bourbons were about to retire, they had published a most important declaration, issued by the Congress of Vienna. At first the authenticity of this document was doubted, as a doubt that Napoleon encouraged, because advantageous to him, though, in the resolute and style, he easily detected the rage of his enemies,—a rage he had himself excited by more than fifteen years' abuse of victory. This document declared that the Powers assembled at Vienna, considering that Napoleon Bonaparte, by violating the treaty of the 11th of April, had destroyed his sole legal claim to existence, and attacked the peace of Europe, they declared him an outlaw,—a decree that

subjected him to be treated as the meanest criminal. The evident conclusion was, that whoever could seize his person ought to shoot him immediately, and would be looked on as having rendered an important service to Europe. Such conduct toward a great man, who had certainly disturbed the peace of Europe, but whose power had been flattered and extolled and whose ambition had been rivalled by every living prince—such conduct, we repeat, was unworthy of the century; and pride, ambition, and terror can alone explain, but cannot justify, the act.

Napoleon did not allow this document to be published for some days, waiting until France should be made acquainted with the entire state of affairs. By comparing the declaration of the 13th of March with some other manifestations, he saw the realization of all that he had foreseen, and the necessity of preparing, without a moment's delay, for a formidable struggle. Fresh manifestations, the natural consequence of the declaration of the 13th of March, left him no doubt on this point. M. de Caulaincourt had no sooner taken possession of his official residence, than the foreign embassies came to demand their passports. Of some—such as the English and Russian, whose heads were absent—the secretaries took it upon themselves to make this demand; but of others, such as Austria, Prussia, Sweden, Denmark, Sardinia, Holland, &c., the ambassadors came in person, and persisted in leaving, notwithstanding all M. de Caulaincourt's efforts to retain them. With M. de Vincent, the Austrian ambassador, he had a long conversation, and sought, by every means, to convince him that France was desirous of peace, and was even determined to adhere to the Treaty of Paris; but it was with difficulty he even obtained a patient hearing, and by no arguments could he persuade the ambassador to take charge of letters from Napoleon to his wife and father-in-law. However, M. de Vincent, anxious to leave Paris at once, consented that one of the secretaries of the Austrian legation, who was to leave a day later, should undertake to deliver the two letters. Napoleon had determined to take a humble tone for the time; but this was a part that M. de Caulaincourt did not wish to over-act: he contented himself with stating his master's pacific intentions clearly; and, without putting any obstacle to the departure of the representatives of the different courts, he sent them their passports the very day they demanded them.

Though no opposition was made to their departure, M. de Vincent's permission was profited by, and the secretary of the Austrian legation received two letters,—one for Maria Louisa, and the other for the Emperor Francis. Queen Hortense who was on the most friendly terms with the officials of the Russian embassy, since Alexander had publicly declared himself her protector—wrote a letter to that monarch, in which she endeavoured to give him the most favourable idea of Napoleon's newly-acquired intentions, both as regarded his home and foreign policy. This letter she gave to M. de Boutiakine, secretary to the Russian legation, and one of the many foreigners whose good will her graceful manners had won for herself, if not for her cause. Through

the same channel, Alexander was informed of the secret alliance that was formed on the 3d of January between Louis XVIII., England, and Austria, against Russia and Prussia. To this were added some papers that M. de Blacas had left at Paris, and which would leave Alexander no doubt of the feelings with which he was regarded by his allies. Queen Hortense took advantage, also, of the departure of her brother's steward for Vienna, to write to several persons there—Maria Louisa, in particular—and to inform them, in the most glowing terms, of Napoleon's triumphant restoration to the Imperial throne, of the people's enthusiastic love for him, and their hatred of the Bourbons, and the consequent necessity Europe was under of avoiding a sanguinary struggle, by approving a deed that was now accomplished, and which would neither disturb the peace, nor interfere with the partition that had been made at Vienna of almost all the States of the universe.

Although the departure of the legations wore an unfavourable aspect, it might be accounted for, at least to a certain degree, for, though accredited to the court of Louis XVIII., they were not to that of Napoleon. This, indeed, need not have prevented their awaiting fresh powers, but, still, their eagerness to depart could not be construed into a declaration of war; and it was of the utmost importance that such a declaration should not be anticipated, but rather allow all the blame to fall upon the Congress of Vienna, which was not more popular in Europe than in France. The only way to meet the conduct of the foreign embassies in a dignified and inoffensive manner was to recall the French ambassadors, who could not, in honour, be allowed to remain at the courts of princes who had broken off their connection with us. Besides, these ambassadors were, for the most part, chosen from among the emigrants,—the implacable enemies of the Empire. M. de Caulaincourt addressed a circular to the officials of embassies, in which he announced that their powers were withdrawn, and that they were, consequently, recalled, and should return immediately. At the same time, he authorized them to declare that France would not take the initiative in hostilities with any nation, and would strictly observe all existing treaties.

Nothing else could be said or done in the actual state of things. A different course of action, however, was to be pursued with each court, and some indirect measures to be adopted toward some—measures that could not be neglected, whatever might be the result. For example, the court of Vienna, besides being the seat of the Congress, might be considered in the light of Napoleon's parent court, to which it might be impossible for him to gain access. It was well known that Austria was discontented with Russia and Prussia, with both of whom she had been inclined to go to war, and that she had often regretted having increased the power of Russia so much. The prospect of having at Paris a son-in-law whom misfortune had corrected, and whom new institutions would restrain, and who would be succeeded by the son of an arch-duchess, brought up by her with pacific views,

was likely to cause serious reflection, and gradually lead Austria to adopt opinions very different from those which dictated the declaration of the 13th of March. There was one man who could make such views effective, and that man was M. de Talleyrand. Could he be won, it would not be impossible to gain over the court of Vienna itself. Napoleon did not yet know how far M. de Talleyrand was pledged to the cause of legitimacy, nor how much he had declined in favour at the Austrian court by yielding to his jealousy of M. de Metternich. In any case, M. de Talleyrand would be a valuable acquisition, and he, it was hoped, might be won by the influence of a singular man, one who was well known in society, though not in politics, who had often been employed in secret negotiations, and who, gifted with rare intelligence and daring, presented one of those contradictory characters that are sometimes met with, and who combine unusual clearness of intellect with irregularity of conduct. The man, who possessed over M. de Talleyrand an influence resulting from his intimate acquaintance with all the secrets of his life, was M. de Montrond; and if there were any one that could succeed in reaching Vienna and obtaining an audience of M. de Talleyrand, and even carrying off Maria Louisa and her son, it certainly was he, with his great tact, his numerous connections, and unparalleled daring. He had been imprisoned at Ham, by Napoleon, for some satirical remarks; he had escaped, had returned to France with the Bourbons, and was now, from the mere love of adventure, ready to undertake any thing, even for the advantage of his old persecutor. It was the Duke d'Otranto, an experienced master in secret diplomacy, who had thought of employing M. de Montrond, and Napoleon, compelled by circumstances, had consented. M. de Caulaincourt intrusted this singular envoy with letters for M. Meneval (who was still with Maria Louisa) and several other influential persons. He was authorized to treat, on any terms, with M. de Talleyrand, M. de Dubou, and some others. He was, also, empowered to present himself to Maria Louisa, and furnish her with the means for flight, if she were disposed for it, and, for this purpose, he was provided with the necessary credit, that want of funds might be no restraint on the inexhaustible fertility of his imagination. It was by such obscure paths that Napoleon was compelled to find an entrance to cabinets that he had once domineered and trampled upon. M. de Montrond left at the same time as the couriers that were sent with the circular that recalled our embassies; but, foreseeing that he should find all the frontiers impassable, he had procured the passport of an abbé attached to the Roman legation, and succeeded in deceiving the European authorities and reaching Vienna, which our couriers were not able to do.

Independent of this secret mission, etiquette and policy required that some of our diplomatic agents should not be recalled. M. Serurier, the French minister at the United States, was left at his post, both because America had always been friendly to the Empire, and that M. Serurier had discharged his duty with great good sense. The secretaries of the le-

at Rome, Switzerland, and Constantinople were ordered to retain their places, and received the title of *chargé d'affaires*. At Switzerland was reconstituted, she jealous of her neutrality,—a feeling deserving of all consideration from protected an important portion of our

It was well known that the court of was displeased by the obstinacy of the in revoking the Concordat, and she promised not alone that her wishes on it would be gratified, but that the possession of old dominions, including the Legation, should be guaranteed. M. de Rivière, had been appointed ambassador at Compiègne by Louis XVIII., was detained there, and M. Ruffin, our former *chargé d'affaires*, received instructions to flatter Sultan in every possible way. The mirage of Napoleon might well be supposed to have impressed the excitable imagination of the superstitious Turks, and won them to the Imperial cause. Lastly, although a great naval was recalled from Madrid, still, it was known that the two houses of Bourbon quarrelled because of Mina's being on French ground, an officer was ordered to treat of the exchange of such as had not yet been restored to their country, and this officer was authorized not to himself to the apparent object of his mission. Even should the coalition be general, something to have America, Switzerland, the Holy See, Turkey, and Spain neutral, and friendly.

He submitted to adopt all these expedients, that he might be able to say to himself that he had not neglected anything, and to France that he had sacrificed all his pride in order to preserve peace. But on his sword alone he counted to counteract adverse feelings of the European

He, consequently, profited by the opinion of the northern and eastern provinces to turn his attention to the immediate object of his military preparations. On the evening of the 20th of the very next morning he had received Marshal Davout to repair to the War Office. He pointed out to him the most skilful of that vast department, and ordered that he should come to the Tuileries to receive the first orders from himself. As he had experience that the formation of the *armée* was of more importance than the organization of regiments, because, the corps once formed, all the rest, men and materials, would be a matter of course, he commenced by their formation, and appointing to complete staff.

The troops that had been cantoned in the department of the Nord he composed the 1st army, making Lille their head-quarters, and appointing d'Erlon their general-in-chief. The troops that had left Paris under the command of General Reille were to constitute the 2nd, and to assemble at Valenciennes. The 3rd was to be the largest, because it was intended to be the first to encounter the enemy. Although it was Napoleon's intention to commence operations at once, he stationed this corps at Valen-

ciennes, a little to the left, that he might the better conceal his plan.*

The 3d, commanded by General Vandamme, and stationed around Mézières, consisted of the troops that had been dispersed through the Ardennes and Champagne. The 4th, under the command of General Gérard, was stationed near Metz, and consisted of the troops of Lorraine. The 5th, intended for General Rapp, was to assemble at Strasbourg, and to be formed of the Alsatian regiments.

These different corps possessed the advantage of protecting each of our frontiers, and of being able, from their situation, to aid in a concentration of forces, which Napoleon intended to render both rapid and unexpected, by means of combinations, of which we shall speak in their proper place. He had already decided that Maubeuge should be the point of concentration; and he resolved to put his plan into execution not only by making the wings cover the centre, but by making the rear cover the van. For this purpose, he determined to form a 6th corps, composed of the troops which would be assembled at Paris, and which could advance rapidly to Maubeuge, through Soissons, Laon, and La Fère. This 6th corps was confided to General Count Lobau, who commanded the first military division. We have already mentioned that, in order to re-establish discipline, he had arranged that almost every regiment should pass through the hands of Count Lobau, at Paris. There would be, consequently, great numbers of troops at Paris, from which it would be easy to form a numerous and well-disciplined corps, which, leaving Paris at the same time that the 1st corps would leave Lille, and the 4th Metz, would form a compact mass with the 2d and 3d at Maubeuge. Thus did Napoleon, with superior skill, manage so that the different arrangements rendered necessary by circumstances should all tend to one end.

To the 6th corps Napoleon joined the Imperial Guard, which he intended to reorganize on a most extensive scale. The old guard he re-established on the basis of four regiments of four battalions, (grenadiers and chasseurs included,) and the young guard on the basis of twelve regiments of two battalions, with the addition of a powerful cavalry, and the old reserve of artillery that had signalized themselves in every battle of the period. Napoleon considered that with the 6th corps and the Guard he would have a reserve of fifty thousand men, which, joined to the four corps stationed between Lille and Metz, would allow him to take the initiative at the head of a hundred and fifty thousand men, (more or less, according to the time he should have to prepare;) and as he showed no inclination to commence hostilities, least of all at Maubeuge, his plan could be thoroughly prepared whilst remaining perfectly secret.

The 5th corps, stationed at Alsace, (that is, without the circle of these combinations,) was to protect the Upper Rhine, and become a second point of concentration in case the brunt

* Napoleon's letters of 25th, 26th, 27th, and 28th of March, prove that he had mentally arranged the plan of this campaign at this very period.

of the war should fall on that quarter. This corps was to join the troops which were destined by Napoleon to guard the Alps, and to act against Switzerland in case she should not observe her neutrality, or against Italy if, as was to be feared, Murat should not be sufficient alone to occupy the Austrians. As this corps was stationed beyond the operations of the Nord, it would be necessary to confide the command to a man capable of acting alone, and not needing to be led by the hand. Napoleon chose Marshal Suchet. He intended to form at a later period a 7th corps, to protect the Maritime Alps; and, lastly, an 8th, which, if it were not needed to restrain the Spaniards, who were not much to be dreaded at the moment, it might restrain the south of France, where the sentiments of the people wore a suspicious character. He intended that the 7th corps should be commanded by General Clausel, who was at this time occupied in reducing Bordeaux.

Napoleon immediately commenced the formation of these corps, to which he gave the title of *corps d'observation*. For their complete organization he had three entire months, which would deprive his preparations of every appearance calculated to excite alarm. The generals he appointed—Erlon, Reille, Vandamme, Gérard, Rapp, and Suchet—were admirably chosen both in a military and political sense; and these were now ordered to repair without delay to their different stations, and to summon all their troops from the fortresses. For this purpose, as each regiment marched to head-quarters, it was to place all its disposable men in the two first battalions, and leave the *cadre* of the third in the fortresses as a depot. Having a great number of officers on half-pay in his service, Napoleon ordered the immediate formation of a fourth, fifth, and sixth battalion in each regiment. When the men, collected in the way we shall explain immediately, would have reached the depot, the third battalion was to be immediately completed and sent to join the *corps d'armée*. The same was to be done with the fourth and fifth, according as men should come to the depot.

This simple organization being decided on, nothing remained to be done but to arrange measures for recruiting. For this purpose, Napoleon made the following arrangements.

On the 20th of March, 1815, there were a hundred and eighty thousand men under arms, and fifty thousand on a six months' leave of absence, who would, at the first summons, raise the effective forces to two hundred and thirty thousand men. This was not much, but even this number would not have existed had not M. de Talleyrand requested Louis XVIII. to arm. Fortunately, France had a much greater number of soldiers who had returned to their homes. If the reader recall what we have already said (vol. xviii.) of the organization of the army under the Bourbons, he will understand perfectly the explanation we are about to give.

At the time of Napoleon's abdication there was in France and Europe the following number of French soldiers of all arms, some constituting *corps d'armée*, others in garrison in the fortresses, or prisoners in the hands of the

enemy. During the campaign of 1814, Napoleon had sixty-five thousand men under his own command. General Maison had fifteen thousand, Marshal Soult thirty-six thousand, General Decaen four thousand, Marshal Suchet twelve thousand, Marshal Augereau twenty-eight thousand,—the whole amounting to a hundred and sixty thousand combatants, composing the active army. There were twenty-five thousand in the fortresses of the interior, which brought up the whole effective force on French ground to about two hundred and fifty-five thousand. There were twenty-five thousand men in garrison in Catalonia, thirty thousand in Piedmont and Italy, more than thirty-two thousand defending the Adige under Prince Eugene, or returned to France under General Grenier. In Hamburg, Magdeburg, and other German fortresses, there were forty thousand men, and forty thousand in the fortresses ceded by the convention of the 11th of April, such as Antwerp, Wesel, Menz, &c., which made the garrisons of Spain, Italy, Germany, and Belgium amount to a hundred and eighty-six thousand men. Nominally, a hundred and thirty thousand prisoners were to return from Russia, Germany, and England, though the real number was considerably more. Were all these collected in France, she would possess a formidable army. Even independently of the forty thousand men, veterans, gens-arms, and staffs, that must always be added to the total amount of the French army, she would have from six hundred to a hundred and ten thousand men, the greater number tried soldiers, and of whom at least half had borne part in all our wars. Had Napoleon been able to assemble all these around him in 1815, both he and France would have been invincible. But we must explain what had become of all these men since the peace.

After the abdication at Fontainebleau, the spirit of desertion, as we have already mentioned, had revealed itself in the army. Few soldiers, from a feeling of patriotic displeasure, others from hatred to the service, of which they had experienced only the severities, had abandoned their standards, which the military authorities took little trouble to defend. It is estimated that at this period from a hundred and seventy to a hundred and eighty thousand deserted, either of the troops stationed in France, or those that had returned from abroad. This would leave four hundred and twenty thousand in the ranks; but, as we have seen, the budget of the Restoration would hardly allow one-third of these to be paid. The surplus must be got rid of in various ways. Of these, twenty-five thousand, who, by the cession of territory, were become foreigners, were sent home. The conscripts of 1815 were dismissed by an ordinance, which caused a further reduction of forty-six thousand. Lastly, a hundred and fifteen thousand men, of every age, were dismissed, who either had served their country for a sufficiently long time, or whose health had been more or less injured in the service of the State. The effective force was thus reduced to two hundred and thirty thousand. And, small as was the number, it was found impossible to pay the expenses; and the Minister of War gave fifty thousand more leave of absence for six months.

which left but a hundred and eighty thousand actually under arms.

This was the exact state of our forces on the 20th of March, 1815: a hundred and eighty thousand men under arms, and fifty thousand on leave of absence, whom an order from the War Department could immediately reassemble. The first thing to be done was to recall these fifty thousand men, which would bring up the effective force to two hundred and thirty thousand, a number that would not suffice for the formation of the three first battalions, each consisting of five hundred men, and still less would it allow the formation of the fourth and fifth battalions. Recourse must be had to some other means. Conscription, which Napoleon had made hateful, and which had been imprudently given up by the Bourbons, could not be employed again without awakening the most painful remembrances. There were the numbers of soldiers that had returned to France, and were now dispersed through its whole extent. Of these, the best as to feeling and experience were certainly those who had been prisoners of war. But the greater number of those who had returned lately were already enrolled; for it was to make room for these that some of the others had been dismissed. The hundred and fifteen thousand who had been definitely dismissed could not be recalled, since they were absolutely restored to their liberty, nor could those disbanded in quality of foreigners be summoned, as they had left the country. There only remained those who had deserted, and, as a last resource, the conscripts of 1815. Those who had deserted were reputed as on leave of absence without pay,—a subterfuge devised by the authorities, to avoid being compelled to punish them.

These could be recalled, and of the hundred and sixty thousand that were still French subjects, it was hoped that eighty thousand would return to their standards, by which our army would amount to from two hundred and thirty to three hundred and ten thousand, or to three hundred thousand exactly. But this number was far from being sufficient, and it would be necessary to fall back on the conscription of 1815. This conscription had been levied by a decree of 1814, which decree had not been revoked. It was therefore perfectly legal to put it into operation, at least when authorized by a decree of the Council of State, which might be easily obtained. Here were abundant means of recruiting the army without levying a fresh conscription. These conscripts, who had been dismissed by a royal ordinance, numbered about a hundred and forty thousand. Allowing for losses through time, and for the bad feeling of some provinces, their number could not be less than a hundred thousand, which would increase the army to four hundred thousand, the greater number of whom had seen service, or been at least for some time under arms; a very great advantage, which would add considerable to the effective force of our arms.

To render this army sufficient to oppose the coalition, all the troops composing it should be on active service, and none called on to do garrison-duty. Another resource that presented itself, and by which Napoleon immedi-

ately determined to profit, was to call out the National Guard, but in such a way that none but men fit for service should be chosen, and those only in provinces of assured patriotism. The state of our laws at this time favoured such an arrangement. The local authorities, whose duty it was to make the selection, could, when choosing the *compagnies d'élite*, called grenadiers and chasseurs, (a mode of proceeding borrowed from the foot-regiments,) select young and vigorous men, some of whom had seen service, and who were neither married nor necessary to the support of their families. This had been done in 1814; and it was seen at Fère-Champenoise what National Guards chosen in this manner were capable of. A valuable addition to the army could thus be obtained, by increasing the *compagnies d'élite*, and this operation would be much facilitated from the great number of retired soldiers dispersed through the country districts, and the still greater number of holders of small portions of national property. With well-organized recruiting companies in each arrondissement, it would be easy, in choosing the old soldiers, and citizens of undoubted patriotism, to form battalions of five or six hundred men each, fit for service. The great number of half-pay officers, added to this facility of forming battalions, presented an opportunity of draughting them into good *cadres*.

Napoleon calculated that, by thus enrolling the thirtieth part of the population, very nearly a million of men would be collected, and that by confining this appeal to the frontier provinces irritated by the late invasion, and near the fortresses that required to be guarded, he could easily raise four hundred battalions, which, did they consist but of five hundred men each, would amount altogether to two hundred thousand. It would not be difficult to induce the inhabitants of Lorraine to defend Thionville, Nancy, and Metz, nor the Alsations to arm for Strasbourg, the inhabitants of Franche-Comté for Besançon, those of Dauphiné for Grenoble, Embrun, and Briançon. In confining himself, for the present, to Ardennes, Champagne, Burgundy, Lorraine, Alsace, Franche-Comté, Lyonnais, Auvergne, and Dauphiné, he was sure to have two hundred thousand men in the *compagnies d'élite*—and thus the army of the line would be disposable for active service. Besides that these men would form excellent garrisons in the fortresses, some of them, such, at least, as were best drilled, might aid the army as bodies of reserve, or even fight in the ranks. The army thus compensated for the regiments left in depot, and amounting to four hundred thousand men, would, in Napoleon's hands, suffice to overpower the coalition, provided he could obtain time to realize the projected levies. France could then meet Europe at the head of six hundred thousand men, four hundred thousand on active service, and two hundred thousand in garrison. This would be sufficient for one campaign, however bloody it might be, and, should the result be favourable, it was not probable that the coalition would attempt a second. It would, consequently, be possible, by not being too exacting, to obtain a moderate peace, infinitely more advantageous than that of Paris.

Such were the principles on which Napoleon founded his plan of national resistance against foreigners. The great number of retired soldiers, the inhabitants of the country districts irritated against the clergy and nobility, and the many officers on half-pay, rendered this plan more easy of accomplishment than it would be in ordinary times.

Napoleon, who, from his long administrative experience, knew exactly how and when every thing ought to be done, gave his orders accordingly. Had he undertaken every thing at once, necessary as expedition was, besides causing great confusion, he would have excited the public mind more than would be prudent. He did not desire to conceal any thing, but he did not wish that the morrow of his arrival should be, as it were, the signal for a general levy; for his desperate appeal to the people's patriotism would be looked on rather as the effect of his military tastes than the result of necessity.

For this reason, he commenced operations by ordering the men on leave of absence for six months to join their regiments. The soldiers who had retired without permission were to be recalled a few days later, and then the Council of State was to decide whether the decree by which the conscription of 1815 had been raised was still in force. The local authorities and gendarmes would not have sufficed for the accomplishment of the three measures had they been attempted simultaneously; and, therefore, a few days' interval between each was not too much. Besides, the men on leave of absence for six months and those who had retired without leave were all, more or less, accustomed to warfare, and might join the ranks immediately on their arrival, provided that they had arms and ammunition.

As Napoleon had determined to reorganize the Imperial Guard, he ordered the *cadres* to return to Paris, and, in order to furnish the old soldiers with an additional motive for again entering the service, he announced that all able-bodied men who had borne arms, and who should demand admission into the Guard, should be draughted into the twelve regiments of the Young Guard that were about being enrolled. This would be sufficient to attract twelve or fifteen thousand additional men.

Not wishing that a single corps should be employed in accessory service, Napoleon ordered that all the disposable vessels should be sent from Toulon to Corsica to bring back three regiments of infantry that were in that island. He took advantage of the respect still shown by the English to the white flag, to allow it to float from the masts of the navy, at the same time that the crews were ordered to resume the tricoloured cockade. Thanks to this *ruse*, he was able to bring back these three regiments, the nucleus of the 7th corps, which, from want of resources, was still but a name.

Having thus provided for the infantry, he turned his attention to the cavalry, which there was no question would be a magnificent corps, could horses be provided. As those who were expected to enlist in the cavalry had served before, there was every probability that all the men would be well drilled,—a circumstance of much more importance in that

branch of the service than in the infantry. Of the hundred and eighty thousand composing the effective force as it existed the 1st of March, about twenty thousand were cavalry. Napoleon determined to increase these immediately to forty, and as soon as possible to fifty thousand. The late Government had contracted for four thousand horses. He ordered the immediate fulfilment of all contracts, and then re-established the garrison depot at Versailles, which, under General Bourcier's direction, had been of such use to him in 1814. He ordered this general repair immediately to Versailles, and in possession of such localities as he had occupied a year before, and collect a large supply of military equipments and horses. He opened a credit of several millions for him, that he might be able to pay ready money for the horses brought by the peasantry.

If the cavalry regiments sent their unmounted men to Versailles, they would be certain to find there every thing they wanted; and, as the active army was to assemble between Lille and Paris, they would not have far to go to procure accoutrements and arms. Napoleon hoped to procure two or three thousand trained horses belonging to the dismissed royal household troops. He also intended to take some thousands from the gendarmes, but for which he would pay immediately. He next sent several cavalry officers, provided with money, to the country districts, and these he expected would return with ten to fifteen thousand horses. From what he had seen on his march from the Gulf of Genoa to Grenoble, he was convinced that, with money, horses might be found everywhere. It was his maxim that, in extreme cases, success was to be obtained by adopting a variety of expedients; for, if one should fail, another might succeed.

As the artillery requires more time to enter the field than any other branch of the service, he ordered that this force should immediately leave the arsenals and proceed to join the different *corps d'armes*. A large number of artillery horses, the remains of our military staff, had been left in charge of the peasantry. Napoleon ordered that these should be collected, and gave directions for the purchase of a number of horses sufficient to supply a powerful artillery, which he intended should not be less than three pieces to every thousand men. He finally gave orders for the formation of a park of a hundred and fifty pieces of artillery at Vincennes, which was to form the customary *corps de réserve* of the Guard.

Having completed his plan for the organization of the army, Napoleon next turned his attention to the fortifications. The final day of the 30th of March, 1814, having shown him the part the capital was called on to play in the defence of the Empire, he determined to surround Paris with works as solid as could be made in three months, and to cover these works with a new artillery. An experience had also shown him the importance of such places as — a, Soissons, Châlons-Thierry, Langres. — Bédouin, in case of an invasion, he determined to fortify them as well as the short — the time would allow, and, as there were any other points that

temporarily useful, he formed generals, who were to make of the frontiers, and report not on, but what passes through forests, could be made capable. He ordered that the large fortified on as the bulwarks of the be repaired, supplied with provisions,—in a word, put into a of defence.

its actual state, could be of no use. If a naval victory were won, it would affect Paris. Napoleon, with his genius of invention, determined that he should aid the movements of the army by two advantages would be obtained: the sailors, thrown idle by the blockade, would obtain employment, and the army would consist of sixty thousand brave men who could be secured. Of these he formed twenty regiments, under the command of naval officers; a part to be sent in defence of our ports, and the rest to be sent to the capital, to assist the army. He also determined to disband the naval gunners among the army, and to send of Paris, with two or three hundred of large calibre, to be brought from Calcutta, Dunkirk, and other

and arms of the different regiments to be provided for. Wanting to procure clothing, to lessen these difficulties, Napoleon the contractors who usually buy, and paid in ready money millions that were due to them.

Restoration had neglected to means Paris and other large on be filled with extra work- means of zealous overseers, ply the most pressing wants. red for each soldier of the line e, a pair of pantaloons, and a elected a uniform blouse that for the National Guard in de- tresses.

ore difficult to procure arms. mbered how, in the last cam- re twenty thousand men from hom want of arms had pre- sisting in defence of the capital. e have seen, that by calling in of 1814, together with those on ix months, he could raise the undred and ten thousand men, dred thousand by the addition pts of 1815. Lastly, he ex- id of two hundred thousand of ard to raise the number of the e country to six hundred thou- the addition of the sailors to re to six hundred and sixty

sequently, require at least six and muskets by the commencement of the time he expected hostilities. There were about two hundred of these, and in the possession of the fort were a hundred and fifty muskets in the magazines, Duke de Berry, who had incessantly been urging the necessity of manufacturing

fire-arms. There were, therefore, two hundred and fifty thousand still to be got. The soldiers who had returned from abroad had brought with them a great number of muskets, which, with a little repair, might be made serviceable; but these muskets were scattered over the frontiers, and most frequently in places where it would be impossible to construct manufacturing factories. Napoleon determined that these should be brought to Paris, where there were already forty thousand needing repair, but where the means of manufacturing and repairing would soon be increased by the erection of new workshops. He divided the others among the fortresses from Grenoble to Strasbourg, and from Strasbourg to Lille. He expected that in two months he would have two hundred thousand repaired, and fifty thousand manufactured. He flattered himself that he should thus procure the six hundred thousand he needed. His plan was to urge on the manufacture of at least three hundred thousand during the latter six months of 1815, in order to keep up a supply and to arm fresh soldiers. For this purpose he ordered the erection of numerous extra workshops in Paris and the environs, in which he employed cabinet-makers, locksmiths, and even watch-makers, all directed by artillery officers. He paid the State contractors eighteen hundred thousand francs that had remained due to them, and placed as much money at their disposal as they needed.

It was M. Louis, the talented Finance Minister of the Restoration, who, without knowing for whom he was working, had prepared the funds which Napoleon was about to employ in the defence of the country. Thanks to the peace and to the courageous maintenance of indirect taxation, M. Louis had re-established the collection of the ordinary taxes, and so considerably enriched the treasury. Besides, by acknowledging the debts of the State, and by the happy combination of the *reconnaissances de liquidation*, he had obtained the valuable assistance of the floating debt, which permits the yearly revenues to be anticipated, and places all the resources of a State at the disposal of the treasury. When this talented minister retired, he left, besides the regular and easily-collected ordinary taxes, the possibility of raising fifty or sixty millions by anticipating the revenue by means of exchequer bills. This resource, together with the current taxes, sufficed for the first months, the expenses not being at that time what they have since become. In three months there would be either peace, or a decisive battle; and were this battle successful there would be no difficulty in replacing that portion of the revenue that had been expended in advance. Thanks to Baron Louis's prompt and successful re-establishment of credit, M. Mollien and M. de Gaëte had found every thing on the best footing, and the means of expending fifty millions beyond the actual receipts. This was all that Napoleon's creative and economical genius needed in order to supply the first expenses, and to prevent the necessity of having recourse to extraordinary or unpopular expedients.*

*There is nothing more difficult in times of revolution than to induce Governments that replace one another to do each other justice; and in no case is this more difficult

Thanks to these combined resources, Napoleon was almost certain of having, within a few months, four hundred thousand men on active service, and two hundred thousand in garrison, all provided with what they needed: and the longer the war was deferred, the greater the probability of seeing his armament completed. In all great administrative enterprises, it is that forethought which, comprehending the whole as well as the details, forgetting nothing, deferring nothing, because nothing has been forgotten,—it is this forethought, we repeat, which secures a successful result, even in the sometimes very short time that can be consecrated to the development of great designs. It is when the whole is not seen at a glance, nor all the details foreseen, but left to develop themselves with time,—it is then that there is danger of delay, because those details which were not taken into account, not having been provided for at the same time as the others, have yet to be attended to; and thus the whole may be retarded by an apparently insignificant omission.

Any person who has any knowledge of the administration of States will easily perceive, by the sketches we have given of Napoleon's preparations, that nothing necessary to a great armament had been forgotten: all had been calculated beforehand, all made clear, and with a certain security in the means of accomplishment that could only be designed by the highest genius perfected by vast experience. It must be added, that, in the execution of these measures, he had carefully kept political considerations in view. Thus, the immediate formation of the *corps d'armée*, which was so essential to their proper organization, and which was made as inoffensive as possible by being called *corps d'observation*, together with the recalling of the men on six months' furlough, the immediate institution of the fourth and fifth battalions, the re-

establishment of the depot at V transporting of arms to where the repaired, and, lastly, the forming Ministry of the Interior, of those which the National Guards were rolled,—all these were urgent measures admitted of no delay. But the advantage of being capable into immediate operation. In 5 days, when the real state of affairs known, when the declared hostility need no longer be concealed, as from fearing to disturb the public would be necessary to call forth the energies of the people, and make their danger, then those other measures as the summoning and selecting soldiers that had deserted, the meeting the National Guards, the decision of Council of State as to the conscription of 1815, the levies of horses, the erecting workshops, and the throwing of works around Paris, which could be attended in secret, could be attended the loss of a single day: for they gave precedence to the others, and then they would at a later period be harmless, since policy would thus demand publicity rather than secrecy.

It was on the 24th of March, after his arrival, that Napoleon retained information of the Bourbons in the country. It was on the 25th, 27th of March that the resolutions we have just spoken were conceived and immediately transmitted to the heads of Department, even before Marshal D time to make himself acquainted with and things that constituted his. Meanwhile, measures for the army of France were decided and ordered, so the minister had only to put them into effect under the direction and supervision of his indefatigable master. Applying

than in financial matters. Calumny, and that sometimes of the deepest dye, is all the justice that can be expected from them. I have seen strange examples of this in my time, but none more extraordinary in the quickness of the reprisals than those of the years 1814 and 1815. When the Baron Louis succeeded M. Mollien and M. de Gatte, he made a most unfair report of the state of the Imperial finances, and handed in a most unjust balance-sheet representing the state of the treasury. Eleven months later he met with the same kind of justice. During the Hundred Days all expenses were met by the resources he had created, though great care was taken not to admit it. When Napoleon was at St. Helena, where he generally showed tolerable impartiality, and would have shown more if his great mind had not been ruled by the bad habits of the times, Napoleon, talking *en passant* of the finances of the Hundred Days, said, carelessly, that Count Mollien (of whom he spoke at other times with well-merited praise) very cleverly employed forty millions, which Baron Louis had used in stock-jobbing by means of the *reconnaissances de liquidation*, had succeeded in meeting all the extra wants of the time. Such is the howling and unjust manner in which Napoleon spoke of one of the greatest financial operations of the age. These forty millions—Napoleon does not estimate the sum high enough—constituted the floating debt, the vast resource which Baron Louis had procured for the state, and the pretended stock-jobbing with the *reconnaissances de liquidation* was only a temporary expedient, blamable of course in ordinary times, but necessary in the infancy of public credit. When Baron Louis put in the market the *reconnaissances de liquidation*, which were nothing else than our exchequer bills, unknown at that time, he thought it right to keep up their value by purchasing them when they began to fall in price, and thus succeeded in keeping up their credit and in maintaining them at par. This could no more be called *stock-jobbing*, than the repurchasing of the

scrip of the *caisse d'amortissement*, which is often done, when he sold quantities of annuities or of the *communes*. Baron Louis bought up of these *reconnaissances de liquidation* what was good; indeed, he did nothing but what was lately necessary. Now that exchequer bills, systematic financial system, are always of necessity to have recourse to such expedient circumstances make them fall below par, it would be blamed who, instead of keeping up by redeeming them as they fell due, would try up at a reduced price. He would be looked upon with the same light as a merchant who bought up the honoured bills and speculated on his own. But at the present time public credit is such that the time of which we speak ministers were the difficulties of endeavouring to establish it. We have not allowed ourselves these reflections, assert truths admitted by all who understand to show once more what justice was then and what, on the other hand, should be in history. The resources created by a talent which supplied Napoleon's expenses in 1814, and by him as a *ressource* kept in reserve for stock-jobbing thus rebuked the calumnious report that had ten months before of the state of his finances a time always comes when every thing and is put in their proper light, and history is only when, instead of having to destroy in silence pronounced a long-deferred condemnation, do unveil the merits of men who have mutual stood each other. As for me, always anxious I feel like those jurymen who scrupulously having to pronounce an acquittal, and not a conviction: and I believe that I do justice to both. I say, "Count Mollien created the credit of the treasury, Baron Louis the credit."

to the Ministry of the Interior, Carnot's attention to General as the most competent person *bureaux* of the National Guard. possessed that rare combination of military and civil qualities specially adapted to the twofold nature of the militia pointed to organize. Napoleon and Mathieu Dumas to prepare as quietly as possible, every thing for the mobilization of the Na-

He next turned his attention to military promotions made, and which had been so ordered that it would be impossible to do so. He laid down a few true principles on this subject, and application of them to a commission possessed of the public confidence. In the decree published he exempted thirteen persons from amnesty, and among these Marmont and Angereau. He was severe in his enmity against the Bourbons, being Governor of Caen, had faults by publishing a most violent attack against the Bourbons. But Marmont's name was left on the list. The decree was, however, determined to erase from the names of Oudinot, Saint-Cyr, who had zealously served the Bourbons; but he was commensurate with their services. He did this not so much to give as to make vacancies for which he devoted themselves to the cause. Three other marshals, and Macdonald, were in pretty good position. Napoleon deferred concerning them. He was so to Berthier that it gave him credit with severity toward that old man sent him word that he would be as weak as a father on commencing returning to Paris. At Marshal Soult would not be supposed him very much irritated the Bourbons, who had recommended after having placed him in a position that involved a self-contradiction of conduct. He took no meanings from him, nor Marshal Macdonald, of character he was well able to judge.

His plan was to induce both to resign and then offer them employment, in their dignities. As for Marmont, Suchet, Davout, Ney, and Napoleon had already declared for the Bourbons, of whom he had not already employed some of them, to give the others appointments in deserts. With regard to Ney, measure advantageous at once to the emperor and to the marshal. Ney, embarrassed by the contradictory which he had acted at Fontainebleau, and thought that the emperor's words, of every one he met reproaches he felt he deserved. His position had a bad effect both on his words. To excuse his own faults,

he was constantly blaming others, saying, at one time, such things of the Bourbons, at another of Napoleon, as not only detracted from his own dignity, but which might make it difficult to employ him. As Napoleon did not wish to lose the marshal's services, he thought it better to remove him from Paris, and therefore ordered him to inspect the frontier from Dunkirk to Bâle, with power over all the civil and military authorities, and with express orders to report every thing connected with the defence of the country or the state of the army. Ney, notwithstanding his characteristic faults, was extremely shrewd with regard to every thing connected with his profession, and would be most useful on the frontier, whilst at Paris he would only injure the public interests and his own.

All these different arrangements with respect to the general armament of France had, as we have already said, been planned and ordered from the 25th to the 27th of March. Meantime, frequent intelligence had been received from the south of the Empire. Napoleon had been informed that all was becoming quiet in the west, at least for the moment, but that the royalists were making some progress in the south, especially between Marseilles and Lyons. Though he felt no uneasiness about this, he wished to put an end to demonstrations that might interfere with his preparations for war. He ordered General Morand to send two columns along the Loire, one on the right, the other on the left bank, each to be composed of one regiment of infantry and two regiments of foot, and to repress every insurrectionary movement. He also desired that he should summon three regiments of infantry from the coast, and send them to General Clausel, to aid him in subduing Bordeaux. He also summoned General Grouchy, who had publicly quarrelled with the Bourbons, because of the dignity of colonel-general being transferred to the princes of the blood, and sent him to Lyons to arrest the progress of the Duke d'Angoulême. He desired him to act with vigour and promptitude, but by no means to treat the prince as it had been intended to treat him. "But," asked the general, "if the prince fall into my power, what shall I do?" "Take him, but treat him with every respect," said Napoleon; "for I wish that Europe should see the difference between me and the crowned brigands who have set a price upon my head." These words, which showed how much he was irritated, referred to the declaration of the 13th of March, which had been published in the names of the sovereigns assembled at Vienna. Napoleon was silent a moment, and seemed to reconsider his resolutions. "The prince," he said, "may be made a means of exchange with foreign courts, and be, perhaps, given in exchange for my wife and son." But he soon abandoned this idea, for the Duke d'Angoulême was not of sufficient importance to be made the object of such an exchange, and repeated his former instructions. "Get the prince out of the country," he said; "if you take him, treat him with the utmost deference; write immediately to me, and we will give him up safe and sound in exchange for the crown diamonds, which I had in my possession last year, but which I did not hesitate to resign,

and which do not belong to Louis XVIII., nor to me, but to France."

This said, Napoleon dismissed General Grouchy, and gave him, as companion of his expedition,—not that he doubted him,—General Corbineau, in whose promptitude, sincerity, and intelligence he felt the most perfect confidence. He desired the latter to remain constantly beside General Grouchy. At the same time, he sent off one of the divisions of the 6th corps, under the Count Lobau, by post. This division was particularly well suited to the south, as it was composed of regiments that had been most forward in declaring for the Empire. They were the 7th of the line, (the regiment of De la Bédoyère,) the 20th, and 24th from the garrison at Lyons, and the 14th, that had come to meet Napoleon between Fontainebleau and Auxerre. These four regiments would suffice to disperse the southern insurgents, and, that easy task accomplished, they were to form the nucleus of the 7th corps, destined to defend the Alps.

Napoleon's attention was not exclusively occupied by these military measures. He was obliged to think also of the home policy, and to declare under what form of government France was to be placed. During the review of the 21st, and one or two which had taken place subsequently, he had addressed the troops in language similar to that he had used at Grenoble, Lyons, and Auxerre. He was come, he said, to restore the national glory, to revive the principles of 1789, and to bestow on France as much liberty as was suited for her. These professions, which had been addressed to some provincial municipalities and to a few soldiers, must now be repeated, with suitable solemnity, before more dignified assemblies, before the great bodies of the State, and this in a manner that would precisely define his engagements with the country.

Napoleon had appointed Sunday, the 26th of March, for the reception of the great bodies of the State, when discourses, which had been previously arranged, would be delivered on both sides. But on the day before, he sought to impress the public mind by an act that would plainly declare his actual sentiments.

No Government had ever repressed the manifestation of public opinion more than his. In the commencement of his reign he had led public opinion captive by the personal admiration he inspired, and in later times an inexorable police suppressed in journals and in books every thought that opposed his opinions. Toward the end of his reign, Napoleon became conscious of the inconvenience of such an oppressive system, and often spoke of it to the Duke de Rovigo, Minister of Police, who fully agreed with him. One great evil resulting from the system was, that no one had faith in the declarations of the Government, even when perfectly sincere. In time of war, for example, to want of faith in the French Government was added implicit belief in foreigners; and, whilst our bulletins were not credited, no doubt was ever entertained of the veracity of those of the enemy, which were infinitely more false than ours. Deeply touched by this state of public feeling, Napoleon, in 1813, wrote to the Duke de Rovigo, "As we are not believed we must

no longer speak in our own name, but availing that of others, tell the whole truth as only safeguard now." In consequence of this resolution, Napoleon despatched no bulletin in 1813 or 1814, but had articles inserted in the "Moniteur," which commenced thus:—"We have heard from the army that," &c.

This painful experience had opened Napoleon's eyes on the subject of the liberty of the press. However, had it been suddenly proposed to him in 1813 or 1814 to expose himself freely to all the violence of the journalists—a violence that is most formidable when restraint is suddenly exchanged for unrestrained liberty,—he would most certainly have refused, as one refuses to undergo a painful operation of whose necessity one is not convinced. As he was now returning from Elba, where, during an entire year, he had been the target against which the journals of Europe had hurled their abuse. After such a trial he had nothing more to fear, and, as he himself very shrewdly remarked, *there was nothing more to be said against him whilst a great deal still remained to be said against his opponents.*

Though still aware of the inconveniences resulting from the liberty of the press, his 30-fold experience as sovereign and exile had changed his opinion on the subject. But he was influenced by a still more powerful motive that coloured every thing connected with his home policy, which was, to do all things the opposite of what the Bourbons had done. His only excuse for expelling them is the risk of a fearful war, was that his Government was to be the antithesis of theirs, and the corrector of their errors. They had not shown sufficient interest for the glory of France; he must, therefore, exalt it more than ever. They were opposed to the interests of the Revolution; he must declare such interests sacred. They granted liberty hesitatingly, and loaded by many restrictions; he must give it fully, without any restraint, and, at the same time, with seeming pleasure and confidence, whatever might be the result; for nothing could be so bad as to have it said that he was in the footsteps of the Bourbons, and that consequently, it was not worth the trouble to get rid of them at the risk of a revolution, and of what was worse, a universal war. It was evident that the censorship of the press had been an infringement of the Charter, and totally opposed to the Government's new meant to inaugurate. Napoleon determined to annul it by the simple insertion of an order in the "Moniteur."

He merely introduced some provisions in the details, which the legislature has since then consecrated as wise and necessary. He required that each journal should publish the name of the principal person connected with the publication, who should be responsible for the articles that appeared in the paper—a person since named the responsible editor. This precaution had been suggested by M. Fouché, who, flatterer himself that he could mould men as he pleased, thought that by making certain persons responsible for what appeared in the journals, he would have them all in his power. Napoleon did not expect this, but he was determined to run every risk, and, on the 26th of March, announced in the

"Moniteur" the abolition of the censorship of the press.

Napoleon could not include among the great bodies of the State which he was about to receive, the two chambers which had been dissolved by the decree of Lyons. Their place was supplied by the ministers, who were received as a body, which gave them an importance they had never before enjoyed, by the Council of State, the Court of Cassation, the Cour des Comptes, the Court of Appeal, &c. Prince Cambacères spoke for the ministers, and in their name entered into all the engagements necessary for those exercising the executive power. Having congratulated the monarch, whom Providence, he said, had twice raised up, — the first time to deliver France from anarchy, the second to save her from counter-revolution, — Prince Cambacères summed up the principles of the executive power in the following words: — "*Your majesty has already traced the path that your ministers have to follow; you have already, by your proclamations, informed the world of the maxims by which you wish your empire to be governed. The Bourbons promised to forget every thing, but did not keep their word. Your majesty will remember your promises; you will forget the violence of parties, and only remember the services rendered to the country. You will also forget that we have been masters of the world, and will only go to war to repel an unjust aggression. You will not seek arbitrary power; you will respect persons and property, and allow the free communication of thought; and we shall be happy to assist you in the accomplishment of a task by which you will gain the best and noblest glory.*"

More than this could not be expected from any Government, until liberty had been secured by law, the best of all securities. "*The sentiments you express are mine,*" said Napoleon, and immediately gave audience to the Council of State.

This body proposed establishing the principles in virtue of which Napoleon had commenced his reign, and in virtue of which the Council of State had not hesitated to resume its functions, as though nothing had intervened between the April of 1814 and the March of 1815. The following are the reasons adduced.

In 1789 France abolished feudal monarchy, for which it substituted a representative sovereignty founded on equality of rights and a just participation by the citizens in the government of the State.

In 1790 the Bourbons affected to adopt the new principles proclaimed by the nation, but by their silent resistance soon provoked and merited a downfall, which a series of national decisions had afterward confirmed.

In the years VIII. and X., France, after long and severe agitations, had confided her government to Napoleon Bonaparte, crowned already by the hand of victory, and intrusted the care of her destinies to him under the successive titles of First Consul and Emperor. The people had twice confirmed these delegations of sovereignty by their votes.

In 1814, the Allied Powers, profiting by a moment of disaster, penetrated into our capital, and the Senate gave up the national constitutions they were bound to defend, and, depending on foreign aid, abolished the Empire

and recalled Louis Stanislaus Xavier to the throne. In doing this, that body had assumed rights to which it had no claim. It had, however, attached as a condition to his return the formation of a Constitution by which the rights of the nation would be partly secured, and which the monarch was bound to accept before ascending the throne.

Louis XVIII. had not fulfilled even this preliminary condition, for, having entered Paris under the protection of foreign bayonets, he dated his acts from the nineteenth year of his reign, thereby annulling all anterior acts of the nation. He gave an imperfect constitution, made still more imperfect by the manner of its execution; he humbled the glory of France, favoured the pretensions of the old nobility, allowed the claims to national property to be disputed, deprived the Legion of Honour of its allotted funds, and lowered the value of the insignia by making them too common, and, in a word, had put in peril all that the Revolution had made sacred.

All, therefore, that had been done since 1814 may be considered as null in principle, as bad in effect, for the Senate did not possess the right to abolish the Empire, and, even admitting that it had, Louis XVIII. had not fulfilled the conditions in virtue of which he had ascended the throne. In fact, the Government of the emigrants had acted in a manner consistent with the illegality of its origin.

Napoleon, by his miraculous return from exile, and received on landing by the unanimous acclamations of the people and the army, had re-established the nation in its most sacred rights, and he alone was lawful sovereign, for no power is legal but that conferred by the nation.

However, time and the actual state of France made modifications necessary in the institutions of the first Empire. Napoleon had promised that these modifications should be made. He would keep this engagement, and would have the promised modifications confirmed in an assembly of the representatives of the nation, convoked for the month of May. Until the meeting of this assembly, Napoleon and his ministers would govern in conformity with existing laws, and the Council of State, which he had previously commissioned to watch over the application of these laws, had come to offer him its loyal and constitutional assistance.

It was Thibaudeau, who had been successively Conventionalist and prefect, that had aided in the construction of this closely reasoned but artificial logic, to which indeed no answer could be made, if the legitimacy of Governments were made to consist in certain conditions dependent on their origin, and not in their form and mode of proceeding. Governments, indeed, spring from all the sudden changes of revolutions, and it is difficult to mark the precise signs that legitimize their origin. They are sometimes the result of popular feeling, sometimes the offspring of victory, sometimes of defeat, and sometimes spring from the revival of affection, in a nation disabused of its errors, for a dynasty which their common misfortunes has made it regret; and each form of government must be accepted, imposed as it is by necessity, and each in turn asserts its own legitimacy, alleging theories

admitted by some, disputed by others, and concerning which the world will never agree. Without denying all that there is of respectable, august, and solid in titles founded on a long hereditary transmission, we must, however, say that, for persons of plain good sense, Governments that were the result of necessity at their commencement become legitimate with time, when the nation for which they were established, finding them suited to its habits and intelligence, and acting in conformity with its general interests, support them with a well-weighed and abiding approbation. This is practically, if not theoretically, the best-founded legitimacy, for though a Government had been proclaimed by a whole nation, men and women, old and young, voting before mayors and notaries, or even did it descend in uninterrupted succession from Mount Sinai, it loses claim to existence once it jars with the faith, manners, honour, or interests of a nation. It is by its deeds, and by its deeds alone, that a Government is to be judged, or its legitimacy determined. Beyond that, all is artificial and mere sophistry. But no better reply could be made to Louis XVIII., dating his acts from the nineteenth year of his reign, than by asserting the sovereignty of the people, exercised by writing "yes," or "no," in miserable registries in the offices of mayors or notaries. One was as good as the other.

Napoleon appreciated these theories at their just value, but he adopted the conventional reasoning to reply to the royalist logic, and gave his consent in the following terms:—

"Princes are the first citizens of a State. Their authority is more or less extensive according to the interests of the nation they govern. Sovereignty is hereditary only because the interests of the people require it. I know of no legitimacy not contained in these principles.

"I have renounced all ideas of the vast empire of which in fifteen years I had only laid the basis. Henceforth the consolidation and happiness of the French Empire shall be the object of all my thoughts."

What was really of importance in all these manifestations was the formal renunciation of the ancient system of a warlike and conquering empire, the renunciation of arbitrary power, the promise of exact conformity to the laws, and the pledge to give institutions which would guarantee the liberty of the nation and the protection of her interests. Napoleon was ready to enter into this engagement at once, were it only to justify himself for having thrown France into a new revolution; but it was only natural that, having been at Paris but six days, the necessity of seizing the reins of government, of establishing relations abroad, and preparing the reorganization of the army, and expelling his rivals from the country, should have occupied him exclusively. This latter part of his task was not yet completed, for the south was still to be delivered from royalist insurrections; he was earnestly engaged in doing this, and needed only a few days to be completely successful.

Indeed, the re-establishment of the Imperial authority met with but few serious obstacles, though there was some great, but not extensive, excitement, that passed away quickly. In the

west, the Vendean leaders, stunned by the second downfall of the Bourbons, had a confused idea of being in some way implicated in the catastrophe, but did not dare to think of a revolution, whilst they saw the rural districts so depressed, the cities so joyous, and when they considered the enemy with whom they had to do, an enemy that would treat them with leniency or severity according to their conduct. Some professional Chouans, and a few Vendean or Breton peasants, full of their ancient zeal, were quite ready to rise; but their generals, unsupported by England, aided by her money and armaments, shrank in the absence of a European war, dared not think of a civil one.

General Morand consequently met no opposition in Vendée, and, having unfurled the tricolour flag on both banks of the Loire, he hastened to the assistance of General Clausel, who had not, indeed, any great need of his aid. The latter general, having assembled at Angoulême some detachments of National Guard and gendarmerie, advanced toward the Dordogne, first sending on a confidential officer to strengthen the garrison of Blaye. This garrison consisted of some companies of the 6th regiment, quartered in Bordeaux. This report immediately on hearing of the events in Paris sent a detachment of one hundred and fifty men to join General Clausel at Cubzac. This illustrious general, therefore, arrived at the banks of the Dordogne with a hundred gendarmes, one hundred and fifty men of the 62d, and three or four hundred National Guards. The bridge of Cubzac having been cut away, the general took his station on the right bank, whilst the Bordelais volunteers occupied the left. Having borne some ill-directed discharges of cannon, he succeeded in forming a passage by the help of boats collected here and there, and commenced a push with the leader of the Bordelais volunteers who had hastily evacuated the *entre-deux-eaux* (as the land enclosed between the Dordogne and the Gironde was called). The volunteers were commanded by M. de Martignac, afterward Minister of Charles X., and who was highly esteemed by his contemporaries for his amiability and eloquence. General Clausel informed him of what had taken place at Paris, and which had been kept secret at Bordeaux in order to prolong the delusions and opposition of the people. It was not difficult for the general to convince M. de Martignac that it would not be possible for him to make any serious resistance, and that attempting it would only injure an important and increasing town. M. de Martignac promised to reply to Bordeaux, and be the bearer of the general's communications, and to bring back quickly an answer dictated by necessity.

The general followed M. de Martignac closely, and encamped with his little troop at Bessac on the right bank of the Gironde, and opposite to Bordeaux in a diagonal direction.

The greatest confusion prevailed in the town at the time, as M. de Vitrolles, in passing through on his way to Toulouse, had communicated to the authorities the orders of Louis XVIII., to which he had added his own. The principal object of the royalists had been to defend the banks of the Loire, from Nantes

to Auvergne, profit by the mountainous country between Auvergne and Cevennes, to take up a position there, and to keep possession of both banks of the Rhone, as far as Arles, Marseilles, and Toulon. They had written to England for arms and money, and to Ferdinand VII. for Spanish soldiers. By this imprudent appeal to foreigners, our ports were as open for the British flag as for that of the Bourbons, and the royalists thus ran the risk of renewing the scenes of 1793 at Toulon. But passion and necessity do not reason, especially when patriotism is blinded by party spirit. All this, however, had not prevented the loss of the Loire, and, the Loire being lost, an effort was made to preserve the line of the Garonne, prolonged by the Southern Canal as far as the Rhone; that is, as far as Bordeaux, Toulouse, Nismes, Marseilles, and Toulon. Great hopes were entertained that the Duke d'Angoulême would be successful on the banks of the Rhone.

As the royalists had possession of the line of the Garonne, the Duchess d'Angoulême did all in her power to preserve it. She had been joined by M. Lainé, who assisted her as far as he could. It would have been a great advantage had M. Lainé succeeded in enlightening the Bourbons at Paris, and thus prevented the revolution of the 20th of March, which could produce nothing but misery. But as Napoleon had got again possession of the French throne, and as a last and desperate struggle with Europe was inevitable, the wisest and most patriotic course would be to join him as quickly as possible, that he might have the entire strength of the nation under his command. A few among the sensible and intelligent population of Bordeaux understood this; but the mass, irritated by the sufferings of twenty years, and afflicted at seeing the sea again blockaded, sympathized, both through self-interest and through conviction, with the Duchess d'Angoulême, and were ready to aid her at the expense of their lives. Under such circumstances, every thing depended on the conduct of the troops. These consisted of two regiments,—the 62d of the line, and the 8th light infantry. These troops took exactly the same attitude as that assumed by the garrison at Lille; that is, they treated the august daughter of Louis XVI. with the most profound respect, but showed unmistakably that Napoleon possessed their affections.

M. de Martignac having come to Bordeaux to announce the arrival of General Clausel, and to present his propositions, the barracks were visited, and the soldiers spoken to; but, though the Duchess d'Angoulême took part in this herself, the result was not at all satisfactory. The troops declared unanimously that they would not allow any one to fail in respect to the princess, but that they would not fire on General Clausel nor permit others to fire on him. After such a declaration, nothing could be done but to retire, which was the opinion of the most rational among the National Guard. The more ardent portion of the population who had enlisted as volunteers wished to persevere; but their opinion could have no weight, as they would themselves have been obliged to fly before the regular troops after exchanging a few shots.

M. de Martignac returned to General Clausel

and assured him of a speedy surrender, provided he did not precipitate events, and allowed the Duchess d'Angoulême sufficient time to leave the city. General Clausel, appreciating the difficulty of the position, promised to remain at Bastide until prudence should have prevailed over passion. On the 1st of April, he took up his position on the right bank of the Gironde, whence he could tranquilly observe the tumult that reigned at Bordeaux. Opposite to him, on the other side of the river, the National Guard and volunteers were drawn up under arms. It was already known that the Duchess d'Angoulême was about to abandon the city, and for this the volunteers blamed the National Guard,—some battalions in particular, that had the reputation of being too moderate. A collision soon followed; an esteemed officer of the National Guard was killed, and the men, excited by the violence of the volunteers, declared for an immediate surrender. The Duchess d'Angoulême embarked; and General Clausel, having got possession of the bridge of the Gironde, entered Bordeaux, and, without a single act of severity, quietly re-established the Imperial authority in the town.

M. de Vitrolles, as we have already said, had tried to establish at Toulouse a royalist Government, which was to serve as a connecting-link between Bordeaux, where the Duchess d'Angoulême was exerting herself, and Marseilles, where her husband, the duke, was making preparations for an offensive campaign. M. de Vitrolles levied taxes and raised troops, formed battalions of volunteers, and placed them, together with the few detachments of the line that still supported the royalist cause, under the command of Marshal Perignon, who resided in Languedoc, and who was neither of an age nor character to serve the royal cause effectually. In addition to these measures, M. de Vitrolles got up a "Moniteur," which was to contradict all reports favourable to the Imperial cause, and to propagate such as were favourable to the re-establishment of the Bourbons. This little Toulouse Government sent out expeditions, some of which proved successful, others unsuccessful, against neighbouring towns which, according to information received from Paris, had displayed the tricolour flag. M. de Vitrolles had reckoned upon being able to maintain his position here, with the assistance of the Spaniards; but M. de Laval had sent him word from Madrid that, though Ferdinand VII. felt a deep interest for the house of Bourbon, he was himself so embarrassed that he could not spare a single regiment.

The news of General Clausel's entry into Bordeaux put an end to this royalist attempt of uniting Bordeaux and Marseilles. General Count Delaborde, who had fought so well against the English in Spain, was in Toulouse, only waiting an opportunity to raise the Imperial standard. General Charton had been sent to him by the War Minister, conferring upon him extraordinary powers, and orders to dispel this royalist phantom that was so uselessly disturbing the country. A part of the 3d regiment of artillery was at Toulouse, the greater part having been sent to Nismes, on the service of the Duke d'Angoulême. One company of this regiment, whose fidelity was suspected, had been sent back to Toulouse.

General Delaborde profited by this circumstance, and, with the assistance of some half-pay officers, opened a communication with this regiment, persuaded the men to mount the tricolour cockade, and then, placing himself at their head, arrested Marshal Perignon and M. de Vitrolles in the Emperor's name. The marshal he allowed to return to his estates, but kept M. de Vitrolles prisoner until the Government should decide his fate. This little revolution, executed on the 4th of April, did not cost a single drop of blood, and was the signal for hoisting the tricolour flag along the Pyrenees, from Bayonne to Perpignan.

The Duke d'Angoulême had Provence, and both banks of the Rhone as far as Valence, under his authority, and he had some prospect of success in these parts.

By his visit to Marseilles and Toulon, and his return through Nîmes, this prince had given additional impetus to the royalism of the south; which, indeed, did not need any. Marshal Massena did not interfere, contenting himself with maintaining the public peace until party spirit should put our ports in danger, and giving up a portion of the troops to the Duke d'Angoulême, only keeping what would be necessary to defend Marseilles and Toulon against any attempt of the English. He had left Toulon in the care of the 69th and 82d regiments of the line, and had led the 16th to Marseilles, to preserve order there, which indeed was not an easy task amid that excited population.

On the other hand, the Duke d'Angoulême, having left Nîmes, ascended the Rhone, and sent a second column through the valley of the Durance, with orders to proceed through Sisteron and Gap, to Grenoble. His plan was, should his party succeed in getting possession of Montélimart, Valence, and Vienne, in the valley of the Rhone, and of Gap and Grenoble in the Alps, to unite both columns before Lyons, and recover this capital of the south, and in Napoleon's rear again raise the white flag that had been lowered for a time. This plan, sketched by Generals Ernouf and d'Aultanne, both of whom had remained faithful to the royal cause, failed merely for want of means of putting it into execution. Could the troops be relied on? And if they failed, would the excited people of the south be equal to conquering the less demonstrative but not less firm and courageous inhabitants of Dauphiné, Lyonnais, and Auvergne? This question could only be solved by a practical test. Here, also, help was sought from abroad; for the Duke d'Angoulême had sent an officer in whom he could confide, to ask the King of Sardinia for some thousand Piedmontese.

The Duke d'Angoulême had under his command the 58th and 83d regiments of the line, that had been sent in pursuit of Napoleon at his arrival, and had since remained in the valley of the Durance; and also the 10th of the line, and the 14th of the cavalry chasseurs, that had been brought from Languedoc. The 10th was commanded by M. d'Ambrugeac, and called "the Colonel's regiment;" the officers were all reliable, though animated by the same feelings as the rest of the army. This regiment showed no symptoms of disaffection, because its members were kept by circum-

stances in another train of ideas. The presence of the prince and of numerous royalist volunteers had led the 10th into a path it would not have chosen for itself. The 14th chasseurs had obeyed, but less ardently, the general impulsion. These troops were joined by a detachment of the 3d artillery, a company of which had just effected the revolution of Toulouse; and they were also reinforced by bands of volunteers from Nîmes, Arles, Arles, Aix, and Beaucaire. As little confidence was felt in the regiments of the line, however well they might seem disposed, an effort was made to weaken or dissolve them by offering sixty francs to every man that would leave the line and join the royalist volunteers. It was accepted by some, who, having left their country at fifteen or twenty, had become in some sort mercenaries, and were willing to fight for any cause, provided it was not that of another country. It was hoped that these well-drilled men would give that consistence to the volunteers in which they failed, not for want of courage, but of experience.

In pursuance of the arranged plan, General Ernouf took the 58th and 83d regiments, that had remained on the banks of the Durance, and undertook the execution of the expedition which, proceeding along this river, was to terminate at Grenoble. He was also accompanied by a contingent of volunteers. To the Duke d'Angoulême, with the 10th of the line—the Colonel's regiment—the 14th chasseurs a troop of volunteers, and four hundred men of the 1st foreign regiment, altogether amounting to about five thousand men, undertook the principal object of the expedition, which was to ascend the Rhone, and successively take possession of Montélimart, Valence, and Vienne. General Ernouf had promised to be as expeditious as possible, and reach Grenoble by the time the duke arrived at Vienne.

On the 28th of March, the Duke d'Angoulême boldly took possession of the *Fort Saint-Esprit*, and, leaving a detachment there, entered Montélimart on the 29th. The people of the Lower Rhone were eminently royalist, whilst those of the Upper were Bonapartists; but there was always a sufficient minority at each place to allow each party to make a demonstration in turn. The Duke d'Angoulême was well received at Montélimart, where he sought to strengthen his position by seizing the bridge of the Drôme.

At the first intelligence of this movement, the authorities of Dauphiné and Lyonnais hastened to collect what troops they had, which were not many, for the greater number of regiments had followed Napoleon to Paris. They had none but the National Guards, who, though most zealous, were not equal to counter troops of the line. General Debelles left Valence with some National Guards, and tried to make a stand on the other side of the Drôme, but was repulsed by Count Antioch d'Escars with a detachment of the 10th of the line, together with some troops composed of volunteers and old soldiers. Though General Debelles had been forced to rejoin the Rhone, he endeavoured to preserve the line of the river by defending the bridge of Lodi.

The Duke d'Angoulême, feeling some confidence, determined to advance from Monté-

mart to Valence. He remained a day or two at Montélimart to organize the places in his interest, and on the 2d tried to force the passage of the Drôme. General Debelle had given the bridge of Loriol in charge to Noël, the commander of the battalion of artillery, an honest man, who would not re-enter the service until freed from his oath by the departure of Louis XVIII. He had under his command three hundred men of the 39th, a half-squadron of the Guards of Honour, and four hundred National Guards from the neighbourhood. Noël placed his artillery on the bridge, defended by a detachment of the 39th, and dispersed the remainder of his men along the Drôme to defend the quays of the river above and below Loriol Bridge. He kept this position for some time, and would have succeeded in arresting the progress of the royalists but for a curious accident, which was interpreted in various ways at the time. The Bonapartists counted with certainty on the defection of the 10th regiment of the line and the 14th chasseurs, and were ready to receive them with open arms. Some soldiers of the 10th, thinking the moment was come to declare themselves, left their regiments, and sprang on the bridge, holding their muskets reversed. They were received as brothers, and it was thought that the troops that followed were coming in the same spirit. But two companies of the 10th, kept in good order by their officers, fired, and then mounted the bridge with fixed bayonets. The men of the 39th were taken by surprise, and retired in disorder, crying that they were betrayed. By this accident, the royalists conquered the whole course of the Drôme, and entered Valence on the 3d of April, with the Duke d'Angoulême at their head, amidst the acclamations of the royalist party.

The duke acted at Valence as he had done at Montélimart: he remained there for two days to appoint authorities devoted to his cause, and to await intelligence from the column which, passing through Sisteron and Gap, was to advance on and take Grenoble. But this column had not been so successful as the other.

General Ernouf, following the route by which Napoleon had arrived at Grenoble, had, in passing from the Durance to the Isère, to traverse the long and narrow gorge of the defiles of Saint-Bonnet, the same where the Elba column had narrowly escaped being stopped in its progress. To avoid this danger, the general determined to force the passage simultaneously at two points. The 58th regiment and some royalists under the command of General Gardanne were to advance along the high-road to Gap, then turn to the left, and enter the defile of Saint-Bonnet, whilst the 83d, under General Loverdo, leaving the high-road that led to Gap, were to advance by a lateral gorge, and reach La Mure through Serres and Mens; thus effecting their purpose by turning Saint-Bonnet.

This plan was followed exactly, and the two detachments advanced toward the appointed places, whilst the Duke d'Angoulême proceeded to Montélimart. General Gardanne, formerly Governor of the pages under the Empire, unwillingly aided the royal cause, and served under the Bourbon only because he

dreaded Napoleon's resentment for his inconsistent conduct since 1814. He appeared before Gap with troops as discontented, but not so irresolute, as himself, and who only waited for a favourable opportunity to change sides. On their way they met the Mayor of Gap, who came in the most friendly manner to offer them provisions, and express his astonishment at seeing them engaged in a warfare so unnatural and useless as resistance to the Empire. The soldiers smiled as they listened, and, looking at each other, asked if it were time to follow their own inclinations. Still the demonstrations of the people around were not yet sufficiently marked to encourage them.

The next day they entered the defile of Saint-Bonnet, and were again met by the mayor and inhabitants, bringing provisions in abundance, as on the day before, but now crying "*Vive l'Empereur!*" with all their might. At this the soldiers yielded, drew the tri-coloured cockade from their knapsacks, fixed them in their shakos, and declared for the Emperor. General Chabert, who now arrived, reassured General Gardanne, by telling him that the past had been pardoned, and thus induced him to follow the example of the troops. The royalist volunteers, who were allowed to depart unmolested, returned to Sisteron under the command of some officers who had remained faithful.

Whilst the detachment under General Gardanne behaved in this manner, that under General Loverdo did not act much better. During the 28th, 29th, and 30th of March, General Loverdo, with the 83d regiment and the two Provençal columns, had advanced toward Serres and Saint-Maurice, and were approaching La Mure in the rear of General Chabert, opposed to General Gardanne. He there learned how the 58th had behaved, and met Generals Gardanne and Chabert, who were come to convert him. Immediately after the landing at the Gulf of Juan, General Loverdo, yielding to his personal feelings, felt inclined to join Napoleon. Since then, placed in the very focus of royalism, he had become so engaged with the partisans of the Bourbons that he could not free himself with honour. He therefore remained faithful to the cause to which accident had bound him; and though tempted to yield to the entreaties of Generals Chabert and Gardanne, he retraced his steps, taking with him the highly-discontented 83d. But scarcely had he arrived at Sisteron, when the regiment that had so unwillingly followed its general deserted to a man, and hastened to join General Chabert on the road to Grenoble. These two regiments were a powerful reinforcement to the partisans of the Empire in this district, and were soon to be sent to oppose the Duke d'Angoulême between Vienne and Valence.

Whilst such untoward events were taking place in the very bosom of that column that was sent to take possession of Grenoble and then join the Duke d'Angoulême on the road to Lyons, still more disagreeable events were occurring in his rear. The Duke d'Angoulême had left the people of Languedoc influenced by different feelings, some ardent in the royal cause, and others inflamed with a revolutionary and Bonapartist spirit. The news from

Paris, at first contradicted, was now universally known to be true, and inspired the partisans of the Empire with hope and the desire of triumph. General Gilly, who had been exiled to Remoulins, near Nîmes, was, with many other half-pay officers, only waiting for an opportunity to rise. He came to Nîmes, where, assisted by some of his old companions in arms, he communicated with the 63d of the line and the 10th chasseurs, whom the Duke d'Angoulême had left in that town, and induced them to assume the tricolour cockade. This was no not a difficult enterprise, for there were no troops to oppose the movement; and, as the Protestant population hastened to follow the example of the soldiers, the revolution was accomplished in an instant at Nîmes. General Gilly then, putting himself at the head of the 63d regiment of the line and the 10th chasseurs, advanced to the Bridge Saint-Esprit, and took it from the detachment of royalist volunteers left to guard the position. Thus, what the Duke d'Angoulême had sought to do to Napoleon befell himself, that is to say that, as he advanced, the work which he had accomplished and left in his rear was destroyed.

Abandoned on the right by the column he had sent toward Grenoble, threatened in the rear by the troops left at Nîmes, the Duke d'Angoulême would have no chance of escape unless able to advance and force the gates of Lyons. But every path seemed to close before him, instead of opening. General Grouchy arrived at Lyons on the 3d of April, and found the inhabitants in an extraordinary state of excitement. From the moment that it had been known in Lyonnais, Franche-Comté, and Auvergne that the Marseillais, with the other inhabitants of the south, were advancing on Lyons, an inverse movement had sprung up among the inhabitants. Besides the jealousy entertained against the southern populations, they were looked on with peculiar prejudice in the district of the upper basin of the Rhone. Of course, a great deal of calumny was added to a little truth: they were called fanatics, cruel-hearted, and devastators. Still, they were not more hated than feared. In consequence of this, the inhabitants of the Lyonnais, and of the districts for thirty leagues round, rose at once, and numerous companies of National Guards hastened to the defence of Lyons. Lyons alone furnished more than six thousand men, and at least thirty thousand were on their way to join them. Nearly all Dauphiné was preparing to make a descent on Vienne and Valence.

General Grouchy sent the Lyonnais National Guards to Saint-Vallier, and ordered General Piré to lead the 6th regiment to the Roman Bridge, and protect the line of the Isère. He next sent a battalion of the 39th, together with the 83d, which had just joined the Imperial cause, to Saint-Marcellin. The Isère was thus guarded on all sides, and the Duke d'Angoulême, who had seen the gates of Grenoble closed on his right, and the Bridge of Saint-Esprit taken in his rear, while he had no hopes of taking Lyons that lay before him, saw himself, as it were, enclosed by an iron circle. No course remained but to retrace his steps as quickly as possible, and endeavour to

regain Avignon and the road to Marseilles before the Languedocians should come up.

On the 5th of April he determined to retreat, and left Valence at six in the morning. While he was retreating, the Isère was crossed at every point by the Lyonnais, the 6th light infantry, and the 39th and 83d regiments of the line. All the 14th Chasseurs on the Bridge of Lorient, and on the Drôme, abandoned the royal cause. The 8d artillery showed the worst dispositions, but the 10th regiment of infantry, (Colonel General,) surrounded by three thousand royalist volunteers, acted with more fidelity. The prince arrived at Montélimart on the 7th of April, where he learned that the road to Avignon was occupied by General Gilly's forces, that had passed the Bridge of Saint-Esprit, and been reinforced by a mass of National Guards from Dauphiné. He was evidently doomed to become Napoleon's prisoner, and had no other resource than an honourable capitulation to save himself and his troops. He sent Baron Damas to negotiate with General Gilly. As far as the prince himself was concerned, there would be no difficulty, and General Gilly, interpreting Napoleon's sentiments by his own, said that the prince should be free on condition of evacuating the country immediately. But, unfortunately, General Gilly's officers and soldiers did not share his sentiments, which prevented his dealing as leniently with the prince as he would wish.

However, the conditions on both sides were stated in such a manner that, after a few objections, every thing was arranged. It was decided that the prince, with some officers, should be at liberty to retire to one of the parts in Provence or Languedoc, and there embark; that the troops of the line should again put themselves under the Imperial authority, whilst the royalist volunteers should be at liberty to depart as soon as they laid down their arms; that the money belonging to the State should be restored to the proper agents; and that every trace of the royalist insurrection would disappear. These conditions were accepted and signed on the 8th of April by Baron Damas and General Gilly, subject, however, to the superior authority of General Grouchy, commandant in the southern provinces.

No sooner were the terms of this capitulation made known, than the National Guards hastened in crowds from Dauphiné, and, taking possession of the road to Avignon, became fearfully excited, and demanded loudly that these conditions should not be ratified.

At this moment General Grouchy, having arrived at Valence, was preparing to descend on Montélimart and Avignon, to continue the pursuit of the royalists. When he learned on the 9th, that the Duke d'Angoulême was a prisoner, and that the decision of his fate was referred to him, he felt greatly embarrassed. Although greatly irritated against the Bourbon, he was not forgetful of the bonds that subsisted between him and them; and to act with harshness toward the Duke d'Angoulême would be as repugnant to his family traditions as to his natural inclinations. Instead of seizing his person, he would prefer impelling him gently toward the sea, as General Bismarck had impelled Louis XVIII. toward the

Belgian frontier. And this would have been conformable to Napoleon's instructions: his words to him were, "Get the prince out of the country." But as the prince was in his hands, he was bound by his very instructions to refer the matter to Paris. He sent a courier to Lyons, that the Emperor's orders might be demanded thence by telegraph. The Duke d'Angoulême and his companions were, therefore, detained at Saint-Esprit until an answer should arrive from Paris. In every other respect he was treated with all the attention due to his rank and gallant conduct. Meanwhile the 10th infantry (Colonel General) and the 3d artillery passed over to the Imperial camp.

During this delay the southern insurrection died away, after a few unimportant attempts. As Generals Ernouf and Loverdo had promised the Duke d'Angoulême that they would reach Grenoble at the same time that he would arrive at Vienne, they endeavoured, notwithstanding the number of desertions, to keep their word. Unsupported, except by some royalist volunteers, they attempted to get beyond Sisteron, in the direction of Gap. General Loverdo encamped on the evening of the 6th at the village of Saulce, situated at the entrance of a defile formed by a steep rock on one side and the Durance on the other. This defile was defended by a battalion of the 49th, provided with cannon. The peasantry, who hated the royalists, had assembled on the summit of the rock, prepared to throw down large stones on the assailants.

On the morning of the 7th, the commandant of the battalion of the 49th advanced between the two rival troops, in order to hold a parley. He was answered with a fire of musketry. He immediately ordered that General Loverdo's column should be attacked with grape-shot, whilst the peasantry poured down on them an avalanche of stones. Then the royalist volunteers, though brave, fled, being neither disciplined nor accustomed to warfare. Some who tried to swim across the Durance were shot from the banks, and the remainder retired toward Sisteron, leaving one hundred and fifty dead on the field.

Whilst these events were taking place on the Durance, Massena was placed in a very delicate position between the Bourbons, whom he did not love, and Napoleon, toward whom he did not feel much better disposed, but who, he considered, represented the cause of the Revolution, whilst he felt himself bound to the prince by a sense of military duty. He did not wish either to serve or betray the prince, but remained at Marseilles to preserve tranquillity and prevent any outbreak. Having learned that a project was entertained of combining the French and English navies, and that, under pretext of uniting the two flags, there was a risk of Toulon's being given up to our rivals on the sea, he thought the time was come to declare himself. He went to Toulon, assembled the troops, and displayed the tricoloured flag. He then sent an officer to Marseilles, and allowed the city twenty-four hours to lower the white and raise the tricoloured flag. Threatened by Massena on one side, and by General Grouchy on the other, Marseilles yielded, and, with great regret, proclaimed the re-establishment of the Empire. On the 10th

of April, all this part of the south had submitted to Napoleon, who was now acknowledged from Antibes to Huningue, from Huningue to Dunkirk, from Dunkirk to Bayonne, and from Bayonne to Perpignan. The Duke d'Angoulême was still a prisoner at Saint-Esprit; and, though he had given unmistakable evidence of courage, he was not free from apprehension, because he judged Napoleon according to the prejudices of his own party. He preserved the dignity that became his rank, piously resigned to whatever might happen, though punished for his unjust prejudices by secret uneasiness.

He was in no danger, as may well be supposed, and had only to suffer the weariness of awaiting the end of his captivity in the midst of an excited people, among whom his enemies alone were visible, whilst his conquered friends were obliged to keep themselves concealed.

It was on the morning of the 11th that Napoleon heard how affairs had terminated in the south, the Duke d'Angoulême's captivity, and the capitulation, in virtue of which this prince was to embark at the port of Cette. He unhesitatingly approved of what had been done, supposing from the despatches he had received that the capitulation had been already executed, or was on the eve of being so. By his orders, M. de Bassano wrote that the capitulation was approved of, and ought to be executed immediately. As soon as this was known, and no attempt was made to conceal it, many persons attached to Napoleon and the cause he represented, found fault with what he had done, and blamed his want of prudence. Without pretending that he ought to avenge himself for the ordinance of the 6th of March, or the declarations of the 13th, they said that they were engaged in a fearful struggle, during which numerous and strange turns of fortune would occur, that many beloved of France might fall into the hands of the enemy, and that, whilst treating the Duke d'Angoulême with all the consideration that was due to him, it still might not be useless to detain him as a hostage. Napoleon did not deny the apparent advantage of this plan, but still persisted in his design of contrasting his conduct with that of his enemies, and thought this contrast more useful to him than would be the most valuable hostage. He did not regret what he had done, even when, on the evening of this day, a fresh despatch informed him of what he had not known before, that the capitulation had not been yet executed, and that the prince was still a prisoner at Saint-Esprit. There was time still to change his resolution, and adopt the opinion of those who did not approve of the capitulation. He had a long conversation on this subject with M. de Bassano. "Perhaps I ought," he said, "to retain the Duke d'Angoulême as a hostage that would be useful in our present hazardous and uncertain position. But I will not do so: it is better to let the sovereigns opposed to us see the difference that there is between them and me." This was proper pride, which shows the want Napoleon felt of public opinion, and the progress that morals had made since the bloody catastrophe of Vincennes. He immediately confirmed the orders sent by M. de

Bassano; and the next day the "Moniteur" published the letter sent to General Grouchy, in which Napoleon said that though the royal ordinance of the 6th of March, and the declaration of Vienna of the 13th, would justify his treating the Duke d'Angoulême as the allies had wished to treat himself, still he would not retaliate, but allow the Duke d'Angoulême to leave as freely as the other members of his family. Napoleon confined himself to obliging the prince to promise that the crown jewels should be restored, without, however, detaining him till the fulfilment of the promise.

Napoleon was delighted at the prompt and happy termination of the troubles in the south. He had never doubted of a successful termination; but days, and even hours, were of great value in his present position; and it was of the utmost importance that his troops should not be exhausted in repressing a civil war. The division sent to Lyons continued its route to help in the formation of the 7th corps, which was to guard the Alps under the command of Marshal Suchet. Napoleon summoned Marshal Massena to Paris, in order to seal a reconciliation with this old companion in arms, who was to return to the south if he chose. Marshal Brune was sent, meanwhile, to command at Marseilles, Toulon, and Antibes. Having learned from some intercepted letters the disposition of the Spaniards, Napoleon thought that the 8th corps, intended for General Clausel, and which consisted of twelve regiments, would be sufficiently strong with six. Of these he formed two divisions, of which one was to be stationed at Bordeaux and the other at Toulouse,—more, indeed, to restrain the royalists than to oppose the Spaniards. Of the six remaining regiments, four were sent as a reserve to Avignon, and two were ordered to Marseilles, where, together with the troops from Corsica, they were to form the 9th corps, which was to defend Var. The regiments at Avignon were to reinforce Marshal Brune or Marshal Suchet, according to the direction the war should take on the frontier. Although Napoleon had advised Murat not to hasten to make a demonstration, he still dreaded some imprudence on his part, and for that reason summoned Marshal Suchet from Strasbourg, where he commanded the 5th corps, and sent him into Savoy to superintend the formation of the 7th. For the same reason, he had prepared a reserve at Avignon, and even thought of giving him the entire of the 9th corps, which was to be organized at Var, under Marshal Brune. Napoleon, unceasingly occupied with this general plan, had made a fresh alteration. Five corps, the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, and 6th, together with the Imperial Guard, were to act under his orders on the northern frontier; the 5th, under Rapp, since Marshal Suchet had taken the command of the 7th, was to continue in Alsace. In Belfort, where there is, as is well known, a gorge between the Vosges and Jura chains, he determined to form an intermediary corps from one division of the line and several divisions of the mobile National Guards. The command of this was given to the general most skilful in mountain-warfare, the illustrious Lecourbe, who had not been employed since the process against Moreau. If Switzerland remained

neutral, Lecourbe was to go either to reinforce the 5th corps in Alsace or the 7th near the Alps, as circumstances might require. If he were not needed at either place, he was to remain where he was, and keep watch on the debouches of Bâle and Poligny.

These additions being made to his plan, Napoleon ordered that those regiments (the 10th in particular) that had taken part in the civil war, with their principal officers, excepting those who had compromised themselves too deeply, should come to Paris. He wished to see them, seal a reconciliation, and attach them to his cause. He also summoned General Grouchy, to reward him in an extraordinary manner; not because this general had accomplished any thing very difficult, but because he wished to show the army that, in the present circumstances, fidelity should not remain unrewarded. By this short expedition, in which scarcely a single shot was fired, and of which the merit, if there were any, belonged to General Gilly, General Grouchy gained a marshal's bâton, which had never before been given but as a reward for a successful battle. But Napoleon wished to encourage devotion to his cause, and at the same time elevate to a high rank an officer accustomed to command cavalry, as he wished to have a commander for the reserve of cavalry, as death or desertion had successively deprived him of Lamie, Montbrun, Bessières, and Murat. Alas! he soon had reason to regret this lavish bestowal of favour, in which policy had more weight than sound military reasons.

Napoleon was right in thus hastening his preparations for war; for each day brought fresh signs of the implacable hatred excited against him throughout Europe. We have already seen how, immediately after the departure of the foreign legations, he had sent couriers to recall our ambassadors, and at the same time to order them to declare that France was willing to keep peace with the European Powers on the conditions of existing treaties. These couriers, who had left on the 28th and 29th of March, had all been stopped at the frontiers. The courier who had presented himself at the Bridge of Kehl; had been sent back by an Austrian commander, who would not allow him to enter even guarded. Another, trying to pass through Mentz, had been stopped by the Prussian commander, and grossly ill treated. A third, passing through Switzerland and Lombardy, had not been able to cross the Alps. These were unusual proceedings, even in time of war; for, as Napoleon remarked, war is made only for the purpose of securing peace, and never, even during the most violent hostilities, had communication tending to put a period to the effusion of blood been interdicted. This unexampled species of diplomatic excommunication was evidently personal, and a consequence of the strange declaration of the 13th of March.

Far from seeking to conceal the reception his couriers had met, Napoleon arranged another mission, still more remarkable, and whose failure he wished should be still more conspicuous. An occasion presented itself quite naturally. On reconsecrating the French throne, it was etiquette that he should write to the different sovereigns to inform them of

the event. Having frequently corresponded with them as ally or master, he could not be accused of the presumption of a *parvenu* in doing so now. He himself wrote a few lines, full of moderation and dignity, in which he declared that he accepted existing treaties, and that, were his sentiments shared by the other monarchs, *justice seated on the frontiers of nations would be sufficient to defend them.* As the greater number of sovereigns was at Vienna, it was to that capital his envoy ought to be sent, and etiquette required that for this mission he should select one of his aides-de-camp, as such are generally the bearers of royal letters. He chose the Count de Flahault, one of the most distinguished of his aides-de-camp, one of the best connected, and who had been most frequently sent to foreign courts. Simple couriers had been stopped, but it was possible that more respect would be shown to a lieutenant-general.

Count Flahault left on the 4th of April, passed the Bridge of Kehl, which the cabinet couriers had not succeeded in doing, advanced into Germany, and, when he flattered himself that he had surmounted all obstacles, he was arrested at Stuttgart by an order from the court of Wurtemberg. He was deprived of his despatches, with a promise, however, that they should be transmitted to Vienna. A commander in the Imperial navy was equally unsuccessful in trying to cross the Straits of Dover. As he had been sent to negotiate on the coast of England, he was not treated as an enemy, but prevented from advancing. His despatches were taken and sent to London, and he was told that they would be opened at Vienna, whence an answer would be sent if necessary.

In order to explain this strange prohibition of all communication, we must relate what took place at Vienna when Napoleon's arrival on the coast of France was announced. When Napoleon left Elba, he thought that the Congress of Vienna had been dissolved, or at least that the sovereigns had left the Austrian capital, and that their ministers alone remained to arrange some unimportant questions. This intelligence was correct when sent to Napoleon; but the late arrival of the King of Saxony at Presburg, his opposition to the decisions of the Congress, together with Murat's military demonstrations, had delayed the departure of the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia, who would not leave while any difficulty remained to be solved. Therefore, when intelligence of the landing in the Gulf of Juan, despatched from Genoa, arrived at Vienna, the sovereigns, with their ministers, except Lord Castlereagh, who had been replaced by the Duke of Wellington, were still here. All were at a fête when the news arrived. They were thunderstruck. Let us picture these potentates to ourselves for a moment: some of them had been deprived of their dominions by Napoleon; others kept in continual apprehension of the same fate; and all had been suddenly transformed from conquerors to slaves, from slaves they had become masters, and had not only recovered what they had lost, but had increased their possessions, some by half, others by a fourth or fifth. Let us imagine them now over-

powered by an unexpected blow, and almost fancying themselves transported back to those terrible years 1809, 1810, 1811, when they were plundered, humbled, and submissive, and we may form some idea of what they felt. Their first sentiment was terror, a terror, alas! flattering to us, for it made them believe that eleven months had been sufficient to restore the exhausted strength of France. This terror was so evident that it excited the malicious mockery of the English diplomatists, who, thanks to the ocean, had nothing to fear for their country. But consternation gave place to violent anger against the real or supposed authors of the coming misfortunes. First, all blamed the Emperor Alexander, who had had the imprudence to give Napoleon the island of Elba by the treaty of the 11th of April. Next the Bourbons were blamed for having, by their maladministration, facilitated his return to France. In fact, there was a general outcry against Alexander's thoughtlessness and the Bourbons' want of ability. And those who uttered these complaints added that they were themselves to blame for having confided the Government of France to such hands.

Alexander was fully aware of the outcry that was raised against him, for the Russians were among the loudest in condemning what had been done. He defended himself by saying that the treaty of the 11th of April was unavoidable; that at the time it was concluded nobody had made a serious objection, for all were anxious to get rid of Napoleon at any price, he being then at Fontainebleau, at the head of seventy thousand men, and able to summon a hundred thousand more from the Pyrenees, Lyons, and Italy, by falling back on the south of France; that the Bourbons were alone to blame, because they had refused to execute the treaty, and had induced Napoleon to break it by refusing to pay his subsidy, and finally had opened him a path into France by their bad government. He added that if he had caused the evil he would repair it, by employing his last soldier and his last crown in the coming struggle. He tried to conceal his annoyance by his anger; and from that day forth among the allies he was the most violent in language and conduct.

So excited were the members of the Congress, that not one thought of asking himself whether Napoleon had not returned changed, or at least ameliorated, by misfortune; whether, for example, he would not be willing to accept, not only the Treaty of Paris, but that of Vienna; in which case nothing need be asked of him but good faith. But the idea of Napoleon inclined to peace, corrected by misfortune, or modified in his views, never entered the mind of any.

They could only see the dreaded leader who had made such fearful use of the armies of France, who had displayed in the heart of Europe the devastating ambition of an Asiatic despot; and these men, filled with terror, came to the instant resolution of struggling with their adversary unto death. There are moments when fear itself gives birth to heroism. There was now but one thought, one wish,—universal, relentless, bloody war, which was to terminate only with the destruction of one party or the other.

However, it was necessary to wait some days before drawing up a declaration: in order to know whether Napoleon had succeeded,—of which there was little doubt; whether France alone was his aim,—of which there was still less doubt; and, finally, it would be necessary to wait for fuller information, and not incur the risk of merely beating the air. In fact, many were doubtful as to what might be the designs of him who had escaped from Elba; for the allies in their anxiety not only shifted the blame, but the danger, from one to the other. Talleyrand wished to believe that Napoleon had landed in the Gulf of Juan with the intention of proceeding by Nice and Tende into Italy. “Do not mind us,” said M. de Metternich, harshly, to him, “but think of yourselves. Believe me, Napoleon is on the road to Paris: perhaps he is at Lyons this very moment, and will be at the Tuileries in a few days.”

Whilst awaiting the solution of these doubts, the allies turned their attention to what was most urgent; and that, for these co-spoilers of Europe, was to take immediate possession of the lands allotted them, and to seize them in the very presence of the former ruler of the continent. For this, the first thing necessary was, to get the King of Saxony's consent to the sacrifices required of him. According to the existing theory of international law,—a theory true at all times, but now put forward with a good deal of affectation,—no territory could be ceded but what the ceder *abandoned himself, of his own free and unconstrained will*. It was therefore necessary that the King of Saxony should abandon the provinces that Prussia coveted, after which Prussia would yield to Russia what she desired in Poland, and the latter could make the necessary concessions to Austria; and thus the series of stipulated concessions, which were sacrifices for some, aggrandizement for others, would follow in natural succession.

The three plenipotentiaries who had defended the King of Saxony were chosen as envoys, and sent to meet him at Presburg. These were M. de Talleyrand for France, M. de Metternich for Austria, and Lord Wellington for England. They proceeded to Presburg, whither Frederick Augustus had been removed, and found him determined to resist, and very little influenced by the services they said they had done him. Several days of intense importunity having passed without producing any change in the king's determination, the three diplomatists assured him that, if he did not formally sign the decisions of the Congress, Prussia would take possession of the provinces allotted to her, whilst he should not be put in possession of those left to the crown of Saxony, but remain prisoner of the allies.

Though this unhappy prince did not yield to these threats, it was evident that he would not resist much longer. The three negotiators then returned to Vienna, to make the final arrangements. They arranged the dispute between Bavaria and Austria concerning Salzburg, and nothing then remained but for the sovereigns to assume the titles of their new States. Alexander immediately assumed the titles of Emperor of all the Russias and King of Poland. Frederick William called himself King of Prussia, Grand-Duke of Posen, Duke of Saxony,

Landgrave of Thuringia, Margrave of the two Lusatias, &c. Besides the title of Emperor of Austria, which he had substituted for that of Emperor of Germany in 1806, the Emperor Francis assumed the title of King of Italy, and by a solemn act, which was immediately published beyond the Alps, he constituted the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, which was to consist of the Italian provinces between the Tisza and the Isonzo. By this act, the Italians, like the Poles, were allowed the consolation of forming a separate kingdom. The King of Sardinia, to whom Genoa was conceded, and the King of the Low Countries, whose possessions had been doubled by the addition of Belgium, assumed the titles of their new States, together with the qualifications resulting from them. The sovereigns took care to take possession of their acquisitions in a few days, in order that the war about to commence might make no change in these arrangements, except to make them more secure in case of victory.

Whilst each was thus occupied with his own interests, intelligence of Napoleon's triumphant entry into Grenoble arrived on the 12th of March, and the nature and success of his designs could be no longer doubted. A meeting was immediately held, and to M. de Talleyrand was left the initiative in the propositions to be laid before the Congress. However much displeased with the Bourbons, none disposed of being the representative of Louis XVIII., so that his sovereign was King of France. As the common interest demanded that the restoration of Napoleon and his family should not be permitted on any account, it became a necessity to support the Bourbons, the only possible dynasty. Although M. de Talleyrand had personal reasons to be dissatisfied with the court of France, he, for the same reason as the Congress, saw the necessity of upholding the Bourbons, and, indeed, he was too deeply committed to their policy to hesitate.

Aware that the surest means of rendering Napoleon unpopular in the eyes of France, exhausted as she was by twenty-two years of warfare, was to prove the impossibility of his reconciliation with Europe, he suggested that the Congress should republish, in its integrity, the ordinance of Louis XVIII. of the 6th of March, and treat Napoleon as a malefactor, who, being broken his ban, ought to be instantly put to death, upon his identity being proved. This was a strange proceeding with regard to a man who had reigned so long and so gloriously; but so violent was the general irritation, that none paused to reflect on public acts, nor their mode of execution. M. de Talleyrand proposed, therefore, that a declaration should be drawn up to the effect that Bonaparte, having violated the treaty of the 11th of April, and thus destroyed the sole legal title that secured his existence, he should be looked on as an outlaw by all nations, and treated as such in case he should be taken. Alexander's generosity and Austria's moderation ought to have raised an objection to such a declaration; but every objection was overruled in a former by night, and in the latter by the day, of being suggested; and the declaration was adopted, and on the 13th of March, an extraordinary to Strasbourg

lished along the frontiers, and, if not too late, serve the royal cause, by letting France know how unanimous Europe was in her enmity to Napoleon.

Some days more were spent in awaiting intelligence, sometimes with full faith in Napoleon's success, sometimes doubting this success when there arose the slightest gleam of hope; but, during these few days, none thought of any thing but immediate and relentless war,—Prussia through revival of all her former hatred, Russia through anger at being the dupe of her own generosity, England through fear of losing the great advantages she had obtained, and Austria through the cold conviction of the impossibility of avoiding the struggle, and through fear of exciting the distrust of her allies. This latter Power, though having as much at stake as the others, was the only one that, thanks to the *sang-froid* of the emperor and of M. de Metternich, was able to judge calmly of the actual state of affairs. Austria was inclined to believe that Napoleon would offer to accept the Treaties of Paris and Vienna; she believed, even, that, enlightened by experience, he would consent to territorial losses, and that, covered with military glory, he would now seek that of peace, and endeavour to add an olive-branch to the many laurels that encircled his brow. But she was not sure of this. And it was also possible that, inconceivable for having diminished the glory of France by his own fault, he would first allow himself and France some rest, and that, when he had given the European union time to be dissolved, and having recruited his own military resources, whilst those of the enemy would be lessened or dispersed, he would recommence the struggle, and again be in a position to propose treaties, if not such as those of Tilsit and Vienna, at least such as those of Campo-Formio and Lunéville. This second supposition was as possible as the first, and, even were it less likely to be true, in doubt it is better to choose the surest plan, and the surest in this case was to seek Napoleon's ruin by every possible means. Thus, though not influenced by hatred, like Prussia, nor by wounded vanity, like Russia, nor by avarice, like England, Austria was calmly and coolly resolved. But there was some difference of opinion in her councils as to the surest means of ruining Napoleon. Some Austrian statesmen were of opinion that Napoleon, returning after the Bourbons had reigned eleven months, would be greatly embarrassed by the numerous parties by whom he would find himself surrounded, and that by merely encouraging domestic factions the allies would be dispensed from the necessity of employing against him the terrible and doubtful engine of war. But this astute calculation, little in harmony with the violent passions of the time, might cause Austria's intentions to be suspected, and would give room for the suspicion that she wished for some such measure as the regency of Maria Theresa, and thus the union of the Coalition, which was looked on as the safeguard of Europe, would be destroyed. Austria, therefore, adhered calmly, but firmly, to the plan of a destructive war; and that for two reasons,—distrust of Napoleon, and the consciousness of the necessity for union among the allies.

Exceedingly anxious not to give the slightest cause of offence, the Emperor Francis and M. de Metternich employed every means to get Maria Louisa into their power, and prevent all imprudence on her part. This was not difficult, as they had the power in their hands, and the duchy of Parma would provide them with the means of persuasion. It did not need so much, alas! to influence this princess. She had already yielded not only to her father's wishes, which might be excusable, but also to those of Count Neipperg, who exercised the most absolute dominion over her, and was become her guide, defender, and only friend. In her isolation and her weakness, she had not been able to resist the attentions and personal attractions of the count, and had quite forgotten her duties, the obligations of her rank, and her sad but glorious destiny. When she heard of Napoleon's first success, she was deeply moved, and yielded to a momentary feeling of regret. But soon, recalling the Austrians' bonds, through which she must break, and, above all, remembering her own faults, she chose the tranquil, opulent, and free existence that awaited her in Parma, in preference to all the risks of a stormy career, which, indeed, were more than she had courage to meet. It must be added, in justice to this princess, that, if she were a weak-minded wife, she was an excellent mother; and, though not endowed with great mental power, she possessed common sense. She believed in her husband's genius, but distrusted his prudence, and had strong doubts as to his being able to retain possession of the throne; she feared that by returning to him she would only endanger her son's inheritance, without securing him the crown of France; and thus, fashioning her son's destiny according to her own tastes, she preferred securing him a certain patrimony in Italy to a chimerical grandeur in France; an undignified calculation, but not incorrect, as events soon showed.

The Emperor Francis and M. de Metternich found her already persuaded, and quite satisfied with their policy,—with the understanding, however, that she was to have the duchy of Parma. The conditions imposed by them were, that she would not leave Vienna; that she would place her son, for a time, under the guardianship of the Emperor Francis, and remit all communications, whether direct or indirect, which she should receive from her husband, to the Austrian cabinet, by whom they would be laid, with the seals unbroken, on the table of the Congress. She accepted of these conditions, humiliating as they were; she gave up her son to the Emperor Francis, who, indeed, showed the greatest affection for the child; and, what was more inexcusable, she gave up all the letters she had received from Napoleon. However, in order to make some show of sincerity, she had a conversation with M. Meneval, who was still with her, and who continued Napoleon's faithful friend. She told him that she would not return to France; that, as she had not joined her husband when conquered and a prisoner, she would not do so now that he was victorious and on a throne; that, weary of excitement, she would retire into private life, and devote herself to her son, and secure him a small but

certain inheritance. M. Meneval having remarked that, though the duchy of Parma had been hereditary, she was only to have a life-interest in it, she replied that that was all she had been able to obtain, which of course was to be regretted; but that she would be able to save money, and that in twenty years she could, in her duchy, amass a large fortune for her son, which, as simple archduchess, she would never have been able to do; that, besides, he would have several large fiefs in Bohemia as a compensation for not inheriting Parma; that he would be an archduke, and, what was not usual in Austria, a rich archduke; that she sought his advantage according to her own views; that in all she acted as a mother, and, as she considered, an affectionate and devoted one. Thus thought and spoke the wife of Napoleon,—not she whom he had chosen in a private station, but she in whose veins the blood of the Cæsars flowed! M. Meneval bent his head in sadness as he heard her words, but spoke not, merely showing in his manner the respectful disapprobation that he did not wish to express.

In consequence of these resolutions, Napoleon's son was taken from his mother, and, spite of his infantile complaints, carried to his grandfather's palace, which he was destined never more to leave. The letters which Maria Louisa had received through M. Meneval and M. de Bubna were placed before the Congress; for Austria was most anxious to prove to her allies that no secret alliance existed between her and Napoleon. As the reward of this submission, all the Powers assured Maria Louisa the sovereignty of Parma and Placentia for life.

Soon fresh letters arrived, from which the best results had been anticipated at Paris, but which produced a very different effect at Vienna. The courier sent to Prince Eugène by his steward, and whom Queen Hortense had intrusted with letters for her brother, for Maria Louisa, and other persons of distinction, had been arrested, his despatches taken and placed before the Congress. When these letters were read, they produced a most unfavourable effect, especially upon the Emperor of Russia. Alexander, who carried every thing to excess, had, whilst in Paris, been a constant visitor of Queen Hortense, and, at Vienna, made Prince Eugène his daily companion. He had obtained the duchy of Saint-Leu for Queen Hortense, and had endeavoured, but unsuccessfully, to procure a small sovereignty for Prince Eugène. In his anger at Napoleon's return, he persuaded himself that the brother and sister had been aware of the expedition from Elba, that he had been deceived by them, and he gave way to a displeasure that was at once sincere and affected; for it was more flattering to his self-love to appear to have been betrayed rather than duped. He, therefore, spoke of arresting and imprisoning Prince Eugène. After a little reflection and some personal explanations, he was appeased on receiving a promise from Prince Eugène that he would not leave Vienna.

All these letters proved, what might have been foreseen, that Napoleon had neither been killed nor arrested on his road; that, in return, he had not sought to kill the Bourbons, but only expelled them from the kingdom, and had ascended the throne promising to keep the peace and observe treaties. But it was of very

little importance to the sovereigns assembled at Vienna whether Napoleon had retained cruel or generous, corrected by misfortune or not, whether he was inclined for war or peace, free or restrained by treaties; even the least prejudiced were convinced that, once re-established on the throne, and his armies recruited, whilst those of the Coalition would be dispersed, he would attempt to recover the French frontiers, by which some of the Allies would be forced to surrender half the Low Countries, and others half of Poland, Saxony, and Italy. There was no time for hesitation; for the counsels of pride, as well as prudence, recommended the Allies to profit by the dispersion of the French forces while those of the Allies were still united, and destroy at once the powerful man who, by his coming, made their domination over Europe doubtful, and endangered the lion's share that they had secured at Vienna.

Now that they were better informed, the first violent declaration of the 13th of March gave place to proceedings more practical and serious, though less violent in form. Immediate warfare was agreed to by a treaty, the simply renewed the Alliance of Chaumont. This alliance stipulated, as the reader may remember, that each of the four Allied Powers should keep a hundred and fifty thousand men on foot until the object of the alliance had been obtained. This contingent was far from indicating all the efforts that were to be made against Napoleon; for it was understood that each Power formally obliged to furnish a stipulated number of men would also employ its disposable resources to secure the success of the common cause. It was agreed that the former arrangements for the direction of the allied forces should be renewed; that no Power should act without the others; and, especially, that no communication should be received from the enemy, without being immediately referred to the Coalition, alone authorized to negotiate in reply. According to the treaty, England was again to furnish the subsidy of six millions sterling, which she had engaged to pay during the continuance of the war, besides a compensation in money for any deficiency in her contingent of one hundred and fifty thousand men.

For her, consequently, the engagement was more burdensome, if not more serious, to her animosities and her interests were so wound by the war that the Allied Powers considered themselves under no obligations for her money. She alone was not represented at Vienna by a monarch or a prime minister, for Lord Feltreagh had left for London. But Lord Wellington, who had replaced Lord Castlereagh, confiding in his past services and his popularity in England, did not shrink from the responsibility. Though he had not received instructions—for the time was too short—he did not hesitate as to how he should act. He considered that the state of things that England had brought about in Europe was worth maintaining at the expense of a war; he had a vague idea of increasing his own fame in the coming campaign, and did not hesitate to complicate his Government, certain that, whatever might be thought of his conduct, and how in England would venture to disavow his act.

The representative of France wished to take part in this treaty, that he might the better secure the position of the Bourbons; for he knew that their want of ability had brought them into bad odour, and that, though all agreed as to the necessity of dethroning Napoleon, the question of who should replace him was by no means decided. M. de Talleyrand was so interested for the Bourbons that, on this occasion, he forgot that sense of propriety which he possessed in so eminent a degree, and did not perceive how ill-placed would be the signature of a French plenipotentiary appended to a treaty which proclaimed an exterminating war against France. He asked permission to sign, but the personal motives of his co-operators saved him from this impropriety. The allied sovereigns did not wish that their subjects, and more especially the English people, should think that they were about to make war for the re-establishment of the Bourbons, and desired to seem entirely occupied by the interests of Europe. They, therefore, decided at they should be the sole contracting parties, but that the other Powers should be allowed to give in their adhesion. The treaty question, which was, in fact, the renewal of the Alliance of Chaumont, dated the 25th March, was sent to London to receive the sanction of Great Britain. Until then it was remain a secret, not as to its general bearings, but at least as to its details.

Now that the object and means were decided, the next question was how these means could be employed. Military conferences were held at Prince Schwarzenberg's house, which Alexander insisted on being present. The plan of the campaign was discussed by Prince Schwarzenberg on the part of Austria, Emperor Alexander and Prince Wolkonsky of Russia, M. de Knesbeck for Prussia, and Lord Wellington for England. They were anxious to commence hostilities at once, and especially Lord Wellington, who already put his pretensions to play the principal part in this campaign. But, in order to act with certainty, it was decided that nothing could be done until considerable forces were assembled, so that each of the allied armies could be sufficient to meet the enemy alone. The allied forces were divided into three principal columns. The first was destined for operations in Italy, where the Austrians supposed that Murat would act in concert with Napoleon. The Austrians, in their zeal for all that concerned that country, offered to send a hundred and fifty thousand men there. This body of the allied forces received orders to enter Italy by Mount Cenis, after having conquered Genoa.

The two other columns were to operate against France, Paris being the final object. The second column composed of Austrians, Bavarians, Saxons, Wurtembergians, Hessians, and Prussians, and consisting of two hundred thousand men, was to appear on the east, between Metz and Mentz. This column would not be able to act on the offensive until joined by the Prussian contingent of eighty thousand men, and, having to pass through Galicia, Bohemia, and Franconia, could not possibly arrive before the middle or end of June.

The last column, though the first in im-

portance, was to commence operations from the north. It was wished that this column should be composed of English, Belgians, Hanoverians, and Northern Germans, especially Prussians, and placed under the command of Lord Wellington, in whose prudence the most perfect confidence was felt. In this case, the northern column would have consisted of two hundred and fifty thousand men, which would complete the number of six hundred thousand active troops, that was hoped could be assembled, without counting the Russian, Austrian, and German reserves, which would raise the entire number from seven hundred and fifty to eight hundred thousand combatants. The Prussians, whose pride was overruled by their hatred, would have willingly given the command to Lord Wellington, but Blücher's self-love presented an obstacle to this arrangement. It required great tact to overcome this difficulty. It was arranged that the Hollando-Belgians should furnish at least forty thousand men; and, as they had a more than ordinary interest in the war, they were to be placed under the command of Lord Wellington, notwithstanding the merit and the well-founded pretensions of the brilliant Prince of Orange, son of the new King of the Low Countries. The Hanoverians and Brunswickers could have no objection to serve under the British generalissimo. Lord Wellington would thus have forty thousand Hollando-Belgians, about twenty thousand Northern Germans, and if to these sixty thousand English were added, he would have under his command a hundred and twenty thousand soldiers, without counting the twelve or fifteen thousand Portuguese he hoped to obtain from the court of Lisbon. He did not expect any aid from Spain. But it would not be prudent to meet Napoleon with a hundred and twenty thousand men: still it was believed that Blücher was too ardent to allow Lord Wellington to take the field first, and it was supposed that he would advance with a hundred or a hundred and twenty thousand Prussians, that his desire to fight would make him compliant, and induce him to place himself, though not avowedly, under the direction, if not under the orders, of the English general. Lord Wellington would thus find himself at the head of two hundred and forty thousand men; and, this body advancing from the north, whilst that commanded by Prince Schwarzenberg advanced from the east, the result would be as in 1814, for, each urging the other toward Paris, Napoleon would be finally stifled there by the hundred-armed Coalition. A second Russian army, under the command of Barclay de Tolly, was to follow the first, whilst the Prussian reserve would soon join Blücher. The Allies would thus have an additional hundred and fifty thousand men; and they did not doubt that, with six hundred thousand, they would overpower Napoleon, whom they did not suppose would be able to raise more than two hundred thousand in the then exhausted state of France.

These calculations, which were a little, though not much, exaggerated, were considered correct, and the proposed plan was immediately adopted.

The Austrian troops were already marching

toward Italy, for on this point there was no need of urging the Austrian cabinet. It was arranged that the second Austrian army should be sent as quickly as possible to Bâle, and that the Bavarians, who had already thirty thousand men, should hasten to raise fifty thousand more; that the Wurtembergians, Badeners, and Hessians should also be urged on; and that England, in addition to her financial largesses to the greater Powers, should be requested to accord some help to the allies of the second order, and that she and the Low Countries should not lose a day in collecting a body of forces capable of opposing Napoleon in case he should anticipate the expected period of hostilities, that is to say, the middle of June. Lord Wellington wished to leave immediately, that he might consolidate the Belgian, Dutch, Hanoverian, and German troops assembled in the Low Countries. He also wished to be nearer London, in order to support the courage of the British Government, and get the engagements ratified which he had entered into without authority. He was requested to give some good advice to the Bourbons, who had retired to Belgium; and all wished him success in the coming struggle. The sovereigns determined to remain at Vienna until the arrival of their troops, which they hurried as much as possible, determined, as soon as all were in marching-order, to follow Prince Schwarzenberg's headquarters, as they had done during the campaign of 1814.

Meantime, M. de Montrond, charged with a secret mission, arrived safely at Vienna, thanks to his address, courage, and numerous disguises. His first visit was to M. de Talleyrand, to whom he was bound by the ties of an old friendship. He was too sagacious not to see at once how deeply this distinguished man was pledged to the cause of the Bourbons, and how useless it would be to seek to win him over. He checked himself when he saw how decided M. de Talleyrand was, but he wished to learn whether the other legations, less interested in the dynastic question, were as impracticable as the French minister. He addressed himself to M. de Nesselrode, whom with the others he sought to persuade that the revolution of the 20th of March not only responded to the feelings of the army, but to those of the French people both in town and country, that numbers were ready to fight for Napoleon, and that consequently a struggle with him would be most formidable; that it would be wiser to calculate the difficulties before commencing a war which would cost more than its object would be worth, if that object were the restoration of the Bourbons. M. de Montrond was sufficiently intimate with these diplomatists and possessed sufficient tact to induce them to explain their views to him. They seemed neither surprised nor discouraged, though fully aware of the importance of his communication. They told him that no one at Vienna was ignorant of the gravity of the coming struggle, but that all were determined to push it to the last extremity, that is to say, to the downfall of Napoleon; that, as far as he was concerned, a definite resolution was already taken, but as to who should succeed him, though the allies would prefer the Bour-

bons, they were ready to do whatever would be considered best.

Napoleon's strange envoy, having become subsidiarily envoy of M. Fouché, endeavored to ascertain whether there was any chance for the regency of Maria Louisa. But he found Austria, as well as the other Powers, totally opposed to such a measure; and, anxious to learn the feelings of that princess herself, he endeavored to gain admittance to the gardens of Schönbrunn. He succeeded by representing himself as a great amateur of flowers, and obtained an interview with M. Meneval without exciting the suspicions of the Austrian police. He told him that if Maria Louisa would lay aside the restraints of etiquette and trust herself to him, he would promise to conduct her and her son safely to Strasbourg. M. Meneval told him that Maria Louisa was as indifferent about the regency as the sovereigns themselves, and desired no other future than that which she had planned for herself, and in which her son was not the only actor. M. de Montrond said no more, faithfully presented the letters with which he had been intrusted, and received the answer, which he was determined to deliver as faithfully; but, as he saw that Napoleon's resignation was impossible excepting that he should some extraordinary success, and that as he thought of Maria Louisa, he determined to try before he left whether the practical good sense of the allies would not approve of the Duke d'Orléans, a prince to whom he was personally attached, and whose exile he had shared in Sicily. He found England still passionately devoted to Louis XVIII., Austria obstinately attached to the principle of legitimacy, Prussia indifferent to every thing but Napoleon's fall, and the Emperor of Russia alone inclined to a change of dynasty in France in favour of the younger branch of the house of Bourbon. Having obtained this information, M. de Montrond left Vienna without betraying him whose emissary he was, and without doing him any service,—for none could be done,—having made an effort for the prince, his friend, and determined to tell the exact truth, as is often common to all superior minds. M. de Montrond gave him a long letter for M. de Cautelcourt, in which, though speaking with unwonted deference, he gave him the most minute information concerning Maria Louisa and the Austrian court; all which it was so important Napoleon should know. M. de Montrond hastened to Paris with the information he had so skilfully acquired.

We should not be sufficiently acquainted with the state of Europe, if, limiting our observation to what was passing at Vienna, we did not turn our attention for a moment to what was going on in London at this time. Though the sovereigns at Vienna showed by their conduct and their sentiments that they still retained an implacable hatred against Napoleon in England, though none were willing to resign what had been gained, a certain modification of opinion had taken place. Still, however, is unquestionably the spring of action in England, as in every other nation, however enlightened; but her resolutions are also modified by a sense of justice, by sympathy for the oppressed, that is to say, for those who are not

oppress herself, by a certain poetic feeling and an admiration of what is noble in action; and it would be impossible to appreciate the English character without taking these different qualities into account. Though Great Britain was not become the friend of France or Napoleon, it is certain that she was not influenced by the same violent passions as a year before. When the intoxication of victory had calmed down, she had given herself to the enjoyments of peace, and fed her imagination with visions of boundless commerce. The eleven or twelve months' repose she had enjoyed had allowed her to send her merchandise to all parts of the globe, and she fully appreciated maritime freedom, so advantageous to her manufactures. The brief reflections she had had time to make had shown her the immense cost of the late war, and she saw that, if it had brought her great advantages, it had also entailed upon her vast expense. Her acquisitions in both hemispheres were more than balanced by the tripling of the national debt, which now absorbed one-half her revenue, and by the income tax, which, so hateful in principle and the mode of collecting, was become a permanent financial necessity. The commissariat, that is, the ambulant administration attendant on the army, had left large debts unpaid in Spain, and another had been contracted in America, whose payment was urgent. In such a state of things, no one was desirous of a renewal of war. Besides, for whom and for what was it to be recommenced? There was no danger of losing what had been gained, for Napoleon had announced his intention of preserving peace on the bases of the Treaties of Paris and Vienna, and though his promise may be doubted, his own interest would be a sufficient security. Besides, he had shown his desire to please England by abolishing the slave-trade: Napoleon had, in fact, just abolished it voluntarily. Not knowing for what they were to go to war, the English naturally asked for whom. It was evidently for the Bourbons and against Napoleon. Now the Bourbons had sunk in the estimation of the English, whilst Napoleon had risen a little.

The compliment which Louis XVIII. had paid the regent had certainly flattered the nation; but the people had conceived a bad opinion of the Bourbon Government. The Government of Ferdinand VII. in Spain was esteemed hateful in England, and that of Louis XVIII. in France was pronounced to be talentless, stultified, and eminently calculated to entail upon his family the misfortunes that had just occurred. Nobody could see the common sense of taking up arms for the Bourbons, for the purpose of imposing on France a Government that England would not choose for herself. As to Napoleon, he gained in public opinion in proportion as the allied sovereigns lost. He had been censured most for his insatiable and subversive ambition. The English people were greatly displeased at seeing Poland abandoned to Alexander and Saxony dismembered for the benefit of Prussia, at the annexation of Venice to Austria and of Genoa to Piedmont, without considering that these sacrifices were the necessary consequence of the arrangements which they had laboured to effect, and without reflecting whether they were not

doing themselves precisely that which they blamed in others: they said that the ambition of Napoleon ought not to be blamed by those who were guilty of as great themselves. Besides, as the English are gifted with a strong imagination, his miraculous return from Elba had reinvested Napoleon with his former *prestige*. Napoleon having returned with the apparent approbation of the French people, he was, in the opinion of the English, sheltered by the principle of *de facto* government, a principle which they had now asserted for twenty-five years against many successive ministries. And under such circumstances to recommence a desperate struggle to perpetuate the income tax, from which they had hoped to deliver themselves, to increase an already overwhelming debt, to bar up the paths of commerce so lately opened, in short, to plunge again into the horrors of war within a few months after being delivered from them, and all this for incompetent princes and against a prince too competent, but without giving themselves time to inquire whether he did not return corrected by adversity,—this seemed to the unprejudiced masses most irrational conduct, inspired by the inveterate prejudices of the Pitt school.

The English ministers were conscious of this change in public opinion, and, had they been present at Vienna, would not have pledged themselves to the Coalition so readily as Lord Wellington. Lord Liverpool and Mr. Vansittart, who were certainly no friends of France, had the greatest objection to recommencing war; and even Lord Castlereagh, though so much influenced by the connections he had formed on the continent, was no less uneasy than his colleagues at the state of public opinion, nor less desirous to conciliate it. The French emigrants who had arrived in London endeavoured to change the feelings of the British Ministry. The Duke de Feltre, sent over by Louis XVIII., communicated to them not only all that he had learned by a long acquaintance with the Imperial administration, but also the newest and most certain documents which he had been able to collect during his late ministry. He assured them that war could not be very hazardous, since when he left Paris, on the 19th of March, there were but a hundred and eighty thousand men under arms, of which fifty thousand could not be concentrated on any one point, and that by all imaginable exertions Napoleon could not bring a hundred thousand men into the field, after supplying the fortresses and interior with the necessary troops. To these reasons were added the promises of certain royalists in the west, who declared that, were some troops and *matériel* sent to Brittany and Vendée, the peasantry of these districts would rise as in former times, and effect a serious diversion, which, dividing Napoleon's forces, would render them less formidable. It was therefore concluded that a prompt and vigorous effort would destroy Napoleon, and secure to each Power the possession of the advantages acquired in 1814. The English ministers were still considering the arguments for and against this measure, when news arrived of Lord Wellington having, without permission, engaged them in a new coalition, and then the fear of disturbing the continental union, a feeling of complaisance for their negotiator, and Lord

Castlereagh's inclination to adopt the continental policy, together with the hereditary bias of the Tory ministers, induced them to declare for war. However, as public opinion was so much opposed to this measure, it was necessary to use some deception, and Lord Castlereagh condescended to dissimulate in a way which, thanks to the advance of public morality, no English minister would now dare to attempt.* The cabinet, therefore, resolved, when all that had been done at Vienna was known, to introduce some restriction, as it were in deference to British principles, and to announce the contracted engagements gradually, as the course of events might seem to justify the conduct of the ministers. The treaty of the 25th of March, by which the Alliance of Chaumont had been renewed, was ratified, with a reservation, however, added to the eighth article. This article, by which Louis XVIII. was allowed to join in the treaty, must be understood, they said, as binding the European sovereigns for their common interest to a general effort against Napoleon, but not as binding his Britannic majesty to go to war for the purpose of imposing any particular Government on France. This treaty was brought to London on the 5th of April, there ratified, and then sent back on the 8th with this specious but false reservation; for the desire of the Government was to substitute the Bourbons for Napoleon.

In a country constituted as England is, it would not be possible to conceal these proceedings from the Parliament, which really exercises the power attributed to the crown. On the 6th of April, the day after the treaty had arrived in London, it was therefore determined to send a message to the two Houses. The substance of this message was that, in consequence of the events which had lately occurred in France, the crown considered it necessary to increase the national forces both by land and sea, and to enter into communication with her allies, in order to concert measures with them for the present and future safety of Europe.

The cabinet requested that this message should be discussed immediately, which was done, notwithstanding the efforts of the Opposition to delay it. The discussion was animated, and the arguments adduced, strong. In the Upper House, Lord Liverpool represented the cabinet, and Lord Grey the Opposition. In the Lower House, Lord Castlereagh was the ministerial leader, Sir Francis Burdett and Mr. Whitebread represented the Opposition. With a very slight difference, the same reasoning was employed in both Houses.

The cabinet made the following statement. France had been treated most generously in the April of 1814. Instead of destroying this nation, which during twenty-five years had not ceased to disturb the peace of Europe, the Allies had treated her with the greatest consideration. She had been allowed to retain a little more than her frontier of 1790, that is to say, Marienburg to the north, Landau to the east, and Chambéry to the south; and she

was left in possession of a museum filled with the spoils of the museums of Europe. As to Napoleon, the treaty of the 11th of April granted him conditions that were only too favourable. The English ministry would not have consented to sign this imprudent treaty were it not that Lord Castlereagh, on arriving at Paris in 1814, had found it drawn up and warmly supported by the Emperor Alexander. Besides, at that time Napoleon had still a hundred and fifty thousand men at Lisle, Paris, Toulouse, and Lyons, and the danger of a prolonged contest had to be taken into consideration. The treaty of the 11th of April conferred on him the sovereignty of the island of Elba, together with a large revenue; this treaty he had daringly broken by quitting the island, and afterward seducing an army that detested peace and only dreamed of promotion and plunder. It is true that it had been said in Napoleon's defence that the treaty had been first broken by others. If this were so, why did he not demand redress? He had said nothing, done nothing. The British cabinet had accidentally learned that he was in want of money, and immediately insisted that France should pay his subsidy. As to the assertion of his not being closely watched, those who made the assertion forgot that in Elba Napoleon was a sovereign, and not a prisoner; to which reason he could only be watched by a cruising-party; and a cruising-party, however numerous, might always be evaded. Colonel Campbell lived alternately at Leghorn and Porto-Ferrajo: he was not, unfortunately, in the latter town on the 26th of February, and had he been, he would have met the same treatment as the other Englishmen who had been given into the custody of the gendarmerie: consequently, the British cabinet was to blame, whilst the fact was patent that Napoleon had been replaced at the head of the Government by the treachery of an army that only cared for war and booty; but Europe could not consent to live in constant alarm merely to procure French soldiers' occupation, protection, and money; nor was there any necessity for immediate war, or of imposing any particular sovereign on France: it was only necessary to continue in close alliance with the Continental Powers, the only means of avoiding an insupportable yoke. England would much prefer peace to war; but how could peace be hoped from a man who broke to-day the promise of yesterday? that, besides, it was better to leave the decision of this question to the Continental Powers, that were in more immediate danger than England, who had better course to pursue to maintain an unchangeable union with those Powers. This message had evidently but one object,—to keep up a close alliance with the Continental Powers, and to be in a position to answer their call should they need the assistance of Great Britain by land or sea.

It would be impossible to dissemble more adroitly, under general truths, the essential fact of the war that had been resolved upon at Vienna. But the Opposition did not fall into the snare, and victoriously repelled all Lord Liverpool and Lord Castlereagh's arguments.

They first asked whether the Government had not already signed a positive engagement

* The dissimulation practised is proved by the recently published Correspondence of Lord Castlereagh; as also by unpublished documents connected with the Congress of Vienna, and which are at this moment before me.

to make war with France for the purpose of dethroning Napoleon and restoring the Bourbons. As the Opposition only suspected, but was not certain, that this was true, the question was put in terms that gave Lord Castlereagh an opportunity of giving an evasive reply, and speaking with a want of candour unworthy of the minister of a free country. As indeed these exact terms had not been used, as it had not been formally said that war would be declared against France for the purpose of replacing Napoleon by the Bourbons, although this was the real object of the treaty, Lord Castlereagh, who had had the treaty of the 25th of March in his possession for two days, replied, with ill-disguised insincerity, that England had not signed any treaty of the kind, and tried to show that none but precautionary measures had been taken, exactly in conformity with the words of the message which had given rise to the discussion.

Though deceived as to facts, the Opposition did not allow themselves to be deceived by arguments. They said that it might have been right to oppose Napoleon to the very utmost formerly, but that making the evident, though dissimulated, engagement of doing so now, was only yielding to the old aristocratic notions of the Tory party; that the treaty of the 11th of April, the natural consequence of the state of things in 1814, had been shamelessly violated in every possible way; that not only Napoleon's subsidy had not been paid, which reduced him to selling some of the cannon of Elba, but that a doubt was expressed as to whether the duchy of Parma would be given to his wife and son; the dotation promised to Prince Eugène had been refused, and the question had been almost publicly discussed whether Napoleon himself should not be transported to an island in the ocean; that he had, consequently, every right to break the treaty of the 11th of April; that when he had come to France he had found not only the army, but the whole nation, ready to receive him with open arms; that, aided by the army alone, he would not have reached Paris in twenty days, but he had reached that city attended by the acclamations of the people from town and country; that it was not at the head of a troop of bandits, as was said, for he had come without firing a single shot, but as the true representative of the French Revolution; that, on the other hand, not an arm had been raised to aid the Bourbons, which did not prove that the nation preferred them to Napoleon; that the war, which was denied, though it was immediately to commence, was only taking part with the Bourbons, whom the majority of the French nation suspected and disliked, and this against Napoleon, whom the greater part considered as the representative of their true interests; that this interference in the domestic policy of a free nation was quite opposed to the principles of Great Britain, an interference which a sense of morality ought to interdict, were it even advantageous to British interests, but which should be most carefully avoided when opposed to them; that Napoleon could not be what he undoubtedly was, a man of great genius, if misfortune had not modified his opinions; that such a change must have taken place to a certain degree, since he had at once accepted

the Treaty of Paris, which he had so obstinately rejected in 1814; his sincerity had been doubted, and his old ambition blamed; what had been said of his ambition was indeed true, but, since the Congress of Vienna, his ambition ought not to be mentioned without adverting to the ambition of those Powers that had seized on Poland, divided Saxony, and deprived Venice and Genoa of their nationality; that experience had shown that these Powers also were dangerous, and would need restraint as much as Napoleon; that, consequently, if, profiting by the lessons of 1813 and 1814, he seriously proposed peace, the offer deserved consideration before declaring war; that he was as good on the French throne as any other; that to recommence war, double the national debt, perpetuate the income tax, in a word, to brave all the risks of a struggle that would be terrible if France should look on it as a national one, would be sacrificing the true interests of England to old Tory prejudices, and that, however flattering the compliments of Louis XVIII. might be, they were not worthy of such a price.

Parliament was evidently influenced by these arguments, which, indeed, had great weight with the public mind in England. Some politicians, who saw that England had gained as much at Vienna as the most ambitious Powers, felt inclined for war as the surest means of securing these advantages; but even those were doubtful as to the result, and considered it wiser to reflect before coming to a decision. Mr. Ponsonby, who held a position between the ministry and the Opposition, was the organ of this opinion. In reply to the message from the crown, the Opposition proposed a resolution equivalent to recommending the Government to preserve peace. To adopt such a resolution would be to declare formally against war, and therefore the majority demanded that events should be allowed to develop themselves before coming to a decision. Mr. Ponsonby said that were the message from the crown to be considered as a formal declaration of war, he would not vote for it, as he coincided with those who thought it wiser not to reject every overture coming from Napoleon; he did not believe what had been said, that he had been recalled by the army alone; that evidently the greater portion of the nation favoured him; that, such being the case, the risks and advantages of war should be weighed; that peace ought to be preferred if it could be obtained on a sure basis, and war entered on only when indispensable and presenting reasonable chances of success; in a word, that the House ought to examine and reflect, and then send a reply to the message of the crown conformable to its sentiments, which were averse to recommencing immediately a desperate struggle, but preferred to continue in alliance with the Continental sovereigns, and to keep up a sufficient force to be able to assist them if necessary. It was for these reasons, and these alone, that Mr. Ponsonby did not join the Opposition. The members of the Opposition, in order to decide the question, appealed repeatedly to the members of the Government; called upon them to declare the truth, and to avow that voting in the sense of the message was voting for war certain and close at hand.

A decided and repeated negative was given to this by several members of the cabinet, who did not hesitate to utter downright falsehood, —conduct which, to the honour of their institutions, it must be said no British ministers have since ever carried so far.

The proposal of the Opposition was not supported by more than forty votes, whilst more than two hundred sided with the ministers.

The motion being carried, the treaty of the 25th of March was ratified and sent to Vienna, with the illusive reservation of which we have already spoken, whilst two members of the cabinet proceeded to Brussels to arrange the different points with Lord Wellington. These were desired to tell him that the cabinet was as anxious for war as he, and would support him most energetically; that all that had been said was but a trick necessitated by the state of public opinion in England; that he should explain the real meaning of the reservation added to the 8th article to Louis XVIII., and tell him that it was a mere salve for the feelings of some persons, but would neither prevent the English cabinet from desiring the restoration of the Bourbons nor from assisting them as earnestly as before. Lord Wellington was also to be told that the six millions sterling that had been promised should be sent to the three great Powers, but that they must not expect more; and that, as to the lesser German Powers, an effort would be made to compensate them in money for the deficiency in the promised contingent of a hundred and fifty thousand men. Lastly, Lord Wellington was earnestly pressed to tell his plans and those of the Coalition, that, knowing, his Government might feel confidence in advancing them. In order to give an appearance of truth to the statements made in Parliament by the ministers, the Admiralty gave orders that the English navy should respect the tricolour flag, which before was fired on, whilst the white was allowed to pass unmolested. The Admiralty further permitted the merchant-vessels of the two nations to frequent the ports of both countries. This was a feint to be kept up for two or three months, until the commencement of hostilities.

When the emissaries of the English cabinet arrived at Brussels, they found Lord Wellington quite ready to admit all these little deceptions of form, provided that nothing essential was changed; and he immediately exerted all his energy to prevent any imprudence being committed by the Prussians on the one hand or the French emigrants on the other. This was no very easy task, as the passions of both were violently excited. The rage of the Prussians was roused to an almost incomprehensible degree. They talked of again entering France, where they would spare neither palace nor cottage. The greater number of their troops were encamped near Liege, and, as the inhabitants of this town were favourable to France, the soldiers committed all sorts of violence, exercising a species of inquisitorial police, imprisoning or exiling all accused of connivance with the French, and directing their severity in particular against the Saxon troops, who, since the dismemberment of Saxony, bitterly repented their conduct at Leipsic, a repentance they took no pains to conceal. So

violent had been the manifestation of feeling on the part of these troops that it was found necessary to send them to the rear and disarm them. Blücher wished to select some of the Saxon soldiers who, in virtue of the late arrangements at Vienna, had become French subjects, and incorporate them with his own army. The Saxons refused to submit to this dislocation, and threatened a desperate resistance, aided by the inhabitants of Liege. Blücher had been advised to defer this measure, but he would not listen to any counsel but the suggested moderation. The "*Mercur de Rhin*," a rabid journal, was the organ of Prussian feelings. According to this journal, the French ought not to be treated as ordinary adversaries, but *like mad dogs, who are dealt with by being knocked on the head*. War, of course, to be declared against Napoleon, was less against him than against the French nation, whose pride and ambition had been disturbing Europe during twenty-five years. France should no longer be allowed to exist as one nation, but be divided into Burgundians, Champenois, Auvergnats, Bretons, and Aquitanians, each with their respective king; while Alsace, Lorraine, and Flanders should be incorporated with the German Empire, which should be restored to its ancient unity by being placed under an emperor; and so Germany was to be treated on a system diametrically opposed to that which was to be applied to France, since her kings were to be removed to give place to an emperor, whilst France was to exchange her emperor for five or six kings; the national property, the fruits of revolutionary pillage, was either to be bestowed on the allied armies, or serve as security for a paper currency wherewith to pay the expenses of the new war. These extravagant plans, published in articles as revolting in language as in principle, were reproduced each morning in the journal, and circulated all along the Rhine.

To language such as this, the Prussians added military projects not a whit wiser. They wanted to advance immediately on Paris, without considering whether the other arms of the Coalition were ready to support them. They asserted that they alone, aided by a few English, Hanoverians, and Dutch, would be able to overcome every obstacle, and finish the war at once.

Ghent, where Louis XVIII. had taken refuge, was the seat of equally irrational excitement. If some of the ministers, such as M. Louis and M. de Jaucourt, who had accompanied Louis XVIII., saw a lesson for the future in the events that had just occurred, others considered them as only motives for exercising too-long deferred severity. It was commonly said that the French army was nothing but a collection of brigands, that must be got rid of; that its commanders had been too much tolerated,—a policy that must be changed by taking off the heads of a few generals and distinguished revolutionists, and that such weakness give place to energy. These persons considered Napoleon's return as the result of an extensive conspiracy, and the pardon of those who had assisted him as deliberate treachery, and not the consequence of exalted feeling. One unfortunate man, Marshal Ney, was loaded with maledictions and marked out

for signal vengeance. Thus, far from thinking of doing better for the future, the royalists only thought of vengeance, and of shedding blood that they would never cease to regret.

It must be said, to the praise of Louis XVIII., that, if deficient in warmth of feeling, he was not subject to such deplorable excitement, and that, whilst he listened to these follies, he neither encouraged nor repeated them, merely confining himself to hoping that the allies would soon restore him to the throne. He even admitted the necessity of allowing a larger share of power to his ministers, and less to his brother, nephews, and others of the court. Unfortunately, some foreign diplomatists, whose good sense ought to have saved them from participating in the folly of the time, often set the example. One of these, Count Pozzo, wrote a letter to Lord Castlereagh, in which much political good sense was joined with the following outrageous expressions:—"We left Louis XVIII. to confront the demons of the Revolution, and we have made him responsible for our imprudences in addition to his own. Bonaparte arrived while things were in this state, the troops overturned the throne which they were bound to support, whilst the people were stunned and stupefied; but they will applaud a different scene, in which we, I hope, will soon perform. But we must not content ourselves with the compliments that we expect; we must put the king in a position to dismiss this army and assemble another, and to free France of about fifty great criminals, whose existence is incompatible with peace. The French ought to undertake this task; but it is the allies who must put them in a position to do so. We are indebted for our safety to our union, and this union is the result of a happy combination of circumstances that may not easily occur again." Such words, uttered by a man of superior intellect, of which he afterwards gave undeniable evidence, show what blind infatuation animated all Europe at the time.

It was this wild excitement that the sage Lord Wellington was called on to appease, and, as may be supposed, he had no easy task. But, as it was principally a question of military operations, in which he had great authority and real power, he contented himself with acting prudently in that department, and allowed talkers to prattle as they pleased. He blamed, indeed, the language of the journals published along the Rhine, and expressed his fear that they would be as injurious as the Duke of Brunswick's manifesto. He advised Marshal Blücher to deal leniently with the Saxons, and to defer the incorporation into his own army of such of them as belonged to Prussia. He advised Louis XVIII. to rid himself of the influence of his court, and copy the example of England by choosing a really responsible ministry, concentrating both power and responsibility. As to the military question, he held conferences at Ghent with the representatives of the British cabinet, the Prussian generals, and the Duke de Feltre, War Minister to Louis XVIII. Although in all these conferences the French forces were estimated very low, Lord Wellington saw more reason for prudence than for precipitation. He succeeded in persuading General Gneisenau, Blücher's

representative, that it would not be wise to hurry, that it would be better to unite the English with the larger portion of the Prussian army and thus form a mass of two hundred and fifty thousand men in the north, and wait until an equally large force should be ready to advance, under Prince Schwarzenberg, from the east, and even to wait until it should be sufficiently near to act with effect. Wellington's plan, sketched according to the campaign of 1814, but freed from Blücher's imprudences, was to defer victory that it might be more certain; to advance methodically in two great columns, each of which would be larger than the supposed army of Napoleon; to make the passage secure by taking possession of all the fortresses on the way, and thus drive Napoleon back on Paris, and overwhelm him with four or five hundred thousand soldiers, and deprive him of the opportunity of employing those military stratagems in which his genius was so fertile. General Gneisenau, a man of intelligence, saw the wisdom of this plan, and promised, on the part of the Prussian army, as much deference to the counsels of the English general as devotion to the common cause. It was agreed that the concentration of forces destined to operate by the north of France should be executed as quickly as possible; that the English, the Hollando-Belgians, the Hanoverians, the Brunswickers, &c., composing Lord Wellington's army, should immediately assemble between Brussels and Mons, along the left bank of the Sambre, whilst the Prussians should take up a position on the right bank, advancing from Liege to Charleroy without loss of time; that constant communication should be kept up by means of numerous bridges, and that they should be ready to aid each other if, whilst awaiting the other allies, their terrible enemy should descend on them unexpectedly. From this time forward, Lord Wellington's calm, strong sense took an ascendancy in the Prussian councils, which, unfortunately for us, exercised an immense influence on succeeding events.

Such were the negotiations and military combinations made by the allies from the 20th of March to the 10th of April. Napoleon had been prepared for this; but when he found that his couriers had been arrested at Mentz, Kehl, and Turin, and that M. de Flahault, though successful in getting as far as Strasbourg, was there obliged to turn back, he saw that the passions excited against him were still more violent than he had imagined. And when M. de Montrond, his private envoy, returned, and to the general knowledge of facts added minute details, he would have been indeed pained, but that he was now accustomed to such strokes of fate. From M. de Montrond he learned that his wife, influenced by love of ease, and the mean wish of getting Parma, and perhaps by more unworthy motives, had put herself and her son under the authority of the Congress, and would not return to Paris. He saw that the determination to war against him was carried even to passion, that a political excommunication had been pronounced against him, interdicting the simplest communications, even those which public justice, for the sake of humanity, commands in time of war. He had been prepared for something of the kind,

but the reality far exceeded his anticipations; still he was neither surprised nor angry, for he knew that it was he who had filled the vial of wrath that was being poured out on him. There is no more correct judge of his own faults than a great man who is conscious of his errors and wishes to repair them. Napoleon was determined, notwithstanding his excitable temperament, not to show the least anger, to bear every thing, and tell all to the public. Up to this time, he had contented himself with saying that he would not interfere in the affairs of other nations, nor allow them to dictate to France, and more he could not say, not having received any declarations of war. Had he by any act anticipated the manifestations of foreign cabinets, there is no doubt but that his quickness in attributing hostile intentions to Europe would have been attributed to his own love of war. But after the public and official events that had just taken place, he need no longer hesitate; he must speak out, that France might know to what a state of dependence foreigners sought to reduce her, for she would not even be allowed to choose her own government. It was necessary to speak, that the nations of Europe might know that their blood was about to be again shed, and that not with the view of achieving their independence or satisfying their ambition,—for Napoleon was willing to accept the arrangements made at Vienna,—but to gratify the passions of their rulers; and, lastly, it was necessary to speak, that the English people might know how grossly they had been deceived. It was most urgent now to promulgate the decrees relative to the retired soldiers, the mobilized National Guards, and concerning all the other military preparations; for though the preliminary labour had, up to this time, been carried on in the different departments of the Government, an official announcement in the *Moniteur* was become necessary to insure the obedience of those who were to be summoned to the defence of their country. It was only Napoleon's pride that could suffer from the announcements he was about to make, for his former glory was sufficient to enable him to bear still greater humiliations, and, indeed, that pride which had so often erred could only interest the world now by humbling itself for a great end, that of showing Europe the justice of his cause.

He commenced by publishing the declaration of the 13th of March as an official document, though it had been spoken of only in a vague and undecided manner. This was followed by a consultation of the Council of State, which was at that moment the highest moral authority, the chambers being dissolved. This body, having verified the authenticity of the declaration of the 13th of March, asserted that this document, which had emanated from the sovereigns in Congress, was at once opposed to justice, truth, and good sense, and was in reality an incitement to assassination. The Council further maintained that, by the treaty of the 11th of April, Napoleon in the island of Elba was a real sovereign, the extent of his possessions being of little consequence, and that, consequently, he might claim the rights of a monarch; that when he landed in the Gulf of Juan, and thus committed an aggres-

sion against the sovereign that had been imposed on France, he had only incurred the consequences attached to the rights of war;—that is to say, the diminution or privation of his states, or captivity if conquered,—but he had by no means incurred the penalty of death, which was only lawful in the case of combatants on the field of battle who refused to surrender. But, by declaring him an outlaw, the king's ordinance of the 6th of March, and the declaration from Vienna on the 13th, had assumed the character of an invitation to assassination, a crime forbidden in civilized nations; that the declaration of the 13th of March had outraged truth as well as justice; that the treaty of the 11th of April had been violated in every possible manner, that the private property of the Bonaparte family had been sequestered, and the stipulated subsidy refused to Napoleon or his relatives, nor had the sum of two millions which Napoleon had been authorized to distribute to certain military slaves, been paid; that there was a hesitation about giving the duchy of Parma to Maria Louisa, though it had been promised her, and she altogether refused to her son; that the promised dotation had been refused from Eugène; and, lastly, that Maria Louisa and her son had been prevented (which indeed was true for a time) from joining their mother and father in the island of Elba; that, consequently, it was the conduct of the royal Government, and not Napoleon's leaving the island of Elba, that had broken the treaty of the 11th of April; that he, therefore, was not an aggressor. But he had a still better reason for what he had done, and that was the welfare of France, for he knew how the French nation, clipped of her glory, threatened in her right, was every moment menaced with subversion by the incessant attacks on the holders of national property, and was desirous of being delivered from the many dangers that hovered upon her; that Napoleon, who was bound by no conditions since the treaty of the 11th of April had been broken, had received the most evident approbation of what he had done, in the reception he had met in France; that, therefore, it was not he who was in the wrong but his adversaries; more especially now they had legalized his assassination, a line of conduct to which he had replied by setting the Duke d'Angoulême at liberty, and by allowing the Duchess d'Orléans and the Duchess de Bourbon to remain in France.

This declaration, however correct, was in reality nothing more than a recrimination; but it was soon followed by a more important document,—M. de Caulaincourt's report of the unsuccessful attempts to establish diplomatic relations with the European Powers. In this report, which was inserted in the *Moniteur* on the 13th of April, there was no mention, as may be supposed, of M. de Montbreuil's secret mission, but only of the couriers that had been sent to announce the Emperor's pacific intentions, and who had been stopped at Fink Kehl, and Mentz. M. de Flakamb's arrestation at Stuttgart was mentioned, and the refusal at Dover to receive the message addressed to the prince regent, and how this message had been sent to the Congress of Vienna. These facts were related with perfect modesty.

tion of language, but with a firmness that showed the absence of all fear. The rejected documents were also inserted in the *Moniteur*, that France and Europe might judge of the conduct of both parties, of those who wished to speak, and of those who would not listen. The conclusion to be drawn from these communications was, that France had no reason either to be sanguine or alarmed, but ought to look on things as they really were, and be prepared to meet hostilities which, though not absolutely certain, were extremely probable.

Napoleon also ordered the debates of the British Parliament to be published, together with the most significant articles of foreign journals, more especially those of the *Mercur du Rhin*. The public were thus warned, and could have no longer any doubt as to the intentions of the Powers. There was nothing now to prevent the promulgation of the decrees relative to arming France, and it became the duty of the army, that had wished for the restoration of the Empire, of the inhabitants of the rural districts, who wished to guarantee the inviolability of national property, in short, it was the duty of all who wished to see the Revolution avenged for the attempts of the emigrants, to arm in support of the chief they had recalled to the throne. The zeal of these different classes might be reckoned on, and their exertions, which, if well directed, had every chance of success, provided that fate were not adverse.

Napoleon therefore published, together with the documents of which we have already spoken, the decrees relative to the recall of the retired soldiers, and the organization of the mobilized National Guards. These decrees, founded on certain laws whose execution they enforced and regulated, were perfectly legal, and altogether free from that semblance of absolute power which Napoleon had formerly arrogated to himself. The old soldiers were summoned to defend the cause of France, so dear to their hearts, with the promise of being dismissed to their homes as soon as peace should be established. They were left the choice of returning to their former regiments, or of joining those nearest them. The National Guards were bound to sedentary service, from twenty to sixty years of age. From twenty to forty they might be summoned, according to their age, strength, tastes, and state of their families, to join the select companies, and serve in the fortresses or the wings of the active army. A committee of the arrondissement, consisting of a sub-prefect, a member of the council of the arrondissement, and an officer of the gendarmerie, was ordered to select the men who were to compose these select companies, either as grenadiers or chasseurs. Those who could afford it were expected to buy their own uniforms, whilst the others would be equipped at the expense of the department. The State would provide arms for all. All officers above the rank of commanders of battalions were to be appointed by the Emperor, and all under that rank by the committees of the arrondissement. Together with these decrees, the Ministers of Police and of the Interior sent circulars to the prefects, in which they sought to excite the enthusiasm of the citizens, and adduced

many reasons to show that it was the interest of all to defend the Imperial dynasty, and this in terms which came better from their lips than they could from those of the Emperor.

Napoleon needed no stimulus. He worked day and night, either directing or urging the administration with that universal and indefatigable attention which embraced at once the whole and the details. He had not been able to insert earlier the articles relative to the old soldiers and the National Guard in the *Moniteur*, as the publishing such significant documents before foreign cabinets had shown hostile symptoms would have the appearance of a provocation rather than a legitimate defence. But fortunately no time had been lost: for had these decrees been published earlier there would not have been agents either in Paris or the provinces to put them into execution. The decree relative to the National Guards needed the creation of an entirely new system of organization, and the delay of that concerning the retired soldiers was not of much consequence; for as these men were perfectly well drilled, they could join their respective battalions the very moment of their arrival. As the men on six months' leave of absence began to come in, Napoleon ordered that the third battalions should immediately join the main body of the army, even though they consisted but of four hundred men, as they could be completed afterward. He ordered that the mobilized National Guards should be immediately draughted into the battalions *d'élite*, that each man should be provided with a simple blouse with a coloured collar, an unrepaid musket, and the troop then sent to the nearest fortress, in order that the regular troops might be rendered immediately disposable. The organization, equipment, and arming of the battalions was to be completed in the fortresses. Napoleon, finding that the purchase of horses for the cavalry went on but slowly, and that the dissolving of the household troops had furnished but three hundred instead of the three thousand he had expected, determined to take seven or eight thousand horses from the gendarmerie, and pay ready money, that they might be replaced without delay. These horses were well fed and well trained, and only needed being accustomed to fatigue. He renewed the order for officers to seek horses all through the country and purchase them with ready money. He repeated that he could have bought as many as he wished between Cannes and Grenoble, that great numbers might be got in the rural districts, and that it was only by employing many plans that the necessary supply could be obtained. Meantime he did not neglect the dépôt at Versailles, of which he took the whole charge upon himself. The military workshops were so well managed that they produced each day a thousand new muskets, and repaired two thousand. The clothing-establishments produced each day a thousand uniforms. It was by constant supervision and by paying ready money that Napoleon succeeded in producing such satisfactory results.

Not content with giving publicity to the manner in which the sovereigns had acted toward France, he determined to make a personal manifestation, and that in presence of

the Parisian National Guard, who, on his arrival at Paris, he had been advised not to trust. This guard was composed of commercial men, more or less wealthy; honest citizens, in a word, who would prefer correcting the Bourbons' faults by legal resistance, to dethroning them for the advantage of Napoleon, from whom they expected war and a very small share of liberty. Napoleon had returned without their assistance, and almost against their will; he had returned as it were by a miracle, and without shedding a drop of blood; he presented himself improved in all essential points; he had repelled the emigrants, restored the principles of 1789, again revived the glory of France, so dear to the citizens of Paris; and, lastly, he was threatened by Europe, who sought to destroy him by means that were at once revolting to morality and subversive of the national independence. These were motives sufficient to win him favour in the eyes of the Parisian bourgeoisie, and, let us add, in the eyes of all good citizens. They certainly would not have allowed him to return, they would have prevented his return at any risk had they been able; but, being returned, and in possession of supreme power, giving unmistakable signs of intending to maintain a healthful policy at home and abroad,—now, too, that he was proscribed by Europe in a manner that seemed a denial of the just rights of France,—it was both good sense and true patriotism to support him.

In every large body there will be always found many shades of opinion more or less great according to the spirit that prevails, and it is sufficient to silence some and allow others to speak, in order to change the apparent or even real sentiments of the whole. Besides that the fact of Napoleon's peaceful re-establishment and promises had greatly calmed the National Guards, many of the officers had been changed, and great pains had been taken to rouse the zeal of those who detested both emigrants and foreigners. The Parisian National Guards were consequently much better disposed to give the Emperor a favourable reception than they had been on his arrival.

On Sunday, the 16th, the forty-eight battalions of the guard were drawn up on one side of the Place du Carrousel, and on the other the numerous and well-drilled troops who were passing through the capital on their way to the frontiers. Napoleon had kept the supreme command of the Parisian militia for himself, and had made General Durosnel his aide-de-camp, only the second in command. He rode along the ranks with an imposing air, the result of natural firmness of character, and twenty years' command of the greatest armies in the universe. The warm acclamations of an ardent minority, which were not contradicted though not joined in by the greater number, gave an almost enthusiastic air to the whole review. After having rode along the ranks of the forty-eight battalions, Napoleon called the officers in a circle round him, and addressed them in the following terms:—

"Soldiers of the National Guard of Paris, I am glad to see you. It is now fifteen months since I organized you, that you might watch over the peace and security of the capital. You have fulfilled my expectations; you have

shed your blood in defence of Paris; and if the enemy has entered within your walls, it was not you, but treason that was to blame, and still more, that fatality which at that time overshadowed all our undertakings.

"The royal authority was not suited to France. It gave the people no security in their dearest interests. It had been imposed on us by foreigners, and would have been, had it continued, a monument of shame and misfortune. I am come, supported by all the strength of the people and the army, to wipe away this stain, and to restore to the honour and glory of France all their former splendour.

"Soldiers of the National Guard, this morning's telegraph announces that the tri-colored flag floats from the walls of Marseille and Antibes. A hundred cannon fired on our battlements will announce to foreigners that our dissensions are at an end; I say foreigners, for as yet we have no enemies. If they assault their troops, we shall assemble ours. Our armies are composed of heroes that have distinguished themselves in a hundred battles, and who will oppose a barrier of iron to the enemy, whilst the numerous battalions of the grenadiers and chasseurs of the National Guards will protect our frontiers. I shall not interfere in the affairs of other nations, but woe to the Governments that attempt to interfere with ours!

"Soldiers of the National Guard, you have been compelled to display colours that had been rejected by France, but you will cherish the national colours in your hearts. You swear to make them your rallying-point, and to defend the Imperial throne, the nation and only security of your rights. You swear never to allow foreigners, whose masters we have so often been, to interfere in our Government. In short, you swear to make every sacrifice for the honour and independence of France!"

This discourse, so well suited to the soldiers, and which so plainly showed the difficulties of the actual position of affairs, was warmly applauded by the officers, to whom it was addressed. "We swear! we swear!" they cried as they waved their swords. Napoleon then saw twenty thousand of the National Guard, and almost as many regular troops, before him, and had every reason to congratulate himself on the proceedings of that day. He had told France what he wished her to know, he had made his peace with the Parisian National Guard, that is, with the rational and sincere portion of the population, who exert so decisive an influence on the fate of every Government.

The next day, the 17th, he left the Tuileries, and took up his abode in the palace of the Elysée, which he found more agreeable in spring, and where he could refresh himself occasionally during his immense labours by a stroll through its shady retreats. He had also changed his bearing toward his subjects. He had always been simple, natural, and even familiar, but never very accessible. In his changed position required that he should be so, that he might be able to influence those whom he wished to win to his cause and to his new opinions. At the palace of the Elysée,

where Queen Hortense did the honours, he could more easily invite to his table those whom he wished to influence, not only by the superiority of his genius, but by the powerful charm of his wit.

His brother Joseph had returned most *apropos* from Switzerland; for he was to have been arrested the very day of his departure by order of the Coalition. Napoleon installed him at the Palais Royal with the title of "Prince," and with a suitable income, and with the express recommendation to act with economy and reserve. These precautions were necessary, as this brother's presence already excited a certain degree of distrust. Every thing that recalled the ancient Empire was feared, and more especially those family royalties which had mainly contributed to raise Europe against France. Napoleon had sent a frigate for his mother, who had gone from Elba to Naples, for his sister, who was detained at Leghorn, and for such of his brothers as had been able to escape the allies. It was a pleasure for him to have them near him; but he was anxious that they should not in any way offend the newly-awakened spirit of France, and meant that they should adopt that simple mode of living which he practised, as much through taste as policy. But each succeeding hour Napoleon became sadder, but concealed his feelings, and his partisans became depressed; they scarcely knew why, but did not possess the same power of self-control as he.

Napoleon's triumphal return to France had made a powerful appeal to the public imagination; but all those whose passions, interests, or prejudices were gratified by the re-establishment of the Empire, had been carried away by an irresistible burst of enthusiasm. But this exultation had not lasted long; soon the great difficulties both at home and abroad became apparent; at home, the disunion of parties, and the absolute opposition in their views,—the Bonapartists merely wishing for the continuance of the Empire, whilst the Revolutionists only intended to make use of Napoleon for a time and get rid of him when he had repelled the enemy; abroad, the frenzied desire to destroy the formidable man who had again made himself master of the power of France, and even to destroy France herself, whose ever-reviving energy made her abhorred by her enemies. Although Napoleon's partisans had formerly felt unbounded confidence in his good fortune and genius, and although this confidence had partly revived under the influence of late events, still a secret uneasiness oppressed them when they thought of the incredible eagerness with which the Powers of Europe were arming against us, and they asked themselves would France be able to resist so many enemies, could she, in less than a year, recover strength to oppose them all, and would Napoleon's genius be able to crush them, for nothing less than total destruction could disarm their implacable hatred. And he himself, though endowed with unconquerable firmness, was no longer under the influence of that calm daring with which a succession of successful enterprises had inspired him in former days. He was thoughtful, and even sad, but was able, thanks to his great mental vivacity, to conceal it from all. But his spirits sank when he was

alone, or when with only five or six persons, such as Queen Hortense, Prince Cambrésès, M. de Caulaincourt, M. de Bassano, M. Lavalette, and Carnot, who from their more intimate intercourse were warmly attached to him. With those who were always ready to counsel, but never to reproach, Napoleon spoke with the most perfect frankness, and even most nobly whenever his own errors were the subject of conversation. He said that the negotiations that had been attempted abroad were scarce deserving the name, that in two months all Europe would be in arms against him; and he should be obliged to meet the enemy with troops so far inferior, though revived by a year's repose, that it would require a miracle to conquer. He considered that the sovereigns whom his downfall had raised to a position they had never before enjoyed, would not willingly consent to resign it, and if conquered in one campaign would at once commence a second, and that consequently France must look forward to a struggle to the death, a struggle that the army and some frontier provinces would sustain with vigour and perseverance, but which the nation, prejudiced against the wars of the first Empire, would most unwillingly support, as it would consider itself as again sacrificed for the benefit of a single individual. By this we see that Napoleon was not deceived, that he did not mistake the rejoicings of the soldiers at the return of their old general, nor the delight of the holders of national property at seeing themselves secured in their possessions, nor the satisfaction of the Revolutionists, freed from the insults of the emigrants, as the serious and unanimous consent of the nation. He had no faith in the enthusiastic effort of 1793, nor in the sincere and generous one made in 1813; he had no confidence but in his soldiers, and if he entertained any hope, it was in the unforeseen chances of war, which would afford an opportunity to a man of genius like him, to change the whole face of affairs in a day. What gave him most pain, though he could not complain of its injustice, was the incredulity which his promises of peace and liberty met with from all. "Yes," he said, "I entertained vast designs, but can I do so still? Can any one suppose that my thoughts are now directed to the Elbe, the Vistula, or even the Rhine? It is indeed a sad thing to give up our geographical frontiers,—the noble conquest of the Revolution; and could they be regained by the loss of my life and that of my soldiers, the sacrifice would soon be made. But there can be no question of such patriotic ambition, since I am willing to accept the Treaty of Paris. We only seek our independence, and to avoid a counter-revolution effected by foreigners. I ask of fate but one or two victories, to re-establish the *prestige* of our arms, and recognise the right to be our own masters; and, this once done, I am willing to accept peace even on moderate terms. But, alas! neither Europe nor France believe this." It must be understood that Napoleon spoke thus only among his most intimate friends, with whom he also discussed another and not less important subject, the new constitution that was to be given to France. At Grenoble, Lyons, and every other place through which he had passed, he

promised to make important alterations in the Imperial laws. France had taken him at his word, and it would be impossible to retract now. The nation, no longer able to endure that a single individual should possess the power of transporting the fate of France to Moscow, was almost unanimous in its desire for what, since that time, has been called a constitutional monarchy, namely, one where the monarch would be represented by responsible ministers, responsible to chambers that could refuse or grant their confidence to these ministers, and could oblige them to govern openly, and make a daily report of their proceedings. Whether this constitutional monarchy was agreeable or not to Napoleon, he was determined to make a trial of it, being too wise to struggle against necessity.

Independent of the intrinsic merit of the institution itself, there was a more pressing reason for its adoption in the present state of things. In order to excuse himself for having expelled the Bourbons and exposed France to a fearful war, it was necessary that he should prove himself to be different to them. Being the personification of the national glory and of civil equality, there was no fear of his appearing the flatterer of foreigners, or the accomplice of the clergy or nobility. But there was one thing he did not represent, and which the Bourbons did represent more than he, and that was liberty, and it is a fact that the nation could more easily believe that he was become pacific than liberal. Having expelled the Bourbons at the risk of such great dangers to France, he was bound to give her liberty; and that not as Louis XVIII. had done, unwillingly and hesitatingly and afterward seeking to resume the half, but fully and freely. Therefore, we repeat that his resolution was already formed under the dictates of prudence, if not of inclination.

As to the merit of the institution itself, which could not be altogether agreeable to him, for a will like his could ill brook restraint, he seemed to be fully converted, especially on the important point, the free discussion of the proceedings of those in power by a daily press.

Certainly, if there is any thing that at first view is repulsive to men of sincerity, it is the daily hearing of mingled truth and falsehood, with a superabundance of the false; to hear ignorance and dishonesty presume to dictate to the most honest and wisest men, and disfigure facts shamelessly, cynically, and without measure. But the opposite condition, that is, the compelled silence of an enlightened nation, is more to be deplored than any inconvenience arising from excessive liberty. Power, protected by silence, may do what it will, and he who can do what he will is very likely to do it; therefore, on reflection, we find that we have but this alternative, either to grant liberty of discussion, or allow opportunity for doing wrong; which is the wiser there can be no doubt, for experience shows that it is better that those who govern should be judged unjustly, than allowed an opportunity of acting with injustice. Besides, the opposite system gradually engenders so much distrust, that it is more difficult for a Government to defend itself against false reports, or the calumnies that circulate from one person to another,

than against the open attacks of the press. Indeed, under the régime of silence, calumny is ever welcome to the distrusted public, and this evil, undermining slowly and unseen, becomes, thus, the punishment of absolute power and is at least as dangerous when it infects the masses, as the unrestrained license of the press. The latter may be overcome by a contradictory reply, but it is impossible to root the other in its hidden retreat. Without taking into consideration that a day will come, and that ever the luckless day of misfortune, when, all barriers being removed, long-restrained passion pours forth on you the accumulated wrongs of twenty years, and overwhelms you when there is not one disposed to listen to you, not one willing to defend you.

Such had been Napoleon's experience, and destined to extremes in all things, his experience in this had been both complete and terrible. Holding, during his former reign, the organs of public opinion in his own power, he had seen such distrust arise among the people, that he could no longer contradict or support a true assertion, and this to such a degree that his power was as it were dumb; all more reliance was felt in the false beliefs of the enemy, than in those of the Government that spoke the truth. Thus, as we have seen, Napoleon ceased to send bulletins in 1810 and 1814, and contented himself with inserting in the *Moniteur* letters purporting to be written by officers in the army to different parts of the State. In the day of trouble, when he was alone, or almost alone, at Fontenoy, Napoleon heard that cry of malice which that afterward accompanied him to Elba, and which did not leave him a single moment of repose, mingling with its just reproaches the vilest and most revolting calumnies, not only on his public acts, but even on his private life. His pride, which was as great as his power, had floated, as we may say, over this sea of infamy, and after all these horrors—though his faults still remained patent—he had tried to see his glory revive, and bring back the people and the army to his feet.

Having escaped this storm, he saw clearly, and loudly proclaimed, that it was but the prudence to restrain the press, and consequently, as we have seen, he abolished his censorship on the 25th of March.

But when the press is permitted to write freely on public affairs, it is but a step further to allow them to be discussed in an assembly, and Napoleon was inclined to believe that it would be possible to govern, though with chambers that would attack, torment, and dismiss his ministers. Experience has shown that, even if the calumny of the press may often be unanswered, the calumny spoken in the forum is instantly refuted in the presence of those who had heard it, and, further, accompanied by the solemn reparation of public justification. There is no rational and appropriate that would not prefer to have his actions discussed before an assembly bound to hear the defence as well as the attack, and to pronounce immediate judgment, to replying, by writing, before readers who had believed the accusation from a malicious feeling, and whose thoughtlessness prevents from reading the defence, and who take no trouble to judge truly.

because that they are not expressly bound to do so.

Consequently, once that liberty was granted to the press there could be no objection to freedom of discussion, and free assemblies followed as a matter of course. All the time that Napoleon was waging a fearful war against England, he was closely observing her institutions, because he sought the revelation of her plans in the discussions of Parliament, and he was far from feeling that repugnance to the English constitution that is felt by narrow or timid minds. He could see nothing in such a constitution but obstacles to his will, and, for the moment at least, he was willing to encounter many and powerful ones, he was satisfied to have his ministers attacked, his laws rejected, and to hear resolutions formally carried. "Formerly," he said, "such opposition would have interfered with my plans; but now my only plan is to gain one battle, recover our independence, avenge the insult of having had two hundred thousand foreigners in our capital, and then to make peace! Peace being obtained, and that on the sole basis of our independence, we shall have nothing more to do than to rule our fair Empire of France, and it will be no humiliation to me to hear the objections or even refusals of her representatives. Having conquered and ruled the world, there will be nothing so terrible in submitting to a contradiction. In any case, my son will accustom himself to it, and I shall endeavour to prepare him by my instruction and example: but all that I ask of Heaven and France is to allow me to conquer once, and only once, these arrogant monarchs that were once so humble!"

Napoleon was sincere when he spoke thus, but he did not know himself. When he should have conquered Europe that once, which he had implored God and men so earnestly to allow him, would he be able to endure contradiction, not only a just and moderate contradiction, but also that ridiculous opposition that often appears in a revolting form in some free States? Could he smile then, and wait a tardy vindication from time? Nobody could tell how that might be, and he no more than another; but he considered that his very position obliged him to make a complete change in the Imperial institutions; for, not being able to give peace, he ought, at least, to grant liberty. His supporters—that is to say, the Revolutionists, all men of sense, and the youth of France—all wished for full and entire liberty, and would not by any means be satisfied with civil equality, or what was called the principles of eighty-nine. This Napoleon was determined to grant; for, whether convinced or not of the intrinsic merit of liberty, he was, at least, convinced of its necessity. What effects it might produce hereafter, he could not tell, nor did he care to inquire, for his mind was occupied by something very different from a desire to know whether he would be more or less inconvenienced by new institutions hereafter; he was interested in another question, whether he should be able to conquer Europe, which was indeed of vital importance to him and his supporters, all soldiers, revolutionists, and holders of national property. That was the sole object of his thoughts, one

that effaced all others. He was prepared to do every thing to please those who upheld him, as their zeal would be in proportion to his concessions, and, with the clear-sightedness of a superior mind, he did not hesitate to do what he could not avoid. He was, therefore, determined to give a fair trial to constitutional monarchy, and even hoped it might succeed, for its failure would have been a triumph to the Bourbons. However, he was not without fear as to the result of the first attempt. If free assemblies are an excellent instrument of government in a country where they have existed for ages, they are, at the commencement of their existence, doubtful and often dangerous. When the art of guiding them has become a true science, in which those leaders excel who to large political views unite the talent of addressing public assemblies, and especially when they have existed a sufficient length of time to be accustomed to the shock of circumstances, and to have accustomed the people to look unmoved upon their stormy agitation, then they are not to be feared, and present more resources in time of danger than an absolute Government that has no bond in common with the nation. But when free institutions are but a day old, when the nation possesses no men trained to the trade of guiding them, when their *début* is made in the midst of a formidable war, the enterprise is dangerous, and one that filled Napoleon with fear.

In modern times, the British Parliament, either from habit or confidence in the protection of the sea, preserved a becoming deportment during war. In ancient times, the Roman Senate, an institution no less deserving of admiration in another sense, sold the ground on which Hannibal encamped. But this was an old assembly, accustomed to govern Rome in good and evil fortune. Nobody could hope to assemble a Roman Senate or a British Parliament in France in 1815. Napoleon saw that in the coming struggle great trials must be endured, and that, with the loss of self-possession, all would be lost. But if, on the other hand, the public remained as tranquil as after Brienne, Craonne, and Laon, it would be possible to succeed. Unfortunately, it was not the courage but the self-possession of the new assemblies that he distrusted,—assemblies a day old, divided into numerous parties that would often consider a reverse but as a happy opportunity of giving vent to their passions. He feared that, at the first disaster, the apprehensions of some, the anger or intrigues of others, would create a chaos by which the enemy would profit to penetrate again into the heart of the country. Therefore, though quite willing to make a trial of liberty, he dreaded doing so at once, and, as it were, within reach of the cannon of Europe.

This apprehension suggested to him the idea of giving a constitution very similar to that of England, but which was not to come into operation until after the commencement of hostilities. This project did not arise from perfidy, but from a secret presentiment of the danger of convoking an inexperienced assembly whilst foreign armies were marching toward Paris. Had he been insincere, he might easily have deceived the friends of liberty, by removing all blame from himself and throwing it on

them, by immediately summoning a constituent assembly, and ordering its members to elaborate a constitution in revising the Imperial *senatus-consultes*. In the existing state of opinion, with some of the old Revolutionists attached to the constitution of 1791, others to those of 1793 and 1795, and the new liberals preferring the British institutions, the struggle would have been both long and violent, unity of opinion impossible; and, whilst this struggle continued in the political arena, Napoleon, exercising provisionally the fulness of imperial power, might gain battles, put an end to the war, and afterward turn against the assembly the inconsistency of its views and the folly of its conduct, dissolve it, and constitute France in any way he pleased.

The success of such a plan was almost certain; but it should be commenced by convoking an assembly,—a proceeding that Napoleon dreaded during the first months of a fearful war whose theatre was to be between Lille and Paris. Besides, not knowing what constitution might be proposed to him, he preferred to frame one himself at once, to frame the best possible constitution, and then seek the approbation of the country, after the fashion of the time, by written votes,—a deceptive method, but of little importance if exercised in favour of a popular measure. This was his real plan; but could he, even when acting sincerely, overcome the rooted distrust of all? He was not believed by Europe when he spoke of peace. Would France believe him when he spoke of liberty? and would not his prudence be considered as only the wiles of a despot? There was the danger. On the rugged path he had trod since his return from Elba, he was compelled to walk bowed beneath the heavy burden of his past errors; and perhaps Providence laid on this latter part of his career a punishment often inflicted on illustrious criminals,—that of having their sincere repentance disbelieved.

The time was now come for deciding these constitutional questions and determining what form of government France should have. The public excitement on this subject had reached the acmé. Articles were written representing every shade of opinion, but most frequently the extremes. Old Republicans awakened from a long sleep, and even royalists, who had formerly considered the slightest wish for liberty a crime, demanded a republic, or something very like it. Others wished for royalty stripped of the appendages of 1791; and many, particularly young men, who were free from the prejudices of the old and the new régime, entertained a penchant for the British constitution, without exactly understanding its mechanism. However slight their knowledge, this was the government they preferred; and it must be added that the majority was on their side. The Charter of 1814, a little enlarged, would gratify the general wish.

In general, all who were not obstinate revolutionists, on whom experience had no effect, or royalists, whom party feelings urged to excess, wished for a constitutional monarchy. The illustrious Sikyes, whose great mind had penetrated the profound mechanism of the English monarchy, asked nothing better for France, and, though not liking Napoleon, he considered

it wiser to join him, that with his assistance the cause of the Revolution and of the national independence might be saved. Carnot, wrung at the events of the Bourbons' twelve months reign, and touched by Napoleon's conduct, and above all, by the acknowledgment of his faults, was satisfied to give constitutional monarchy a trial under his authority. Fouché cared little for theories; he feared Napoleon, whose return he had beheld with regret, and though he did not desire his fall,—which would immediately bring back the Bourbons,—he sought to bind him by guarantees, and looked forward to diminishing his power by the aid of any opposition party that might spring up in the future chambers, and whom he hoped by his intrigues to lead. Like everybody else he wished for constitutional monarchy, but he wished that the power of the monarch should be restricted as much as possible.

The constitutional party—as it was called under Louis XVIII.—had been dispersed by the revolution of the 20th of March. Its principal leaders, being compromised, had fled in dread vengeance of Napoleon. Reasoning by his mode of proceeding, many of them had remained in Paris, where he allowed them to live in peace. Madame de Staël had not left her house; M. de Lafayette had returned to his château of Lagrange. M. Benjamin Constant, the most active and most compromised of all, particularly by his fierce tirades against the Empire, and especially the famous article inserted in the *Journal des Débats* of the 18th of March, had got a passport from Mr. Crawford, the American minister, and remained concealed until such time as it would suit him to make use of it. Late events had detached all these persons from the Bourbon cause, and they were prepared, if reassured as to their safety and if what was said of Napoleon's intentions were true, to try that constitutional monarchy under him which had failed under Louis XVIII. Prince Joseph, regretting that Napoleon had been left the power of doing every thing, even to ruining himself, conceived in the opinion of the constitutional party, had even made advances to the chiefs,—especially to M. de Lavalette and Madame de Staël,—and sought to make Napoleon do the same, in which, indeed, he was not disinclined.

The statesmen of the Empire, who were for the most part old revolutionists disengaged from liberty, or royalists won over by Napoleon's genius and glory, and who under his late acquired the habit of passive obedience, considered by absolute authority,—these persons had no inclination to make the proposed experiment of liberty, in whose success they felt no confidence. The High-Chancellor Cambacérès, with his practical good sense, saw, however, that nothing else could be done; but, as on the 20th of March he had only acted from obedience, he confined his co-operation to the administration of justice. MM. Mallevé, Gatte, and Decrès had resigned, with their customary functions, the habit of allowing Napoleon to decide all difficult points. M. de Bassano approved, as usual, what Napoleon did, though he did not feel his personal confidence in the result. M. Molé doubted both the men and measures of the day, and expressed his doubts so that he might not be

love, half to condemn. He had accepted the administration of roads and bridges, one that did not compromise him much. All the majority were for a very liberal national monarchy. Many articles and pamphlets were written on this subject, in several memorials concerning the new constitution were sent to Napoleon,—strange notions for the most part, for, in general, who present to a prince plans unasked for by his subjects, that seek to bring them into notice, or dreamers, seeking to give reality to their fancies. As Napoleon read *actums*, he sometimes smiled, sometimes grieved, but oftenest became sad at seeing the public mind in such a state on the eve of a struggle with all Europe. M. de Lavalette was his real confidant. Napoleon eschewed Cambacérès just as much, and had as little affection for M. de Bassano, but his warm words, which must find vent, found but a echo in the first and a monotonous refrain in the latter. He spoke more freely to Lavalette, who advised freely, but assumed the airs of offended wisdom; his counsels were not followed. Napoleon spent the greater part of the night with him, even after a day of hard

times when he read certain papers advice not only in an exciting but threatening tone, he became excited, and ran rapidly up and down the saloons of the palace, and declared that France wanted nothing of such tribunals, that she had confidence only in him, and that, had he given his opinion, the army and the people would have crushed the royalists and silenced the fault-finders. But before M. de Lavalette could find time to remind him how his language became him, he had recoiled at his self-possession, and, smiling at the elegant productions on his table, and commending the France of 1800, that implored him to save her from babblers, with the France of 1815, seeking unbounded liberty, he began to question whether all that were seriously and whether such variability of opinion represented real necessities and profound notions. M. de Lavalette replied, with a smile, that the sentiments of France ought to be judged by the exaggerations of a time of excitement, but estimated by her aspect in ordinary times, and it would be seen that she wished for moderate liberty, which would protect her alike from the rash enterprises of an individual or the licentious exactions of the multitude; that she had changed her opinion as to the principle of liberty; the only question had been about the measure meted out to her; and that reflection would show that since 1789 her wishes were the same as they were at the existing

Napoleon was convinced by these observations, but mourned over the vain confusion of ideas that prevailed at a time when a great military crisis was at hand, and began to question whether, embarrassed by so evident *maladresse* of the friends of liberty, it would be possible to encounter the struggle.

"To make a first trial of constitutional liberty," he said, "amidst the roar of cannon, and such a roar, the world has yet heard nothing like it." Still he did not think of opposing the liberals, for he had no choice but to join them or the royalists, and, as he could not depend on the latter, he was obliged to trust the others. As in time of war he had ever been mild and calm in the presence of danger, so now in his new position he was wonderfully gentle, exhibiting no appearance of anger, but seeking to soothe those who did, and was in reality less anxious about what proportion of power would remain to him than concerning the means that would be given him of conquering the external enemy.

We have already mentioned his secret plan, which was not to burden himself with a constituent assembly, though that would be an infallible means to destroy liberty by the ridicule which the consequent confusion of ideas would entail; he intended to take into confidence a few sensible men, with whom he would draw up a constitution that could not fail to satisfy the true liberals; this he would promulgate solemnly, and then hasten to meet the enemy; but he did not intend to assemble the new chambers, until he should have driven back the allied army to a sufficient distance from the capital. Accident had unexpectedly provided him with the best possible person for drawing up a constitution. M. Benjamin Constant, that impetuous writer who on the 19th of March had denounced Napoleon as a calamity to the country, and had promised, in the names of the friends of liberty, never to support him again, was still, as we have said, concealed in Paris, less desirous of seeking the means of escape than of discovering whether he might safely remain. For this purpose, his friends had sought the assistance of General Sebastiani, a man of moderation, as all true politicians are, sure that with him M. Constant's secret was safe. When the general heard that he was still in Paris, he hastened to the Emperor, told him that M. Benjamin Constant was in France, and at his disposal. "Ah! you have him!" cried Napoleon, as if he were glad of an opportunity of revenge. The general was surprised, and almost alarmed; but Napoleon quickly added, "You need not be alarmed: I don't intend to injure your *protégé*: send him to me, and he will have no reason to be dissatisfied." Napoleon saw at a glance that he now had an opportunity of displaying the highest degree of generosity, and at the same time of securing the services of the first writer of the time and the best suited to draw up his future constitution, by pardoning the most violent of his opponents and raising him to a considerable post. He no sooner perceived the possibility, than he resolved to put it into execution. It may be asked whether in acting thus he did not display more contempt for human nature than true generosity; but such an inquiry shows ignorance of his character. The feeling that influenced him was identical with the so much lauded clemency of Cæsar,—that is, a profound knowledge of men, an acute perception of the short duration of their passions, united to great pliability of disposition in their regard, and great power of influencing them. However

this may be, Napoleon sent the Chamberlain with a most polite invitation to M. Benjamin Constant to come to him.

Now that forty years of public discussion has instructed us in the operation of (forgotten but for a moment, I hope) free institutions, and consequently taught us self-respect, few persons could be found who would accept such an invitation, or, if they had, it would have been only to ask their sovereign's permission to retain their personal respectability by not taking part in a government they had so violently opposed. M. Benjamin Constant accepted Napoleon's invitation at once, because he was dissatisfied with the Bourbons for acting so badly to the constitutional party, and, deeply impressed by Napoleon's liberal promises, he considered it necessary to support him as the only man that could save France from invasion.

Napoleon had the choice of many ways of receiving this distinguished man, who for the moment was at his mercy. He might have been flattering or harsh; but neither would have been worthy of him. He was simple, polite, and frank.

He did not allude to the past: he only spoke of the business about which M. Benjamin Constant had come. He told him that, having promised France a free constitution, he now wished to give it without the restrictions of timid tyranny, or the astute compliance of a wily ruler who gives at first more than is demanded, only that he may have the power of withdrawing every thing afterward; he said that the public mind was greatly excited on this subject, and, as was to be expected, not very logical. He did not know whether this would be the final demand of the people, for their opinions had often varied since 1800, when they would not have liberty on any terms, whilst now they could not obtain too much; but the truth was that only a minority wished for a free constitution, the mass of the people wished only for Napoleon himself, and only asked him to rid them of the nobles, priests, and foreigners; but that he felt great deference for the opinions of enlightened men, and wished to show that he was as enlightened as they; that he was, therefore, determined to grant a constitutional monarchy; that he knew well that there was but one form under which that could be given, and that was to have responsible ministers obliged to discuss public affairs openly in the two chambers; with unrestrained liberty of the press, and no preliminary censorship; that of the last point he was firmly convinced, that it was childish to think of restraining the press, that consequently he would offer no fundamental opposition, and only wished to give it in a suitable form that should not be humiliating to him; that it might be doubted whether he would submit ultimately to the restraints he was preparing for himself; that such distrust was very natural, and would not offend him in the least; that he was quite prepared to endure the inconvenience of the constitutional régime, but he hoped that consideration would be shown for him. Formerly he had great designs, to whose execution a constitutional monarchy would be an obstacle, but that now he had but one desire, to overcome the external enemy; it could not be denied that the struggle would be terrible;

that negotiations had been mentioned, but a reality there had been none; that it would be absolutely necessary to fight to the death, and he hoped that the proper supplies would not be refused him; that immediately after subduing the enemy he would conclude a peace, and that then when nothing was to be done but to administer the government at home, the assistance of the representatives of the country would not displease him, though sometimes opposed to his views. He added that a man's disposition was not the same at forty-six as at twenty-six; that he felt the change in himself, and that, in any case, the divided but well-supported authority of a constitutional monarchy would be best suited to his son; that he laboured now more for his son's interest than for his own; that consequently there could be no serious disagreement between him and his true friends of liberty, that nothing remained but to consider the form, and he hoped for his dignity and fame, which were identical with those of France, would be respected.

These words, spoken in a calm, firm, and decided tone by a man whose brow was shaded with innumerable laurels, made a deep impression on M. Constant's excitable imagination, and almost completely convinced him, and he blessed the destiny that made him the prisoner of such a conqueror. Napoleon then gave him numerous plans for a constitution, some bearing signatures, some anonymous. Up to this time he had been polite, but serious; but he smiled now in taking up several of these plans, of which he first announced the contents and then the name of the author. "This is by a republican," said he; "this by a monarchist of the Mounier school; and this third by a pure royalist." Then, making a summary of the contents, Napoleon laughed at the contrast presented between the ideas and the author's names, for despotism was frequently proposed by republicans, and anarchy by royalists. "Do what you will with all these," he added, "arrange your ideas, probably you have done so already, put them in a proper form, then come to me, and we shall find no difficulty in coming to an agreement." Napoleon then dismissed M. Benjamin Constant, without being either flattered or treated him harshly, but he conquered him by his simplicity, grace, and vast mental power, before which no question seemed to present matter for argument, but to be already decided.

M. Benjamin Constant, besides possessing a clear, piquant, and sententious style as a writer, was the best-informed man of his time in all that concerned the theory of constitutional monarchy. He was only deficient in the experience which shows what are the most essential points of this mechanism; for though he was better informed on the subject than any of his contemporaries, he still could not tell exactly what should be insisted on as essential, and what might be yielded without a compromise of principle. But he was not influenced by any of the prevailing errors, and, being then the publicist employed by the liberal party against the first Restoration, he possessed an influence, as far as regarded the granting of a constitution, greater than that of any other man in France.

As his opinions were already decided, he did

not spend much time in putting them into a proper form, and soon sought Napoleon again. He found him as simple and more friendly than before, and at each succeeding interview these two men became more at ease with each other, if not more familiar. Their conversation turned on the details of the future constitution, and never did the least disagreement arise between them. Napoleon admitted without the least hesitation that the daily press should not be submitted to a preliminary censorship, and should be accountable to the legal tribunals alone for any deviations from rectitude. This was yielding at one stroke all the contested points of the question. As we have already said, experience had entirely changed Napoleon's opinion on this subject. As to the two chambers, and the obligations on the part of the ministers to appear there and justify their acts, M. Constant met with no difficulty from Napoleon, and this was equivalent to sharing the government with the chambers, and more than sharing it, for if under such a system the monarch reserves to himself the privilege of sanctioning acts, he leaves their direction to the chambers, which is nothing more than submitting to necessity. In fact, it is impossible to govern a country in opposition to the real opinions, the dominant ideas, of the nation; if it be attempted for a few days it is soon of necessity given up. It is better, therefore, to submit with a good grace to what cannot be avoided, and accept the most direct means of introducing the general feeling of the nation into the Government, which is, in other words, making all ministerial acts depend on the vote of the chambers.

Napoleon agreed also that the chambers might revise the laws as they pleased, but that the Government should not be obliged to sanction the laws so amended; that the chambers might not *beg*, as it was expressed in the charter of Louis XVIII., but *invite*, the Government to propose such laws as might be required by public opinion, and even name the different points of them, but under the express condition that the invitation should not be presented to the Emperor until the two chambers had agreed on the question. The Chamber of Deputies was to decide the first on all questions of taxation, and the Chamber of Peers to possess jurisdiction over the ministers, military commanders, and all persons invested with great authority. This was constitutional monarchy without the least reservation. The next thing to be considered was how the chambers were to be constituted.

Napoleon agreed that the Chamber of Deputies—which though least in dignity was greatest in influence—should be chosen by direct election. Did time permit, a law might have been drawn up pointing out what classes of citizens should have the right of voting for deputies. The subject was new and important, and it was difficult in the existing state of knowledge to decide on the different questions that might arise. It was thought better to employ the existing system a little modified. This was Sièyes's system of having the great mass of citizens choose about a hundred thousand electors for life, and these divided into two classes,—colleges of the arrondissement, and colleges of the departments. This had

the apparent advantage of allowing all the citizens to vote, but the real defect, inherent in universal suffrage, of being but an illusion, for the important point to be attained in admitting the intervention of the country in the Government is to ascertain the feeling of the enlightened portion who are capable of forming an opinion. However, the hundred thousand citizens, whose names were at that time inscribed on the list, offered a sample of the nation sufficient to represent its real feelings. The plan of having the candidates proposed by the colleges of the arrondissements to the colleges of the departments, and by these to the Senate, was abandoned as being calculated to produce a misrepresentation of the real opinions of the country by submitting them to the action of two ballots. Napoleon agreed that the colleges of the arrondissements should choose, without intervention, three hundred deputies, and the colleges of the departments about the same number; which would give an assembly almost equal in number to the English House of Commons. M. Benjamin Constant was satisfied with this basis, which indeed offered a great amelioration; for even the Charter of 1814 allowed only the old legislative corps chosen by the Senate from the lists drawn up by the electoral colleges. Napoleon also agreed to the total renewal of the second chamber every five years, an arrangement which experience has since consecrated as the only rational one.

The formation of the second chamber caused greater difficulty between Napoleon and M. Constant, not that the one would yield less, or the other demand more, but the most serious difficulties arose naturally out of the question itself.

Though not quite decided on the point, M. Constant was inclined to favour an hereditary peerage. He considered that such an institution would afford the happiest union of stability and independence of conduct, in the formation of an upper chamber. Though Napoleon was more convinced of this than M. Constant himself, he had the greatest objection to introduce hereditary rights into the new constitution. In his own concise and figurative language, he said, "An aristocracy is necessary, especially in a free state, where the democratic principle has always a preponderating influence. A Government that seeks to move in one element alone is like a balloon in the air, that will be borne along according to the direction of the wind. But, on the contrary, one that is exposed to the action of two elements can use each at pleasure, and is controlled by none. It is like a vessel borne along by the waves, and using the winds only to assist its progress. The wind impels, but does not rule its action." Here is a profound thought ingeniously expressed. But, notwithstanding that he held this opinion, Napoleon feared that, in the existing state of things, the representatives of the aristocratic principle then in France could not be brought to bear usefully on his project. "The old nobility," he said, "are opposed to me, and the new are very new. They are not like the English aristocracy, coeval with the English Constitution, to whose formation they have contributed, and whose institutions they have not ceased to uphold. Besides," added he, "we

have a people extremely prejudiced against hereditary nobility. The sentiment that animates the people at this moment, and made them receive me so enthusiastically, is their hatred of the nobility and the clergy, and if you talk to them of an hereditary peerage you will only excite their indignation, without the certainty of having created a real aristocracy, with a Chamber of Peers, that for a long time will be composed of chamberlains and generals."

These different considerations perplexed Napoleon very much; for if he were conscious of the necessity of an hereditary nobility, he dreaded its effects on the excitable temperament of the French liberals.

As to general guarantees, he admitted without objection the immutability of the magistracy, the personal liberty of the subject, freedom of worship, &c., only asking that all should be expressed in clear, precise terms, that would leave no room for equivocation. One, and one only, he objected to, and that most warmly,—the abolition of confiscation. He did not seek to stipulate for the contrary; he only wished that point to be passed over in silence. "I do not wish," he said, "to take anybody's property, nor to imitate the National Convention in any thing. But a new emigration is about to commence. If the war continues, you will have a rising in Vendée. Whether it continue or not, you will have such assemblings as that at Coblenz on our frontiers. There is one already forming at Ghent, in which men whom I have loaded with honours and riches are figuring. This combination will increase every day, and if I do not end the struggle in three months, a Government will be organized there whose orders will be better obeyed by a certain class of Frenchmen than mine. Do not think that I wish to deprive anybody of his life or fortune. But I must defend myself; and how can I do that against a Government that abides abroad and is obeyed at home, if I have not in my hands some means of intimidation? At this very moment there are secret orders issued by the former prefects of Louis XVIII., both at Besançon and Marseilles. I shall expel them, but they will remain on the frontier, where they will do as much harm as if in the country itself. I must have the means of restraining my declared enemies, and of winning over the wavering. Be sure that while I can sequester property without confiscating it, I can influence even Talleyrand himself. However, I am determined, when we shall have peace, to restore this guarantee, of whose necessity I am convinced, and I only ask to have it passed over in silence until then."

Napoleon continued obstinate in this, the only point of the new constitution in which he showed a despotic feeling. He was wrong in trying to keep any share of arbitrary power, for possessing greater or less means of intimidation could neither injure nor serve him; it was the battle-field alone that could decide his fate. But in justice it must be admitted that the conduct of the royalists was such as to excuse Napoleon's intentions. They had kept quiet at first, because they were afraid; but, taking courage when they found that all parties

were allowed to speak, write, and act as they pleased, they went openly from Paris to Vendée and Ghent, evidently preparing civil war in the former province, and exciting royalist movements in the capital. There was an absolute danger for the moment; but should the enemy come up to the walls of Paris, the danger might be serious; and it is evident, however much one may disapprove of Napoleon, that it was only natural that an energetic man, one not accustomed to yield to any obstacle, and living at a time not far removed from revolutionary influences, should wish to possess the means of intimidation, even without the intention of putting them in force.

M. Benjamin Constant said no more on the subject at that time, though he was determined to return to it again. A last question remained, a mere matter of form, but one on which Napoleon was, if possible, still more decided: what was the title to be given to the new constitution. He wished to grant this new charter the same name as Louis XVIII. had granted his, but without allowing his intention to appear, and appearances were all-important in this case, as on them depended the acceptance or denial of a right. "I have recognized the national sovereignty," he said, "but the act not conferring a favour, for the nation is the real sovereign, and no monarch is firmly placed on his throne but he whom the people support. I do not mean to follow the example of Louis XVIII., and give the new constitution as if emanating from my sole authority; but I do not present it as an emanation of my right. I offer it as the offspring of my good sense. I wish to make it as excellent as possible, and to accomplish such a work you and I are more competent than an assembly of men who could never agree in their opinions, and who perhaps, would convulse the country before coming to a conclusion. When we shall have finished the work to the best of our ability, I shall present it for the national acceptance in the same way as the old Imperial constitution—that is, by votes registered in the offices of the mayors. Some will call this a deceptive method. I admit it. But it is not more deceptive than the convocation of primary assemblies, a method much more complicated, though not less satisfactory. In affairs of this kind, the important point is to do what is right; and as to the form, provided it does not negative the principle, the simplest is what should be preferred. The true acceptance of the people is the duration of the constitution, which is the enlightened assent of the nation rallied by experience."

M. Benjamin Constant was not inclined to dispute this, for he also thought it would be better to avoid a constituent assembly that might work for a year without result, or primary assemblies, that might cause dissension and confusion. He thought it better to adopt the shortest form of acceptance, provided it involved the recognition of the national sovereignty. However, he wished that the new constitution should differ from the old Imperial constitutions, not alone in essential principles—which it did—but in form as well; he wished that the title should be different, in order to inspire confidence, that it might not be confounded with the old *Senatus-Consultum*, which

once they had emanated from Napoleon's mind were converted by the servile Senate into fundamental laws of the State. He said, therefore, that without attaching any real importance to a mere form, it would be necessary by some means or other to allay the public distrust, perhaps by giving the new constitution a character that would distinguish it from all its predecessors. "No, no," replied Napoleon, "a wish is entertained to deprive me of the past, to make me a different man from what I am, to efface my fifteen years of sovereignty, to blot out France's glory and mine, as if every thing in my former reign had been bad. . . . I will not consent to it. I yield to experience and to circumstances, which will no longer allow such a dictatorship as I have enjoyed, but I will not submit to humiliation. Besides, believe me, France wishes for her old Emperor, changed a little, of course, but still she desires him and no other." On this point Napoleon was inflexible, for he considered that a new form was only meant to humiliate him, by compelling him to disavow his past career. The new constitution was consequently to be considered as a modification of the old, and by no means as inaugurating a new order of things. In this Napoleon was as obstinate for what he called his glory as Louis XVIII. had been for what he called his rights. This was a serious fault; for the constitution of 1815 was totally different from those of 1802 and 1804, and though men in general seek to appear to give more than they really do, Napoleon in this instance ran the risk of seeming to grant less than he really did. Silly precaution, and mournful consequence of pride! In the existing state of public opinion, it would have been far better to promise more than was intended to be given, than to give more than was promised.

The result of this consultation was the new and unfortunately celebrated title of "Additional Act added to the Constitution of the Empire," a title calculated to persuade the nation that it was getting only a modification instead of, as was really the case, an entire change of constitution. M. Benjamin Constant, delighted at obtaining what was essential, yielded what concerned the mere form, which was wrong in him, though it was natural that a philosophic mind should attach but little importance to externals. He took his pen, and drew up, in clear, simple, and elegant language, the best-written and best-constructed charter that was granted to France during the long course of her revolutions. He saw the Emperor again and again, and came to an agreement with him on all points, even on that relating to an hereditary peerage. Napoleon having objected to this last point for the reasons we have already stated, after having again repeated that it involved the risk of making the new constitution unpopular by introducing an hereditary peerage, he changed his opinion after having profoundly reflected on another point, namely, the difficulty of utilizing the nobility in the existing state of France. He said that should he gain three or four battles, and be able to conclude a peace, perhaps the ancient noblesse would side with him as they had done before, and that an hereditary peerage would be a greater attraction for them than the Senate; that he would thus possess

the means of luring them back, and the two classes of nobility, the old and new, fused into one, would perhaps ultimately form a sufficiently imposing aristocratic body. He therefore yielded this point, but insisted on the article relating to confiscation.

The new constitution was drawn up very quickly, for its authors disagreed but on one point, and the editor wielded a practised pen; but it was time that it should emerge from obscurity and receive the support of an influential authority. It had been already spoken of by the public, nor were the secret conferences on this subject unnoticed, and some jealous feeling was excited both in the Council of State and among certain revolutionists, who, having assisted in drawing up the former constitutions, were offended at being refused all participation in this. It was now time that it should be submitted to the Council of State, and it was necessary that M. Benjamin Constant should have a seat in that assembly, that he might be able to justify his work.* This created a very natural opportunity of appointing him Councillor of State, and thus in a simple and adroit manner Napoleon conquered his once most violent enemy, and this enemy had the satisfaction of being conquered in a way that reflected no disgrace upon himself. This sudden friendship excites more surprise now than it did then. So many strange changes of opinion had occurred in 1814, and political morality was so little understood, that, though this intimacy was remarked, it excited neither surprise nor displeasure. M. Benjamin Constant was, therefore, appointed Councillor of State, that he might assist officially in framing the constitution. Some persons, such as Prince Cambacérès, M. Regnaud de Saint-Jean d'Angély, M. Boulay de la Meurthe, and the presidents of the different sections of the Council of State, were summoned to the Palace of the Elysée to assist at some preliminary conferences, in which few objections were raised, for indeed, with the exceptions of the title and the silence on the subject of confiscation, there was no room for objection. However, some few alterations were made, and another article inserted, which, though quite unnecessary, was still in conformity with the passions of the time. The most important of all objects for the Bonapartist was the dynastic question, the sale of the so-called national property for the holders thereof, the abolition of tithes and feudal rights for the agriculturists, and for the revolutionists of every shade of opinion the irrevocable condemnation of the ancient régime. A final article, numbered 67, was consequently inserted, in which it was declared that the French people, in delegating their power to the authorities appointed by the constitution, did not give them the right of proposing the restoration of the Bourbons—even though the Imperial dynasty should be extinct—nor of re-

*M. Benjamin Constant, in his "Letters of the Hundred Days," acknowledges the great part he had in the "Additional Act," but does not say that it was the work of his hand. Still there is no doubt the entire was written by him, and that, with the exception of some modified articles, the whole work was his. Besides, it is easy to see, from the unity, precision, and elegant simplicity of the style, that it was the work of one pen, and that the best of its time. Napoleon's style, which was loftier, was more dogmatic and more nervous.

establishing the feudal nobility, seigniorial privileges, tithes, or religious privileges, nor, more especially, was any power recognised that could attain the validity of the sales of national property, and every one, no matter whom, was forbidden to make any proposal of the kind. The only advantage of this article was, that it enumerated the more essential points in a separate category, and endowed them as it were with a sacred character, sacred indeed only as long as the constitution itself would be esteemed such.

The new act was then laid before the Council of State. Scarcely any objection was made at the meeting; but in private conversation the title of "Additional Act added to the Constitution of the Empire" was very much criticized, as not distinguishing it sufficiently from former constitutions, and which would give an opportunity of introducing other modifications, as had formerly been done by a *Senatus-Consulte*, adopted by the Senate, and sanctioned at the mayor's offices by some million "ayes," against some million "noes." It was universally remarked that nothing had been said of confiscation, and many persons became alarmed. Everybody even in the general meeting remarked that the abolition of confiscation had been announced in the Charter of 1814, and that the nation would be irritated at not finding it in the "Additional Act;" consequently the presidents of the sections, and M. Benjamin Constant in particular, were requested to press the Emperor to consent to fill up this so-much-to-be-regretted omission, and which might give room to so much misinterpretation.

A final meeting took place in the palace of the Elysée, on the evening of the 21st of April, when the constitution was definitely drawn up. The task imposed on the different co-operators in the new constitution was faithfully performed, and Napoleon was requested to fill up the omission relative to the abolition of confiscation. The article of the Charter of 1814, which abolished this barbarous punishment, was referred to. Napoleon replied that it was an act of pure hypocrisy on the part of the Bourbons. He said that their eagerness to nominally suppress confiscation arose solely from a desire to invalidate the origin of national property, which was the confiscated property of nobles and priests. But their respect for property was but a pretence; for they had taken every opportunity of plundering the holders of national property directly or indirectly. These false appearances should be distrusted, and no credence accorded to fraudulent intentions. As to him, he had no desire to seize on any person's property, but by persisting in their present demand they would deprive him of the only means he possessed of intimidating the new Coblentz. Though the council did not deny what he said of the Bourbons, they persisted in asserting the principle of property, which was sacred in itself, and which it would not look well not to recognise at a time that such pains were being taken to proclaim the rights of citizens, till then unknown, or but partially recognised. At this Napoleon rose with sparkling eyes and menacing gesture, and, pacing the room with rapid strides,

said that they sought to lead him into a course foreign to his nature, by which they would impart a dangerous vitality to the old doctrines of the day, which they were encouraging and exciting; that public opinion was becoming worse every hour; that France—the real France—looked for the old arm of an Emperor, but did not find it; that he would be left unarmed, a prey to every faction; that both the people and the army abhorred the emigrants, and would blame him for every indulgence shown them, and would not pardon his leaving them riches that would be employed in supporting a foreign war; that circumstances alone must be blamed for this slight deviation from the mildness of the liberal régime; that he wished to make him an angel, but that he was not one, and they must be content with him such as he was,—a man not accustomed to allow himself to be attacked with impunity. After the outburst, which was but the repetition of what was said every day by men alarmed at the pretended revolutionary movement, Napoleon became calm, but did not yield the point relative to the abolition of confiscation, though he solemnly promised that this article should be recognised after the establishment of peace. He acted like all rulers who promise to renounce the exercise of arbitrary power when the existing necessity shall have ceased, that is, when the evil has become incurable both with regard to themselves and their victims.

All yielded before Napoleon's anger, M. Benjamin Constant as well as the rest; for he was anxious to see published in the *Messenger* a work of which he was proud, and which might have done him lasting honour, but for this one omission.

On Sunday, the 23d of April, the *Messenger* published the new constitution, under the title of "An Act added to the Constitutions of the Empire." The preamble was very skillfully drawn up. It told how the Emperor, guided by experience, had at different times modified the preceding constitutions, particularly in the years VIII., X., and XII., always, however, submitting these modifications to the consent of the nation; that in those days, solely occupied with the project of establishing a vast federal system in Europe,—this was the title Napoleon gave to his plan of universal monarchy,—he had been obliged to defer any arrangements necessary to the liberty of the nation; that having been induced to abandon this vast federal system, and devote himself to the welfare of France, he was determined to modify the Imperial constitutions, preserving all that was good in the past, and borrowing from the advanced intelligence of the country all that could tend to secure the rights of the citizens, and this by giving the greatest possible extension to the representative system; by combining the highest possible degree of political liberty, with the energy necessary to make foreign nations respect the independence of the French people and the dignity of the crown.

According to the terms of the new constitution, the Emperor was invested with the executive power, and exercised the legislative power in concurrence with two chambers. One of these, the *Chamber of Peers*, was hereditary, the members, whose number was not

fixed, to be appointed by the Emperor. The other, the Chamber of Deputies, was to be elective, and to consist of six hundred and twenty-nine members, elected for five years by the two series of colleges,—those of the departments and the arrondissements. At the expiration of five years, fresh elections were to be made. The commercial interests were to be represented by twenty-three members, chosen after a special fashion. The Chamber of Representatives was to appoint its own president, subject, however, to the Emperor's approbation. The Chamber of Peers was to have supreme jurisdiction over ministers, military commanders, &c. The Chamber of Representatives was to have the initiative in all questions relating to finance, and levying of troops. The budget was to be voted every year. The chambers were to have the power of amending the laws, and could even propose laws, in virtue of their initiative, and these laws, if approved by the chambers, might be submitted to the Emperor. The ministers might be members of either chamber, or might take a seat there, though not members, and were bound to appear before the chambers when called upon, and explain their acts. They were responsible to the Chamber of Representatives, by which they might be impeached, but were to be judged by the Chamber of Peers. The Emperor could dissolve the Chamber of Representatives, but he was bound to summon another within six months at the latest. The appointment of magistrates was permanent; the military tribunals were to have jurisdiction only over military misdemeanours. Personal liberty was guaranteed to all Frenchmen. They could neither be imprisoned nor exiled arbitrarily, and should only be subject to their natural judges. A state of siege could only be proclaimed in case of foreign invasion or civil war. In the latter case, a state of siege could only be declared by passing a law, or, if the chambers were not sitting, by issuing a decree, which should be converted into a law as soon as possible. Every Frenchman should have the right of printing his opinion without a previous censorship, and was answerable only to the law of the land. Misdemeanours of the press

were to be tried before a jury. The right of individuals to petition was recognised. Equality and freedom of religious worship were established. Lastly, the dynasty, the national property, the abolition of titles and ancient privileges, were placed, as we have seen, under a special guarantee, since the members of both chambers were forbidden to propose any measure inimical to them.

All enactments made by former *Senatus-Consultes* that were opposed to this new act were annulled. The others remained in force. The present additional act was to be presented for acceptance to the French people in the offices of mayors, advocates, &c., where they would express their approval or disapproval by *ay* or *no*, inscribed on registers kept for that purpose. The revision of the votes was to be made in an assembly of the *Champ de Mai* composed of all the members of the electoral colleges that should happen to come to Paris.

Never before had so much liberty been accorded to France, liberty as great as could be reasonably expected, and complete, with the exception of the article relative to confiscation, the consideration of which was adjourned. It was not from any covert motive that Napoleon was so liberal, but because his great mind saw that, as he was obliged to grant liberty, it would be necessary to grant it as fully as possible, and being at that time entirely occupied by one idea,—that of conquering Europe, arrayed against him,—he felt that, this once obtained, the more or less of power he would enjoy would be but a secondary object; besides, he considered that in the working of the constitution, more would be conceded to him than to another, thanks to his glory, genius, and strength of will; besides, he thought less of himself than of his son, whom he did not desire to see possessed of more power than that enjoyed by a king of England.

We are now to see how this liberty was received, and the following recital will show that, in politics as well as in every thing else, it is not sufficient that a remedy be good, but that it also be applied at a proper time.

BOOK LIX.

THE CHAMP DE MAI.

PUBLICATION of the Additional Act—Effect it produces—It is very badly received, though the most liberal and benevolent constitution that France had ever got—Reasons of this reception—France has no more faith in Napoleon when he speaks of liberty, than Europe when he speaks of peace—Rage of the royalists, and indifference of the revolutionists—The constitutional party is the only one that receives the Additional Act favourably, and yet it is discredited—Lafayette's important position on this occasion—The constitutional party will adhere but on certain conditions—Demand that the Chambers be immediately summoned—Napoleon wishes to defer the Chambers' meeting during the first operations of the campaign—He is forced on, and resolves on putting the Additional Act in force, by summoning the Chambers even before the Act is accepted—At the same time he summons the electoral body to the Champ de Mai—These measures calm the public mind somewhat—Consequence of the proceedings at Vienna and London—Though much excited, the Powers consider the approaching struggle as most serious—Austria tries to get rid of Napoleon by exciting troubles in the country—Attempt at a secret negotiation with M. Fouché—A secret agent is sent to Basle—This secret proceeding is discovered by Napoleon, who seeks to counteract it by sending M. Fouché de Basle to Basle—Violent interview with M. Fouché, who is detected in treasonable practices—No immediate consequence from this conspiracy—The Coalition continues, and the British minister is compelled to tell Parliament that it is intended to commence war immediately—The Opposition declare they have been deceived; this is followed by the Parliament, but still a great majority votes for the war—The armies of the enemy march toward France—Napoleon's adventures in Italy—His unwise enterprise, and his sad end—He flies to Provence—Everybody, and Napoleon himself, considers this a bad omen—Progress of military preparations—Spontaneous formation of federal battalions—Napoleon hopes these will assist him in the defence of Lyons and Paris—Whilst the revolutionists prepare to aid Napoleon, the royalists throw off the mask, and commence a civil war in Vendée—First insurrectionary movement at the four subdivisions of old Vendée, and combat at Aizenay—Napoleon's prompt measures—He deprives himself of twenty thousand men that would have been most useful against the foreign enemy, and sends them to Vendée—At the same time he orders M. Fouché to negotiate an armistice with the leaders in Vendée—Result and spirit of the elections—Reunion of the Chamber of Peers and the Chamber of Representatives—Disposition of the latter—Though sincerely desirous to aid Napoleon against the enemy, it dreads appearing servile—Its first acts give proof of its extreme susceptibility—Napoleon is very much affected—Champ de Mai—Grandeur and sadness of the ceremony—Address to the two Chambers—Napoleon's severe and dignified advice—His profound remarks on why his Government cannot work well with the two Chambers—Sinister omens—He leaves Paris on the 12th of June, to put himself at the head of the army—Adieux to his ministers and family—Final considerations on this attempt at restoring the Empire.

NEVER had liberty been so extensively granted to France as by the "Additional Act," and never had it been so badly received. All, both young and old, who after the long sleep of the public mind had awakened to their love of liberty, and understood it in a different manner, because experience had not yet led them to adopt a common system. It was generally expected that some hundreds of constituents would be summoned to deliberate on the different forms of government, and each fancied that the form of constitution he preferred would emanate from these discussions. The greater number flattered themselves that they would be of the number of these constituents, and even the Council of State had expected to be called on to draw up the new constitution, instead of which, their sanction to a completed work was all that was asked. Thus the mode that was adopted was at once offensive to personal pretensions and to the advocates of certain systems. Besides, all disliked the old Imperial constitutions, which they justly considered responsible for the misfortunes of the first Empire, and a radical change had been hoped for, absolutely different from the old system, both in substance and form.

There was a feeling of general and bitter disappointment when one morning there appeared in the *Moniteur*, completely finished and beyond the possibility of alteration, a simple act, qualified as "additional" to the Imperial constitutions, of which it appeared to be only a modification, whilst the public desired a complete change; and for the stability of this act no other guarantee was offered than its mute acceptance in the offices of the mayors, justices of peace, &c. Instead of the

perfectly new order of things that had been expected, a work in which all should join, and which should be consecrated by universal approbation, there was given what was considered but an insignificant modification, sealed not by the hands of power, and ratified in a commonplace manner, in which no confidence could be felt, as it offered no guarantee that a succession of additional acts might not be published after the fashion of the ancient *Sénatus-Consultes*. The people could not but feel and say that they had been deceived in the most unworthy manner, when so little had been expected, and that little not even secured.

The public was prejudiced by the title of the work before reading it. It would require more knowledge than was then general to see that this contained the principles of a constitutional monarchy, such at least as a legislator could write, as bringing it into operation could only be the work of time. But, however well informed the friends of liberty may have been at this time, they were totally devoid of experience. Some were displeased because the Additional Act announced the formation of two chambers, others because it did not declare something like a republic, and all, as Napoleon had foreseen, were indignant at finding that one chamber would be hereditary. To the discontent excited by the title announcing a modification instead of a total change, and to the discontent excited by the form, which recalled the charter granted by Louis XVIII., was now added the displeasure felt against the work itself. The old republicans looked on it as a monarchy, the royalists of 1791 as a monarchy with two chambers, that is, the *Régner monarchie*, whilst the young liberals, being

informed than the other two classes, considered it an aristocratic monarchy because of the hereditary peerage. The journals unanimously repeated the same diatribes, and the royalists, taking courage from the leniency of the Imperial police, joined with the republicans, the enemies of monarchy, with the monarchists opposed to the two chambers, and with the young liberals, who objected to an hereditary nobility, saying, what indeed ill became them, that the Additional Act was only a charter like that of Louis XVIII., which perpetuated feudal monarchy by two chambers, of which one was to be hereditary. They thus helped to propagate the idea then prevalent, that Napoleon was not at all changed, that now that he was established in authority he had no idea of keeping the promises he so liberally made at his arrival, that he returned to his old practices, he had drawn the semblance of a constitution from his own personal despotism, enunciated in the same form and almost in the same terms as the Bourbon charter, and ratified in a manner peculiar to himself, that is, by registers in public offices, a manner of proceeding quite as insolent and deceptive as that employed by Louis XVIII. This opinion was at once adopted by all those inclined to distrust Napoleon, and had the bad effect of cooling the zeal of the friends of the Revolution and liberty, the only persons inclined to hasten to the frontiers. Every man that felt displeased or disheartened was not only a partisan lost to Napoleon, but a soldier withdrawn from the defence of the country. Whilst patriots of every shade of opinion, excited by the royalists, declared that the Additional Act was nothing but a dark emanation of despotism, on the other hand, those who accused the Government of joining the revolutionary party, and who made their affected fears an excuse for keeping aloof until victory should have been pronounced in favour of one party or the other, these men asserted that Napoleon was not recognisable, that he no longer possessed will or energy, that he allowed himself to be led by fools, that he had given an anarchical constitution, and that, having once consented to be the instrument of regicides and Jacobins, he would end by being their dupe and victim.

But everybody's mind was disturbed by the prospect of the great impending crisis, that now was seen approaching with giant steps in the train of the European Powers. All parties felt that their fate depended on this crisis, and excitement being added to want of judgment, they were more impressionable, and consequently more unreasonable, than usual.

Napoleon saw all this, and was much affected by the distrust he inspired. He had foreseen that the hereditary peerage would not please, but he had no idea that the title of the new act would have been so misjudged. Still he tried to be calm midst the universal anxiety. "You see," he said to M. Lavalette, for whom he frequently sent, that he might give vent to his feelings that filled his heart, "you see all are attacked with vertigo. I alone, in this vast Empire, have preserved my presence of mind, and should I lose it I know not what would become of us!" In fact, he made constant efforts to restrain his excitable nature, checked the slightest expression of an-

ger, listened to the most ridiculous objections with a calmness and patience which he generally showed only in times of great danger, taking care not to increase the conflagration enkindled by the passions of others by the addition of the flame of his own, and thus expiated the faults of his long despotism by sufferings known but to God and a few friends. But, alas! though faults may be expiated in the sight of God, they cannot be in the sight of man. God sees the repentance and is content; but men possess neither his intuition nor his clemency; they only see the fault, and their rude justice will not be satisfied without an evident, complete, and terrible punishment! Napoleon was destined to experience the full bitterness of this truth.

The old constitutionalists, and only the wisest of these, were the sole defenders of the Additional Act. They had been flattered and all doubt removed from their minds by the fact that M. Benjamin Constant had drawn up the new constitution. They were still better pleased when they read the document itself. Madame de Staël, who was preserved by her rare intelligence and perfect knowledge of England from being infected by the general errors, loudly approved of the Additional Act. It was also approved by the enlightened school of Genevese publicists, who followed the impulse given by Madame de Staël and M. Benjamin Constant. M. de Sismondi, the most learned of these publicists, undertook to defend it systematically in the *Moniteur*. In a series of remarkable articles, he proceeded to prove that the form that had been adopted had no resemblance to the *octroi* of Louis XVIII., for this prince admitted no authority but his own, and consequently reserved to himself the power of resuming what he had given, whilst Napoleon had formally recognised the sovereignty of the nation, and submitted his work to its approbation, and was irrevocably pledged to the nation, were what he did approved; that though the mode adopted for drawing up and presenting this new constitution left a large influence to the ruling power, it was the only method that could be adopted under existing circumstances, as convoking the primary assemblies to elect a constituent body, whose deliberations would be most difficult with an enemy so near, would also give rise to interminable disputes about a work concerning whose principles all sensible men were agreed; that had Napoleon meant to deceive, he could have allowed this constituent body to enter on endless disputes whilst he went to fight the foreign enemy, and then, returning conqueror, he could have held the assembly up to ridicule, dismissed it and resumed all his former authority; that on the contrary, having himself presented a perfect plan, a plan which with the exception of one point left nothing to be desired by the true friends of liberty, he had proved the sincerity of his determination to strip himself of his ancient authority, and to bestow a constitutional monarchy on the country; that by comparing this with all preceding constitutions, it would be seen that it was the best that had ever been given to France, and was in many respects more liberal than that of England itself; that, finally, it was not only natural but necessary to retain the

Senatus-Consultes, for as they were formerly annulled in every thing contrary to the Additional Act, they were not to be feared in a political sense, and that annulling them altogether would be to crush the civil and administrative legislation, that is, the entire organization of the State, at one blow; that a new constitution could not be expected to do more than change the political form of the Government, whilst it should be left to time to modify the civil and administrative legislation in conformity with the spirit of the Additional Act.

All that M. de Sismondi wrote was true, but true only for sensible and unprejudiced men. Others, and they were the greater number, inspired by distrust or displeasure at some clauses of the Additional Act, thought that in the whole document they could recognise Napoleon's temper and despotism. As to the former, they might, indeed, have been right, for, though much influenced, he may not have been altogether changed by his misfortunes; but they were wrong with regard to his despotism, for he had given them a better constitution than that of England, and since they had committed the enormous fault of recalling Napoleon, they ought to have made use of him against the enemy, and tried to make the part of constitutional monarch supportable to him. M. de Lafayette was more just, notwithstanding the susceptibility of his liberalism. He disapproved of the form but admired the principles of the Additional Act, and complimented his friend M. Benjamin Constant on them. "Your constitution," he wrote to him, "is better than its reputation, but you must try to make the nation believe in it, and to win that belief it must be put into immediate and vigorous execution."

M. de Lafayette had passed fourteen years on his estate of Lagrange, and though grateful to Napoleon for having liberated him from the dungeons of Olmütz, he could never pardon him for having deprived France of liberty. However, though feeling no ill will toward a man who had done him an important service, and even admiring both his character and genius, he still had not the slightest faith in his change of opinion. His own opinions were so little subject to change that he could not understand how those of another could alter. However, a man so zealous as he asked nothing better than to make a trial of liberty, no matter with whom, whether with Napoleon or the Bourbons. If under Napoleon political liberty was more endangered, there was also more security for the principles of 1789, and more independence and greatness in the sight of foreign nations. Being perfectly satisfied with the Additional Act, with the exception of one point, he was most anxious to see it put into operation, and was ready to lay aside all distrust, were the chambers summoned at once. In his opinion, nothing further need be apprehended from Napoleon, were the most distinguished men of the liberal party formed into a public assemblage. When the nation should have profited by his word to repel the enemy, if it were no longer satisfied with him, he could be deposed in favour of his son, and then constitutional monarchy would be secured. Such reasoning had one defect, that it

authorized Napoleon to reason in the same fashion and say that, when conquered, would dismiss the friends of liberty if he was not satisfied with them, and thus all that was gained by restraining him by the immediate assembling of the chambers would be to be his power of acting against a foreign war without in any way diminishing his power for attacking the cause of liberty.

However that may be, M. de Lafayette, we have said, would be quite satisfied, provided the chambers were summoned up immediately. There was no person upon whose good opinion so great a value was placed, for among the revolutionists none was so respected as he as Carnot. If he had not, like Carnot, had the honour of organizing victory, he had at least of not having voted either the death of Louis XVI. nor that of any citizen. Inducement to support the Empire would be the very best guarantee for Napoleon's liberal intentions. Great efforts were consequently made to win him. Many persons assisted in the net, among others, General Mathieu Dumas, Prince Joseph, and M. Benjamin Constant. General Mathieu Dumas, who was entirely occupied in organizing the National Guard for the defence of the country, and who was certainly anxious for liberty, but still more for the success of our arms, took advantage of his old acquaintance with M. de Lafayette to bring him into closer connection with Prince Joseph. Joseph had been acquainted with M. de Lafayette, but their intimacy had been interrupted by his two successive royalisms of Naples and Spain, an intimacy he now sought to renew with the honourable and useful intention of procuring Napoleon a support and a fresh link with the nation. He met the illustrious patriot of 1789 with the semblance of the French liberalism, a principle which indeed he had adopted under his brother's heavy yoke, and which he believed himself to possess to a greater degree than he did, a mistake that materially assisted him in the part he had to play. M. de Lafayette listened with rather haughty politeness to all he had to say, and told him he would believe any thing that was wished, provided the chambers were assembled immediately; but Joseph did not conceal that Napoleon would object strongly to this measure, as he would be afraid to leave a legislative assembly in Paris, whose debates might disturb the public mind whilst he was fighting the enemy.

M. Benjamin Constant also paid his court to M. de Lafayette. "You are my conscience," he said, which meant that he considered him as his excuse for his present conduct. Indeed, M. Benjamin Constant could not conceal from himself that his conduct, even amid the harassed tergiversation of the time, had been noticed and unfavourably commented on, as it was not easy to explain how he would become Councillor of State to a prince on whom he had once called down public vengeance. But to have M. de Lafayette for his friend and the approver of his conduct, was a sufficient reply to every reproach. M. Benjamin Constant, therefore, sought to persuade him, as M. de Lafayette coolly told him, as he had told Joseph, that he would believe all that was said, and approve all that was done, provided the chambers were assembled. There was a very

al objection to this immediate convocation would be putting the constitution before it had been accepted. Noting the importance of this objection, influence on M. de Lafayette, nor on any of the immediate convocation. They blamed a mode of acceptance the popular will was treated very differently. They were ready to treat it with still more respect by supposing it to be known even as pronounced. They said that the effect of a mere ceremony was but of little consequence, provided that what the people had done. However, this proposal was approved by him who alone had the power to decide, and it would not be easy to obtain consent.

When Napoleon was determined to put the constitution into operation, and was anxious that it should succeed, as the liberal party was identical with the failure would be the Bourbons' he still dreaded assembling the chambers, fearing that at the first report of their coming they would lose, not courage, (they had shown the contrary,) but premeditation. He was prepared for terrible scenes, perhaps even to being forced to leave the walls of Paris, to prevent the enemy from entering the capital, but he did not think that he would succeed, provided he could keep the citizens quiet, and induce them to look calmly on all the horrors of the revolution. With his instinctive clearness, he foresaw that a chamber of representatives summoned at the actual moment would contain men of every party, to the unsuccessful battle—which was possible—admitting the hypothesis of definite success instead of furnishing a motive for perseverance, would perhaps become a source of dissension, and perhaps even wrest the sword with which he was defended, and it must be admitted that this was neither unfounded nor insincere, for the formed and disunited assemblies are unfavourable instruments for carrying out a policy. He therefore wished to profit by the delay naturally resulting from the Additional Act, to defer assembling the chambers, and gain two months during which he might have time to strike the first blow at the enemy, or was it impossible that his military successes might give rise to events that would alter the campaign, if not the war, in two months. Then having recovered his ancient courage and the courage of the nation being restored, the chambers might be allowed to assemble without danger.

He reflected on the events that succeeded that involved what is worse than the defeat of a dynasty—the defeat of a nation. He perceived the prudence of Napoleon. But France felt as much dissatisfied with liberal opinions, as Europe did with the Bonapartes. In addition to the dislike felt for some parts of the Additional Act, it was generally looked upon as a deceitful promise, which Napoleon made on his return from his next victory. If any thing could conquer the unpopularity, it would be seeing an assembly placed beside the Government, watch-

ing their movements jealously, discussing, in an opposite interest, public affairs, and ever ready to frustrate any unconstitutional attempts on their part. Such was Napoleon's fearful position, for which he had to thank his own past faults; he could not assemble the chambers without running the risk of having anarchy in his rear, with the enemy in front, nor could he refuse to assemble the chambers without forfeiting public confidence, without which no troops could be raised.

Joseph, from a sincere zeal, as well as from a desire to make himself of importance, sought to obtain from his brother such concessions as would gain him credit with the constitutionalists, for which reason he pressed most earnestly for the immediate convocation of the chambers. Joseph's entreaties were warmly supported by M. Benjamin Constant, who was desirous of pleasing his friends, especially M. de Lafayette, who profited with great finesse by the desire that was shown to obtain his approbation. Both said that the "Additional Act" had not been successful, that nobody believed in it, that something more decisive should be done, that the presence of six hundred representatives and two hundred peers around the throne could alone obtain credence for the Imperial promises. Napoleon defended himself warmly. He said he knew that the "Additional Act" had not succeeded, that its title, for which he was in fault, and the hereditary peerage, for which M. Constant was to blame, had ruined it in the public opinion; that the public mind was running after chimeras, instead of looking for what was tangible and healthy, that this erroneous tendency was increasing daily, that no sacrifices whatsoever would restrain it, and that, for the sake of trying to remedy an evil which time alone could cure, he would not encumber himself with a constituent assembly, when, in addition to his other difficulties, he was about to meet in conflict all the armies of Europe. For several days he resisted the entreaties with which he was assailed, and which proceeded principally from the constitutional party, who were most anxious to find new excuses for their adhesion, and at the same time to surround themselves with a numerous assembly where they hoped to rule.

Still the entreaties, which were not less than the resistance, were supported by the unheard-of violence of the periodical press, particularly the royalist writers, who condemned the "Additional Act" for not explicitly recognising the sovereignty of the nation. Unfortunately, men calling themselves patriots allowed themselves to be entrapped by these declamations. Napoleon was not deceived by this, but he needed the assistance of the revolutionary and liberal party to oppose the royalist party at home and the allied army abroad, and it was all-important to him not to allow that zeal to cool by which the old soldiers, and especially the mobilized National Guard, were impelled toward the frontiers. What impelled these honest men to hasten to fill the deficiencies in our regiments, or to defend the fortresses, was hearing constantly dinned into their ears that they must hasten to the frontier to expel the foreigners, the Bourbons, the nobles, and priests, in fact, the

counter-revolution. Now, if the revolutionary and liberal party, by whom these things were said, should become silent through discontent, the consequence might be a frigidity which would deprive the army of all support, and leave it alone in its struggle with the enemy: this army was undoubtedly brave, but numerically insufficient to resist combined Europe. This consideration exerted a daily increasing influence on Napoleon, who saw a mournful want of popularity succeed by degrees to the enthusiasm with which the friends of the Revolution had received him on his disembarkation. However, this reason might not have been sufficient to influence his determination, had not another been added.

Whilst at home, aided by the distrust he had inspired, it was sought to represent him as an incorrigible despot, acting artfully for the time, but only waiting an opportunity to resume his old practices, abroad he was represented as a fierce tyrant, surrounded by soldiers as fierce as himself and not daring to move a step beyond the ranks, and inspiring terror and fear; in a word, that he was hateful to the French people, on whom he was come to impose his iron yoke again. It was in vain that he appeared at the almost daily reviews on the Place du Carrousel, where every one might approach him, notwithstanding the detailed accounts published in the *Moniteur*, it was repeated that he never appeared abroad except surrounded by soldiers. The constant repetition of this falsehood ultimately influenced public opinion in Europe, and it was believed that to overthrow the despot all that was needed was to conquer one or two hundred thousand mamelukes, when France would be found eager to cast off his tyranny. This second falsehood needed refutation as much as the first. Whatever might be the disadvantage of convoking the chambers at once, it would have the double advantage of putting an end to these false reports at home and abroad, proving that Napoleon had been serious in granting the "Additional Act," since, without waiting for the legal delays, he had put the people in immediate possession of their rights; and this step also proved that he did not fear to come in contact with the people, since he surrounded himself with their representatives. "Well," he said to Joseph and M. Constant, who still persisted in demanding the anticipated execution of the "Additional Act," "I have decided: I will assemble the chambers, and thus put an end to all doubts as to my intentions. I will prove my confidence in a nation that it is said I fear, by surrounding myself with its representatives." One difficulty alone remained, that of anticipating the popular desire, by dispensing with the acception of the Constitution before putting it into execution. A decree was drawn up, preceded by a preamble, which accounted for this proceeding by attributing it to Napoleon's desire to be surrounded by the representatives of the nation, and to see them near his person for a few days before leaving for the army. To this skillfully-written preamble succeeded the decree convoking the electoral colleges for the purpose of immediately choosing six hundred and twenty-nine representatives. This same decree also an-

nounced that those colleges whom had been formerly appointed by the should at the approaching election exercise power of choosing for themselves. It was published on the 30th of April, and hoped that a month would be sufficient for electoral operations, and that the representatives would be able to meet the electoral assembly of the Champ de Mars 26th.

He did not confine himself to this concession. In order to prove that he intended to put the nation in full possession of its rights, a new decree was made, which gave the communes the right of electing mayors and municipal officers. This concession was confined to those communes the prefects had exercised the right of appointing the mayors, and the reason given in the decree was, that the new prefect might be ignorant of the respective municipal candidates. As this was the case in a greater number of communes, and even in the smaller, the appointing of municipal authorities was almost entirely placed in the hands of the patriotic party. A large number of these were holders of national property, and this, as a party measure, was very wisely devised.

However great the ill humour of the patriotic party might be, it was necessarily repressed or silenced at least for some days by measures which put the Additional Act in immediate and effective operation. It can now be hardly said that it was but a vain promise whose fulfilment was delayed until the establishment of peace, but the reality would be indefinitely postponed, could he who freely placed himself in the midst of the representatives of the country be depicted as a fierce tyrant obliged to hide himself from the world. This Napoleon once proved both his sincerity and his power.

M. de Lafayette was now fully satisfied, said so. Joseph had been commencing to offer him a peerage; but he refused, saying that he would not accept any appointment from the nation, and intended presenting himself to the electors of Marais. M. de Constant, in the greatest surprise, asked how the Emperor's repugnance had been come, and, in return for that service, his influence with one of the electoral colleges, to secure his return as one of the members of the second chamber. M. de Lafayette consented; for at this moment he was in no mood to refuse any thing. He was also to perform another service, one which his patriotism could not refuse, and which he would with the greatest pleasure. His friend, Crawford, the United States Minister, who was about to return to America, where he had been appointed Minister of War, was to pass through England, where he had friends and influence. M. de Lafayette induced him to undertake to deliver some lectures written in favour of peace and abolition, and some of the principal men in England, such as de Staël, who from her long opposition to the Emperor could not be suspected of partiality, wrote most pressing letters to the British ministers, with whom her brilliant talents

might have some influence, and to withdraw from the Coalition. He said, was no longer a despotism, but a liberal monarch supported France. Both the people and he devoted to him; the struggle was cruel, and for the sake of humanity it would be better to accept Napoleon, restrained by legal institutions, really desirous of peace if not of to shed torrents of blood in a successful attempt to dethrone him, listened to, believed, and in word, he would grant both the liberty he had promised. And opposite allies, but successful in the end would not accept the Treaty of Amiens perhaps think himself bound by the final Act." Consequently, the in- habitants, of humanity, and liberty recommending a pacific policy. Staël's reasoning was, as may be seen, as it was clever and pa-

constitutional party thus repaid sacrifices with the warmest support of great importance occurred in 1800, which displayed the feeling about resisting foreign invasion, interested Napoleon more than anything. Although the long silence of the past had been succeeded by political and love of contradiction, still in the face of the enemy the proscription silenced the spirit of opposition.

For example, the inhabitants of Burgundy, Lorraine, Alsace, Normandy, and Dauphiné took part in the wars for defence with the greatest ardour. Soldiers joined their regiments, and selected for the mobilized National Guard immediately obeyed the summons. Officers appointed to organize the eastern provinces showed great dispositions, those of the west showed, though from different motives, been seen by what passed at Lyons, Marseilles, and Rennes during the months of the Restoration that the people of these towns had been both alarmed by the position the nobility had assumed, especially in taking up arms in the midst of the 20th of March, power passed into the hands of the bourgeoisie they rejoiced more from the liberty induced, than from a wish to see their ambitious views. But great prevailed at Quimper, Rennes, and Nantes, &c., in consequence of the probable Vendean leaders, their evident sympathy with England, and the appearance of English vessels laden with arms and acts of violence in the country districts. The inhabitants in particular, who had suffered so much between the attacks of the nobles on the one side and the Carrier on the other, could not resist civil war without horror, and were in the greatest excitement, and poured assassination of an old man produced a profound impression on the honest

inhabitants of Nantes, who conceived the idea of forming an alliance with the principal cities of the five departments of Brittany, by which they promised mutual assistance in case of internal or external danger, and this alliance was to be called the Breton Federation, in imitation of the Federation of 1790. No sooner did this project become known, a project so well suited to the existing circumstances, than it was generally adopted, and several hundred inhabitants of Nantes set out for Rennes, where the same idea had been adopted, and where they were anxiously expected. They were received with enthusiasm, fêted and lodged by the principal citizens, and some intelligent men were commissioned to draw up the compact by which the Bretons bound themselves to repress the enemy at home and abroad. Nothing could be more sincere than the conduct of the honest Bretons at this time, or freer from party spirit. They did not mean to overawe power or oppress the upper classes of the nation, but to defend themselves against the incendiarism and assassinations of the old chouanism, and also to prevent the landing of the English. The prevailing tone of these meetings was extreme liberalism. It was agreed to draw up a preamble, in which the objects of the association should be explained, to which some articles would be added determining the engagement of the confederates toward each other. The first stipulation was that the confederation should not form a body distinct from the other citizens, acting independently with separate uniform, arms, and commanders, but that they should be incorporated with the existing and legal institutions of the National Guard, which, as it existed throughout the Empire, they could at any time join and so become useful whenever danger threatened. They should be bound to place themselves at the disposal of the public authorities, and immediately obey their commands to join either the mobilized or sedentary battalions, and should a deficiency occur in the legal cadre of the National Guards, the confederates were bound individually to go whithersoever the mayors, prefects, or sub-prefects summoned them, to repel any attempt against public order. They also bound themselves to another duty, altogether moral, which was to efface, as far as in them lay, those false notions by which it was sought to deceive the simple peasantry, and to lead them both by word and example to fulfil their civic duties; in a word, the confederates put themselves at the disposal of the Imperial Government, both for the internal and external defence of the country.

Notwithstanding the disadvantages attached to every political association, the Confederation influenced by a deep sense of the public danger, and divested of all personal views,—being nothing more than auxiliary to the existing authority,—was less objectionable than others, and might even be of great advantage to the country.

The preamble and act were drawn up, and both were about to be submitted to the prefect. The Government, as we have seen, had no part in this movement, which was quite spontaneous and resulted solely from the fears

of the most independent and most honest of the Breton population. Though Napoleon had long been popular in the western provinces, where he had restored tranquillity, still, his wars in 1812 and 1813 had lowered him in public opinion. He was considered as most dangerous, and his return had been welcomed only because it would put an end to the influence of the emigrants, and in the hope that he would be checked by restrictive laws. For this reason, and not wishing that the new federation should assume a Bonapartist character, the Emperor's name had not been mentioned. Sensible men pointed out the danger of forming such an association independent of the Government, and which could render no real service, except acting under the jurisdiction of the Government, and could hope for sanction only on these conditions. The preamble was then revised, and made to correspond with the wishes of those good citizens, who were willing to assist Napoleon, but on condition of a true and rational liberty.

The greater number of the towns of Bretagne sent deputations to Rennes, and several days were passed in fêtes, rejoicings, and promises of mutual assistance. In a short time, more than twenty thousand confederates were assembled in the departments of the Lower Loire, Morbihan, Finistère, Côtes du Nord, and Ille-et-Vilaine, which composed Old Brittany. No sooner was this proceeding on the part of the Bretons known, than it produced a great sensation in the neighbouring departments, and, by degrees, throughout France. The Angevins, threatened by the same dangers as the Bretons, prepared to follow their example. It was not the Chouans that the Burgundians hated, but the Russians, Austrians, and Prussians, and they, also, sent deputies to Dijon to sign the act of federation, and adopted without alteration the original text of the Breton federation. Lorraine, Franche-Comté, Lyonnais, and Dauphiné were inclined to do the same. Amid this general movement,—particularly in the provinces threatened by civil or foreign war,—it was not possible that the great city of Paris should remain indifferent and inactive. But there are many Paris in Paris; and, while the nobles regretted the Bourbons and the middle classes regretted peace, the humbler classes were inflamed with a brutal hatred against what they called the nobles and priests, and by a patriotic dislike of what they called the foreigners; they had always regretted not having had muskets to defend the walls of the capital in 1814. Among these were men compromised by the disorders of 1793, young men inspired by sincere patriotism, and honest soldiers retired from service, all of whom excited the inhabitants of the faubourgs to imitate the example of the people of Brittany and Burgundy. This movement commenced in the faubourgs Saint Marceau and Saint Antoine, and soon spread through all the others. The Parisians adopted the act of the Bretons, but wished to have a preamble of their own, for, though all followed the plan invented by the Bretons, each province wished to adduce a motive of action consonant with its own particular views. The confederates of Paris addressed themselves to Napoleon himself, asked for an audience,

desired to be passed in review and authorized to present him an address.

These different confederations had scarcely existed during the last days of April and the first of May. The Additional Act had been published in the mean time, and had caused some discontent, but, its effect being annulled by the decree summoning the chambers, had not lessened the enthusiasm of those provinces threatened with foreign or civil war, and they continued to form federations. The Government, we repeat, had no part either in the arranging or propagation of these provincial federations. The men who composed them were influenced by a variety of motives. Some who were satisfied to get rid of foreigners, and of a counter-revolution effected by foreigners at any price, met the spontaneous action of the more zealous portion of the people with delight. Those, on the other hand, who regretted the sacrifices Napoleon had made to their opinions, thought, or affected to think, that the revolutionary party was prepared to seize all authority, and expressed the greatest horror of these federations. They considered this movement—especially at Paris, where it was nearer to them—as an abominable and a serious danger. If Napoleon either encouraged or suffered them, they were resolved to look on him as a dishonest and lawless instrument of the Jacobins. As to him, he smiled at their fears, allowed them to say what they would, and was himself quite content with the movement that had taken place. He looked on it from inclination, good sense, and interest, and did not feel the least inclination for what was called Jacobinism; but he understood them, and had not the same horror of them that some felt, on the contrary, he was glad that so many vigorous arms had risen to the defence of the country; some of which would restrain the Chouans in Bretagne, and would dispute the entrance to the capital with the English, Russians, and Prussians. They might be an embarrassment in time of peace, but he cared little for what would happen, provided the enemy were expelled, after which he was certain, in cases of popular commotion, to be aided not alone of the army, but of the chieftains, that might, indeed, be more liberal than he, but would never go so far as to launch democratic enterprises.

He, consequently, felt no hesitation in permitting or even aiding these federations. As we have said, he found them very useful in supporting public opinion against the emigrants, Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux, Nantes, Rouen, &c., and very useful at Paris for the defence of the capital. This last point was to him the most important of all. His plan was, as we have seen, to protect Paris by solid works; as there was not sufficient time to construct defences in masonry; he intended to bring up two hundred cannon from the army, and to have them worked by sailors, to have two hundred field-pieces, worked by young men from the different military schools, and he considered that if to the fifteen or sixteen thousand men from the dépôts he could add twenty-five thousand more from the faubourgs, all strong men, and all, for the most part, old soldiers, that Paris, defended by forty thousand

stry and ten thousand gunners, impregnable, and that then, unrepentant, with his regular army, very coalition. He did not reckon on the National Guard,—not because that heir courage, but because he suspected inclinations, and, with his usual candour, saw that, though necessity might rally round him for an instant, he secretly regretted the Bourbons.

He had not even determined whether to leave them arms; but he decided on that point to the last moment. The Federalists, he was resolved to treat them regularly, find them reliable and even incorporate them with the army, by which he would make use of the hour of danger, and, if necessary, to them the muskets of these he determined not to arm them for; in the first place, because he refused to know and to organize them, and that, he was not sufficiently rich to be able to lavish muskets so

ed to the brave General Darricau organizing them under the title of volunteers, attached to the Parisian National Guard, in which character they were to fight for the external defence of the city. He even consented to review them on the 14th and to receive the address they presented him. He chose the same day for reviewing the 10th regiment of the National Guard, the only one that had fought at the battle of the 10th. This regiment was neither constituted, nor influenced by opinion to those that had inspired, the 83d infantry regiments that had followed so enthusiastically in Danton's footsteps. The peculiar circumstances in which the 10th was placed had kept the men longer in the service of the Bourbons. The 10th did not enjoy a good reputation, and were even accused of having betrayed the bridge of the Drôme, at which they were quite innocent, as we have sought to prove. Napoleon had ordered the 10th to Paris, that he might review them, and that he might address them in his soul-stirring speeches.

On the 14th of May, having been reviewing the Federalists and 10th regiments, great excitement was caused at court of twofold temerity. Those who had seen Napoleon's condescension to the republicans were shocked, and said, "he is not present, that he was abandoned to the rabble, and that it would

soon be impossible to be of his party. Those, on the other hand, who were sincerely attached to Napoleon, and who sought no false pretext to abandon him, were seriously alarmed at his meeting the 10th regiment, in whose ranks it was said an assassination had been plotted. These latter, through real alarm about Napoleon, kept so close to his person on that day as to annoy him.

Napoleon, unmoved by the affected lamentations of one party, or the exaggerated fears of the other, descended into the courtyard of the Tuileries and commenced by receiving the Federalists. They numbered thousands; men without uniforms, and some badly dressed, but the greater number old soldiers, on whose tanned faces energetic feeling was unmistakably written. He turned several times to those near him, and, ridiculing the fears of certain persons, said, smilingly, "It is such men I want, who will fight unto death before the walls of Paris." He then listened patiently to the discourse which the appointed spokesman of the Federalists read as best he could. "Sire," he said, "we received the Bourbons coldly because they had become strangers to France, and because we do not like kings forced on us by enemies. We have received you with enthusiasm, because you are the man of the people, the defender of the country, and because we expect from you a glorious independence and rational liberty. You will secure us these two precious possessions, you will consecrate the rights of the people forever, you will reign in virtue of the constitution and the laws. We come to offer you our services, our courage, and our lives for the defence of the capital."

"The greater number of us have fought under you for liberty and glory; almost all of us are old defenders of our country, and the country may with confidence give arms to those who have shed their blood for her. Sire, give us muskets, and we swear to fight only for the country and for you. We are not the instruments of any party, the agents of any faction. We have heard the summons of our country, we have hastened to obey the voice of our sovereign: that is sufficient to show what the nation may expect from us. As citizens we obey the magistrates and laws; as soldiers we obey our leaders. We only seek to sustain the national honour, and to render the entrance of an enemy into this capital impossible, should the city be again threatened with such an insult."

The Emperor replied in the following terms:—

"Federal soldiers, I have returned alone because I relied on the people and the army of whose attachment to their country's honour

few subjects upon which a greater variety has been expressed than about the formation of the 10th, and Napoleon's feelings toward the 10th. He had accused Napoleon of having excited them for employing them against the royalists; but he was afraid of them, and on that account not arm them, and thus deprived himself of the aid of the patriots. Both assertions are false. Napoleon knew nothing of the formation of the 10th, which, indeed, had no other origin than the fact that, in the west, were called in existence, Napoleon was not displeased with them; though he saw very clearly that the 10th, at a later period, make use of them to his disadvantage. At the moment, he did not feel alarmed of patriotism in those who supported him

against foreigners, and men were what he wanted above all things. His dominant, and I will say his only, passion was to conquer Europe once more. Nothing else was of importance to him. What he valued in the institution of the Federalists was, that it gave twenty-five thousand good soldiers for the defence of Paris. The want of muskets alone prevented him from arming the Parisian Federalists immediately, and so little fear had he of their being armed, that it was his firm purpose, as we see by his correspondence, that, were Paris in danger, the muskets of the sedentary National Guard should be transferred to the active National Guard intrusted with the external defence of the city. It was a plausible pretext for transferring the arms of one corps to the other without offending anybody.

I was convinced. You have justified my confidence. I accept your offer; I will give you arms. I will give you, as officers, men covered with honourable scars, and who are accustomed to see the enemy fly before them. Your strong arms, habituated to the hardest labour, are well suited to carry muskets. As for courage, you are Frenchmen! You will instruct the National Guard. I shall feel no anxiety about the capital when I know that you and the National Guard undertake its defence; and if it is true that foreigners persist in the impious project of attacking our independence and honour, I shall be able to pursue victory without a feeling of solicitude about my capital. Federal soldiers, I am glad to see you, I have confidence in you. *Vive la nation!*" When he had finished this allocution, the Federalists defiled before him, and, if men are to be judged by their dress, it was a painful spectacle. It was indeed painful to see this Emperor, once so powerful and so proud, surrounded by magnificent troops, and to behold him now obliged to accept as defenders of the country men who had neither uniforms nor muskets! These soldiers were certainly as good as any others, and he did well to receive them; but what can be said of a policy that had reduced him to such extremities?

Having reviewed the Federalists, Napoleon advanced toward the 10th, ordered the men to form into a square, and then, alighting from his horse, he placed himself in the centre. An anxious group of officers pressed around him; he desired them to retire, and kept only two or three aides-de-camp near him, and then, in a sonorous voice, addressed these energetic words to the Duke d'Angoulême's regiment:—

"Soldiers of the 10th, you alone of the entire army have dared to fire on the tricolour flag, the sacred standard of our victories, which we have borne into so many capitals. For such a crime I ought to erase the number of your regiment from the army list, and expel yourselves from its ranks. But I am willing to believe that the fault was your officers' and not yours, and that it was they that misled you. I will change your commanders, I will give you better, and then place you in the van of the army. You shall be present wherever a shot shall be fired; and when, by devotedness and courage, you shall have washed out your shame with your blood, I will restore your standards, and I hope that in a short time you will be again worthy to bear them."

The soldiers whom Napoleon had addressed so harshly replied with loud cries of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" and extending their hands toward him they declared that not they but their officers were in fault, that they had followed them unwillingly; but the moment they found themselves free they had declared their true opinions, and that wherever they were placed they would prove that they were not inferior to the other soldiers of the army. Far from being received with musket-shots, Napoleon had met nothing but enthusiastic acclamations and proofs of fidelity. It is not by flattery, but by energetic exhortation that men can be ruled and led to great deeds.

It was thus that Napoleon acted toward the nation at this time; and, to give the public the necessary impulse, he had determined to

tell the whole truth. Formerly he knew every thing, now he concealed nothing; permitted the publication of articles in foreign journals, in which he himself was gently attacked, or which showed a small hatred toward France.

France could now see plainly that the expulsion of the Bourbons and the re-establishment of Napoleon, in giving some additional guarantees for the social principles of 1789, but involving doubts as to political liberty, would also cause a terrible effusion of blood. But it was now her duty to stand by what she had done or allowed to be done, and true good citizens who would have wished to see Napoleon stopped on his road from Cannes to Paris, because that with the Bourbons there would be more easily obtained and peace was certain, now that Napoleon had returned with evidently wise intentions, considered it his duty to support him to the utmost of his power, to avert the danger and shame of a counter-revolution effected with foreign bayonets. Every day, addresses arrived from the municipalities, tribunals, and electoral colleges, all expressing a desire to find, under Napoleon's rule, liberty at home and independence abroad, and these demonstrations imposed the obligation of restraining and supporting him. This twofold sentiment was expressed in all, though the form varied according to the greater or less enlightenment of the quarter where the addresses came. These sentiments were universal; they animated the electoral colleges, where, midst the excitement of the royalist and revolutionary press, propositions were being made for elections stamped with the Bonapartist and liberal character of the time. The liberty of the press was complete, and still, though no restraint was put on printing, M. Fouché had seized a number of the *Censeur*, a celebrated journal of the time, and which, as we have already said, was printed in volumes to escape the censorship during the first Restoration, and which breathed the honest liberalism of youth. Napoleon made the commission of this act through the remonstrances that reached him, and ordered the restoration of the volume, though that called for fierce invectives against himself. He thus showed that he was sincere in his determination to respect the liberty of the press; and this toleration, far from injuring, rather benefited him, for the more the people were left to themselves, the more frankly they testified the desires that animated them,—a desire for regulated liberty, and the determination to make foreigners respect the national independence. As an incentive to public feeling, a list of club had been allowed to form in the city called the *Café Montansier*, Place du Palais Royal, where many officers and old revolutionists assembled, and whence were heard to issue alternately patriotic and military songs, or virulent declamations against foreigners, the Bourbons, emigration, &c. &c. The excitement against all these was very great both in the faubourgs of Paris, and the eastern and western provinces, the former threatened with a civil and the latter with a foreign war, and notwithstanding the evident suppression of the Additional Act, it seemed probable that Napoleon would not want support if he

faithful to the two conditions he had upon himself,—to defend the country and to preserve the French liberty.

In France every effort was made to prevent a national one, the European war. It was feared lest it might become such, and consultations were held to consider what conduct should be pursued. Napoleon's allies were still repulsed, and one sent from Paris had been arrested quite recently. When the Emperor, commissioned to announce the establishment of the Empire to the sovereigns assembled at Vienna, had been arrested, the French cabinet sent another, intended indeed for the office; this was M. de Talleyrand, a Belgian, attached to Maria Theresa's service, and who, since the return of Napoleon to Austria, had become one of the Emperor Francis's chamberlains. This gentleman was about to leave Paris, whither he had gone on private business. A man in his position, and returning to his court, had better not be another of passing the frontier. He was entrusted with two letters, one from Napoleon to M. de Metternich, and another from Napoleon to the Emperor Francis.

It was no longer a question of war or peace, but of political consideration, but of the rights of a man,—the claims of a father on his son; of a son-in-law, demanded his wife, or at least a woman, whom there could be no legitimate refusal to deliver to him. M. de Talleyrand made some reflections on the prohibition of diplomatic intermarriage, and persevered in, and again made the oft-repeated offer of accepting the terms of the Treaty of Paris. M. de Talleyrand, more fortunate than the other ministers of foreign affairs who had been rejected at Kehl and Mentz, or than M. de Flacourt at Stuttgart, succeeded in getting as far as Lintz, where he arrived at the end of April, and was stopped under pretence of irregularity in his passports: he was obliged to give up his despatches, which were retained at Vienna, and placed on the table of the Emperor.

These letters told nothing but what had been said before. However, none of the sovereigns were now swayed by the same feelings. They signed the celebrated declaration of the 13th of March against Napoleon, and were uninfluenced by the opinion propagated against this declaration both in England and France.

Therefore, thought better to draw up a declaration more pacific than the first, but less so than the second. This was intended to be sent to the English Opposition, who were in opposition to the war, and who were in favour of the Bourbons, and was also intended to allay public feeling in France, in order to prevent the war assuming a national character. The latter motive had the greatest weight, for though the English and Germans represented Napoleon as unsupported by the army, the European sovereigns began to see that many interests were connected with his, and not interests alone, but especially those of the many who were dependent on Europe pretending to impose laws on us. It was, therefore, sought

to produce a document which would answer all these objections, but the result was not very successful. Every exertion was made to find suitable terms to declare that no intention was entertained to interfere in the government of France, nor to impose on her any particular monarch or system of government, that the allies confined themselves to the desire of excluding one man, and this for the good of all, since long experience had proved that this man was incompatible with the general peace. Although excluding one monarch, when there were but two to choose from, was in reality imposing the other upon the nation, still the secretaries of the Congress succeeded in expressing these ideas so as not to jar with the rights of nations; and, to avoid all objections from the British Parliament, no mention was made of the Bourbons. But this omission excited the courts of Spain and Sicily immediately. The British embassy, too, thought that omitting all mention of the Bourbons was treating them with too much indifference, and might give an opening to dangerous pretensions. Lord Clancarty, the principal member of this embassy since the departure of Lord Castlereagh and Lord Wellington, supported the Spanish and Sicilian courts when they asked whom the allied sovereigns meant to raise to the throne of France if they put Louis XVIII. aside. Did they think of a regency under Maria Louisa, a monarchy with the Duke of Orleans, or a republic? As it was impossible to give any explanation on these different subjects, the Congress separated without drawing up any declaration, as they considered that not inserting the Bourbons' name in the declaration would be a defect, and that its insertion would only excite embarrassing objections.

Two courts, the Russian and Austrian, and each from different motives, were opposed to any explicit declaration in favour of the Bourbons. Alexander was still as relentless as before toward Napoleon, either because he was piqued by the ridicule he had incurred by the treaty of the 11th of April, or because he did not wish that a personage should again appear upon the stage of the world who would throw all others into the shade. But though still as determined as ever against Napoleon, he was by no means inclined to give him Louis XVIII. again as successor. Besides that Louis XVIII. had offended him in many ways, he considered that the second restoration of the Bourbons would not be more permanent than the first. Austria came also to the same conclusion, but by a different process of reasoning. She was quite as determined as Russia to exclude Napoleon, and would not sanction Maria Louisa's regency on any terms; but, the Bonapartists once excluded, she would prefer the Bourbons to any other. In fact, there was not a purer royalist in Europe than the Emperor Francis. But the Bonapartists could only be expelled by war, to which Austria had strong objections, not through weakness,—which is not her ordinary failing,—but through prudence. She had just ended a violent struggle, and that with a success that had not crowned her exertions at any time during the past century. By it she had recovered her former possessions in Poland, together with the frontier of the Inn, she had got Illyria and Italy as

far as the Po and Tessino. The greatest imaginable success in any future war could not give her more, and would, if successful, only increase the pretensions of Russia and Prussia, always so closely united. Such reflections could not inspire much desire for warfare. Besides, the intelligence from France represented Napoleon as certain of the support of the liberal and revolutionary parties, which placed the greater portion of the national forces at his disposal. Only one thing could deprive him of this support, and that was a combination that could grant such terms to the revolutionists and liberals as would detach them from Napoleon, whom they dreaded, and of whom they had always felt the greatest distrust. Austria was, consequently, inclined to adopt a policy that would excite domestic troubles around Napoleon, but which without altogether excluding the Bourbons forbade any close connection with them. With such views, M. de Metternich, who was well informed of every thing that occurred at Paris, thought of the Duke d'Otranto, whom he considered just suited to the plots he contemplated. He considered that the best means of exciting confusion in France was to flatter the vanity and ambition of such a man, and he determined to send a secret agent to ask M. Fouché by what other means than a terrific war the dispute between France and Europe might be terminated. For the mission, M. de Metternich chose and sent to Basle a prudent man named Werner, who was worthy of the confidence reposed in him. At the same time, he commissioned the clerk of a banking-house, who was going to Paris on business connected with his firm, to give a letter to M. Fouché, informing him of the subject in hand, and requesting him to send somebody to Basle with whom M. Werner might confer. Thus, whilst at Vienna the allies were vainly disputing about the new declaration, M. Werner set out for Basle, where he arrived on the 1st of May, and where he waited the confidential person with whom he was to treat.

It was not without much difficulty that the banker's clerk, bearer of M. de Metternich's letter, succeeded in gaining access to M. Fouché, nor did he attain his object without giving some slight indications of the purport of his mission. M. de Caulaincourt learned this, and with his usual fidelity told Napoleon, by whose orders the clerk was arrested, searched, and questioned, when it was found that communications either were, or were about to be, established between M. Fouché and M. de Metternich. Although Napoleon had sworn to lay aside the old man, and had done so up to this time, still for a moment he resumed his former self. His excited imagination saw a thousand treasons concealed beneath the detected plot, and, yielding to his natural impetuosity, his first impulse was to have M. Fouché arrested, his papers seized, and his perfidy denounced and punished; a proceeding he expected to be agreeable to the nation, for the public felt but little esteem for this minister, and would approve of his punishment once his crime was known.

This was but a momentary excitement. Napoleon determined to reflect, examine, and make himself fully acquainted with all particulars before coming to a decision. M. Fouché

came on business, and, as he entered, assumed that imperturbable cool him on the field of battle, spoke and confidentially of the affair especially of the intrigues plotting in order to provoke the confident locutor, approaching as nearly a fact whose avowal he sought. T. ter did not understand the Empe and though he had received M. de letter, instead of disarming his by a sincere avowal, persisted in Napoleon was tempted to break than once, but restrained himself, and dismissed M. Fouché as much deceiving, and quite unconscious nation he had undergone. Nape the best means of discovering this perfidy he exaggerated, would I confidential person at once to Basle provided with the private marks of which had been discovered, might M. Werner, and thus detect the very source. For this purpose, Fleury de Chaboulon, the young man joined him at Elba, and whose dexterity he had rewarded by an in his cabinet. He sent for him plan of conduct he was to pursue, as him with orders to the authorities frontiers to let no other pass but arrest M. Fouché's real agent, if send one, and thus prevent the fulfil mission.

M. Fleury de Chaboulon set out. When he arrived at the frontier he prescribed orders to the authorities passed on, and found M. Werner where he at once began to act his skilfully. M. Werner, completely told him simply the purpose for which been sent. M. Fleury de Chaboulon that what was called M. Fouché's quite a recent affair, indeed it had commenced; that consequently nothing preceded the present communication, the first time in his life, when treason question, M. Fouché was not the one but the recipient of the proposal, that there was no idea of assassinating as that prince had believed, but of det him without having recourse to the and doubtful chances of war. M. assured M. de Chaboulon most sure no design was entertained inimical of Napoleon, he indignantly repelled supposition, but avowed a design on power, and said that Europe would him on any terms to occupy the throne; but that, Napoleon once France might choose any government pleased, a republic excepted; that confidence was felt in the Duke d'Oran geance and influence, that his hereditary leon was well known, and that his it was sought to help in resolving the of how the world could be spared a fearful effusion of blood.

M. Fleury de Chaboulon played the agent to M. Fouché very well, and that minister had indeed reasons to of Napoleon, and had felt some against him, but that he had once

for the sake of his country; that in certainly had wished for other arrangements than those that had been made, that he desired Napoleon's return, but had been convinced how necessary he was, for he could place France on a firm basis, all parties, and form a durable Government. That Napoleon had returned with healthy every subject, that he was determined to maintain peace, and to give France liberal institutions; that, besides, it would be useless to dethrone him, as the army, the economists, the holders of national property, men filled with new ideas, in fact, all with the exception of the emigrants, looked on him as the representative of their rights and interests, and above all as the representative of national independence; that thousands of volunteers were joining the army; that Napoleon was about to add a hundred thousand chosen National Guards to four hundred thousand of the regular army; that the struggle with him would be short; that the campaign of 1814, in which, owing to his genius, the allies had run such a risk, would be nothing in comparison to that of 1815, because that, instead of opposing an army that had been either beaten or dispersed, they would meet the force of France in Champagne, that it would consequently be better to come to terms than cut each others' throats for the sake of the Bourbons, whom France would not receive when imposed on her by force; that Napoleon would be most happy to accept such an arrangement, and would be glad to learn M. de Metternich's opinions on the subject, that he might endeavour to adapt his own to them, if, as he did not think they were worthy the sagacity of that statesman.

Metternich's envoy, who believed he was speaking to M. Fouché's agent, was overwhelmed with surprise at hearing language so direct, and persevered with innocent simplicity in repeating that he was astonished to have heard, that it was generally thought that the Duke d'Otranto did not like Napoleon, that he was not at all deceived as to his worth, that he was also considered a man that would readily agree to any arrangement; but that since he had dispositions so different from what he expected, he—M. Werner—had nothing to do but as he was come rather to receive than to make proposals. After a little further conversation, both agreed to return to their respective capitals, tell them what they had heard, and meet again with instructions better adapted to the real state of affairs. M. Fleury-Boulon, who had been well instructed by Napoleon, insisted on M. Werner's getting information as to the sovereigns' opinions on the most important subjects, such as the restoration of the crown to the King of Rome, whether Napoleon should abdicate, and a remainder Prince Eugène in case Maria Louise would not return to defend the rights of the Emperor. The two envoys then separated, agreeing to meet again at Basle in a few days.

Some time Napoleon had another and more interesting conversation with M. Fouché. Whether

the obstinate silence of the Minister of Police excited an irritation that Napoleon could not conceal, or whether, as some say, M. de Real had warned M. Fouché, the latter told Napoleon, with affected indifference, that an obscure person had brought him a letter from M. de Metternich, to which he had not attached any importance, and of which, consequently, he had made no mention. Napoleon, in going to receive M. Fouché, left M. Lavalette, who remained in the next room, where all that passed could be heard. The Emperor could scarcely restrain himself at this proof of the duplicity of his Minister of Police; he told him that he knew all; that such a communication from the principal member of the Coalition, and containing the offer of sending an agent to Basle, was one of the most important that could happen under existing circumstances, and that it was impossible that it could be forgotten. Then in a harsh and severe tone he added, loud enough to be heard in the next room, "You are a traitor, and if I punished your treason as it deserves, all France would applaud. If my government does not suit you, why don't you say so? why do you persist in remaining my minister?" M. Fouché, like a servant accustomed to his master's violence and who had long ceased to be well treated, murmured some embarrassed words of excuse and retired. On his way he met M. Lavalette, to whom he said, with a smile of indifference, "The Emperor is the same as ever, distrusting every one, seeing treason everywhere, and quarrelling with every one, because Europe will not bear with him any longer." M. Fouché said no more, as though such treatment, whether deserved or undeserved, could only be treated with indifference.

During two months Napoleon had constantly restrained himself, but lost his self-command on this occasion, in which he committed a great fault, for such things must not be said, or, if said, all further connection with him to whom they are addressed should be broken off. At the height of his power he might have given vent to this outburst of feeling, with no worse result than making an unimportant enemy; but now the very accusation of treason made this man a real and dangerous traitor. Besides, Napoleon was unjust to M. Fouché; for though that minister had given cause for suspicion in concealing such serious overtures as those in question, it was evident from what had been learned at Basle that if symptoms of treason existed none had yet been realized. It would have been better to warn the minister coolly, let him see that his proceedings were known, but not throw off all restraint, since the serious and delicate state of affairs forbade a severe punishment. Indeed, M. Fouché had had the art to make the public believe that he was an independent minister, capable of giving rational advice to his master, and if necessary of opposing him. Had Napoleon punished him, many would think it was because he could not brook advice, and all would believe that fortune herself had abandoned him, were he forsaken by M. Fouché. As he could not punish, it would have been wiser to remain silent. Besides, having once given way to his anger, he was not likely to win back M. Fouché by a contemptuous indulgence. Seeing that nothing

serious had been done, he was determined to wait, and meantime to keep his observant eye fixed on his Minister of Police. He told what had passed to M. Fleury de Chaboulon, bid him call on M. Fouché and make arrangements with him for carrying on this bizarre negotiation at Basle, and to learn what reply M. Metternich would make to the questions that had been proposed to him. M. Fleury de Chaboulon called on M. Fouché, who spoke of the Emperor as of a child that could neither restrain nor guide himself, and who was again preparing his own ruin, and who ought to be served, not for his own sake, but for the common good. Having avenged himself by contemptuous remarks upon Napoleon, he agreed with M. Chaboulon upon the mode of arranging a second interview, and of turning it to profit by obtaining the best information they could.

M. Fleury de Chaboulon returned to Basle, where he found M. Werner faithful to his appointment. M. Werner, still believing that he was treating with the Duke d'Otranto's representative, assumed a more decided tone, and explained himself more explicitly as to the intentions of the Powers assembled at Vienna. In the commencement he spoke even more decidedly concerning Napoleon than on the first occasion, making his exclusion a matter of necessity, he being incompatible with the general tranquillity. Napoleon once excluded, he declared that it was the wish of the sovereigns to come to a friendly arrangement, as they entertained no ill feeling toward France, nor did they think of imposing a Government on her. What the sovereigns would prefer, and what would be sure to procure better conditions for France, would be the restoration of the Bourbons. If France consented to this, such arrangements might be made as would secure the opinions and interests that had sprung from the French Revolution. The Charter should undergo the necessary modifications; the greater number of public employments should be bestowed on all the new families; the emigrants who had returned since 1st of April, 1814, should have no part in public affairs; a homogeneous and independent ministry should be formed, constituted in such a manner as to be free from all court influences. M. Werner added that if France rejected the elder Bourbon branch, the Coalition would not refuse the younger, they would even, if necessary, consent to Napoleon's son ascending the Imperial throne, reserving to themselves the power of choosing a competent person to act as regent in case Maria Louisa refused to accept the office. But the absolute and irrevocable condition was that Napoleon should cease to reign, and place himself in the hands of his father-in-law, who would treat him with every consideration dictated by honour and family ties.

It was in vain that M. Fleury de Chaboulon repeated what he had said before, dwelling especially on the great forces at Napoleon's disposal. M. Werner listened politely, and only repeated what he had said, that, provided Napoleon was excluded, the sovereigns would be willing to treat on every other point, even the transmission of the crown to Napoleon's son, they choosing a regent, who would conciliate the interests of France with those of

peace. Then, after many suppositions, the two agents separated, to meet again should their superior be useful or right.

M. Fleury de Chaboulon returned and related all that had passed, and the Duke d'Otranto, and was disappointed communications that had no result. Napoleon concluded the Vienna had been mollified, and would consent to accept his son; he received a hope of finding them less obstinate than he had expected, that two or three battles would be overcome them altogether, which he had not calculated on before. But Fouché came to the conclusion that was the only obstacle to peace, the Duke d'Otranto, had done well in Maria Louisa's regency, as such a regent would at once put an end to the war with which France and Europe were warring, and that if Napoleon understood interests, and those of his dynasty, adopt this plan, and abdicate in his son, remaining at the head of the army, all should be arranged with the Emperor then seek an honourable and peaceful corner of the world, then he could expect, after having terminated so long. These opinions M. Fouché with thoughtless levity, which was explained by his believing that Napoleon's greatness weakened. Some of these reached Napoleon's ears, but he did not revenge, saying that, except he gave absolute treason, it was better to let Fouché to intrigue and talk, both were an absolute want of his realm that such intrigues or remarks were nothing; victory alone could deal with him once more conqueror, he could or punish him, but if, on the other were conquered, an enemy the more certain, which would have been inevitable by defeat. This opinion, it was exaggerated, for, even if the fidelity of those he left behind might have consequences, or, perhaps, give him repair them.

M. de Metternich had not failed to see what may be seen, since he had introduced into the French Government, and M. Fouché an opportunity of convincing himself that Napoleon still detested him, and of making him believe that Napoleon put aside every thing would be arranged by him, the Duke d'Otranto for the sovereigns at Vienna must accept him as the instrument of a nation. Allowing M. Fouché to see, in perspective, the possibility of his playing the same part that M. de Talleyrand had in 1814, was flattering the strongest dangerous of his passions, and kept with the desire of gratifying it. The minister had not wasted his exertions; he had no idea of the injury he had done or the service he had done. However that might be, it was still necessary, at Vienna, to add some to the declaration of the 13th of March

is a fresh declaration to France and to

Up to this time it had been found
le to construct a declaration that would
ll, some considering it unjust and un-
as over the Bourbons in silence, and
inking it imprudent to announce the
of imposing them on France. In this
ssment, the Coalition profited by some
ances that occurred most opportunely.
ty of the 25th of March was just at
e brought back to Vienna, ratified by
courts. England alone had added a
o the 8th Article, to the effect that
the Allied Powers wished well to the
s, their essential and primary object
ecure the welfare of Europe, endan-
Napoleon's occupying the throne of

It was necessary now to reply to the
on, and state how far it was adopted.
e despatch was therefore sent from
o cabinet, which, because of its easy
strained style, gave a better opportu-
nity of explanation, and of conciliating
the sides of opinion, than could be done
in a solemn declaration addressed to all

Lord Clancarty, consequently, sent
h to Lord Castlereagh, in which
authorized to declare to the British
that the Congress accepted the reser-
vations attached to the 8th Article, and under-
stood in the same sense as England; that the
on of the 13th of March, the refusal
of communication with France, and the
other couriers, simply signified that the
idea of that great country was believed
compatible with the peace of Europe;
his experience proved what might be
learned from him if once allowed to secure
the peace; that he would profit by the first
opportunity to take up arms, and again seek
to bring Europe to a yoke she was deter-
mined to endure; that the allies conse-
quently went to war with him and his adhe-
rents from choice, but necessity; that
not, in any way, dispute the right of
France to choose her own government, nor did
they intend to restrict the exercise of this right;
they confined themselves to requiring that
the dynasty might be chosen should give
security for the permanent tranquillity of
Europe, and, this point once secured, they
refrain from all interference in the in-
ternal affairs of a great and free nation.

Lord Clancarty finished by saying that, in
being certain that he was giving the
views of the different cabinets exactly, he
submitted his despatch to their principal
members, who had unanimously approved and
signed all that it contained.

At Vienna such efforts were made to
see who wished for a formal declara-
tion in favour of the Bourbons, and those who
sought Napoleon's exclusion from the
throne. The British ministers were compelled
by the Opposition to enter into an explanation,
and stated that theirs was a war policy.
It was fortunate enough to get Parliament
to state their views. We shall give a brief
of what occurred in London.

On the 25th of March, announcing
the Alliance of Chaumont, had
been published in the different journals toward
the 7th of April, and caused no little surprise

to the members of Parliament, who had been
told that the English ministers' preparations
for war were merely precautionary, and did not
imply a determination to make war on France.
Were the ministers acquainted with this treaty
of the 25th of March or not, when the royal
message had been discussed on the 7th of
April? If they knew of it, they had deceived
Parliament and sinned against political honesty,
which in a free country might permit silence,
but cannot countenance falsehood. Mr. Whit-
bread, one of the most talented and active
members of the Opposition, called upon Lord
Castlereagh, whilst all the members sat silent
and surprised, and asked an explanation of his
conduct, and whether the treaty of the 25th
of March was authentic or not. Lord Castle-
reagh, taken by surprise, muttered some words
in reply,—acknowledged the fundamental prin-
ciples of the treaty, without admitting the exact
terms. "What difference is there," cried the
Opposition, "between the real treaty and that
which has been published?" Lord Castlereagh
could not tell of any, since none existed, and
replied that, the treaty not being yet universally
ratified, he was not permitted to enter into any
explanation. The Opposition, however, saw
plainly that the treaty was authentic,—that
the English Government had pledged them-
selves with the other allies to declare imme-
diate war,—that the ministers had completely
deceived them when talking of precautionary
measures, for it was impossible to credit that
the treaty signed at Vienna on the 25th of
March was not known in London on the 7th
of April, that is, thirteen days after it had
been signed. Lord Castlereagh, not daring to
venture on a direct falsehood, admitted that
he knew of the treaty on the 7th of April.
"Then you have deceived us most shamefully,"
exclaimed the members of the Opposition with
the greatest violence. The minister was greatly
embarrassed. And with good reason; for,
though political morality was then at a very
low ebb, Parliament had never been so daringly
deceived. Mr. Whitbread then said that as the
time for explanation had not yet arrived, it
would be better that the sittings of Parliament
should be suspended until such time as it
would be convenient to tell the entire truth, as
otherwise the members might fall into error,
and vote contrary to their principles whilst
they remained ignorant of the true state of
affairs. Lord Castlereagh, driven to extremi-
ties, appointed the 28th of April to lay the
treaty before the House and justify its contents.

On the 28th of April the treaty was laid
before Parliament, and gave rise to a violent
discussion. Mr. Whitbread, having repeated
that Parliament had been deceived by the
ministers, who spoke only of simple precau-
tions when they were really preparing for war,
then said that this war was dangerous and by
no means necessary to the interests of Great
Britain, and moved that a respectful address
should be presented to the crown, requesting
that the best means of preserving peace might
be taken into consideration. Lord Castlereagh
then spoke, and indulged in some personalities,
saying that if ministers had formerly listened
to the advice of Mr. Whitbread and his friends,
the struggle against Napoleon would have been
abandoned on the very eve of triumph, and

England would be far from the magnificent position she had acquired, had she not followed advice very different from that offered by those gentlemen. He then sought by subtleties and semi-falsehoods to reply to the reproach of having treated Parliament with duplicity. What had been said on the 7th of April? That ministers were about to make preparations to meet whatever events might arise, but they had made no precise declaration of war or peace. They had only promised to protect British interests in the best possible manner, and these interests depended on a strict union with the Continental Powers. As these Powers, from their geographical position, were in more danger than England, it was only right that the question should be decided by them. Far from having advised them to make war, the danger of such a step had been pointed out to them, but it was unanimously admitted that a general disarmament would be folly in the presence of such a man as Napoleon, and that as to keep their forces on a war-footing would involve the allies in overwhelming expenses, they had come to the determination of declaring war. Could England then separate from the Continental Powers, and break off an alliance to which the deliverance of Europe was owing, and to which she was still indebted for her safety? Nobody ventured such an assertion. Neither would any one dare to say that these Powers were in the wrong. In short, was it possible for them to exist in a state of perpetual anxiety, and as a consequence of this anxiety keep their forces constantly on a war-footing? Was it not evident, for example, that if Napoleon were allowed to secure himself on the French throne, and permitted to assemble three or four hundred thousand men, he would profit by the first opportunity and again attack his neighbours? It was said, indeed, that he was changed, and had adopted pacific views; yes, changed in words, to lull the vigilance of the Powers, and those would be very foolish indeed that would put faith in such a change. At the very first favourable moment, as soon as he should perceive a diminution in the forces of the allies, or the appearance of disunion among themselves, he would again spring upon Europe, and again subdue her to his yoke. This was a truth which no rational man could doubt. It would, therefore, be wiser to profit by the advantage of being prepared, for there are times when attack is nothing more than defence. It was indeed asserted by some that the man in question would be supported by the great French nation. If it were so, and that the French nation from weakness or ambition would support this man, well, then, let her take the consequence! Europe should not be exposed to inevitable destruction because one nation chose to have such a ruler, or because a corrupt army, covetous of riches and honour, chose as its leader a barbarian who sought to renew the wild enterprises of Asiatic conquerors! The allies did not want to impose a government on France, they only sought to deprive her of the power of injuring others, of perpetually disturbing the repose and political existence of the world.

Such was the substance of Lord Castlereagh's explanations. Though he did not say that

war had been irrevocably decided on, he had so amply dilated on the motives for declaring it, that his words were equivalent to a declaration of war. Many members replied to Lord Castlereagh: of these the most distinguished was Mr. Ponsonby, a man of moderate opinions, and who had induced the majority to vote on the 7th of April in the sense of the royal message, as he considered that it left England still free to declare for war or peace. Mr. Ponsonby had consequently been right than anybody else to complain of having been deceived. It was evident, he said, that on the 7th of April the cabinet wished Parliament to believe that there was still a choice between peace and war, which was not the case, for war had been resolved on, even at that time the treaty of the 25th of March had been signed at Vienna and had arrived in London. Mr. Ponsonby might have answered this more positively, had he seen Lord Castlereagh's despatches. The members of the House of Commons believed on that day that they were voting for precautionary measures when in reality they were voting for war. The House had therefore been deceived by the ministry. "Now," said Mr. Ponsonby, with an indignation the more significant because of his equable temper, "such conduct will not be tolerated in private life; and the opinion are we to form of it when pronounced in public affairs, where the interests not only of an individual, but of a whole country are at stake?" Mr. Ponsonby did not consider the reasons for undertaking the war at all sufficient, especially when compared with the risk. "Undoubtedly," he added, "England ought not to separate from the Continental Powers but she evidently had a right to advise, and it was certain that the British ministers had, as they boasted, shown their allies all the dangers of this new struggle? Those dangers were serious, as they were about to defy a once a great man and a great nation." Mr. Ponsonby added, that he had never admired this man in a moral point of view, but surely could deny his immense genius, nor the energy of the people under his command. To treat such a people, to attribute to them every vice and arrogate to ourselves every virtue, was the way to discuss such a subject correctly. It was no less true that they were seeking the extraordinary man to whom they were opposed, the support of that redoubtable people by their scarcely concealed attack upon their independence. It was said that no man was entertained of imposing a government on them, but merely, in the general interests of the community, to forbid them one in particular. "If," continued Mr. Ponsonby, "there were three or four other governments besides this interdicted one, from which they could choose, then it might be said that no attempt was made to impose one on them. But every rational man must see that France had no choice but between Bonaparte and the Bonapartes, and excluding Bonaparte, was it so compelling them to accept the Bonapartes? These latter had been tried, and notwithstanding their moral qualities, had offended the nation by their political faults, and it would be insulting the French people beyond endurance to compel them to accept the Bonapartes again."

It would be carrying Mr. Pitt's policy beyond all bounds, to renew a war for the sake of the Bourbons, who, when almost miraculously restored to their throne, had not been able to maintain their position. If such reasoning were carried out, the august dynasty actually occupying the English throne could not have reigned, for the English people would have been under an obligation to struggle unto death for the re-establishment of the Stuarts. And even were the boasted advantages obtained for Great Britain, by the last peace, compromised, let them be abandoned; but there was no need of making such a sacrifice, for Bonaparte offered peace, offered it with importunity on the conditions of the Treaties of Paris and Vienna. Should then torrents of blood be shed, the national debt be doubled, and the income tax prolonged to infinity, and all this for advantages that nobody thought of contesting? Some said that Napoleon's word could not be relied on; that he was an ambitious, insincere man. But to speak plainly, since the sittings of the Congress at Vienna, had any Power in Europe the right to accuse another of ambition? Doubtless the enterprising disposition that Napoleon had formerly shown furnished a just cause of alarm, for men rarely change; but it was also true that as age advances, their conduct undergoes modifications, and men who in early life could not endure repose at a later period seek and love quiet. Besides, a clear view of his own interest is often sufficient to modify the conduct of a man of genius. Napoleon hated England, but had he not proved his desire to please her by abolishing the slave-trade? When he set the Duke d'Angoulême at liberty after a price had been set upon his head, was his conduct not very different from what it had been toward the Duke d'Enghien? This obstinate, incorrigible man was, therefore, not as unchangeable as was said, and if to prevent a pretended danger he was driven to extremities, and compelled to fight, and the French nation forced to join him, might he not gain two or three brilliant victories? and what would then become of the advantages gained in the last war, which they were so anxious to protect? What would become of these continental Powers, for whose protection prudence and reason had been sacrificed? In case of such an event, would it not be evident that false calculations had been made, and because certain persons would not believe in a change of conduct if not of disposition, which self-interest had rendered most probable, they would have risked the advantages gained by a long war, and which nobody was disputing, together with the safety of the continental sovereigns, for certainly were Napoleon again victorious he would not accept the Treaty of Paris. They might, therefore, by excess of prudence, be wanting in real foresight, and create the very difficulty they were seeking to avoid."

Such were the reasons advanced by both parties in the British Parliament, and the entire may be reduced to this:—Could Napoleon's offers of peace be trusted? Thus the same doubt that prevailed in France influenced the rest of the world, and war was to be declared against Napoleon, not for what he meditated at the time, but for what he had

done or wished to do formerly. He offered peace; he sought it by every means, direct and indirect, asked for it humbly, and was met by universal doubt. This doubt, indeed, was the only reply that could be made to the excellent reasoning of the English Opposition, and though the Parliament appreciated Mr. Whitbread's pacific address, it was rejected by two hundred and seventy-two votes against seventy-two.

From this moment war was proclaimed against us in London in the name of all Europe, and, unfortunately, whilst it was only resolved on in London, it was actually commenced in Italy. We have seen how the unfortunate Murat had been brought into connection with the island of Elba by the Princess Pauline, who had gone alternately from Porto Ferrajo to Naples, and from Naples to Porto Ferrajo. By her zeal, and with the assistance of the Queen of Naples, she had succeeded in reconciling Napoleon to Murat, and prepared their united efforts for the new course of events, which might be easily foreseen, though its details could not be known beforehand. When Napoleon was about to leave Porto Ferrajo, he communicated his intention to Murat, and desired him to write to Vienna and announce his intention of observing the Treaty of Paris. He also advised him not to take the initiative in hostilities, but to wait until France, replaced under the Bonaparte sceptre, could give him assistance; he was to fall back if attacked, that he might have the advantage of distance and concentrated forces on his side, and to fight rather on the Garigliano than on the Po. This advice was worthy of him that gave, but quite above the comprehension of him that received it. Murat's imagination took fire when he heard of Napoleon's landing and entry into Grenoble. He felt no doubt of his brother-in-law's success, and in his excitement, almost forgetting the Austrians, he only thought of the danger of seeing Italy pass as quickly as France under the Imperial sway, and of his again losing the iron crown; for this hapless prince not only thought of keeping the kingdom of Naples, but of doubling or trebling his dominions. He did not put an iota of the prudent advice he had received into execution.

On first learning Napoleon's departure, far from sending the message with which he was intrusted to Vienna, and by which it was intended to tranquillize Austria with regard to Murat as well as with regard to France, he betook himself to his usual practices of dissimulation. He sent for the English and Austrian ministers, and told them that he was quite ignorant of his brother-in-law's intention,—a useless falsehood, which nobody would believe; and he would have done better in admitting what he knew, as it would give him an opportunity of assuring Austria and England that their interests should not suffer. Then, when assured of Napoleon's success, instead of remaining at a distance from the Austrians in the south of the Peninsula, he thought to seize all Italy at once, and proclaim himself king before the Empire should be proclaimed on both sides of the Alps. He determined to commence his march at once, making several excuses to Austria and England, whom he did not wish to offend, and whom he wished

to deceive as long as possible. His first step was to take possession of the Marches, as a retaliation on the Pope, who had not recognised him, and he next intended to advance to the banks of the Po, telling Austria and England that he thought it better to take up a position on the line of the armistice of 1814, when it was stipulated that the Austrians should occupy the left bank of the Po, and the Neapolitans the right. Such a proposition could only be sustained by Murat's resuming his position of 1814, that is, by becoming the ally of the Coalition against France. He said nothing contrary to such a supposition, and even sent the most tranquillizing assurances to England. Before leaving to put himself at the head of his troops, he confided the regency of the kingdom to his wife, who did all she could to turn him from his foolish enterprise; but he took no notice of her advice, gave her the most extensive powers, and left ten thousand men to protect Naples, a precaution most necessary in the existing state of the public mind, and which ought to have influenced him not to advance northwards, but to concentrate his forces behind the Garigliano. He had still at his disposal fifty thousand men, all well equipped, and making a tolerably good appearance, but deprived of their French officers, who had left the Neapolitan service, some through disgust, others because of the ordinance of Louis XVIII., which recalled them. Murat had also thirty thousand militia, but these could not be efficiently employed in their own country, especially in a war in which the rivalries of contending dynasties would exercise so great an influence. He commenced his campaign with fifty thousand men, including those in the Marches.

This first unwise division of the Neapolitan forces was not the only one. Murat sent a column through the Roman States to Tuscany, in order to expel the Austrian general Nugent. This column, consisting of seven or eight thousand Neapolitans, was ordered to pass within view of Rome, advancing through Viterbo and Arezzo to Florence, and to rejoin the principal army at Bologna. The appearance of an armed force so near the Vatican was not calculated to please the Pope, nor to reassure him as to the views of the Neapolitan court. Murat sent General Campana to assure him of his devotion to the Holy See, and to implore him to remain at Rome; for this new King of Italy affected to imitate Napoleon in all things, and, whilst creating an Italian kingdom for himself, wished that the head of the Catholic church should remain in his dominions, peaceful, honoured, richly endowed, and nominally free. But it was not easy to persuade the Pope, who had refused to be the subject of the modern Charlemagne, and was still less inclined to submit to a petty Italian prince, whose bravery, devoid of genius, gave him no right to believe himself the founder of an empire. Uninfluenced by Murat's assurances, the Pope left his capital, accompanied by several cardinals, and was soon followed by all the most distinguished persons in Rome, among whom were Charles IV., King of Spain, and his wife, the Prince of Peace, the Queen of Etruria, &c. All retired to Genoa. The example was followed by the other Italian

courts. The Grand Duke of Tuscany went to Leghorn, where he was sure of protection from the English; the King of Sardinia joined the Papal court at Genoa, where Lord Besset was staying.

The Neapolitan troops destined for Tuscany passed under the walls of Rome without entering the city, and proceeded toward Florence through Arezzo. Murat, with the principal corps, passed through Ancona and Rimini.

Whilst advancing in this way, he addressed both English and Austrians in the most friendly tone. He said that his intention in advancing toward the Po was to place himself in a position conformable to the terms of the armistice of 1814,—which was rather an insinuation of alliance than a threat of hostility. But such a comedy could not last long, and the unfortunate Murat was soon compelled to declare his intentions fully, and to let the people of Italy see what crown he ambitioned to place on his head. Napoleon had sent messages after messages to keep him quiet, and at last sent General Belliard, an excellent adviser both in civil and military policy. But these messages did not reach Murat on his road, and he had nothing to guide him but rumours and some letters from Joseph, who sent him an account from Switzerland of Napoleon's triumphant progress, and implored him to join the cause of France.

When Murat arrived at Ancona, he learned that Napoleon had passed beyond Lyons, that the French army joined him wherever he appeared, and that henceforth no doubt could be entertained of his success. This intelligence produced a magical effect on Murat. He saw Napoleon re-established on the throne and again putting forth his hand to seize Italy, and fancy painted the Austrians as quickly expelled from Italy as the Bourbons had been from France. From these imaginings he concluded that he ought not to allow himself to be anticipated, that he ought himself to expel the Austrians from Italy, take their place, and appear before Napoleon as an auxiliary with twenty million Italians at his disposal, and, consequently, one whom it would not be easy to dispossess in favour of Prince Eugène. His excitement was increased by the neighbourhood of the Austrians, who had taken possession of the Legations, and whom he should meet on leaving the Marches. He must, therefore, either stop on the frontier of the Marches and there wait the course of events, or declare himself at once by attacking the Austrians. Murat and three of his ministers who accompanied him had a great discussion on this subject. All begged him to take time, and not throw down the gauntlet to the Allied Powers. Up to this time, he had done nothing that he could not justify to the Austrians or English. He had announced that he was about to occupy the line of the ancient armistice, and would prove his sincerity by stopping in his progress before he had gone far. He might there await the course of events in France with safety, with the advantage of not compromising either himself or Napoleon, and of not removing the seat of war too far from Naples in case hostilities should commence. These were sufficient, and more than sufficient, reasons for passing in his

course. But Murat considered that the prestige of Napoleon's fame would make his success as certain in Italy as in France. He fancied that the French Empire would be no sooner established in France than it would again spring up at Milan by a reflex action, and that Prince Eugène would be again proclaimed viceroy. This last fear tormented him, and he wished to meet Napoleon with the double advantage of having expelled the Austrians and of being in actual possession. Whilst his ministers were making the greatest efforts to prevent his commencing hostilities, and when he seemed half inclined to adopt their advice, he received a letter from Joseph, dated Prangins, in which this prince told him of Napoleon's late triumphs, conjured him to adopt his cause, and to aid him in Italy both by arms and diplomacy, and, at the same time, to endeavour to win the Austrians from the Coalition by assuring them that they should not be molested. He then added these unfortunate words:—"Speak and act as your own feelings dictate, advance to the Alps, but do not pass them."* This letter, written in the intoxication of joy, contained the most deplorable contradiction, for it advised Murat to display a friendly feeling toward the Austrians, and at the same time to advance toward the Alps. Yet, had Murat read it with somewhat more reflection than it had been written, he would have seen that Joseph did not understand the existing state of things. Had Joseph known that the Austrians occupied both banks of the Po, he would not have supposed it possible to act in a conciliatory manner toward them, and at the same time advance toward the Alps. He evidently did not know that the Austrians were on the right bank of the Po, but thought them confined to the left bank, as in 1814, which would have permitted another force to advance, without coming in conflict with them, to the foot of the Alps at least in some parts of the chain. Besides, it was quite evident that this advice to march to the Alps, but not to go beyond, was not so much an invitation to advance, as a recommendation not to violate the French frontier. Unfortunately, Murat took no notice of any thing but of the advice to march toward the Alps; he wished to seize all Italy at once; he would not listen to the advice or entreaties of his ministers, but passed the frontier of the Legations, and drove back the vanguard of the Austrian cavalry on Cesena. As the Austrians were not numerous enough to oppose an army of more than forty thousand men, they retired in good order toward Bologna. They were commanded by General Bianchi. The loss on both sides was inconsiderable.

It was on the 31st of March that Murat flung aside the mask, and assumed the Italian crown by his own authority. On the same day, he published a most declamatory proclamation, dated from Rimini, calling all Italians to independence, and promising them a united Italy. In this proclamation, he did not speak of Napoleon or of France, and that

through two very mean motives: first, that he might still keep on terms with the English, and, secondly, to avoid any reference to the vicereignty of Prince Eugène. This was very unwisely done, for it was folly to think of temporizing with the English, after breaking with the Austrians; nor was it less foolish to think of forming, at that time, a purely Italian party, independent of Austria or France. Owing to the long wars against Austria, there was, at that time, in Italy, no choice but to be either the partisan of Austria or of France. Besides, though the Italians had been alienated from Napoleon in 1814, because of all that they had suffered under his rule, they had immediately returned to him; they knew but him; they could only feel enthusiasm for him; and Murat chilled their zeal when he substituted his own for that great name, and did even worse in referring to his defection in 1814, which had been unanimously blamed by all opposed to the Austrian rule in Italy.

This unsuccessful proclamation was his first vexatious failure. Some youthful imaginations were excited by it; but it produced no effect on the mass of the people, who augured but little good from Murat's proceedings. He advanced to Bologna, having had a skirmish on the way with the Austrian cavalry, and, collecting a few Italians, sought to form a Government there; but he met with very little assistance. Still, in this populous and enlightened city of Bologna, animated by Italian patriotism, he might have found many ready to aid him, though displeased at his too evidently self-interested views, but that, with his usual heedlessness, he had not thought of procuring muskets, without which the greatest enthusiasm, could he have excited it, would have been useless.

Having displayed his empty royalty for some days to the people of Bologna, he continued his march toward Modena and Parma, intending to cross the Po and assume the iron crown at Milan. This was a strange mode of following Napoleon's or even Joseph's advice, who had so strongly recommended him to act with policy toward the Austrians. The latter, in falling back, concentrated their forces. A sanguinary conflict took place on the Panaro, in front of Modena, in which each side lost about eight hundred men. The Neapolitans, under Murat, behaved very well, and advanced to Modena. General Filangieri, who afterward distinguished himself, was seriously wounded on that occasion. As the Austrians were not in a position to take the offensive, they recrossed the Po, intending to defend its banks until their forces should be assembled.

Having committed the great fault of attacking the Austrians, instead of remaining in the Marches, and concentrating his forces before the Abruzzi, by which he would have afforded an opportunity for diplomatic or military negotiations, Murat had but one way of repairing his error—if, indeed, it could be repaired—and this was, to recall the troops he had sent into Tuscany, and then, at the head of fifty thousand men, to advance on Parma, Piacenza, and Pavia, whence it was only a step to Milan, by crossing the Po in the upper part of its course. He would, by this, have got posses-

* This letter, which has been spoken of as the deciding cause of Murat's conduct, is still to be found in the *Affaires Étrangères*. It is dated Prangins, 14th of March, and contains the passages literally as we have quoted them.

sion of all the Austrian posts on the Lower Po, and produced a profound impression on the public mind, by entering the capital of Lombardy. This, indeed, had been Murat's plan, especially as it would be following Joseph's advice of advancing to the Alps, but, as he could not avoid mingling intrigue with rashness, he tried to continue relations with Lord Bentinck, assuring him that he only took up arms because Austria had deceived him, by plotting against his crown after having guaranteed its possession to him, but that if England would support him, he would support her. Lord Bentinck, who, though perfectly upright, was not deficient in astuteness, told him that, if he wished to be believed, he must first respect the King of Sardinia's dominions; and Murat had the folly to pause in his progress, and even to turn back. He abandoned the idea of crossing the Po above Piacenza, where he would have found the passage less difficult, and the Austrians weaker, and returned toward Bologna, in order to attempt a passage at Ferrara. He attacked Occhio-Bello on the 8th of April, and, after losing a great number of men, was obliged to give up all idea of crossing this great river. He returned to the Legations, not knowing what to do, for he dared not return to Piedmont, because of the English, nor could he force the Po, defended as it was by the entire Austrian army. He had proclaimed himself King of Italy, but no popular acclamation confirmed this spontaneous investiture. His defeat had deprived him of the impulse under which he had advanced on the offensive, and, by advancing too far, he had sacrificed the strength which a defensive position would have given him. Reckoning from that moment, he was morally, even before being materially, ruined. He then, but too late, thought of the advice his brother-in-law had given him, and determined to return through the Marches to the Abruzzi route, in order to fight, on the banks of the Garigliano, the decisive battle that Napoleon had advised him to avoid, or, in any case, to let it be as near Naples as possible. He, therefore, fell back through Cesena and Rimini, but the Austrians, having had time to concentrate forces to the amount of sixty thousand men, followed him under the command of Generals Bianchi and Neipperg (the latter had left Maria Louisa to serve in Italy). It was, therefore, doubtful whether Murat could reach Capua, or Naples, without being compelled to accept battle. During the execution of this most difficult retreat, his rear-guard was every day engaged in skirmishes, in which Murat sustained the courage of the Neapolitan soldiers by his personal bravery, but which always ended in his losing the disputed position. His troops were soon seriously diminished by demoralization and desertion. Having arrived with the greater number of his troops at Tolentino, he determined to decide his fate by a desperate conflict. The battle was long, and was well sustained by the Neapolitans, with Murat fighting like a hero at their head. So desperate were his efforts, as he flung himself into the midst of the enemy's battalions, in search of conquest or death, that, for a moment, he believed victory to be within his grasp. But, unfortunately, General Neipperg arrived with

fresh troops, and Murat was obliged to yield to the numbers and superiority of the Austrian army.

The vanquished Neapolitans retired along the sea-coast by Fermo and Pescara. But a body of Austrians having made a flank movement through Salmona, Castel di Sangro, and Isernia, they were quickly compelled to resume the direct route to Naples. Murat attempted to keep the enemy back, but after the final effort of Tolentino his soldiers deserted in thousands. He soon had no more than ten or twelve thousand men, and when he reached the neighbourhood of Capua, he left this wreck of his army to Baron Carascosa, that he might not himself fall into the hands of the Austrians. He returned privately to Naples, where he was very badly received by the queen, who had vainly sought to prevent his foolish expedition, and to whom he addressed these mournful words:—"Madam, do not be surprised at seeing me alive, for I have done all I could to meet death." The unfortunate Murat spoke the truth. He had behaved like a hero, but nothing can supply the want of political judgment in a ruler. He embarked on board a small vessel for Provence, whilst his wife treated with the Austrians and English concerning the surrender of Naples. The complete evacuation of Naples by this branch of the Bonaparte family was naturally the principal condition of the capitulation, and the restoration of the Bourbons its inevitable consequence. The queen asked nothing but liberty for herself and her children, but this, like many other conditions, was violated by the allies, and Napoleon's sister was taken to Trieste. On the 20th of May all was over at Naples.

Such was the end of Murat's royalty. The termination of his life, delayed for a few months, was still more mournful. This unfortunate man was gifted with the most brilliant military talents, he was brave even to heroism, and would have been an accomplished cavalry officer if to the talent of leading his squadrons to the charge he had added that of economizing the lives of his men. He was good, generous-hearted, and possessed of some intelligence, but was attacked by that *malade de régner* with which Napoleon infected his relatives, and even his lieutenants, and of which the hapless Murat died. This mortal pest for a moment changed an excellent man into a faithless and almost perfidious one, and his disastrous ally for France, for, according to Napoleon's opinion, Murat was twice the cause of his ruin—by abandoning him in 1814, and by joining him too soon in 1815. This opinion was doubtless exaggerated, for Murat was not of sufficient importance to cause the ruin of France, though he might compromise her seriously. It is certain that if in 1814 he had joined Prince Eugène, instead of declaring against him, a great number of Austrians would have been detained in Italy, by which the invaders of France would have been considerably diminished, or so far restrained that Prince Eugène would have been able to stand by Mount Cenis on Lyons, a proceeding that might have had the most happy results. It is also certain that if Murat in 1815 had concentrated his sixty thousand men in the neighbourhood of Ancona, and there taken up a position

of imposing immobility, at the same time giving occupation to the Austrians, the latter would not have had a single soldier to send to Antibes or Chambéry, and thirty thousand men might have been brought from the Vosges to Ardenes, by which Napoleon would have had a much larger body of forces at Waterloo. It is true, that though Murat had not twice caused the ruin of France, as Napoleon said,* still he compromised her twice by his fatal desire of reigning, which turned a heroic and generous soldier into a mediocre king, a faithless relative, and a bad Frenchman.†

Whatever may be the justice of these different opinions, the war in Italy was finished about the middle of May, and the Austrians were able to lead the greater part of their forces toward France. All the armies of Europe were now advancing toward our frontiers. Besides the troops that the Austrians would be able to bring to the Var and Mount Cenis, seventy thousand more of their troops, forty thousand Bavarians, twenty thousand Wurtembergians, ten thousand Badenians, and ten thousand men belonging to the petty princes of Germany, were marching toward the Rhine. These were followed by eighty thousand Russians who had already reached Prague, and seventy thousand more who were actually traversing Poland. One hundred and twenty thousand Prussians under Blücher were encamped between the Sambre and the Meuse, besides important reserves on the Oder. Lastly, one hundred thousand English, Hanoverians, Hollando-Belgians, and Northern Germans were concentrated round Brussels under the Duke of Wellington. This latter had advised Blücher to wait for the general assembling of the European troops before attacking Napoleon, but finding about the middle of June that, with the Prussians, two hundred and fifty thousand men were assembled, he was tempted to commence the siege of our fortresses, without waiting the arrival of the column from the east. But it had been so generally resolved not to act except unanimously, that Wellington and Blücher confined themselves to collecting their troops, choosing their positions, and making arrangements for communicating with each other in case of the sudden appearance of the French. All were now moving toward our frontiers, and about the end of June our country was about to be invaded by four hundred and fifty thousand men, independent of the Russian and Prussian reserves, or the Austrians who were coming from Italy.

The English were to pay a subsidy of five millions sterling, to be divided between Russia, Prussia, and Austria, two millions and a half to be divided between the petty princes of Germany, and another million for the second Russian army; making altogether eight millions

and a half sterling, or two hundred and twelve millions five hundred francs. Generally speaking, the feeling of the people of Europe against France was considerably toned down, but that of the Governments was more virulent than ever. For example, the English did not care to restore the Bourbons at the expense of injuring their commerce and perpetuating the income tax. The Germans had either given up all hope of liberty, or had been plundered like the Saxons, and all, oppressed by the expenses of war, had no desire to see it renewed. The Belgians regretted the French since the arrival of the Dutch, English, and Prussians among them. The Austrians were quite discontented at the preponderance of the Russians. These different sentiments worked on the minds of the people, and caused them to view the sovereigns assembled at Vienna with a portion of the hatred that a year before had been exclusively bestowed upon Napoleon. The sovereigns, on the other hand, were more irritated than ever, and could not forgive Napoleon for having disturbed them while enjoying the gratification prepared for their ambition at Vienna. These sentiments were shared by the troops, though condemned to fight again. The Prussian army, as we have already said, was more excited than any other. The officers at Liège, offended by the dislike of the inhabitants, frequently committed outrages on some of the Belgians, who were considered friends of ours, and declared that this time they would not leave one stone upon another in the French provinces. They even threatened to cut the throats of the women and old men, but fortunately were not able to fulfil these ferocious threats. They came into daily collision with the Saxons. The journals of the Rhine continued to indulge in the most exaggerated language. The Bourbons, they said, did not know how to govern, an art that Napoleon understood but too well, for he had drawn more from the resources of France in two months than the Bourbons had done in a year. Therefore, neither the one nor the other ought to be allowed to reign. France ought to have a dozen kings—a project proposed before—whilst Germany should have the benefit of a single emperor; Alsace and Lorraine should be restored to Germany, and the national property employed in remunerating the German soldiers and paying the expenses of the exterminating war that was about to be undertaken. No proposition should be listened to unless France, as a sign of submission, should first give up Lille, Metz, and Strasbourg. The French emigrants at Ghent were in constant communication with Wellington and Blücher, telling all they could learn about France, and discussing the important question of a fresh insurrection in Vendée. Lord Wellington,

* Ninth volume of Napoleon's Memoirs, page 18.

† Napoleon also accused Murat of being the cause of the Austrians not listening to him in 1815, as they believed that the offensive operations of the Neapolitan army had been caused by advice from Paris. This arose from an ignorance of facts on the part of Napoleon; and very natural, for at St. Helena he had not access to the documents connected with the Congress of Vienna. Long before Napoleon had landed at the Gulf of Juan, the Austrians had divined Murat's intentions from the note he had addressed to the Congress concerning the Bourbons, and were so certain of an attack on his part, that they had ordered, as we have already mentioned in this volume, a concentration of one hundred and fifty thousand men in Italy. Besides,

the declaration of the 13th of March had been published before the Neapolitans had marched on Cesena, and had no connection with Murat's conduct in Italy. This unfortunate man had no influence on the political resolutions of the court of Vienna with regard to France, and the consequence of his errors, sufficiently great without being exaggerated, were that he engaged too soon with the Austrians, by which the latter, having decided the Italian question, were able to send fifty or sixty thousand men toward the Alps in time to counteract the efforts of a large portion of our forces. Such is the simple truth, free from all exaggeration, and conformable to our uniform practice when treating of men and things.

who was attentively watching Napoleon's preparations, was desirous of embarrassing him by an insurrection on both shores of the Loire. Did no other effect result from such a combination than that ten or fifteen thousand men should be detained between Nantes and Rochelle, whilst the combatants were engaged between Maubeuge and Charleroy, it would be a vast advantage for those who would be obliged to bear the first shock of the French armies. But the Vendean leaders, finding the zeal of the people in their province cooled, had resolved not to anticipate the movements of the allies, nor to make any movement until the latter should have given full occupation to all the French forces.

In compliance with the urgent solicitations of Lord Wellington, the Marquis de La Roche-jacquelin was despatched to give the long-deferred signal of insurrection, with a promise of assistance from an English fleet, bringing arms and munitions of war.

Such was the unpromising picture that presented itself to Napoleon toward the end of May. It would be difficult to describe how much he had been affected by Murat's catastrophe. Though the fate of Murat and the Neapolitan army could not be regarded as a presage of what was to befall him and the French army, still he could not avoid looking on the events at Naples as a sinister omen. The late favour that fortune had bestowed on him on his passage from Porto Ferrajo to Paris had not deceived him, and the difficulties that soon arose, together with the increasing animosity of all Europe, convinced him that implacable fortune was not yet appeased, and he now looked on the few days between the 26th of February and the 20th of May as the last gleams of the setting sun. When he saw Murat overthrown,—Murat, whose frivolity he had always regarded with a kind of antipathy, but who had led his cavalry so well on the battle-fields of Europe, and who was one of his oldest companions in arms,—he gave way to the deepest commiseration, and became oppressed by sombre forebodings, which he in vain endeavoured to conceal, but which his friends perceived in spite of his efforts at self-control. Though discontented with his brother-in-law, he sent a confidential person to console him, and tell him, but with gentleness, how numerous and serious his faults had been, and to advise him to remain for some time between Marseilles and Toulon, in whatever place he preferred. It would not, indeed, be wise to present the vanquished King of Naples to the Parisians, nor to gladden the enemies of the Empire with the view of a victim whom they would only look on as the forerunner of one still more important and more detested.

The royalists, with the usual ill feeling of party spirit, seemed to divine all that passed in Napoleon's mind, and rejoiced greatly. They looked on Murat's fall as the forerunner of Napoleon's. They took no notice of the difference between the men, but remarked, indeed, not without some truth, that if Napoleon and the French army were much superior to Murat, Lord Wellington, Marshal Blücher, Prince Schwarzenberg, and the five hundred thousand men under their command, were no less superior to General Bianchi and the Austrian army

at Tolentino. Profiting by the liberty accorded them, they enumerated the symptoms that had preceded Murat's fall, and published them in certain journals: they were unrelentingly active, particularly in the south of Marseilles, Toulouse, and Bordeaux, whilst the preparations in Vendée gave grounds to apprehend a speedy rising in that quarter.

All this was clearly seen by Napoleon, and he considered that the only remedy for such a state of things was an immediate, vigorous, and successful war. M. Fouché, animated by a love of foreign as well as domestic intrigue, made a fresh attempt to enter into relations with the Powers at Vienna, to whom he sent M. de Saint-Léon, a man of talent, professing liberal opinions, intimately acquainted with M. de Talleyrand, and every way suited to go forth in strong terms the danger of an ultimate struggle in favour of the Bourbons. Fouché gave him a letter for M. de Metternich, a very sensible and almost eloquent epistle, in which he pleaded Napoleon's cause most warmly, hoping that, should he not serve Napoleon, for whom he did not care, he might, perhaps, secure the regency of Maria Louisa, or promote the interests of the Duke d'Orléans, and thus avert the return of the Bourbons. Napoleon was not deceived, either as to Fouché's motives, or as to the little prospect there was of his success: however, he allowed him to proceed with his attempt, as it could neither injure him nor interrupt any of his preparations. But he saw that his real, his only, resource was an immediate attack upon that portion of the allied forces that was within his reach, and he thought of profiting by the circumstance of Prince Schwarzenberg being in the rear of the other columns, to fall suddenly on Blücher and Wellington stationed on our northern frontier. He was already contemplating, as we have said, one of his most profound projects, and if any hope existed for him, it gleamed from within, from his own genius, which showed to his keen military glance the chances left by the short-sightedness of his enemies. Could he gain one more and victory as of old, the royalists would be silenced, Europe, now heedless of his overtures, would consent to negotiate, and all the difficulties with which his Government had to contend would pass away. He worked night and day in preparing an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men between Paris and Maubeuge, and this mass he intended to hurl like a club at the head of the English and Prussians, the enemies nearest to him. He was most anxious to set out, and hoped that when the votes on the constitution would be announced in the assembly in the Champ de Mars, the elections over, and the two chambers assembled, he would be able to leave Paris for Flanders, there to decide his fate and that of the world in two or three days. Never had he worked with more energy or success. He picked battalions of the National Guard and formed with the greatest expedition, especially in the frontier provinces, where alone he was certain of obtaining one hundred and fifty thousand men. Napoleon sent these battalions, clad in a simple blouse with coloured collar, to the different fortresses, where their old munitions were to be repaired during the leisure hours

of garrison-life. Unfortunately, the recruiting of the regular army was not so successful. The number obtained by recalling the old soldiers was not so great as had been expected. Many of them preferred serving in the mobilized National Guards, whose service was limited both as to locality and duration, conditions which contributed not a little to the rapid formation of these battalions. Many also had married, and others, who had only served during 1813 and 1814, had no taste for war, of which they had known nothing but the disasters. From all these causes, instead of the ninety thousand men that were expected from the hundred and fifty thousand that had deserted in 1814, only seventy thousand could be collected, of which fifty-eight thousand had already presented themselves, and twelve thousand were on their way to join. By adding these to the hundred and eighty thousand men that composed the effective army on the 1st of March, and to the fifty thousand on six months' leave of absence, who had all obeyed the summons of recall, there was a prospect of raising an army of three hundred thousand men, of whom two hundred or two hundred and ten thousand were to be on active service, and the remainder left in dépôt or in the interior. This, certainly, was not a sufficient number to meet the dangers that threatened France. Napoleon determined to call in the conscripts of 1815, whom the Council of State had declared to belong to Government, at least that portion of them that had been incorporated in 1814. A law, commanding the return of the others, was ordered to be prepared for presentation to the two chambers. It was calculated, after allowing for losses, that these conscripts would amount to one hundred and twelve thousand men, of whom forty-five thousand could be recalled immediately. The active army would thus amount to four hundred and twelve thousand. It was expected that the mobilized National Guard would amount to two hundred thousand, which, with fifty thousand sailors expected in Paris and Lyons, twenty thousand Federalists in Paris, and ten thousand at Lyons, would be a sufficient number to defend France. There still remained another resource, on which Napoleon had already calculated, and this was to ask the assembled chambers for an extraordinary levy of one hundred and fifty thousand men to be raised from those that had formerly served. Napoleon would thus have about eight hundred thousand soldiers, who, with unity among those in power, and perseverance in action, would leave little reason to doubt of the safety of France.

Still the force actually at his disposal amounted only to three hundred thousand, of whom, as we have said, more than two hundred thousand might be led to the field. There were two hundred thousand well-chosen National Guards to defend the fortresses and defiles of our frontiers. Napoleon had ordered that the forty-five thousand conscripts of 1815 that could be legally raised should be immediately called out, which would give him the command of two hundred thousand men, a sufficient force, in his hands, to strike a first terrible blow. But this force could not be at his disposal before the middle of June.

He worked incessantly to combine and or-

ganize these troops, for which purpose alone he wrote one hundred and fifty letters a day,—at one time ordering one or two hundred recruits who had been left in a dépôt to be sent on to join their battalion, at another arranging for cavalry regiments that had men but not horses, or for others that had horses but not men, or who wanted equipments. Napoleon, with his wonderful memory, took note of every thing, gave his orders, sent officers in all directions to see that they were executed, received them immediately on their return, listened to their reports, and sent them off again as often as the complete accomplishment of their tasks required. Napoleon had already sent the third battalions from such fortresses as had received a large number of mobile National Guards, and had organized the fourth, which was intended to serve as a dépôt. The fifth battalions of some regiments had been formed, in which case the fourth was immediately sent to join the other battalions. These, however, were the exceptions, for the regiments had, in general, but three battalions, which would have been sufficient had they contained greater numbers: but, notwithstanding all the efforts that had been made, very few consisted of more than six hundred men. Napoleon paid no less attention to the cavalry than to the infantry. Thanks to the dépôt at Versailles, to the horses taken from the gendarmerie, and to the purchases made in the provinces, he hoped by the middle of June to assemble forty thousand excellent cavalry soldiers, including the Imperial Guard, all of whom had seen service. The preparing of clothes and repairing of arms engaged no little portion of his attention. Napoleon visited in person the workshops of the tailors, saddlers, armorers, and animated the artisans by his presence. The artillery officers, employed in directing the construction of arms, rendered the greatest services. He was able to give new muskets to the entire army, repaired muskets to the mobilized National Guard, whilst he still had one hundred thousand for the conscripts of 1815. Should the war continue until winter, he would be able to supply all wants during the summer and autumn. By his wonderful exertions, Napoleon had in two months—from the end of March to the end of May—raised, equipped, and armed three hundred thousand men, fifty thousand of whom had been on six months' leave of absence, seventy thousand were old soldiers, and one hundred and eighty thousand were picked National Guards; an enormous feat, as those will acknowledge who understand administrative difficulties, and which would have been impossible but for the immense number of military men in France at that time.

With a prudence that foresaw all things, Napoleon calculated that if the enemy crossed the frontier, both the fortresses and dépôts would be blockaded. He therefore ordered all the dépôts to fall back: from the northern frontier on Abbeville, Amiens, Saint-Quentin, Chalons, Bar, Brienne, Arcis-sur-Aube, and Nogent; from the eastern, toward Chalon, Dijon, Autun, and Troyes; and from the southern frontiers on Avignon and Nîmes. By this he was assured that should a sudden invasion isolate our fortresses, it would not isolate our

regiments, nor deprive them of supplies of men or war-materials. A commission composed of Generals Rogniat, Dejean, Bernard, and Marescot—who had been restored to favour, from which he had unjustly fallen after the capitulation of Baylen—was occupied in putting our fortifications of the first, second, and third rank in a state of defence. The most urgent repairs, with the providing of arms and provisions, had been ordered, and were in course of execution. Moreover, the commission pointed out those passages of our frontiers where an intersected route or well-placed earth-works would enable the mobilized divisions of the National Guard to offer an effectual opposition to the enemy. Paris and Lyons, as being the most important posts, were already protected by works.

Napoleon had not forgotten that in 1814, while he was manœuvring round Paris, that both his crown and France would have been saved, had that great city been able to hold out but one week. He considered Lyons as important in the east as Paris in the north, and ordered that all the preparations that the shortness of the time would allow should be made for the defence of both. We have already seen that he had been content with earth-works at Paris, not having had time to construct them in masonry. General Haxo had covered the two declivities of Belleville with redoubts, so that the Plain of Vincennes to the south, of Saint Denis to the north, together with all the heights, were occupied, and there is no doubt but that, if Marmont's soldiers had been so supported on the 30th of March, 1814, they would not have yielded. The Canal of Saint Martin, which runs from Villette to join the Seine at Saint Denis, was defended by *flèches* so as to present a well-defended line. Preparations were made for inundations at Saint Denis. It was not very likely that the enemy, piercing this line, would dare to venture between the heights of Montmartre and the Seine, as they would risk being thrown into the latter. But, in any case, Montmartre, Clichy, and L'Etoile had been provided with strong redoubts, by which they were turned into very solid *réduits*. Lastly, the earth-works were commenced on the left bank, between Montrouge and Vaugirard. The Federalists, with a number of the National Guards, had offered to assist in raising these works. Napoleon accepted their services for the sake of the good example they gave; but he had two thousand well-paid labourers, whose more skilful hands exactly and speedily followed the plan of the redoubts marked out by General Haxo.

As the public were acquainted with all our relations with Europe, Napoleon, having nothing more to conceal, had ordered these redoubts to be armed,—in the first place, that he might himself preside at the operation, and secondly, to tone down, before the appearance of the enemy, the effect that such operations might produce. He reasoned differently now from what he had done in 1814, since, instead of concealing the dangers that threatened the country, he sought to put them in the strongest light. Of the three hundred large cannon that had been ordered from the ports, and which were to be transported by sea to the

mouths of the Seine, two hundred had arrived at Rouen, and were en route to Paris. They were placed in the unfinished works as they arrived. To avoid any confusion that might arise from difference of calibre in the distribution of ammunition, Napoleon arranged that the twelve- and six-pounders were to remain on the right bank, which was the most exposed, while the eight- and four-pounders were placed on the left. He had formed a battery of the large pieces of ordnance that arrived from the ports on the highest points of Saint Chamond. The schools of Saint Cyr and Alfort, together with the Polytechnic, every day practised at the guns. A park of two hundred field-pieces was prepared at Vincennes; these were to be employed as movable artillery, and sent to any point where they might be needed. Two regiments of sailors from Brest and Cherbourg were marching toward Paris. Napoleon had also ordered the revision and complete organization of the Federalists, whom he fixed into twenty-four battalions. Though he could not arm them yet, he gave each battalion a hundred muskets, for the purpose of drilling those who had not served before. His object was to reduce the National Guard by degrees to eight or ten thousand sure men, and to give the fifteen thousand muskets of the others to the Federalists. It was not from any demagogical calculation that he made this arrangement, but from a certain distrust of the National Guard, whom he suspected of royalist principles, and from his great confidence in the zeal and bravery of the Federalists, whose lives he did not hesitate to sacrifice toward the walls of Paris. Thanks to all these preparations, in six weeks at the very utmost, that is, at the end of June, Paris would be protected against every attack.

With the defence of the capital, Napoleon had combined that of Nogent-sur-Meuse, Meaux, Château-Thierry, Melun, Montereau, Nogent-sur-Seine, Arcis-sur-Aube, and Auxerre, and placed all under the orders of Marshal Davout, whom he intended to invest with extraordinary powers and to appoint governor of Paris. The defender of Ham, proscribed by the Bourbons, seemed to him to possess in the highest degree the military and political qualities necessary for such a post. He expected to be able to leave him seventy or eighty thousand men, composed of what would remain of the National Guard, the Federalists, the sailors, and the *dépôts*. With such a force, such fortifications, and such a governor, he considered Paris invincible.

Napoleon was occupied at the same time with the defence of Lyons, for which he ordered the different works that were to be executed. Acting on the same principles as in the second capital as in the first, he had ordered one hundred and fifty large pieces of ordnance to be brought from Toulon by the Rhone, and to be placed in the works. A regiment of marines was marching to the same destination. The veterinary school at Lyons, like the schools at Paris, was to work part of the batteries. Trusting in the good feeling of the inhabitants, he had fixed the number of National Guard who were to defend the city at ten thousand. He sent them ten thousand old muskets, which were to be repaired and

workshops that were to be erected in the town. From the surrounding districts, Burgundy, Franche-Comté, and Auvergne,—all of which had followed the example of Brittany,—he expected to draw ten thousand Federalists, who, with the dépôts, would complete the garrison of Lyons. The superintendence of these details was intrusted to Marshal Suchet. Napoleon recalled him from Alsace, and appointed him to the command of this frontier with these words:—"I am satisfied as to the safety of any place you command: go, then, and guard the east for me, whilst I go to protect the north against all Europe." Marshal Suchet was to have, with the seventh corps, twenty thousand excellent troops, besides twelve thousand furnished by two divisions of National Guards, and would, consequently, be able to occupy Savoy with thirty-two thousand soldiers. Supported by Lyons, which was well fortified, he had every chance of repelling the Austrians. On the Lower Rhone, in the direction of Avignon, was a reserve of four of the six regiments of the eighth corps. With the remaining two and three regiments from Corsica, Marshal Brune was to form the ninth corps, which was to watch over Var, Toulon, and Marseilles. The latter city was the object of special watchfulness. Napoleon ordered that the Marseillais National Guard should be disarmed, and reduced to fifteen hundred sure men, that the forts of Saint Jean and Nicholas should be armed, and that all ammunition not absolutely necessary should be taken to the arsenal at Toulon. He caused the bridge of Saint Esprit to be cut down, and ordered that the small fortress of Sisteron should be put in a state of defence to stop the progress of the enemy should they venture into Dauphiné and Lyonnais after invading Provence. Above Lyons, in ascending the Saône, Napoleon had placed under General Lecourbe, as we have already said, a supplementary corps that was not counted among the nine corps appointed for the defence of the territory, as it had been formed later and consisted of one division of the line. Napoleon had also given him two fine divisions of the select National Guards, and confided to him the defence of the gap of Belfort and the passages of the Jura. The army of Alsace, or the fifth corps, joined with Lecourbe, guarded the Rhine. This fifth corps had been formed altogether in the lines of Wissembourg. Picked battalions occupied Strasbourg and the fortresses from Huningue to Landau. Other battalions guarded the passages of the Vosges, whilst the light cavalry, aided by the volunteer lancers raised in the district, scoured the country along the Rhine. It was arranged that, on the first appearance of the enemy, the tocsin should be sounded, the commandants of fortresses should retire within their defences, the generals and prefects should retreat, carrying with them the cattle, provisions, and the *levé en masse*, consisting of all well-disposed citizens. They were to retire toward the difficult passes, whose defence had been prepared beforehand, make a stand there as long as possible, and only fall back at the last extremity, and then join the *corps d'armée* appointed for the protection of the frontier. Free bodies organized in the district itself where there were numbers of old soldiers were to

take part in these measures. Lastly, having exerted his genius in order to profit by all the resources of the country, Napoleon thought of another combination, which in certain districts might be of real utility. When looking over the accounts of the War Minister, he had remarked that there were fifteen thousand officers and seventy-eight thousand non-commissioned officers and soldiers pensioned by the State. If few of these could bear the fatigues of bivouacs, or heat, cold, and hunger, many of them could serve in the interior of a town, hold a musket or sword, or be useful in some way. Being attached to the Revolution and the Empire, and feeling no affection for the Bourbons, they would serve as a check on the ill disposed; for which reason Napoleon determined to recall twenty-five or thirty thousand, and distribute them in those towns of whose sentiments he was not satisfied, where they would be ready to rally round the authorities and support them by word or deed as occasion might require. Napoleon did not wish to compel them, but merely to appeal to their zeal; and, to render the change of place more easy, he ordered that, besides their pay, they should receive travelling-expenses and rations. He ordered some to be sent to Marseilles, Toulouse, Bordeaux, Nantes, Angers, Lille, Tours, Dunkirk, &c. Thus, not one man in the country, from the youngest to the oldest, was allowed to remain idle or useless.

To these measures of a universal and indefatigable foresight Napoleon added others necessary for the particular organization of the army under his command. It has been already seen that it consisted of five corps: the 1st was stationed in the neighbourhood of Lille, under Count d'Erlon, the 2d near Valenciennes, under General Reille, the 3d near Mezières, under General Vandamme, the 4th near Metz, under General Gérard, and the 5th between Paris and Laon, under Count de Lobau. Napoleon intended that the corps under Generals d'Erlon and Reille, and those commanded by Generals Vandamme and Gérard, advancing from different points, should be concentrated at Maubeuge; then, strengthening them with the Guard and the 6th corps from Paris, he intended to cross the frontier with one hundred and fifty thousand men. The time is not yet come for explaining the measures by which he hoped to surprise the nearest and most considerable portion of his enemies. But having determined to commence operations on the 15th of June at the latest, and being then in the last days of May, he traced General Gérard's march, who, as he had to advance sixty leagues to the point of concentration, would be obliged to put his troops in motion before the others. Napoleon had told him in the strictest confidence the day on which he was to move forward, and he pointed out all the precautions he should take in order to conceal the real reason of his departure. The Count de Lobau was ordered, as fast as his regiments should be ready, to send them to Soissons and Laon, where the 6th corps was assembled. Napoleon was very much occupied with the Guard, which he hoped to raise to twenty or twenty-five thousand men: the organization of this body was now confided to General Drouot. As usual, the great reserve of

artillery was the chief object of Napoleon's care, and he carried his vigilance so far as to inspect it himself and to point out even a defective harness.* As he had not yet a sufficient number of draft horses, notwithstanding the six thousand obtained from the peasantry, he ordered eight or ten thousand to be procured in the provinces neighbouring the *corps d'armée*; for these horses ready money was paid.

So many things could not be accomplished without involving some annoyance. Marshal Davout, accustomed to act at a distance from his master, and with a certain independence, sometimes lost temper at finding himself under a surveillance that left him neither liberty nor repose. He was obedient, most certainly, but not like the Duke de Feltre, that is, to the total annihilation of his own individuality. He was particularly annoyed because Napoleon appointed all the officers himself; but this was a point upon which the Emperor was most tenacious, as at that crisis it was as essential to be assured of the fidelity as of the bravery of the military. It was arranged that three trustworthy persons, the Counts Lobau, La Bédoyère, and Flahault, should revise the selection. The two latter, being well acquainted with the sentiments of the young officers, found fault with some of the appointments made by the War Minister, at which the latter was not a little offended. Napoleon had to interfere several times; but we should not mention such things, were it not that these disputes with the Minister of War induced, at a later period, serious consequences. A dispute arose about General Bourmont, whom Marshal Davout would not admit to active service, and for whose fidelity Generals La Bédoyère and Gérard were ready to answer with their lives. Napoleon, after much consideration, adopted the opinion of the two generals, but was obliged to send a formal order to Marshal Davout, without which he would not have submitted.

Napoleon chose Marshal Mortier to command the Imperial Guard. He would have wished to recall Berthier and make him major-general of the army.—Berthier, who had been head of his staff in all his wars, Berthier, the correct and unwearied transmitter of his wishes; in short, he wished to have his friend Berthier near him. Berthier had yielded to some temptations, but Napoleon let him know that he wished him to forget these errors, as he himself had forgotten them, and bade him come and join him again. Berthier could not resist the appeal: he set out for France, but was so closely watched that when he arrived at Basle he was obliged to return to Germany, where a deplorable and mysterious death awaited him.

At a loss how to replace his major-general, Napoleon bethought him of Marshal Soult, the most hard-working of his lieutenants, who had joined the Bourbons, believing that their Government would endure, but now, finding that he had been mistaken, he was seeking to efface the traces of his error. He felt embarrassed by the violent proclamation he had once published against Napoleon, and now sought to redeem his fault by addressing an equally violent one to the army on the occasion of his

assuming the rank of major-general. Through consideration for the marshal, Napoleon softened down many of the expressions, and had it then published as an order of the day.

He knew men too well to notice their change of opinion, especially in such times as then. It was more important to him that men should be good soldiers than consistent politicians. The essential point was not whether Marshal Soult had served more than one master, but whether he possessed Berthier's clear-sightedness, precision, and exactitude. Events will soon show whether Napoleon had made a happy choice. His last measure was to give the regiments their former numbers, which, a no great regret of the men, had been changed. This restoration gratified them, and placed them in some sort under an obligation to act in a manner worthy of their past career.

Napoleon ordered all his generals to put themselves at the head of their troops, with the exception of Marshal Soult, whom he kept with him, in order to initiate him into his new functions. Napoleon was ready to leave, and only waited the assembling of the *Chambre de Mai*, and the meeting of the chambers. That moment was approaching. The vote on the Additional Act had been pronounced, the elections were over, and almost all the newly-appointed deputies had arrived in Paris. The violent abuse of the journals, pamphlets, and newsmongers, against the Additional Act, had been silenced by the elections, which gave a diversion to the public mind, and proved at the same time, that there was no intention of evading the promised constitution, when the chambers had been summoned even before the appointed time. There had been perfect freedom in voting for the Additional Act, and at the elections. There had been no restriction, either in writing or speaking, nor were the votes of those who gave the most offensive reasons for their political opinions rejected. M. de Lafayette had accepted the Additional Act at Meaux, but made a reservation in favour of the sovereignty of the people, which, in his belief, had been intrenched on by some of the articles of this Act. M. de Kerpulap voted against it, protesting in favour of the Bourbon dynasty. The Government had not debilitated themselves, as no arrangement had yet been made for the defence of power in a free State. With the exception of the momentary suspension of the sixth volume of the *Constitution*, a suspension immediately removed, as we have seen, by Napoleon's order, personal liberty had not been attacked in any way, and the people enjoyed the varied, confused, and violent liberty of the time of the Revolution. Each had proposed his chimera, and in the form he pleased him; but one ingredient of a constitution was wanting, and that was excitement of parties, (for rarely has there been more,) but of the nation itself. The nation took no part in the voting, for, as against the Additional Act, at the municipalities, notaries, or *justices de paix*, nor in the choice of representatives at the electoral colleges. Disgusted with revolutions and counter-revolutions, the people knew not whom to what to approve, and, in their indecision, remained concealed at home. We are speaking now of the intermediate classes, the war, the

* I give these details from innumerable letters before me at this moment, and in which the most trifling remarks on the different descriptions of *matériel* are noted down.

interested portion of the nation. s, whom they had not wished for. pon reflection, they had believed fording them a pacific and liberal had, after a reign of eleven ometely disgusted them. Napoleon, d their pride, and responded to ir instincts, terrified them, for, idering whether he were changed hether he were really inclined to erty, they plainly saw that his war, exterminating war, that dy in the destruction of France, e. Thus, disgusted by the one, by the other, the classes of ve spoken shrank back to their took no part, either in the adop- Additional Act, or the choice of atives.

when France looked on General a saviour, three or four millions record their votes; but now not elve or thirteen hundred thousand the Additional Act, and not more adred thousand electors appeared al colleges.

ted numbers showed plainly who had presented themselves at the s, the notariats, and the colleges: artisans, in whom passion never ay too much, perhaps, in saying e the Bourbon partisans had not ar at any of these places. It was ould have suffered any restraint it. Their adversaries, piquing n their moderation, took very t to attack, or even threaten their the royalists disliked every thing th liberal institutions, and, form- t unjust opinion of their adver- looked on them as dangerous nd, from want of custom and neglected to exercise their rights. f the boldest ventured to vote, and m bravado than a desire to exer- its. Only three or four thousand en hundred thousand voters had "no" against the Additional Act, smaller number had appeared at the eges to dispute the election of the idate; so that every thing passed greatest calmness, and in the most

. Those who had appeared in the bers were the old revolutionists, f national property, the passionate national glory, who persisted in onified in Napoleon, public func- ing from 1789, and, lastly, many nen, who considered that, the fault g Napoleon's return having been was better to defend the national e in his person, and to give an o constitutional monarchy, which in so specious a manner; for e not slaves to prejudice, or party accept liberty, by whomsoever e choice made by these different ectors was, in general, good, and e character. There being no op- choice, everywhere, fell on civil anctionaries anxious for the con- the new Empire, on holders of erty desirous to secure their pos-

sessions, on revolutionists, such as Barère, who repented the lengths to which they had gone, or on young and upright liberals, like M. Duchène of Grenoble, whose opinions were sound, but who were deficient in experience. All these had adopted the two prevailing resolutions, to support Napoleon against Europe, but to resist him should he return to his despotic practices. However, these newly-chosen representatives, more attached to Napoleon, through motives of interest, than to liberty, which they professed as a principle, had so often heard it said that, in accepting Napoleon, his glory, and social principles, they ought not to accept his despotism, that they had become very susceptible with regard to the imperial power, and acted more like liberals than Bonapartists, and that to such a degree as to compromise Napoleon's cause for that of liberty, though such was not their intention. Such a state of things would require a tact, patience, and dexterity that were not likely to be found in ministers meeting free assemblies for the first time.

In obedience to the decree that invited them to assist at the ceremony of the Champ de Mai, the electoral colleges chose as their representatives the most zealous, the richest, and most inquisitive of the electors. From four to five thousand of these arrived in Paris, independent of the six hundred representatives. Deputations had also come from the regiments that were to receive their colours at the Champ de Mai. Napoleon had ordered the ministers and other high functionaries to throw open their houses to the deputies of every kind, and to receive them most hospitably. All uttered the same opinions, that Europe should be opposed, and if possible conquered, as war with her was unavoidable, but immediately after the conclusion of peace the idea of conquest should be abandoned, and a true constitutional monarchy founded, so that the nation might not be at the mercy of strangers abroad, or of a single individual at home. These sentiments were echoed by the Government, whose feelings they expressed, some, indeed, like Carnot, with an honourable fidelity to the Emperor, others, like M. Fouché, with a scarcely concealed spirit of intrigue. This latter, of his own free will, assiduously cultivated the acquaintance of the electors that had been sent to Paris, the deputies in particular, preferring the younger as more manageable, and affecting, as was the fashion of the day, the most unchangeable dislike to the Bourbons, together with the greatest alarm at Napoleon's being at the head of the Government, saying that if he had had the patriotism to abdicate in favour of his son, every thing—this he knew for certain—would be immediately arranged, that he had received communications, &c. Such assertions made by the Minister of Police had a most dangerous effect, and did no more honour to his sagacity than to his fidelity; for the sovereigns, firmly attached to the Bourbon cause, would not accept any of his imaginary arrangements, and if they pretended to have no ill will but toward Napoleon, it was that in getting rid of him they might at the same time seize the sword of France. The Duke d'Otranto's remarks, spreading from mouth to mouth, caused great excitement, and even came

to Napoleon's ears, though in a somewhat subdued form. He, however, learned sufficient to see that his Minister of Police was betraying him, but, restraining himself better than on a former occasion, he awaited a more favourable opportunity for enforcing his authority, which would have been perfectly right, for no well-regulated State would endure a minister who denounced the sovereign he served as a public danger. A good citizen might think so, especially before Napoleon's return, but, with such sentiments, he ought not to accept the post of Minister of Police.

Had all the reports relative to the Additional Act and the election of representatives been sent to Paris, they might have been immediately revised, and the ceremony of the Champ de Mai, which was to solemnize the acceptance of the new constitution, might have taken place on the 26th of May, the day appointed. The opening of the chambers would have followed at once, and then Napoleon could have left for the army. But, as some days would be required to collect the *procès-verbaux*, the ceremony was deferred until the 1st of June. Napoleon resolved to open the chambers three or four days later, and to leave on the 10th or 12th, so as to be in full operation on the 15th. Eighty-seven places of meeting were appointed in Paris for the deputations from the electoral colleges, who were to revise the votes of their departments and appoint a central deputation for a general revision under the superintendence of the High Chancellor.

The deputations employed the last days of May in these formalities, but Napoleon devoted them to the completion of his military preparations. About this time, his mother, his uncle, Cardinal Fesch, and his brother Jerome, having escaped the vigilance of the English navy, arrived in Paris. Napoleon advised his brother to forget, and to seek to make others forget, that he had been king, and be thenceforward nothing but a soldier, and take the command of a division of the second *corps d'armée*, (General Reille's), which the prince most willingly did. At the same time another member of the Imperial family arrived, Prince Lucien, who had so long persisted in living in Rome, far from the favour and authority of his brother, and who only relaxed in his estrangement since the family misfortunes had commenced. He came to Paris for two equally honourable motives, to join his brother and to plead the Pope's cause. Napoleon felt the greatest pleasure at seeing his brother again, particularly at this time, when the fleeting enthusiasm of the 20th of March had passed away, and so many were becoming unfriendly to him. He gave him all possible satisfaction with regard to the Pope. Being determined to observe the treaties of 1814 with regard to sovereigns for whom he felt no esteem, and who had shown themselves his implacable enemies, he must be more inclined to do so toward an inoffensive prince whom he loved even when he persecuted him, who was neither his rival nor enemy, and whose moral authority—which was a great consideration—might be used to Napoleon's advantage, if he were only properly treated. He desired his brother to tell the Pope—which was but the repetition of his first instructions—that he did

not intend to interfere for the future in the spiritual or temporal affairs of the See; that he would do all he could to the ancient Pontifical territory and Legations, and that in France he warranted him the exercise of his spiritual on the basis of the Concordat. That that was necessary to please the Pope him to our side should we be victorious.

Napoleon established Prince Lucien at the Palais Royal. He wished to have pointed representative for Isère, and devoted to the Imperial cause. His intention was, if Lucien were chosen in the Chamber of Representatives, to name him President of that chamber, but he forgot how he had presided over the Cents on the memorable day of the maire.

Whilst he was thus occupied in cares, previous to his departure, he received the sudden information of a revolution in Vendée. We have seen how Duke de Bourbon had appeared in France he had been very easily won that he had been compelled, not by but prudence, to retire into England, also seen how Louis XVIII. had sent Louis de la Rochefoucauld from Vendée, bidding him pass through the commissioning him to rouse the malcontents of the House of Bourbon. Now see how Vendée answered this.

The old surviving Vendean leader d'Autichamp, de Suzannet, de Sable, of experience, in whom royalist confidence was placed by good sense, finding that the peasantry had become stung and inflamed during the last twenty years, exposing the province to new ravages, attempted at a civil war, which could have serious result. They asserted that though able to make a useful diversion, hostilities should have commenced. Napoleon and the allies, was yet capable of resisting him, until he was attacked by the Coalition. They were, therefore, determined to wait until the combat resounded on the Sambre before giving for a revolt on the Loire.

Men of more inflammable temper blamed this seeming pusillanimity, and that the fault of having allowed the Bourbon to leave might be explained by zeal. Touched by these reproaches, hearts stirred by old memories, the leaders hastened to go through the number the peasantry and see what fighting-men they could reckon, and the warmth of their loyalty. It was by such sentiments that the emperor Marquis Louis de La Rochefoucauld stirred them. This brother of the Duke de La Rochefoucauld, not having joined Vendée, joined to a desire of upholding hereditary greatness of his name, faith in the goodness of his cause, personal courage; but his passions equal his other qualities. He had from the English some muskets and powder, with the promise of a large immediate supply of arms, powder, and money. He had set out with the

the promised aid, and embarked on a small English vessel anchored within the Sables d'Olonne, whence he wrote to other Auguste de La Rochejaquelein to inform him with his mission, plans, and intentions.

On receipt of this intelligence, an assembly was held on the 11th of May at La Basse-Mer, near the Loire, in the presence of M. de Suzannet, successor of the late Charette. Those present at this assembly were MM. d'Autichamp, de Suzannet, Auguste de La Rochejaquelein, the third brothers of that name. M. de Sapinaud was absent. Notwithstanding the presence of these leaders had for deferring the issue, they could not resist the intelligence contained in the letters of the Marquis de La Rochejaquelein, promising large assistance in arms, ammunition, money, and even men, and a speedy commencement of European operations in Flanders. It was therefore decided on the 15th of May the tocsin should be sounded, and arms taken up throughout the country.

Each leader was to command in the district with which his family ties and former connections connected him; M. d'Autichamp in the district of Mortagne, M. Auguste de La Rochejaquelein in the neighbourhood of Bressuire, that is, in the district of Mortagne, M. de Sapinaud in the district called le Mortagne, lying between Mortagne-les-Hermines, Fulgent, and Bourbon-Vendée. M. de Suzannet was to command in the district of La Rochejaquelein. It was estimated that M. d'Autichamp would be able to raise eighteen thousand men, M. Auguste de La Rochejaquelein twenty thousand, M. de Sapinaud eight thousand, and M. de Suzannet twenty-five thousand, amounting to fifty-six thousand men. The calculations made in time of civil war are, it is to say, baseless.

Officers sent by Louis de La Rochejaquelein arrived between the 11th and 15th of May, announcing his speedy arrival with four thousand muskets, several million cartridges, and a corps of three hundred English men. This first supply was to be followed by another four or five times larger. Intelligence, confirmed by trustworthy officers, aided the leaders of the insurrection, and they kept their word on the appointed day.

On the night between the 14th and 15th of May the tocsin sounded throughout these districts, which twenty-five years before had been drenched with blood and heaped with bones, and that without being able to check the French Revolution, and with no other resources than to render it a little more bloody. The means were not about to do better this time, rather let us say were about to do violence for a mere dynastic question they sought to draw off fifteen or twenty thousand men from the formidable rencontre of the 10th, and thus contribute to the most bloody tragedy in our history. These poor people, some excited by their personal recollections, others by the recitals of their fathers, heeded the call of their leaders and presented themselves armed with muskets, sticks, and pikes, and fastened to poles. About a third of the arms were very indifferent muskets, and very few of them had balls. The most zealous urged

on the faltering with encouragements, reproaches, and even threats. A great number joined from fear of being called cowards or *blues*. M. d'Autichamp, who expected to have been able to raise eighteen thousand men, had found but four, at the utmost five, thousand willing to join him; with these he advanced toward Chemillé and Chollet, where there were four battalions of the 15th and 16th regiments of the line, and though most anxious to take possession of these two points, which commanded the route from Angers to Bourbon-Vendée, prudential motives induced him to abstain from the attempt. He dreaded meeting three thousand regular soldiers with four or five thousand badly armed peasants. He left some detachments to reconnoitre, and advanced along the Sevre between Clisson, Tiffauges, and Mortagne, in order to communicate with M. de Suzannet, join him, and then attempt something with their combined forces.

M. Auguste de La Rochejaquelein, who, in his country, had never encountered any but gendarmerie and National Guards, flung himself on Bressuire, disarmed the National Guard, seized a hundred and fifty muskets, and, having heard that his brother Louis was on the coast with a supply of *matériel*, resolved to hasten thither in order to supply his wants. But, considering it dangerous to make this movement while the forces occupying Chollet were in his rear, he determined to advance boldly toward that town, in the hope of joining M. d'Autichamp, and of taking this important post with his assistance.

At this very time General Delaborde, who had the 12th, 13th, and 22d military divisions under his command, that is, the divisions of Bretagne and Vendée, had ordered the troops to concentrate themselves, and desired the colonels of the 25th and 26th to repair from Chollet to Bourbon-Vendée, in order to reinforce General Travot, commandant of the department of Vendée. The 26th was already *en marche*, and was passing through the village of Echaubroignes, where it was surprised on the 17th of May by M. Auguste de La Rochejaquelein and his two thousand five hundred peasants, who appeared on his rear on their way to Chollet. Although the men of the 26th did not amount to more than a thousand, they drew up, defended Echaubroignes, and then forced their way through the insurgents in order to return to Chollet, as they dreaded not being able to advance to Bourbon-Vendée. They had about fifty men killed and wounded; and of the insurgents about double that number were put *hors de combat*. The insurgents had fought in their own disorderly fashion, but with an ardour inflamed by native courage and faith in their cause.

M. Auguste de La Rochejaquelein was now compelled to come to a stand, for his poor followers could never be more than a few days absent from their homes, and believed that they had done sufficient for their cause for the time-being if they traversed a few leagues or once encountered the enemy. He, however, retained four or five hundred of his best-armed and most resolute men, with whom he intended to join his brother on the coast.

Meanwhile, M. de Suzannet had left Maisdon, assembled his forces between Machecoul, Clis-

son, Montaigu, and Bourbon-Vendée, whence he advanced to Saint-Léger to assist M. de Sapinaud, who had assembled his army of Le Centre. When he arrived at Saint-Léger on the 16th, he learned the arrival of M. Louis de La Rochejaquelein off the coast of Saint Gilles with a small English division, and he immediately advanced to meet him. He found him disembarked at Croix-de-Vic, having been aided by the people of the country, who had attacked the custom-house officers and old coast-guard. But great was M. de Suzannet's surprise when he found in what he boasted aid from England consisted. There were no artillerymen, there was no money, and only two thousand muskets instead of the promised fourteen thousand. This was supporting the old reputation of England in these parts, that is, of making large promises but forgetting to keep them, a reputation shared in by all the emissaries that appeared in her name, however high their rank. The muskets, powder, and more especially the money, were absolutely necessary to the Vendean insurgents, not that they were avaricious, but, as they were armed with nothing but rusty muskets or sticks, they needed weapons to fight and money to procure provisions. Possessed of ready money they might always send forward some peasants to procure bread and meat, and they might thus avoid the pangs of hunger, and support themselves without incurring the disgrace of ravaging the country through which they passed.

M. de Suzannet's soldiers were painfully undeceived, and complained that it was the old trick practised again; that England, as of old, only sought to perpetuate war for the destruction of France. M. Louis de La Rochejaquelein pretended that it was not so, assured them that a large convoy would soon arrive, and at length obtained some credence. M. de Sapinaud arrived with his two thousand troops as dejected and discontented as those of M. Suzannet, and all retired into the Bocage to avoid the attacks of the *bleus*, who would unfailingly come in great numbers from Nantes and Sables.

M. Louis de La Rochejaquelein had presented himself in the name of Louis XVIII., and united in his person the twofold character of representative of his king and envoy of the British Government. He inherited a great name, possessed zeal and courage, and although inferior in rank and age to the old Vendean chiefs, he was appointed generalissimo, thanks to the easy disposition of MM. de Suzannet and de Sapinaud. Though this arrangement was established for the purpose of promoting military unity in the operations, it could not induce concord in sentiment, for M. d'Autichamp, a lieutenant-general and renowned for his former services, could not be pleased at seeing himself placed under the orders of M. Louis de La Rochejaquelein, a simple *maréchal-de-camp* wholly unacquainted with Vendean warfare. But M. de La Rochejaquelein wrote to him, and he submitted, like his brothers in arms, to a superior whom he believed to have been appointed to Vendée by the king.

It was necessary to decide on some plan. The two thousand muskets had been taken by the inhabitants of the Marais and divided between them. About eight hundred thousand

cartouches had been landed, and of portion was sent to M. d'Autichamp other to M. Auguste de La Roche under an escort of some hundred men. M. de Suzannet and de Sapinaud had seven or eight thousand men, and were to make some attempt before they returned to their homes. The most useful would be to seize Bourbon-Vendée, within reach and was the principal the department, or the Sables, a point that would be most useful for future embarkations. M. de Suzannet, infusing local feeling, wished to seize the *Neufmoutiers*, which would secure a serviceable *réduit* in the middle of the Marais. A doubt as to which of these projects had adopted prevailed, when intelligence of Travot's having left Bourbon-Vendée and all the Vendean leaders agreed to advance toward that point. They hoped to profit of the absence of this general and take possession of his principal station, or to assail him if he had not many troops. Pursuing this project, they passed the night of the 17th at Aizenay.

General Travot had recalled some detachments from the Sables, and, joining what he already had, he set out for Saint Gilles with twelve hundred men to prevent the disembarkations that were to take place in the Marais. He met the convoy destined for M. Auguste de La Rochejaquelein captured a part, and then advanced to Aizenay, where the great mass of the Vendean generals was assembled. Caring little about numbers, and suspecting that the movement of the insurgents were not conducted after a regular military fashion, he determined to attack by night at Aizenay. He consequently advanced to that point on the night of the 18th of May, found them in the greatest disorder, some sleeping after a fatiguing day, others eating and drinking after their privations, but none keeping guard. He suddenly with a thousand men seized upon seven thousand unfortunate peasants, threw them into the greatest confusion, killed or wounded three or four hundred, and put the rest to flight. These, at first, took refuge in the neighbouring woods of Aizenay, and the greater number returned to their homes as was their wont after a few days, without whether conquered or victors.

Meanwhile M. d'Autichamp remained on the frontier of his district. Having learned that the 15th and 26th regiments of the line had fallen back on Pont-Barré in the district of Angers, he had seized on Chelles, and gave his men leave to return to their homes, which they would have done even if he had not given them permission. M. Auguste de La Rochejaquelein collected the remains of a convoy that had been destined for him, his brother, and then returned to Bourges.

Although the Vendean leaders had none but the most devoted men, they almost become masters of the Marais, the country lying between Chelles, Cholet, and the Herbiers, on one side, and the Loire and Machecoul on the other. The Imperial garrisons had fallen back on the Loire, and others on the principal

such as Parthenay, Fontenay, and endée. The peasantry, though as as ever, were neither so zealous al, and the number of those who in the insurrection was not more thousand. The extreme smallness tance sent by England had cooled r and roused all their ancient preinst the British Government. In rect the bad effect of this, M. Louis hejaquelein assured them that a y would soon arrive, and it was t difficulty that he succeeded in self believed. The veteran leaders, ere not on the best terms with each d'Antichamp was not pleased at self under M. Louis de La Roche- authority, and the latter, with the f General Canuel, an Imperial offi- become a furious royalist, tried to sde to a military organization, d have deprived the inhabitants of al peculiarities without imbuing the qualities of a regular army. s to bring the four Vendean armies hat closer proximity, and then to ogether to the coast to await the mmunition, arms, and money which l, and whose arrival he was con- nising in order to keep up the cou- e poor peasants, who could not fight as, or support themselves without

e the events which had taken place during the last days of May. Na- neither surprised nor seriously them. With his usual quickness on, he saw that the insurrection did sufficient energy to extend beyond e where it originated, or cause any ger in the interior of the country. was sufficient to interfere with his parations, and it would be abso- ssary to send some troops to the the insurgent country if he did not vil to spread further. He was, bliged to sacrifice some of his regi- rifice greatly to be regretted, and as resolved to make as light as pos- said that one battle gained in the d do more toward the pacification than all the troops he could send had intended to place General De- he head of the troops destined for at province, but that general being ced him by General Lamarque. ing the departure of the latter, he neral Corbineau, in whose intelli- nergy he had well-grounded confi- first instructions to him were, to his troops and resist the entreaties ens where the holders of national d taken refuge, and who were all garrisons. He desired him to tell t was their business to provide for by organizing National Guards. of concentration were Angers and he Loire, and Bourbon-Vendée and e interior. Since the evacuation conquests, the gendarmerie were ous in France, and there was a very t at Versailles. Napoleon formed five battalions of foot and three

squadrons of horse, and sent them, without loss of time, to the banks of the Loire. These battalions and squadrons, composed of tried soldiers, were to serve as a rallying-point to the Federalists and National Guards. The next thing to be done was, to prepare columns of regular troops to penetrate into the interior of the insurgent country to crush the insurrection. The 26th and 16th regiments of the line had fallen back on Angers; Napoleon allowed them to remain there, that they might have time to collect their effective force, and strengthen them by the addition of the 27th. The 43d was at Rochefort, and the 65th at Nantes. Napoleon ordered that they should be reinforced by two or three regiments from General Clausel's corps, and ordered that the 3d and 4th battalions of these regiments should be immediately formed. This being done, the columns stationed on the circumference of the insurgent province were to enter centripetally and crush the rebels wherever they appeared. Napoleon gave orders that no quarter should be given. These columns were followed by military commissions, commanded to try and execute immediately the principal rebels who should be taken with arms in their hands. He ordered that the châteaux of the different leaders of the insurrection should be razed to the ground. He wished to terrify these hapless peasants by the examples of an immediate and rapid punishment, and it must be admitted that they had not the same legitimate reasons for revolt as in 1793, since their religion, lives, and properties were respected, and they had even been spared the rigours of the conscriptions, for the levies made in their provinces were so small as scarcely to deserve the name. "When the Vendéans see," said Napoleon, "to what they are exposing themselves, they will reflect and become calm." That the result might be more speedy, he sent the 47th regiment by post to Laval, where the Chouans were beginning to make some disturbance, and a division of the Young Guard, under General Brayer, as a reserve to Angers. Thus, notwithstanding his determination to detract as little as possible from the main body of the army, this deplorable insurrection deprived him of four or five regiments, of several of the third battalions, and a division of the Young Guard, amounting in all to at least twenty thousand men—a great loss on the approaching battle-day, when it might have turned the scale of victory. It was a great misfortune, of little advantage to the royalist cause, while it ruined that of France at Waterloo!

Napoleon saw from these movements of the royalists, that it was intended to aid the enemy without by insurrections at home, and he was determined not to leave a clear stage to those who, seeking to ruin him, might destroy France. He wished that measures should be taken against those who were ostensibly fomenting civil war. But this was opposed by some of his ministers, who, with justice, refused to adopt again the exercise of arbitrary authority, and this principle was particularly urged by M. Fouché, who sought to win favour with all parties by accommodating himself to their views. It was a very serious question, for, on one hand, there was the danger of allowing uncontrolled liberty to adversaries who

were only too well disposed to profit by the facilities accorded to them, and, on the other, there was the risk of returning to the barbarous laws of the Convention and the Directory. Napoleon insisted that a bill should be drawn up, defining, in moderate but decided terms, the different misdemeanours tending to provoke civil war or conniving at a foreign one, and this he intended should, together with the bills on financial questions, be the first presented to the chambers. Meanwhile he desired the Council of State to seek among anterior laws for those that were neither exaggerated nor cruel, and order them to be put in force. He ordered that all who were not habitual residents should leave the insurgent districts, and that a list should be made out of those who had left their ordinary residence, either to command troops or to join the court at Ghent, and commanded that they should return to their dwellings immediately, under pain of having their property confiscated. At Toulouse, and still more at Marseilles, daring men, known as implacable enemies of the Empire, were preaching insurrection to an excitable population. Some of these were removed, and the National Guards of these towns were reduced to a small number of reliable men, who might safely be trusted with arms.

"I do not wish to act with cruelty," he said to his ministers, "but I wish to intimidate, for if, while six hundred thousand men are marching toward France, I suffer such domestic insurrection, we shall have revolts in Paris itself, aiding the allied armies." His ministers remained silent, M. Fouché as well as the rest, though secretly determined not to execute his master's orders, and that not from any respect for the principles of a rigorous legality, but to serve his personal interest with the royalists. Sad and deplorable are the times when a civil war convives with a foreign invasion, when men are agitated between the fear of not defending their country to the utmost and the apprehension of betraying the principles of rational political liberty.

However, Napoleon considered that other measures than intimidation should be used against the Vendéens. He saw plainly that they were not as zealous as formerly, and there was evidently a difference of opinion, and even disunion, among them, and thought that political means might be usefully employed. "These unfortunate Vendéens are mad," he said to his ministers. "During my whole reign I have not interfered with them; I have not disturbed one of their priests or leaders. On the contrary, I have rebuilt their cities, made roads for them, in fact, done every thing that the time would permit, and in return they rise against me when all Europe is opposed to me. Notwithstanding my objection to cruelty, I cannot allow them to go on in this way, and I shall be compelled to visit them with fire and sword. But, after all, for what purpose? They cannot decide the question. I am going to fight against their friends, the English and Prussians, and to decide, not only the fate of two dynasties, but of all Europe. If I am conquered, their cause is won; if I conquer, they cannot be victorious. I will eradicate every trace of this hateful civil war, both men and things, I will destroy every thing that can

induce these poor deluded peasants to dance, or allow themselves to be destroyed by the countrymen for the gratification of the most absurd prejudices. Consequently, their fate depends not on them, but on the Coalition against me. Let them keep quiet, let them not allow their fields to be laid waste, their huts not burned, and their best men murdered, and for an object which they cannot attain. Let them not allow mine and a foreign army to decide the question in deadly conflict! Be certainly men enough will fall without making it necessary that Frenchmen should cut one others' throats. Let them wait for a few days, and all will be decided. You," he said, turning to the Duke d'Otranto, "have known me have had relations with these Vendéens; there must be many of them in Paris. Go to them to your house by fair means or foul, make them listen to reason, and propose a suspension of arms, which will spare much more suffering to hapless France. You need not fear a long truce. In four weeks their cause will be lost or gained, and that by shedding other blood than theirs; and, should their cause be lost, they understand it, their true interests will be saved, for, by my laws and labours, I shall save them more than the Bourbons ever could, whom they have been sacrificing themselves uselessly for the last twenty-five years."

The Duke d'Otranto could not receive a more agreeable mission than that of entering into personal relations with adverse parties. He summoned MM. de Malartie, de Flavigny, and de la Béraudière, and sent them into Vendée to propagate Napoleon's sentiments, which he delivered exactly, though in his own words. "Why," he said to them, "will you sacrifice yourselves for the sake of those Bourbons to whom you owe nothing, and to injure a man who has advanced your interests, and who, perhaps, will not be in power for more than six weeks longer? You are misled by the prejudices of your priests and the ambition of your leaders. They are leading you to slaughter for their own interest, and not for yours; but, if you have the sense not to interfere, you will be rid of the Empire in a short time, or you will be under a yoke no more burdensome to your province. You doubt Bonaparte; I do not like him much better, but neither you nor I can do any thing. Be going, like a madman, to oppose all Europe, in all probability he will be overcome, in such case we will come to an understanding; and, as, should Bonaparte be defeated, he must be replaced by the Bourbons, we shall make arrangements for their recall, and for making them reign more wisely than before. I do not ask you to lay down your arms, nor to submit to the Empire, but to suspend hostilities. I shall even endeavour to obtain that the imperial troops shall be withdrawn from your province, that you shall be masters there, but on condition of your remaining quiet and non-offensive."

These words were calculated to make an impression on the Vendéens, for, independent of the iniquity of their late attempt, and what they did not acknowledge even to themselves, and which was no other than to dispute the French army of twenty thousand soldiers, their attempt at civil war was abandoned.

vagant. The three Vendean negotiators were touched by the true and almost cynical language of the Duke d'Otranto, and immediately set out for Vendée, to propose a suspension of arms on the conditions we have mentioned. And, as had been told the Vendéans, they would not have long to wait, for they were on the eve of the 1st of June, the day appointed for the Champ de Mai, after which Napoleon would set out for the army to decide the dispute between him and Europe.

Almost all the registers of the votes on the "Additional Act" had arrived, and their revision had commenced. The deputations from the electoral colleges had assembled on the 29th and 30th of May in the eighty-seven places of meeting appointed them, and had begun the computation of the votes. This work being ended, each college appointed five members to revise, under the superintendence of the Prince High Chancellor, the votes received from all the departments. They had also authorized their delegates to draw up an address to the Emperor. These delegates, amounting to about four or five hundred, assembled on Wednesday, the 31st, in the palace of the Corps Législatif, and found that the number of votes—not including those of departments whose registers were not yet come in—was 1,304,206: of which 1,300,000 were affirmative, and 4206 negative. The number of votes for the institution of the Consulship for life was 3,577,259, and for the institution of the Empire, 3,572,329. The numerical superiority of the affirmative was the same, but the number of voters had been reduced almost to one-fourth, which proves that in 1815 the rational majority of the nation, divided between the counter-revolution, represented by the Bourbons, and war, represented by Napoleon, knew not to whom they could confide her destiny, and testified their irresolution by their silence.

The revision being finished, the address was next to be prepared. Several were proposed, but that drawn up by M. Carion de Nisas, with the approval of Government, was adopted. In this, the two prevailing opinions of the day were very warmly expressed: those were, France's determination to fight under Napoleon's orders for national independence, and, after the establishment of peace, to develop public liberty according to the system of constitutional monarchy. Devotedness to Napoleon was as warmly expressed as could be desired. M. Dubois d'Angers, whose voice was strong enough to be heard in the largest assembly, was appointed to read this address.

The object for which the Champ de Mai was to be held had changed very much since its announcement at Lyons, when it was intended to present the new institutions to the assembled electors, and to crown the King of Rome in presence of his mother; but, by Maria Louisa's refusal, and the manner in which the "Additional Act" had been presented, it was reduced to a simple revision of votes. In order that the ceremony should make more impression on the public, Napoleon determined to distribute the colours to the troops about to leave for the northern frontier. These standards given to men who swore to die in their defence within a few days, was a circumstance well calculated to touch the feelings of the numerous

citizens collected at the Champ de Mai. Even to the very eve of the ceremony, the most contradictory reports were in circulation as to what was to take place. These originated with the Duke d'Otranto. This indefatigable intriguer was always dreaming of getting rid of Napoleon, not that the Bourbons might be recalled, whom he considered still worse, but to have, if possible, a regency under Maria Louisa and the King of Rome, thinking that he himself would rule under the government of a woman and a child. M. de Metternich's attempt at a secret negotiation with him, interrupted by M. Fleury de Chaboulon's mission to Basle, had only increased his idea of his own importance, and confirmed his resolution of getting rid of Napoleon, and substituting for him Maria Louisa and the King of Rome. He boldly said to every one that would listen to him, with an imprudence that nothing but Napoleon's precarious situation could explain, that if this man, as he called him, had any patriotism he would retire from the stage and abdicate in favour of his son, by which he would infallibly disarm Europe, or at least show that she was in the wrong, and so make it incumbent on every Frenchman to fight to the death. He added that they would not be obliged even to fight, as in all probability Napoleon's abdication would be sufficient to appease Europe. When M. Fouché was asked on what authority he made such assertions, he answered, with a mysterious air, that he had good reasons for what he said, hinted at intimate relations with foreign Powers, by which he not only gave authority to his words, but importance to himself. According to him, Napoleon ought to profit by the Champ de Mai to give this proof of his disinterestedness and to essay this profound stroke of policy. It may be imagined what progress such assertions made, especially when uttered by the Minister of Police, a man not much respected, but supposed to be of great weight. To avert Napoleon's anger and excuse any of these remarks that might reach his ears, M. Fouché resolved to present him what he considered a most profound project, which was, to offer his eventual abdication to the sovereigns on condition of an immediate peace, and, should this be rejected, to denounce their bad faith to the nation and summon every man to take up arms.

According to the Duke d'Otranto's reasoning, should this proposal be accepted by the sovereigns, Napoleon would have secured the crown to his son and vast glory to himself, and would be accompanied by the universal respect of mankind into whatever retirement he might choose; whilst, on the other hand, if the sovereigns refused, he would have a right to demand the very greatest sacrifices from France.

Napoleon disdainfully rejected this scheme of an over-excited brain, more remarkable for fertility of invention than soundness of judgment. Whenever Napoleon had the wisdom to restrain himself in M. Fouché's presence, he treated him with the greatest disdain,—a convenient mode of acting toward a presumptuous person, whose assumption he might otherwise be obliged to treat too seriously. It was not very difficult for him to prove, both to M. Fouché and others, how chimerical such a project was. When Europe demanded that Napoleon should

be sacrificed, she only meant to disarm France, and, that once done, to make us pass under the yoke. Indeed, were this offer of an abdication not immediately followed by the delivery of Napoleon into the hands of the sovereigns,—which would have been an act of baseness on the part of France and of deceit on the part of Napoleon,—Europe would have looked upon the whole thing as a jest, deserving only of contempt. And had Napoleon been given up, the French would be in the same position as the Carthaginians, who, having delivered their arms and ships to the Romans, were then compelled to yield Carthage too; and so, Europe, that did not approve either of Maria Louisa or the King of Rome, would have imposed the Bourbons on a people that had been so silly as to put themselves in their power. And the sole result of these tergiversations would have been to exhibit both hesitation and fear, to weaken Napoleon's authority at the moment he most needed support, to spend in useless negotiations time so valuable for military preparations, and, above all, to enervate the moral strength of the military, who saw only Napoleon, and wished to see no other object than him. Reasons so evident showed how very superficial was M. Fouché, and how very little solidity there was in his plans. This did not prevent M. Fouché from expatiating on his project in every direction, which caused no little excitement in the public mind, by propagating the idea that Napoleon, by an act of devotedness, might have saved France from the fearful dangers to which she was left exposed. The real self-sacrifice on the part of Napoleon would have been to die at Elba, an act of virtue too heroic to be expected from any mortal. Were it not so, the aspirations of master-spirits would never shape themselves into acts, which is to say that the human heart would be void of ambition.

This question of an eventual abdication, which, indeed, had never been seriously proposed, having been put aside, it was next to be considered in what character Napoleon should appear at the Champ de Mai. Should it be as a general, more a soldier than an emperor, or as a sovereign surrounded by all the pomp of a throne? Many very sincere liberals, but inclined to republicanism, who only wished to use Napoleon as a means of ridding them of the Bourbons, desirous that even externals should correspond with what they considered the true state of the public mind, were anxious that Napoleon should appear at the Champ de Mai as a simple soldier. On the other hand, the alarmed partisans of authority exclaimed loudly, when it seemed that Napoleon was likely to yield to the liberals: they did not hesitate to say that he was abandoning himself to the revolutionists in order to win their support, and that it would have been as well for him to have remained at Elba as to return to be their slave. Napoleon took as little heed of the demands of the one party as of the affected fears of the other, but he was piqued by the assertion that he had sunk in position, that he had fallen into the hands of the *canaille*, merely because he had consented to reign as a constitutional monarch. Therefore, though he did not attach much importance to what had been said by the zealous partisans of imperial

authority, he did not wish to justify their unfriendly remarks by appearing as it were crowned before the thousands assembled from all parts of France. He consequently determined to appear at the Champ de Mai in the same state as at his coronation. This was certainly no very serious fault, since his fate was to be decided by a battle in Flanders, and not by the fleeting impression produced by a futile spectacle on agitated minds; but still it was an error, as he needed the support of the friends of liberty, whose feelings he ought to have conciliated in trifles. However that may be, he did not give himself much trouble about these conflicting opinions, but appeared on the 1st of June at the Champ de Mai wearing robes, a plume of feathers and imperial mantle, and in the coronation-carriage drawn by eight horses, preceded by the princes of his family, and with marshals riding on either side. Among the latter was Marshal Berthier, whom Napoleon had not seen for a month. When he saw him he could not restrain a movement of anger, and said, "I thought you had emigrated." He proceeded to the Champ de Mars, through the gardens of the Tuileries, the Champs Elysées, and by the Jena bridge, and ever through an inquisitive and ardent crowd, that applauded him very warmly. On one side of the Champ de Mars were the twenty-five thousand men composing the Parisian National Guard, and on the other twenty thousand soldiers of the Imperial Guard, and of the 6th corps, who were to leave immediately after the ceremony. Napoleon was cheered by all, but the Imperial Guard and 6th corps received him with almost frantic acclamations. These impassioned cries, it must be acknowledged, did not proceed from an interested devotedness to the revolution they had effected, but were the expression of their resolution to die for the honor of the French army.

Napoleon drove round the military school, where he entered by the rear. When he had ascended to the first floor, he was conducted to the place set apart for the ceremony. This was an external building of a semicircular form, the two extremities connected with the military school, and the centre opening on the Champ de Mars. The throne, to which rose on the right and on the left a semicircular flight of steps, was supported against the *Ecole Militaire*; opposite was an altar, and through the open space beyond was seen the Champ de Mars, all bristling with bayonets. In front of the building a platform was erected, from which Napoleon was to distribute the standards, and from this platform a long flight of steps decorated with magnificent trophies communicated with the Champ de Mars.

Napoleon, accompanied by his wife, took his place on the throne amid enthusiastic cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* His brothers were seated on *tabourets* on either side. Behind and a little higher was a gallery close to the windows of the *Ecole Militaire*, occupied by his maternal sisters. To the right and left, on the benches of the semicircular amphitheatre, were seated according to their rank, the different Corps d'Etat, the civil and military authorities, the magistrates, the newly-elected representatives, the deputies of the electoral colleges, and the military deputies came to receive the stand-

ards of their regiments. This vast assembly comprised from nine to ten thousand persons. At the altar stood M. de Barral, Archbishop of Tours, surrounded by his clergy and preparing to celebrate mass, whilst from all parts of the enclosure the Champ de Mars could be seen, occupied by fifty thousand soldiers of the regular army and National Guards, and a hundred pieces of cannon. Paris had never seen a more imposing spectacle. Content, that sentiment that vivifies every thing, was alone wanting to the scene. The Emperor had been received with the loudest acclamations by the electors and military deputies, but, alas! these acclamations spoke more of desire than of hope. Napoleon's noble countenance wore a grave and almost sad expression beneath his plumed cap. No wife, no son, sat beside him, and all felt the painful isolation to which the inexorable will of Europe had reduced him. Instead of wife and child were seen brothers, whose presence recalled the many fatal wars undertaken for family aggrandizement. Among these brothers, Lucien alone was beheld with favour, for he alone had never worn a crown. Some of those present disapproved of the pomp displayed; others, and they were the greater number, were occupied with more serious thoughts, and were reflecting on the pressing dangers of the State. From time to time the soldiers uttered convulsive cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* in them the prevailing sentiment of sadness gave way to the noble enthusiasm of patriotism. In a word, the aspect of the whole scene was that of preparations made for a duel unto death—not between two individuals, but between one nation and the entire world.

The ceremonies commenced by imploring the blessing of Heaven upon a throne that had been restored, God alone knew for how long, and upon a nation now prostrate at the foot of the altar. Mass was celebrated, and a *Te Deum* sung. After mass the deputies of the electoral colleges, about five hundred in number, and headed by the Prince High Chancellor, advanced to the foot of the throne. Their spokesman then read the address in a loud and sonorous voice, and was distinctly heard by all present. This discourse spoke of devotedness to the Emperor, of liberty, of peace, could it be obtained from Europe, and, if not, of a desperate war, for these were the sentiments of all who desired or submitted to Napoleon's return. The substance of the address was as follows:—

“Assembled from all parts of the Empire, around the tables of the law, on which we have just inscribed the wishes of the people, it is not possible for us, the organs of France, not to give utterance to her sentiments, and not to tell the head of the nation, in presence of all Europe, what the nation expects from him and he may expect from her. What do these monarchs desire, sire, who are advancing against us with such warlike preparations? What have we done to justify their aggressive proceedings? Have we violated any of the treaties of peace? Enclosed within frontiers which nature had not marked out for us, and which even before your reign had been removed by victory and peace, we have not overstepped these narrow bounds, through respect for treaties which you have not signed,

and which you still were willing to observe. What, then, is the object of our enemies? They do not like the ruler we have chosen, and we do not like him they would impose on us. They have dared to proscribe you—you that have been so often master of their capitals, and who have generously propped them on their tottering thrones! This hatred on the part of our enemies increases our love for you. If they proscribed the humblest of our citizens, it would be our duty to defend him with the same energy, for he would be under theegis of France.

“Do they ask only for guarantees? Are they not to be found in our new institutions, and in the will of the French people, henceforth united to yours? Vainly do they seek to conceal their evil designs under the simple plea of seeking to separate you from us, and of giving us masters who understand us no more than we understand them! Their short stay among us has destroyed every illusion attached to their name. They can no longer believe our oaths, nor we their promises. It was but too evident that they sought to restore tithes, privileges, feudality, and all that had become hateful to us. A million officials, magistrates devoted for twenty-five years to the maxims of 1789, a still larger number of enlightened citizens, who have adopted these same principles after mature reflection, and from among whom we have chosen our representatives, five hundred thousand warriors, our strength and our glory, and six million landed proprietors, who owe their title of possession to the Revolution,—these were not the Frenchmen of the Bourbons; they wished to reign for the advantage of a few privileged men, who during the last twenty-five years had been either punished or pardoned. Their throne, raised for a moment by foreign arms, and surrounded by incurable errors, has sunk before you, because you brought with you from your retreat—which generates great thought only in the minds of great men—true liberty and solid glory. Has not the triumphal march from Cannes to Paris opened all eyes? Does the history of any people present a more national, a more heroic, or a more imposing scene? Is not this bloodless triumph sufficient to undeceive our enemies? Do they wish for a more bloody one? Well, then, sire, you may expect from us all that the heroic founder of a throne may hope from a faithful and energetic people, who are immovable in their twofold desire for liberty at home and independence abroad.

“Confiding in your promises, our representatives are about to revise our laws in the calmness of matured wisdom, and to assimilate them with the constitutional system; and may the rulers of nations listen to us during this time. Should they accept your offers of peace, the French people will expect that your firm, liberal, and paternal government will console them for any sacrifices made for peace; but should we be left no choice between disgrace and war, the nation will rise as one man to free you from the perhaps too moderate offers that you have made in order to spare Europe fresh convulsions. Every Frenchman is a soldier, victory will again follow your eagles, and our enemies who counted on our dis-

sensions will have cause to regret having provoked us."

This discourse, of which we have only given the principal passages, and which was pronounced with a sonorous voice and touched all present, won the warmest applause even from the prejudiced.

The Arch-Chancellor then announced the number of votes, which was, as we have said, 1,800,000 affirmatives, and 4206 negatives, and declared that the Additional Act had been accepted by the French people. The Act was presented at the foot of the throne. The Emperor signed it, and then pronounced the following discourse, conceived with his usual strength of thought, and couched in his customary nervous style.

"Electors, Deputies of the Army and Navy:—

"As Emperor, Consul, and soldier, I have received every thing from the people. In prosperity, and in adversity, on the battle-field, in the council-chamber, on the throne, or in exile, France has been the abiding and sole object of my thoughts and actions.

"Like the Athenian king, I have sacrificed myself for my people, hoping that her natural integrity, her rights and honour, would be assured to France, as had been promised.

"Indignation at seeing these sacred rights, acquired by twenty-five years' victory, ignored and lost forever, the cry of the wounded honour of France, and the desires of the nation, have recalled me to this throne, which is dear to me because it is the palladium of independence, honour, and national rights.

"Frenchmen, when, amidst the general rejoicings, I traversed the different provinces on my way to my capital, I necessarily calculated on a long peace: all nations are bound by the treaties their Governments have signed.

"I had then but one thought, that of founding our liberty on a Constitution suited to the wishes and interests of the people. I have convoked the Champ de Mai.

"I soon learned that those princes, who ignore all principles of honour, who have outraged the opinions and dearest interests of so many peoples, are about to attack us. They mean to enlarge the kingdom of the Low Countries by giving her our northern frontier fortresses as a barrier, and also to appease their own dissensions by dividing Lorraine and Alsace between them.

"We have been obliged to make preparations for war.

"However, before trusting my own person to the risks of battle, my first care has been to constitute the nation without delay. The people have accepted the Act I presented to them.

"Frenchmen, when we shall have repulsed these unjust aggressors, and that Europe will be convinced of what she owes to the rights and independence of twenty-eight millions of men, a solemn law, modelled after the forms designed by the Constitutional Act, shall consolidate the different requirements of our Constitution, which at present exist in distinct and separate forms.

"Frenchmen, you are about to return to your provinces. Tell your fellow-citizens that the present position of public affairs is serious;

that by concord, energy, and perseverance, we shall come victorious out of the struggle between a great people and their oppressors; that future generations will scrutinize our conduct severely, and that a nation has lost every thing when she has lost her independence. Tell them that foreign kings, whom I have placed upon their thrones, or who are indebted to me for the preservation of their crowns, all of whom, in the days of my prosperity, vied with each other for my alliance and the protection of the French people, all now direct their blows against my breast. Did I not see that it is our nation that they detest, I would place this life, for which they are so anxious at their mercy. But also tell your countrymen that the rage of our enemies will be powerless so long as Frenchmen regard us with that affection of which they have given so many proofs.

"Frenchmen, my wishes are those of the people; my rights are theirs; my honour, my glory, my happiness, can be no other than the honour, glory, and happiness of France."

The discourse excited the warmest sensations. The Archbishop of Bourges, acting as grand almoner, then presented the New Testament to Napoleon, who, with his hand on the book, swore to observe the Constitution of the Empire. The Prince High Chancellor was the first that took the oath of fidelity. "We swear!" cried thousands of voices. There arose loud acclamations on every side, and together with the oft-repeated cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* were mingled cries of *Vive l'Impératrice!* The latter exclamation not being warmly responded to, caused some embarrassment, since none could tell whether it was right to repeat it in the absence of her, who should have hastened with her child to join her husband, but who had neither the courage nor the inclination to do so. This painful scene was broken after a few moments by the military deputies, who brandished their swords and cried, "*Vive l'Impératrice! Vive la Reine Rome! We shall bring them back.*"

When this part of the ceremony was over, Napoleon rose, laid aside the imperial mantle, crossed the semicircular enclosure, and advanced to the platform where he was to distribute the flags. The scene at this moment was glorious, because the grandeur of the act and the feeling that pervaded the assembly corresponded to the magnificence around. On the Emperor stood the Minister of the Interior, holding the standard of the Paris National Guard, the War Minister with the flag of the first regiment of the line, and the Minister of Marine holding the flag of the first naval corps. The numerous steps communicating with the Champ de Mars were crowded on one side with officers holding the flag of the National Guards and of the army, and on the other with the deputations assembled to receive them. In front were fifty thousand men and a hundred pieces of cannon ranged in several lines; in short, nearly the whole population of Paris was assembled in the Champ de Mars.

Napoleon advanced to the first step, addressing the detachments of the different corps, who were immediately in front and which

reach of his voice, he said, as he took hold of one of the flags, "Soldiers of the Parisian National Guard and of the Imperial Guard, I confide to you the eagle and the national colours: you swear to defend them with your lives if necessary against the enemies of the country and the throne!" "Yes, yes, we swear it!" was replied by thousands. "You," resumed Napoleon, "you, soldiers of the National Guard, swear not to allow foreigners again to sully the capital of this great nation." "Yes, yes, we swear it!" cried the National Guards, in all sincerity and fully determined to fulfil their promise. "And you, soldiers of the Imperial Guard, you swear to excel yourselves in the approaching campaign, and to die rather than allow foreigners to dictate to your country!" "Yes, yes!" replied the soldiers of the Guard with enthusiasm,—a promise they soon fulfilled on the plains of Waterloo, not by conquering, alas! but by dying. These short addresses being finished and responded to with ardour, the military deputations advanced in serried ranks to receive their standards. Napoleon became animated by a scene that recalled the many encounters in which these regiments had distinguished themselves, and, addressing suitable phrases to each, filled up the measure of their enthusiasm. This scene, though prolonged, produced a deep effect upon the spectators. As the day was now far advanced, and as there was not sufficient time to distribute the flags of the National Guards to the deputies of the electoral colleges, this part of the ceremony was adjourned to the following days. The troops then defiled in quick step, amid the flourish of trumpets and cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* enthusiastically repeated by the soldiery, and soon caught up by the National Guards, who were carried away by the prevailing enthusiasm.

Whilst this portion of the ceremony, which was pronounced magnificent by the beholders, was being performed in the Champ de Mars, anxiety, disunion, and deep preoccupation reigned in the enclosure behind, in which the different Corps d'Etat were assembled, and whence they had not a sufficiently distinct view of the ceremony to be impressed by it. The liberals, tainted with republicanism, thought the scene before them bore too much resemblance to the old Empire; their opponents, more alarmists than alarmed, considered it too like the revolution; whilst the greater number of electors, who had come in all sincerity to Paris, would have wished to approach nearer to the Emperor, and not be separated from him by the pomp of a great ceremony. Thus, whilst in front all hearts were transported with national enthusiasm, those assembled in the rear were saddened and divided by an anxiety arising naturally from the circumstances. It was no longer the federation of 1790, when the nation was ignorant, enthusiastic, and united; it was the morrow of a vast revolution, in which the nation had acquired information, had fallen, was overwhelmed by faults of her own commission, almost driven to desperation, and retaining none of the sentiments of 1789, except a heroic bravery well exercised by twenty-five years of warfare. M. Fouché imprudently contributed to these dissensions, which ulti-

mately brought about his own ruin; he dared, during one of the intervals of this long representation, to say in a low voice to Queen Hortense, "The Emperor has lost a great opportunity of filling up the measure of his glory and of securing the crown to his son by abdicating. I have advised him to do so, but he will not take advice." Such expressions were not calculated to unite all in a common resolve to defend France and liberty under Napoleon, whom all parties ought to have accepted, since they had either desired or permitted his return, and who, indeed, was the best military leader they could have found.

Wishing to complete the distribution of the standards, and come into closer connection with the electors, Napoleon determined to assemble them in the great gallery of the Louvre, where, drawn up in two lines, they, together with the military deputies, would have sufficient space. He appointed the following Sunday, the 4th of June, for this second ceremony, and fixed the opening of the chambers for Monday the 5th, or Tuesday the 6th, according to the time necessary for arranging them. He intended to leave on the following Monday, June the 12th, and expected to have the chambers installed and set to work before leaving for Flanders to decide his own fate and that of France. There was a great difference of opinion, some thinking it would be better not to take the initiative in hostilities, but to await the enemy between the frontier and the capital, and so throw upon them the odium of being the aggressors, whilst others, more influenced by military than political reasons, and knowing that the English were alone on the frontier, wished to overpower them by attacking them unexpectedly. Napoleon listened to all, replied but rarely, that he might conceal his designs whilst he watched the movements of the adverse masses with an observant eye, and calculated the point where he might interpose and strike, before the different columns of the enemy could combine their forces.

He estimated that the time for this would be about the 15th of June, when he hoped to have assembled the forces necessary for effective operations. The Count de Lobau pressed him to commence operations. "Wait," he said, "until I shall have at least a hundred thousand men under my command, and you will see what I shall do with them." He expected to collect a hundred and fifty thousand men by the middle of June, and, having fixed his own departure for the 12th, Napoleon wished, before leaving, to arrange with the chambers the mode of managing public affairs.

He convoked them for Saturday, the 3d of June, so that they might be able to verify the credentials of their members, choose a President, Vice-President, and Secretaries, and be regularly constituted before the Imperial *séance*, for at that time the members were sworn, and the business of the chamber in full operation, before the sovereign came in person to open the session. Napoleon had a private motive for acting thus. He wished, as we have already said, that his brother should be chosen President of the Chamber of Representatives, for which purpose he had him elected representative of the department of Isère, and that,

indeed, without the least difficulty. He therefore wished to await the result of the scrutiny in the Chamber of Representatives, before publishing the list of peers, among whom he could not refuse to inscribe his brother's name in case he should not obtain the presidency of the second chamber.

In any case, Napoleon's project was very difficult of execution. The six hundred and odd members of the Chamber of Representatives, the greater part of whom were, as we have said, old magistrates, military officers, holders of national property, and sincere Revolutionists, were all animated by the very best dispositions, and determined to support Napoleon, but to restrain him within the bounds of the new constitution. They were, certainly, displeased with the Additional Act, not because they wished any addition to what it contained, but because it connected the second Empire too closely with the first, and because it left them very little to do. However, as the Emperor in his discourse at the Champ de Mai seemed to authorize their remodelling the Imperial laws, in order to adapt them to the Additional Act, and even to modify the latter, if necessary, they had been gratified on all essential points, and had no serious cause for opposition. Still, having been elected under the general feeling of distrust toward the Imperial despotism, they were extremely anxious to prove their independence. All who exercise authority, individuals or assemblies, have their foibles: the members of the Chamber of Representatives had one, which was the fear of appearing servile. They were therefore always ready to address Napoleon in the language of the tribunes of old, though animated by very different sentiments, whilst they ought to have been, on the contrary, though ready to resist if he returned to his old customs, willing to join him in saying France and the principles of the Revolution. This susceptibility rendered the Chamber of Representatives little disposed to choose Prince Lucien; the members would have considered themselves compromised by assuming the Imperial colours at the very commencement of their sittings. To this feeling was added the inexperience of newly-arrived provincials, who knew nothing of Paris, of men, or the management of public assemblies. Though they rejected Lucien because he was the Emperor's brother, they did not know whom else to choose. Some members inclined to republican principles would have been satisfied with M. de Lafayette, who, though he had accepted the Additional Act, did not conceal his disapprobation of Napoleon; but the Revolutionists accused him of an inclination to the house of Bourbon. He was too revolutionary for some, not sufficiently so for others, and was not likely to get a majority of votes. M. Lanjuinais was approved by all parties because he had opposed the Mountain in the days of the Convention, and the Emperor during the first Empire. His being ennobled by Louis XVIII. was not considered an objection. That would show that the members of the chamber were not exclusive, but chose the friends of liberty wherever they found them. M. Lanjuinais had, therefore, every chance of being chosen President of the Chamber of Representatives.

The inconvenience of a too-lately conceded liberty is, as we have already observed, that it is first put into operation under perilous circumstances, when power and freedom are mutually jealous, and when they oppose each other instead of uniting for the common good. The Government, as deficient in experience as the chamber, did not understand the motive which influenced the latter, and committed the mistake of seeking an impossibility in the presidency of Prince Lucien, whilst they would have advanced their own interests more by giving up this project, and not opposing the election of M. Lanjuinais, which was neither offensive nor injurious.

The Chamber of Representatives assembled on Saturday, the 3d, voted a provisional president, and then divided into committees to verify the elections, and declare all those they admitted to whose elections no objection could be made. The commissioners appointed to examine the elections of Isère remarked in simplicity, and not from any ill-feeling, as in all probability Prince Lucien would be elevated to the peerage, it would be necessary to know this before admitting him, or his colleague, M. Duchesne. The chamber deferred his admission until the list of peers should be officially announced. The admission of all whose election any objection could be made was in like manner postponed. This objection to Prince Lucien did not arise from ill-will. But ill will soon came: it was whispered the Napoleon wished his brother to be appointed president, that that was the real reason for deferring the publication of the list of peers; and this was soon followed by many unfavourable remarks. One member said that the chamber ought immediately to proceed to the election of the *bureau*, for which it would be necessary to know who was to be appointed to the peerage, that no mistake might occur in the selection. The Government made no reply, since no arrangements had been made for the direction of the assembly, and all remained in a state of indecision, which though it had not yet called forth any expression of dissatisfaction, would eventually do so. It was arranged, though the chamber had been invited to take part in the ceremony at the Louvre, that the members should hold a sitting at the palace of the Corps Législatif, in order to finish the question of the election, and proceed to business as quickly as possible.

On the next day, the 4th of June, while the deputations that had assisted at the Champ de Mai were assembled at the Louvre, the representatives assembled at the palace of the Corps Législatif, in order to continue their labours. At the very opening of the sitting, the question of Prince Lucien's election was again raised, and this time with a malicious feeling, and it was asked in what light his election was to be regarded. One member suggested that Prince Lucien being a peer in his own right, he could not be a representative. The assembly, more inclined to assert its own independence than to seek causes for hostility, and by no means pleased at this suggestion, rejected the proposed motion for adjournment. Things were in this state, when a letter addressed to the provisional president by Count, Minister of the Interior, announced that the

list of peers would not be published until the Chamber of Representatives should be constituted. So despotic a mode of proceeding showed but little knowledge of public assemblies. The chamber expressed strong disapprobation; one member, M. Dupin, exclaimed, "And if we, in our turn, say that we will not resolve ourselves into a deliberative assembly until the list of peers is published, what reply can be made to us?" This remark, though very just, expressed more anger than was felt by the assembly, and was received with loud murmurs; the members then proceeded to the election of a president, without deciding the question of the elections of Isère. Prince Lucien's name was not mentioned, as the decision concerning his admission had been deferred. Not one vote was given to him; all were divided between MM. Lanjuinais, de Lafayette, de Flaugergues, and some other candidates. M. Lanjuinais had one hundred and eighty-nine, M. de Lafayette, sixty-eight, M. de Flaugergues, seventy-four, M. Merlin, forty-one, M. Dupont de l'Eure, twenty-nine. These votes expressed the sentiments of the chamber. The chamber wished to assert its independence, and it was evidently inclined to choose the man most likely to maintain it, for M. Lanjuinais had been one of the Opposition in the old Senate, without being the declared enemy of the Emperor. However, although M. Lanjuinais had the greatest number of votes, he had not an absolute majority; the scrutiny was recommenced, when he obtained two hundred and seventy-seven votes, M. de Lafayette, seventy-three, and M. de Flaugergues, sixty-eight. M. Lanjuinais was appointed president, subject, however, to the Emperor's approval, as provided by the Additional Act.

Whilst these scrutinies were going on at the Palais of the Corps Législatif, the second ceremony of the distribution of the colours was proceeding at the Louvre. The Emperor, on his throne, first received some deputations come to present addresses, and then proceeded to the Louvre gallery, which contains* the *chefs-d'œuvres* of painting, collected by our kings during so many centuries, for the amusement and instruction of the French people and for the glory of France. On one side were ranged the deputations from the electoral colleges, with the standards for the National Guards, and on the other the military deputations. This gallery, the largest in Europe, filled with glorious standards, and containing ten thousand persons, produced a grand and singular effect in its lengthened perspective. This ceremony was principally for the sake of the electoral colleges. Napoleon, whom they had the pleasure of hearing and seeing quite near, addressed them with his usual felicitousness of expression, and produced a good impression on the greater number. Their imaginations no longer represented him as an Oriental despot, but as a great man, simple, accessible, and ready to listen to the demands of his subjects. When he had reached the large square saloon at the end of the gallery, Napoleon turned back, and, directing his looks toward the military deputies, again electrified them by his presence and his words. He told them that they would soon again meet where they had so often met before, where they had

learned to know each other's value, on the battle-field, whither they were now summoned, not by the love of conquest, but to assert the national independence. This ceremony commenced at noon, and did not finish until seven in the evening. It was succeeded by a magnificent fête in the gardens of the Tuileries.

At the close of the day, Napoleon had to examine the scrutinies of the Chamber of Representatives, and to come to a resolution on the subject. His first feeling was one of extreme displeasure. Opposing him on an important question would not have wounded him so deeply as this personal slight, this repelling his brother for another, a respectable man indeed, but who had been one of the Opposition in the Senate under the first Empire. He considered that it would have been wiser, as well as more generous, to unite themselves closely to him at a moment when all Europe affected to make war on him alone. But, as we have often had occasion to repeat in this history for the general benefit, the consequence of our faults is to be punished for them at a time when this chastisement is most poignant. After having during fifteen years accepted, encouraged, and exacted boundless servility, Napoleon could not now obtain that personal consideration which at this moment would have had the double merit of being a proof of courage, and a beneficial demonstration in the presence of a foreign enemy. He had restrained himself during two months and a half, but could do so no longer, and gave way to the greatest irritation. "They wish to insult me," he said, "by electing an enemy. As the reward of all the concessions I have made, they want to offend and weaken me. If it be so, I will resist, I will dissolve this assembly, I will appeal to France, who knows but me alone, that will confide her defence but to me, and values not these obscure men, who altogether could do nothing for her. These men," he added, "do not want the Bourbons, they would be miserable if they risked their places, their properties and opinions, by their return, and will not support me, who alone can secure what they fear to lose, for it is only by cannon-shot that the revolution can be defended, and who among them could fire one?"

This first explosion of anger would not have had any bad consequences, or rather would have had the advantage of calming Napoleon, by giving vent to the feelings that oppressed him, had it not been divulged and even exaggerated by the perfidy of the Duke of Otranto, who told everywhere that Napoleon was incorrigible, that he wished to dissolve the chambers the very day after their assembling. Napoleon became calm after having given vent to his anger. Carnot, the Prince High Chancellor, M. Lavalette, M. Regnaud de Saint-Jean d'Angély, endeavoured to calm him, which they did without difficulty, as, his anger once passed, his own great mind suggested to him all that the wisest men could say. He saw that disunion at this moment would be madness, that some allowance must be made for the weakness of this assembly, that wished to appear disobedient when most devoted. Besides, M. Lanjuinais was an honest man, friendly to the Revolution, though opposed to its excesses, anxious for the success of the common cause,

and easily won by kindness. This was warmly asserted by M. Regnaud de Saint-Jean d'Angély, who by his past career, and brilliant eloquence, was eminently qualified to become the organ of the Government in communicating with the chambers. For this reason, he was more anxious than ever to win their good opinion by supporting their cause with the Emperor. Although sincerely devoted to Napoleon, he had fallen under M. Fouché's influence, who, seeing that he was flattered by the important part he was called upon to act with regard to the chambers, encouraged him to accept the position, and facilitated his success by every possible means, and endeavoured to persuade him that Napoleon could only be saved by opposing him, which was, alas! only too true some years before, and which had it been recognised and practised in time might have saved both Napoleon and France; but it was too late in 1815, and might be even most dangerous when practised in the face of all Europe. However, M. Regnaud de Saint-Jean d'Angély's advice to accept M. Lanjuinais as president was very wise, for at the time any other choice would have been unsuitable and impossible.

Whilst some were endeavouring to persuade Napoleon, others had gone in search of M. Lanjuinais, and told him, which was true, that he owed it to the Emperor to wait on him and come to an explanation after his long opposition in the Senate, and reassure him as to the use he would make of the immense power he would possess as president. M. Lanjuinais repaired to the Palais d'Élysée the very same evening, and was immediately admitted. Napoleon received him with extreme amiability and frankness, and said, "The past is forgotten, I am not so weak as to think of it; I estimate men only by their existing dispositions and opinions. Are you my friend or my enemy?" M. Lanjuinais was touched by the frankness with which Napoleon questioned him, and said that he was not his enemy, that he looked on him as the representative of the Revolution, and that he would support him cordially, provided the conditions of the constitutional monarchy were maintained. "We are agreed," said Napoleon: "I ask no more." The interview terminated in the most amicable manner, and Napoleon resolved to confirm the choice of the chamber.

However, the rumour of his first opposition to the choice had spread abroad. M. Fouché told it to everybody; he said Napoleon was still the same, that he could not suffer an independent assembly, and that it would be a miracle if the chamber were not dissolved in a few days. The next day, Monday, the 5th, the members assembled to complete the work of their organization; what had happened was whispered from bench to bench, and as the result of M. Lanjuinais' interview with Napoleon was not yet known, great discontent prevailed. The temporary president announced that he had communicated the decision of the chamber to the Emperor, who had replied that he would think about it and communicate his resolution by his chamberlain. This announcement was received with loud murmurs. One member very justly remarked that it was not through the intervention of a chamberlain that the

monarch ought to communicate with the chambers. M. Dumolart, and after him M. Regnaud de Saint-Jean d'Angély, endeavoured to explain the Emperor's reply by saying that the temporary president had not caught his work, an explanation the latter immediately adopted as a reparation for his want of tact in repeating what it would have been much wiser to conceal. During this discussion, M. Regnaud de Saint-Jean d'Angély, in order to put an end to a difficulty that interrupted the proceedings of the chamber, hastened to the Ellysée, and returned with the decree appointing M. Lanjuinais to the presidency, which he presented in his character of Minister of State, and the removed all cause of offence. The discussion of the chamber was appeased by M. Lanjuinais' election being approved. The members then chose their vice-presidents, M. de Flaugergat (403 votes,) M. Dupont de l'Éure, (257 votes,) and M. de Lafayette, (257 votes.) The first vice-president was not appointed until the next day, when General Grenier was chosen.

At the same time that the definite appointment of a president was announced to the Chamber of Representatives, the Chamber of Peers was presented with a list containing the names of those that were to be nominated to the peerage. Napoleon had desired his brothers and principal ministers to draw up a list of peers, each according to his own view. From these different lists he composed one consisting of one hundred and thirty names, a number which could and ought to be increased afterward, according as success should attract new supporters, especially among the old noblesse. M. de Lafayette had been pressed by Joseph to accept a seat in the upper chamber, but he preferred taking his place in the Chamber of Representatives, where he would find more conformity of opinion and would exert more direct influence over passing events. Napoleon had chosen his brothers, Joseph, Lucien, Louis, and Jerome, (who were put in their own right,) his uncle, Cardinal Fesch, his adopted son, Prince Eugène, (deposed at Vienna by the Coalition,) Marshals Duroc, Suchet, Ney, Brune, Monney, Soult, Lobau, Grouchy, Jourdan, and Mortier; the ministers Carnot, Decrès, de Bassano, Cadoudal, Mollien, and Fouché; Cardinal Cambacérès, the Archbishops of Tours, (de Bérault,) of Bourges (de Beaumont,) de Toulouse, (de Mauguin,) Generals Bertrand, Drouot, Lefebvre, Clausel, Savary, Duhesme, d'Erlon, Exelmans, Friant, Flahault, Gérard, Lohau, Le Bon, Delaborde, Lecourbe, Lallemand, Lefebvre-Desnoëttes, Molitor, Pajol, Rimpson, Reille, Treut, Vandamme, &c. He had chosen many regicides, Sièyes, Cambacérès, Carnot, Fouché, Thibaudeau, not because they were regicides, but because they were eminent men, who being regicides should not exclude from important public functions. From the old noblesse he had chosen MM. de Beaumont, de Beaufremont, de Boissy, de Forbin, de la Roche-foucault, de Nicolaï, de Pradlin, de Ségur, &c. If he did not choose a greater number of the old noblesse, it was because there were not more to choose from. He expected that the approaching victories would win over what it was not his love for old names, as was well that directed his choice, but because he was

the advantage of placing these men in the Upper Chamber, which should be at once conservative and independent.

Prince Joseph was greatly offended when he heard the decree read, by which he was appointed peer, as he considered that he was one in his own right. Notwithstanding all the efforts that were made to keep him silent, he declared that it must be by a mistake of print that he was mentioned in the decree, as he was a peer by birth, and not by the Emperor's nomination. It was great imprudence on the part of the Emperor's brothers not to restrain themselves in the midst of the disturbances that were already commencing. Who could be blamed for speaking unwisely if the Emperor's brothers could not forbear such childish protests? They committed another fault no less important, in not wishing to sit with their colleagues, but demanding distinctive seats beside the president. They gave up this pretension when they saw how badly it was received. Prince Lucien was the first to give the good example by taking his seat among his colleagues.

The 5th and 6th of June being occupied by these proceedings, the Imperial *séance* was deferred until the 7th. This *séance* was to consist in reading the speech of the crown, and in the members of both chambers taking the oath of fidelity to the Emperor. Napoleon had as usual written the speech that he was to deliver, and had drawn it up in that concise, frank, and firm style that accorded so well with a mind so resolute as his. He wished to grant a constitutional monarchy, not that he himself might be restrained, but from the conviction that it was needed, and that his own faults had rendered it indispensable. He determined to explain his views in brief but decisive terms. Knowing also that the representatives saw with regret that a complete constitution was presented to them, in which there was nothing that required alteration, he consented to grant them the right to take part in its construction, by amalgamating the old constitutions with the new. To this permission he wished to add some advice given in the same firm tone as the concession itself. This done, there still remained important points to be treated on. Although by no means inclined to persecute, Napoleon was determined that he would not allow himself to be attacked by any of the opposing parties with impunity. He would have wished to anticipate the insurrection in Vendée, but on this subject he found himself at variance with his ministers. The latter, though believing that certain conspiracies ought to be repressed, were still afraid that if anterior laws were put in force it would only furnish a pretext to those who said that the old arsenal of revolutionary laws was still allowed to exist. This difficulty must be arranged, and measures proposed that, without being arbitrary, would restrain the somewhat daring activity of all parties. The press had been freed from the censorship, but this only made it the more necessary and right that its excesses should be repressed by the regular tribunals. Lastly, a budget was to be presented.

All this would afford sufficient and regular occupation to the chambers, and Napoleon had himself drawn out the plan of procedure, in a

clear and concise discourse, which was unanimously approved by his ministers when communicated to them.

Whilst he was preparing his address to the two chambers, the Lower one, with the eagerness of all new assemblies, was impatient to enter on the most delicate subjects. On Tuesday, June the 6th, the eve of the Imperial *séance*, a member proposed a motion relative to the oath to be taken on the following day. He proposed that a declaration should be made purporting that no oath could be exacted but by virtue of some law, and that the oath to be taken on the following day should not in any way prejudice the right of the chambers to modify the Imperial constitutions.

This proposal caused great excitement. Were it taken in its strictest sense, it must be concluded that the required oath was illegal, and ought not to be taken unless a law were drawn up on that very day to authorize it. But even were this law immediately drawn up, it would not be possible that it could pass both chambers within twenty-four hours, and it would therefore be impossible to take the oath on the following day, by which it would seem to all Europe that the chambers refused to swear fidelity to Napoleon. Such a circumstance, at a time when five hundred thousand soldiers were marching toward France, might produce the most serious results.

This proposal was received with evident displeasure by the members, for, though very watchful of their independence, they were aware that, having placed Napoleon on the throne, it would be wrong to seek to weaken his position. Several members objected at once. They said that former *Senatus-Consultes* had authorized the taking of the oath to the Emperor, and that it was perfectly legal, since these had not been repealed; that, besides, it was an understood thing that this oath only implied fidelity to the Imperial dynasty, and by no means involved an admission of the immutability of the laws, since their revision had been decided on and even alluded to by the Emperor in his discourse at the Champ de Mai. M. Roy, afterward Minister of Finance under Louis XVIII. and Charles X., and who had been harshly treated by Napoleon, replied that since the second Empire was commencing with a new order of things, the Chamber of Peers having no resemblance to the Senate, nor the Chamber of Representatives to the Corps Législatif, the *Senatus-Consulte* that had been spoken of should be considered as having fallen into desuetude, and insufficient to legalize the oath required of the two chambers. The Assembly, aware of the danger involved in this discussion, gave evident signs of dissatisfaction. MM. Dumolard, Bedoch, and Sébastiani, replied warmly to M. Roy, saying that if the peerage and the Chamber of Representatives differed from the Senate and the Corps Législatif, the monarch still remained, and they were as much bound to be faithful to him under the new *régime* as under the old; that besides, as the common safety depended on the concord of those in power, it was only complying with the exigence of the time to take the proposed oath with alacrity. M. Boulay de la Meurthe, Minister of State, went still further, for he

spoke of a foreign party, among whom he did not class, he said, either the originator of the motion, nor those who supported him; this party, he said, was headed by the royalists, who only sought to create disunion at home that they might open the gates of France to the enemy. These exaggerated assertions were received in embarrassing and even reproving silence. The termination of the discussion was demanded on all sides. At first it was proposed to return to the order of the day, but soon something more definite was desired, and the oath was declared legal, suitable, and necessary. Whether it was that its opponents were absent or converted, this proposal was unanimously adopted by the Assembly.

In a country long accustomed to the exercise of liberty, where it has become customary to attach importance to the acts of the majority, and not of individuals, which must be left free, as they are thus deprived of any dangerous tendency, much importance would not have been attached to this stance.

But his opponents profited by the opportunity to assert that Napoleon was not supported by the nation, since the representatives objected to the oath of fidelity the very day after their instalment. Napoleon was much affected by it. He had wished that, since the Allied Powers directed all their attacks against himself individually, the chambers would have met this feeling by identifying themselves with him. Seeing that fate itself was against him, he had become sad, especially since Murat's fall; he became still more so now, when, instead of the firm and cordial union that he needed, he saw himself reduced to a state of isolation. He felt more deeply than ever that it was arms alone that would decide and win him back the hearts of the people, which—it is sad to say—are most attracted by success.

On the 7th he repaired, clad in a simpler costume than he had worn at the Champ de Mai, to the Palace of the Corps Législatif, where he was warmly applauded by the representatives, whose sentiments were excellent, if their experience was but small, and who, strange to say, received him much better than the Chamber of Peers. In consequence of the extremely liberal tone of public opinion, the Chamber of Peers, embarrassed if not ashamed of owing its existence to mere authority, thought it better suited to its dignity to receive its founder with moderate applause, whilst it left a more vivacious expression of sentiment to the Lower Chamber, that owed its existence to the nation.

The Emperor having taken his seat on the throne, with his brothers on either side, the Prince High Chancellor read the oath, which was as follows:—"I swear to be obedient to the Imperial constitution, and to be faithful to the Emperor." The High Chancellor then summoned the peers and the representatives, who all took the oath most readily. This done, Napoleon pronounced, in a tone of impressive gravity, the following discourse, which is a model of simplicity, conciseness, and dignity:—

"My lords and gentlemen of the Chamber of Representatives:—
"During the last three months, circum-

stances and the national confidence have invested me with unlimited power. This is the dearest wish of my heart is satisfied: I come to found a constitutional monarchy.

"Men have no control over the future, the destiny of nations can be fixed but by institutions alone. France needs a monarchy to secure her liberty, her independence, and the rights of the people.

"Our laws are scattered; one of our most important duties will be to collect them into a single form, and to reconstruct them on a single principle. This is a work that will distinguish the present epoch in the eyes of succeeding generations.

"I desire that France should enjoy all possible liberty. I say possible, because liberty will ever lead to an absolute government.

"A formidable coalition of kings is opposed to our independence; their armies are at our frontiers.

"The frigate 'Melpomene' was attacked in the Mediterranean by an English frigate, and taken after a desperate resistance. Blood has been shed in time of perfect peace.

"Our enemies calculate on our internal disunion. They are exciting and fomenting war. There have been meetings of notables; communications are held with them now, as with Coblenz in 1792. Legislative measures are absolutely necessary. I bid perfect confidence in your patriotism, intelligence, and attachment to myself.

"The liberty of the press is an essential part of the existing constitution, of which no portion can be altered without changing the entire political system; but repression measures are necessary, especially in the present state of the nation. I recommend this important object to your consideration.

"My ministers will inform you of the state of our affairs.

"The state of the finances would be satisfactory, but for the increased expenses caused by existing circumstances.

"However, all expenses might be met by the resources of the budget were it within the year, and it is to the nation's advantage that such a result should be attained. My Ministry will direct your attention.

"It is very likely that the highest monarch will soon summon me to his country at the head of her army, and I will do our duty.

"Let you, peers and representatives, be the example of confidence, energy, and patriotism to the nation, and, like the great nation of old, be resolved to survive the dishonour and dishonour of your country. The sacred alliance will triumph."

This discourse, which treated an important subject with such simple and perfect dignity, was received with it so well deserved. A more complete acknowledgment of constitutional principles could not be desired, nor a more explicit of its principles.

At the commencement of the session the English had preceded us in their customs. Each chamber determined to present an address

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y; he saw himself sur-
on, and his most trifling
every possible way. His

most sincere friends, who formerly would not
have dared to repeat what was said of him,
now hastened, some through affection, others
through a diminution of respect, to tell him
of the harshest things that were said against
him. From those he learned that M. Fouché
still continued to make the most impertinent
remarks, that he did not execute his orders,
especially those with regard to the royalists,
who were in communication with Ghent and
Vendée; that on the contrary he treated them
with the greatest consideration, and frequently
sent for them to his office that he might win
favour with them by disobeying the Emperor's
orders. When Napoleon learned this treacher-
ous conduct he became angry, was tempted to
punish, but forbore, fearing it might be said
that he had reassumed the despot, and thus
his former severity toward inoffensive per-
sons, such as the bearers of the Bull, for in-
stance, deprived him now of the power of re-
straining formidable enemies detected in overt
acts of treason. He recovered his serenity in
thinking of war, and the chances it offered to
a man of genius, in thinking of the triumphs
he had won in 1814, which would have saved
him had he had a few redoubts outside Paris,
or a brother worthy of him within. But
scarcely had his courage been revived by
these thoughts than it sank again when he
reflected on the masses of enemies that were
marching toward France, when he thought of
all the enemies at home, and he asked himself
if his Government would be able to bear a re-
verse, which was possible even in a war des-
tined to be eventually successful, and, with
his vast sagacity, he believed that the present
state of things gave unerring indications of an
abiding opposition to his interests, a feeling
that, though it did not shake his strong heart,
cast a veil of sadness over his spirit. He often
spoke on this subject with his friends, and
sometimes, though overpowered by fatigue, he
often passed a great part of the night in dis-
cussing the change in things around him, in
reflections on the fate of great men, and his
own destiny in particular, which indeed had
all the appearance of a declining star.

It was whilst under the influence of these
gloomy forebodings that he determined to visit
Malmaison, where the Empress Josephine had
died the preceding spring, and where he had
not been since his return from Elba. He felt
a want of revisiting that modest dwelling
where he had passed the happiest years of his
life with a wife who certainly was not fault-
less, but who was a true friend, one like whom
a man does not meet a second in his lifetime,
and one whom he never ceases to regret once
that she is lost. He made Queen Hortense
accompany him. She had not ventured to
visit a spot so full of distressing memories
since the death of her mother. Notwithstand-
ing his numerous occupations, he spent sev-
eral hours wandering through this little chateau
and the gardens, where Josephine once culti-
vated the flowers she had caused to be brought
from all parts of the globe. He fell into a
mournful revery as he again beheld these
objects, at once so dear and so saddening.
What a difference between 1815 and the years
1800, 1801, and 1802, when he was admired,
trusted, and loved by everybody! But at that

smiled, and repeated several times, "Ah, indeed, it is essentially necessary to you that I should win a battle." He did not mean by this that a victory would enable him to crush the authority of the chambers and re-establish an absolute government, for he could not see how it would be possible, in the present state of the public mind, to govern in the name of a solitary silent authority; but he hoped, when the anxieties attendant on danger would have passed away, that confidence would return, and that he would be able to infuse unity and simultaneousness of action into the public mind, and so enable the new institutions to work smoothly. Were he victorious, it is very possible he would not have confined his views to this; but at that time he was convinced that his own cause was identical with that of moderate liberty, and that the triumph of the opposite opinions would be the triumph of the Bourbons. "If we do not succeed in this attempt," he often said, "we must only yield the place to Louis XVIII." He did not foresee that even with the Bourbons themselves, supported by five hundred thousand foreigners, liberty would rise again, provided that the country were allowed the right of voting the laws and budget in an independent assembly, though that assembly were composed of the most violent royalists.

During these three days the two chambers had prepared their addresses. Many circumstances occurred in the Lower Chamber which proved its desire of remaining united to the Emperor, at the same time that it dreaded appearing servile. M. Felix Lepelletier, in replying to the motion relative to the oath, proposed that Napoleon should be styled the Saviour of the Country. The anxiety immediately depicted on every countenance showed how all dreaded that a new course of adulation was about to begin. "What will you say then," interrupted a member, "when Napoleon will have saved the country?" This inopportune proposal was put aside by some judicious remarks of a few representatives devoted to the Government. The proposed address breathed the prevailing sentiment of the time, that is, a desire to unite with Napoleon; but it also revealed a great watchfulness over the public liberty, and extreme anxiety to revise the Imperial laws and assimilate them with the "Additional Act," which it was their secret wish to remodel altogether. Even the Chamber of Peers, itself as inexperienced as the Lower Chamber, sought to adopt the prevailing tone of the time, and presented an address that said, "Should our success correspond to the justice of our cause, to our confidence in the Emperor's genius and the bravery of the army, the nation will have nothing afterward to fear but the intoxication of success and the seductions of victory." This phrase disturbed Prince Cambacérès, who asked permission to communicate it to Napoleon. The latter disapproved of it extremely, and it was changed to the following:—"Should our success correspond to the justice of our cause, . . . France asks no other result than peace. Our institutions will serve as guarantees to Europe that the French Government will never be hurried away by the seductions of victory." This correction was adopted, after a warm discussion.

Thus, as it often happens, each one, forget-

ting his individual rank and character, became the flatterer of the ruling spirit. Napoleon was to receive the two chambers before leaving, and he resolved to give them some sage advice, authorized by present circumstances, and which is not forbidden to the crown—especially when in the right—even in the most rigorously constitutional monarchy. Napoleon received the chambers on the 11th of June.

Having heard the address of the Peers, he made the following reply:—

"We are engaged in a serious struggle. It is not the intoxication of success that endangers us to-day. It is the yoke under which foreigners seek to make us pass.

"The justice of our cause, the public spirit of the nation, and the courage of the army, give us every reason to hope for success; but should we meet with a reverse, it is then that I should most desire to see the energy of this great nation displayed; it is then I would wish to see the Chamber of Peers give proofs of its devotedness to the country and to me.

"It is in times of danger that great nations, like great men, display the energy of their character, and become objects of admiration to posterity."

When Napoleon had heard the address of the Chamber of Representatives, he said,—

"It gives me pleasure to hear my own sentiments expressed by you. In our present serious position, my thoughts are all absorbed by this impending war, on which the independence and honour of France depend.

"I shall leave to-night in order to take command of the army; the movements of the enemy have rendered my presence indispensable. I shall be glad if, during my absence, a commission, appointed by both chambers, would deliberate upon the entire body of our laws.

"The Constitution is our rallying-point, it must be our polar star, in these stormy times. Every public discussion that will tend to lessen confidence in that will be a misfortune for the State. We should find ourselves in the midst of shoals, without compass or guide. We have arrived at an important crisis. Let us not imitate the example of the Lower Empire, which became the laughing-stock of posterity, because when surrounded on all sides by barbarians the people occupied themselves with the discussion of abstract questions, whilst the battering-rams of the enemy were beating in their gates."

These noble but severe remarks offended those to whom they were soon to be only too applicable; but so great was their truth and justice that they made a profound impression on the majority. It was indeed true that the dangers to be feared were not those that result from victory. It was no less true than an allusion to the Greeks of the Lower Empire attacked by Mohammed's battering-rams was inopportune. The representatives, who were present in great number, commenced to applaud loudly, but were restrained by M. Lanjuinais under pretext of deference for the crown. Napoleon would assuredly have pardoned such a breach of etiquette. The greater number, who were devoted to Napoleon as the defender of the Revolution and of France, were greatly displeased by the president's pro-

hibition. They retired each with very different sentiments,—Napoleon's friends declaiming against foreigners, whilst his enemies declared that a decree ought at once to be drawn up forbidding the dissolution of the chambers, as they asserted that should Napoleon return victorious his first act would be to dissolve them. The persons who spoke in this way did not consider that a decree of the assembly anticipating the Emperor's right to dissolve the chamber would be simply violating the constitution in the most audacious manner. The majority, believing in all sincerity that it would be a good and patriotic work to labour at the remodelling of our laws, were thinking of appointing a committee to revise and amalgamate the Imperial constitutions.

Having dismissed the members of the two chambers, Napoleon completed his preparations on the same Sunday evening, took leave of his ministers, gave his last instructions for the defence of the capital to Marshal Davout, whom he had appointed Commandant of Paris, took leave most cordially of Carnot, whose sincerity had touched him, parted coolly, but without any appearance of anger, from M. Fouché, and then passed the remaining moments with his family and friends. As the hour of strife approached his spirits rose, for he felt himself upon the ground he had ever trod as master. He folded Queen Hortense, his adopted daughter, affectionately in his arms, and said to Madame Bertrand, as he shook hands with her before getting into his carriage, "Let us hope, Madame Bertrand, that we shall not soon have to regret the island of Elba." Alas! the hour was approaching when he would have to regret every thing, even the saddest days of his past life! He set out on Monday, the 12th of June, at half-past three in the morning.

Such was, until military operations commenced, which was very soon, as we shall shortly see,—such was that fatal and sombre period called the "Hundred Days," a period that commenced with an extraordinary triumph, but soon changed into difficulties, annoyances, and gloomy presentiments. This contrast may be easily explained: from Porto Ferrajo to Paris, from the 26th of February to the 20th of March, Napoleon stood in opposition to the faults of the Bourbons, and, besides, he enjoyed a succession of successes from Porto Ferrajo to Cannes, from Cannes to Grenoble, from Grenoble to Lyons, and from Lyons to Paris. It seemed as if Fortune herself had returned to associate with her favourite; sometimes bringing a favourable wind to his flotilla, and sometimes bringing to meet him men who could not withstand his influ-

ence. But, having once entered Paris, it was no longer the faults of the Bourbons that stood opposed to him, it was his own, the faults that had accumulated during his first reign, a remedy which all his genius and repentance seemed unavailing. The Treaty of Paris, which he had so obstinately refused in 1814, and now sacrificed his crown rather than accept, he now accepted without hesitation, and offered terms of peace to Europe with a humility that well became his glory. "No," replied Europe: "you offer peace, but not sincerely." And she repulsed the suppliant with proceedings as rude as even to forbid his couriers to pass the frontiers. Napoleon next addressed himself to France with a sincere offer of liberty; but, though his temper abhorred restraint, his genius enabled him to see that he could no longer govern without the nation, and that liberty was the only choice left him. France did not reply in the same terms as Europe, but she seemed to doubt, and, to convince her of his sincerity, Napoleon was obliged to dissolve the chambers at once, those chambers filled with excited, violent, and implacable parties, who offered him no support against Europe, but their divisions. Repelled by Europe, repulsed with distrust by France at a moment that he needed all the support that she could give, Napoleon, after twenty days of joy, sank into a state of gloomy sadness, which he could not shake off when extracting from our ally the ruins the heroic but unfortunate army of Waterloo! He triumphed through the faults of the Bourbons, but sunk beneath his own, and after having presented to the world so many glorious and instructive spectacles, he offered no other more deeply moral and tragic—given sincerely, but vainly, penitent. But we must say that, midst all these vicissitudes, those twenty days of fleeting joy, those "Hundred Days" of mortal sadness, there was one spot that had not one, no, not one single day's content; and that was France! France, the hapless victim of Napoleon's faults, as well as of those of the Bourbons; a victim because he had allowed those faults to be committed, which was at once her error and her punishment. What a sad century is ours, at least for those who saw its commencement! Be it granted that the generation which succeeded us may see it close with happier days! But the men of that generation believe that it is by turning to profit the lessons in which the first half of the century abounds, and which it has been the object of this history to narrate truthfully, that they will be enabled to merit and to deserve this happy termination.

BOOK LX.

WATERLOO.

y Napoleon for opening the campaign of 1815—The fortresses being occupied, and Paris and Lyons efficiently strong garrisons, and Vendée kept in check, he still has 124,000 men under arms, to co-operate on the northern frontier.—In another month Napoleon would have had 100,000 men more, of which he determines to take the offensive immediately.—In the first place, that the enemy may not turn the most fertile and the most devoted provinces of France; and in the next, because that by coming from the east not being so forward as that coming from the north, he hoped that by coming immediately he should be able to attack them the one after the other.—His plan for concentrating and interposing them between the English and Prussians before they could suspect his coming.—Napoleon's operations at three o'clock in the morning of the 15th of June.—Takes Charleroy, overpowers the Prussians, and occupies his position between the two adverse armies.—The Prussians having Liège and the English Brussels as their bases of operations, could only combine their forces on the high-road leading from Namur to Brussels, and through Sombreffe and Quatre-Bras.—Napoleon determines to advance with his centre and right wing, in order to attack the Prussians, whilst the left wing, under Ney, would keep the English in check.—Combat of Gilly on the road to Fleurus.—Ney's hesitation at Quatre-Bras.—Notwithstanding this, every thing on the forenoon of the 15th proceeds according to Napoleon's wishes, and he has taken up the two armies so as to be able on the next day to attack the Prussians before the English could intervene.—His arrangements for the 16th.—Napoleon is obliged to defer his attack on the Prussians until, in order to allow his troops time to draw up in line of battle.—He orders Ney to seize Quatre-Bras, then to direct his column on the Prussian rear.—About the middle of the day, Napoleon with his centre, before Fleurus.—Blücher's eagerness to engage.—His position before Sombreffe, behind the villages of Ligny.—Battle of Ligny, from three until nine o'clock on the evening of the 16th.—Violent resistance at Saint-Amand and Ligny.—Fresh directions to Ney to seize Quatre-Bras, and to send a corps to the rear.—Napoleon, finding that his orders are not executed, makes a new arrangement, and, with his centre, attacks the Prussian line above Ligny.—Decisive result of this skillful manœuvre.—After immense loss, the Prussians thrown back beyond Sombreffe, and Napoleon remains master of the high-road leading from Namur to Brussels.—During the combat at Ligny, Ney, fearing that he should have to fight the British army, allows the propitious moment to escape, and does not attack until the English are in immense numbers, so that he is only able to keep them in check; and D'Erlon, on his side, going forward and sometimes to Quatre-Bras, loses the day in these marchings and countermarchings, and is of no use.—Notwithstanding this, Napoleon's plan has succeeded, for he was able to attack the Prussians before the English, and would be able on the next day to attack the English alone.—Arrangements for the 17th.—Napoleon wishes to observe the Prussians and complete their overthrow, and above all to keep them at a distance from the English, detaches his right wing under the command of Marshal Grouchy, with orders to keep up a constant communication with himself.—This wing is composed of the corps of Vandamme, fatigued from the battle of Ligny.—He himself with his centre, composed of the corps of Lobau, the reserve of cavalry, advances toward Quatre-Bras to support Ney and attack the English.—These troops occupy him during a part of the morning of the 17th, after which he sets out to join his troops, who are waiting for him at Quatre-Bras.—His surprise at finding Ney, who was to form the head of the column, inactive in the rear of the English, still believing that he was in presence of the entire English army, was waiting Napoleon's arrival.—This delay obliges the army to spend a long time in passing Quatre-Bras.—Sudden storm, which drives the English army into a marsh.—Great distress suffered by the troops.—Combat of the rear-guard at Gosselies.—The English army, which stops on the plateau of Mont Saint-Jean, in front of the forest of Soignes.—The Duke of Wellington's plan.—He intends to take up his position on the plateau of Mont Saint-Jean, to await the Prussians, and with their assistance commence a decisive engagement.—Napoleon is displeased with the English for their conduct on the 16th, he sends them word that on the 17th he will be on their left, in front of the forest of Soignes.—Prolonged reconnoitre of Napoleon on the 17th, under a shower of bullets.—His great satisfaction when he is convinced that the English are in the position of his right.—His confidence in the result.—He orders Grouchy to advance, and sends on a detachment to support the English in the rear.—Grouchy's movements on the 17th.—He needlessly follows the Prussians to Namur, and does not see his error until near the end of the day of their march toward Wavre.—Infantry toward Gembloux, but only advances two leagues and a half in a day.—However, they are not prevented from their operations in any direction.—In the evening he sends word to Napoleon that he is on the point of making every exertion to keep them from joining the English.—During the night Napoleon rises to observe the enemy.—The bivouac-fires of the English leave no doubt as to their determination to fight, and do not cease until near six in the morning, Drouot declares, in the name of the artillery, that it is too late for them to act before ten or eleven o'clock.—Napoleon determines to defer the combat until that day.—He wishes to drive the English left on the centre, and cut them off from the road to Brussels by a practicable passage through the forest of Soignes.—Distribution of his forces.—Appearance of the English army.—Napoleon ascends a hill in front of the farm of the Belle-Alliance.—At the signal of battle, he sends another officer to Grouchy to tell him of his position and to order him to attack the English on his right.—The firing commences at half-past eleven.—Great battery in the French ranks furiously on the English lines.—The firing has hardly commenced, when a dark mass is seen at Quatre-Bras.—The Light Cavalry are sent to reconnoitre.—Our left, commanded by General Reille, attacks the Prussians at Gosselies.—In spite of the enemy's resistance, both wood and orchard are taken, but the Prussians obstinately determine to seize this post.—The Light Cavalry informs Napoleon that the mass seen is the Prussian troops, and these troops Prussians.—Another officer sent to Grouchy.—Count Lobau is sent to the Prussians in check.—Attack in the centre on the road to Brussels, in order to seize Haye Sainte, to expel the left wing of the English from the plateau of Mont Saint-Jean.—Ney directs this attack, but his soldiers seize the orchard of Haye Sainte, but without succeeding in seizing the buildings of the Prussian camp.—The English left.—Excitement of the troops.—The position is taken, and the French on the plateau, when our infantry columns are assailed by a furious charge of the Scotch Dragoon into disorder because they had not been drawn up so as to be able to resist the cavalry.—Napoleon orders cuirassiers to attack the Scotch Dragoons.—Horrible slaughter of the Scotch Dragoons.—Although D'Erlon's corps had been repulsed, the attempt had to be recommenced.—The Prussians appear, and Napoleon orders Ney to stop the attack on the English, orders Ney to seize Haye Sainte, to support the centre, and to remain there until he could estimate the value of the Prussian attack.—Ney repels the first divisions of Bulow.—Ney attacks and seizes Haye Sainte.—He drives back the Prussians who were advancing to attack him, and pursues them as far as the plateau.—He sees the English in the distance, and thinks the time is come for a decisive stroke.—He asks for a reinforcement, and sends him with a division of cuirassiers, that he may be able to join Reille at the chateau de Gosselies.—The cuirassiers, falls on the English and breaks their first line.—All the reserve cavalry, and those of the Prussian army without the Emperor's orders.—Extraordinary combat of the cavalry.—Ney performs prodigies.

—Sends to Napoleon for some infantry, in order to complete the overthrow of the English army.—Napoleon engaged in a desperate combat with the Prussians, cannot send any infantry to Ney, for he has none but those of his Guard.—He sends directions to Ney to hold his position on Mont Saint-Jean as long as possible, promises to come and conclude the combat with the English, if he can conclude that with the Prussians.—Napoleon at the head of his Guards, attacks the Prussians with great fury.—Bulow is driven back with great loss.—Napoleon after this success, recalls his right wing to the centre and forms them into columns of attack, in order to put an end to the combat with the English.—First engagement of four battalions of the Guards against the British infantry.—Heroism of these battalions.—Whilst Napoleon is hastening to their assistance, he is suddenly attacked by the Prussian corps of Ziethen, the last that had arrived.—Frightful confusion.—The Duke of Wellington seizes the offensive, and our exhausted army, attacked in front, flank, and rear, without aid, overtaken by night, and unable to see Napoleon, is for several hours in a frightful state of confusion.—Disorderly retreat to Charleroi.—Disastrous operations during this fatal day.—When the cannons of Waterloo are heard, all his generals ask him to join them.—He does not understand their views, and refuses.—How easily he might have saved the army.—At the end of the day he sees his mistake, which he regrets excessively.—Character of this last campaign, and real cause of the overthrow of the French army.

NOTWITHSTANDING all the exertions Napoleon had made during the two months which elapsed from the 25th of March to the 12th of June, the result was not equal either to his efforts, his expectations, or his wants. He had in the first place reckoned on having 150,000 men to encounter the English and Prussians on the northern frontier, then after the events of La Vendée he reckoned on 130,000, and in the end he was able to assemble only 124,000 combatants in his last struggle with fortune. Any one, either theoretically or practically acquainted with the difficulties of government, will consider this a surprising result. Thus, as has been seen, when Napoleon resumed the exercise of the supreme authority on the 20th of March, he found an effective army of 180,000 men, from which subtracting the inefficient (that is, the gendarmes, the veterans, the staffs, &c. &c., amounting to 32,000) there remained 148,000 men, of which latter number there was left, when he had supplied the dépôts and made the necessary subdivisions in the different parts of the country, not quite 30,000 men whom he could concentrate on any part of the frontier. This is the truth, and will not surprise any one who has held the reins of government in a great State.

Napoleon, in order to remedy this great deficiency as quickly as possible, had recalled 50,000 men who were on six months' leave of absence, by which he increased his army from 180,000 to 230,000, and immediately after he recalled the old soldiers, who, instead of the 90,000 he had expected, brought him only an increase of 70,000 recruits, and this because a great number of them had entered the National Guards. By this last measure, his effective force on the 12th of June did not amount to 300,000, but to 288,000, as 12,000 out of the 70,000 old soldiers were still *en route* to join the army. There still remained the conscription of 1815 which ought to yield 112,000, of which 46,000 could be called out immediately and 66,000 when, as we have already explained, the law on this subject should be passed. The precautions needed with every thing connected with the conscription prevented any one being yet called out on this claim. The mobilized National Guards, who had zealously responded to the call of the State, had already furnished 170,000 men, of whom 138,000 had joined up to the 12th of June, and 32,000 more were ready to follow. Of the 138,000 National Guards who had arrived, 50,000 formed into active divisions composed the principal part of Rapp's corps on the Rhine, of Lecourbe's near Bèfort, and of Suchet's on the Alps. The remaining 88,000 were in garrison in the fortresses. The army of the line, the only really

effective force, was reduced for the moment to 288,000, and by deducting the gendarmes, veterans, &c., whom we have already mentioned, it did not amount to more than 238,000. It was divided as follows: 66,000 remained in the dépôts of the regiments, 20,000 were Rapp's corps, 12,000 in Suchet's, 4000 in Lecourbe's. (It has been already seen that the remainder of these corps were formed of the mobilized National Guards.) Four thousand were in reserve at Avignon, 7000 at Antibes under Marshal Brune, 4000 under General Clausel at Bordeaux, and about 17,000 or 18,000 were in La Vendée. There remained 124,000 fighting-men, who were all tried soldiers, all in their ranks, and all liable to those reductions which must be made in estimating the numbers of an army; the exact truth is to be known.

We must add that each succeeding day would add to the strength of these forces. Twelve thousand veteran soldiers were actually on their way to join, and there were besides 46,000 conscripts from the levy of 1815, and 30,000 or 40,000 of the mobilized National Guards, that is to say, about 100,000 men a reinforcement that would allow of 238,000 or 50,000 recruits being withdrawn from the dépôts to strengthen the army of the line, and to add 30,000 to the active divisions of the mobilized National Guards. One month would have sufficed to produce such a result, and allowing two, an additional augmentation of 100,000 men would have been obtained, and the active army would have amounted to 400,000, and the mobilized National Guards to 200,000 men. These troops were provided with every requisite. New muskets had been given to the soldiers of the line, repaired ones to the active divisions of the National Guards. The National Guards in garrison in the fortresses were obliged to exercise themselves with old muskets, which were to be successively repaired. The artillery was provided with every necessary, except that they had not a sufficient number of horses. On the 20th, Napoleon had at once procured two thousand horses, he had got six thousand from the peasantry, and raised ten thousand more, a number of which had been already distributed to the different corps. The northern army had 350 pieces of ordnance drawn by post-horses, a sufficient number, allowing about three guns to every thousand men. The army had 40,000 horses, which it was hoped to increase to 50,000. This corps was complete, all the men being tried soldiers and all the horses good. Their uniforms were almost

many in the line had but a coat. The National Guards, the unfitness of their uniforms, with a coloured collar, which was the risk of being treated by revolted peasants and not as soldiers. The prefects, being very busy in these first moments of bustle, without sufficient funds, were not able to remedy a defect which as being a serious excited great discontent among the National Guards, though it did not diminish their patriotic feeling.

Napoleon, in the space of two months, raised France from a state of anarchy, for while on the 20th of March he did not assemble an important army, on the 12th of June, he provided with every necessary, on the northern frontier, and he was not unpropitious, to give every aspect to affairs. On the 1st, and the Alps, she had the 1st, which with some additions Napoleon assembled at once in number to meet the enemy. They were well garrisoned, and each division would have added a fresh defender of the soil. Some have asked why forty thousand divided between the corps of Masséna and Suchet, where they did not meet, whilst joined with Napoleon had decided the victory. They are altogether groundless. The Jura, and the Alps could not be defended: in these places it was necessary that forces should be maintained, quickly reinforced, if danger threatened, in that direction, would be an invading army. Napoleon, for the most part, of mobilized guards; but these needed some thousand of the line added to four thousand to Lecourbe's, and Masséna to Suchet's, would give assistance, and furnish them with artillery, cavalry, and engineers, to be found among the mobilized guards. Thus, Rapp had from 10,000 men, Lecourbe from 12,000, Masséna from 30,000 to 32,000, and in conquering the Prussians and returning to the Rhine to attack the Russians, who were advancing on the northern frontier, he would find there the nucleus of an army, the addition of 70,000 or 80,000 that he would bring with him, 120,000 men. Certainly less was needed for the Rhine, the Jura, and in doing this he had but done what was entirely indispensable, at the same time sufficient resources to strike the blow in the north. Of all generals, Napoleon, not one understood so well how to distribute his forces, so as to do every thing, without doing what was indispensable, reserving at the same time the force for decisive operations. It is not by any means weakened in 1815.

It is said shows how great would

have been the folly of hastening to the Rhine on the morrow of the 20th of March, to take advantage of the enthusiasm excited by the miraculous return from Elba. Had Napoleon done so, he would have met forces triple and quadruple the strength of his own; he would, by going so far, have made the reconstruction of our regiments more difficult and almost impossible; and finally he would have turned against him all those who desired that every means of preserving peace should be tried, and who would not pardon his going to war unless it was absolutely inevitable. But if it were wise to wait until our forces were drawn from the inefficient state in which they were on the 20th of March, and until the hostile dispositions of Europe were no longer doubtful, there remained an important question, whether, having waited until the middle of June, it would not have been better to wait until the middle of July or August, when our forces would have been completely organized.

In fact, as Blücher and Wellington had determined to remain inactive at the head of the northern columns until the eastern column, under Prince Schwarzenberg, could be brought into action, a month would have been of the greatest importance for the development of our resources. The old soldiers, the conscripts of 1815, the mobilized National Guards, would all have joined, by which we should have had an additional hundred thousand men, who would have almost all been draughted into the active army, and Napoleon would have had 200,000 instead of 124,000 men under his command. If, whilst thus waiting, he had, as in 1814, allowed the enemy to advance into the heart of our provinces, the two armies of our enemies could not have been able to reach, the one Langres, the other Laon, before the 1st of August. The dépôts in retiring would have added large numbers of men to the different regiments; Rapp evacuating Alsace would have joined Napoleon, who would thus have 250,000 men under his immediate command. Meanwhile, Paris would have been filled with sailors, federalists, and men from the dépôts, and might have accumulated a hundred thousand defenders. Lyons, surrounded by solid fortifications, would have been filled with sailors from Toulon, with National Guards from Dauphiné, Franche-Comté, and Auvergne; Suchet with Lecourbe would have appeared before Lyons with fifty thousand men; and then, whilst Suchet at Lyons defended the south, Napoleon at the head of 250,000 men, and Paris well defended in his rear, would have defended the north, and there could be no doubt of the result of the campaign, even though, as it was asserted, the invaders amounted to 500,000, of whom at least 100,000 would have been detained in the rear. Now, when it is remembered what Napoleon effected in 1814 with seventy thousand men, whilst Paris was undefended by a single cannon, general, or soldier, and Lyons abandoned to the incapacity of Augereau, we must repeat that it cannot but be regretted that he had not confined himself to the defensive instead of acting on the offensive. But acting on the defensive, however advantageous it may seem, had very serious drawbacks. The eastern and northern provinces, the fairest, richest, and most devoted of all

France, would have been sacrificed without striking a blow, their immense resources abandoned to the enemy, and themselves exposed to a second invasion, after having suffered so much from the first, and this at a time when they had furnished nearly 170,000 mobilized National Guards, who would be led into the interior, whilst they left their wives, children, and property exposed to the enemy. This, besides being an immense sacrifice, would have been both cruel and ungrateful, and an acknowledgment of impotency to the people of France, who were tortured with anxiety, and who would be justified in believing that such conduct was an avowal of weakness on the part of the Government. The liberal and revolutionary party would have been dejected and dispirited, whilst the royalists would have become more audacious than ever. The Parisians and members of the chambers, already sufficiently anxious, would have become more excited, embittered, and still more disunited. Had Napoleon abandoned Alsace, Franche-Comté, Burgundy, Lorraine, and Champagne to the enemy, after having deprived them of their best defenders, he would have done little less than proclaim his own weakness, encourage his enemies, dispirit his friends, keep the country and himself in a state of painful anxiety for two months, and abandon the chambers to all the vacillations consequent on a state of terror: all this would have occasioned serious disadvantages, and, even without taking Napoleon's natural impetuosity into account, it is evident that any other plan would have been more agreeable to him.

And there was one, of whose expediency he had no doubt, and on which he meditated with all his own peculiar force of thought. The two invading columns were a hundred leagues apart, and, besides this, the eastern column would not be ready for action before the middle of July, that is, a month later than the northern, so that they would be prevented both by distance and time from assisting each other. Wellington and Blücher were encamped along the northern frontier behind Charleroy, and though near each other, were not so much so but that it would be possible, for the accomplishment of some great design, to penetrate between them. The one had his base of operations at Brussels, the other at Liege. They had tried to keep up a communication by stationing numerous posts on the left and right of the Sambre, which flowed between them; but they had done this after the manner of second-rate minds, who have rather glimpses than defined views of things, whilst Napoleon at Paris, with that clear glance which nature had made so prompt and experience so sure, saw where he could penetrate between their badly-united camps, attack first the Prussians, drive them back upon the Meuse, and then the English, whom he would force to retire toward the sea, and by this one blow produce an advantageous change of opinion in Europe, operating on the spirit of party that divided the British Parliament at London, and on the apprehensions of the Austrians at Vienna. Having conquered the northern column, he could return to that on the east, and having, between fighting and conquering, passed that month that was to bring him an additional hundred thousand men,

he would have made a better impression these, and possibly increased their numbers, then, falling with them on Prince Scherberg, he might probably force him back to the Rhine, and then, if he were not too weak, might obtain peace from the disconcerted of Europe. Supposing even that Napoleon perceived himself, that this daring offensive movement had not the expected success, the nothing to prevent his return to the del that is, to disputing the French soil a foot, as he had done in 1814, and after exhausted all the chances of the first, could return to the second without missing his position. Having fought in Alsace, Franche-Comté, Lorraine, Burgundy, and Champagne, these provinces could complain of his abandoning them, and by trying the offensive before having resumed the defensive, he would not have begun single favourable chance for the country himself.

There was but one objection to this plan, that was a serious one. In tempting fate so boldly in the midst of the English and Prussian forces, he ran the risk of a partial defeat, and then all these resources so laboriously accumulated would, together with the Government itself, be annihilated. This was Napoleon's reason for objecting to the immediate assembling of the chambers, for a defeat might throw them into a kind of frenzy. If the thing was done, and it was necessary to give a better tone to the chambers, the power and all, by endeavouring to obtain a decisive success as soon as possible. Napoleon's superior powers of penetration showed him that this decisive success might be achieved, and he now sought it with all that impetuous peculiar to generals inspired by genius. Political genius manifests itself in most cases in knowing how to wait for a favourable opportunity, but military inspiration sees at a glance where a blow can be struck, and strikes it. Thus, whilst the greatest politicians have been distinguished for their patience, the great generals have signalized themselves by promptness in action. Each order of mind has its own inconveniences, and acts according to the laws of its nature. Napoleon, therefore, influenced by the peculiarities both of his own nature, and of the position in which he was placed, determined to attack the English and Prussians with the 124,000 men under his immediate command, and afterward, aided by the reinforcements he expected, to attack the Russians and Austrians. This plan he formed early, and meditated on with invincible profoundness of calculation, and, as we shall see, it was singularly successful at its commencement.

Whilst the Prussians had their base of operations at Liege, and the English near Brussels, with a line of communication kept up by posts on both sides of the Sambre, Napoleon had his 124,000 men extended in a long line of encampment from Liege to Metz, with his rear-guard at Paris. It was necessary to concentrate these forces rapidly, that he could assemble them within a space of two or three leagues, and this without alarming the carelessness of his enemies, or at least after they but to half suspect his intentions, and while

confine themselves to half-measures was at Lille, under the Erlon, the second under Reille, the third under Vandamme, at fourth under Gérard, at Metz, under Lobau, at Paris, so that hundred leagues between D'Erlon and Gérard to the right, and sixty in and the rear. To concentrate under such circumstances was no Let us see what measures Napoleon the successful result of this

ent of the troops through Soissons and Maubeuge, in proceeding from frontier, could give no intimation designs, as it was the route by regiments had been passing for a es, a great portion of the enemy's in the northern frontier, it was he French troops should march on, as others had advanced to-rasbourg, and Lille.

o ascertain the truth, it would essary to calculate what number y each of these routes; but the is never either sufficiently well efficiently vigilant to make such r clear-sighted enough to draw rect conclusions, excepting when an of genius. Napoleon had con- off successively the divisions y the Count de Lobau and those with all the *matériel* of the artil- ed by any other apprehension allied generals might divine that eing assembled in the north of which could cause no surprise, at direction that the bulk of the Prussian troops was collected. most likely to excite suspicion the left to the right, from Lille and that from the right to the z to Maubeuge, for these might sign of concentrating his forces on of Maubeuge, and of after- on Charleroy. Gérard's corps, t remote, was the first put into fortunately the number of the

Metz was very small, conse- was to be feared from their vigan- mission of intelligence. Na- d General Gérard to quit Metz June, with all possible secrecy, ates, and take special care that fitted the fortress. He was to rse to Philippeville without al- the officers to know whither he boby, with the exception of the was acquainted with the plan of , and General Gérard himself, nfidence which he had earned, s fact, that he was advancing on

General d'Erlon, the most re- centre, next after General Gé- ers to put his troops in motion at is to say, two days later than s, and to advance from Lille to observing in like manner the ey. General Reille was to set ncienness on the 11th of June, as ched the town, and advance to- ge, which Vandamme, who was

at Mézières, could reach in a very short time. However, as the movements from Lille to Valenciennes and from Valenciennes to Maubeuge might awaken suspicion, Napoleon conceived an ingenious mode of deceiving the Duke of Wellington, to whom he gave credit for possessing much more penetration than Marshal Blücher. He foresaw very clearly that the British general, having come by sea, and depending on the sea for his reinforcements, would take every precaution that he should not be cut off from this base of operation. He therefore ordered that the mobilized National Guards should issue from Lille, from Dunkirk and the neighbouring fortresses, and make such a movement toward the advanced posts of the enemy as might indicate serious operations. This movement was so arranged that it was distinctly visible and apparently directed toward the coast, so that if intelligence arrived of the departure of the troops from Metz and Mézières, it might be supposed that the general tendency of the French troops was to advance toward Lille, Ghent, and Antwerp. Besides, intelligence of these indications of our march—supposing the enemy to be more vigilant and better served than was the case—would not reach the head-quarters at Brussels for two, three, or four days after being received, and, moreover, this intelligence would be so contradictory that it would disturb without enlightening, and could not lead to the adoption of any line of conduct before the concentration of the French troops would have been effected. All the French corps were, consequently, advancing to their destination when Napoleon left Paris on the 12th of June.

Having left the palace of the Elysée at half-past three in the morning, he stopped for a few moments at Soissons, where he inspected the works erected to defend that place from a *coup-de-main*, gave, according to custom, a number of orders, and passed the remainder of the day at Laon. The next day, the 13th, he examined the position where he had fought the sanguinary battle the preceding year, gave orders for what would be necessary to secure possession of the place in case of a forced retreat, and on the evening of that day he slept at Avesnes. After inspecting the state of the magazines here, and listening to the report of his spies, who informed him that the enemy was perfectly quiet, he rested on the evening of the 14th at Beaumont, in the centre of a vast forest that bordered the frontier. The accounts of all our *corps d'armée* were excellent. Gérard had marched across Lorraine and the Ardennes without the slightest intimation of his movements having reached the Prussians. Some intelligence of what was going on at Lille and Valenciennes had reached the enemy, but the strong demonstration made before Lille had induced the belief that the French had designs on Ghent, and probably on Antwerp. Napoleon had all his *corps d'armée* around him, within a distance of five or six leagues from each other, masked by a dense forest, and unperceived by the enemy, judging by their immobility. We shall describe how the corps were located on the evening of the 14th.

Count d'Erlon was stationed on the left, at Solre-sur-Sambre, with the first corps, com-

prising about 20,000 infantry, and on the same line, General Reille was encamped at Leers-Fosteau with the 2d corps, 23,000 strong. These two generals were to form the left wing of the army, which would thus amount to between 43,000 and 44,000 infantry. On the right, but at twice the distance, because he came from Metz, General Gérard had passed the night at Philippeville with the 4th corps, comprising an effective body of from 15,000 to 16,000 combatants. These were intended to form the right wing of the army at a later period, after receiving various reinforcements. Lastly, in the centre, that is to say, at Beaumont, were Vandamme with the 3d corps, that had come from Mézières, and which amounted to 17,000 men, the Count de Lobau with the 6th corps, that had been raised at Paris, and which was reduced to 10,000 men by the detachments sent to Vendée; lastly the Guard, comprising 13,000 infantry, 6000 cavalry, and 2000 artillery, amounting in all to 20,000 fighting-men. Napoleon, leaving, as was his custom in all his campaigns, to each corps *d'armée* only as much cavalry as was absolutely necessary, had divided the bulk of this branch of the army into four special corps, comprising the Light Cavalry under Pajol, the Dragoons under Exelmans, the Cuirassiers under Generals Kellermann and Milhaud, the four corps composing a superb reserve of 13,000 tried cavalry, which he intended to employ as circumstances should require. Having neither Murat, nor Bessières, nor Montbrun, nor Lasalle, to command them, some of these generals having succumbed to fortune, others to death, he selected Grouchy, who had a short time before been created marshal. Grouchy was a good cavalry officer, more competent to execute than to plan a military movement, in a word, more proper to obey than to command. To these troops must be added 4000 or 5000 soldiers attached to the artillery parks and trains, completing the effective force assembled round Beaumont. Never had so difficult a military operation been so successfully effected, for 124,000 men and 350 pieces of cannon had been concentrated on the borders of a forest whose density alone separated them from the enemy. And yet this enemy was unaware of their presence.

The moral disposition of the troops, as regarded devotedness to their chief and ardour for battle, exceeded any thing ever before witnessed. There was not a man among them who had not seen service. The most inexperienced in those ranks had made the campaigns of 1814 and 1813. Two-thirds were veteran soldiers, returned from remote garrisons, or from Russian and English prisons. Authors of the revolution of the 20th of March, they still burned with the fanaticism of that period.* No sooner did they behold Napoleon than they exclaimed, "Long live the Emperor!" with a fervour at once military and patriotic. The recalled half-pay officers shared

the sentiments of the soldiers. Unfortunately the regiments had been re-cast several times first under the Bourbons, then under Napoleon, and there were to be found in the number of officers, strangers to the regiments though having seen much service, and were not sufficiently well known by the soldiers when they were appointed to command. This was one of the grounds for the general distrust that prevailed with regard to the officers. It was a common opinion in the ranks that only the marshals, but the generals and the officers of a lower grade, had come to terms with the Bourbons; that Napoleon's return from Elba had been a disagreeable surprise to them, and that consequently their fidelity in the approaching struggle would be at least doubtful. This opinion, which was true in some respects, was false in others, for officers of high rank, though they had beheld Napoleon's return with regret, were for the most part incapable of betraying him, at least before fortune should have declared against him. It cost them a struggle to attach themselves again to his cause, but they felt that the honour and the glory of France were at stake, and they were ready to fight to the last. So must we forget that there were among the officers many who had contributed to the revolution of the 20th of March, and these were ready to combat, not alone with courage, but with passion. Still the soldiers, formerly attached to Napoleon, had little confidence in their officers. It was a general belief that some of them held communication with the Bourbons. All who did not express themselves with as much ardour as the soldiers became immediately objects of suspicion. The business was become, to all intents and purposes, a state where the soldiers and officers talked politics and discussed the conduct of their generals, as partisans discuss the proceedings of their political chiefs. These dispositions, though they did not detract from the military value of the combatants, acted injuriously as regards the spirit of subordination, unity, and tranquillity. In a word, this army, though inflamed with military enthusiasm, wanted cohesion; but Napoleon acted as a combining force, and when he appeared the army recognised in him its centre of unity. All were enlightened at the prospect of encountering the enemy on the morrow, and of avenging the disasters of 1813 and 1814, and never were beheld more noble and touching victims than these soldiers, all eager to pour forth their blood in the sacred cause of patriotism.

Napoleon was determined to rally the ardour of his soldiers, and to lead them that very night into the midst of the English and Prussian bivouacs. As he had foreseen, the two allied generals, though aware that it was necessary to remain as close as possible to each other, had, however, neglected to guard the connecting space between their movements, and had not taken the precautions necessary to prevent an adverse success. The Duke of Wellington was wholly occupied with the design of covering the Low Countries, Blücher was equally anxious to defend the route to the Rhenish provinces, and had taken up a position conformable to the object he had in view. The Saxons, being

* General Foy, in his military journal, to which his son has been so obliging as to give me access, writes, on the 14th of June, "The troops exhibit not patriotism, not enthusiasm, but an actual mania for the Emperor and against his enemies. No one doubts that victory will declare for France."

h position toward that of the
 ng with the Meuse near Namur,
 mp of the two allied generals.
 four *corps d'armée*, each con-
 30,000 men, forming a total
 antants, occupied the banks of
 the Meuse. Bulow was at
 the corps, Thielmann, with the
 between Dinant and Namur,
 the 2d, was at Namur.
 e 1st corps, actually touching
 d two of his divisions at Charle-
 utposts beyond the Sambre,
 sts of Beaumont, which hid us-
 tion. The two other divisions
 of Charleroy, communicating
 the English army stationed
 the Low Countries. A fine
 l from Namur to Brussels
 effe, Quatre-Bras, Genappe,
 , and Waterloo. This route
 med the most important means
 on for the allies, as it was on
 that the Prussians and Eng-
 for mutual assistance. They
 mised to repair thither should
 ed on that frontier, for Charle-
 e or six leagues distant from
 iding from Namur to Brussels.
 he left on leaving Charleroy,
 s route at Quatre-Bras, and
 high-road to Brussels. By
 ight, you reached Sombreffe,
 route to Namur and Liege.
 count that the Prussians kept
 s divisions at Charleroy and
 urus and Sombreffe.
 Wellington had under his com-
 men, English, Hanoverians,
 Brunswickers, and subjects of
 English were old soldiers, tried
 warfare, and justly proud of
 Spain. The most brilliant
 ish army, after the English,
 legion, composed of the wreck
 Hanoverian army, recruited
 nd thoroughly warlike. The
 the Hanoverians properly so
 wickers, and the Nassau corps,
 in 1813 and 1814, when all
 inst us; of these, some were
 ps of the line, others acted as
 . The troops of the line
 soldiers than the militia, but
 ted by intense hatred against
 essed boundless confidence in
 . They were judiciously dis-
 English troops, so as to par-
 olid discipline. In this mass,
 ounted to 38,000 men, the
 erman legion to 7000 or 8000,
 to 15,000, the Dutch-Belgians
 runswickers to 6000, and the
 u, much attached, as was natu-
 of Nassau-Orange, to 7000.
 ellington, as we have already
 ured to persuade Blücher to
 perations until the second in-
 composed of Russians, Aus-
 s, Württembergers, &c., which
 an easterly direction, should
 he same distance from Paris
 at came from the north. In

order to kill time and satisfy the restless
 ardour of the Prussians, the Duke of Well-
 ington consented to undertake some sieges, and
 for this purpose some parks of artillery had
 been prepared. But whilst thus occupied they
 had taken but slight precautions to defend
 themselves against a sudden attack of the
 French. The Duke of Wellington, whose per-
 spicacity was here at fault, had only thought
 of defending himself against an attack upon
 the coast, for which, however, there were no
 grounds of apprehension, for had Napoleon
 cut him off from Antwerp, he certainly could
 not have cut him off from Amsterdam, and
 consequently could not have deprived him of
 his base of operations, whilst, on the other
 hand, he had a manifest interest in separating
 him from Blücher, and of throwing his forces
 between those of the English and Prussians,
 and of engaging them one after the other.
 Of this latter danger, which was certainly the
 more real, neither the Duke of Wellington nor
 Blücher had the slightest suspicion. But,
 taught by the lessons they had received from
 Napoleon, of the necessity of keeping as close
 as possible to each other, they had promised
 to meet on the high-road leading from Namur
 to Brussels in case an attack should be made
 in the direction of Charleroy. They were to
 hasten thither as quickly as possible, the one
 from Brussels, the others from Namur and
 Liege. The Duke of Wellington had divided
 his army into three bodies. That forming his
 right, under the command of the brave and
 excellent General Hill, extended from Oude-
 narde to Ath; another, under the brilliant
 Prince of Orange, occupied the space between
 Ath and Nivelles, not far from Charleroy and
 the Sambre. The third body was kept as a
 reserve at Brussels. By this arrangement, the
 Duke of Wellington had designed to put him-
 self in a position to concentrate his forces,
 either on the right in case of an attack in the
 direction of the sea, or on the left in the
 event of being called to the aid of the Prussians.
 But for the carrying out this double purpose
 his corps were too dispersed, for two or three
 days at least would have been necessary to
 combine them either on the right or the left.
 However this might be, in case of an attack in
 the direction of Charleroy, against the English
 or the Prussians, the rallying-point had been
 fixed on the high-road between Namur and
 Brussels, and it was for the defence of this
 road that the Prussian corps of Ziethen had
 been stationed as we have described,—two
 divisions at Charleroy on the Sambre, two
 others in the rear between Fleurus and Som-
 breffe.

On the evening of the 14th of June, the
 English entertained none, or at least very
 slight suspicions of the designs of the French.
 It was merely known that there had been some
 movement on the frontier, but no one suspected
 the object or gravity of this movement. It
 was indeed a great and marvellous operation
 to have assembled within four or five leagues
 of the enemy an army of 124,000 men, coming
 too from places so remote as Lille, Metz, and
 Paris, and all this effected without the English
 and Prussian generals conceiving the slightest
 suspicion of the proceeding. The history of
 military warfare does not, that we are aware,

chronicle a like phenomenon. Napoleon was not the man to lose the fruit of a first success, by delaying to profit by it. He resolved to commence operations on the night of the 14-15th, to advance suddenly upon Charleroy and surprise the place, which was probably ill guarded, to cross the Sambre and fall suddenly on the high-road leading from Namur to Brussels, certain that, however closely located to each other the English and Prussians might be, he would find them feebly defended at their point of junction, and would succeed in taking up a position between them with the mass of his forces. He had given minute directions that in the bivouacs every thing should be kept as quiet as possible, that the fires should be kept low, and that no traveller or peasant should be allowed to pass, in order to retard as long as possible positive intelligence of our approach. Vague rumours had certainly found circulation; but these, as experience proves, seldom move the threatened enemy to decisive resolutions.

On the evening of the 14th, Napoleon gave the following orders. At three in the morning all our heads of columns were to move forward, so as to reach the Sambre about nine or ten o'clock. On the left, General Reille was to advance from Leers-Fostean to Marchiennes, seize the bridge of Marchiennes, situate about half a league beyond Charleroy, cross the Sambre at that point, and be in a position to execute the ulterior instructions received from head-quarters. Count d'Erlon, with the 1st corps, leaving his post two leagues beyond Solre-sur-Sambre, was to enter Marchiennes two hours after General Reille, and take up a position in his rear. In the centre, General Vandamme, quitting the environs of Beaumont, had positive orders to appear before Charleroy between nine and ten o'clock in the morning. General Rogiat was to march with him, accompanied by the engineers and marines of the Guard, in order to break down the bridge and gates of Charleroy. General Pajol had orders to escort Rogiat with the light cavalry belonging to the reserve. Napoleon intended to accompany him at the head of four squadrons of the Guard, in order to see and direct every thing in person. Count de Lobau had orders to set out with the 6th corps one hour after General Vandamme's departure, in order that the latter might have time to defile through the forest. The Guard was to leave an hour after the Count de Lobau. The baggage-carts were not allowed to accompany the different corps; orders were given that they should not move until all the troops should have defiled. Lastly, General Gérard, who had then only reached Philippeville, was to leave at three in the morning, fall suddenly on the Châtelet, two leagues below Charleroy, cross the Sambre at that point, and take up a position on the left bank, and there wait orders from head-quarters. Thus, between nine and ten in the morning, 124,000 men were to rush from all points on the Sambre, both above and below Charleroy, and it would be strange if, concentrated within a space of two leagues, they did not succeed in piercing the enemy's line, however strong it might be.

At three o'clock on the morning of the 15th of June, the entire army, with the exception

of Vandamme, who, however, ought to have been the first to set out, was in motion. Yet there was no more skillful or able general than Vandamme, nor more devoted, to the cause of the Empire, at least to that of the French Revolution. He was quite willing to fight, but he had not corrected his characteristic defects—violence of temper and lack of ease. He had been compelled to quit Beaumont, to give place to the corps of Lobau, the Imperial Guard, and the Emperor. He made a considerable display of ill-humour, he had taken up a position on the right, and had concealed himself in a country-house, and sheltered from view. Marshal Soult possessed all the qualities that ought to belong to the head of the staff, except precision and experience; he had not, as Berthier would have done, expedited his orders two and three times in succession, to make sure of their execution. The single officer despatched by Vandamme sought him during a long time, broke his leg in the search, and was unable to transfer his mission to another. Furious, unaware of what was going on, remained quietly sleeping in his bivouac. General Rogiat, having reached his quarters, expressed his astonishment at finding him asleep, and informed him that he ought immediately to advance on Charleroy. Vandamme, shocked at General Rogiat's tone, told him sternly that he had not received instructions from head-quarters, and that it was not his duty as a junior officer that he was to take orders. However, in spite of this reply, Vandamme prepared to march. But it took some time to awaken, assemble, and put 17,000 men in motion, and it was not until between five and six in the morning that the 3d corps was advancing toward Charleroy. Having to defile by narrow paths through a dense forest and long straggling villages, Vandamme was not able to advance very rapidly, and his three hours' delay retarded in the same proportion the progress of the corps of Lobau and the Guard, who were to follow on the same route. Fortunately General Rogiat did not wait for the infantry, and, finding himself sufficiently strong with Pajol's light cavalry, he advanced upon Charleroy. Napoleon, annoyed at seeing the road so many troops, all going to their destination, pressed forward with all possible expedition at the head of the squadrons of the Guard that accompanied him.

Meanwhile, Pajol, securing the enemy with his light cavalry, drove back the Prussian posts, after making two or three hundred prisoners. Rogiat, who followed with six companies of engineers and marines of the Guard, suddenly attacked the bridge of Charleroy, and seized it before the enemy had time to destroy it. He blew up the gate of the town and entered, thus opening a passage to Pajol. The latter passed through Charleroy at full gallop, and pursued the Prussians who were hastily retreating.

Within a short distance of Charleroy, the road branches off in two directions. The one tending to the left joins at Quatre-Bras, the other to the right at Sombreffe, the high-road from Namur to Brussels, of which we have already spoken. The Prussians, anxious to keep possession of this road, by which Blücher and

Id combine their forces, retreated | branch roads that led to this is to say, the roads leading to Namur, but the fugitives were s on the latter route. Pajol lonel Clary with the 1st Hussars issels route, and with the res cavalry he advanced toward y followed by Exelmans' dra-

vents were taking place upon the Beaumont and Charleroy, Gene- had left Leers-Fosteau at three t with the 2d corps, had encoun- sants at the entrance of the wood -Tilleul, had defeated them, and ree to four hundred prisoners. ly advanced on Marchiennes, idge, and crossed the Sambre in the morning. He afterward r as Jumel and Gosselies in the russels. Here he paused to give uthing-time and to await orders rters. Count d'Erlon, who had ore remote point with the 1st t yet reached the Sambre. On ral Gérard, having been delayed ivisions, had not left Philippe- ate hour, and, whether on this ause of the distance he had to lay was far advanced when he ridge of the Châtelet with the at these diverse delays were un- the Sambre was crossed at two iennes and Charleroy—and Na- a few hours throw a body of tween the English and the Prus- o render their junction impos-

llowing closely Generals Rognat sed through Charleroy between elve o'clock; he did not stop ed his light cavalry as quickly e advanced to where the Charle- es into two branches,—one lead- i, the other to Namur. Fearing Clary might not be sufficiently s regiment of Hussars to oppose who had retreated in the direction ordered General Lefebvre-Desno- manded the light cavalry of the ort Clary with his division of 2500 ordered General Duhesme, who e infantry of the Young Guard, egiment as soon as it arrived, ry and Lefebvre-Desnoëttes. He e despatched orders to his left, s Reille and D'Erlon were placed, o press forward to Gosselies, late large masses in the direction ie point from which the English eir appearance. General Reille, t seen, having crossed the Sam- iennes, was marching toward selies, and could concentrate on point 23,000 infantry.

n these precautions with regard els route, Napoleon advanced nur road, where he was to en- ussians, and where they might e very numerous, their head- at Namur, that is to say, at a ren or eight leagues, whilst the

head-quarters of the English, established at Brussels, were at a distance of fourteen leagues.

Of the two divisions of the Prussian corps of Ziethen that occupied Charleroy, one, the Steinmetz division, had retired along the Brussels route, the other, the division of Pirch II.,* had retreated along the Namur route, passing through Fleurus and Sombreffe. The latter had stopped at the village of Gilly, situate on the Fleurus road, about a mile distant from Charleroy. Pajol had followed with the light cavalry, Exelmans with the dragoons, and Grouchy himself, at the head of the cavalry reserve, had taken the command of this advance-guard. General Ziethen had orders, in case of attack, to resist, so as to retard our advance, but not to enter into a serious engagement. Seeing himself pursued by 6000 horse, he evacuated the village of Gilly, and took up a position behind a wide brook that, passing by the Abbey of Soleilmont, falls into the Sambre near the Châtelet. Acting under the orders of Ziethen, General Pirch had barricaded the bridge that crossed this brook, stationed two battalions in the rear, and several others on the left and right of the route in the woods of Trichehève and Soleilmont. He determined to await the French in this position, which enabled him to offer a prolonged resistance. Marshal Grouchy, on his side, though having under his command the divisions of Pajol and Exelmans, thought it better not to advance, for the cavalry was not sufficient to overcome the obstacle he had to contend with, and he would be exposed to an unprofitable loss of a large number of men.

Such was the position in which Napoleon found things on his arrival at Gilly. He quickly decided on a course of action, with that correctness of judgment that never deserted him in military affairs. Before him lay a chain of wooded hillocks, whose base was washed by the stream of Soleilmont. On the opposite side lay the plain of Fleurus, celebrated by the battle fought there by Generals Jourdan and Kleber, and where an encounter with the Prussians was now very probable, for the high-road leading from Namur to Brussels ran straight through it. Napoleon, who was very anxious for this encounter, in order to beat the Prussians before engaging the English, wished to secure an entrance to the plain of Fleurus; but he had no intention of occupying the plain, for that would have driven away the Prussians, a movement that would have defeated his designs. Up to this point every thing had occurred as he had foreseen and wished. He had conceived the belief that the English and Prussians, however much it might be their interest to remain in close proximity to each other, would, notwithstanding, leave between their respective forces a space not very strongly guarded, and he thought that by bringing the whole strength of his army to bear upon this point he might become master of the position. This calculation, so profound, was fully verified. La Sambre, which had been so happily snatched from the enemy,

* There were in the Prussian army two generals of the name of Pirch.—Pirch I. and Pirch II.: Pirch I. commanded Blücher's 2d corps d'armée; Pirch II. commanded a division under the orders of Ziethen, who was at the head of the 1st corps.

afforded a view of the space which separated the English and the Prussians. The French saw that they had the English on their left in the direction of Brussels, their advance-posts within five or six leagues, and the main body at a distance of twelve or fourteen. The Prussians were on the right, in the direction of Namur, their advance-posts within two or three leagues, the main body at a distance of five or six. Napoleon's object in endeavouring to take a position between the English and the Prussians being to encounter them separately, it was necessary to do two things—to attack one of these two armies immediately, and to oppose an obstacle to the advance of the other whilst so engaged. The necessity of accomplishing these two designs was evident; but which of the two armies ought to be attacked first? The Prussians, evidently: in the first place, because the Prussians were in closer proximity to us, and secondly, because, if we left them on our right, they would have come up on our rear, and attacked us at a disadvantage during our engagement with the English. Besides, owing to the enterprising spirit of their chief, the Prussians would probably be impatient to fight, and would profit by their proximity to come to blows with us, whilst the English, by reason of the distance and by reason of their natural sluggishness, would give us time to overwhelm their allies before coming to their assistance. But being placed under the necessity of first engaging with the Prussians, it naturally followed that, instead of preventing them from taking possession of the plain of Fleurus, it would be more our interest to aid their design, as otherwise they might execute a great retrograde movement, and, passing through Wavre, join the English in the rear of Brussels. Now, if the two allied armies operated a junction beyond Brussels, Napoleon's plan would be defeated, and his position rendered most dangerous; for he could not advance into Belgium, as he would have to retrace his steps to face the invading column that was coming from the east, and he could not encounter 220,000 men with 120,000, unless he could find the means of engaging them separately. If he found the two adverse armies combined, he would be obliged to recross the frontier with the consciousness that his plans had been defeated and his tactics brought into contempt. It would therefore be imprudent to advance farther than Fleurus in the direction of Namur, whilst on the contrary, in the direction of Brussels, it was indispensable to take up a position which would prevent the English reaching the battle-field on which we should fight the Prussians.

Ziethen's corps having, as we have said, taken up a position behind the bridge of Soleilmont, and in the woods that bordered the road on the right and left, it was absolutely necessary to dislodge them, in order to become masters of the *débouché* of the plain of Fleurus, but not to go one step beyond. Napoleon therefore ordered Grouchy to force the stream, beat the woods, and reconnoitre the country as far but not farther than Fleurus. Having given these orders, he retraced his steps at full gallop, to take cognizance of what might occur in the direction of Brussels. He sent orders to Vandamme, who had not reached Charleroy

until noon, and who had spent two hours traversing the narrow streets of that city, to hasten, in the first place, to make up Lobau and the Guard, and in the next, to might come to the support of Grouchy. It was the 15th of June, the heat was such that a portion of the troops had already lost five, the others seven, leagues. But the day was not diminished, and they went to advance rapidly in every appointed direction. After having given orders to Vandamme to hasten his march, Napoleon, advancing beyond the point where the Charleroy road branches, advanced a short way upon the line leading to Brussels. This branch road, as we have already said, joined at Quatre-Bras the highway leading from Namur to Brussels, forming the line of communication between the two allied armies. The position of Quatre-Bras was, therefore, a question of importance, for it was, at the same time, the route by which the English army could reach the Prussians, and the point where the English general could concentrate his own troops. Napoleon had already seen how the Duke of Wellington, having established his reserve at Brussels, ranged in advance and in a semicircle the main body of his army, so that the one under General Hill occupied the space between Oudenarde and Ath, and those under the Prince of Orange extended from Ath to Nivelles. Nivelles was, consequently, the point by which the English could combine their operations with their left wing; besides, a paved road led from Nivelles by a very short journey to Quatre-Bras, so called on account of the roads which crossed at that point, and here—at Quatre-Bras—the English would meet their reinforcements arriving from Brussels, so that this would be the same time the rallying-point of the English with the Prussians, and the point of concentration for the English themselves. It was therefore, in this vast theatre of military operations, was of equal importance. As it was naturally of as much value to us as to the allies, Napoleon looked upon it as essential to the success of his plan of operations that Quatre-Bras should be invincibly occupied, in order that the English might not be able, by means of long and tedious *détours*, either to concentrate their own forces or join those of the Prussians. It was influenced by these motives that Napoleon had taken possession of Charleroy rather than he sent forward in the direction of Quatre-Bras, first, Colonel Clary with a regiment of hussars, then Lefebvre-Desnoettes with a light cavalry of the Guard, then one of the infantry regiments of the Young Guard, and, lastly, the corps of Reille and D'Erlon, numbering 40,000 infantry and 3000 horse. All these forces were despatched to keep the English in check whilst Napoleon engaged the Prussians with 80,000 men. While Napoleon was advanced a little beyond the point of bifurcation, urging forward his troops as fast as possible, he perceived Marshal Ney coming in all haste, followed by a single aide-de-camp, Colonel Heymes. Napoleon, we must remember, had given him, after the 23rd of April, a mission to the frontier, in order to diminish the embarrassment of his position by removing him from Paris, and, this mission being accomplished, he had allowed him to remain at the

, which the marshal had quitted ere any of the Champ-de-Mai. Napoleon must remember, had exhibited his march toward the marshal on the 10th of June. Wishing, however, to show the marshal's great energy, he had not, on leaving Paris, to join him as early as possible if he wished to be present at the first battle. Ney received this news that he had only time to take with him his aide-de-camp, Heymès, and set out on his march without any military equipment, even horses, he was obliged to use those of Marshal Mortier, who was ill at the time. The marshal arrived knowing nothing of the French position, ignorant of what position he was in, and of what troops he was to command. He was in a state of feverish agitation on the discontent he felt with the French, and therefore not possessing the calmness of mind necessary in difficulties, though his extraordinary energy was greater than at that moment. Having welcomed the marshal, told him of the position of the left wing of the army, which was composed of the 1st and 2nd divisions—those of Generals Reille and Drouot—cavalry divisions attached to the light cavalry of the Guard, and sent to Ney for the day with a remount to spare it. These forces consisted of 45,000 thousand men of all arms. Napoleon told Ney that with these forces he advanced beyond the Sambre, and arrived at Gosselies, he was to take the enemy sword in hand, and take the key of the fortress. "Do you know Quatre-Bras?" he asked the marshal. "I should like to," replied Ney: "I fought in this locality and I remember that it forms the key of all the roads." "Go, then," replied Napoleon, "and take possession of this locality, which the English might join the French to make observations."* Ney set out with ardour, and apparently disposed of the French. It was then about half-past five, having despatched Marshal Drouot, he fell back in the direction where he had left Grouchy, Pajol, and waiting Vandamme's infantry, and the Prussian rear-guard. His sole direction was, as we have seen, to break the *débouché* of the plain of Fleurus, and to be in a position to fight the Prussians the following day, and he would have avoided going beyond that point by driving them on that day by the way between Namur and Brussels, have forced them to seek in the forest a rallying-point with the English, would have frustrated all his plans only intended to cross the stream, and take up a position on the

opposite side of the wooded hills that enclose the plain of Fleurus. Vandamme had at length arrived with his infantry, and had drawn up his men behind Grouchy's cavalry. But neither he, nor Grouchy, nor Pajol, nor Exelmans wished to commence operations until Napoleon should arrive. They were inclined to think that the entire Prussian army lay on the opposite bank of the Soleilmont stream. And, indeed, judging from appearances, it was only natural that they should entertain such a belief. General Pirch II., reinforced by some battalions of Jagow's division, had filled the woods on the right and left of the route with troops, barricaded the bridge, and ranged several battalions in serried columns behind. As it was impossible that any eye could penetrate the density of the woods or see beyond the chain of hills, free scope was left to the imagination,—a faculty that plays a conspicuous part in military warfare,—and the French generals were at liberty to picture the entire Prussian army drawn up behind the intervening screen. But Napoleon's stern judgment, triumphing over his imagination, showed him, in the scene presented to his view, an enemy taken by surprise, who had not time to concentrate his forces. On the morning the case would be different; but Napoleon was convinced that at that moment he had only two or three divisions before him, and he believed that a *coup-de-main* would dislodge them from their post. He therefore ordered that the Prussians should be immediately attacked and driven from the position which they seemed prepared to defend.

The stream that separated the opposing forces flowed from the abbey of Soleilmont, which lay on the left of the French, and, running in front of them, flowed on toward their right until it mingled in the Sambre, near the Châtelet. Marshal Grouchy ordered Exelmans' Dragoons to march toward the right and ford the stream, in order to turn the position of the enemy. At the same time three columns of infantry, one of the Young Guard and two of Vandamme's corps, prepared to carry the bridge. The Prussians, thus threatened with a front and flank attack, hastily retreated,—their instructions being to retard the advance of the French, but, at the same time, to avoid any serious engagement with them. The French crossed the stream with little difficulty, but Napoleon saw with vexation that the Prussian infantry was about to escape him. In his impatience to overtake these troops, he despatched after them the four squadrons of the Guard then on service about his person. General Letort rushed upon the Prussians at the head of these four squadrons, overtook them at the moment when they were forming into squares in a clearing in the wood, broke and sabred one of the squares, and fell upon a second, whose ranks he also broke. Rushing upon a third, he unfortunately fell, pierced by the enemy's balls. The Prussians left some hundreds dead and wounded on the field, besides a loss of three or four hundred prisoners. But we paid dearly for this advantage by the loss of General Letort. He was one of our bravest, most intelligent, and most amiable cavalry officers. Napoleon regretted him, and justly, and, at

* To warn the reader that the assertion of Napoleon in this recital is one of those that stand in the long and warm discussions of the campaign of 1815 has been the subject. The assertion will be found discussed at considerable length, page 577.

St. Helena, immortalized his memory by the eulogium he pronounced upon him.

Exelmans' Dragoons, having completed the *détour* they were commissioned to execute on the French right, drove back the Prussians under Pirch and Jagow, and did not pause until they reached the borders of the wood. An advance-guard alone went so far as Fleurus.*

This result being obtained, Napoleon returned to Charleroy to learn what had occurred on his left wing and in his rear. He had not heard Ney's cannon, and he was surprised. He soon knew the cause of this inaction.

Ney, upon quitting Napoleon, had met in the neighbourhood of Gosselies General Reille, with four divisions of the 2d corps, that, after having crossed the Sambre at Marchiennes, had continued to advance in the direction of Quatre-Bras. These four divisions, comprising more than 20,000 infantry and extending over a league, were preceded by the light cavalry of Piré, which was attached to the 2d corps, and by that of Lefebvre-Desnoëttes, which belonged to the Imperial Guard. These two cavalry divisions amounted to 4500 men. Ney was consequently at the head of 25,000 men. At the appearance of this formidable mass, the division of Steinmetz, fearing to be cut off from the Prussian army, if they persisted in defending the Brussels route, made a *détour*, by which they reached the Namur road, leaving Quatre-Bras undefended. Ney, who had received orders from Napoleon to advance in the direction of Fleurus, detached the Girard division to observe the division of Steinmetz, and then taking the Bechelu division, comprising 4500 infantry, with the 4500 cavalry of Piré and Lefebvre-Desnoëttes, he advanced at the head of these 9000 men. Having in his rear the infantry divisions of Foy and Jerome, amounting to 12,000 men, with the 20,000 of D'Erlon, he certainly had no grounds for apprehension. The distance from Gosselies to Quatre-Bras is about three leagues, which might be traversed in less than two hours and a half at a moderate pace. Reille's soldiers had, it is true, already marched seven leagues, but having set out at three in the morning, they had had fourteen hours to perform the journey, and had rested more than once on the way. They might consequently perform three leagues more that day without exhausting their strength. It was obviously within Ney's power to keep the promise he had made to Napoleon, and seize Quatre-Bras, but suddenly, whilst marching forward, he heard Vandamme's cannon thundering along the banks of the Soleilmont stream. It was about six o'clock, and Ney became very uneasy. He feared that Napoleon was engaged with the Prussians, in which case they must be in his rear. He began to hesitate and deliberate without coming to a determination.

In addition to the anxiety inspired by the cannon he heard, Ney had fresh cause of

alarm. In approaching Frasnes, which lies far from Quatre-Bras, he perceived a mass of infantry, which he believed to be English, though the men did not wear the English uniform; but Ney grounded his opinion on this circumstance that these troops advanced from the quarter where the English were stationed. He reasoned after the same fashion as Vandamme, Grouchy, Pajol, and Exelmans had just before reasoned at Gilly, when they believed themselves face to face with the entire Prussian army, and Ney thought that he was possibly in front of Lord Wellington's advance guard, which, drawn aside like a curtain, would suddenly disclose the entire English army. Ney, spite of his constitutional timidity, had become, like most of our generals, vacillating, and was seized with a double apprehending danger both in front and rear. He paused before the undefended road leading to Quatre-Bras, that is to say, he hesitated when the fate of France lay within his grasp, and which, by extending his hand, he could have decided.

What forces were at that moment opposed to him? Precisely what he saw, and to men. In fact, the Duke of Wellington, who was still at Brussels, had, during the morning, only received vague reports, and had issued no positive commands. But the Prince of Saxe-Weimar, who belonged to the Perponcher division—one of those that composed the corps of the Prince of Orange—had compensated for the instructions he had not received, and under the simple dictates of good sense, had advanced from Nivelles to Quatre-Bras with 4000 Nassau soldiers. Marshal Ney had in the stopped short at the sight of 4000 foot-soldiers of no great importance, when he was at the head of 4500 tried infantry, besides 4500 brave cavalry. Had he but made one step more in advance, he could have scattered the whole detachment in the twinkling of an eye.

It certainly was only natural that he should believe that he was in the presence of more than 4000 men, but then on the arrival of the other divisions under General Reille he would have at his command a force of 12,000 men, and it was indeed a bad calculation to believe that the English army, taken by surprise at ten or eleven o'clock in the morning, could have already received orders for concentration from Brussels, or, if such had been received, that they could have been put into execution. In any case, having at his command 4500 cavalry, why did he not ascertain what force lay before him? A cavalry charge, under any circumstances, would have cleared up the mystery. Ney, who on the morning of the next day showed himself again the bravest of the brave, was no longer the valiant general who, at Jena and Eylau, had plunged France into sanguinary combats by being too rashly forward. It is unfortunately so common an occurrence to see men vacillating who had been formerly too daring. Ney did not advance beyond Frasnes, which is situate within a league of Quatre-Bras; he left there the Bechelu division with the Piré and Lefebvre-Desnoëttes cavalry, and returned to Charleroy to acquaint the Emperor with what had taken place.

Napoleon, who had mounted his horse at

* Marshal Grouchy, in one of his writings, complains that Vandamme would not advance farther on that evening, but Napoleon, in refuting the work of General Roguet, at St. Helena, gives reasons for stopping at this point, which fully justify General Vandamme.

morning, and had not alighted in the evening, having been on eighteen hours—though this exertion on account of an indisposition he was at that time suffering—had been some minutes' repose, and was seated, where he listened to reports and orders. Again on his feet at the arrival of Ney, who related what had happened, and explained the reasons why he had not acted. Napoleon sometimes without cause, but he was particularly delicate and grave circumstances, wishing to agitate men whom the affairs had already sufficiently dispirited, did not utter a word of reproach to the marshal, though the inexecution of his orders he had given him was much to be regretted. Besides, up to this point repara-

tion was easy, and taken as a whole the day's proceedings had been successful. Napoleon, bringing his army of 124,000 men a distance of one hundred leagues, had come unawares upon the English and Prussians, and had succeeded in taking up a position between them, so that they would be compelled to fight separately. This must inevitably be the case, for he had the Prussians on his right and in close proximity in the direction of Namur; and on his left, but at a greater distance, he had the English in the direction of Brussels.

He was consequently convinced that, by allowing his troops to rest during the night, he could on the following day attack the Prussians before the English would be able to come to their assistance, and thus fight both armies successively. It certainly would have been better if Ney had previously occupied Quatre-

Bras, which, indeed, was not even mooted at the time he wrote. When Napoleon was at St. Helena, he was aware of Ney's sad fate, and always spoke of his errors with generous forbearance.

Does anybody contradict what he says? Not one. Did Marshal Ney deny it? By no means. It is true that there had been no discussion on this subject at the time when the heroic marshal fell pierced by the bullets of the Frenchmen, nor had any other question been raised but that concerning the famous charge of cavalry he had led at Waterloo. There is nothing known concerning the marshal that can be opposed to Napoleon's testimony.

Major-General Marshal Soult was both an ocular and auricular witness of all that occurred. He alone had seen and heard every thing, and he alone could give a faithful testimony. He frequently said, during his life, that on the afternoon of the 15th of June he had heard Napoleon order Marshal Ney to proceed to Quatre-Bras. Marshal Ney's son, the Duke of Elchingen, who died during the Crimean campaign, a young general deservedly regretted because of his great talents and honourable principles, undertook to defend his father's memory on every point, a memory in itself too glorious to need any extrinsic aid. But it was both natural and honourable that a son should defend his father with some exaggeration. The Duke d'Elchingen called on Marshal Soult, who, from a feeling that can be easily understood, would not remember, in presence of a son, that Napoleon, on the 15th of June, had ordered Marshal Ney to repair to Quatre-Bras. The Duke d'Elchingen has related his conversation with Marshal Soult in a composition published under the title of "*Documents inédits sur la campagne de 1815*." But we have a witness quite as respectable, and diametrically opposite to him. General Berthézène, commanding one of Vandamme's divisions, relates in his interesting and truthful memoirs (vol. ii. p. 359) that Napoleon, in the afternoon of the 15th of June, gave precise orders to Ney to occupy Quatre-Bras, and that he was told this by Marshal Soult, an ocular witness of the conversation between Napoleon and Ney. When General Berthézène published this, Marshal Soult was alive, and could have contradicted his assertion.

We have thus one testimony of Marshal Soult contra-

dicting the other, but if I had to choose between the two, I should rather believe that of 1815, an epoch much nearer to the time when the event referred to took place, and when the presence of a son, solicitous, so to speak, that the memory of his father might be spared, was not thrown into the balance.

Taking no heed, therefore, of a doubtful testimony, there still remains Napoleon's assertion, given spontaneously, and which bears, in the highest degree, the impress of simplicity and truth.

But probability still remains, superior, in my opinion, to all human testimony.

To make it probable that Napoleon at four o'clock on the afternoon of the 15th had not thought of Quatre-Bras, and had sent on Ney without appointing him a definitive position, it should be believed that Napoleon had not consulted the map, or that he was the dullest of men. The reader can judge whether either of these suppositions is founded on probability.

Of all generals whose memory history has preserved, Napoleon is supposed to have been he who studied his charts most. This is known to all who lived with him, or have read his orders and correspondences. It was this constant study of maps that made him the greatest warrior in all that concerned general movements, which he called the sublime part of the art of war. In the present instance he must have studied his position profoundly to

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Bras, and thus rendered it absolutely impossible for the English to come to the assistance of the Prussians; but what had not been accomplished on the evening of the 15th might be done on the morning of the 16th, whilst Napoleon would be engaged with the Prussians, and might be effected in time to allow Ney to bring some detachments to Napoleon's assistance, the more especially as they would be fighting in each other's rear. It may therefore be confidently asserted that the plan was completely successful, since, notwithstanding Ney's vacillation, we had interposed an army between the Prussians, whose forces were only half concentrated, and the English, who were completely dispersed. In any case, if there were any failure in the day's arrangement, it was through Ney's fault, for from five to eight o'clock he would have had time to occupy Quatre-Bras with Reille's 20,000 men, supported by the 20,000 of D'Erlon. Besides, Napoleon, satisfied with the general result, and not seeking faults where it would be of no service to find them, spoke in a friendly tone to the marshal, and at two in the morning sent him to Gosselies, impressing on him the importance of Quatre-Bras, and promising to send him precise orders when he should have received and compared the reports of his lieutenants. He then threw himself on a bed to take two or three hours' rest, while he allowed the troops to repose during seven or eight hours, which, indeed, they needed after the day's march, and as a preparation for the combat of the morrow.

At this moment, the French army was stationed as follows. Grouchy on the right, with Pajol's light cavalry and Exelmans' dragoons, passed the night in the wood of Lambusart, having a simple advance-guard at Fleurus; Vandamme, having performed a march of seven

or eight leagues under a burning sun, was encamped a little in the rear, but in view of Gilly. On the extreme right, Gérard and the 4th corps had seized the bridge of Châtelet, but had not arrived until very late as he had to wait the arrival of one of his divisions at Philippeville, seven leagues from the Châtelet. He was stationed on the Sambre with half his corps on either side.

The foot-guards of the centre had crossed the Sambre, but the horse-guards, the heavy cavalry of reserve, the 6th corps, (Lobau's) the reserve of artillery, the great park, and the baggage had not been able to cross the bridge of Charleroy, which were encumbered with horses, and cannon. This was doing a great deal, since they had already marched some 12 and some seven leagues, during intense heat, incommoded by vast material, and obliged to pass through narrow defiles. Besides, they would require but two or three hours to cross the Sambre on the following day. To the left at Frasnes, on the road to Brussels, Marshal Ney had the Bachelu division of infantry and the cavalry of Piré and Lefebvre-Desnoettes in the rear, from Mollet to Gosselies, the remainder of the 2d corps, one division of which—Gérard's—had advanced to Wagnies; and lastly, he had the Count d'Erlon, with the centre of the 1st corps, between Gosselies and Marchiennes. As the men of the latter corps had had several hours' repose, they would be ready for action at an early hour next morning. Napoleon being thus placed with Grouchy, Pajol, Exelmans, Vandamme, Gérard, and 38,000 men on his right; Ney, Reille, D'Erlon, Lobau, Desnoettes, commanding 45,000 men, on his left; and in the centre the Guards, Lobau's heavy cavalry, the parks and reserve of artillery, amounting to 40,000, and only two or three hours being required to cross the Sambre

have chosen so correctly Charleroy as his basis of operation, from which he could penetrate the encampment of the enemy and place himself between the two allied armies. He had chosen Charleroy, because from this point he could pounce at once on the high-road leading from Namur to Brussels, and which formed the line of communication by which the enemies could combine their forces. He had there two points to choose between: Sombref, if he turned to the right in the direction of Namur, Quatre-Bras, if he chose the left in the direction of Brussels. He could arrest the Prussians at Sombref, and the English at Quatre-Bras. He did still more at Quatre-Bras, he prevented that portion of the British army which was stationed at Nivelles in front of Ath, from joining the reserve at Brussels. Quatre-Bras was consequently of more importance than Sombref, and while he intended to advance to Sombref by Fleurus, he would not think of reaching Quatre-Bras by Frasnes. But this is not all. At that moment he was not anxious to oppose the progress of the Prussians; he was rather disposed to allow them to debouch, that he might attack them at once, whilst that with regard to the English he was most desirous of restraining them at any risk, in order to prevent them from assisting the Prussians. This he considered of so much importance that he sent on this service the principal forces that had already passed the Sambre, that is, those of Reille, D'Erlon, Piré, Lefebvre-Desnoettes, amounting to 45,000 men, and he would have combined this imposing mass, placed it under the command of the vigorous Ney, merely to send them forward without a definite object! And he would have said to him, "Proceed to Frasnes," a point where nothing could be effected, and he would not have said, "Go to Quatre-Bras," that was within a league of Frasnes, and where it would be possible to prevent the English forces from combining with the Prussians. This would be to suppose too many improbabilities, and all to prove upon one occasion the stupidity of one of the greatest generals that ever lived. On the following morning Napoleon, in a written order, mentioned Quatre-Bras in a manner that showed how much importance he attached to

it, an importance of which it is to be supposed that he has been ignorant the day before. Could it be by chance that he took up his position at a point so important as Charleroy, and only that night sent forward the country to discover the intentions of the enemy? This, I repeat, is bespeaking impossibility upon impossibility, and adding improbability to improbability. And yet this ignorant idle, thoughtless man advanced through masses of his enemies, without even looking to see if the Duke of Wellington, who certainly did not stand in the way of nothing but Quatre-Bras. He descended one of the least celebrated, advanced, children, as we shall see, of greatest haste, and that without his orders, Napoleon, the blind Napoleon, whose eyes were to be opened the morrow, took no heed of Quatre-Bras, and it was a difficult and so delicate, committed to the hands of the forces under his command, and sent his heavy orders such as he never before had given, not only one order, such orders as he himself gave, "Advance," without telling him where, when, and how. Bras was but a league distant!

Let who will believe such a supposition. I have tried to influence the reader; I have said a little, and I would take without my permission, to show what a vision; but the historian is placed and he, with all on my heart, I declare that I believe in absolute fatality exists in favour of the opinion I hold. I feel more interested than I in the little action, and to the most deplorable position; but I have given a means diminished in my eye because he is a conclusion. What I seek now is truth, it is a truth, have already said many words, and did not know it, that must be sought, fast, and good, it is result be what it may. Truth is a word, and it is any just cause. Napoleon's military glory is his despatch, or make liberty of the name. He is between Napoleon and his lieutenant, and it is sincerity. Whatever that does not mean, it is not to be less great, or less less.

the next morning be in a position to attack the Prussians or the English, after separating them; he might, moreover, which he pleased to combat during the

event had occurred in General Gérard's General de Bourmont, together with Clouet, his aide-de-camp, formed the plan, so fatal to his fame, of leaving the morning of the 15th, at the very moment when all our columns were about to

Energetic in warfare, mild and unobtrusive in private life, esteemed in the Imperial army here he had served with distinction, by his former friends, the royalists, to whom he could have brought a name discredited in military service, both parties held equal attractions for him; he saw the danger both; he judged and condemned them, and great difficulty in deciding which he should join. General de Bourmont had at first refused to take service, although his tastes inclined him to the army, and the smallness of the salary made it a necessity. Having at length yielded to the very natural desire of resuming his professional avocations, and having General Gérard, obtained a grade corresponding to his rank, he soon regretted what he had done when he learned that Vendée had been suppressed, and that his friends and relatives were treated with the utmost severity. As for the reproaches of the royalists, he seemed to leave the army and repair to his estate.

On the evening of the 14th, he sent General Hulot, his oldest commander, to inform him, that he would be absent next day, and not say why; he transmitted to him the order of the commander-in-chief, that he should carry them out, addressed a letter of recommendation to his guarantee, General Gérard, and ordered the enemy's outposts, declared he would join King Louis XVIII. This immediately noised through the 4th corps, and produced an extraordinary excitement, far from disheartening the troops, it increased their enthusiasm. But it increased the feeling of distrust toward the commander, who all, with the exception of those who were own and loved by the soldiers, became objects of suspicion. General de Bourmont did not leave the morning of the 15th, but did not reach the Prussian head-quarters until noon, when Marshal Blücher was already aware of his presence. It interested him to know. General de Bourmont's conduct was thus an injury to himself, neither useful nor honourable to his country, whose triumph was secured by other means, and attributable to more general

causes. Allied commanders had not employed the same tactics as Napoleon. Whilst we were engaged at Beaumont on the 14th, Marshal Blücher had acquired only vague information of the French approach. But toward evening these became more certain, and he committed the 4th corps under Bulow at Liege, and the 1st under Thielmann stationed between Namur, to advance to Namur. He ordered Pireh I. (2d corps) to proceed to Sombreffe, Zieten (1st corps) to concentrate between Charleroy and Fleurus. The French were driven back from Charleroy on the morning of the 15th, and from the bridge of

Sombreffe at noon, when he retired to Fleurus. Pireh I. took up his position at Sombreffe on the high-road leading from Namur to Brussels. Thielmann hastened to the same point; Bulow, who did not receive orders until late in the day, quitted Liege to proceed to Namur. The fiery Blücher was determined to accept the challenge to fight on the following day—the 16th—between Fleurus and Sombreffe, without waiting for the British army, though with the hope of seeing a large portion arrive at Quatre-Bras.

The English, owing either to natural disposition, or because of the greater distance they had to traverse, were slow in making their appearance. The Duke of Wellington, anxious to maintain his communication with the sea, was determined not to allow himself to be deceived by false alarms, nor to move until the attack was decidedly directed to one side or the other, by which he ran the risk of deceiving himself, that he might avoid being deceived by Napoleon. Although he had been more than once informed of the approach of the French, information unfortunately given by some of ourselves, he would not make any movement until he should receive more precise information. He might, however, have formed his divisions, so that he need but give the order to march when the route they were to take should be decided on; but as he commanded men who would more readily forgive him for risking their lives than causing them unnecessary fatigue, he had refrained from issuing any orders. On the 15th, he was informed by the Prussian general Zieten of our actual position, and he then ordered his troops to form round the three principal English quarters; at Ath for the right wing, at Braine-le-Comte for the left, and Brussels for the reserve. But this did not prevent his attending a ball given by the Duchess of Richmond at Brussels. It was during the amusements of the evening, amusements at which all the English commanders and diplomatists accredited at the court of Ghent were present, that he received the detailed account of our entrance into Charleroy, and the passage of the Sambre. He immediately left, without interrupting the merriment of this Coalition festival, and proceeded to issue his orders.

He commanded his reserve to march at once from Brussels to Quatre-Bras. He ordered General Hill and the Prince of Orange to make a movement from the right toward the left, the former from Ath toward Braine-le-Comte, the latter from Braine-le-Comte in the direction of Nivelles: the latter was especially enjoined to send on all his disposable troops to Quatre-Bras. He himself prepared to set out that night, that he might at early dawn meet Marshal Blücher between Quatre-Bras and Sombreffe and combine his movements with those of the Prussian army.

Whilst the English general was giving these somewhat tardy orders, his lieutenants, stimulated undoubtedly by the danger, made better and prompter arrangements than his. The head of the Prince of Orange's staff, having learned that the French were before Charleroy, assembled on the afternoon of the 15th the Perponcher division, one brigade of which, commanded by the Prince of Saxe-Weimar,

advanced spontaneously to Quatre-Bras. This same commander of the staff concentrated Chasse's division and Collaert's cavalry in the neighbourhood of Nivelles, so that on arriving at his head-quarters the Prince of Orange found that, thanks to the prudence of a subordinate, the most urgent measures had been already prescribed and partly executed.

Thus on the evening of the 15th the English army began to move forward from every point, but had not yet an entire division at Quatre-Bras, whilst the Prussians, owing to their greater proximity, and having received earlier intelligence, were able to assemble half their effective forces on the plain of Fleurus, and would be able to have three-fourths of them there on the morning of the 16th.

Though Napoleon had not retired to rest until two in the morning, he was up again at five. Notwithstanding that he was suffering from a very disagreeable illness, he had been on horseback for eighteen hours on the 15th, and was prepared to do the same on the next day, a sufficient proof that his activity had not decreased.* He had resolved on the plan of the day's proceedings even before he had received the report of his lieutenants. As the English head-quarters were at a distance of fourteen leagues to the left, and the Prussian head-quarters at eight leagues to the right, with their different corps concentrated, whilst the English were dispersed between the Scheldt and the Sambre, it was evident that during the course of the day he would find the Prussians assembled on the plain of Fleurus, and that he could not encounter the English until the next day at the earliest. A clear view of his position showed that the best thing to be done was to turn to the right and fight the Prussians, and station a strong detachment on his left to arrest the progress of the English. Though this was all-but certain, nothing could be absolutely determined nor definite orders given until he received the reports of his outposts. Had the entire army passed the Sambre on the previous evening, and had it been possible to commence operations at once, it would undoubtedly have been better to come to a decision immediately, and, without loss of time, march forward in both directions, proportioning the forces employed to the anticipated danger. But there were still at least 25,000 men, 10,000 of whom were cavalry, together with the great park of artillery to cross the bridge of Charleroy and defile through the narrow streets of the town. This operation could not be executed in less than three hours, and meanwhile the troops that had already crossed the Sambre were reposeing after the fatigues of the previous evening, and Napoleon was occupied in receiving the reports

of the light cavalry, which was of the greatest importance, placed as he was between two adverse armies, and the somewhat small generals believing that they were face to face with the combined armies of England and Prussia. But on the 16th of June there was but seventeen hours' daylight, so that a delay of three hours could not be of much consequence.

Napoleon, having visited several positions, heard the reports of the spies and light cavalry, was confirmed in his conjectures of the previous evening. There could be at Quatre-Bras only the troops collected from the neighbourhood, whilst three-fourths of the Prussian army was assembled between Fleurus and Sombreffe. A report of Grouchy's, dated at 10 o'clock, announced that the whole French army was deploying before Fleurus. Two were, therefore, two very good reasons for going to meet the Prussians: in the first place, they alone were within reach, and secondly they would be left on our flank should we advance without fighting them. Napoleon, being again examined his maps, issued his orders at about seven o'clock, verbally, to the major general, who was to transmit them in writing to the different commanders. He commenced with the right wing, whose concentration was most important, and ordered that the corps of Vandamme and Gérard (the 2d and 3d) should advance in front of Fleurus. Vandamme, having bivouacked near Gilly, had a march of two leagues and a half, and Gérard three, being encamped on the Châtelet. Supposing no delay to be made in the transmission of the orders, these troops could not be on the ground before eleven in the morning. This would be early enough, as they could fight any time before nine in the evening. Napoleon also ordered the Guards, encamped near Charleroy, to advance in the direction of Fleurus. To these he added Millaut's division of cuirassiers, consisting of three thousand splendid horsemen. We shall now see what way he intended to employ Vandamme's cuirassiers.

These troops, consisting of Pajol's light cavalry, Exelmans' dragoons, Vandamme's and Gérard's corps of infantry, the Guard, Millaut's cuirassiers, and Gérard's division, which had been detached from Reille's corps the previous evening, to make their way toward Fleurus, did not amount to less than 63,000 to 64,000 first-rate soldiers. There was a sufficient force with which to oppose the Prussians, who, supposing they had assembled three-fourths of their army, could not have more than 90,000 men on the plain of Sambre. There were still the Count of Lobau's 100,000 men, (6th corps,) tried soldiers, who, by the

* Contemporary testimonies as to Napoleon's health during these four days are very contradictory. His brother, Prince Jerome, and a surgeon attached to his staff, both assured me that Napoleon was suffering at that time from an affection of the bladder. M. Marchand, attached to his personal service, a man whose veracity cannot be doubted, assured me of the contrary. This shows how difficult it is to discover the truth amidst contradictory though sincere testimonies; and I could furnish other proofs, no less strange, of how difficult it is to make many witnesses of this period agree, though all were present at the events they relate, and all men at least to speak the truth. But I shall not do so, lest I should encumber this history with tedious notes. I shall confine

myself to saying that whatever may have been the state of Napoleon's health at this period, it did not in any way interfere with his activity, as may be seen by what follows. I have verified the accuracy of his accounts of numerous and authentic witnesses, among whom the principal was General Guillin, the worthy son of the Duc de Guillin, killed at Valmy, and late commander of a military division at Rome. General Guillin was a fine time seventeen years of age, and as first page brought me to the Emperor. He did not know Napoleon at the moment, and the correctness of his memory, as well as the truthfulness of his character, justify me in placing equal confidence in his assertions.

the numbers on our right to 74,000,* would relieve Napoleon from all apprehension in regard to the Prussians. He had fought on with much inferior numbers in 1814. However, although he was convinced that the English could not have yet combined their forces, he would not run the risk of deceiving himself at such a time, and determined that some hours he would leave Count Lobau at the junction of the two roads leading to Tournus and Quatre-Bras, trusting to this general's sagacity to bring up his forces to wherever the danger seemed most pressing. The position of all parties would be known in three or four hours, Count Lobau would have time to hasten to the point where the army should have assembled in the greatest numbers. As to the Brussels road, and the important position of Quatre-Bras, Napoleon ordered Ney to proceed immediately thither with the corps of Generals Reille and D'Erlon, with the cavalry attached to these corps, and Count de Valmy's cuirassiers. Napoleon confided these brilliant cuirassiers to the marshal, that he might withdraw the light cavalry of the Guard, which he lent him the evening before with the recommendation to spare them. However, he gave permission to retain them in an intermediate position, if they were already too far advanced to retrograde with ease, and he also desired that Valmy's cuirassiers should be left on the road called *des Romains*, an old route crossing the country from left to right, that he might be able to recall them to Fleurus if necessary. The troops confided to Ney amounted to about 60,000 men. The following were Napoleon's instructions relative to their disposal during the day. Ney was to take up a strong position at Quatre-Bras, so as to be able to repulse the English, whatever efforts they might make to seize the position. Ney was even ordered to station a division a little beyond, that is to say, at Genappe, and hold himself in readiness to form the head of the French column that was to advance on Brussels in case the Prussians should avoid encountering us and en-

deavour to combine their forces with the English in the rear of that city, or in case they should be defeated and thrown back on Liege.

Napoleon, when rid of these, intended to fall back rapidly on Ney, to support him on his march to Brussels. To these orders, so profoundly calculated to meet all contingencies, Napoleon added another, which, as we shall see, exhibited profound forethought. As Ney was to have 45,000 men under his command, and if he took immediate possession of Quatre-Bras would not have to encounter a very great English force, Napoleon wished him to send a detachment to Marbais, a little village situate on the high-road between Namur and Brussels. This could easily be done, for as Napoleon and Ney would fight in each other's rear during the approaching combat, the one being at Fleurus, the other at Quatre-Bras, whichever had first completed his task could easily send a detachment, great or small, to the assistance of the other, and which, besides the numerical advantage it would bring, could attack the enemy in the rear. Marbais, situate on the high-road between Namur and Brussels, and not very far from Sombreffe, was admirably well selected for the accomplishment of this object. These arrangements, having been decided on at about seven in the morning, ought to have been embodied in writing in the staff style by Marshal Soult, and immediately despatched to the different commanders.

Unfortunately, the new major-general, a novice in the exercise of his delicate functions, was not as rapid in composition as Berthier, nor could he, like him, catch at once the true spirit of Napoleon's ideas, nor reproduce them in a few expressive words. Though Napoleon gave his orders at seven o'clock, they were not written and despatched until between eight and nine. This, though a sad waste of time, did not entail any serious consequences, the troops meanwhile crossing the Sambre, and as in any case the day was to be devoted to fighting the Prussians, the latter part of

I have taken as much pains to verify the forces as the movements, and the different hours at which they were made, and I believe that the following numbers are the nearest to the truth:—

Under Napoleon's orders in the direction of Fleurus.	Pajol.....	2,800 men.	
	Exelmans.....	3,300	
	Milhaud.....	3,500	
	Vandamme.....	17,000	
	Gérard.....	15,400	
	Guard (infantry).....	13,000	
	Guard (heavy cavalry).....	2,500	Lefebvre-Desnoëttes with Ney.
	Guard (artillery).....	2,000	
	Gérard (the division detached from Reille).....	4,000	
		64,000	
Lobau's corps placed between them both.....		10,000	74,000
Under Ney at Quatre-Bras.	Piré's cavalry.....	2,000	
	Reille's (without Gérard).....	17,000	
	D'Erlon.....	20,000	
	Lefebvre-Desnoëttes.....	2,500	
	Valmy.....	3,500	45,000
			119,000
Parks of artillery, stragglers killed and wounded in the combats of advanced guard on the 15th.....		5,000	124,000

the day would answer that purpose quite as well as the earlier.* Napoleon, having no motive for hastening his personal movements, as he was to perform on horseback the passage that his troops were performing on foot, determined that, before leaving for Fleurus, he would write a detailed letter to Ney, in which he would explain his intentions with the brevity and precision peculiar to himself. He told the marshal that, as his officers would move faster than those attached to the staff, he sent him his definite instructions by one of them. He informed him that he was about to set out for Fleurus, where it appeared that the Prussians were drawn up in line of battle, that he would fight if they offered resistance, but would advance to Brussels if they retreated. He instructed him to make his position good at Quatre-Bras, by placing a division in front of that station, and another on the right at Marbais, which latter division would be able to fall back on Sombreffe. He again desired him not to give the light cavalry of the Guard too much to do, and to keep back Valmy's cuirassiers, so that both these corps might be able, if necessary, to fall back on Fleurus. He repeated, that when the Prussians should have retreated or been beaten, he would immediately turn to the right to support Ney in the movement on Brussels. He then explained his plan for the remainder of the campaign. He wished, he said, to have two wings, one composed of Reille and Erlon's corps and some cavalry under Ney, and the other, under Grouchy, consisting of Vandamme and Gérard's corps with a contingent of cavalry, and intended himself, with the Guard, Lobau, and the reserve of cavalry, in all about 40,000 men, to turn sometimes to one, sometimes to the other wing, and thus raise them alternately to the importance of the main body of the army.

These double instructions were intrusted to a confidential officer, Count de Flahault, the Emperor's aide-de-camp, and who, being acquainted with the English language and character, might be very useful to Marshal Ney. In passing through Gosselies and the different points on the route to Quatre-Bras, Count de Flahault was to deliver the Emperor's orders to the several commanders, that they might

proceed to their immediate execution ere before the major-general's orders should arrive. M. de Flahault left at nine †

These different orders being despatched, the right in the direction of Fleurus, and the left in the direction of Quatre-Bras, arrived at their destinations, some at nine, some at ten o'clock. The French troops were marching from every point. Vandamme advanced from Gilly to Fleurus, and took up his position in front of that little town, covered by Pajol's light cavalry, and Esermann's legions. General Gérard had passed the Sambre at the Châtelet, and advanced on the left toward Fleurus. The Guard, amounting to 18,000 men, horse and foot, (in this number we only include those that fought,—the others were with the artillery,) had passed Gilly and were approaching Fleurus. The day was but warm. Already the Prussians were deploying before Sombreffe, behind the hills of Saint Amand and Ligny, and with the evident intention of giving battle.

Count de Lobau and the heavy cavalry had passed the Sambre at Charleroy. The latter divided into two corps had proceeded in two different directions. Milhaud's cuirassiers had gone to join Vandamme, Gérard, and the Guard at Fleurus. Valmy's cuirassiers had proceeded to the left toward Gosselies and Quatre-Bras. On this road was D'Erlon with the first corps, who, having arrived late the previous evening at Marchiennes, allowed his troops to repose whilst he awaited the orders of Marshal Ney, his superior in command. Had the duties of the staff been executed at Berthier's time, he would have immediately learned the instructions intended for Ney, so that he would have been able to send in the execution, by immediately giving the order of march. General Reille with the entire of the 2d corps passed the night at Gosselies when they had arrived the evening before. Ney and Jerome's divisions were also at Gosselies. Gérard's a little to the right at Wagnonville, at Frasnes, very near Quatre-Bras, was Reille's division, with which Ney, on the previous evening, had held the Prince of Saxe-Weimar in check. Piré's cavalry and Lobau's Benoit's light cavalry were also there. So having passed the night with General Ball

* Severe critics have blamed Napoleon's tardiness on the morning of the 16th. Some account for it by a diminution of activity, but others, finding this reason incompatible with the march from Cannes to Paris, consider it altogether inexplicable; but neither party has sought the explanation where it might be found, that is to say, in the unprejudiced study of the events of those days as recorded in authentic documents. Napoleon was on horseback from three in the morning on the 15th until nine at night, when he threw himself upon a bed until midnight, when he rose, and remained conversing with Ney until two o'clock, then slept again for three hours, and was on his horse at five on the morning of the 16th. This is not the conduct of a prince enervated by age or rendered effeminate by luxury. Placed between two opposing armies, when a false movement would be destructive, it was not of so much importance to him to fight two hours earlier on a day seventeen hours long, as to know the exact position of the enemy's forces before ordering his own to the one point or the other. As the most important information, that sent by Grouchy, describing the Prussian movements, had not been despatched until six, and did not consequently arrive until seven, it cannot be said that any time was lost, at least by the commander-in-chief, whose orders were immediately given to the major-general, and despatched by the latter between eight and nine; and we must, besides, remember that this time was employed by some of the troops in reposing after a march of ten or

twelve leagues, accomplished on the previous evening by others in crossing the Sambre. It will be seen by the following, that the troops were on the ground at noon, so that battle could not commence before halfpast two, but that then a complete victory, which, but for an accident, would have been gained much earlier in the day. The terrible delays of the morning of the 16th had, therefore, injurious influence on the battle of Ligny, so that the combat at Quatre-Bras, which would completely have answered its proposed end had the orders been fully executed. These delays of the morning were by the necessity of waiting the arrival of intelligence, and would in any case have attended the passage of the Sambre. As for the delays of the afternoon, which were more to be regretted, those were due either to a want of the fault, not of the commander-in-chief, but of his tenants. We repeat, that if we do not stop where Napoleon's policy, so often open to criticism, is found, we must examine more closely when fault is found with military operations of a general, or when a department of his art, and who took more the other precautions at a time when the existence of France was as his own was at stake.

† A letter of General Reille's dated yesterday mentions M. de Flahault as having crossed the Sambre at halfpast nine and ten o'clock.

Gosselies, had left for Frasnes to observe the movements of the English, but gave directions to Reille to open the despatches from ad-quarters, that he might be able to transmit the Emperor's orders to the different commanders, and secure their immediate execution. He then advanced to Quatre-Bras, where he was deeply impressed by what he saw. The Prince of Orange and the Duke of Wellington had just arrived at Quatre-Bras. They had been preceded by General Perponcher, commander of the nearest division composed of the Saxe-Weimar and Bylandt brigades. He had already mentioned how the Saxe-Weimar brigade had set out of its own accord the evening before; it was soon to be joined by the Bylandt brigade, already on the road. The latter brigade could not arrive at Quatre-Bras before two in the afternoon. The English divisions, some coming from Ath and Nivelles, others from Brussels, could only arrive successively at three, four, and five o'clock. Nevertheless the Prince of Orange had promised the Duke of Wellington to make every effort for the defence of Quatre-Bras, and even to sacrifice both himself and soldiers to the attainment of so important an object. Finding in this valorous lieutenant, the Duke of Wellington took his way along the high-road from Brussels to Namur, in order to consult with Marshal Blücher. He found him ranging his army in order of battle before Sombreffe, and determined to fight with or without support. The Duke of Wellington would have been better pleased had he found him less lined for action, but promised to give him actual assistance toward the close of the day by occupying Quatre-Bras and endeavouring to take up his position on the right of the Prussian army. These arrangements being made, the Duke of Wellington returned by the Brussels road to hasten the march of his own troops.

Such were the arrangements made by the various generals on the different parts of this great battle-field. The French generals, as valiant, but not as confident, as ever, looked with apprehension on what was passing around them. Ney, impetuous, but deficient in coolness, feared that he had to encounter the entire English army, while some of his generals asserted that they were about to encounter one hundred thousand English with only some few thousand French. The almost defensive attitude assumed by the Prince of Orange seemed a confirmation of the truth of this statement, and Ney sometimes felt inclined to rush upon the prince with the four thousand men he had, sometimes he listened to those who said that the enemy had their forces concealed behind the wood, and how imprudent it would be to attack them until he received the reinforcement of forty-five thousand men proposed by Napoleon.

It was the same to the right. General Gérard, one of the bravest and most devoted officers in the army, had been sent with his division to Wagnelée to make observations in the direction of Fleurus, and by the Emperor's orders he had remained there to serve as a connecting link between the two portions of the French army. From the point where he was, he discerned the Prussians distinctly,

and saw them deploy before Sombreffe. He reported this to his immediate superior, General Reille, assuring him that the Emperor would soon have to encounter the entire Prussian army between Sombreffe and Fleurus. When this report arrived at Gosselies, it made a profound impression on General Reille. This general, who had behaved so well at Vittoria, had unfortunately retained an inextinguishable remembrance of that day, and was one of those who felt too little confidence in fortune to act with decision and vigour. The position seemed to him most dangerous, with the English in front and the Prussians in the rear, and this caused by Napoleon's wonted temerity. He was thoroughly imbued with this opinion when General Flahault passed on his way to Marshal Ney. General Flahault gave him the Imperial commands, and as Marshal Ney had told him, when he was leaving, to see to the execution of these orders when they would arrive, General Reille should have immediately marched his entire corps toward Frasnes. At the very latest this corps could have arrived there at noon, time enough to drive back the few battalions of the Prince of Orange. Far from doing this, General Reille, taking advantage of his influence with Marshal Ney, ventured, upon his own responsibility, to assemble his corps in front of Gosselies, and to keep it there, until fresh announcements from General Gérard should give him more exact information as to the movements of the Prussians. It is always very hazardous for a general to substitute his own views for those of the commander-in-chief, but under such a leader as Napoleon, whose boundless forethought embraced all possibilities, it was very daring in General Reille to take upon himself either to modify the orders or defer their execution; it was a proceeding that might, as we shall see, have induced the most serious consequences. General Reille informed Marshal Ney of what he had done, and immediately sent the orders from headquarters to Count d'Erlon, in his rear, that this general might set out and join the 2d corps on the road to Quatre-Bras. Ney, whose apprehensions increased by those of his lieutenants had made him hesitate to act, sent an officer of the lancers to Charleroy to inform Napoleon that he was apprehensive of having the English army in front and the Prussian on his right flank, and that he informed him of his position, not knowing whether he ought to fight with the small body under his command.

Napoleon was about to leave Charleroy for Fleurus when he received Ney's message. He was greatly annoyed when he saw that Ney, usually so resolute, had relapsed into the uncertainty of the previous day, and immediately sent him word that Blücher, being at Namur the evening before, could not, consequently, be at Quatre-Bras on this day, where there could not be more than a few English troops from Brussels, and those not very numerous, that he should, therefore, assemble Reille and d'Erlon's infantry with Valmy's heavy cavalry, and with these drive all before him. Napoleon left to the commander of the staff the task of committing this order to writing, which he did in the clearest and most precise terms. Napoleon immediately set out for Fleurus.

He arrived there about noon. He had been preceded but a very short time by the troops; they were drawn up on the plain of Fleurus. To the left, on the high-road from Charleroy to Namur, was Vandamme's corps, composed of the infantry divisions of Lefol, Berthezène, and Habert, together with General Domon's light cavalry. By Napoleon's orders, Gérard's divisions, belonging to Reille's corps, remained still farther to the left, at the intermediate position of Wagnelée. To the right was the 4th corps, under Gérard, consisting of Vichery, Pecheux, and Hulet's divisions, with Maurin's cavalry. More to the right, and in advance, were Fajol's light cavalry and Exelmans' dragoons; Milhaud's cuirassiers were in the rear. Lastly, in the second line and as a reserve, were the entire Guard, infantry and cavalry, with magnificent artillery. These fine troops consisted of 64,000 men of all arms, as we have already mentioned. Three leagues in the rear, at the junction of the roads, was Count de Lobau with 10,000 men, waiting for a signal to turn either to Fleurus or Quatre-Bras. The weather, as we have said, was beautiful, but the heat was stifling. The troops were in a state of excitement, and anxious for a decisive battle, which every thing they saw seemed to prognosticate. On the arrival of the 4th corps, the entire army had learned General de Bourmont's defection. The intelligence aroused intense indignation. His conduct was qualified as an abominable piece of treachery, and it was even said that many other officers were ready to follow his example. The distrust in those officers who had taken service under the Restoration, or who did not sympathize in the general enthusiasm, had now reached its acmé. One soldier left his ranks, and walking directly to Napoleon, said to him, "Sire, do not trust Soult: he will betray you." "Do not be uneasy," replied Napoleon: "I'll answer for him." "Be it so," said the soldier, returning to his ranks, but evidently not convinced. This suspicion, though groundless,—for the head of the staff was doing his very best,—shows the moral tone that pervaded the army, where the men were devoted even to fanaticism, but totally devoid of self-possession. General Gérard had hastened to Napoleon, and felt at first some embarrassment in speaking of General de Bourmont, whose guarantee he had been. But Napoleon, without showing any displeasure, said, as he pulled his ear, "You see, my dear Gérard, that the blue are always blue, and the white always white."¹

As the Prussians deployed before us, they seemed every instant more numerous. The indented plain of Fleurus, on which one of the most terrible battles of the age was about to be fought, presented at this moment a most imposing aspect.

The high-road leading from Namur to Brussels, of which we have so often spoken, and on which abutted the two branches of the Charleroy road, the one leading to Quatre-Bras, the other to Sombreffe, ran from our right to our left on a tolerably high embankment, and divided the waters that flowed to the Sambre and

the Dyle. The Prussian army was already toward this point in vast masses. As the troops arrived at the heights of Sombreffe they made a demi-tour to the left, and taking up a position in front of Fleurus, joined the divisions that had left Charleroy the previous evening. The ground occupied by the Prussians on the flank of the road and in front of us was extremely favourable for defensive operations.

The stream of Ligny, flowing from the east of the road between Namur and Brussels, at pretty near to Wagnelée, exactly where Gérard's division was stationed, ran from the left wing toward our right, almost parallel with the road, and after many sinuous windings passed through three villages called Saint-Amand-le-Hameau, Saint-Amand-le-Grand, and Great Saint-Amand. When this stream reaches Great Saint-Amand, it turns abruptly, and instead of running parallel with the road, runs almost at right angles to it, passing through the village of Ligny to Sombreffe, where, assuming its original direction, it runs along the foot of some tolerably high hills, and 500 feet a tributary of the Sambre. The Charleroy road, by which we had come, crossed the stream by means of a small bridge, and then joined the road leading from Namur to Brussels at a point quite close to Sombreffe, near Point-du-Jour. This shallow but usually well-bordered by willows and lofty poplars, was eminently suited for the battle-field of an army seeking to prevent our occupying the important road from Namur to Brussels. The ground beyond its source and beyond the village through which it ran, rose sloping to the left of the road that the Prussians wished to defend, and presented an amphitheatre occupied by twenty-four thousand men. Upon the summit of this high ground, the mill of By was conspicuous, and behind the mill, in a depression of the ground, stood the village of By, whose steeple only was visible.

The Prussians were distributed in the following order on the field of battle. Bülow and Henkel's divisions, belonging to Zieten's corps, that had been driven back on the previous evening from Charleroy, occupied the former the three villages of Saint-Amand, the latter the village of Ligny. There were six battalions in the village, and the remainder of the army was disposed in serial masses on the slope behind. Pirch II. and Jäger's divisions were kept as a reserve, the former in the high ground defending Saint-Amand, the second behind the village of Ligny. There were about 30,000 men there. The corps of Pirch I., the second of the Prussian army, placed on the high ground to Namur at a spot called les Trois Rues, formed with its four divisions, Tippelsbach, Braune, Krafft, and Langer, a second line of about 30,000 men, ready to support the first. The 3d Prussian corps—Thielmann's—had arrived from Namur, had been placed by Bülow on his extreme left, and in advance of Point-du-Jour, exactly at the junction of the Charleroy and Namur roads.

He wished, by this means, to defend his communication with Namur and Liège, by which Bülow's corps and all his material were to come. This was a wise precaution, but would not have the effect of paralyzing the better part of the

¹ This celebrated saying, so often referred to on occasions on which it was not said, was addressed on this day to General Gérard, from whose lips I have learned the occurrence.

was first to defend effectually the Charleroy road crossed the Namur to Brussels,—that is, and Sombreffe; next to protect the three Saint Amands, and then—was never unmixed with pre-ush beyond Saint-Amand, drive on Charleroy, and even force ambre, should fortune and the his aid. But he flattered himself, for this campaign of s destined to terminate so ador him, did not commence so d on this day—the 16th—our destined to be softened by one

a ground lying between Saint-gny, being disposed in form of e, ought to be easily visible to umerous trees bordering the oted our view, and it was only openings between them that we easional glimpse of the masses a army. A little to our right, of the plain of Fleurus, was a owner, alarmed for his property, to protect. Cap in hand, and red at finding himself in Nace, he led him by tottering lad of the mill, whence they could sure the battle-field chosen by om this observatory, Napoleon ctly Ziethen's 30,000 men stan the villages of Saint-Amand some on the slope behind, and high-road leading from Namur discerned the corps of Pirch I., r to Ziethen's, and lastly, Thiel- which, just coming from Na-inning to occupy the heights e French extreme right. He this army amounted to 90,000, ce, as it had been reduced to osses of the previous evening. at once, that he had before him embled Prussian army, which ble to join the English, since ough the first to hear of our ly just arrived,—consequently o had received the intelligence later could not possibly have ot. He, therefore, determined edately, and according to the

He resolved to confine him-reme right, along the hills bor-am of Ligny as it approaches o some very evident though rtant demonstrations, and so to leave a portion of his forces y alarming him about his comh Namur; then with his right d of Gérard's infantry, he ink Ligny with vigour. With his of Vandamme and Gérard's ended to attack the three Saint-o keep his Guard as a reserve d wherever it should be most n order to make this battle pro-rt results, which it would not be ed to the valiant seizing of any e determined to employ Ney's a manner as to give a decisive e combat. If we have given a

clear description of the configuration of the ground, the reader will perceive that the battle-field presented a lengthened triangle, whose apex was at Charleroy, and whose sides fell on the high-road from Namur to Brussels, one at Quatre-Bras, the other at Sombreffe (Sombreffe and Point-du-Jour are nearly equivalent). Napoleon and Ney, the one opposed to the Prussians, the other to the English, were each on a side of the triangle, and, so to speak, in each other's rear, with an interval of about three leagues. It would, therefore, have been easy for Ney, who had not yet a numerous enemy to encounter, to detach 12,000 or 15,000 of the 45,000 men under his command, and who, wheeling round, could take Ligny and Saint-Amand in the rear, and thus surround the greater part of the Prussian army. Had this manœuvre been executed in time, neither Marengo, Austerlitz, nor Friedland would have produced greater results than the impending battle, results of which, indeed, we stood much in need.

There was no deficiency of roads for effecting the projected movement; for, besides the excellent cross-roads from Frasnès to Saint-Amand, it would have been very easy, by retrograding on the road to Quatre-Bras, to reach the old road called *des Romains*, which cuts the triangle we have described, and, passing near Saint-Amand, joins the Namur road at Brussels.

Napoleon, having descended from the mill, whence he had formed so correct a view of his position, gave orders for an immediate attack. His generals, as on the evening before, were anxiously considering the aspect presented to their view. Whilst Ney, at Quatre-Bras, thought that the entire English army was drawn up before him, these fancied they should have to fight the united English and Prussians. And yet it was not possible that the English could be both at Quatre-Bras and at Saint-Amand. Still the error of our generals was very natural, considering that they had not a clear idea of the general state of affairs. They believed that Blücher, already established on the high-road from Namur to Brussels, was in communication with the English, who would join their forces to his; for otherwise his right wing, at Saint-Amand, would be without support and exposed to the greatest danger. Not believing that he could commit so great an error, they supposed that Blücher must have the English army either in his rear or to the right. Napoleon told them that Blücher was brave but rash, and did not consider things so closely; that in the hope of joining the English, he had advanced even before he could be supported by them, for which he would, in all probability, pay dearly, as it would be impossible for the English, at that moment, to join him at such a distance as Saint-Amand. He ordered them to prepare for making an immediate attack, but not to open fire until they received a signal to do so. He said to General Gérard, for whom he felt a particular affection, that if Fortune would only show him a little favour, he hoped that the events of this day would decide the fate of the war. His lieutenants repaired to their appointed posts.

Vandamme, according to his orders, turned, together with his three divisions, to the left of

the Charleroy road, by which we had come, and deployed before Saint-Amand, having Gérard's division, which he commanded for the day, on his extreme left, and General Dorn's cavalry a little beyond. Gérard, with the 4th corps, taking the high-road directly before him, advanced about half a league, then, wheeling to the left, took up his position before the village of Ligny, so as to form almost a right angle with Vandamme. Grouchy, with Pajol's light cavalry and Exelmans' dragoons, galloped after the enemy's sharpshooters as far as the foot of the hills which are bathed by the stream of Ligny as it flows toward the Sambre. And lastly, the entire Guard, formed into close columns, was stationed in front of Fleurus, between Vandamme and Gérard. In front of the Guard was the reserve of artillery, with the cavalry of the Guard on one side, and Milhaud's noble cuirassiers on the other.

This mass of 64,000 men, drawn up in order of battle, remained motionless for more than an hour, expecting to hear the roar of Ney's cannon. Napoleon was desirous that before hostilities should commence on the plain of Fleurus, that the engagement at Quatre-Bras should begin, in order that Ney might have time to fall back on the Prussians. At two o'clock he sent him word that the Prussian army before Sombrefe was about to be attacked, and ordered him to bear down all opposition at Quatre-Bras, and then, wheeling round, attack the Prussians in the rear. A detachment of 12,000 or 15,000 men, that could be easily spared, considering the small number of the enemy at Quatre-Bras, would produce an immense effect.

Having despatched this order, and having, not without anger and astonishment, waited until half-past two, Napoleon gave the signal for attack. It was not long before this signal was responded to.

Vandamme ordered Lefol's division, which formed his right, to advance on Great Saint-Amand. When the firing was about to commence, General Lefol formed his division into a square, and addressed his men in an animated discourse, to which they replied by enthusiastic cries of *Vive l'Empereur!*

Then dividing them into several columns, he led them directly against the enemy. The ground which these troops had to traverse before reaching Saint-Amand sloped considerably, and near to the village was studded with hedges, enclosures, and orchards. The houses of the village were strongly built of stone. Beyond was the bed of the stream marked by a deep border of trees, through the openings of which might be seen the Prussian reserve provided with a numerous artillery. Our soldiers had scarcely advanced a few paces, when terrible ravages were made in their ranks by the chain shot from the village, and the balls from the batteries above. A single ball killed eight men in one of our columns. But the enthusiasm of our soldiers was too great to allow them to waver. They rushed forward almost without firing, and, penetrating into the gardens and orchards, drove thence the Prussians at the point of the bayonet, but not without encountering a brisk resistance. They then entered the village, notwithstanding street opposition and firing

from the windows, and soon compelled the enemy to retreat beyond the stream, boldened by this success, for which they had paid dear, they would have the fugitives farther, but Steinmetz's talions of reserve suddenly appearing the stream, discharging a shower of grape-shot, the French troops retired much from the violence of the firing, the impossibility of conquering masses drawn up in a semicircle on the slope surmounted the mill of Bry.

General Steinmetz wished to retake the village, and, bringing battalions to the assistance of those from Great Saint-Amand, he made good to attain his object. But though we had not been able to advance beyond the village, they were not of a temper to allow themselves to be driven out. They truly the Prussians, received them with a close and forced them to fall back on their General Steinmetz then returned to the village with his entire division, sending battalions to the right to try and turn Great Saint-Amand.

Vandamme, who was attentively watching every variation of the combat, sent a detachment of Berthezène's division to oppose the Prussians that had been sent to turn Great Saint-Amand, and despatched Gérard's division to the villages beyond, Saint-Amand-le-Mont, Saint-Amand-le-Hameau. While Lefol's vision was pouring its murderous balls those attempting to cross the stream, Berthezène's brigade held those in check that trying to turn Great Saint-Amand, and brave General Gérard partaking the enthusiasm of his men advanced at la-Haye, Villier's brigade on his right and Pajol the left. He entered and established himself at la-Haye, spite of a fearful Prussian musketry. We thus got possession of three Saint-Amands, without, however, being able to debouch beyond, in presence of masses of the Prussian army; for Steinmetz's division were the remnants of their corps and the entire of Pichler's—about fifty thousand men.

The action at Ligny had commenced later, but not less warmly. General Gérard having executed a reconnaissance along the stream of Ligny,—during which he was near being carried off by the enemy,—his rear and his right flank were threatened by the Prussian cavalry, and by the corps, both stationed at Point-du-Jour, was, therefore, necessary to act with caution. It was possible that while he was back on Ligny, Thielmann's infantry descending from Point-du-Jour on his flank, the Prussian cavalry, crossing the stream, might fall on his rear. Threatened by double danger, he ranged Bismarck's division now commanded by General Helmke, in the battle from Tongrinelle to Balloire, with to defend the banks of the stream to the extremity. This division, placed on his right, and supported by the 4th corps, General Maurin and Pajol's and two squadrons, was sufficient to defend his flank and rear. Having taken these precautions, General Gérard advanced with

d Pecheux divisions, on the village of forming almost, as we have said, a right th General Vandamme's line of battle. rmed his troops into three columns, ere to fall successively on the village , that lay on both banks of the stream. eaching the village it would be neces- cross a small plain and seize the and enclosures immediately in front. d's three columns approached they eived with so terrible a volley that, anding all their energy, they were o fall back. General Gérard then ard a large body of artillery, whose riddled the village of Ligny that it sible for the battalions detached from and Jagow's divisions to maintain tion. Profiting by their disorder, he at the head of his three columns, erce fire, and took possession first of ds, then of the houses, and reached street of the village running parallel ream. Then commenced a series of which an eye-witness has described ling all the ferocity of civil strife; own hatred of the Prussians had species of fury among our soldiers, no quarter, nor did they receive any. Gérard, having himself led on his arried his victory from the main e river, and had even got beyond it, xpected return of Jagow's division to fall back. The main street of e ran parallel to the river, another sed this, passing over the stream by a bridge, in front the church, which on an elevation. Jagow's division, sumed the offensive, advanced from e street, penetrated as far as the ad compelled us to retire almost to mity of the village. But Gérard, and, brought his men again to the ad remained master of the principal o the right, on the elevation on which h was built, he stationed a numerous , which poured a shower of shot on fians whenever they sought to return ss street, and to the left he stationed ruined castle (there are no remains) a garrison provided with artillery. prodigies of energy and self-devotion, ded in establishing himself in the in- Ligny. But here, as at Saint-Amand, ch were obliged to pause. Having d the villages which separated them Prussians, they could not advance, of the reserves drawn up in semicir- es on the slope topped by the mill of

osition justified the skilful manœuvre y Napoleon; for an attack directed nt-Amand to Ligny, in the rear of the s, could alone put an end to their re- ; and it ought even to do still more, placing them between two fires, half y would have been destroyed.

ton, impatient for the execution of the t, sent orders to Ney, whose cannon t beginning to make themselves heard, e in all probability, could not be so cupied by the English that it would sible for him to detach ten or twelve men to attack Blücher's rear. This

order, dated quarter-past three, drawn up by Marshal Soult, and intrusted to M. de Forbin-Janson, ran thus:—

"Monsieur le Maréchal:—

"The combat which I announced to you is raging here. The Emperor desires me to tell you that you must immediately manœuvre so as to envelop the enemy's right and attack their rear with impetuosity. The Prussian army is lost if you act with vigour. *The fate of France is in your hands.*"

Whilst M. de Forbin-Janson was hastening with this order to Quatre-Bras, the battle continued as furious as ever, but the Prussians had not succeeded in driving us from Ligny, nor had we been able to cross the stream. The old General Friant, who commanded the foot-grenadiers of the Guard, and whose eye had been trained through an entire life passed on the battle-field, advanced to Napoleon, and said, as he pointed to the villages, "Sire, we shall never be able to dislodge these lads, if you do not take them in the rear with one of your divisions." "Make your mind easy," replied Napoleon: "three times have I ordered that movement, and I shall now order it for the fourth time." He knew that D'Erlon's corps, the last that had begun to march, could not be farther off than Gosselies, and that an officer following at full gallop could easily bring him back to Saint-Amand. He sent La Bedoyère with a note written in pencil, containing a formal order to D'Erlon to turn back, if he were advanced beyond, or to turn aside, if he were only as far as the old Roman road, and by this route fall on the rear of the mill of Bry. This order, of whose execution there did not appear to be any doubt, was intended to produce a result that would have equalled the greatest triumphs of past centuries. But did fortune will it so?

Meanwhile, Blücher, whose patriotism and energy never relaxed, had sent all that remained of Henkel and Jagow's division to Ligny. These fresh battalions, entering the village, advanced for a moment as far as the principal street; but General Gérard's skill and courage seemed to redouble; he brought up his last reserves, and holding firm to the right on the platform near the church, and to the left, in the old castle, he did not allow his conquest to be wrested from him; but he sent word to Napoleon that his resources were exhausted, and that it was absolutely necessary for him to have assistance. Four thousand corpses already strewed the village of Ligny.

At Saint-Amand, Blücher had also made a violent effort, by sending the corps of Pirch I. to support Ziethen; that is to say, he brought into action the 60,000 men stationed between Bry and Saint-Amand. He then sent the division of Pirch II. to the assistance of Steinmetz, with orders to recover Saint-Amande-la-Haye at any price; he sent Tippleskirchen's division to Saint-Amand-le-Hameau, with equally energetic instructions. To this mass of infantry he had joined all the cavalry of the 1st and 2d corps under General Jurgas, intending that they should turn Vandamme's left. At the same time, he ordered the other three divisions of the 2d corps, commanded by Brauze, Krafft, and Langen, to advance and replace on the heights of Bry the troops that

were about to enter into action; he ordered General Thielmann to advance on Sombreffe, without, however, too much exposing Point-du-Jour, where Bulow (4th corps) was to débouch. He recommended him to excite the alarm of the French for their right wing, by making a demonstration on the Charleroy road.

In consequence of these arrangements, Blücher himself advanced at the head of his soldiers, and made a vigorous attempt upon the three Saint-Amands. The division Pirch II. advanced with the greatest impetuosity on Saint-Amand-la-Haye, and succeeded in forcing an entrance. General Girard,* at first repulsed, returned with his left brigade under General Piat, and succeeded in maintaining his position. Blücher, at the head of the rallied battalions of Pirch II., reappeared in the avenues of the village, now strewn with dead; but Girard, by a last effort, expelled the energetic old man, who was lavishing his inexhaustible courage in the interests of his country. Girard, who had declared that he would not survive if France were vanquished again, was mortally wounded in this desperate struggle. His two brigadier-generals, De Villiers and Piat, were seriously wounded. Each colonel being thus left to act on his own responsibility, the valiant Tiburce Sébastiani, colonel of the 11th light infantry, performing prodigies of valour and displaying wonderful presence of mind, kept his position at Saint-Amand-la-Haye. Out of 4500 men, the Girard division had already lost the third part, besides three generals.

More to the left, toward Saint-Amand-le-Hameau, Habert's division, sent by Vandamme to support Girard, succeeded most happily in arresting the progress of Jurgas' infantry and Tippleskirchen's cavalry. General Habert having ordered a body of sharpshooters to conceal themselves amidst the tall ripe corn, waited there until the Prussian cavalry had arrived within about half the distance of a musket-shot. He then ordered a sudden and well-directed discharge of musketry, which, taking the enemy by surprise, obliged them to retire in great disorder. Thanks to these combined efforts, we remained masters of the three Saint-Amands, but had not been able to cross the sinuous stream of Ligny. On our right, on the opposite extremity of the battlefield, Thielmann's infantry, having descended from Point-du-Jour by the Charleroy road, were driven back to the fatal stream by a vigorous charge of Exelmans' dragoons, and held in check by a continuous fire from the Hulot division, dispersed as sharpshooters. Thus arrested on the banks of the stream, we harassed our enemies, and they us; but the disadvantage was greater to us, as we needed both a prompt and complete victory to enable us to overthrow the two armies opposed to us. But Napoleon, ever on horseback, and ever watchful, suddenly devised a means of making the combat more destructive to the Prussians than the French. We have already said that the stream, on which the three disputed villages stood, turns abruptly immediately on

passing Great Saint-Amand, so that the angle and that of Ligny were almost at angles to each other. As Napoleon pressed toward Ligny, that is, along the side of the angle, he discovered, through an opening between the trees bordering the stream, the Guard, then, attacking these masses in the rear, and extending to the mill of Bry. He immediately ordered up some batteries of Guard, then, attacking these masses in the rear, soon committed fearful ravages among them. Each discharge brought hundreds of men to the ground, overturned gunners and horses, and blew the carriages of the cannon to pieces. Napoleon, contemplating this spectacle with that fearful coolness which the battle develops even in the least sanguinary man, said to Friant, who was constantly beside him: "You see that they will pay dear now for the time they make us lose." He then, slaughtering of men by thousands was sufficient; it was now late, and it was necessary to terminate this combat with the Prussians, in order to be able to meet the English in the morrow. General Friant was in doubt, seeing that the movement ordered to be made in the enemy's rear had not been effect. "Do not be uneasy," said Napoleon: "there are more ways of gaining a battle than one," and then with his usual fertility of brain he devised another combination for putting a speedy termination to this fearful struggle.

The effect produced by his artillery being *en écharpe* suggested to him the idea of advancing still farther in the same direction, passing Ligny, and crossing the stream with all the Guard, and thus take the sixty thousand men, who were attacking the three Saint-Amands, in the rear. Had this movement succeeded, and executed by the Guard, there could have been no doubt of its success. The Prussian army would have been cut in two. Ziethen and Pirch separated from Thielmann and Bulow, and though the result might have been so great as if a detachment led by Ney had attacked Blücher's rear, still it would have been great, very great, and even sufficient to rid us of the Prussians for the remainder of the campaign.

Having devised this combination, Napoleon ordered Friant to form the Guard into columns of attack, to advance as far as the heights of Ligny, and pass behind the village in order to cross higher up the ill-boding stream, the waters now flowed mingled with human blood.

These orders were about being put in execution, when Napoleon's attention was suddenly attracted to Vandamme's position. Blücher, about to make a fresh attempt to recover the three Saint-Amands, had sent Ziethen's exhausted divisions to the rear, replaced them by those of Pirch I. Vandamme had exhausted his resources, and vehemently demanding aid. It was no longer possible to allow him to wait in expectation of an attack on the enemy's rear, which he so often ordered had not yet been seen. Napoleon immediately sent him a division of the Young Guard under General Dole, allowing the Old Guard and heavy cavalry still to advance toward Ligny. Vandamme's troops to the left, and Gérard's to the right, uttered cries of joy as they saw the

* The reader will not forget that the General Girard commanding a detached division of the 2d corps is not General Gérard who commanded the 4th corps, and was at this moment attacking the village of Ligny.

to their assistance. Loud cries of *avant!* were re-echoed from both sides. Lobau, who had been compelled by the cannonade to come nearer, took the place of the Guard, and the reserve.

All time that the Young Guard came under the assistance, for Habert's division, stationed at Saint-Amand-le-Hameau to support Girard's half-destroyed division, saw masses of Prussians advancing whilst others were preparing to attack in the rear, was preparing to advance. Vandamme hastened to the spot, and was seriously alarmed, not so much at the masses in front as by the danger threatened in the rear. He shuddered at the thought of Kulm, and all its horrors perceived deep columns, clad in red, led to him the Prussian uniform, from their movements seemed to surround his forces. Not wishing to be between two fires, as he had been in the last, he sent an officer to reconnoitre the Prussians in the rear of Habert's division. The officer did not approach very near the supposed enemy, but, convinced that they were Prussians, returned at full speed with his report to Vandamme. This alarmed Habert's division to take up position at right angles to his left, so as to be between the real enemies in front and imaginary foes in the rear. Meanwhile the officer after officer to tell Napoleon of the new occurrence.

Napoleon was amazed at the intelligence, and did not comprehend it, for had a Prussian column succeeded in gliding behind the French army at Quatre-Bras and Saint-Amand, it must be that the different cavalry stationed to Ney's right and left had been both idle and blind the entire day. And D'Erlon's division, too, must not have seen this, either if oppositions were equally inadmissible, or if conjectures were of no avail, when he received an authentic report despatched from the scene of action. Napoleon immediately ordered several aides-de-camp to gallop forward, and see with their own eyes what was going on between Fleurus and Quatre-Bras. He obtained an explanation of this unexpected disposition of what seemed Prussian divisions on his left flank.

When he countermanded the orders to his Old Guard to advance toward the stream, it would not be prudent to deprive his reserve, if a large corps were to attack his rear. But he allowed the Guard to advance to the support of Girard's exhausted divisions, and the continuation of the fierce cannon-playing on the Prussian flank, was such terrible ravages.

At this time Blücher, whom nothing had deterred, was making a fresh attack upon Saint-Amand-le-Hameau and Saint-Amand-la-Plaine, the rallied battalions of Ziethen II. Attacked now for the fifth time, his line was beginning to give way, and he sent the head of the Young Guard directly on le-Hameau and la-Haye, the Prussians, and again recovered

the line of the stream of Ligny. Just as this was effected, the aides-de-camp who had been sent to reconnoitre returned and dispelled the error into which a giddy-brained officer had led Vandamme. This fancied Prussian corps turned out to be D'Erlon's battalion, which, at length, complying with Napoleon's repeated orders, was proceeding toward the mill of Bry, and, consequently, about to take the enemy in the rear. There was therefore nothing more to be dreaded on this side, there were even very good grounds for hope that the oft-repeated orders should at length be put into execution. Napoleon did repeat these orders, and at the same time proceeded to execute the great manœuvre which had been interrupted by the false report that was now explained. The importance of this movement became every moment more evident, for Blücher, by accumulating his forces in the direction of the three Saint-Amands, had left a space between himself and Thielmann, and a vigorous effort made above Ligny in the direction of Sombrefe would separate the corps of Ziethen and Pirch I. from those of Thielmann and Bulow, throw them into the greatest disorder, and deliver them as prisoners into D'Erlon's hands, should his movement succeed. In any case, this manœuvre was most opportune, for it was that decisive blow so long expected, a blow disastrous to the Prussian army, whether D'Erlon had or had not reached the neighbourhood of Bry, and would in any case terminate the battle to our advantage by removing the obstinate resistance we encountered beyond the stream of Ligny.

Napoleon ordered the Old Guard to resume its suspended movement, and to defile behind Ligny, as far as the extremity of that fated village. He was not likely to send his chosen battalions into Ligny itself, where they were sure to be incommoded by heaps of ruins and of dead bodies; he led them to a spot a little beyond, where they would only have to pass the stream and the trees on its bank. The sappers under his own directions had cut down the trees and hedges so as to allow a free passage to a deployed company. To the left, he stationed three battalions of the Pecheux division, which, debouching from the village of Ligny at the same time that the Guard debouched from the ravine, would greatly aid the movement of the latter. He next placed six battalions of grenadiers in close column, supported by four battalions of chasseurs. A significant silence was observed by these admirable troops, proud of the honour of being chosen to put a termination to the battle. The sun now, sinking behind the mill of Bry, gilded the trees with its declining rays as Napoleon at last gave the impatiently expected signal. Then the column of the six battalions of grenadiers rushed through the ravine, crossed the stream, and ascended the opposite bank, whilst the three battalions of the Pecheux division debouched from Ligny. This obstacle being overcome, the grenadiers paused to form into line and attack the height on which were stationed the Krafft and Langen divisions, supported by the entire Prussian cavalry. Whilst the French were falling into line, the enemy discharged a volley of balls and grape, which they bore unflinchingly. The Prussian cavalry,

thinking from their uniform that they were some battalions of the mobilized National Guard, advanced and parleyed, trying to induce them to surrender. One of our battalions, suddenly forming into square, slaughtered a number of the enemy's cavalry. The others formed into columns of attack, charged with fixed bayonets, and cut down all that opposed them. The Prussian cavalry returned to the charge; but at the same moment Milhaud's cuirassiers bore down on them at full gallop. A bloody conflict ensued, but soon terminated to our advantage, whilst the Prussian army, divided into two parts, was forced to fall back hastily.

At this moment Blücher, having made a last and fruitless attempt to recover the three Saint-Amands, hastened to the relief of his troops at the mill of Bry. He had come too late, and meeting our cuirassiers had been unhorsed and trodden down. This heroic old man, lying on the ground near an aide-de-camp, who took good care not to give the slightest indication of who he was, heard the galloping of our men as they cut down his squadrons and completed the defeat of his army. Meantime Vandamme at length debouched from Saint-Amand, Gérard from Ligny, and General Hulot advancing by the road leading from Namur to Charleroy, with Bourmont's division, opened that route to Pajol and Exelmans' cavalry. It was now past eight o'clock, and the shades of evening began to envelop the hideous scene, and on the right and left victory had declared in our favour. However, the Prussian army, which had retreated before the victorious Imperial Guard, did not appear to be harassed in the rear; D'Erlon so often summoned and so long expected did not appear, and no greater result could be hoped for than that just obtained. The Prussian army, retreating on every side, left us in possession of the field of battle, that is, of the high-road from Namur to Brussels, the line of communication between the English and Prussians, and left besides on the field 18,000 dead or wounded. We took a few prisoners and some pieces of cannon. These, it is true, were not all the losses the Prussians suffered. Many, terrified by the fearful struggle, had fled in confusion. Twelve thousand had thus deserted their standards, and this day reduced the Prussian army from 120,000 to 90,000 men. But what was this in comparison to thirty or forty thousand prisoners that might have been made had D'Erlon appeared, by which the ruin of the Prussian army would have been completed, and the English troops left unaided to sustain our attack? Napoleon had had too much experience to be surprised at the accidents by which the most skillful military combinations are often frustrated; but still he could not understand why his orders had not been obeyed, nor could he discover though he sought the cause. According to his calculations, the entire English army could not have been at Quatre-Bras on that day, and he could not comprehend why Marshal Ney had not been able to send him a detachment, nor why D'Erlon had not arrived when he was so near Fleurus. Revolving these thoughts in his mind, he still lingered on the battle-field, now enveloped in profound darkness, and permitted his soldiers, wearied

from their long march on that morning and the previous evening, besides fighting all day, to bivouac on the ground where the combat had terminated. Lobau's corps, (the 5th,) now become the sole reserve, was ordered to bivouac and was stationed round the mill of Bry. It might have been possible to send this corps in pursuit of the Prussians, had the state of things at Quatre-Bras been known; but not a single officer had come from Ney, and as Lobau were the only fresh troops that Napoleon had (the entire Guard being overcome by fatigue), he thought it better to keep them near him, since, if the enemy should again assume an offensive attitude, he had no other troops with which to oppose them. However, he sent some of his detachments, that of Tesse, under the intelligent and alert Pajol, to pursue the Prussians and hasten their retreat. Then he kept to protect his bivouac.

What he did not yet know, or at least he suspected, may be divined from Marshal Ney's arrangements. It must be remembered that in the morning Ney was in a state of anxiety, fancying that he had before him, not the Prince of Saxe-Weimar's four thousand men, but the entire, or at least the larger portion of the English army. He was confirmed in this opinion upon seeing a reconnaissance made by officers of high rank, a preliminary, so believed, to a great battle. General Hulot's strange conduct in retarding, on his own responsibility, the advance of the 2d corps did but add to the marshal's perplexity, and he passed the entire morning vacillating between a desire to fight and the dread of committing an imprudence. It was under the influence of these different impressions, that he sent a lancer officer to inform Napoleon that he feared the forces opposed to him were superior in number to his, to which Napoleon quickly replied that the troops assembled at Quatre-Bras could not be very numerous, that at most there could only be those that he hurried from Brussels, that Blücher's headquarters being at Namur, he could not send any force to Quatre-Bras, and that consequently Ney ought to lead on with D'Erlon's corps with Valmy's cavalry, to scatter the slender resistance he might meet. Had Napoleon been at the enemy's headquarters, he could not have formed a more correct judgment, or given more suitable directions. Besides the letter brought by M. de Flahault, Ney had received a formal order from headquarters to attack the enemy and consequently made every preparation to do so, but, unfortunately, the 2d corps had not yet arrived at noon. General Reille, charged by General Girard's report of the appearance of the Prussians, had detained this corps near Gosselies. It certainly would have been very for Ney, with the Bachelin division and the cavalry of Lefebvre-Desnoëttes and de Tré, amounting to nine thousand men, to overpower the Prince of Saxe-Weimar, whose forces, still the reinforcement he had received of two thousand men, did not amount to more than six thousand in all. The Prince of Orange had hastened to him, but unaccompanied, and not certainly Ney's 4500 infantry and 4000 excellent cavalry would have destroyed the enemy. Still we can understand that when Ney heard

a brilliant staff he believed himself in presence of an entire army, and would not venture to commence an attack with the forces under his command. Urged at length by the Emperor's repeated despatches, he lost patience and sent orders to General Reille and D'Erlon to advance at once. Had General Reille, on the receipt of the orders brought by General de Flahault, marched forward with the Foy and Jerome divisions, he might have arrived at Quatre-Bras at noon, and with these divisions Ney's forces would have amounted to at least 22,000 men, and with Valmy's cuirassiers to nearly 26,000. This number would have sufficed to overpower the enemy at noon, or even at one o'clock. Unfortunately, General Reille did nothing of all this, and contented himself, in compliance with the repeated request of his commanding officer, with coming alone at about two o'clock to Quatre-Bras. Ney testified the desire he felt to attack the forces before him, saying they could not be very numerous, and might be easily overcome. General Reille, full of the remembrance of Spain, as Vandamme was of that of Kulm, far from stimulating Ney's ardour, sought rather to depress it by representing to him that this was not the way to act with the English, that to come to an engagement with them was not a trifling affair, and that it would be better to wait until all his forces should be assembled; that, indeed, they could see but a small force before them, but that in all probability the entire English army was concealed behind the wood, and only waiting the commencement of the combat to make its appearance, and that it would, therefore, be unwise to attack unless with his entire force. This counsel was good in principle, but in the actual circumstances it was fatal, for at Quatre-Bras there was only the Perponcher division, of which three-fourths had arrived at noon, and the remainder at two o'clock, the entire amounting to only eight thousand men. Ney, therefore, determined to wait the arrival of the Foy and Jerome divisions, for though General Reille had come himself, his troops, not having received orders until late, had not yet formed into line. Now the thundering of the cannon at Saint-Amand and Ligny was heard; it was nearly three o'clock, and Ney* determined to commence the attack, hoping that the report

of the cannon would hasten the advancing troops. The Bachelu division had arrived the evening before, that of General Foy had just joined, and he was thus certain of 10,000 infantry. He had also the cavalry of General Piré and General Lefebvre-Desnoëttes, which, with Valmy's 3500 cuirassiers, amounted to nearly 1000 horsemen. It is true that he had been told not to overwork Lefebvre-Desnoëttes, and to keep Valmy a little in the rear, but these were not positive commands, they were only counsels, and counsels which the necessity of the moment rendered void. He decided therefore on commencing the attack. The Jerome division was in sight, it was known that D'Erlon's was on its way, and it was hoped that the sound of the cannon would stimulate its zeal and hasten its arrival.

We shall give a detailed account of the battle-field on which this long-delayed but heroic struggle was to be fought. Ney occupied the high-road leading from Charleroy to Brussels, and passing through Frasnes and Quatre-Bras. He was a little in advance of Frasnes, on the border of a pretty extensive hollow, with Quatre-Bras, consisting of an inn and a few houses, in front. Before him was the road leading from Charleroy to Brussels, passing through the centre of the hollow, then turning toward Quatre-Bras, where, on one side, it joined the Nivelles route, and, on the other, that of Namur. To his left were the wooded hills of Bossu, concealing the Nivelles road which ran behind; in the centre, on the road itself, was the farm of Gimioncourt; to the right, opening toward the Dyle, were several ravines bordered by trees, and in the extreme distance was the road leading from Namur to Brussels, along which resounded the roar of cannon from Ligny.

The disposition of the enemy's forces in front of Quatre-Bras was distinctly visible, but we could see nothing of those behind, which left Ney in the greatest doubt as to the numerical force with which he was about to engage. The Prince of Orange, having nine battalions of the Perponcher division under his command, had stationed four of them to our left, in the wood of Bossu, two in the centre, at the farm of Gimioncourt, one on the road, to support his

* I take these details from General Foy's military journal, written daily as the events occurred, and therefore more worthy of confidence than accounts written twenty or thirty years after the occurrences they relate. This journal asserts that Ney wished to attack, that General Reille dissuaded him, alleging the peculiar character of English troops, and advised him to await the concentration of the divisions; and the journal further says that this consultation took place at the very time that the firing at Ligny was heard. This firing was heard at half-past two at the earliest. Consequently, the attack at Quatre-Bras had not commenced at that hour. Ney wished to commence earlier, but had been prevented, either by General Reille's advice, or by the tardy arrival of his divisions. Colonel Heymes's account also proves that the marshal was impatient for the arrival of the divisions of the 2d corps, and that he began the attack before he had collected all his forces, hoping that the sound of the cannon would hasten the troops on march.

In order to transfer the responsibility of the events at Quatre-Bras from Ney to Napoleon, it has been asserted that the marshal, by commencing the attack at two o'clock, anticipated the order sent from Fleurus at two, and which could not arrive at Frasnes before half-past three. Here is a double error. The firing at Ligny was heard before Ney commenced his attack, which, consequently, could not have been before half-past two or, pro-

bably, three. Besides this, Ney had received before eleven o'clock the message brought by M. de Flahault, by which he was ordered to advance even beyond Quatre-Bras, and he had also received the message which Napoleon had sent when about to leave Charleroy for Fleurus, and which, in reply to the information brought by the lancer officer, was meant to appease the marshal's anxiety, and ordered him to summon Reille's and D'Erlon's troops to his aid, and then attack the forces opposed to him. Ney ought to have received at half-past eleven at latest this latter message, which had been despatched from Charleroy before Napoleon's departure. He consequently had not anticipated the Imperial orders, some of which he received at half-past ten and others at half-past eleven, and which enjoined him to pay no regard to his own opinion of the enemy opposed to him, but commence an immediate attack. It is certainly true that he was most anxious to engage from the time he received the second order; but he waited for Reille's troops, which that general, influenced by General Girard's information of the approach of the Prussian army, had kept back. Further on I shall consider the part played by each in these events. But it may be said here that all these things were ruled by a deplorable fatality, and by a lingering remembrance of our late reverses, which, acting on the imagination of our generals, made them, contrary to their natural dispositions, both weak and vacillating.

artillery, and two as a reserve in front of Quatre-Bras.

Ney resolved to overpower the enemy in front, not knowing exactly how many were in his rear, but counting on the arrival of the Jerome division, which was already in sight, and on D'Erlon's, which must soon appear. He stationed Bachelu's division on the right of the high-road, Foy's on the road itself, and Piré's cavalry on the right and left. The enemies' sharpshooters were soon driven back by ours, and Piré's cavalry, charging the Dutch battalions in front of the farm of Gimioncourt, at full gallop, cleared the ground. Our artillery on the road, superior in quality, number, and position to that of the enemy, dismounted several of their cannon and caused great devastation among their infantry. The brilliant Prince of Orange, annoyed by their fire, had the hardihood to attempt to capture our batteries. He endeavoured to communicate his courage to the battalion protecting his artillery, and lead them against our cannon. Whilst he headed the charge, waving his hat, General Piré sent forward one of his regiments, which, attacking the battalion in flank, drove it back, unhorsed the prince, and very nearly made him prisoner.

It was now our infantry's turn. The Gantier brigade of Foy's division, following the high-road, attacked the farm of Gimioncourt. This brigade, led by General Foy himself, took the farm and passed the ravine on which it was situate. Jamin's brigade, the second of Foy's division, turning to the left, advanced toward the wood of Bossu, into which it forced Saxe-Weimar's battalions to retire. The Prince of Orange found himself in a critical position, for his two battalions of reserve stationed in front of Quatre-Bras would not be able to arrest the progress of Bachelu and Foy's victorious divisions. Had Ney possessed more confidence, and thrown himself on Quatre-Bras, he would certainly have taken that important post, and the English divisions, advancing on one side from Nivelles and on the other from Brussels, would have been obliged to make a long *détour* before being able to act in conjunction, during which Ney would have been able to render his position at Quatre-Bras impregnable. But still doubtful of what enemy was really opposed to him, and not daring to engage Valmy's cuirassiers or Lefebvre-Desnoëttes' cavalry, he prepared, waiting for Jerome's division, the most numerous of the 2d corps, before pursuing his success further. Jerome's division appeared at last, at about half-past three, but at the same moment the Prince of Orange received a large reinforcement. Picton's division, consisting of eight English and Scotch and four Hanoverian battalions, arrived from Brussels, and brought him nearly 8000 men; 1100 of Collaert's cavalry debouched by the Nivelles road a little after the Brunswick troops arrived from Vilvorde; and the Duke of Wellington, having made his several observations, came himself to take the supreme command. The Brunswick troops, at least those that arrived on the ground, brought a reinforcement of 3000 foot and 1000 horse. The Duke of Wellington, with the Perponcher, Picton, and Brunswick divisions, had already 20,000 men under his command, and was therefore very

nearly equal in strength to Ney, even after arrival of Jerome's divisions.*

Whilst things were going on thus in British army, Jerome's division arrived on edge of the hollow where we were left, and brought Ney a reinforcement of excellent infantry. He had consequently 19,000 in line. In case of necessity, he had employed Valmy's 3500 cuirassiers, & the last Imperial despatch, sent when Napoleon was about to leave Charleroi, obliged him to use Reille, D'Erlon, and Valmy's in sweeping away the enemy before he could authorize his employing them. He had left Valmy in the rear, and did not dare to make use of Desnoëttes' troops. He again sent orders to D'Erlon to come, and with the aid of Jerome's division renewed battle, which he was determined should be decisive. He ordered Bachelu's division, which formed his right wing, to take position of Gimioncourt as its starting-point and advance, if possible, as far as the highest point of Namur. On the high-road he sent Gantier's and Jamin's brigades and the division, supported on their flank by Piré's cavalry, and ordered them to march directly to Quatre-Bras. To the left, along the road of Bossu, he replaced Jamin's brigade by Jerome's fine and numerous division, in which General Guillemot was second in command. Ney thus advanced his entire line from left to right, which was not a good arrangement, as he was about to meet serious obstacles on each wing, whilst if he had confined himself to mere demonstrations,—on one side toward the farm of Gimioncourt, and on the other toward the wood of Bossu,—and concentrated his forces on the high-road, he would, with probability, have taken Quatre-Bras, and the English line, the two divisions of which being thrown back,—one on the wood of Bossu, the other on the Namur road,—would not have been able to form a recombination. The Duke of Wellington had placed his greatest strength in his wings. On his left, along our right, along the road to Namur, he had stationed six of Picton's eight English battalions, with the four Hanoverian battalions in the second line. Of Picton's two remaining battalions, he had placed one at the junction between the little road of Dame-Avelines and the high-road of Namur, and one, and only one, at Quatre-Bras. On his left, he had placed Perponcher's cavalry troops in the wood of Bossu, and in Quatre-Bras itself, and he stationed Brunswick's front with Collaert's cavalry. The whole

* Here is an almost exact account of the strength of forces at half-past three or quarter to four:—
The Duke of Wellington had—

Perponcher.....	2,500
Collaert.....	1,100
Picton (English and Hanoverian).....	3,000
Brunswick.....	4,500
	— 11,100

Ney had drawn up in line—	
Bachelu (including artillery).....	4,500
Foy.....	2,500
Jerome.....	2,500
Piré.....	2,500
A little in the rear, which he could not dare send forward, were—	
Lefebvre-Desnoëttes (light cavalry).....	2,500
Valmy (cuirassiers).....	3,500
	— 8,500

Quatre-Bras, the most important point, but badly defended.

Seeing this, the soldiers of the 72d, immediately to the right of the 108th, were the first to rally, the others followed their example, and the English were driven back to the point whence they had come. The Foy division, seeing this movement, supported it by advancing along the road, and assisted in driving back the English left wing. The ground was now strewn with as many red as blue uniforms. However, to force the English left wing, it would be necessary to again brave the fearful firing of Picton's battalions, and of the four Hanoverian battalions by which they were supported. Bachelu, appreciating this difficulty, formed the judicious resolution of turning his efforts altogether to the right, toward what was called the Piraumont farm, lying behind the Namur road.

General Foy was advancing slowly with his two brigades along the high-road, not venturing to make a vigorous attack on Quatre-Bras, because of what was taking place in our right wing, and more especially because of the obstacles our left met along the wood of Bossu. The brave Jerome division, which had been ordered to make a movement against this wood, persisted in trying to force a passage, but the Brunswick and Bylandt troops, profiting by the advantage of their position, succeeded in keeping their ground. This division supported by Foy's movement on the high-road was about taking possession of the wood so violently disputed, and of advancing on the Nivelles road, when the Duke of Brunswick led on a charge of cavalry. He rushed with his Uhlans on our infantry, but was stopped by their fire; he was soon driven back, and put to flight by Piré's lancers and chasseurs. This brave prince fell pierced by a ball. Our lancers and chasseurs at once pursued Brunswick's Uhlans as far as Picton's infantry, which he was hastily forming into squares. Notwithstanding his efforts, our lancers, led by Colonel Galbois, drove back the 42d with great slaughter. They forced their way to the 44th, but could not succeed in totally destroying them, being repelled by the fire of the rallied soldiers. The French chasseurs, anxious to imitate the lancers, attacked the 92d, but could not succeed in breaking their lines, but, however, pushed on to Quatre-Bras, cutting down the fugitives they found on the Namur road, and for one moment seemed on the point of carrying off the Duke of Wellington himself. But, unable to sustain their position at such a distance, both lancers and chasseurs were obliged to retreat and form again behind our infantry.

It is six o'clock, and we are approaching the attainment of our object; for on the left Jerome's division is on the point of debouching beyond the wood of Bossu, in the centre Foy's division, supported by our artillery, is ascending the steep that abuts on Quatre-Bras, whilst on the right Bachelu, advancing through the Piraumont farm, has nearly reached the Namur high-road. A decisive blow is needed in the centre to secure victory by the capture of Quatre-Bras. Time presses as reinforcements are flowing from all parts to the Duke of Wellington. First ar-

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rived the Nassau contingent under General Von Kruse,* consisting of 3000 men; then came Alten's division, consisting of an English and German brigade, amounting to about 6000 men. The English general would then have 30,000 men to oppose the 19,000 of the French general, already diminished by 3000 since the commencement of the engagement. Ney, though he could not see the reinforcements that reached his adversary, felt, however, that the resistance was increasing, and became miserable at not being able to overcome it. Whilst anxiously expecting D'Erlon's arrival to help him in these straits, he receives a piece of information that throws him into actual despair. General Delcambre, the chief of D'Erlon's staff, arrives at full gallop to say that, in obedience to an Imperial order, written in pencil and brought by La Bédoyère, D'Erlon's corps, so often ordered to Quatre-Bras, had been commanded to turn back and advance toward Ligny. On hearing this, Ney declared he had been placed in a fearful position, that it was the hope, nay, the certainty, of D'Erlon's aid that had induced him to engage the English, whose entire army was now opposed to him, and that he would certainly be destroyed if he did not get the promised help. Agitated, and not reflecting on what he was doing, he exerted the authority given him over D'Erlon, and sent General Delcambre to him with a formal order to return to Quatre-Bras.

At the very moment that Ney gave this hasty order, he received the letter that had been written at quarter-past three at Fleurus, and brought by De Forbin-Janson, and in which Napoleon ordered him to fall back on the heights of Bry, exciting him to make this movement by telling him that the Prussian army would be annihilated, and that consequently the *safety of France was in his hands*. In a cooler moment, the marshal would have perceived, what was very plain, that the principal action was not now at Quatre-Bras but at Ligny; that the Prussian army once destroyed, the ruin of the English must inevitably follow next day, and that it would consequently be better to obey Napoleon, and that at once, by confining himself to acting on the defensive at Quatre-Bras, which was possible, as he proved an hour later, and send immediate orders to D'Erlon to advance to Fleurus. An officer at full gallop could have delivered this order within half an hour, and an hour later, that is to say, at half-past seven, D'Erlon would have been in the rear of the mill of Bry, and thus enclose the Prussians between two adverse armies. But Ney did not make this very simple calculation. Occupied solely with what was presented to his view, he only thought that he ought to obtain a victory as quickly as possible on the spot where he was, and then fall back on Napoleon. His only thought was, by some desperate effort, to overcome the obstacles opposed to him. He had seen the prodigies of valour effected by our cavalry during the day. Inflated with the

hope that, with the assistance of the horse, could bear down all before him, he was Count de Valmy, one of whose brigades had ordered to come closer, and, addressing him Napoleon's words, said, "General, the *safety of France is in your hands*. You must make great effort against the English corps, to bear down the mass of infantry opposed to you. If you succeed, France is saved, and you shall be supported by the army." General Kellerman, always fond of moderation, made more than one objection to the plan, but yielded to the marshal's almost epidemic entreaties, and commenced preparation for the desperate attack that had been made to his valour.

To accomplish what Ney had commanded would require the Count de Valmy's 12 brigades, consisting of 3500 cuirassiers and dragoons, together with the light regiment of the Guard, commanded by Lefebvre-Desnoëttes in person, and when all had been worn down by our horse, a mass of infantry would have been required to take definitive possession of the conquered ground. Instead of saving Jerome's fine division to wear out in one against physical obstacles at the Bois, he should have left but one brigade of infantry to sustain the combat at that spot, and he with the remaining four thousand men of the division, five thousand of Fay's Valmy cuirassiers and dragoons, the lancers, and Picard's Lefebvre-Desnoëttes' chasseurs, that is, not nine thousand horse and nine thousand foot, break the English centre, as Massena had done the Austrian centre at Caldiero in 1805. But Ney, actuated at the same time by the impulses of heroic valour, and perurbed by deep anxiety of mind, only thought of making some desperate effort. Unfortunately, preparation itself needs some degree of promptness to secure success. Ney, whilst preparing Napoleon's most essential directions by sending D'Erlon to his assistance, was most scrupulous in observing the now unnecessary caution of leaving Kellerman at the junction of the old Roman road, and the still more important one of not overworking Jerome's Desnoëttes' troops, and confined himself to employing one of Valmy's brigades, which allowed Jerome's brigade to retreat into the wood of Bossu.

Count de Valmy, notwithstanding the wisdom of the orders he had received, prepared himself for a vigorous attack, giving the horses a little time to rest, and at the head of his chasseurs and lancers, hastened to support him. The Count de Valmy proceeded along the high-road, and moved the acclivity toward Quatre-Bras as he then turning abruptly to the left in the direction of the Bossu wood, he with his brigade composed of the 8th and 11th cuirassiers, rushed on the English infantry, commanded by Major Halkett. Balls rained on the cuirasses and helmets of our horsemen, but they did not flinch. The 8th regiment was attacked by our 8th, borne down, a number of the men put to the sword, and the flag borne off by a cuirassier named Lami. The English regiment took refuge in the wood. Kellerman, having rallied his squadrons, rallied the 30th, whose ranks he could not break, and he

* The Nassau contingent was not the same as the Nassau troops of the Prince of Saxe-Weimar, that had defended Quatre-Bras on the previous evening. The latter were called Nassau-Orange, because they were in the service of the house of Orange.

ed and cut down the 33d, and two battalions, and thus forced his way Bras. Meanwhile, Piré commenced on the right on Picton's infantry, drawn up in several lines, met by our light cavalry with a sharp directed fire. But the 6th lancers, Mel Galbois, and distinguished by its on this day, succeeded in reaching the road, and cutting down a Hanoverian battalion in Picton's rear. The Duke of Wellington had only time to mount a horse

cavalry maintained the position it had on the plateau of Quatre-Bras. Had other regiments come to its aid, had even a part of Jerome's come and hold the ground that had been won, or if his three other brigades been sent to meet, its triumph had been complete. It was, unfortunately, been thrown by an operation amid a host of enemies, the left without support exposed to a charge. The English infantry that had been in the houses at Quatre-Bras received an incessant shower of balls on our left. Surprised by this fire, and not being themselves supported, they began to retreat, first slowly, but afterward with increasing rapidity of terror. The Count de Saxe in vain to retain them on the left, they had lately so victoriously assisted their retreat was hastened by the character of the ground, and by their position. Their general being thrown forward, and with his head uncovered, being left on the field, took hold of the hands of two cuirassiers, and returned ended between two horses at full gallop, seeing this confusion, ordered the 1st to be blocked up by Lefebvre-Desnoettes, rallied by arresting our fugitive, after they had performed prodigies

now displaying all that incomparable skill which he had been endowed by nature with. He rallied his troops, and steadily pressed the line of battle. On the high-road, the English division at the point to which it retreated, whilst Bachelin's division was debouching by the Piraumont farm, on the high-road; he next hastens to the wood, to carry the wood of Bossu, seen terminus of all his efforts. But his resistance increases every moment. The troops content to defend the wood, leaving its precincts, superb battalions to approach in numbers sufficient to overwhelm them. In fact, the Duke of Wellington, at the head of 30,000 men, was reinforcing the English guards under General Picton, the remainder of the Brunswick corps, fresh squadrons of cavalry, giving them, whilst Ney had scarcely 16,000. At this moment, resuming his lion-like march forward at the head of Jerome's against the troops debouching by the left, arrests their progress. Recovering his presence of mind in the midst of physical exertion, he sees the risk of continuing on the left. He determines to confine himself to the measures, which he ought to have taken, after allowing the morning to pass

without attacking the English. In consequence of this wise resolve, he slowly draws his entire line from right to left, remaining himself on horseback in the centre, and encouraging the soldiers by his noble bearing. The advantage of ground was on his side as he ascended the side of the hollow. The English had now to ascend an acclivity under a murderous plunging fire. Ney attacked them with a continuous shower of balls and grape, sometimes arresting their progress at the point of the bayonet, and sometimes by a close fire of musketry, and thus two hours were spent in ascending the side of the hollow extending from Frasnes to Quatre-Bras.

Firm in the midst of the bullets that fell around him, Ney stands an object of terror to the enemy and of admiration to his soldiers, but he deeply feels the turn affairs have taken, and exclaims, with heroic but profound sorrow, "Would that all those bullets were lodged in my body!" Alas! the scene before him was a victory compared to what he was doomed to witness two days later!

It was nine o'clock, darkness enveloped these funeral plains, and more than forty thousand corpses strewed the triangle formed by Sombreffe, Quatre-Bras, and Charleroy. At Quatre-Bras Ney had killed or wounded nearly 6000 of the enemy, and had himself lost about 4000 men. At Ligny, as we have already said, 11,000 or 12,000 French and 18,000 Prussians lay weltering in their blood, without counting the numbers that had fled. Forty thousand valiant men were again sacrificed to the fearful passions of the time!

It will naturally be asked where the Count d'Erlon was all this time, since he had neither appeared at Ligny to complete the victory nor at Quatre-Bras to force back the English on the Brussels road. The answer is a sad one: he had spent the day in objectless marches, his peerless valour rendered useless by the fatality that then presided over all our affairs.

He had remained at Gosselies all the morning, awaiting orders that did not come until eleven o'clock, when General Reille informed him of General de Flahault's message. He immediately advanced toward Frasnes, sending, as he had been ordered, his right division under General Durutte to Marbais. When the men of this division saw themselves in the Prussian rear, they clapped their hands, and loudly applauded the foresight of Napoleon, who had placed them in such a position. But they had scarcely advanced a league in that direction, when some of Ney's officers, sent when the marshal was about to attack the English, came to order the whole corps to Quatre-Bras. Durutte's division had like the others been recalled to Frasnes, amid the murmurs of the soldiers, angered at being turned from a point where they foresaw that they should have accomplished great deeds. At about half-past three General La Bédoyère suddenly arrived with a note from the Emperor, renewing the order to march to Bry. The men again rejoiced as they recovered the prospect of triumph. D'Erlon, while obeying the order brought by La Bédoyère, sent, as we have seen, Major Delcambre, the head of his staff, to inform Ney of the reason of his retiring from Quatre-Bras. This general ful-

filled his mission to Ney, and returned with a formal and positive order to D'Erlon to retrace his steps and return to Quatre-Bras. Between five and six o'clock, General Delcambre overtook the 1st corps on its march to Bry, and brought it back toward Quatre-Bras. General Delcambre was succeeded by several officers, who came to inform Count d'Erlon that Marshal Ney, counting on his assistance, had commenced an engagement with the English with inferior forces, and would be ruined without his aid, by which all Napoleon's plans would be overturned, and that by not returning to Quatre-Bras Count d'Erlon involved himself in a grave responsibility. These were exaggerations, for, as the event proved, had he acted on the defensive between Frasnes and Quatre-Bras, he ran no greater risk than that of not accomplishing anything decisive on that day at Quatre-Bras, whilst an immense triumph would have been secured at Ligny. But D'Erlon did not know how affairs stood on either field of battle. In the direction of Ligny he only heard of a victory to be completed; at Quatre-Bras, he was told, he was needed to prevent a disaster. Ney, his immediate superior, summoned him in consequence of a pressing necessity, and he very naturally obeyed. He did what in point of fact was wrong, as we shall soon see, but he did it in all sincerity, with the very best intentions, and influenced by the terrified countenances of those who came from Quatre-Bras. Thus, for the second time on this day, he abandoned the road to Bry, and turned toward Frasnes. Though determined to do this, he asked the opinion of General Durutte, a very distinguished officer, commanding his first division, the one most in advance toward Bry, and, in accordance with this general's advice, he adopted a middle course. On one hand Ney seemed to need immediate aid; on the other hand, the victory of Ligny would be decided by the appearance of some troops on the Prussian rear; moreover, there would be a very great risk in leaving the space between Fleurus and Frasnes unoccupied, as it would be leaving an issue open by which the enemy might advance between the two French armies. As to the authority of the commands, D'Erlon was left to decide between Ney, who was his immediate superior, and Napoleon, who was commander-in-chief. Having duly weighed all these different considerations, he determined to advance with three divisions to Quatre-Bras, and allow Durutte's division to proceed alone to Bry. But at the same time he advised General Durutte to act with prudence, an advice he made still more impressive when *en route* he heard how bad an aspect things had assumed with Ney. D'Erlon then, to the great regret of his men, set out for Quatre-Bras, whilst General Durutte advanced hesitatingly toward Bry, which gave rise to a report that he was disaffected or even a traitor, a most unjust accusation, for this general was as zealous as prudent, and only acted in obedience to his superior's commands. He arrived between nine and ten o'clock at Bry, hastened the Prussians' retreat, but did not take a single prisoner, and D'Erlon arrived at Frasnes, in Ney's rear, when the firing of the cannon had ceased, and when he could not be of any use.

Such was that sanguinary day, the 16th of June, 1815, the second of the campaign in which two battles were fought, one gained at Ligny, the other undecided at Quatre-Bras. It would be impossible to appreciate the results of this day were they only considered as regard to what occurred at Quatre-Bras, or the false movements by which D'Erlon's army was rendered useless. In the first place, the concerted plan of the campaign had been successful. Napoleon had occupied the high-road from Namur to Brussels, and indeed at two points, only at one—Ligny—but that was sufficient for his object. The Duke of Wellington had certainly secured the master of one point on this road—Quatre-Bras—but though he continued to occupy a point so necessary for rallying the English army, it was not the less separated from it by Blücher, whom he could only reach at a great distance in the rear. The English were therefore so circumstanced that they were either compelled to fight without the French, or to make a great circuit to rejoin them. The first and most essential result was consequently obtained. In the second place, the French had intended to attack the English, beaten, thoroughly beaten, whose ranks had been reduced one-fourth, by the number of the wounded, and disbanded; its original 20,000 men being reduced to 90,000. The French might certainly have been so completely conquered as not to be able to make their appearance again, by which every thing would have been changed, for the English army, compelled to fight next day without assistance, would have been completely ruined in its turn. The decisive result was not obtained, and it was a great misfortune. But the French succeeded in taking up a position between the allied armies, and that which they had intended to attack first was beaten. The execution of the plan had consequently been accomplished; and if the great results that would have been expected, and which would have changed the fate of France, were not obtained, who was to blame? History must judge, if it recounts facts it must also pronounce judgment. Here, therefore, is the conclusion that we think may be drawn from the statement of these events.

The chief fault found with this day's proceedings is the time lost on the morning of the 16th. This blame, as may be well seen, is directed to the events at Ligny, not to what occurred at Quatre-Bras. We now discuss this question as if Napoleon had his entire army assembled on the morning of the 16th, and had nothing to do but send his troops to march at dawn. This was not the case. About 25,000 men had been engaged during the night to the right of the Sambre, and in the morning had to drill with their *matériel* across the bridge and along the streets of Charleroi. At the Château de Gérard's troops had not all crossed the Sambre, and were exhausted from fatigue. It required three full hours for the different parts of the French army, not to form but to be in a position to advance toward the English, in which they were to fight. Besides, Napoleon had scarcely any doubt as to the position of the enemy's forces, still it was

his,—between two armies, each of great strength to his own,—it was that he should seek for certainty in a decisive step, and that the delay by the troops in marching was not by him in seeking intelligence of the movements. Marshal Grouchy, who was ordered to commence reconnoitring in the morning, acknowledges that he did not know, and did not report until after the Prussians were forming at Sombreffe. This information arrived at Charleroy until long after orders were given before eight, between eight and nine. Beresford, in catching Napoleon's ideas of a half-hour; but certainly it was to be done, it cannot be said it was lost. As the troops advanced, would require several hours to assemble, whilst Napoleon, on horseback, here in an hour, he could very easily give his stay at Charleroy, and give any information, and issue any sensible orders. When, therefore, how Napoleon was occupied at Charleroy, at ten or eleven o'clock in the morning, these details must be taken into account. It is asserted that the delay was the inactivity of a man who, though at the time, had been eighteen hours back on the 15th, had slept but a few hours during the night, had risen at once that fearful and sanguinary day—which did not terminate until the 16th, and during which he was on horseback. Further consideration more conclusive of these, which is that it was not the consequence to enter early into the battle as at Quatre-Bras, where it was necessary to bar the road as quickly against the English, whilst at Sombreffe it was necessary to allow the Prussians the time to be able to fight them under favourable circumstances. It would not be wise to commence the battle on the 16th, if it were intended to be a day, it was not of much consequence whether the battle was fought in the morning or in the evening, the day dawned before the battle, and did not close until the evening. There was, therefore, no time to fight, and a small part of the morning passed in collecting and bringing up the troops was lost. The day was equally well spent at Ligny. The army arrived at Fleurus before the battle, all his generals in a state of readiness, did not hesitate himself, and he was ready for battle. But the troops, the 1st corps especially, had not been ordered to wait. At Sombreffe he was ready; but having formed the combination of making a portion of the army fall back on his in order to flank the Prussians in the rear, he determined to gain some advantage of time, and he heard the report of his lieutenant at the useless delay, he was angry after message, and at last he decided to commence about half-past

two. Even then there was sufficient time to derive every desirable advantage from the victory, if at half-past five a false alarm had not caused Vandamme to lose some valuable time, and obliged the decisive charge of the Imperial Guard to be deferred until seven. Had this charge been made at half-past five, there would have been sufficient time to pursue and destroy the Prussians. But there was sufficient time to beat them thoroughly, for a third of their troops actually engaged were killed, wounded, or put to flight.

It cannot be said that the day was as well employed at Quatre-Bras. If in a certain sense time was not all-important at Ligny, on the contrary, every moment lost at Quatre-Bras was a misfortune. Besides the immense importance of getting possession as quickly as possible of the point of junction between the English and Prussians, it was not less desirable to attack the English before their entire forces should be assembled. On the evening of the 15th there were but 4000 of the enemy at Quatre-Bras, and all these were Nassau soldiers. Up to noon on the 16th this number had not increased. It was not until two o'clock that they amounted to 7000, to which number not a soldier was added up to half-past three. Ney, on the other hand, had 9000 under his command on the evening of the 15th, and had them also on the morning of the 16th, when he might have increased the number to 20,000 if he chose. It would be extremely improbable to suppose that the verbal orders given in the afternoon of the 15th did not refer to Quatre-Bras; but, even admitting that they did not, the written orders delivered by M. de Flahault at half-past ten on the morning of the 16th, and renewed so often during the forenoon, contained the formal command to attack Quatre-Bras and take it at any cost. During the five hours which elapsed from half-past ten until half-past three, 20,000 men could certainly have overpowered Perponcher's division, that amounted only to 7000.

It is true that Ney from eleven o'clock, that is, from the time he received Napoleon's written orders, no longer hesitated, and was firmly resolved to attack Quatre-Bras; but as General Reille, misunderstanding General Girard's report, had taken upon him to keep back the troops, the marshal was obliged to wait until nearly three o'clock. Consequently, he is not to be blamed for what occurred after eleven o'clock, and when again at two he wished to make a sudden attack upon the enemy, General Reille, influenced by the remembrance of events in Spain, again restrained him, undoubtedly with the very best intentions, but still he did restrain him. When at length the attack commenced, the English were equal, and soon became superior, in numbers.

Thus at Quatre-Bras much precious time was lost, from the evening of the 15th to the afternoon of the 16th, and lost when its importance was greatest.

So far as to the manner in which the time had been employed. We shall next turn our attention to the mode of operation. Napoleon's first combination at Ligny was one of the finest in his whole military career. Seeing that the Prussians, heedless of the safety of their right wing and rear, were deploying between Ligny

and Saint-Amand, whilst they had Ney's 45,000 men in their rear, he determined to make some of these 45,000 fall back on them, which manœuvre would have thrown half the Prussian army into our power. General Rogiat, who criticizes Napoleon severely after his fall, asserts that Napoleon ought to have preferred another mode, and attacked the extremity of the three Saint-Amands, that is, that he ought to have brought up our extreme left against the extreme right of the Prussians, in order to throw them back on Sombreffe and separate them from the English. Napoleon, at Saint Helena, refuted these censures with all the haughtiness of offended genius replying to presumptuous and calumniating mediocrity. There was no question, as he very well remarks, of separating the Prussians and English, which had been already done by Ney at Quatre-Bras, but of destroying a portion of the Prussian army, which would have been the result of Ney's movement. Thus, when by delays and deplorable misunderstandings this most admirable combination was frustrated, Napoleon, by determining to pierce the enemy's line above Ligny, gave an additional proof of the fertility of his resources in the field.

But at Quatre-Bras the ground was neither so correctly estimated nor so skilfully attacked. Ney was more heroic than ever, but not as cool. He exhausted his strength at the wings, to the right at the Gimioncourt farm, and to the left at the wood of Bossu. The furious charges made by his cavalry, fruitless because unsupported, prove that the enemy's line might have been pierced in the centre, that is, at Quatre-Bras. Had Ney, instead of literally obeying an order that was revoked by a second, as well as by the course of events, sent forward Valmy's four brigades, and Lefebvre-Desnoëttes' light cavalry, which latter would with Piré's amount to several thousand horse, and instead of compelling Prince Jerome's fine division of 8000 men to exhaust its strength against the wood of Bossu, had he left one of General Foy's brigades before this wood, and directed these 7000 horse and 8000 foot against Quatre-Bras, he certainly would have broken the Duke of Wellington's centre, driven part of his troops along the Nivelles road, and the others toward Sombreffe, and thus secured the valuable position of Quatre-Bras.

Although such a victory would be most desirable, as it would have curbed the pride of the English, and destroyed part of their forces, yet it would not have been the most important event of the day. Thanks to Ney's great firmness, what was most essential had been done when the progress of the English was arrested at Quatre-Bras, and all would have been well had D'Erlon not been rendered useless by orders and counter-orders, and so allowed the Prussian army to escape, half of which he certainly could have captured. This was the real misfortune of the day, which prevented the battle of Ligny, all glorious and important as it was, from becoming a decisive victory, and rendered its results so much inferior to what they might have been. It was only part of the fatality that reigned over those days, a fatality that circumvented the best-laid plans, and rendered the most extraordinary heroism

fruitless. It is confounding to see how de D'Erlon approached the scene of action, how often he was recalled before attacking, and that to the despair of his men, more desighted than their commanders.

This, we repeat, was the misfortune of the day. Was this misfortune attributable to the error of any individual, or owing solely to the rigour of fate? We shall inquire. Napoleon, knowing that in the early part of the day he would not have many enemies to oppose, could very well ask for 12,000 or 15,000 of his 45,000 men for the accomplishment of a decisive object, more decisive even than the taking of Quatre-Bras. Consequently, the order to D'Erlon was not an error in itself. When Ney received this order, he ought to have resigned himself to do without D'Erlon, and act on the defensive, which he could so well have done with 20,000 men, as he passed two hours later. As to D'Erlon, he ought to have obeyed his immediate superior, the Emperor, the commander-in-chief, and still be very easily understood that, once in the combat, and seeing the number of the enemy increase, Ney should endeavour to conquer on the spot where he was engaged, and then hasten to assist in completing Napoleon's triumph. It was also very natural that D'Erlon, receiving such bad accounts from Quatre-Bras, should think it right to obey Ney's orders, given as they were in such terms of despair; and on the whole there seems no reason to blame fortune than mortal misunderstandings. Indeed, Napoleon's expressive words, "*The fate of France is in my hands*," words meant to rouse Ney's enthusiasm, were understood by him to render the necessity of taking Quatre-Bras, while a reality they referred to the victory of Ligny, and though meant to secure the success of Napoleon's plans, only tended to frustrate them, a striking proof of the designs of destiny on our behalf, or rather a proof of how hard and bewildering that position was to Napoleon, the only person who possessed the free exercise of his faculties, a point Napoleon himself had created by seeking defiance of Europe, in defiance of France, in defiance of common sense, to render his reign henceforth become impossible.*

However much Napoleon might have regretted the incompleteness of his victory,

* I cannot conclude these already too long relations without adding a few words in support of a gratuitous supposition, which pretends that D'Erlon, after his marchings and counter-marchings at Quatre-Bras instead of to Bry, it was by an order from Napoleon himself. In that case, he would have to and fro, which prevented his being at Sombreffe where, could not be laid to Ney's charge, who would have to come to Quatre-Bras, nor to D'Erlon's own credit. Ney in preference to Napoleon, let it be said, himself, who countermanded his own orders. This thesis originated with M. Charras, is his latest work, and extremely well-written work on the campaign.

Hypotheses are admissible in history when they explain what would otherwise be inexplicable, when they agree with probability and the induction drawn from the general course of events. Here there is nothing of the kind. The supposition of M. Charras renders the whole before quite simple, inexplicable. Confused by conflicting orders of Napoleon and Ney, the Duke of D'Erlon, without falling in respect to his superior, executed what is always very hazardous in military affairs, and he drew his own conclusions—and, believing he was in great danger, and that Napoleon was equally in danger, he determined to go to Quatre-Bras.

repeat that he had reason to be satisfied; for up to this time his plan had been crowned with success. He had succeeded in surprising the English and Prussian armies, and, taking up his position between them, he had conquered the Prussians, and arrested the progress of the English, and had forced them sufficiently apart to allow him time to fight the Duke of Wellington alone on the morrow or the day following. Blücher, having lost the high-road from Namur to Quatre-Bras, could no longer join the Duke of Wellington by this the only direct route, and should be obliged either to separate altogether from the English by advancing by Namur toward the Rhine, or endeavour to join them at Brussels, if he wished to continue the campaign conjointly with them. Between the belligerent armies and Brussels was the deep and extensive forest of Soignes, surrounding this town from southwest to northeast, and which being three or four leagues in depth, and ten or twelve in length, would present great difficulties to the advance of a large army, encumbered with considerable *matériel*. If the Prussians, deprived of their direct communication with the English by the high-road from Namur to Brussels, wished to rejoin them, they could do so by advancing through Gembloux and Wavre to the borders of the forest of Soignes, in the front or rear of which they might have met them. If for greater security they should

advance through the forest in order to effect their union beyond it, that is, under the walls of Brussels, they need cause us no uneasiness, as they would arrive too late to assist their allies. If, on the other hand, they wished to join them nearer than the forest of Soignes, the danger might be very serious indeed; but as Napoleon was actually between the Prussians and English, and only five leagues from the forest, it would be impossible that this junction could be effected in advance of the forest, that is, before his eyes, unless he himself allowed it, or that his lieutenants, whose duty it was to prevent them, should allow the enemy to do as they pleased. Being, besides, actually face to face to the English at Quatre-Bras, he was as certain as it was possible to be that he could attack them on the following day, and beat them before the Prussians could come to their assistance. It is therefore incontestable that though he had only conquered, not entirely routed, the Prussians, that his plans had been successful up to this time, since he was in a position to encounter his enemies one after the other. If the Prussians were not totally routed, as they ought to have been, they were very well beaten, and an active pursuit might have produced the same result as the intended attack of D'Erlon. They ought not to have been allowed a moment's rest next day, but constantly pursued, so that those who had left their ranks should be entirely cut off,

under this aspect, all is simple and clear; but there is neither clearness nor simplicity in supposing that Napoleon countermanded a movement on which he considered the issue of the war to depend, and that before he had time to learn the state of affairs at Quatre-Bras or with what difficulties Ney was surrounded. M. Charas' explanation consequently renders what is simple inexplicable, and, far from being probable, is opposed to all probability. Still he hypothesizes might be taken into account, if not altogether admitted, did it rest on any authority; but there are only two witnesses to the fact, and these are both a direct contradiction to this supposition. These witnesses are the Count d'Erlon, and General Durutte, who commanded a division of the 1st corps. Certainly, could any testimony be decisive concerning Napoleon's orders to Count d'Erlon, it would be that of Count d'Erlon himself, who received and had to execute these orders. When questioned by the Duke d'Elchingen as to these events, he gave the following reply, related by the Duke d'Elchingen himself in a production entitled "*Documents inédits sur la campagne de 1815.*"

"I stopped with the generals of the Guard beyond Frasnes, where I was joined by General La Bédoyère, who showed me an order written in pencil, which he was taking to Marshal Ney, and which enjoined him to send my *corps d'armée* to Ligny. General La Bédoyère told me that he had already given the order for this movement by changing the direction of my column; he also told me where I could join it. I set out immediately, first sending General Delcambre, the head of my staff, to inform the Marshal of my new destination. He was sent back by Marshal Ney with imperative orders for me to join him at Quatre-Bras, where, counting on the co-operation of my *corps d'armée*, he had commenced a most serious engagement. I consequently believed that the necessity must be very pressing when the marshal assumed the responsibility of recalling me though he had received the note I mentioned."

"I thought the necessity must be very pressing," says the Count d'Erlon, "when the marshal assumed the responsibility of recalling me though he had received the note which I have spoken of." . . . Is it not evident, merely from reading this passage, that if Count d'Erlon had received a final order from Napoleon authorizing his marching to Quatre-Bras instead of to Bry, he would have said so simply, since he would thus justify himself with a single word, and need not to defend himself by the urgency of Ney's position, and by the supposition that Ney was authorized in contradicting Napoleon's orders? He would have said simply that Napoleon had countermanded the order written in pencil shown him by General La Bédoyère, and his justification would have been complete and satisfactory. The necessary conclusion is that he did not receive this last countermanding order, which would have

fully exculpated him. This seems to us an absolute and incontestable proof.

Here comes another witness, quite as important,—General Durutte. This competent and intelligent general commanded the division of the 1st corps, which formed the head of the column. He drew up a note now in my possession, and of which the Duke d'Elchingen quoted a portion at page 71.

General Durutte having related how the Count d'Erlon, in obedience to an order from Napoleon, had advanced toward Bry to attack the Prussians in the rear, continues as follows:—"Whilst he was *en marche*, orders arrived in haste from Marshal Ney commanding that the 1st corps should be sent on to Quatre-Bras. The officers who brought these orders said that Marshal Ney had encountered superior forces at Quatre-Bras, and had been driven back. This second order embarrassed Count d'Erlon very much, as at the same time he received fresh orders from the right to advance toward Bry. He nevertheless decided on joining Marshal Ney; but as he remarked with General Durutte that the enemy might make a column debouch in the plain between Bry and the wood of Delhoute, by which the Emperor's army would be totally cut off from Marshal Ney's, he determined to leave General Durutte on the plain."

This is quite as decisive as the evidence already quoted. This testimony of an ocular witness shows that Count d'Erlon had received contradictory orders, that he hesitated at first, but that he was finally decided by Ney's danger, and by this danger alone, for, as he says, he received at the same time fresh orders from the right to march toward Bry. These orders from the right were the reiterated orders of the Emperor, and this passage is more than a sufficient proof that they had not been revoked, since, if that were the case, General Durutte, who was present and shared in the perplexity, would not have failed to say that their embarrassment had been terminated by a fresh order from the Emperor. From all this, it is quite evident that the supposition of a countermanding order from the Emperor is not only gratuitous, but in direct contradiction to the conclusive testimony of the only known witnesses. Consequently, those movements which rendered D'Erlon's corps useless are attributable to Ney, who did not act on the defensive, and summoned D'Erlon to his aid at any risk. And blame must also attach to D'Erlon, who, embarrassed by opposing orders, allowed himself to be influenced by Ney's despairing message. This error did not proceed directly from Napoleon, or from an obscurely-worded command, but it did indirectly, inasmuch as he was the general and superior cause of the moral condition of his lieutenants. It needs no proof to justify us in saying that Napoleon was a bad politician, but to assert that he was a bad general seems to me a most rash assertion, which I could never be induced to admit.

and their army as much reduced by the pursuit as it would have been by the battle itself.

Napoleon returned to Fleurus at about eleven at night, and though he had been actively employed since five in the morning, he did not seek the rest he so much needed until he had given all necessary orders. He was then told, though not very minutely, that Ney had only succeeded in arresting the progress of the English, though he had been engaged with them all day. He sent him orders to be under arms next morning at dawn in order to advance to Brussels, and that he need feel no fear of the English, who could make no opposition after the battle of Ligny, since by advancing on them by the high-road from Sombrefe to Quatre-Bras, they could be taken in the rear if they attempted to resist. He ordered Pajol to take a little rest, and then pursue the Prussians; he sent after him Teste's infantry detached from Lobau, as a reinforcement, in case the Prussian cavalry should turn on them. Napoleon then flung himself on a bed to refresh himself by a few hours' sleep.

He was up again at five, ready to continue his operations, as he considered that the moment for attacking the English was come. As there was but little chance of seeing the Prussians for three or four days at least, it was the English that he was to seek and fight, and with such soldiers as his, and under his own immediate command, he could have no doubt of the result. Having adopted the plan of two wings, which he intended to support alternately with his centre, consisting of Lobau's corps, the Guards, and the reserve of cavalry, in all, about 40,000 men, he was now about to leave his victorious right wing at Ligny and join the left wing, which had been neither victorious nor conquered at Quatre-Bras. His left wing, consisting of Reille's and D'Erlon's troops, and part of the heavy cavalry, being now reinforced with the troops of the centre, amounted to about 75,000, a sufficient force to oppose to the English. He very naturally formed his right wing of the troops that had fought at Ligny, too fatigued to fight on this day; these were the 4th corps, (Gérard's,) the 3d, (Vandamme's,) Girard's division, Pajol's chasseurs and hussars, and Exelmans' dragoons, which were already placed under Marshal Grouchy's orders.

The part already allotted to this right wing, and which was to be performed whilst Napoleon was engaged with the English, was to watch the Prussians, complete their defeat, or at least aggravate it by pursuing them at the point of the sword, and check them if they showed any intention of falling back on us. It would have been the extreme of negligence, a negligence most unworthy of a great commander, to allow the conquered Prussians to do what they pleased, perhaps join the English in advance of the forest of Soignes, or perhaps, encouraged by our negligence, advance on Charleroy, threaten our rear, intercept our communications, but, in any case, recover from their defeat, and bring the important contingent of their recruited forces to the aid of the English, or perhaps of the Russians or Austrians. It would consequently be an unpardonable oversight to neglect them,

and as the detachment sent in their pursuit need not proceed farther than four or five leagues from the others, it could be easily recalled. We must add, that this detachment ought to be tolerably large if it were called to fight, stop, or pursue the Prussians. Napoleon had but 110,000 men to oppose 190,000, and perhaps these were reduced by the losses of the preceding days, and he was obliged to employ 75,000 of them against the Duke of Wellington, he could assign more than 35,000 or 36,000 to Grouchy. In this number, under a skilful and brave commander, would have been sufficient against a beaten army. On the memorable day of Auerstadt, in 1806, Marshal Davout had successfully opposed 26,000 French to 70,000 Prussians. It is true that Grouchy was Davout, nor the moral condition of the army the same in 1815 as in 1806, but our soldiers were as warlike as ever, besides that they were animated by the courage of despair.

Napoleon determined to do what he thought his own plans as well as prudence suggested, which was to advance with his centre upon the left wing and attack the English, leaving his right to observe the Prussians, complete their defeat, and keep them at a distance whilst he fought the British army. Being risen at five o'clock, he wished to march once, in order to overtake the Duke of Wellington in the course of the day; but, as he was only at a very short distance from the forest of Soignes, it would be impossible for him to advance quicker than the English general, who need not fight until he desired for if he wished to advance through the forest to rally the Prussians beyond it, all the time that would be employed to overtake him would hasten his retreat, without giving us the least chance of coming up with him. Notwithstanding this, Napoleon, impelled by his natural impetuosity and his desire to decide the vital point at issue between us and Europe, was anxious to reach the English at once. But it was objected to this that the troops were fatigued by a three days' march and two days' incessant fighting. He certainly did not intend to employ Gérard's and Vandamme's troops,—the 3d and 4th corps,—as, weltering in their blood, they still lay surrounded by 30,000 corpses, and would be refused a few hours to clean their arms and prepare their soup, in short, to rest and breathe. He naturally intended to send Lobau's corps first, as it had not fired a single shot. But it was absolutely necessary that this corps should be supported by the 4th, who had fought vigorously the evening before, and, notwithstanding all their exertions, could not do without rest and food. He arranged all the day's proceedings in such a manner that the military operations might be performed with the necessary celerity, at the same time that the troops had sufficient time to rest. As it would be necessary to leave Quatre-Bras to reach the English, it was Ney who was on the spot, who should defend it, and as he had 40,000 men to defend through one passage, there was no doubt but that the troops arrived at nine or ten they would be in time to defile after him; and as they could reach the borders of the forest of

Soignes in two or three hours, the battle, like that of the day before, could take place in the evening, provided that the English would consent to fight. Napoleon, without hoping too sanguinely for this meeting in advance of the forest of Soignes, a meeting for which he was too anxious to suppose that the English would desire it as much, did every thing in his power to force it if possible; and should he not succeed, he determined to enter Brussels in the evening or on the following morning, which would produce an immense moral effect, and place the English at a great distance from the Prussians. He therefore decided that Lobau's troops should be the first to advance by the Namur road to Quatre-Bras, so as to be able to defeat immediately after Ney's. Lobau was to be followed by the Guard, and the Guard by the heavy cavalry.

By this means he would secure two hours' rest to the Guard and heavy cavalry. As to Vandamme's and Gérard's troops, so fatigued from the battle of the previous evening, they could get some repose during the morning, as they could not be sent in pursuit of the Prussians until the cavalry should have discovered what route they had taken. Without such a precaution, there was risk of choosing the wrong route, no great inconvenience, indeed, for mounted cavalry, but a very great risk for foot-soldiers depending on their own strength and already very much fatigued.

Whilst Napoleon was issuing these orders, Count de Flahault, who had been present at the combat of Quatre-Bras, and who had left Ney at night, arrived at head-quarters about six in the morning. He told Napoleon, without, however, detracting from Ney's merit, whose heroism was admired even by those who disapproved of his tactics, how mediocre had been the marshal's arrangements at Quatre-Bras, and how the feverish agitation under which he seemed to labour, whilst adding, if possible, to his devotedness, detracted considerably from his military judgment. Napoleon, himself, had observed something of this since the 20th of March, but he saw that he must employ this incomparable hero such as he was, such as he had been made by the circumstances of the time, too powerful to be resisted by individual character. The result of Napoleon's observations was that he thought it wiser to keep him near himself, that he might be able to send him forth as a lion wherever the greatest danger threatened. To these details M. de Flahault added one still more important; that Ney, distrustful of fortune, still doubted the result of the battle of Ligny, and, far from being inclined to advance boldly, was more disposed to act on the defensive at Quatre-Bras. This was disagreeable information for Napoleon, who would have been glad to learn that Ney was at that moment *en marche* with his troops. He immediately ordered Marshal Soult to write to Ney and assure him that the victory of the evening before had been complete, and to order him to march boldly and speedily to Quatre-Bras. Then the English, seeing 40,000 men advancing along the Namur road, would immediately decamp, fearing they might be taken in flank if they offered a prolonged resistance. He was also to advise him to keep his divi-

sions together, and at the same time to reprove him, though in a gentle tone, for the manner in which he had acted on the previous day, when, though great results had been obtained, these results were far inferior to what was needed and might have been expected. At the same time, Napoleon sent some officers to reconnoitre on the high-road between Namur and Quatre-Bras, and see whether Ney was advancing and the Duke of Wellington retreating. Having given these orders at seven in the morning, he got into his carriage and drove to Ligny, where, having arrived, he mounted his horse, visited the field of battle, looked after the wounded, and distributed remedies and rewards to those who had fought the day before, at the same time that the others were marching toward the scene of the new day's strife.

These remedies and recompenses had been well earned by the boundless self-devotion of these men on the preceding day, and in such a case gratitude may, indeed, be looked on as good policy. Meantime, Vandamme and Gérard's soldiers were cleaning their muskets, making their soup, and recruiting themselves after the fearful struggle of the previous day. When they saw Napoleon, they rushed to meet him, waving their shakos, brandishing their sabres, and uttering enthusiastic cries of joy. His mere presence delighted them, and was a sufficient recompense for all their dangers and sufferings. The time spent in gratifying and encouraging such sentiments was certainly not lost. Napoleon, having saluted the wounded and waved his hand in acknowledgment of the men's acclamations, rode through the villages of Saint-Amand and Ligny. Within Saint-Amand, the number of slain was pretty equally divided between the French and Prussians, but all the bodies beyond the stream were clad in the Prussian uniform. These hapless men, by their obstinate efforts to recover Saint-Amand, had fallen in numbers at all the approaches to the village. The rising ground behind, as far as the mill of Bry, where the artillery of the Guard had attacked the Prussian reserve *en écharpe*, was strewn with the bodies of men and horses, mingled with broken cannon, a spectacle which, however gratifying to the victors, was most painful to humanity. But at Ligny the scene was fearful. There the combat had taken place in the village itself, where men had fought hand to hand with all the animosity of civil strife. The number of the slaughtered Prussians and French was equal, and, save their lifeless bodies, no human form was to be seen, all the inhabitants having fled from their homes and concealed themselves in caves. Some wounded soldiers, moaning from pain, were the only living objects in this new necropolis. In leaving Ligny and ascending the ground where the Imperial Guard had decided the victory, the slain were almost exclusively Prussian, or, in making a sad computation, we may say that there were two or three Prussians to one Frenchman. It is, therefore, no exaggeration to say that if the combat cost us 9000 men it had cost the Prussians 18,000, without counting deserters. We had no prisoners but wounded, except two or three thousand of the rear-guard, picked up

by the cavalry. Thirty pieces of ordnance remained in our hands.

Napoleon, having ordered the removal of as many of the wounded French as possible, a labour in which the Belgian peasantry zealously assisted, desired that assistance should also be given to some Prussian officers, who had been wounded in a much larger proportion than the common soldiers. These brave men had sacrificed their lives to the violence of their passions. Napoleon addressed them with courtesy and generosity, and told them that though France was hated by the Prussians she did not reciprocate the feeling; that if she had been severe on them during the late wars, it was the inevitable punishment of their aggressions in 1792, of the Convention of Pilnitz, of the Brunswick Manifesto, and of the war in 1806; that, besides, they had had ample vengeance in 1814, that it was time now to put an end to these sanguinary reprisals, which he was determined to do by an immediate peace, and, in testimony of his pacific intentions, he would commence by having them cared for in the same manner as the officers of his own guard. This address, which was immediately translated into German, was very well received by these unfortunate men, who waved their feeble hands in reply to Napoleon's parting salutation. This scene, published in all the journals, was calculated to calm the German passions should victory continue to smile on us for twenty-four hours longer.

When Napoleon arrived at Bry he dismounted while awaiting the result of the reconnoissance directed toward Quatre-Bras. Apparently content with what had been done during the last two days, and hoping for still better results for the ensuing days, he conversed with his accustomed ease with his generals on various subjects,—war, politics, the different parties that divided France, royalists and Jacobins.* It was during this conversation that he received the first report of the officers sent to reconnoitre between Namur and Quatre-Bras; and he learned that instead of meeting Ney in this direction they had seen only the English. He was greatly annoyed at hearing this, and sent fresh orders to the marshal to advance without paying any regard to the English, whom he was to attack in flank if they resisted; he next ordered Lobau to hasten his march to Quatre-Bras, and then expedited the departure of the

Guard. He was preparing to leave himself in order to direct the movement in person, when he received a report from General Pajol, who had been in pursuit of the Prussians since dawn. This rather strange report told him some fugitives and cannon had been picked up near Namur, and, consequently, in the direction of Liege. To judge by this first indication, it would seem that the Prussians, having the English to depend on the sea as their line of operation, had resolved to return to the Rhine, and were about to join the Russians and the Austrians. Napoleon could not give credence to this supposition. He concluded from his knowledge of Blücher, that the general would endeavour to join the English either in advance or in the rear of the forest of Soignes, and that, consequently, he was brought for in the direction of Wavre. But war as in politics, we must not rely implicitly on probabilities, but, whilst allowing them due weight, we must hold our judgment free. It was thus that Napoleon acted. Marshal Grouchy was with him at the moment. From him he gave his instructions verbally, instructions so completely the result of the chance that they might be divined before uttered. He desired him to pursue the Prussians vigorously, to make their defeat as complete as possible, or at the very least prevent them from soon assuming an offensive attitude; but, above all, to keep them carefully in view, to manage so as to remain in constant communication with the main body of the French army, but between it and the Prussians. Marshal Grouchy, to do him justice, was alarmed at seeing himself placed on his own responsibility in so delicate a position, and modestly said to Napoleon, at the same time declaring his inability to divine what route the Prussians had taken. Napoleon told him that he must keep up a communication with head-quarters by means of the high-road to Namur, so that he could at any moment demand or receive orders, that Pajol's report certainly did not give positive information, but that he had only to send some of his cavalry toward Wavre, or some toward Namur, and he would soon tell what he ought to do. As Napoleon mounted his horse he repeated aloud, and with much emphasis, "*Above all things, pursue the Prussians briskly, and keep up a communication with the left.*"† Grouchy, in obedience to Napoleon's

* Marshal Grouchy, who sincerely regretted his military errors of 1813, at the same time that he would not acknowledge them, has sought to show that it was on the 17th, and not on the 18th, that time had been lost, and, in a very inexact recital, represents Napoleon as losing his time in the fashion of a talkative, idle, and irresolute prince. In this portrait we could scarcely recognise the man who had come from Elba to Paris in twenty days, who in two days had suddenly established himself between the Prussians and English, before they suspected his approach. Nobody will believe that Napoleon, who, when he could have awaited an attack in Champagne, had boldly advanced into Belgium, that he might have an opportunity of surprising and successfully combating the armies of his enemies, had suddenly become weak and irresolute. But Marshal Grouchy, like many ocular witnesses, ignorant of the secret intentions of those whose acts are before their eyes, attribute to them the most childish and chimerical motives. Marshal Grouchy, in asserting that Napoleon, on the morning of the 17th, was a little inclined to action as an Oriental prince, only shows that he did not comprehend the true position of affairs, and that he neither knew nor understood that Napoleon was obliged to wait—first, until Ney should have defeated at Quatre-Bras with 40,000 men; secondly, until Lobau's troops should be en marche toward Quatre-Bras; thirdly, until the Guard should have eaten their

sup and left their baggage; fourthly, until some report from Pajol's cavalry should inform him of the direction the Prussians had taken. It was but slight to the credit, and it certainly was not too much to allow him a few hours for the accomplishment of all these things. But while Napoleon conversed on various subjects with a clearness of mind of which few men are capable, also engaged in very important undertakings, had which given him these few men are capable of accomplishing was not have undertaken.

† All these details have been communicated to ocular eye-witnesses, who has repeated them to me at least six hundred times, having them, as he said, so vividly before his eyes as when they occurred; and time witness a Marshal Gérard, one of the most upright and truthful men I have ever known. These facts have also been confirmed by a number of persons who both saw and heard what passed. Marshal Grouchy has endeavoured to mislead as to the nature of the orders he received; but his own assertions, his letters to Napoleon, confirm these several particulars, that he was to go in search of the Prussians, &c. that he was to pursue them briskly, &c. that he was not to lose sight of them; 4th, that he was to remain in communication with head-quarters, 5th, that he was always to endeavour to prevent the Prussians from joining the English. These points being established, it is easy to see

orders, set out immediately, and advanced, in the first instance, along the Namur road, where Pajol had found the fugitives and cannon. Napoleon left him Gérard's corps—the 4th—reduced to 12,000 men, Vandamme's—the 3d—reduced to 13,000, Pajol's, reduced to 1800, and Exelmans', reduced to 3200. He also left him Teste's division, detached from Lobau's corps, and consisting of about 3000 foot. Here was then a total of 33,000, without counting Gérard's division, all whose generals were killed, and whose numbers did not amount to more than 2500 men. This division was to remain in the rear, that the men might recruit themselves, take care of the wounded, and defend Charleroy, an arrangement which relieved Grouchy from the necessity of sending a detachment in that direction. Napoleon, with Ney, Lobau—reduced to two divisions—the Guard, Milhaud's cuirassiers, and Subervie's division, taken from Pajol, had about 70,000 men. This number, considering the superior quality of his troops, would have been sufficient to defeat the English had not a great error or a great misfortune compelled him to fight two armies. With the 30,000 men he had left Grouchy—including Gérard's division—and about 4000 attached to the great park-train of artillery, he had about 110,000 soldiers, deducting 14,000 killed or wounded in the different combats and the two battles. The Prussians and English, who had lost from 30,000 to 40,000 men in dead, wounded, and fugitives, had had certainly more cause to complain, and the campaign, up to this time, may be considered as entirely in our favour. It needed but one successful day to make it decidedly so.

Napoleon left the heights of Bry at about eleven in the morning,* and advanced at a gallop along the high-road from Namur to Quatre-Bras to make his observations. He found the men of the Guard about to quit their bivouacs, and Lobau arrived at Marbais on his way to Quatre-Bras. When Napoleon arrived at Marbais, he saw the English sharp-shooting on the high-road, apparently not having left Quatre-Bras, which proved that Ney had not made any movement. However, on approaching nearer, the English were seen to retire gradually, as from the heights of Quatre-Bras they discerned our infantry advancing in deep column along the Namur road. Red uniforms were also discernible to our left toward Frasnes, a sight which, though it did not excite alarm, at least awakened great uncertainty. How could it be possible that Ney, having received such repeated orders and the promise of being supported, had not yet advanced, and how, above all, was it that he was surrounded by English? The mystery was soon cleared up: it was the red lanciers of the

Guard that were mistaken for English soldiers, but who being observed more closely by our light cavalry were recognised and treated as French. Still none of Ney's troops had advanced. Count d'Erlon was quite near, and not having fought on the previous day his men were not fatigued; he had therefore taken the position nearest to Quatre-Bras. Napoleon sent him orders to march thither immediately, as he did himself, pursuing the English, who retired as he advanced. He arrived there soon, but his troops had to defile through a single passage, and certainly three hours was not too long a space of time for 70,000 men to pass the bridge of Genappe on the Brussels road. However, had the weather continued fine, it would not be impossible to reach the entrance of the forest of Soignes at four o'clock and commence the attack between four and nine o'clock. Unfortunately, the sky became covered with clouds and threatened one of those summer storms which, in a few minutes, render the roads impassable. However, Napoleon had had little hope of overtaking the English during the day, and had considered a battle in advance of the forest of Soignes as dependent on the free will of the English themselves, and upon that he did not build any strong hopes. If they were inclined to fight they would pause, and he could come up with them on the following day, which would be better for his troops. Our light cavalry, who had advanced through the fields to our right, between Marbais and Quatre-Bras, had seen the corn beaten down by the passage of numerous troops, which was a proof that the Prussian corps had taken the Tilly route, leading to Wavre, and following the course of the Dyle. This indication of their route destroyed the supposition that the Prussians had advanced toward the Rhine, and as Marshal Soult was not with Napoleon at this moment, he employed Marshal Bertrand to transmit to Marshal Grouchy more positive directions than the verbal ones he had given him two hours before. He ordered him to advance toward Gembloux, on the road to Wavre, and which possessed the advantage of being connected with Namur and Liege by the old Roman road. He impressed on him the importance of knowing the exact state of things on every point, of not losing sight of the Prussians, and of seeing whether they were inclined to leave the English and turn toward the Rhine, or were about to join them and fight a second battle near Brussels, of watching them incessantly to try and discover their real intentions, that in any case he was to keep his divisions united, and station posts of cavalry along the road, so as to be in constant communication with head-quarters.

conclusion in this great historical dispute. In any case, the instructions given to Marshal Grouchy are so consistent with the state of things at the time that one may safely affirm that he could not have received any others.

* I state these hours on the best authority. Marshal Grouchy mentions others; but, as will be seen hereafter, he makes constant mistakes as to time, and his assertions in this respect are completely erroneous. For example, here are two proofs of Marshal Grouchy's inexactness as to time, a want that cannot be attributed to his temperament, but to the regret he felt for the great fault he had committed, and from which he was naturally anxious to exonerate himself. In relating the events of the morning of the 18th, he asserts that he left Gembloux at six o'clock.

Now, incontestable proofs show that some of the troops did not leave until eight, others at nine, and some, even, not until ten. He also says that it was near three o'clock on the afternoon of the same day that he got the order to march in the direction whence the roar of the cannon proceeded. It has been asserted by several unanimous witnesses, whose correctness he afterward admitted, that this order had been given at half-past eleven in the morning. We do not quote these facts in order to attack the marshal's veracity, but to prove that, in the agitation caused by the remembrance of that day, his assertion cannot be accepted with confidence, especially in what relates to time, which, in military as well as in civil events, is always very difficult to be determined.

At Quatre-Bras Napoleon was joined by Ney, who informed him himself of the cause of his indecision during the morning. The marshal, influenced by the events of the previous evening, did not dare to advance, believing that the whole English army was before him; nor had he ventured to move, until he saw the English retire before the Count de Lobau. He sought to excuse his tardiness, and Napoleon, not wishing to increase his agitation, contented himself with some not very severe remarks. But the soldiers, who saw that the *brave des braves* had committed some fault, whispered among themselves that *Rougeot*, as they called the illustrious marshal, had got a good scolding. Napoleon waited with impatience until the troops had defiled at Quatre-Bras, a movement which was not completed until three o'clock.

About this time the lowering clouds descended in torrents of rain, and deluged the neighbouring country with an extraordinary quantity of water. In a few moments the whole country was changed into one vast marsh, through which neither man nor horse could pass. The troops of the different *corps d'armée* were obliged to assemble on the two paved roads of Namur and Charleroy, which unite and form one at Quatre-Bras. These were soon overcrowded, and soldiers of all arms were mingled in fearful confusion. This painful spectacle put an end to all regret for the morning's delay, for had our troops set out three hours earlier, such an inundation would have interrupted all military operations, and turned both evening and morning to the advantage of the English, who, intending to fall back on the excellent position of Mont Saint-Jean, would be benefited by every thing that increased the difficulty of the attack.

The troops defiled in the following succession:—Subervic's light cavalry, Milhaud's cuirassiers with some mounted batteries of artillery, D'Erlon's infantry, (1st corps,) Lobau's, (6th corps,) Kellerman's cuirassiers, the Guard, and, lastly, Reille's corps, which, having fought bravely at Quatre-Bras, had reposed during the morning after the fierce combat of the preceding evening. Napoleon marched with the advance-guard, which he commanded in person. They had to traverse the large town of Genappe, where they crossed the Thy, which takes the name of Dyle a few leagues farther on. The English had placed their cavalry in the rear, in order to retard our march by a few vigorous and well-directed charges whenever the nature of the ground permitted. The ground slopes downward toward Genappe, but rises again after the passage of the Thy, so that directly in front we had the English rear-guard hotly pressed by our van-guard. Napoleon—who, under torrents of rain, gave directions for all these movements himself—had ordered up twenty-four pieces of cannon, which kept up an unceasing fire on the retreating columns. The English, hastening forward, did not allow themselves time to fire in return, but suffered our balls to do fierce execution among their living masses, without making any attempt to retreat. As we left Genappe, the English hussars charged our cavalry, but were imme-

diately driven back by our lancers. Lord Ebridge, in his turn, charged our lancers at the head of the mounted guards, and drove them back. But the English guards were compelled to yield before our cuirassiers. In a few minutes the road was strewn with dead and wounded, the greater number belonging to our enemies. Our cannon, especially, had covered the ground with lacerated human bodies, most fearful to behold. During these attacks Colonel Sordani, a model hero, covered himself with glory. Though his arm was lacerated with wounds and half severed from his body, he persisted in remaining on his horse. He only dismounted to have the limb amputated, which operation did not diminish either his valour or courage, for he mounted his horse immediately, and remained at the head of his regiment until it reached the walls of Paris.

During all these charges Napoleon did not cease, for one moment, to direct the advance-guard himself. Still the march was slow, for both English and French bent before the violence of the storm. Several hours had not sufficed to discharge the clouds of their immense masses of water, and our troops were in a deplorable condition. The paved road no longer sufficed for their numbers, and the infantry, being obliged to give place to the artillery and the cavalry, were forced off the sides of the road and obliged to walk knee-deep in the slimy Belgian soil. It soon became impossible to preserve the ranks; each advanced as he could or would, following at a distance the column of artillery and cavalry that occupied the high-road. Toward the close of the day their sufferings increased with the continuous rain and darkness. Their minds were depressed, as though the severity of the weather was the forerunner of some misfortune. It would have been a consolation had there been any probability that at the conclusion of the painful march they might hope to come in with the English, and satisfy the long-dreaded rancour of both nations in a combat on suitable ground. But it was doubtful whether the English would not disappear in the depths of the forest, and join the Prussians behind its leafy curtain.

There was among the wounded prisoners an English officer, a relative of Lord Ebridge. He was presented to Napoleon, who received him with marked politeness and questioned him very adroitly, hoping to discover the Duke of Wellington's views, which this officer was in a position to know. He replied to all the Emperor's questions with dignity and courtesy, but declared that, though a prisoner, he would not betray his country to procure kinder treatment for himself. Napoleon, appreciating such sentiments, ordered M. de Flakus to see that this English officer was treated with as much consideration as though he were a Frenchman high in the Imperial favour. But he had learned nothing, or almost nothing, of the plans of the British army. Still journeying along the Belgian road, which traversed an undulating plain, the French reached toward evening, an eminence, whence the country round could be distinctly seen. They were at the foot of the celebrated position of Mont Saint-Jean, beyond which could be seen the sombre verdure of the forest of Soignies.

The English, having set out at an early hour, had had time to take up their position behind this point, where the elevation of the ground protected them in a great measure from the hardships we had to endure, and where their commissariat had provided them with abundant provisions, though obtained at a high price. They could scarcely be seen, concealed as they were by the hill of Mont Saint-Jean. The rain was succeeded by a dense fog, which enveloped the country around, and anticipated by two hours the natural termination of day. Nothing was visible, and Napoleon was left in a painful state of doubt; for, if the English had actually entered the forest with the intention of crossing it during the night, they would, in all probability, join the Prussians behind Brussels, and the plan of fighting them separately, so successfully carried out up to this time, would be frustrated. It would certainly be a serious undertaking to advance beyond Brussels for the purpose of encountering 200,000 brave and exasperated enemies, and that with only 100,000 soldiers,—heroically brave indeed, but in numbers only equal to half the opposing force,—and, in addition to this disadvantage, there was the great column of the Austrians and Russians advancing on our right, and not more than forty leagues distant. Napoleon, desirous of terminating the great anxiety he felt, ordered Milhaud's artillery to fall into line and discharge all their cannon. This order being immediately obeyed, the English replied by firing fifty pieces of ordnance into the hollow between us and them. Napoleon then alighted from his horse, and, escorted by only two or three officers, proceeded himself to observe the position that the English seemed to have selected. Every moment balls fell around him in the thick mud, which they splashed in all directions. What he saw and heard relieved his anxiety somewhat, for so prompt and extended a cannonade could not come from a simple rear-guard posted on the road to arrest the pursuit of an enemy, but must proceed from an entire army in line and protected by all its guns. He had now no doubt that the hour of battle was at hand, and his future anxiety could only be concerning the result. And this anxiety was enough for the strongest nerves. But still he had so much confidence in his own genius and the valour of his soldiers, that all he asked of Providence was an opportunity to fight, depending on himself to secure a victory.

Napoleon, having ascertained that the English were actually before him, ordered General Milhaud to recall his cuirassiers, that they might enjoy the repose they so much needed to prepare them for the fearful struggle of the morrow. Having left his staff in the rear, he advanced on foot along the height occupied by the English. Accompanied by the Grand Marshal Bertrand, and his first page, Gudin, he moved about there for a long time, seeking to ascertain the peculiarities of a position so soon to be bedewed by human blood. At every step he sunk into the mud, from which he extricated himself sometimes by help of the grand marshal's arm and sometimes by Gudin's, and then continued his observations with his

pocket-glass. Though he paid no attention to the bullets that were raining around, he was drawn from his abstraction by the sight of his page, a lad of seventeen, whose father he had loved, and who had fallen at Valentine. "My child," he said, "this is the first time you have been present at such a festival. It is a rough commencement, but your education will be the more quickly finished." The boy, a son worthy of his father, thought, as well as Bertrand, only of his master; but nobody would dare to express a fear in Napoleon's presence even for him, and they continued their reconnoitring until ten o'clock at night, bullets still whistling around, and their feet continually sinking deep in the mud. Napoleon, who never spent time uselessly, had continued this investigation only that he might see with his own eyes the English bivouac. The horizon blazed in a short time with the light of a thousand fires, fed with wood from the forest of Soignes. The English, as drenched as we, passed the evening in drying their clothes and cooking their provisions. "*The horizon*," as Napoleon poetically expressed it, "*seemed one vast conflagration*," and those flames which, at that moment, seemed to him a prelude of victory, filled him with joy, a joy, alas! destined to be of short duration.

Napoleon remounted his horse and returned to his head-quarters at the Caillon farm. He announced a decisive battle for the following day, a battle which he said would decide the fate of France. He ordered his generals to make the necessary preparations. Of all the orders expedited, the most urged was that addressed by Napoleon to Grouchy, for it was of vital importance that his movements should not be left to chance under existing circumstances; and, as the marshal was at a distance of four or five leagues, these orders should be sent to him immediately, that he might receive them in proper time. At about ten o'clock, Napoleon sent him instructions suitable to every aspect that the position of things could assume.

Grouchy was ordered to follow the Prussians in order to complete their defeat, to watch their proceedings, and, whatever they might do, to keep himself as an impenetrable wall between them and the English. What many possibilities might not be speculated on in such a situation? The Prussians could, as had been conjectured when the fugitives and cannon had been found on the Namur road, either advance to Liege, to join the other allies on the Rhine, or march through Gembloux and Wavre by the road which crosses the eastern extremity of the forest of Soignes, by which they could join the English beyond Brussels. They might also stop at Wavre near the Dyle, before advancing through the forest to join the English at the other side of it. None of these probabilities were alarming, not even the last, provided that Grouchy did not lose his presence of mind, which, up to this time, he had never lost. Napoleon, as he ever did, gave instructions suitable to the existing state of things, and traced them with the greatest precision. "If the Prussians," he said, in his orders to Grouchy, "have turned to the Rhine, you need not trouble yourself about them, but only leave 1000 horse to follow them and make sure that they do not

fall back on us. If they have taken the road to Brussels by Wavre, it will be sufficient to send 1000 horse after them, and then, as in the former case, do you return to us and assist in beating the English. But if the Prussians have stopped in advance of the forest of Soignes, at Wavre, or elsewhere, do you take up your position between them and us, engage them, keep them in check, and send a detachment of 7000 men to attack the right wing of the English in the rear." Had Napoleon's military genius been less great or less correct than it was, he could not have dictated any other directions than these. These instructions, to leave some troops to watch the Prussians, whether they took the direction of the Rhine or Brussels, and in either case to join Napoleon with the entire of the right, or if they had stopped at Wavre to engage and keep them aloof from the terrible struggle that was about to commence between the French and English armies; whilst he sent 7000 men to attack the English right wing in the rear,—these, we repeat, were instructions suited to what was known of the position of affairs. Could the orders be delivered and put into execution in time, there could be no question as to the result. It was ten o'clock; even admitting that the officer who was to transmit the orders did not leave until eleven, he might arrive, at the very latest, at two in the morning at Gembloux, where it was natural to suppose that Grouchy was to be found. From the farm of Caillou to Gembloux, following the paved road to Namur and turning off at Sombrefe to the Wavre road, the distance could not be more than seven or eight leagues, whilst it was scarcely five in a direct line. A mounted horseman could certainly traverse this distance in less than three hours. Marshal Grouchy, receiving his orders at two in the morning, could leave Gembloux at four, and be quite near Napoleon at the commencement of the battle; for whether he allowed the Prussians to pursue the route to the Rhine or to Brus-

seis, or had to follow them to Wavre, sending only a detachment to Mont Saint-Jean, he and his *corps d'armée* would not have more than five or six leagues to traverse.* Having despatched these orders, Napoleon retired to snatch a few moments' repose in the middle of the night, as was his custom when engaged in any great undertaking. He slept soundly on the eve of that day, the most terrible of his life, the saddest that ever broke on France.

As to the rest, the enemy's generals had made almost the very arrangements that Napoleon himself would have desired when he asked Providence to allow him the chance of one more battle. On the previous evening the Duke of Wellington, after the battle of Quatre-Bras, had stopped at Genappe and taken up his quarters there. Not having heard from Marshal Blücher, who was either displaced or not having been more effectually surrounded or disabled by his terrible fall from attending to his duties, the British general took it for granted that the Prussians had been beaten, especially as he saw French vedettes had a Quatre-Bras and on the Namur road. The French would, indeed, have been obliged to retreat if a victory had not permitted them to occupy so advanced a position. The Duke of Wellington, therefore, determined to fall back on Mont Saint-Jean, on the borders of the forest of Soignes, resolved to fight in the position which he had long studied, assuming the possibility of a defensive battle being fought under the walls of Brussels for the preservation of the kingdom of the Low Countries. However good his position might be, he would not fight unless sure of being supported by the Prussians. He, therefore, sent an officer to Blücher to know if he might count on his assistance.

Whilst the English were making these arrangements, inflexible old Blücher, notwithstanding his discomfiture at Ligny, had no idea of thinking himself beaten, but was determined to renew the combat on the next day as he

* That this order was given has been disputed. Marshal Grouchy said that he did not receive it, which we believe, both because he has said it, and because that it is only too probable, as officers travelling by night amidst patrols of the enemy might be arrested, as unfortunately happened during this campaign, and give the despatches meant for French generals either to Prussians or English. But if we believe Grouchy, to whose word some suspicion may be attached, as he had a great error to justify, we do not see why we should not also believe Napoleon, who, in two documents written at St. Helena, has stated positively that he sent these orders, and even mentions their most minute details. We do not say that because the assertion comes from St. Helena it is necessarily true, but neither do we admit that it must necessarily be false. We believe Marshal Grouchy's assertion; for though we have seen that he gave facts a certain colouring in order to justify himself, still we do not believe that he was capable of telling a direct falsehood, or denying an order he had received. Besides, we have a regard for probabilities. Had Marshal Grouchy received the order, he would certainly have put it into execution; for acting otherwise would have proved him a traitor or a madman, neither of which he was. But if we, judging him by the laws of morality and probability, and notwithstanding the many alterations he has made in his accounts of these events, either from defect of memory, or a desire to excuse himself, we admit that he would not deny an order he had received, if we admit the probability that he would have obeyed this order had he received it, there can be no reason why we should not judge Napoleon by the same rule. He affirmed most positively at St. Helena that he sent these orders, and even gave the most minute details of their contents, and we find it impossible to believe that on this occasion he spoke falsely. And then as to the probability of his having sent them. It would be utterly impossible that Napoleon, who

was vigilance itself, could, on the eve of the most dangerous battle of his life, have neglected to send orders to his right wing, which was to play so important a part in the coming struggle. Such negligence could scarcely be attributed to the most effeminate or dullest of Eastern sultans. Or could the most vigilant, the most active of generals, be suspected of such carelessness? We can furnish another proof, if possible, still more conclusive. Had Napoleon at St. Helena, invented the story of this order, he would have been his absolutely incredible enemy, and he certainly would have arranged the account differently. Instead of saying that he was ignorant of the position of the Prussians on the evening of the 17th, or that he had not asked Grouchy for 7000 men, he would have said that he had given orders on events that had become known since that he had boasted that he had desired Grouchy to pass the French all his forces, and take up a position between the Prussians and English. Napoleon's modest assertion, that he had despatched an order framed in accordance with his views as to the enemy's position, and which would have been sufficient had he not been ignorant of that position, is, in our opinion, an irrefragable proof that he spoke the truth at St. Helena, and asserted nothing but the simple truth. We cannot admit the supposition that he did not send the orders to Grouchy on that night, and, assuming he did not, those he mentioned, founded on the slight knowledge he possessed, seem to us the most probable; and we believe that had he wished to invent a falsehood he could not have invented one that would tell more to his advantage. We therefore believe both him and Marshal Grouchy to be contradictory statements, which are easily reconciled by the admission of an order. *Nonobstant* however, much consist in believing that the actors in any great event speak truth, neither is judicious criticism prompt to suppose that all they say is false.

following, when he should find a position favourable to his operations. Far from thinking of retreating to the Rhine, he was determined to remain, and not advance farther than the forest of Soignes, where, either with or without the English, he would fight a fresh battle, and not in the rear of Brussels. He had consequently retired in two columns to Wavre, whither he summoned Bulow's (the 4th Prussian) corps, which had been on the march during the battle of Ligny. Ziethen and Pirch I., who had fought between Ligny and Saint-Amand, and were the most in advance on the road from Namur to Quatre-Bras, had, during the night of the 16th-17th, retreated along the right bank of the Dyle through Tilly and Mont Saint-Guibert. Thielmann, who had not passed Sombreffe, had fallen back on the Gembloux road and joined Bulow at Liege. All had arrived successively at Wavre during the afternoon of the 17th, and taken up their position on both sides of the Dyle. The remainder of the day was passed by Blücher in allowing the troops a little rest, procuring provisions and fresh ammunition, and in sending his horse to collect the fugitives, which our cavalry, had it been better directed, would have taken prisoners in thousands. When informed of the Duke of Wellington's plans, he sent him word that he would be at Mont Saint-Jean on the 18th, hoping that if the French did not attack on that day that they would on the following. What noble and energetic patriotism in an old man of seventy-three!

The English and Prussian generals had thus decided on fighting in front of the forest of Soignes on the 18th, provided the French would allow them.

It was Marshal Grouchy's duty to prevent this junction. A glance at the chart will show that nothing could be easier than to effect this, although the marshal's forces amounted to only 34,000, whilst the Prussians were 88,000. Napoleon having by a rapid movement made himself master of the high-road from Namur to Quatre-Bras, the route by which the English and Prussians had intended to combine their forces, both armies had been compelled to fall back, the former by the Mont Saint-Jean road, the latter by that of Wavre. Both these roads pass through the extensive forest of Soignes and meet at Brussels. The forest, as we have already said, surrounds Brussels from southwest to northeast. Wellington pursued to Mont Saint-Jean by Napoleon, and Blücher retreating to Wavre before Grouchy, were separated by a distance of four leagues, measured in a straight line. Grouchy was as near to Napoleon as Blücher was to the Duke of Wellington. Now, when Grouchy was parting from Napoleon, he had been ordered to keep in constant communication with him, and had he not lost all traces of the Prussians he might have accomplished one or other of two things; he might have placed himself between Napoleon and Blücher and prevented the latter's advance until the English had been beaten, or, had he not been able to prevent his advance, he might have attacked him in flank as he sought to join the British army. That Grouchy did not encounter the Prussians, or even see them within so small a space, is almost a miracle, a miracle of incomprehensi-

ble misfortune! Grouchy's most important mission, that of interposing his troops between the English and Prussians, would have been favoured by the locality itself. Napoleon was separated from Grouchy, and Wellington from Blücher, by the Dyle, an insignificant little river flowing from Genappe to Wavre, and whose approaches could be very easily defended. Had Grouchy, in obedience to his instructions, kept up a constant communication with head-quarters on his left, he could have advanced to the Dyle, crossed it, and, having thus interposed the stream between himself and the Prussians, he might dispute the passage with them, and perhaps prevent their advance to Mont Saint-Jean. Or, had they passed the river earlier than he, he could have surprised them in their flank movement and brought them to a full stop before they could reach the Duke of Wellington. The inequality in numbers would have been compensated by the impression left on the minds of the Prussians by the battle of Ligny and by the flank attack, and Grouchy would have been able, if not to conquer, at least to give occupation to the Prussians and delay their arrival at Waterloo until their presence would have been useless.

That he might not lose time, and that his pursuit of the Prussians might be attended with success, it was, indeed, necessary that Grouchy should know, or at least suspect, what route they had taken. But there were so few probabilities to choose between, and these could be so easily verified by Grouchy's thirteen regiments of cavalry, and the space to be traversed was so very circumscribed, that any time lost in seeking the enemy could easily be recovered. If the Prussians, beaten at Ligny, had retired by Liege to the Rhine, nothing was required but to send a detachment of cavalry after them, and think no more of the affair; if they advanced toward Wavre in order to fight either in advance or in rear of the forest of Soignes, they had only two roads to choose between, one by Tilly and Mont Saint-Guibert, the other by Sombreffe and Gembloux, both terminating at Wavre. Three detachments of cavalry, one sent to Namur and two to Wavre, could have discovered the truth in a few hours, and Grouchy, having left Napoleon at eleven, might have known at three or four in the afternoon which route the Prussians had taken: he might have reached Wavre at nine if he determined to go there, or the left bank of the Dyle if, as would have been better, he crossed that river to put himself in closer communication with Napoleon.

Marshal Grouchy did nothing of all this. Though both clear-sighted and vigorous when in action, he had no discernment in the direction of general operations, nor any of the sagacity essential to an officer commanding an advance-guard sent in search of an enemy. He had not sent a reconnoitring party to the left from Tilly to Mont Saint-Guibert, the route taken by Ziethen and Pirch I.; nor had he sent one to the right in the direction of Gembloux, and, in parting from Napoleon at Sombreffe, he thoughtlessly hastened to Namur, where, as he was told, Pajol had found both fugitives and cannon. Whilst galloping along in this direction, without a destination, he learned that

the cavalry sent to reconnoitre during the morning had seen great numbers of Prussians near Gembloux, and apparently advancing toward Wavre. At the same time, Napoleon's despatch, sent from Marbais by the grand marshal, gave him the like information. He immediately set out for Gembloux, giving orders to his infantry to follow. It was near three or four o'clock in the afternoon when this infantry, composed of Vandamme's and Gérard's corps, set out. This delay, certainly, allowed the men some time to recover from the fatigues of the previous evening, but it would have been better to have left at noon for Gembloux, which was so situate as to afford the troops the advantage of profiting by every possibility; for at Gembloux they would be on the direct road to Wavre and in communication with Liege by the old Roman causeway. They would have had the advantage of arriving at Gembloux before the commencement of the storm which swept over all the low-lying lands of Belgium at two o'clock, and, having rested three or four hours, could have advanced on Wavre, were that definitively found to be the most advantageous direction.

The information collected from the peasantry about Gembloux pointed out Wavre as the point to which the Prussians had retreated, and there certainly was sufficient connection in these reports to influence a less vacillating mind than Grouchy's. But as Bulow had passed by the Liege road, and as there was consequently *matériel* on that route, Grouchy's perplexity increased, and he did not know on which supposition to act. A variety of reports, in war as in politics, will cause perplexity by their very number, excepting to a man whose reason is at once sufficiently discriminating and stern to compare and decide. What seemed most probable was that the Prussians were advancing to join the English at the forest of Soignes, or, as was less probable, that they were retreating toward the Rhine; but there was not the least probability that their forces were divided between these two directions. And yet this was what Grouchy believed, influenced by the traces found both on the Wavre and Liege roads, indications very easily explained, since, as the Prussians were advancing toward Wavre and their rear still near Liege, which they had just left, it was natural that they should leave traces of their passage in both places. There was another important reason which should have decided the marshal's choice. If he erred in advancing on Wavre, the evil was not great; for, though he allowed the Prussians to advance unmolested toward the Rhine, he brought a strong reinforcement to Napoleon against the English. If, on the other hand, he erred in marching toward Liege, an imminent danger would be the result, that of allowing the Prussians to advance unmolested to Wavre, where they would find themselves close to the English, and consequently in a position to overwhelm Napoleon with their combined forces. This reflection would not allow a clear-sighted man to hesitate for a moment as to what resolution he was to come to. Unfortunately, Grouchy was not such a man, and he seemed totally to forget that his most important mission, as was evident both from the circumstances themselves and from Napoleon's verbal

instructions, was to keep in the track of the Prussians and prevent their falling on us when we had beaten the English.

Toward the close of the day, more numerous and consistent reports left no doubt that the Prussians had advanced along the road to Wavre,—in consequence of which, Marshal Grouchy contented himself with leaving his cavalry on the Liege road as a last resort against a possibility which he never ceased to fear; but he took care to station the larger portion of his cavalry on the Wavre road to advance of Sauvenière. He allowed his own infantry to remain at Gembloux, where, in consequence of the weather, it had not arrived until late; but he wished that the men should refresh themselves, and be in condition to march early on the following day. It was certainly, very annoying that, whilst the Prussians ought to have been hotly pursued, our troops had advanced but two and a half leagues during the day, but if they set out at four in the morning of the 18th, all might still be remedied; for Marshal Grouchy was only ten leagues from Wavre and six from Napoleon, a distance that could be traversed by a pedestrian in three-quarters of an hour. There was still time enough to accomplish what had not been done on the 17th. At ten at night, at the very time that Napoleon was writing to him, Grouchy wrote to inform Napoleon of the resolution he had taken, which, as he said, left him still in choice of advancing either to Wavre or Liege; at the same time he announced his determination to march next morning with all his force to Wavre, should it be positively ascertained that the enemy had chosen that route; and he added that he did this *in order to appear to the Prussians from the Duke of Wellington.* The last expression showed that the marshal seemed at last to understand the true nature of the mission, and also proved that Napoleon had expressed himself clearly when he gave him his verbal instructions in the morning.

In this manner did the 17th of June close this theatre of war, which did not altogether comprise a space of more than five or six leagues, and on which 300,000 men were to terminate twenty-two years of desperate and by mutual slaughter.

Whilst all were sleeping in the camps of the four armies, Napoleon, after a short repose, rose at two in the morning, still fearing that the English would retire to join the Prussians in the rear of Brussels. All European powers were, indeed, so convinced of the danger of meeting him in a pitched battle, a danger so evident for the English in their actual position, stationed as they were with a great force in the rear, through which it would be most difficult to retreat, that he could not comprehend why they did not retreat and join the Prussians behind the forest of Soignes, which they could easily accomplish.

But, in reasoning thus, he did not take into account the hatred of the Prussians against the ambition of the British commander. The former was willing to lay down his life provided he could accomplish the ruin of France; the latter aspired to the honour of terminating alone the quarrel that existed between France and Europe. Napoleon, however, was still in doubt, and, notwithstanding the risks, withdrew

again falling in torrents, he recommenced, accompanied by two or three officers, the reconnaissance to which he had before devoted so many hours. The ground was wetter and the mud deeper than it had been even on the previous evening. Notwithstanding these unfavourable circumstances, which would render an attack on an army in position so difficult, he felt real pleasure in seeing the fires of the British encampment. These fires gleaming along the whole length of the battle-field attested the presence of the English army. For a moment Napoleon was alarmed by hearing the rolling of a carriage to his left in the direction of Mont Saint-Jean, but the sound soon ceased, and the reports of his scouts returning from the enemy's camp removed all uncertainty as to the Duke of Wellington's intention of fighting. Napoleon was both surprised and pleased, and day now beginning to dawn left not a trace of doubt, for had the English general intended to retreat he would not have awaited the daylight, with such an adversary in his rear, to enter the long and dangerous defile of the forest of Soignes.

Whilst Napoleon was making his reconnaissance, he received the despatch which Grouchy had sent from Gembloux at ten o'clock in the evening, and in which he informed him of the position he had taken between the roads leading to Liege and Wavre, and of his inclination to advance toward Wavre in order to separate the Prussians from the English. Though Napoleon thought meanly of the manner of proceeding adopted by the marshal, who, pursuing the enemy during an entire day, had only advanced two leagues and a half, still he consoled himself in seeing that Grouchy was advancing toward Wavre and seemed to understand the essential point in his instructions, which was to keep the Prussians and English asunder. His anxiety was allayed by the reflection that, provided Grouchy set out at four or five in the morning, he could join him at ten, and thus execute the instructions, despatched the previous evening from head-quarters, which commanded him to pursue the Prussians to Wavre and send 7000 men to Napoleon. As the state of the ground, drenched by twelve hours' continuous rain, rendered it impossible that the battle could commence before ten in the morning, Grouchy's appearance at that hour, or even later, with the entire or part of his forces, on the left of the English, would be sufficient to produce most important results. At three in the morning, Napoleon, as an additional precaution, sent the marshal a duplicate copy of the order already sent at ten on the previous evening. Berthier always sent several copies of the same order by different officers, thus increasing the probability that one would arrive at its destination; but Soult, a novice in his new duties, had not taken this precaution. But two despatches having been sent, one at ten in the evening, the other at three in the morning, might have seemed sufficient, especially on a road that was apparently safe, since an officer bringing a report dated ten at night had arrived at two in the morning.

Reassured, though not quite satisfied, Napoleon's sole remaining wish was that the weather would improve to allow free scope for the operations of the artillery. He passed the

entire night in making reconnoissances, returning occasionally to the farm of Caillon and drying himself before a large fire. Day broke about four, and the weather became somewhat clearer. The sun soon burst through the heavy curtain of clouds and lighted up the horizon, and hope, deceitful hope, filled Napoleon's agitated heart. He flattered himself that the clouds would be dissipated by the sun's rays, that the rain would cease, and that in a few hours the ground would be sufficiently dried to allow the movements of the artillery. Drouot and the other officers whom he consulted assured him, that, thanks to the season, the ground, though not perfectly firm, would be sufficiently so to allow the heaviest pieces of ordnance to be put in position. The sky continued to become clearer, and Napoleon waited patiently, little thinking that he was allowing time not only for the operations of the sun, but also for those of the Prussians.

About eight o'clock, there being no longer any apparent danger of rain, Napoleon invited his generals to share his frugal morning meal, and discussed the plan of the coming battle with them. From the summit of a mound he had got a complete view of the ground and of the position of the enemy's forces, and had already mentally arranged his plan of attack, and seemed quite confident of the result of his combinations. General Reille, who had often fought against the English, had retained a profound impression of their firmness, an impression that had acted injuriously on the operations at Quatre-Bras, but on the present occasion he had the merit of communicating several useful truths to Napoleon. He told him that though the English were very inferior in attack, they were superior to any other European forces when acting on the defensive, and that it would be better to seek to conquer them by skilful manœuvring than by a direct assault. "I know," replied Napoleon, "that it is difficult to beat the English when in position; but I intend to manœuvre." He intended, in fact, to combine stratagem with direct warfare, and did not believe that it would be possible for the English to resist his system of operation. "We have," he said, "ninety chances to a hundred;" but Ney, who entered as he spoke these words, said that he might possibly be right if the English would only wait his coming, but that at the moment they were beating a retreat. Napoleon did not give the least credence to this, as he said if the English wished to retreat they would have done so before dawn. This argument was unanswerable. Napoleon, however, mounted his horse and went himself to see how matters stood, and, finding that the English had not moved, he dictated his plan of attack, which was transcribed by several officers and transmitted to the different commanders.

The time is now come to describe this battle-field, the fatal scene of one of the most sanguinary conflicts of the century, the most disastrous though the most heroic in the history of France. The English had taken up their position on the plateau of Mont Saint-Jean, which extended right and left to a distance of about two leagues, and, sloping gently toward the direction in which we were placed, formed a small valley between the two armies. The forest of Soignes

spread its sombre verdure for several leagues behind. The English, to protect themselves from our artillery, had taken up a position on the opposite slope of the height, and had left on the summit only some well-horsed and well-guarded batteries. Running along the plateau was a cross-road, passing from the village of Ohain on our right to Merbe-Braine on our left, bounded by a quickset hedge in some parts and deeply sunk in others, forming a kind of *fossé*, covering so completely the entire English position that one might be tempted to believe it expressly fashioned for the occasion. The valley between the two armies passed below the farms of Papelotte and La Haye, and then running along the foot of the village of Ohain became the bed of a tributary of the Dyle, and took its way toward the small town of Wavre, which with the aid of a glass might be seen at about three leagues and a half to our right. This valley, declining to our left, wound round the position of the enemy and poured its waters into the little river Senne. This partition of its waters between the Senne and Dyle was caused by an embankment, which, running from us to the English, supported the great causeway from Charleroy to Brussels. This causeway, after clearing the plateau of Mont Saint-Jean, joined the Nivelles road, which, bordered with trees, lay on our left, so that Mont Saint-Jean was the point at which the two principal causeways met. It was by these two roads that the different portions of the British army, those that had arrived at Quatre-Bras and those that had not had time to advance beyond Nivelles, had joined, and formed the great mass which was to dispute Brussels with us. A little beyond Mont Saint-Jean, at the entrance of the forest of Soignes, was the village of Waterloo, which has given its name to the battle, because it was thence that the English general dated his despatches.

The English were stationed on the opposite slope on both sides of the Brussels road. The Duke of Wellington had commenced the campaign with about 98,000 men, of whom he had lost nearly 6000 in the different rencontres of the preceding days. He had sent a detachment of at least 15,000 to Hal, fearing to be attacked on the right, that is, toward the sea, a fear that never left his mind, and which was quite unworthy of his military discernment. He had at Mont Saint-Jean, subtracting a few detachments, 75,000 men, consisting of English, Belgians, Dutch, Hanoverians, Nassauvians, and Brunswickers. On his right, in advance of Merbe-Braine, between the Nivelles and Charleroy roads, he stationed the English Guards, with Alten's division, composed of English and Germans. Clinton's division formed into a deep and serried column was stationed as a reserve in the rear. The extreme right was occupied by Mitchell's English brigade detached from Colville's division. This wing having to guard the Nivelles and Charleroy roads was made stronger than the other, besides being supported by the Brunswick corps and the greater part of the allied cavalry. As a last and unnecessary precaution, the Duke of Wellington had placed Chassé's English-Dutch division at a distance of three-quarters of a league at Braine-l'Alleud, to pro-

tect his right wing from the chimerical danger of an attack in the direction of the sea. At his centre, that is to say, upon the high-road from Charleroy to Brussels, he had erected an *abatis* at the spot where the road debouched on the plateau. He placed very few troops on the road itself, as those on either side would be sufficient to defend it. He had merely stationed Lambert's English brigade as a reserve a little in the rear, in the direction of Mont Saint-Jean. Picton's division, composed of Kemp and Pack's English brigades, and Best and Vincke's Hanoverians, was posted to the left, opposite to our right, part placed in ambuscade in the Ohain cross-road and the rest in a mass in the rear. And lastly the extreme left was formed of Perponcher's division, and kept up a communication with the village of Ohain by means of the Nassau troops. The wing had been left weakest, as the Duke of Wellington expected it to be reinforced by the Prussian army. The great masses of troops were stationed on slopes in the rear, almost entirely out of our view.

The Duke of Wellington had also occupied some detached posts in front of his position. To his right, opposite our left, where the plateau of Mont Saint-Jean begins to make sweep to the rear, was the château of Groumont, consisting of several buildings, an orchard, and a wood descending almost to the base of the ravine. Here the Duke of Wellington stationed a garrison of 1800 of his best troops. In the centre, on the Brussels road, was the farm of La Haye Sainte, consisting of one large building and an orchard. The defence of this place had been intrusted by the Duke to a thousand men. To his left, toward the base of the plateau, he had stationed some detachments of the Nassau brigade in the farms of La Haye and Papelotte.

We shall here describe the position and distribution of the English army. In front of the three detached and strongly-occupied posts higher up, on the little road that ran along the plateau, half-way up the eminence, were numerous battalions in ambuscade, and on the opposite side of the plateau, on the left and right of the Brussels road, were masses of cavalry and infantry, some deployed and some serried columns. From this description it is evident that the English army, both from its position it occupied, as well as from the number and quality of its soldiers, presented a formidable obstacle to French valour.

Having examined the position, Napoleon immediately decided on his plan of attack. He resolved to draw up his army at the foot of the plateau and first seize the time by advanced posts, the château de Groumont on the left, the Haye-Sainte farm in the centre, and the Papelotte and La Haye farms on the right, then to send his right wing supported by an entire reserve to attack the English left, and both in position and numbers, force it to the centre, which occupied the Brussels road, his possession of this road, the only passage through the forest of Soignes, and thus compel the British army to enter the wood, through which there were at that time but few roads, and which, if it did not entirely prevent, would greatly retard, the retreat of a routed army. Napoleon, in thus bringing his right wing

operate on the English left, had the advantage of directing his greatest effort against the weakest point of the enemy, of seizing the principal road through the forest, and so cutting off the English from the Prussians, who in all probability, if not certainly, were at Wavre. This plan, the last proof of Napoleon's promptness of determination and clearness of judgment, was undoubtedly the best, considering the configuration of the ground and the distribution of the enemy's forces. This plan being decided on, Napoleon stationed his troops conformable to their appointed duties. As the rain had ceased some hours before, the ground was tolerably firm, and the men fell into line with wonderful quickness and order. To our left, between the Nivelles and Charleroy roads and opposite the château de Goumont, General Reille's corps (the 2d) was drawn up on the side of the valley that separated us from the enemy, each of its divisions being formed into two lines, Piré's light cavalry being at the extreme left, in order to be in a position to reconnoitre as far as the extreme right of the English. On the right wing, that is to say, on either side of the Brussels road, Count d'Erlon's corps, that had not yet been engaged, was stationed with 19,000 infantry opposite to the English left, his four divisions being placed one behind the other, and each drawn up in double file. General Jacquinet with his light cavalry was stationed *en vedette* on our extreme right and making his reconnoissance in the direction of Wavre. The artillery of these different corps formed in front an extensive battery of eighty pieces of ordnance.

Behind this first line, Count de Lobau's corps, distributed equally on both sides of the Brussels road, formed the centre reserve. On his left, and, consequently, in General Reille's rear, Kellerman's magnificent cuirassiers were drawn up, whilst Milhaud's equally good cuirassiers were stationed in General d'Erlon's rear. Such was our second line, a little less extended but deeper than the first, and dazzling as the cuirassiers of our heavy cavalry reflected the sun's beams. The splendid infantry of the Guards, with Lefebvre-Desnoëttes' chasseurs and lanciers on their right, and Guyot's mounted grenadiers on their left, were stationed on each side of the Brussels road, where they formed our third and last line, still deeper and less extended than the second: so that the French army had somewhat the form of a great fan gleaming, as the bayonets, sabres, and cuirasses of our men flashed back the sunlight. In less than an hour all these fine troops had taken their appointed position, and altogether produced a most imposing effect. They inspired Napoleon with a pride and confidence which he manifested both by look and word. Desirous, if it were possible, of exciting still stronger enthusiasm in his men, he again traversed the field of battle, passing from left to right in front of the troops. The moment he appeared, the infantry placed their shakos on their bayonets, the horse their helmets on their sabres, and waved them in the air, whilst loud cries of *Vive l'Empereur* were heard on every side, and continued long after Napoleon had passed from their sight. Thus he presented himself to all his troops, whom he left exultant with joy and hope, notwithstanding the dread-

ful night they had passed encumbered with mud, without fire and almost without food, whilst the English army, having arrived some hours earlier than we, and being abundantly supplied with provisions, suffered but very little. Our men, however, had had time to prepare their soup in the morning, and were, besides, in a state of enthusiasm that made them insensible to every physical suffering, to every physical danger.

Napoleon, having adopted Drouot's advice, of delaying operations until the ground should become somewhat firm, had now no motive for hastening the battle, especially as he saw that the English did not mean to avoid the encounter. There were two advantages to be gained by delay: the ground would become firmer, which would facilitate the attack, and Grouchy would have time to arrive. Every thing, indeed, seemed to promise the speedy arrival of the lieutenant to whom he had intrusted his right wing. At ten in the evening, as we have seen, Grouchy had sent word that he was at Gembloux, ready to advance on Liege or Wavre, but more inclined for the latter, which showed that he was beginning to comprehend that his principal mission was to separate the Prussians from the English. At two in the morning he wrote to announce his definite intention of going to Wavre at daybreak. Napoleon, having sent his directions at ten and having repeated them in a fresh order sent at three, expected that if Grouchy could not come with his entire *corps d'armée*, he would at least send a detachment of 7000 men, which would leave him 26,000 with which to arrest the progress of the Prussians, or fall back fighting on the right of Mont Saint-Jean. Napoleon therefore reckoned on a detachment from his right wing, or the entire of it. But, notwithstanding the orders sent in the evening and repeated during the night, he determined to send another officer to Grouchy to inform him of the actual position of things, and to explain once more what was expected from him. He sent for Zenowicz, a Polish officer appointed to bear his message, and, leading him to a height from which they could see the country round, he said, turning to the right, "I expect Grouchy on this side; I await his arrival impatiently; go to him, bring him with you, and do not leave him until his *corps d'armée* debouches on our line of battle." Napoleon ordered this officer to march as quickly as possible, first getting from Marshal Soult a written order, which would give more in detail the orders he had just issued verbally. This being done, Napoleon, who had passed the night wading through the mud, whilst making his reconnoissances, and who had slept but three hours since he had left Ligny at five o'clock on the morning of the previous day, now flung himself upon his camp-bed. His brother Jerome was with him at the time. "It is ten o'clock," he said, "and I will sleep until eleven. I shall certainly wake, but in any case rouse me yourself; for these," he added, pointing to the officers, "would not dare venture to disturb me." Having said this, he laid his head on his slight pillow and was soon sound asleep.

Meantime, all was commotion around him, each hastening to occupy his appointed station. The English, who had had plenty of rest and

food, were methodically taking their places on the ground where they were about to display their wonted inflexibility. The French hurried through a scanty breakfast, and, though having had but little rest and little food, were impatiently waiting for the signal to fight, which they were accustomed to receive from the batteries of the Guard. Several divisions had only just fallen into line. General Durutte's especially, which, through the fault of the head of the staff, was late in setting out, and was now hastening to its proper station, whilst the men had scarcely time to eat their soup. But our soldiers were inflamed with an ardour that made them look with indifference on all suffering, whether resulting from circumstances or the errors of their commanders.

The operations of the different armies, however distant, all tended to the same object—the decisive action that was about to take place on the plateau of Mont Saint-Jean. Blücher, having assembled his four corps at Wavre on the evening before, and having rallied some of the fugitives, which our ill-commanded cavalry had not picked up, was preparing to fulfil the promise he had made the Duke of Wellington, of bringing him all or part of his forces. He still had 88,000 men, exhausted and wounded since the 16th, but all, thanks to his patriotic example, ready to fight to the last extremity. The 4th corps, (Bulow's,) not having yet fired a shot, was the first that Blücher ordered to march to Mont Saint-Jean. He had given orders that this corps should cross the Dyle at dawn, but, having been stopped by a conflagration at Warre, the men had not been able to set out until after seven in the morning. They were ordered to advance toward the Saint-Lambert chapel, on the flank of the position where the French and English were about to fight. They might arrive about one in the afternoon. Blücher's plan was to have Bulow supported by Pirch I., (2d corps,) and to send Ziethen (1st corps) by the Ohain road along the forest of Soignes, so that they might be able to debouch nearer the left wing of the English. These two corps, (Pirch I. and Ziethen's,) reduced to 15,000 each, would with Bulow's, which was still entire, amount to 60,000 men, which was the aid the Prussians were about to bring the English. Blücher had finally determined to leave Thielmann's (3d) corps, which had not suffered much at Ligny, as a rear-guard, with directions to check Grouchy at Wavre and not allow him to pass the Dyle.

The possibility of 60,000 Prussians arriving on his right flank was certainly a very serious consideration for Napoleon. But there were 34,000 Frenchmen, who, having conquered at Ligny, were full of confidence in themselves and devotion to their cause, and who were so placed that they could hurl back on the Prussians the blow aimed at themselves. If they arrived at Mont Saint-Jean before Blücher, they would render Napoleon invulnerable for one day at least; and if they arrived later, they would place Blücher between two fires, which would certainly overpower him. The only question was whether they would come, but indeed it was difficult to doubt it.

We have seen how Marshal Grouchy, having lost half the preceding day in fruitless searches,

had at length discovered that the Prussians had advanced to Wavre, and had himself proceeded to Gembloux. It was late when he arrived, but, as his troops had only marched six leagues and a half during the day, they could by leaving at four on the morning of the 18th, reach in the forenoon the more remote part of the scene of action.

Unfortunately, although Grouchy was close of the preceding day no longer entertained a doubt as to the route taken by the Prussians, he had not given Vandamme orders to march until six in the morning, nor Gérard until seven, and, as arrangements had not been previously made for the distribution of rations, Vandamme's men were not ready to leave until eight, nor Gérard's until nine. Still, nothing was lost or even compromised by these delays, as the distance to be traversed was only four leagues in a straight line, and not more than five by cross-roads. In cannon, which was soon to make the country around re-echo with its thunders, might have been the most unmistakable of all aids, and supposing that five hours would be needed to join Napoleon, (which would be too much to allow, as we shall see,) there would be still sufficient time to bring up a force powerful enough to turn the balance in our favor. And, if Blücher were advancing toward Mont Saint-Jean, Grouchy in all probability was doing the same; and at eleven in the evening, whether the details we have given are known or not, there was as much to be hoped as feared for the fortunes of France. What we say, as much to be hoped as feared! There was no room for any other sentiment than hope, if the cannon that was about to vibrate on the ears of these 84,000 Frenchmen should, at the same time, produce an exalting influence on their mind. Alas! it could awaken the minds of all,—with but one exception, him who commanded them.

The Polish officer Zenowicz, whom Napoleon despatched with his last orders to the marshal, had lost an hour waiting for Marshal Grouchy's written despatch. This ambiguous delay was not worth the time it cost. It amounted that a great battle was about to be fought with the English. Grouchy was to advance to Wavre, in order to keep up a communication with the army, and co-ordinate his operations with those of the main body. True as was his language, still, compared with the orders sent on the previous evening and with the actual state of things, it showed clearly enough that Grouchy sought to hesitate, and either place himself between the English and Prussians, or attack the latter, no matter how, so that he prevented them from coming to the aid of the English.

Eleven o'clock struck, and Napoleon without having given his brother the trouble of awaking him, was already up. He had left the Caillou farm, and repaired to La Belle Alliance farm, whence he could command a view of the entire hollow in which the battle was to be fought. He ascended a mound, his horses standing saddled at his

* Some of the troops did not leave Gembloux until late. These details are attended by others in my possession, taken by inhabitants of the town.

foot, with his maps spread on a table and his officers around him. Both armies awaited, motionless, the signal to begin. The English were calm—confident in their courage, their position, their commander, and in the approaching Prussian reinforcement. The French—we mean the soldiers and inferior officers—in the most exalted state of enthusiasm, thought neither of the Prussians nor of Grouchy, but only of the English that they saw arrayed before them; and all they asked was to be allowed to attack the enemy, trusting for victory to themselves, and the fertile genius of him who commanded them—a genius that had hitherto been equal to any emergency.

At half-past eleven Napoleon gave the signal to fire, and 120 French cannon responded. In accordance with the plan he had laid down, of throwing the left wing of the English on their centre, in order to deprive them of the Brussels road, the principal attack was to be made by the right wing; and here Napoleon had concentrated a great quantity of artillery. He had brought up to this point not alone the batteries of Count d'Erlon, whose duty it was to execute the operation, but also the batteries of General Reille, which were to attack on the left, the batteries of Lobau formed into a reserve, and some of the artillery of the Guard. These formed a battery of twenty-four guns, which, firing across the small valley that lay between the two armies, sent their balls to the opposite side of the plateau. The English left wing inclining somewhat backward in obedience to the nature of the ground, our right wing accommodated itself to this position, and formed an angle with the line of battle, so that many of our balls fired in an oblique direction fell in the centre of the British army.

On our left General Reille had collected the batteries of his own divisions and of Piré's cavalry, and kept up a fire on the wood and château of Goumont. Napoleon, to sustain the fire of this wing, had ordered Kellerman's mounted artillery to join and fall in behind Reille's corps, so that from this side forty pieces of ordnance, at least, poured their projectiles on the Duke of Wellington's right. Many balls fell harmless, but many also carried death into the thickest masses of the enemy, making terrible gaps, notwithstanding the precaution that had been taken to station them on the opposite side of the plateau.

This violent cannonade having continued for half an hour, Napoleon ordered an attack on the wood and château of Goumont. There were two reasons for commencing the attack with our left: first, because the Goumont post, being the most advanced, was nearest; and, secondly, because by drawing the enemy's attention to their right it would be averted from the left, where our principal attack was to be made.

The second corps, composed of Foy, Jerome, and Bachelu's divisions, descended into the valley and, forming round the wood of Goumont, enclosed it in a kind of semicircle. Foy's division, forming our extreme left and backed by Piré's cavalry, was to advance a little farther, to join that part of the English which made a circuit to the rear, but this division was not the first that was to engage.

The Jerome division rushed on the wood of Goumont, which intercepted its progress; whilst on its right Bachelu's division filled the space between Goumont and the Brussels road. Our sharpshooters repelled those of the enemy; then Bauduin's brigade, composed of the 1st light infantry and the 3d of the line, rushed on the wood, which consisted of lofty, but not closely planted, trees interspersed with thick brushwood. It was occupied by a Nassau battalion and several Hanoverian companies. Four companies of the English Guards defended the buildings beyond the wood, completing a garrison consisting, as we have already said, of 1800 men.

Bauduin's brigade stood a murderous fire, directed from the brushwood growing between the trees. It was difficult to return the fire of a concealed enemy; therefore our men forced their way into the wood, killing with their bayonets those who had fired on them at a short range. The brave General Bauduin lost his life in this attack. The Nassau soldiers, aided by the configuration of the locality, defended themselves with obstinacy, but Prince Jerome, turning the wood on the right with Foy's brigade, forced them to retire. We had scarcely taken the wood when a still more serious obstacle presented itself. Beyond was an orchard, surrounded by a hedge of large closely-planted trees, from which, as from an impenetrable wall, the enemy poured their balls. The first who sought to force this hedge fell beneath the fire. But no obstacle could deter the French infantry. They cut their way with the axe through this hedge, and killed with their bayonets all those who had not time to fly. This second obstacle was succeeded by a third. Beyond the hedge rose the outbuildings of the château, which, on the right, consisted of a strongly embattled wall and, to our left, of a strongly-built farm. Six hundred of the English Guards defended the place.

As this was not the important point of attack, it would not be worth while to lose thousands of men for the sake of removing so trifling an obstacle; and the conquest of the wood was quite sufficient to prevent the enemy from making an attempt on our right, without sacrificing for a merely secondary object the excellent cavalry of the 2d corps, the third part of the entire infantry. This was General Reille's opinion; and he ordered that the desperate efforts made to take these buildings should cease, but did not look himself to the execution of his orders; and the generals of the brigades and divisions, carried away by their own ardour and that of their men, resolved to conquer both farm and château. The Duke of Wellington, seeing the obstinacy of our attack, sent a Brunswick battalion and some fresh detachments of the Guards to support the defenders. The struggle at this point was become most violent.

Whilst our left was thus engaged, Napoleon, obliged to leave the details to his lieutenants, was carefully watching the general progress of the battle, and was preparing to make his principal attack on the enemy's left and centre. This attack was to be made under his own eyes by Marshal Ney, and its object was,

as we have said, to deprive the enemy of the command of the Brussels road, the only practicable one through the forest of Soignes. The troops of the 1st corps, displeased at not having fought on the 16th, were anxiously waiting for the signal to commence the attack. Napoleon, telescope in hand, was trying to discover whether the enemy had made any new arrangements in consequence of the attack on the château of Goumont. All he could see was, that some troops were advancing from Braine-l'Alleud. This was the Chassé division, which the Duke of Wellington had unnecessarily left on his extreme right, in order to keep up a communication with the troops he had left still more uselessly at Hal. Whilst the English general ordered up this division to reinforce his right, he left his centre and left inactive, merely closing the ranks thinned by our balls.

Napoleon, constantly watching his extreme right,—the point from which he expected Grouchy,—saw in the direction of the chapel of Saint-Lambert an indistinct cloud on the horizon, whose exact character he could not immediately define. If the reader remembers the description we have given of the field of battle, he will remember that the valley between the two armies, stretching on toward Wavre, passed successively at the foot of the farms of Papeltote and La Haye, then traversed thick woods, next joined the valley which served as a bed to the stream of Lasne, near the chapel of Saint-Lambert, and, still farther on, lost itself in the valley of the Dyle. It was on these distant heights of the chapel of Saint-Lambert that Napoleon perceived the indistinct cloud. It advanced; from which he supposed it must be troops. Napoleon handed his glass to Marshal Soult, and he, after making his observations, passed it to the other generals of the staff. Each gave his opinion. Some thought it the summit of a wood; others said it was an object in motion. Napoleon delayed giving orders for the attack until he should ascertain the exact nature of this disturbing apparition. His experienced eye soon cleared up the mystery: what he saw were troops *en marche*. Was it a detachment sent by Grouchy, or Grouchy himself? Was it the Prussians? At the distance at which he was placed Napoleon could not distinguish whether they were French or Prussian troops, as the uniform of both was blue. Napoleon sent for General Dorn, who commanded a division of light cavalry, and desired him to ascend the hillock where he himself stood, pointed out the troops that were discernible on the horizon, and bid him reconnoitre. If they were French, he was to hasten their march; if they were enemies, he was to arrest their progress: in any case, he was to report immediately who they were. For the accomplishment of this commission he added to his division Subervic's, consisting of 1200 or 1300 light horse. Both divisions amounted to 2400 men; sufficient not only to observe, but also to delay the march of the advancing troops, should they be enemies.

Napoleon did not feel uneasy yet. Had Grouchy allowed some lateral columns of the Prussian army to escape, he must be pursuing them, and would appear almost as soon as they,

and the accident, far from being disadvantageous, would be a gain; for these columns thus placed between two fires would be inevitably destroyed. But the mystery was now cleared up. A sub-officer of Hussars was taken prisoner by our light cavalry. He was the bearer of a letter to the Duke of Wellington from General Bulow, announcing the approach of the Prussians and demanding instructions. This officer was a very intelligent man. He declared that the approaching troops were Bulow's corps, consisting of 30,000 men, and advancing to join the left wing of the English army. This was a serious, but still not very alarming, piece of information. If Bulow, who had come from Liege by Gembloux, was near Grouchy, whose eyes must have been closed if he had not seen him pass, could not be far off. His entire corps, or the detachment that had been asked for, must arrive almost at the same time as Bulow's: so that this would still turn to our advantage. If our right was formed into a right angle by the addition of a strong detachment sent to oppose Bulow, the latter would be placed between two fires at the arrival of Grouchy's 7000 men, or of 34,000 led by himself. Napoleon sent for Count de Lobau, and ordered him to choose a position on the declivity of the heights looking toward the Dyle, where, with his two divisions of infantry and Dorn's and Subervic's cavalry, he could make an obstinate resistance. These troops would altogether form a mass of 10,000 men, that, commanded by the Count de Lobau, would be equal to a much larger number, and could very well hold their ground until the arrival of the 7000 that, at the very worst, might be expected from Grouchy, or until Grouchy himself should come with all his forces. Bulow's 17,000 would thus be opposed by 30,000, so stationed that some would be in his front and some in his rear. There was therefore, no cause for alarm. At the worst, it was only a diminution by 10,000 men of the force with which Napoleon had intended to attack the English left wing and force it to their centre, and thus deprive them of the command of the Brussels road. But the Count that was not spared in these desperate engagements was to be employed as a resource, and should victory be more expensive it would be less decisive: Napoleon was not in the least anxious. His 68,000 men were about to be opposed to 105,000 instead of 95,000; the chances of success were indeed less, but still very great.

It was certainly in his power to retreat and decline fighting, but it would be a very serious thing to retreat from a battle already commenced, and that in presence of both English and Prussians. Such conduct would be a renunciation of the ascendancy gained by the victory of Ligny; it would be converting a recross as a fugitive the frontier which, two days before, he had passed as a conqueror, and all this with the conviction of having to meet, within a fortnight, 250,000 additional men when the Austrians, Russians, and Saxons would have arrived. It was certainly better to fight a battle out which, if gained, would definitively maintain things in the position in which we wished to place them, than, by retreating, allow the two invading columns to

the north and east to unite and overpower us with their combined forces. In the actual state of things there was no choice but to conquer or die. Napoleon was convinced of this, and as the events of the day assumed a more serious aspect, they taught him nothing that he had not previously known. Still, to imagine that the Prussians could come without Grouchy would be taking a very gloomy view, and supposing that fortune had assumed a far more rigorous aspect than she had worn at any time during twenty years of warfare. He, therefore, confined himself to taking fresh precautions to secure Grouchy's arrival in line. He ordered Marshal Soult to send an officer with a despatch dated one o'clock, announcing the appearance of the Prussians on our right, and giving the formal command to advance immediately and assist in beating them. An officer at a gallop could reach Grouchy in less than two hours, and bring him within reach of the two armies in less than three. Grouchy would thus arrive before six, far too early an hour to have the battle decided. Up to that hour, De Lobau would be able to hold his ground on our right, aided by the nature of the ground and sustained by his native energy.

There was now an additional reason for hastening the attack on the left wing of the English; for, besides the advantage of being able to fall back on Bulow if we should conquer the English, we should separate the English from the Prussians, and so cut them off from their assistance. Napoleon consequently gave Ney the signal of attack.

This important operation was to commence by a vigorous onset on the centre, directed against the farm of La Haye Sainte, situated on the high-road to Brussels. Our right wing, deployed, was then to mount the plateau, seize the little Ohain road running midway along the heights, rush on the enemy's left, try to force it on their centre, and so obtain possession of Mont Saint-Jean, at the junction of the Nivelles and Brussels roads. Quoit's brigade from the Alix division,—D'Erlon's first,—placed as a column of attack on the right of the high-road and supported by a brigade of Milhaud's cuirassiers, had orders to seize the farm of La Haye Sainte. The Bourgeois brigade,—Alix's second,—placed on the right of the high-road, was to form the first *echelon* in the attack on the plateau. The Donzelot division was to form the second, the Marcognet division the third, and the Durutte division the fourth. Both Ney and D'Erlon had, of course, with the intention of giving more consistence to their infantry, adopted, on this day, a very strange arrangement, the disadvantages of which were soon felt. It was customary in the French army for the attacking column to advance with a battalion deployed in front to fire on the enemy, and the battalions on each flank formed into serried columns in order to resist the charges of the cavalry. On this occasion, however, both Ney and D'Erlon had drawn up the eight battalions of each division in file, ranging them with a space of five paces between each line, so that there was barely room for the officers between the battalions, and rendering it impossible for them to form into square to resist the cavalry. These four divisions, formed into four dense columns, advanced abreast, at a

distance of three hundred feet from each other. D'Erlon, on horseback, led on his own four *échelons*, Ney headed Quoit's brigade that advanced to attack La Haye Sainte.

General Picton commanded the English left. His first line was composed of the 95th battalion of Kemp's English brigade, placed in ambush along the Ohain road; and in the same line was Bylandt's brigade of Perponcher's division. His second line, on the edge of the plateau, consisted of the remainder of Kemp's brigade, Pack's Scotch brigade, and the Vincke and Best Hanoverian brigades. The Saxe-Weimar brigade—Perponcher's division—occupied the Papelotte and La Haye farms. Vivian and Vandeleur's light cavalry flanked on the extreme left, waiting the arrival of the Prussians. This portion of the enemy's army was protected by twenty pieces of artillery.

At about half-past one, Ney attacked La Haye Sainte with Quoit's brigade, and D'Erlon, with his four divisions, descended into the little vale that lay between the two armies. The simplest mode would have been to demolish La Haye Sainte by a brisk cannonade, by which much blood would have been spared there, as well as at the château de Goumont; but the excitement of the troops was so great that obstacles were little heeded. Quoit's soldiers, led by Ney, rushed first on the orchard, surrounded by a quickset hedge in front of the buildings of the farm. They forced an entrance under a shower of balls, and drove out the German legion. Having seized the orchard, they next attacked the buildings, but a murderous fire from the embattled walls soon decimated their ranks. A brave officer—Vieux—commandant of engineers, and who was afterward killed under the walls of Constantine, advancing axe in hand to beat down the door of the farm-house, was struck by a ball, but did not yield until the number of his wounds rendered it impossible for him to stand. The door still resisted, and the balls rained from the walls.

The Prince of Orange, seeing the danger to which the German battalion defending La Haye Sainte was exposed, sent Luneburg's Hanoverian battalion to its assistance. Ney allowed the Hanoverians to approach, and then attacked them with one of his two regiments of cuirassiers. This regiment rushed on Luneburg's troops, drove them back, trod them down, bore off their standard, and, having sabred some, pursued the others as far as the edge of the plateau. Somerset's Horse-Guards now charged our scattered cuirassiers, who, taken by surprise, were forced back, but a smart fire from one of Quoit's brigades, led by Ney, soon stopped the mounted guards. During this protracted combat at La Haye Sainte, of which the orchard alone had been taken, D'Erlon, protected by our great battery of eighty guns, led on his four divisions, crossed the valley, and began to mount the opposite ascent. The ground being soft and wet, the infantry took some time to cross the space that lay between them and the enemy. They were soon too far advanced up the height for our cannon to fire over their heads; but still, though unprotected, they continued to mount with wonderful firmness. As our first *echelon*—formed of the second brigade of Alix's division—approached the summit, it was attacked by a murderous

fire from the 95th regiment, lying in ambush on the Ohain road. (As we have seen, Alix's first brigade was attacking La Haye Sainte.) The Alix division drew a little now to the right, to get out of the range of the balls, and thus narrowed the distance between it and the second echelon (Donzelot division). Both advanced along the Ohain road, forced their way through the hedge, and, having stood a murderous fire, rushed on the 95th and the deployed battalions of the Bylandt brigade. They killed a great number of the 95th, and drove back Kempt and Bylandt's battalions at the point of the bayonet. To their right, our third echelon—Marcognet division—having mounted the height under a shower of grape-shot, crossed the Ohain road, overpowered the Hanoverians, and succeeded in ascending the plateau at a short distance from the Alix and Donzelot divisions. The position was apparently taken, and the victory ours, when, at a signal from General Picton, Pack's Scots rose unexpectedly from among the corn, and poured a close fire on our two front columns. Surprised by this fire, at the very moment of debouching on the plateau, they pause. General Picton orders Kempt and Pack's combined battalions to charge them at the point of the bayonet. This general falls dead, struck by a ball in the forehead, but the charge continues as vigorous as ever, and our two columns begin to waver. They still continue to resist, and are mingling with the English infantry, when a sudden storm bursts on them. The Duke of Wellington, having hastened to the spot, attacks them with Ponsonby's 1200 Scotch Dragoons, called the Scotch Greys, from the colour of their horses. These dragoons, formed into two columns, charge with the customary energy of English cavalry, penetrate between the Alix and Donzelot divisions on one side and the Donzelot and Marcognet on the other. Attacking in flank the dense masses of our infantry, too dense to be able to fall into square, they penetrate without breaking their lines, but they succeed in throwing them somewhat into confusion. Yielding to the shock of the cavalry, and impelled by the sloping ground, our columns descend pell-mell, with the dragoons, to the bottom of the valley they had crossed. The Scotch Greys carried off on one side the flag of the 105th,—Alix division,—and on the other that of the 45th,—Marcognet division. These were not their only exploits. Two batteries that formed part of the great battery of eighty guns had been ordered to advance to the support of our infantry. The dragoons dispersed the gunners, killed the brave Colonel Chandon, sank the cannon in the mire, and destroyed the horses, which they could not bring away.

These achievements happily soon came to an end. Napoleon had seen this confusion from the height where he was stationed. He sprang on his horse and galloped across the battlefield to where Milhaud's heavy cavalry were stationed, and ordered the Travers brigade, consisting of the 7th and 12th cuirassiers, to attack the Scotch dragoons. One regiment attacked them in front, another on one flank, whilst the lancers, under General Jacquinot, attacked them on the other. The Scotch dragoons, surprised in all the confusion of pursuit, and attacked on every side, were at

once cut to pieces. Our cuirassiers, indeed, with the desire of avenging the infantry, rushed on them with their long sabres and beared them down. The 4th lancers, headed by Colonel Bro, dealt with them as unsparingly. A quartermaster of the lancers, named Colman, rushed into the thickest of the fight, and the brave Ponsonby, commander of the dragoons, prisoner. The Scotch seek to free their general, but Urban lays him dead at his feet, then, attacked by several dragoons, he rises directly to him that holds the standard of the 45th, unhorses him with a blow of his lance, kills him with a second, seizes the colour, kills another of the Scotch who is pursuing him close, and then, covered with blood, rushes to his colonel with the trophy which he had so gloriously redeemed. The Scotch, in their plight, fall back on Kempt and Pack's infantry, leaving dead or wounded 700 or 800 of the 1200 that originally composed their brigade.

On D'Erlon's extreme right, Dumas's division, comprising the fourth echelon, had also with nearly the same fate as the three others. This division had advanced in the order prescribed to all four, that is, with its battalions in line and ranged one behind the other, five paces between. But, as Vandeleur's square was about to charge, the 85th regiment, this division was attacked by Vandeleur's dragoons, its ranks were not broken, its first line yielded for a moment to the brisk fire of musketry, and supported 3d chasseurs, the division fell back in order on the square of the 85th, which yielded a step.

Such was the result of this attack on the English, from which Napoleon expected such great advantages. As tactics, of which both Ney and D'Erlon had been guilty, had left our two fine divisions at the mercy of the enemy, and cost them 3000 men in dead, wounded, and prisoners. The English had lost 1000 dragoons, part of Kempt and Pack's divisions, and Generals Picton and Ponsonby, and about the same number of infantry. But they had maintained their position, the whole operation was now commenced under the disadvantage of being in the first attempt. We were still part of the La Haye Sainte farm, a nowise disheartened, were rallied to the side of the valley that lay bet the English. Napoleon joined them in front of their ranks, midst the firing from one line to another, resounding in the air. The viscount Desvaux, commander of the Guard, was killed at his side.

Though much distressed by the position, Napoleon continued calm and firm, that the soldiers should be aware that the arrangements would be different that they would certainly overcome their obstinacy. But his attention was attracted by another object. He who had been sent to meet the summit of the Saint-Laurent sent word that these were actually engaged with

charged their advance-guard several times, and that he wanted infantry to arrest their progress. Already were the Prussian bullets falling in the rear of our right flank on the Charleroy road. At the same time, one of Marshal Grouchy's officers, who had succeeded in reaching us, announced that Grouchy, instead of leaving Gembloux at four in the morning, had not left until nine, and had then advanced toward Wavre. Had the marshal advanced directly on Mont Saint-Jean he would have joined the main body before that hour; it was then about three o'clock. But Napoleon saw clearly that Grouchy did not understand either the nature of the ground or his orders, and began to give up all hope of seeing him. He would now have two armies to encounter. It was too late to retreat, as he would be assailed in flank and rear by 130,000 men, justified in regarding themselves as victors, whilst he, having lost 8000 in the late engagement, could meet them with but 60,000, who would consider themselves defeated if they were ordered to retreat. Napoleon, therefore, determined to face the storm, and meet all difficulties with the brave men still under his command, and whose courage seemed to rise as the danger became more pressing.

The Count de Lobau had gone to the right to seek a proper spot on which to act on the defensive. Napoleon ordered him to go with his corps, which, since Teste's division had left, amounted to only 7500 bayonets. He also gave him some batteries of the Guards to replace his battery of twelve-pounders, which was one of those dispersed by the Scotch dragoons. Count de Lobau left immediately, and his corps, leaving the centre, traversed the battle-field with imposing slowness. He was to take his position on the right, parallel to the Charleroy road, and at a right angle to our line of battle.

The ground which the Count de Lobau was about to occupy was extremely well adapted to a small number of troops about to oppose superior forces. As we have already said, the little valley that lay between the two armies became, as it stretched farther on, the bed of the Smohain stream, and farther still, formed a junction with the little stream of Lasne. Between these streams there rose a kind of promontory, wooded on its sloping sides. The Count de Lobau took up his position across this promontory, his right at the Hanotelet farm, his left at the château de Frichermont, joining Durutte's division, toward the Papelotte farm, and thus closing the entire space between the two streams, whilst in front he had a battery of thirty pieces of ordnance, whose gunners awaited the enemy match in hand.

Bulow's corps had descended from the Saint-Lambert Chapelle by a most difficult path into the bed of the Lasne stream, marching sometimes through shifting sand, sometimes over slippery clay, the artillery following with great difficulty. Having crossed these treacherous soils, he had to traverse a thick wood, where a few well-posted troops could arrest the progress of an entire army. Unfortunately, so confident were the French that none but Grouchy could arrive on this side, that no precautions had been taken there, which, when Blücher,

who had been joined by Bulow, perceived, he was filled with delight. At about three o'clock, Bulow's two first divisions, preceded by their cavalry, advanced toward De Lobau's position, Losthin's division advancing toward the Smohain stream, and Hiller's toward the Lasne. Domon and Subervie's squadrons met them with drawn swords, and delayed their approach as long as possible. Lobau awaited them on the edge of the slope, ready to receive them with a shower of grape.

Though Napoleon as yet felt no alarm for this side, he had somewhat modified his plans. Acting on the offensive against the English, it depended on himself whether he would suspend the action, and not resume it definitively until he could appreciate the importance of the Prussian attack. His plan now was to meet the Prussians with so much determination that they should be kept in check for an hour or two at least, then return to the English, and advance with D'Erlon's corps, the Guards, and the heavy cavalry along the Brussels road to Mont Saint-Jean, and then with all his forces fall on the Duke of Wellington's centre, and put an end to the contest by one desperate effort, the offspring of despair. To secure the success of this effort it would be necessary at the centre to get possession of La Haye Sainte, in order to check the English whilst temporizing with them, and to be able afterward to debouch on the plateau when the last blow was to be struck. On the left it would be necessary to have possession of the entire or a part of the château de Goumont, to be able to sustain our position. Napoleon therefore ordered Ney to take La Haye Sainte at any price, station himself there, and await the signal for the general and definitive attack on the British army. As General Reille had not had his heavy cavalry at the attack on the château de Goumont, his battery of twelve-pounders having been added to the great battery on the right, Napoleon sent him with some howitzers with which to set fire to the farm and château.

During this time the combat in the centre and to the left had not slackened in the least. The Jerome division was vigorously attacking the orchards and buildings of the château de Goumont, and had lost almost as many men as the enemy. These soldiers had succeeded in getting through the thick hedge at the end of the wood, but had not been able to force the embattled walls of the garden: they had turned to the left to seize the buildings on the farm, whilst Foy's division, taking their place, answered the fire of the English along the orchard. Colonel Cubières, commanding the 1st Light Infantry, and who had distinguished himself two days before in the attack on the wood of Bossu, had turned the buildings under a fearful fire from the plateau. Seeing a back-door leading into the yard of the château, he was determined to force it. Sub-Lieutenant Legros, a brave man, formerly a sub-officer of engineers, and whom his comrades called *l'enfonneur*, seizing a hatchet, forced the door and entered the yard at the head of a few brave fellows. The post was ours, and we should have kept it but that Lieutenant-Colonel Maedonnel, dashing forward at the head of the English Guards, succeeded in repelling our men and closing the door, and so saved the

château de Goumont. The brave Legros was left dead on the field. Colonel Cubières, who had been wounded the previous evening at Quatre-Bras, was at this moment struck by several shots, and fell under his horse; he was about being killed by the English, but, touched by his valour and age, they spared his life and bore him bleeding from the field. The French were, therefore, compelled to return to the border of the wood without having conquered this fatal mass of buildings. But the battery of howitzers having arrived, it was stationed on the right side of the valley, whence it poured a hail of balls that soon set the farm and château in flames. Though surrounded by the conflagration, the English, continually reinforced, persisted in holding a position which they considered most important to the defence of the plateau. This combat had already cost the French three thousand men, and the English two thousand, a slaughter from which we obtained no other advantage than the taking of the wood of Goumont. The Jerome and Foy divisions had thronged round this wood, where they were somewhat sheltered, and Bachelu's division, reduced to three thousand men at Quatre-Bras, had also sought shelter there from the fire of the British artillery, reserving themselves for some occasion where their courage could be better employed. Thus the space between the château de Goumont and the Brussels road, where Ney was attacking La Haye Sainte, remained almost unoccupied.

Ney was making desperate efforts at La Haye Sainte to seize a post which Napoleon would need in his decisive attack on the English centre. Quot's brigade had remained in the orchard, whence it continued to fire on the out-houses of the farm, D'Erlon's division had again formed on the side of the valley, and Ney had brought them closer to his position, in order to throw them on the plateau by the Brussels road when the opportunity should arrive. This illustrious marshal certainly needed no stimulus, for his peerless bravery seemed, on this day, to surpass the capabilities of mere man. Knowing that Napoleon wished to get La Haye Sainte at any cost, he summoned two battalions of Donzelot's division, the first that had rallied, and leading them up to La Haye Sainte commenced an impetuous attack. Excited by his example, the soldiers forced the door of the farm-house, entered under a fearful fusillade, and massacred the battalion of German light infantry that was defending it. Of five hundred men, only forty with five officers escaped, pursued at the point of the sword by our cuirassiers, of whom not one brigade had ceased to take part in the combat.

The German legion, stationed on the Ohain road, seeing this hapless remnant of one of its battalions returning, prepared to come to their assistance. Two battalions belonging to the German legion went down as far as La Haye Sainte to try to recover the farm. The moment he saw them, Ney sent the brigade of cuirassiers to attack them. The two German battalions immediately formed into square, but our cuirassiers charging furiously down out them to pieces and captured their standard. The other, having had time to form, resisted two consecutive charges, but would have been

beaten in turn had not Somerset's mounted Guards come to its assistance. Our cuirassiers retreated, forced to allow one battalion to escape, but with the cruel satisfaction of having almost totally destroyed the other.

Ney, master of La Haye Sainte, thought he could debouch victoriously by the Brussels road on the plateau, and asked for some additional troops, thinking the moment was come for making a decisive attack on the English army. Having summoned D'Erlon's division from La Haye Sainte, he led them forward and succeeded in occupying that part of the Ohain road nearest to his right, and which Kempt's and Pack's half-ruined troops could not defend. He wished to join his left to Reille's troops, stationed in different detachments round the wood of Goumont, leaving empty space between that wood and La Haye Sainte. He sent several times to Napoleon to ask for troops to fill up this space, and his countenance glowing with heroic ardour, he repeatedly said to General Drouot that when he got some additional troops he would secure a brilliant victory and totally repulse the British army.

It was now half-past four, and our right wing formed *en potence* was exposed to a severe attack from Bulow. The Prussian troops issuing from the wooded depths between Smohain and the Lasne streams were mounting the slope, having Lossin's division on their right and Hiller's on their left. The brave Lobau awaited them with imperturbable coolness, and received them with a fusillade which though it did great mischief in the ranks did not arrest their advance. They returned the fire to the best of their ability, and their projectiles, falling behind us in the midst of our parks and baggage, caused no confusion on the Charleroy road. A practised eye saw that they were not supported, and seizing the opportunity and toward his first line, and a charge with bayonets drove the assailants back into the thickets they had left. This success, however, which was due to the vigour and promptness of the commander of the 6th corps, only gained time, for other Prussian columns were now seen coming to the assistance of the 1st, and some making a wide *détour* on our right flank were preparing to surround us. Napoleon, who had the twenty-four battalions of the Guard at his disposal, had had no expectation of such an attempt; but he was determined to meet and overcome it before making the attack on the English army, with which he flattered himself to put an end to the battle. He, therefore, ordered General Dabrowski to lead the eight battalions of the Young Guard, which he commanded, to the right of the 6th corps, giving him twenty-four guns to clear the Prussian ranks with chain-shot.

Napoleon remained in the centre with three battalions of the *sauvegarde* and Old Guard, intending when the attack on the Prussians would be terminated, to fall like a thunderbolt on the English with these three battalions, the cavalry of the Guard and the *sauvegarde* reserve of heavy cavalry. Besides, General

* Two of these battalions were killed in the battle of Ligny.

who had been so long expected, might at length arrive. It was five o'clock, and if we only held firm, without hurrying events, he would have time to arrive and take part in a victory that could not fail to be brilliant, if he attacked the Prussians in the rear whilst they were at the same time attacked in front. With these views, Napoleon sent word to Ney that it would be impossible to send any infantry, but that he would send him Milhaud's cuirassiers provisionally, to occupy the space between La Haye Sainte and the wood of Goumont, and desired him to await his orders before commencing the attack, that was to decide the fate of the day.*

In obedience to Napoleon's orders, Milhaud's cuirassiers, who were behind D'Erlon, advanced at a trot, traversed the field of battle from right to left, crossed the Brussels road, and took up their position behind their first brigade, which Ney had so often led against the enemy. They took up a position between La Haye Sainte and the wood of Goumont, where they occupied the space left vacant by Reille's divisions, which, as we have said, were crowded around the wood. The advance of eight regiments and four brigades of these formidable horsemen created a great sensation. All thought they were going to charge, and that the final moment was come. They were received with shouts of *Vive l'Empereur!* which they enthusiastically re-echoed. As General Milhaud passed before Lefebvre-Desnoëttes, who commanded the light cavalry of the Guard, he clasped his hand and said, "I am going to charge: support me." Lefebvre-Desnoëttes, whose valour needed no fresh incitement, believed that it was by order of the Emperor he was desired to support the cuirassiers, and, following their movement, he took up a position behind them. Serious inconveniences had resulted at Wagram and Fuentes d'Onoro from the institution of commandants-en-chef of the Imperial Guards, where it had paralyzed the efforts of these troops, but here we had to regret the decay of that institution, owing to Mortier's illness, as there was no one to check unreasonable enthusiasm, and, to add to the disaster, Napoleon had been obliged to leave his post in the centre and betake himself to the right to direct the action against the Prussians, who thus deprived us not only of our reserves but of Napoleon's presence.

When Ney saw such a body of noble cavalry at his disposal, his confidence and daring redoubled, and he became more than ever impatient to justify what he had said to Drouot, that were he allowed to act he would, unaided, put an end to the English army. The changes made in our order of battle induced the Duke of Wellington to make some in his. Alten's division stationed in the centre and to the right had suffered severely. This he reinforced with Brunswick's corps and Mitchell's and Lambert's brigades. He ordered General Chassé, who was posted at Braine-l'Alleud, to come to the support of the right wing. He, also, ordered Clinton's division, hitherto left in the rear of the English, to move forward, and recalled Vincke's Hanoverian brigade from

the left, which he no longer considered in danger since D'Erlon's fruitless attempt and the appearance of the Prussians. As his troops had already suffered a great deal from our artillery, and were likely to suffer more since we had got possession of La Haye Sainte, he took care when concentrating them toward the right to make them fall back a little, and on horseback, in the midst, he prepared them for a fierce assault which might be easily augured from the brilliant helmets of our cuirassiers and the lances of our light cavalry.

The English artillery was left alone on the edge of the plateau, in consequence of the retrograde movement of the infantry, as well as in compliance with the usual English tactics. It was customary in the British army, whenever the artillery was in danger of an attack from mounted troops, to draw off the gunners and horses into the squares and leave the cannon, which the enemy could not remove without horses, and when the storm had passed the gunners returned to their posts and turned the guns against the retreating foe. There were now sixty ill-defended pieces of ordnance in front of the English line, offering a strong temptation to a daring enemy.

Ney, still elated by the combat of La Haye Sainte, and trusting in his four lines of excellent cavalry, consisting of five thousand men, was not a man likely to bear patiently the fire of the English artillery. Seeing that this artillery had no support and that the English infantry had made a retrograde movement, he determined to seize the line of guns before him, and putting himself at the head of Delort's division of four regiments of cuirassiers, and ordering Wathier's division to support him, he advanced at a trot notwithstanding the bad state of the ground. Not being able to debouch by the Brussels road in consequence of the obstructions, and inconvenienced by the embankments of the Ohain road, he turned a little to the left, crossed the ridge of the plateau with his four regiments, and fell with the rapidity of lightning on the badly defended cannon. Having passed the line of guns, and seeing Alten's infantry apparently in retreat, he sent his cuirassiers after them. These brave horsemen, heedless of the balls raining around, galloped after Alten's division, broke the squares and commenced a furious slaughter. Some of these squares, however, broken at first by the weight of both men and horses, rallied quickly and again fell into order. Others, that had not been penetrated, continued to discharge a murderous fire. Ney, seeing this resistance, moved forward his second division—Wathier's—and Alten's division was forced back on the second line of the English infantry, by the violent charge of these four fresh regiments. Several battalions of the German and Hanoverian legions were overpowered, trodden under foot, put to the sword, and deprived of their standards. Our cuirassiers, the oldest soldiers of the army, glutted their rage by a merciless massacre of the English.

Immovable during this violent attack, the Duke of Wellington ordered Somerset's mounted guards, Trip's Dutch carabineers, and Dornberg's dragoons to advance between the intervals of the infantry. These English and German squadrons, profiting by the inevitable

* The reader will find further on a discussion on this assertion of Napoleon.

confusion of our cavalry, had at first some advantage over them, and succeeded in driving them back. But Ney, hastening toward Lefebvre-Desnoëttes, made a signal to advance, and precipitated him on the Duke of Wellington's English and German cavalry. Our brave lancers rush on the mounted guards, and, making good use of their lances, drive them back in their turn. This charge having allowed the cuirassiers time to form again, they, with the chasseurs and lancers, fall again upon the English cavalry. All are intermingled; a thousand hand-to-hand fights commence with swords and lances by the horsemen of both nations. Ours had the advantage, and a portion of the English cavalry strewed the ground. Those who escaped took refuge behind the squares of the English infantry, and our horsemen were again stopped in their onward course, to the great detriment of the light cavalry of the Guard, who, being unprovided with cuirasses, lost a number of men and horses.

Ney had two horses killed under him during this outburst of furious human passion. His coat and hat were riddled with balls; but, still invulnerable, the bravest of the brave was determined to keep his oath, and break the British lines. When he looked upon what he had accomplished, he flattered himself that he would be able to fulfil his vow; and seeing on the other side of the plateau 3000 cuirassiers and 2000 mounted grenadiers of the Guards that had not been yet engaged, he asked that they should be given him to complete the victory. He rallies the troops that had just fought, ranges them on the ridge of the plateau to afford them time to breathe, and gallops off to recall the others to the combat.

The entire army saw this formidable *mêlée* from a distance, and from the movement of the helmets and lances advancing and retreating, but never leaving the position, had formed a favourable augury of the result. The simplest soldier felt instinctively that such an enterprise once begun ought to be continued, and the men were right; for if it was unwise to begin, it would be still more unwise not to go on with the undertaking.

Napoleon, whose attention was attracted by the fearful tumult caused by the cavalry, saw what Ney's impatience had led him to attempt. All who surrounded him applauded; but this consummate captain, who had fought more than fifty pitched battles, exclaimed, "He has begun an hour too soon." "This man," added Marshal Soult, speaking of Ney, "this man is always the same! He will compromise every thing, as he did at Jena and Eylau!" Still Napoleon thought it better to support him in what he had commenced, and sent orders to Kellerman to support Milhaud's cuirassiers. Kellerman's 3000 cuirassiers were stationed in front of the heavy cavalry of the Guard, consisting of 2000 mounted grenadiers and dragoons, all eager for action; the cavalry being quite as zealous as the infantry on this most fatal day.

Kellerman, who had had some experience at Quatre-Bras of what he called Ney's foolish zeal, condemned the desperate use which at this moment was made of the cavalry. Distrusting the result, he kept back one of his brigades, the carbiniers, and most unwillingly

sent the remainder to Ney. The latter hastened to meet them, excited them both by word and gesture, and at their head mounted the plateau, on whose ridge the cavalry which had been just engaged had paused for a moment's breathing-space. The Duke of Wellington calmly awaited this fresh attack. Behind Alten's almost ruined division he placed Brunswick's corps, Maitland's guards and Mitchell's division, and in the third line Chassé's and Clinton's divisions. It would be a difficult task to overpower three such opposing forces; one may be vanquished, or two, but there was very little hope of succeeding against three. Still the daring Ney debouched on the plateau with his iron-clad squadron, and at a given signal these gallant horsemen galloped forward, brandishing their swords and crying *Vive l'Empereur!* Never, as an eye-witness declares, did the annals of war reveal so fearful a spectacle.*

These twenty squadrons, led on by their generals and officers, advanced at full gallop, and, though they were received by a terrible fusillade, attacked and broke the enemy's line. Alten's unfortunate division, already ill-treated, was now entirely cut to pieces, together with the 69th English regiment. The few that remained of this division fled in disorder along the Brussels route. Ney rallied his squadrons, and advanced on the second line. This attack was vigorous as the former, but it was met by an invincible resistance. Several squares were broken, but the greater number held their ground, and some of our horsemen, who had penetrated to the third line, fell by the English bayonets, or succeeded in galloping back to renew the charge. The Duke of Wellington then decided to sacrifice the remainder of his cavalry. He moved them forward into the midst of the *mêlée*, where they were not cut down; for though the bayonets of the English infantry could arrest the progress of our cuirassiers, no cavalry could sustain their formidable shock. In this extremity he determined on employing Cumberland's 10th hussars, who had not been yet engaged; but at sight of this scene of slaughter, the hussars fell back in disorder, carrying with them along the Brussels road the equipages, the wounded, and the fugitives, who were already hounding thither in crowds. Notwithstanding the desperate resistance that Ney met, he still hoped to destroy the English army at the point of the sword. He unexpectedly received a fresh reinforcement. Whilst this titanic combat was going on, the heavy cavalry of the Guard hastened forward, though nobody knew why. These had been stationed in a slight hollow somewhat in the rear, when some officers having advanced to assist Ney in this present conflict, believing that he had conquered, brandished their sabres, and cried "Yankee!" At this cry other officers rushed forward, and the nearest squadron, regarding this as the signal to charge, advanced at a trot. The entire mass followed, and, yielding to a species of mechanical impulse, the 2000 dragoons and mounted grenadiers ascended the plateau, trampling through wet and muddy ground.

* General Foy, especially, in his military journal, as an eye-witness, declares that, during his long military career, he had never been present at such a scene.

Bertrand, being sent by Napoleon to keep them back, hastened to do so, but could not overtake them. Ney profited by this unexpected reinforcement, and directed it against the razed wall he was endeavouring to batter down. The heavy cavalry of the Guard did wonders, breaking the squares; but many of them, not having cuirasses, sank beneath the fire of the enemy. Ney, whom nothing could daunt, sent forward Milhaud's cavalry, who had got a few moments' rest, and he thus kept up a kind of continual charge, each squadron after attacking the enemy falling back to form, and then return to the attack. Some of them even turned the wood of Goumont to return to their ranks and renew the combat. Meantime Ney, seeing Kellerman's carbiniers in reserve, hastened to where they were, asked what they were doing, and then, despite of Kellerman's resistance, led them against the enemy. These made fresh breaches in the second line of the British infantry, broke several squares, cut the men in pieces, even under the fire of the third line, and destroyed three-fourths of that second human wall, without being able to reach or touch the third. Ney still persisted, and for the eleventh time led on his 10,000 horse to the attack, killing as they went, but still unable to subdue the firmness of the infantry, that, though shaken for a moment, again closed their ranks, fell into line, and continued to fire. Ney, foaming with excitement, and bare-headed, his fourth horse shot under him, his coat pierced with bullets, covered with contusions, but fortunately not seriously injured, said to Colonel Heymès, that if he could get the infantry of the Guard, he would destroy the exhausted English infantry, whose strength was nearly spent. He sent him to ask Napoleon for this reinforcement.

Hoping for this assistance, and knowing that he could not put a finish to the combat with cavalry alone, and that the bayonets of the infantry would be needed, he drew back his horse to the edge of the plateau, where they made a firm stand, their courage sustained by his determined bearing. He passed along the ranks encouraging them, telling them to keep their post despite the firing of the artillery, and that if they could maintain their position on the plateau they would soon be rid of the English army. "It is here," he said, "my friends, that the fate of our country is about to be decided; it is here that we must conquer in order to secure our independence." Leaving the cavalry for a moment, he hastened to the right to D'Erlon, whose infantry had succeeded in seizing the Ohain road, and were still firing on the almost exhausted battalions of Kempt and Pack. "Keep firm, friend," he said to him, "for if you and I do not fall here beneath the bullets of the English, we shall certainly fall beneath those of the emigrants." A sad and bitter prophecy! This peerless hero, going from his infantry to his cavalry, sustained their courage under the enemy's fire, whilst he himself seemed invulnerable midst the balls that rained around. Four thousand of his cavalry strewn the ground, but in return, on the other side, 10,000 English, horse and foot, had paid for their obstinate resistance with their lives. Nearly all the English generals were more or less seriously wounded.

A number of fugitives, under pretence of removing the wounded, had hurried with the servants, sutlers, and baggage-conductors, along the Brussels road, crying that all was over, that the battle was lost. On the other hand, the soldiers in line remained immovable in their ranks. The Duke of Wellington, who was as firm as Ney was brave, told them that the Prussians were approaching, and would be with them immediately, but that in any case they could only die. He looked at his watch and prayed that Blücher or night might come to his rescue. He had still 36,000 men on the plateau that Ney was attacking so violently, and he did not yet despair. Neither did Ney lose hope, and these two great hearts held the destinies of two nations in the balance. A strange phenomenon of exhaustion was then exhibited: for nearly an hour the weary combatants ceased from strife. The English occasionally discharged some of their remaining guns, our cavalry remaining immovable in front of the sixty cannon and six flags they had captured, whilst the ground before them was strewn with thousands of dead bodies.

During this unprecedented combat, the suitable and terrific termination of a sanguinary century, Colonel Heymès hastened to Napoleon to ask for the infantry, of which the marshal was in need. "Infantry!" cried Napoleon, with an irritation he could no longer restrain: "where does he suppose I can get them? Does he expect me to make them? You see the task before me, and you see what troops I have." Indeed, the state of things on the French right had become most serious. Bulow's corps of 30,000 men, which Napoleon was trying to keep at bay with De Lobau's 10,000, was now about to be reinforced by dense columns which were already visible emerging from the wooded depths from which the Prussian army had advanced. It was evident that the French would have to encounter Blücher's entire force of 80,000 men, and could only oppose them with 13,000 infantry of the Guards,—the horse-guards, the entire reserve, dragoons and cuirassiers, having been employed and exhausted by Ney in a premature attempt.* Napoleon had now

* Napoleon's assertions on this subject have been much contested: some have even gone so far as to say that he had ordered the cavalry movement which Ney had executed so prematurely. I shall repeat, in the first place, that if every assertion emanating from St. Helena is not necessarily true, neither is it necessarily false. Napoleon says, in the "Relation" written in General Gourgaud's name, and repeats it in that which bears his own, that he had ordered Ney to take up his position at La Haye Sainte, and wait there for fresh instructions; that he regretted the cavalry charge that Ney had made, but that, once made, he decided on sustaining it. This assertion has so much appearance of probability that I, at least, feel inclined to credit it. There are, besides, many, to me, apparently convincing proofs of its correctness. In the first place, Napoleon was so preoccupied with the attack of the Prussians, that he suspended every other action but that directed against them: for example, he would not otherwise employ a single battalion of the Guards until Bulow's progress had been arrested. How then can we admit that, whilst unwilling to withdraw any part of his reserve of infantry from his right, he would allow his heavy cavalry to charge unsupported by infantry? How could we admit that so experienced a general would commit the error of ordering his cavalry to charge when he could not detach any portion of his infantry to their support? It is too much to accuse him of giving an order which the most incompetent of his generals would not have ventured to do. It may be said that Ney did so. But Ney was not Napoleon. Ney was

given up all hope of Grouchy's coming, as our right wing had heard nothing of him, nor could the most practised eye or ear catch on the wide extent of the horizon either shade or sound that could indicate his presence or approach. The infantry of the Guard, which had just been demanded, was Napoleon's only resource against a fearful catastrophe. Certainly, had he himself seen the state of the British army described by Ney, and had not the danger on his right increased, Lobau's corps alone would have sufficed to keep Bulow in check, and Napoleon might have led the infantry of the Guard against the English, and completed their destruction, and then return to oppose the Prussians with what indeed would be only the remnant of his troops, but troops flushed with victory. But he distrusted Ney's judgment, he could not forgive his precipitation, and he could see the entire Prussian army emerging from that yawning abyss which was continually pouring forth fresh masses of enemies. He, therefore, determined to check the Prussians by a serious engagement before going to seek a doubtful contest in the centre, during which a fatal and ruinous one might be fought on his right. However, when his momentary irritation had subsided, he sent Ney a less severe and more hopeful reply than that he had before made to Colonel Heymès. He desired the latter to tell the marshal that if he were in a difficult position at Mont Saint-Jean, he was himself in still greater difficulties on the banks of the Lasne, where he was opposed by the entire Prussian army; but that, when he would have repelled or even checked them, he, with the Guard, would hasten to complete the conquest of the English; that, until then, the plateau was to be held at any cost, as Ney had been so eager to mount it, but, could he only maintain his position for an hour, he might reckon on efficient aid.

Whilst Colonel Heymès was bearing to the marshal an answer so different to what he had expected, the combat with the Prussians was becoming quite as fierce as that with the English. Blücher, having ascended the heights

that border the Lasne, could see distinctly what was going forward at Mont Saint-Jean, and, although he had no objection to let the English suffer something in punishment of what he considered the tardy aid they had given him at Ligny, he still would not ignore the common cause by the indulgence of any feeling of mean resentment. Seeing the formidable assaults of our cuirassiers, he ordered Bulow to attack the French right wing, and ordered Pirch to assist him with his 15,000 men, whilst Ziethen, with about an equal number, was to support the English on the Ohain road, giving directions to advance as quickly as possible, so that the war might be terminated on this memorable day.

Blücher had infused some of his own valor into the minds of all, and the Prussians, inflamed with patriotism and hatred, made unheard-of efforts to get possession of a kind of promontory that rises between the Sambre and Lasne streams. Whilst Lothian's division was endeavouring to take the château de Frichermont, and Hiller's the Hammelet, they had left a space between them which Bulow filled with Prince William's cavalry. The valiant Count de Lobau was on horseback in the midst of his men, where his lofty stature made him conspicuous above them all, and now, with imperturbable calmness, he retired as leisurely as if he were only manoeuvring at a review, sometimes sending Solanin's and Domon's cavalry against Prince William's squadrons, and sometimes with fixed bayonets arresting the progress of Lothian's infantry on his right or of Hiller's on his left. At six o'clock, and he had lost 2500 of his 7000 foot, so that he had now but 5000 men to oppose to 30,000. His greatest danger was on the right, where the Prussians were making every effort to turn our position. The village of Planchenois was situated in the rear of the Belle Alliance near the source of the Lasne stream, that is, on our right and rear. If the enemy, advancing along the ravine, could enter the village which lay at its extremity, our position would be turned, and we should

on the spot, was excited, beside himself, he was not the commander-in-chief, nor did he know, as Napoleon did, that at this moment he could get no infantry. An error that might be very natural on the part of Ney would be by no means so in Napoleon. We have even still more conclusive proofs.

Ney's warmest defender, Colonel Heymès, speaking of this cavalry charge, at which he was present, does not venture to say that it was made by Napoleon's command. Had such been the case, he would certainly have mentioned it. He merely says that Ney wished to get possession of the position and artillery which the Duke of Wellington had apparently abandoned when he made his retrograde movement. It is evident that, could such an excuse be made for Ney's conduct, it would not have been passed over in silence by those who have even given a false colouring to many facts in order to justify the marshal. Here is another proof quite as convincing, in my opinion. Napoleon, in the detailed bulletin of the battle, which he wrote at Laon in presence of Ney, said that the cavalry, yielding to the impulses of a reckless valour, had charged without his orders; an assertion which Ney might have contradicted, and which he did when, two days later, he attacked the bulletin in the Chamber of Peers. I have heard from trustworthy persons, who were present when this bulletin was drawn up, that Napoleon said, "I could accuse Ney of the greatest fault committed on that day, but I will not." This was the reason why, without mentioning Ney, he attributed the fault of prematurely expending all our cavalry force to the reckless valour of the cavalry,—an assertion that was perfectly correct. He certainly would not have made such an assertion in

presence of Drouot and so many other worthy veterans, if he himself had ordered the charge in question. He did Ney, when, two days later, in the Chamber of Peers, he broke into violent invectives against the precipitation of that day's operations,—invectives pointed against Napoleon,—venture to assert that Napoleon had demanded the premature charge of cavalry; as even could he have made it, that would have shown his approaches universally uttered against him. The same is corded in Gourgaud's narrative, page 47, where Louis Foulst says, "This man will compromise every man who did at Jena," was well known in the army, and he had described to me more than once by other witnesses the occurrence.

For me the most irrefragable proofs are, that having suspended every attack but that against the Prussians, could not, at the same time, have ordered a great charge of the cavalry; that, whilst Ney was present, he contradicted him, he had not hesitated to set it in the bulletin of the battle, that this charge was only a reckless valour of the cavalry; and that when, two days later, he blamed Napoleon, violently, he did not send forward the very simple and complete excuse that the outbreak of reckless valour originated with Napoleon himself and had been sanctioned by his orders. I should hold that Ney was carried away by the impulse of his own bravery, and that, the movement being unexpected, Napoleon determined to maintain it, not indeed being able to do otherwise. It was the second order which he became an inevitable necessity, that he was so founded with the first. I am not an apologist, as a historian, seeking neither more nor less than the truth.

lose the Charleroy road, our only line of retreat. Bulow, having ordered Ryssel's division to support Hiller's, had got both along the ravine as far as Planchenois, whilst he sent Haaken's division to support Losthin's, in the direction of Frichermont. It was in consequence of this serious danger that Napoleon, who had gone to the spot himself, had sent all his disposable troops to the Count de Lobau. On the left, he had drawn off Durrutte's division from D'Erlon's corps, and sent it toward the La Haye and Papelotte farms, so as to form a solid turning-point at the apex of the angle formed by our line of battle. On the right, he had sent General Duhesme with the Young Guard and twenty-four cannon of the reserve to Planchenois, to defend a point that may well be called the Thermopylae of France. General Duhesme, an accomplished officer, with eight battalions of the Young Guard, amounting to nearly 4000 men, under his command, had, at this moment, occupied both sides of the ravine at whose extremity lay the village of Planchenois. Whilst he made a shower of bullets and chain-shot rain on the Prussians, his youthful infantry—some from among the trees and bushes, others from the houses in the village—defended themselves with a murderous charge of musketry, and showed no inclination to abandon their position, though assailed by more than 20,000 men.

About half-past six, Blücher having given orders to seize Planchenois, Hiller formed six battalions into column, and having nearly demolished the village with a fire of musketry and howitzers, sought to force it at the point of the bayonet. Our men stationed at the windows of the houses poured a terrible fire, then Duhesme, advancing at the head of one of his battalions, drove back the Prussians at the point of the bayonet, and forced them into the ravine, where our artillery poured upon them a volley of grape. They were driven back, horribly mutilated in their unsuccessful attempt. Blücher then repeated his absolute order to his lieutenants to take Planchenois; and Hiller, in presence of his commander, rallied his battalions, having given them a few moments to rest, and adding eight more, he, with the entire fourteen battalions, returned to the charge determined to carry a post so vigorously disputed. These fourteen battalions descended into the ravine, which was lined on each side by the French, and advanced into the midst of an actual fiery gulf. Hundreds fell, but the survivors closed their ranks, marched over the dead bodies of their comrades, and, urging each other forward, succeeded at length in entering Planchenois and reaching the termination of the ravine. Another step, and they would be on the Charleroy road. The Young Guards fell back, quite discomfited by the violence to which they had been exposed. But Napoleon suddenly appears among them. It is the privilege of the Old Guard to repair every disaster. This invincible troop will not suffer us to lose our line of retreat, the last resource of our army. Napoleon summoned General Morand, and, giving him a battalion of the 2d grenadiers and another of the 2d chasseurs, ordered him to repel this alarming attack on our rear.

He rode along in front of these battalions. "My friends," he said, "the decisive moment is come: it will not do to fire; you must come hand to hand with the enemy, and drive them back at the point of the bayonet into that ravine, whence they have issued to threaten the army, the Empire, and France." "*Vive l'Empereur!*" was the sole reply of this heroic troop. The two appointed battalions, leaving their post, formed into column, and advanced, one on the right the other on the left of the ravine, whence the Prussians were already issuing in great numbers. They advanced on their assailants with such firmness of step and such strength of arm that all yielded at their approach. Enraged against an enemy that had sought to turn the position, they overturn or slaughter all that oppose them, and soon put those battalions to flight that had beaten the Young Guard. Sometimes with the bayonet, sometimes with the butt end of the musket, they stab or strike, and such was the fury that animated them that a drummer of one of the battalions pursued the fugitives with his drumstick. Carried away by the torrent of confusion they had themselves produced, the two battalions of the Old Guard rushed into the ravine and pursued the Prussians up the opposite height as far as the village of Maransart, opposite to Planchenois. Here they were received with a volley of grape, and compelled to retreat; but they remained masters of Planchenois and the Charleroy road, and to avenge the defeat of the Young Guard two battalions of the Old Guard had sufficed. The victims of this fearful charge may be estimated at 2000.

To judge by appearances, the Prussians' serious attack on our flank had been repelled. No fresh incident could now be expected but the approach of the long-expected Grouchy, who must come at last, and whose presence would be a serious misfortune for the Prussians, as it would place them between two fires. A cannonade was heard in the direction of Wavre, which showed that our right wing was there, but the detachment which had been so formally demanded from Grouchy must be on the road, and its mere appearance on Bulow's rear would produce most important results. Durrutte still held his position at Papelotte, the angle of our line of battle; at the centre and on the left our cavalry kept possession of Mont Saint-Jean; and the six flags taken from the English infantry by our cavalry were laid at the feet of Napoleon. The aspect of affairs, so gloomy in the early part of the day, was beginning to brighten. Napoleon, whose spirit had been clouded for a moment, now felt cheered; he might hope for a fresh victory by bringing up his now disengaged Old Guard to the rear of his cavalry to complete the defeat of the English. Up to this time 68,000 French had successfully opposed about 140,000 English, Prussians, Dutch, and Germans, and had wrested a great part of the battle-ground from them.

Promptly seizing the decisive moment when the attack of the Prussians had been repelled, Napoleon ordered the Old Guard to form again and advance to the centre of his line of battle, that is, to the plateau of Mont Saint-Jean, and, making them pass through the ranks of our

cuirassiers, precipitated them on the exhausted British infantry. Although worn out, our own cavalry would not fail to feel their courage revive when they should see the Old Guard engaged: they would make a last charge and put an end to this terrible struggle. It is true that there would no longer be a reserve to repel any unexpected accident; but the great gambler was reduced to that extremity when despair becomes prudence!

Of the twenty-four battalions of the Guard, reduced to twenty-three at Ligny, Napoleon had thirteen that had not been engaged. Eight battalions of the Young Guard had been engaged at Planchenois, and were still needed there. Of the remaining thirteen, one was drawn up in square at the junction of the Planchenois and Charleroy roads,—little enough, assuredly, to protect our line of communication. Even though the last resources should be called into action, two battalions should at least be left at head-quarters, to meet any accidental occurrence, such as a new attempt of the Prussians on Planchenois. Napoleon, therefore, left the two battalions of the 1st grenadiers at Rossomme, a little in the rear of the farm of Belle Alliance, and led forward himself the ten others, consisting of 6000 foot. These included the battalions of the *moyenne* and Old Guards, all well-trying and more or less experienced soldiers, resolved to conquer or die, and equal to forcing the lines of any infantry whatever.

Napoleon was engaged in ranging them in columns of attack on the side of the valley that lay between us and the English, when he heard a discharge of musketry in the direction of Papelotte, that is, at the angle of his line of battle. His heart almost stood still. It might be Grouchy; it might be a fresh influx of Prussians, and, in his anxiety, he would rather be disappointed of the former than that it should be the latter. His fears increased when he saw some of Dürutte's troops abandon the Papelotte farm—at the cry of *sautez qui peut*, uttered either by traitors or by those who dreaded treachery. Napoleon rode to meet the fugitives, spoke to them, led them back to their post, and then returned to La Haye Sainte, when, looking toward the plateau, he perceived some movement among the cavalry, that had hitherto been quite immovable. A dark presentiment filled his mind, and he began to fear that, from their elevated position, the cavalry could perceive the arrival of a fresh reinforcement of Prussian troops. But, banishing thought and plunging into action, he immediately ordered La Bédoyère to gallop from right to left along the ranks and say that it was Grouchy's musketry that had been heard, and that great things would soon be done if they would only keep firm a few moments longer. Having sent La Bédoyère to disseminate this useful falsehood, he determined to make the ten battalions of the Guard that he had brought with him advance on the plateau of Mont Saint-Jean. He confided four to the valiant Friant, who was to make a furious attack with them in concert with Reille, who was to rally what remained of his corps for this last effort, and he arranged the six others diagonally from La Haye Sainte to

Planchenois, so as to connect his second right, and to provide against the early events which he dreaded. His plan was, supposing things were not as bad as he feared, to lead himself these six battalions after the other four, and force the English line at any price, and thus terminate the day.

As he was leading the four battalions destined for the first attack along the Charleroy road, he met Ney in a state of distraction, who declared that the cavalry would give way if a large reinforcement of infantry did not immediately arrive. Napoleon gave him the six battalions he was bringing up, and promised to send six more, but did not say, which unfortunately was quite unnecessary, that the fate of France depended on the approaching charge. Ney led off the four battalions and mounted the plateau at their head, at the same time that Reille's shattered corps was about to emerge from the wood of Goumont.

Whilst Ney and Friant were preparing a charge with their infantry, the Duke of Wellington, seeing the hairy caps of the Guard, felt that the decisive moment was come, and that his own glory and that of his country depended on the last effort. He had seen but Prussian columns approaching, and, hoping for their aid, he was determined to hold out the last, although, in his rear, the French road was crowded with fugitives. He endeavoured to inspire his companions with his own courage. Picton, who had been killed a little while before, had been succeeded in command of the left wing by Kempf, who, having lost 2000 or 3000 men, sent to the Duke of Wellington for a reinforcement. "Let them die," he replied; "I have no reinforcement to send." General Hill, who was second in command, said to him, "You may be killed here; what orders do you leave me?" "I hold out to the very last man, so as to give the Prussians time to approach." Having said these noble words, the Duke of Wellington closed his line, drew it up in form of a golf archer bow, so as to place the new angles between two fires, then, ordering Marshal's guards to lie flat on the ground, he calmly awaited the approach of the Imperial Guard.

Ney and Friant led forward their four battalions, and made them debouch on the plateau *en échelon*, that on the left advancing first, and the others successively, each a little to the right and in the rear of the preceding. When the men of the first battalion appeared, advancing with a firm step, they were met with a charge of chain-shot that broke the line in a hundred places. The line of heavy men wavered, but did not yield, and continued to advance with heroic firmness. The other battalions mounted in their turn, met the same reception, and showed equal firmness. They paused to level their muskets, and equal with a terrible fusillade the injury that had been inflicted on them. At the same moment, Friant and Bachelot's divisions of Reille's corps advanced on the left and attracted a portion of the enemy's fire. Having discharged their muskets, the battalions of the Guard were about fixing their bayonets, in order to close combat with the British infantry, when, at a signal from the Duke of Wellington,

ton, Maitland's guards rose from the ground, and poured on them a close and fearful discharge of musketry. This unexpected shock did not make our soldiers yield, but, closing their ranks, they still continued to advance. The aged Friant, the model of the old army, though seriously wounded, descended the plateau, all covered with blood, to declare that victory was certain if the other battalions came to support the first. He met Napoleon, who, having placed one battalion of the Guard in square, half-way up the acclivity, in order to check the enemy's cavalry, was now advancing with the five remaining battalions to attack the English line. Whilst listening to Friant's report, his eye, ever turned to the right, discovered about 3000 horse dashing down the declivity. These were Vandeleur's and Vivian's squadrons, who, seeing that they were about to be aided by Ziethen's corps, which was advancing by the Ohain road, were now hurrying to charge. In fact, whilst Piroch's corps was gone to support Bulow, Ziethen's had advanced, skirting the forest of Soignes, to support the Duke of Wellington's left. It was eight o'clock, and this reinforcement would decide every thing. In a moment Vandeleur's and Vivian's cavalry were in the centre of the scene of action. Napoleon, having left one of his battalions in square, in the centre of the valley, hastened now to form the others into square, to prevent his line being pierced between La Haye Sainte and Planchenois. If the cavalry of the Guard remained intact, he could easily get rid of Vandeleur's and Vivian's squadrons, and, the ground being cleared, he could summon his left and centre engaged on the plateau of Mont Saint-Jean, retire in good order to his right, and, collecting what troops were left, pass the night on the field of battle. But of the entire cavalry of the Guards he has but 400 chasseurs to oppose to 3000 of the enemy. He made them advance, however, and these 400 valiant men rushed on Vandeleur's and Vivian's squadrons, drove back those nearest them, but were themselves soon beaten back by the ever-increasing stream of the enemy's cavalry. In a moment the field was filled with a multitude of English and Prussian cavalry. The battalions of the Guard, formed into immovable citadels, receive them with a continuous fire, but cannot prevent them from advancing in every direction. To complete our distress, Ziethen's infantry, which had arrived after the Prussian cavalry, and attacked Durutte's half-ruined division, drove these troops out of the La Haye and Papelotte farms, and thus deprived us of the spot on which our line of battle rested, and which was formed *en potence*, because of our being obliged to meet two armies at once. All now was tumult and confusion. Our heavy cavalry, which had been kept on the plateau of Mont Saint-Jean by Ney's indomitable firmness, retired now, that they might not be cut off from the centre of the army. This retrograde movement on a sloping ground was soon changed into an impetuously descending torrent of men and horses. The remains of O'Brien's corps followed the cavalry. Intoxicated with joy, the English general, who up to this time had confined himself to acting on the defensive, now attacked in his turn, and led on

his line against the battalions of the Guard, now reduced to half their original number. From left to right the English and Prussian armies advanced against us, preceded by their artillery, pouring forth a destructive fire. Though Napoleon saw clearly the real state of things, he endeavoured to rally the fugitives around the battalions of the Guard that still continued in square. With a calm demeanour, but despairing mind, he stood firm under a shower of balls, endeavouring to rally his infantry and oppose an obstacle to the rush of the two victorious armies. He now mounted an ill-trained gray horse, that plunged as the balls and bullets rattled around. He bid his page, Gudin, bring him another, and he mounted in a mood that would have led him to bless the blow that would have laid him low forever.

The English and Prussian infantry continuing to approach, the squares of the Guards which had at first resisted the cavalry were now obliged to retrograde, impelled by the enemy and hurried along by the crowd of fugitives. Our army, which had shown superhuman courage during the day, fell now into that dejection that succeeds violent emotions. Distrusting their commanders, feeling no confidence in any one but Napoleon, whom the darkness, unfortunately, prevented them from seeing, our men called on their Emperor, sought him, and, not finding him, fancied he was dead, and abandoned themselves to despair. "He is wounded," said some; "he is dead," cried others, and, giving way to their imaginations, they fled in all directions, asserting that they were betrayed, and that since Napoleon was dead nothing more was to be hoped for in the world. Had one corps remained entire that could have rallied them, told them how matters stood, or shown them Napoleon alive, they would have stopped, still ready to fight and die. But all were taking flight, and four or five squares of Guards amidst those 150,000 victorious enemies were no more than a few rocks, whose tops, rising above the sea, are dashed by its angry waters. These squares, hidden by the masses of the enemy, are not perceived by the main body of the army that fled along the Charleroy road. There they found the artillery leading their empty wagons, all their ammunition being consumed. The confusion increased, and the Charleroy road soon became a chaos of tumult and terror. The historian has now but a few sublime acts of despair to relate, which he will record to the eternal honour of those martyrs to their country's glory, and to the shame of those who so causelessly lavished such torrents of human blood.

The debris of the battalions of the Guards were driven pell-mell into the valley, where they still fought without yielding. Now were heard those words that shall live for ages, and which some attribute to General Cambronne, and others to Colonel Michel:—"The Guard dies, but yields not." Cambronne fell almost mortally wounded, and remained lying on the ground, for he would not allow his men to leave their ranks to bear him away. The second battalion of the 3d Grenadiers, reduced from five to three hundred men, remained in the valley with their comrades lying lifeless

beneath their feet, and hundreds of slaughtered horsemen dead before them, but they still continue the combat and refuse to surrender. Closing their ranks as they are thinned, they await a last attack, and now, assailed on four sides at once, they discharge a fearful volley that brings down hundreds of cavalry. The enemy, exasperated, brought up their artillery, and discharged volley after volley in rapid succession on the four angles of the square. The angles of this living citadel were beaten down, the square became more compressed, presenting an irregular but firmly resisting outline. The square extended its lines, in order to occupy more space and protect the wounded who had taken refuge in the centre. These brave men stood another charge firmly, bringing down the enemy in their turn. Too few now to remain in square, they took advantage of a short respite to form into a triangle turned toward the enemy, so that in retrograding they could save those who had taken refuge behind their bayonets. They are again attacked. "We will not yield," cried these valiant men, now reduced to one hundred and fifty. Then, discharging their muskets for the last time, they all rushed on the cavalry that were pursuing them so fiercely, and with their bayonets killed both men and horses until they sank in this last sublime outburst of heroism. Admirable devotedness, unsurpassed in the records of history!

Ney put a worthy termination to this day, which God had granted him to expiate his faults by a display of unexampled heroism. He was the last that descended from the plateau of Mont Saint-Jean, and on his route he met what were left of Durutte's division, beating a retreat. The noble remnant of this division, consisting of some hundreds of men of the 95th, under Rullière, the commander of the battalion, was now retreating under arms. General Durutte had advanced some steps to seek a road, when Ney, bare-headed, his broken sword in his hand, and his clothes torn, seeing a handful of armed men, ran forward to lead them against the enemy. "Come, my friends," he said, "come and see how a marshal of France can die." These brave men, excited by his very appearance, wheeled round and rushed in despair on the Prussian column that was pursuing them. They slaughtered numbers, but were soon overpowered, and scarcely two hundred escaped death. Rullière, who commanded the battalion, broke the flag-staff, hid the eagle beneath his coat, and followed Ney, who was now unhorsed for the fifth time, but still unwounded. The illustrious marshal retired on foot until a subaltern cavalry officer gave him his horse, and then proceeded to join the main body of the army, sheltered by the darkness, which at length hung like a funeral pall over the battle-field on which 60,000 French, English, and Prussians were lying dead or wounded.

In the midst of this horrid scene, our soldiers fled in confusion, seeking the man they still idolized, though he was the principal cause of their misfortunes; but they continued to call for Napoleon, till, believing him dead, they hurried along the faster. It was wonderful that he had not fallen; but Providence had reserved for him, as for Ney, an end more

fruitful in admonition for others! After having braved a thousand deaths, he retired into the square of the first regiment of grenadiers commanded by Martenot. He marched in this way pell-mell with a number of wounded, in the midst of his old grenadiers, who were part of the charge confided to their loyalty, and determined not to allow him to be torn from them; even on that day of woe, they did not despair of the fate of their country, as long as their old commander lived.

As for him, he had lost all hope. With sombre, but calm countenance, he rode in the centre of the square, his far-seeing gaze probing futurity, and seeing that more than a battle had been lost that day! He only interrupted these gloomy meditations to inquire his lieutenants, some of whom were among the wounded near him. Nobody knew what had become of Ney. It was known that Frim, Cambronne, Lobau, DuRoi, and others were wounded, and great anxiety was felt for them, as the Prussians were accustomed to kill all who fell into their hands. Though the English did not behave during this event all the humanity that should be practiced by civilized nations, still, to do them justice, they alone showed any respect for the wounded. They had succoured and respected Cambronne when he was grievously wounded. In the square, in whose centre Napoleon had sought refuge, was so stupefied that the news spread almost without speaking. Napoleon, who sometimes addressed a few words to the major general, or to his brother Jerome, who was still beside him. Sometimes, when not annoyed by the Prussian squadrons, the square halted, and the side that was attacked led then the sad and silent march was resumed, disturbed occasionally by the terror of fugitives that swept by, or by the cavalry of the enemy. They thus arrived at Genappe about eleven at night. The bridge of this little town was so encumbered by the wagons of the artillery that the passage was completely blocked. It was fortunately not difficult to ford the Thy, which flowed past Genappe, and all, stepping into the stream, crossed to the opposite bank. This was an advantage for the fugitives, who could easily cross the little stream singly, which the enemy marching in corps d'armée could not do.

At Genappe Napoleon left the square of the Guard where he had taken refuge. The other squares, being encumbered by wounded and fugitives, had been broken up. From the time of their arrival at Genappe, each sought his own safety as best he could. The artillery not being able to preserve their guns, and the traces and led off the horses, which were of more importance. Two hundred pieces of cannon were thus left to the enemy, but not one of them had been taken during the battle. It was very strange that we lost but one standard, Urban, sub-officer of banners having recovered that of the 45th, one of the twelve from D'Erlon's corps. The wounded alone were made prisoners.

This fatal day cost us more than 25,000 men, counting the 6000 or 6500 wounded who fell into the hands of the English. The loss of the English was pretty nearly the same as ours. The Prussians lost from 8000 to 10,000 men.

The allies had thus lost more than 30,000 men; but they had not lost the victory, as we had. The Duke of Wellington and Marshal Blücher met between La Belle Alliance and Planchenois, where, as they embraced, they congratulated each other on the immense success they had achieved. And they had reason to do so; for the one by his indomitable firmness, and the other by his ardour in recommencing the struggle, had assured the triumph of Europe over France, and made full reparation for the error committed in fighting in advance of the forest of Soignes. Having allowed a little time for the expression of a very natural exultation, Blücher, whose army had not suffered as much as the English, and whose cavalry was intact, undertook the pursuit, which was well suited to the rage the Prussians felt against us. On this night they committed outrages disgraceful to their nation, and, if local traditions may be believed, they assassinated General Duhesme, who fell wounded into their hands.

If the Prussian cavalry had not suffered from the moral fatigue of the combat, they had from the physical weariness of the march, and were obliged to stop at Dyle. Our soldiers were, consequently, able to reach the Sambre, and cross it either at Châtelet, Charleroy, or Marchiennes-au-Pont. Our wounded and fugitives were everywhere received by the Belgians as fellow-countrymen. The year 1814 had inspired them with deep hatred against the Prussians, and awakened all their French sympathies. They participated in the grief of our defeat, and sheltered all the French soldiers who sought an asylum in their country.

The obstruction was very great at Charleroy, but less than at Genappe; the Gérard division, commanded by Colonel Matis, and which had been left in the rear, protected the passage. Napoleon stopped a few moments at Charleroy with the major-general and his brother Jerome to despatch some orders. He sent an officer to Marshal Grouchy to inform him verbally of the sad events of the 18th and to order him to retire to Namur. He gave the command of the army to his brother Jerome, leaving him Marshal Soult as major-general, and recommended both to collect our scattered forces as quickly as possible and lead them to Laon. He preceded them thither himself, to collect all the resources that were possible after so great a catastrophe. He first went to Philippeville, accompanied by about twenty officers belonging to the different corps of the army.

In beholding so fearful a disaster succeeding the brilliant victory achieved two days before, it will naturally be demanded what had become of Marshal Grouchy and of the 34,000 men intrusted to him by Napoleon. We have seen how this marshal had lost half the day on the 17th, seeking the Prussians where they were not, and neglecting to send forward his infantry, that, having arrived at Gembloux at an early hour, might have been on the morning of the 18th on the track of the Prussians. Still the evil might have been repaired, and even changed into a great advantage, had the 18th been employed as it ought. When the marshal arrived at Gembloux he had an idea of the route the Prussians had taken, and saw that they were not thinking of regaining the Rhine through Liege, but of joining the English,

either in front or rear of the Soignes forest. He could not be ignorant that his true mission was to prevent the Prussians from recovering the effects of their defeat, and above all to hinder their joining the English. He could have had no doubt concerning this second part of his orders, and the more important of the two, since, when writing to Napoleon in the evening, he promised to do all in his power to keep Blücher and the Duke of Wellington apart. If such were his intentions, he ought to have left, at the very latest, at four on the morning of the 18th, which he might easily have done, as his infantry had marched but two leagues and a half on the previous day. But, as we have seen, he had not given Vandamme orders to leave until six, nor to Gérard until seven. He had even sent some of his cavalry to Wavre, and some to Liege, from a lingering faith in the false ideas of the day before. Whatever his object might have been, it was a serious fault to set out so late, when he had to pursue a vanquished enemy, and to keep them in view that they might not attack Napoleon. By a still more unpardonable negligence, if that were possible, provisions, so easily attainable in that rich country, had not been provided beforehand, which delayed the troops still longer. Consequently, though Vandamme had received orders to depart at six, and Gérard at seven, the former had not been able to leave until eight, nor the latter until nine. It was ten when the last of the infantry set out. Troops advancing along a single road studded with numerous villages, which constantly rendered the passage so narrow that it was difficult to pass,—the ground, moreover, broken up by the rain and the march of the Prussians,—could advance but slowly, and were obliged to make long halts. Vandamme's troops, that were in front, stopped several times;* especially after having traversed Sart-à-Valhain, they paused for a long time at Nil-Saint-Vincent. These pauses compelled Gérard's corps to do the same, and thus the whole column stood still. These delays were not occasioned alone by the difficulty of great numbers advancing along the same road, but from the vacillations of Marshal Grouchy, who, though he had no doubt that the Prussians had fallen back on Wavre, still felt inclined to believe that some had gone to Liege. But how insignificant must have been the number of those who had taken that route! It was much to be wished that all had gone thither and remained there, as they would so have been put beyond the possibility of influencing future events, at least those that were about to decide the fate of France.

At half-past eleven in the morning, Vandamme's corps arrived at Nil-Saint-Vincent, and Gérard's at Sart-à-Valhain; that is, the first had advanced three leagues in three hours and a half, and the second two in two hours and a half. Was that the pace at which to pursue a vanquished foe? Whilst the troops were advancing, Grouchy himself stopped at Sart-à-Valhain to breakfast. Several of his generals were with him; Gérard commanding the fourth corps, Vandamme the third, Valazé the engineers, and Baltus the artillery. Sud-

* This is testified by General Berthézène in his Memoirs.

denly they heard loud and distant detonations on the left, in the direction of Mont Saint-Jean. The noise continued to increase. There was no longer any doubt; it was Napoleon, who, having fought his first battle with the Prussians, was now fighting the second against the English in advance of the forest of Soignes. All present exclaimed unanimously that they must hasten in the direction whence the sound of the cannon proceeded. General Gérard, the most influential man present, both on account of his character and the glory he had acquired in the late campaigns, rose and said quickly to Marshal Grouchy, who was at breakfast, "Let us join the Emperor." General Gérard, a man of refinement and even gentleness in private life, was very impetuous in war, and expressed his opinion with a vehemence that was not likely to cause it to be well received. Marshal Grouchy had in Gérard and Vandamme two lieutenants who considered themselves much superior to their commander, and their opinion was constantly manifested in their remarks. The marshal's susceptibility was hurt, and he took in bad part advice that was given very unceremoniously. General Gérard's natural excitability was increased by conviction and patriotism, to which each fresh peal of cannon added but new fuel, and all the generals present, with the exception of him who commanded the artillery, supported his advice. There would have been an end put to all discussion had the officer whom Napoleon had sent to the marshal at ten o'clock on the previous evening arrived. But he did not, as Marshal Grouchy frequently repeated during his life, and we must give credit to what he said, for he could not otherwise have had any other motive for hesitation. The fate of this officer has never been ascertained, and whether he was captured or whether he deserted to the enemy is alike unknown. However that may be, Marshal Grouchy had left for his guidance only the general verbal instructions he had received from Napoleon on the morning of the 17th, when he told him to pursue the Prussians, but to keep in communication with him, so that he might not allow the Prussians to join the English. These directions were so necessary a consequence of the situation, that had they not been given, either verbally or in writing, they might have been very easily divined, since it would be difficult to suppose that our right wing could be separated from us for any other purpose than to watch the Prussians and take up a position between them and the English. When the roar of Napoleon's cannon was heard, the safest course would have been to advance toward him as a support, and prevent the Prussians from interfering with his operations against the English army.

Marshal Grouchy was as brave of heart and as polished in manner as an ancient *gentilhomme* of France, but he was susceptible and narrow-minded, and concealed a more than ordinary obstinacy beneath a courtly manner. He was offended at the tone assumed by his lieutenants, and said rather sharply that their advice was probably very good, but not in accordance with his instructions, which enjoined him to pursue the Prussians, not to look after the English; that in all probability the Prussians were at Wavre, whither they should be fol-

lowed, without any reference to what was going on at Mont Saint-Jean; and that, in any case, Napoleon was a commander who would not bear dictation or suggestion. General Gérard replied that there was no question of dictation or suggestion with regard to Napoleon's orders, but merely of understanding them; that when he sent his right wing to pursue the Prussians, and ordered that it should keep in constant communication with him, it was evident that he wished to keep the Prussians at a distance and his right wing near, so as to be able to summon it to his aid if necessary; that at this moment they could not be certain of where the Prussians were, but that they must be either advancing by Wavre to Brussels, or skirting the forest of Soignes to join the English, and in either case it would be better to advance to the scene of action; for if the Prussians were at Brussels, Grouchy could aid Napoleon in destroying the unsupported British army, or if the Prussians had joined the English, he would only be carrying out Napoleon's instructions. This argument was unanswerable, and is a proof of General Gérard's great military sagacity. But, unfortunately, Marshal Grouchy did not profit by the sage but so strongly expressed counsel that was given him. He only replied by enumerating the difficulties that would prevent its execution. What was the distance, he asked, from where they were to Mont Saint-Jean, or to the Chapel of Saint-Lambert, or to Planchenois? How much time would it take to get there? Could they be able to take the artillery with them? These were the objections he made to going to the scene of action. The owner of the chateau where Grouchy was breakfasting said that the battle-field was at about a distance of between three and four leagues, and that they could reach it in less than four hours. A guide, who had been long in the French service, promised to lead the army to Mont Saint-Jean in two hours and a half, or perhaps less. General Baltus, who alone sided with Grouchy, expressed some anxiety about the removal of the artillery. General Valard, commanding the engineers, assured him that the sappers would remove every obstacle. General Gérard said it would be sufficient if they could bring a few pieces of cannon and some wagons of ammunition, the rest would be done by the carabines and bayonets of his infantry, that the very appearance of the troops, even at a distance, would suffice to draw off a portion of the Prussian forces, and extricate the Emperor if he were in difficulty, or, if not, assist in completing his victory. Meantime the roar of the cannon became louder, the discussion grew warmer, and even the private soldiers caught up the tone,—but with this difference, that among them there was no difference of opinion: all asked why they were not led to the battle-field, why their courage was left unemployed when perhaps their comrades needed that of either to resist or pursue the enemy. Every detonation excited their enthusiasm, and evoked fresh cries of impatience from these intelligent and heroic men. The enthusiasm of the soldiery should, no doubt, be regarded with a certain amount of distrust, and Napoleon himself has said that the voice of the soldiery, when listened to, has much power

commit as many errors as Governments have done when they yielded to the impulses of the multitude. This assertion is equivalent to saying that all kinds of enthusiasm should excite distrust. But in the case under consideration the dictates of reason were in accordance with the instinct of the masses. It was now half-past eleven, and had Grouchy's troops set out at noon, at the latest, they would have arrived, as our sad recital has shown, quite early enough to be of service. Vandamme's corps, the most in advance, was at Nil-Saint-Vincent, a short league from Sart-a-Vallain, which Gérard's troops had reached. Exelmans' dragoons had got as far as the Dyle. From Nil-Saint-Vincent the troops could advance to the bridge of Moustier, which, through an oversight favourable to us, the enemy had left unguarded,—which, indeed, was very natural, for, seeing themselves pursued in the direction of Wavre, they only thought of occupying the bridges in the immediate vicinity of Wavre itself. The bridge of Moustier being passed, the noise of the cannon alone would have sufficed to guide them to Maransart, opposite to Planchenois, and situated on the side of the ravine through which the Lasne flowed, and where Lobau was at the moment engaged with Bulow. The fresh arrivals would have then been placed in the rear of the Prussians, whom they would infallibly have driven into the ravine and destroyed, for there was no means of extricating themselves but by repassing the wood through which they had advanced with so much difficulty. The distance from Nil-Saint-Vincent is not more than five leagues.

Soldiers eager to engage would certainly have marched this distance in four or five hours; and the proof is, that Vandamme's corps accomplished the distance between Gembloux and La Baraque—about the same space as from Nil-Saint-Vincent to Maransart—between the hours of eight in the morning and two in the afternoon, spite of many halts, especially one more than an hour long at Nil-Saint-Vincent, which is to say that Vandamme made the march in less than five hours. We must add that the roads from Gembloux to Baraque had been broken up by the passage of the Prussian troops, whilst the cross-roads to Maransart were, indeed, in excellent condition. The inhabitants of the locality said it would require three hours and a half, or four at the utmost, to accomplish this march. Let us allow five, which is a great deal for such enthusiastic troops, and, supposing they set out at noon, they would arrive at five in the afternoon. Gérard's corps would arrive an hour later, that is, at six, but the very sight of Vandamme's corps would have produced the desired effect, which Gérard's would only have to complete. Up to five o'clock, as we have seen, Bulow's corps had only exchanged a few thrusts with Domon's and Subervie's cavalry. It was half-past five before he was seriously engaged with Lobau. At six he was engaged with the Young Guard; at seven with the Old. Nothing was decided at half-past seven. There were, therefore, from six to seven hours during which the arrival of these expected troops might have been of use. We may even add, that had they arrived on

the scene of action at six o'clock, they would have produced a greater effect than had they arrived at five, as they would have found Bulow engaged, and would have destroyed him by forcing his troops into the current of the Lasne stream. What an effect this spectacle would have produced on our soldiers, what an effect on the English, and what an advantage might not have been derived from the twenty-three battalions of the Guards, thus rendered disposable, and that might have simultaneously attacked the exhausted British army!

In truth, Marshal Grouchy could not divine all the good he might have effected on this occasion, for he had been too remiss in his surveillance of the Prussians to discover their plans. But the Gérard dilemma still existed: either the Prussians had advanced toward Napoleon, in which case his orders to pursue them and keep in communication with the Emperor would be carried out by advancing to the right; or the Prussians had gone to Brussels, and neglecting them would have been of no consequence, as the main object—the destruction of the British army—would have been attained.

But the wretched marshal would not listen to any arguments, and, despite the displeasure of his lieutenants and the anger of General Gérard, he continued to advance to Wavre.

Vandamme's and Gérard's corps, preceded by Exelmans' cavalry, pursued their march, and Vandamme's arrived at a place called La Baraque before two o'clock. Greater certainty was gained as they advanced; through the openings of the woods they could see what was going on on the other side of the Dyle, and Prussian troops were seen advancing toward Mont Saint-Jean. General Berthezène, who commanded one of Vandamme's divisions, reported this to Grouchy, but without inducing him to change his plans. He might now have adopted a mode of conduct indicated by the circumstances themselves, and which would have had the happiest results, though not so great as would have been obtained by marching directly to Maransart. It was evident that, by continuing to advance toward Wavre, they would find the Prussians firmly established behind the Dyle, and to reach them it would be necessary to force this river at Wavre, where the passage was most difficult, and where it would cost lives that it was most important should be spared. It would therefore be better to cross the Dyle in the vicinity where they were, by the badly defended bridges of Limel or Limelette, which could easily be seized. Thus, freed from all obstacles, they would have found themselves within sight of the Prussians and free to follow them in any direction. It would certainly have been better to have effected this passage in the morning, as Grouchy would thus have fulfilled the orders he had received to follow the Prussians and keep in communication with headquarters; and even at two o'clock this movement would have produced the desired effect. The Prussians would have been surprised *en marche*, Grouchy could have fallen perpendicularly on their left flank, which would have compensated for his inferiority in numbers, and, at the very least, he might have arrested Perch I. and Ziethen's corps, which, as we

have seen, caused the greater part of our disaster. Marshal Grouchy was not in the least influenced by these considerations, and, though he was told that Prussian troops were advancing in the direction whence the cannonade proceeded, he still continued to march toward Wavre, where he arrived at four o'clock. The aspect of things at this spot was not calculated to afford much satisfaction to a military man of sound judgment. Thielmann's corps of 27,000 or 28,000 men was firmly established at Wavre, where it could keep an army of double or treble the number in check for an entire day. In such a case, what was to be done? To attack Wavre would be to run the risk of uselessly sacrificing a number of lives, and that without a certainty of success, and, meanwhile, 60,000 Prussians would have had time to advance to Mont Saint-Jean. Did Grouchy make no movement, he would only appear as a spectator at a decisive action, without having obeyed any of the instructions he had received. The best thing that could be done, then, was to turn back and seize the bridges of Limel and Limelette, which he had neglected to do in passing, and which would offer less resistance than that at Wavre. General Gérard represented this to Marshal Grouchy, who persisted in his blindness, and, having the Prussians now before him at Wavre, concluded that, as he had been ordered to pursue them, it was his duty to attack when he found them. History probably does not furnish another instance of such mental blindness.

At this moment arrived the Polish officer Zenovicz, who should have left La Belle Alliance at half-past ten, but had been detained an hour longer through Marshal Soult's fault, and who, to avoid being captured, had retrograded to Quatre-Bras, whence he had proceeded to Sombreffe, from Sombreffe to Gembloux, and from Gembloux to Wavre, where, in consequence of Marshal Soult's dilatoriness, he had not arrived until four o'clock. He brought the despatch of which we have already spoken, and which, unfortunately, was most ambiguous.

Having announced that the Prussians had appeared in the direction of Wavre, the major-general added, "The Emperor bids me inform you that he is about to attack the British army, which has taken up its position at Waterloo, near the forest of Soignes; and His Majesty desires you to advance to Wavre, in order to be near us, support our operations, and keep up a communication with us; driving before you the corps of the Prussian army, which have taken that direction, and must have stopped at Wavre, whither you are to hasten as quickly as possible. You will send a few corps of light troops to follow the enemy's columns on your right, observe their movements, and pick up the stragglers. Inform me immediately of your arrangements and your march, as also of any information you may have got concerning the enemy, and do not neglect to keep up communications with us. The Emperor wishes to hear from you constantly."

This deplorably ambiguous despatch, interpreted in its true sense and according to the position of affairs, could only mean that, instead of following the Liege road, where the Prussians had been sought for a short time,

Grouchy should turn toward Brussels, known with certainty that the was taken that direction, which the despatch mentioned under the general name of Wavre did not, certainly, mean that Wavre was the terminus of the march, since these words "in order to be near us to support our operations" accompanied with the express recommendation repeated twice, of keeping up a communication with head-quarters, clearly show the design of making Grouchy's corps a principal action. In any case, the Zenovicz's verbal commentary would all doubt. Napoleon, as we have seen, looking to the horizon and turning to the left, had said to him, "Grouchy is marching in that direction; it is from that quarter he is to hasten to him, and do not leave him till he is ready to debouch on our line of battle."

The man must certainly be mental who could not understand such orders, evident that Wavre was only a general position, signifying the direction of the opposition to that of Liege, and the point to which Grouchy was to tend was in accordance with existing circumstances, by Napoleon's words and gestures, and the embassy officer Zenovicz. Grouchy could only the written and verbal order, that he advance to Wavre itself. "I fear," he said to his lieutenants, "in coming to Wavre, General Gérard's excitement knew no bounds, and was manifested both in words and in actions. 'I told you,' he said to Grouchy, 'if we were ruined we should have it for you for it.' This was followed by many other remarks, and Adjutant Zenovicz, that by his presence he might not matters worse. Marshal Grouchy persisted in his opinion, and, as if to carry out his intentions still more rigidly, he ordered an attack to be made on Wavre."

Vandamme's corps was ordered to make the attack,—an order that was immediately obeyed. But the Prussians had taken their position so that all our efforts were vain. Habert's division rushed on the bridge, covered it with the dead bodies of soldiers, but could not succeed in dislodging the enemy's position. The 4th corps, little in the rear of Vandamme's, was ordered, its commander, General Gérard, a presentiment that at that moment the army was being defeated for want of a timely advance, rushed in despair on the mill of Wavre, where there was a bridge a little higher than that at Wavre. The illustrious general's advice would have saved France, had it been followed, sought death, and nearly died. A ball passed through his body, he fell, and the bridge was not carried.

Louder and Louder pealed the cannon of Waterloo, and all felt the conviction that we were uselessly sacrificing valuable lives in a position that it was both useless and impossible to force, whilst had they passed Limel and the Limelette bridges they have crossed the river with ease long earlier and brought decisive aid to the body of the army. Three times, during the day, might Grouchy have saved France by leaving Gembloux at four in the afternoon and crossing the Dyle, when he should

cessity have seen and followed the Prussian movements; next by deciding at noon to advance from Sart-a-Valhain to Maransart, by which he should have come up at five, or at the least at six, on Bulow's rear; and again by crossing the Limel and Limelette bridges at two o'clock, when Prussian columns were seen proceeding to Mont Saint-Jean, by which he could at least have kept back Pirch and Zieten; but on each occasion the commander of the right wing closed his eyes to what was so evident! It is plain that Providence had condemned us, and that Grouchy was the instrument chosen for our punishment! But the wretched man, for so we must always call him, acted in perfect good faith. His greatest fault was that he was more inclined to estimate the advice of his lieutenants by the manner in which it was given than by its essential value.

About six in the evening his eyes were unsealed. The officer who had left at one o'clock, after Bulow's letter had been intercepted, brought a fresh despatch explanatory of the former, proving that Wavre was not a particular but a general designation, that the position of the main body of the French army was the point to be kept in view, with which Grouchy was to keep in communication, and advance on the rear of the Prussians, who would thus be destroyed between two fires.

The major-general had at length succeeded in expressing himself clearly, and in making Grouchy, spite of his obtuseness, perceive his meaning. The marshal doubted no longer, but the time when he could be of use was passed.

Napoleon had been overcome, and Gérard, with numbers of valiant men, had fallen before Wavre without any advantage to the army or to France. Marshal Grouchy gave immediate orders to seize on the Limel and Limelette bridges. Pajol's light cavalry and Teste's division were in the rear, having been sent in pursuit of the Prussians in the direction of Liège, and had now returned, having marched nearly twelve leagues during the day, a proof that five or six might have been accomplished in half that time. The marshal ordered them to seize the Limel bridge, which was easily done, as it was held only by a few of the Prussian rear-guard. But at the time that this bridge was taken the sound of the cannon had ceased, and the stillness of death reigned over the surrounding country. Grouchy consoled himself by supposing that the battle of Waterloo had been gained, and he said so to his lieutenants. He had need of such consolation, as may easily be believed, but it was a sentiment that did more honour to his heart than to his head!

But he was alone in thinking thus. General Gérard, apparently mortally wounded, and resigned to die, had now but one thought more painful than his wound, and that was that France had been obliged to yield. It was a sad night. From Wavre to Limel all were up at dawn on the following morning, anxious to hear what had occurred on the previous day, for an ominous silence reigned over all the plain, especially in the direction of Mont Saint-Jean. At last the officer who had been sent from Charleroy at eleven the night before arrived, announced the loss of the battle, and ordered the marshal to retreat to Namur. Grouchy, whose countenance expressed the

consternation of an honest man who had made a mistake and sought to justify himself, said to his lieutenants, who were too sad to be angry, "Gentlemen, when you will have learned my instructions you will see that I was justified in acting as I did." They did not reply: it was no time to dispute. The point to be considered was how to extricate themselves from their perilous position, separated as they were from the wreck of the French army by two victorious adverse armies. The commander of our right wing, with the forces under his command, immediately advanced by the Mont Saint-Guibert and Namur road, ordering Vandamme's and Gérard's corps to march to the same point by Gembloux. But what would be the consequence if these thirty-four thousand men should meet the whole or part of Blücher's and Wellington's 150,000 victorious soldiers?

Such were the events on both scenes of action on that fatal day, June 18, 1815,—events which the English call the battle of Waterloo, because their bulletin was dated from that village; the Prussians, the battle of La Belle Alliance, because it was there that they fought; Napoleon, the battle of Mont Saint-Jean, because it was on this plateau that the French army performed such prodigies of valour; and which the historian calls the battle of Waterloo, as custom, from whose decision there is no appeal, has named it so. The faults and merits of this day can be easily appreciated by any one who, freeing his mind from prejudice, knows how to profit by the assistance of common sense.

We have seen the motives which induced Napoleon to assume the offensive against re-combined Europe; and it cannot be denied that his reasons were weighty. The column invading the east under Prince Schwarzenberg, and that approaching the north under the Duke of Wellington and Marshal Blücher, were more than one hundred leagues asunder, and the latter was a month in advance of the other. Nothing could be simpler than to take advantage of their separation both in time and space, for to wait their arrival, and allow them to unite, would be to permit them to invade the fairest provinces of France, after having deprived these provinces of their bravest men, who were draughted into the mobilized National Guards. There was also the danger of encountering the immense mass of five hundred thousand men, and though Napoleon would leave Paris well defended in his rear with 250,000 active troops, still it would be running a very great risk to allow these formidable forces to combine, when they might be encountered separately. Besides, assuming the offensive at first did not exclude the possibility of recurring to the defensive afterward. By making an attempt to repel the invasion, even if unsuccessful, the provinces would be deprived of the right to complain, even if they were afterward abandoned to the enemy; and had not the campaign opened with so fearful a disaster, a transition could easily have been made from the offensive to the defensive, as is daily done by generals far inferior to Napoleon.

It was, consequently, a very wise plan, one that posterity could not blame, to seek to profit by the distance both in time and place of the

two invading armies, endeavouring to defeat that on the north before the arrival of the other coming from the east. Future ages will certainly be more inclined to admire than blame that profound sagacity which saw that though it was the interest of the Prussians and the English to combine their forces, still as they advanced from different points, the one coming from Brussels, the other from Liege, there would be some spot where the connection would be weak, and where it would be possible to interpose an army between them, that, after separating, could encounter them singly. Napoleon, endowed with the twofold sagacity of genius and unequalled experience, saw this, and, deceiving the enemy by the most skillful manœuvres, succeeded in concentrating his *corps d'armée* in five or six days, some coming from Metz, some from Paris and Lisle, so that on the evening of the 14th of June 124,000 men and 300 pieces of cannon had reached the forest of Beaumont without the knowledge of the Prussians, whose advanced posts were only two leagues distant. On the morning of the 15th Napoleon had crossed the wooded ground that concealed him from the enemy, seized Charleroy within view of both English and Prussians, and on the evening of the same day had taken up his position between the allied armies, surprised and confounded at his sudden appearance. In the whole annals of warfare we find no record of a manœuvre executed with so much security, precision, and success.

There is but one thing to be regretted with regard to this day,—that Ney, the daring Ney, was wanting in boldness at Quatre-Bras, and did not seize this position, by which the English and Prussians would have been effectually separated. But they were, in point of fact, sufficiently separated, as the Prussians, attacked by Napoleon, would be obliged to fight unaided by the English, and Quatre-Bras could have been seized on the morrow, though it had not been on the eve.

Up to this time the result was equal to the skill with which the arrangements had been made. The first thing to be done on the 15th was to fight the Prussians who were within reach, and, when they were beaten, to fall on the English. Was it absolutely necessary that this should be done in the morning rather than in the afternoon? In politics one should never hurry, but in war we cannot act with too much expedition, as the sooner the result is obtained the sooner are we secured against the caprices of fortune. But in war, more than under any other circumstances, there are material necessities which must be obeyed. And in the present instance there was a necessity which could not be evaded; and that was the arrival of the army in line. Notwithstanding the rapidity of the march on the previous day, the 6th corps, the Guards, the cuirassiers, and the parks had not yet crossed the Sambre, Gérard had only reached it, and D'Erlon had advanced but one league beyond. Time would also be required to transport the troops to the scene of action at Fleurus, and during their march Napoleon would have time to collect the reports of his vanguards, and be assured of what his genius had divined. In accordance with these peremptory reasons, he fought the battle of Ligny in the afternoon rather than in the

morning, and its success was as advantage at one part of the day as it would be the other, and as in June the day close until nine o'clock, the opposers would have a abundant time between nine to slaughter each other and see victory.

As for the battle itself, nobody could say that its plan and execution were consummate general. The Prussians taken up their position at the village of Amand and at Ligny, in order to cut the high-road from Namur to Brussels, of communication with the English, rear being thus turned to the French at Quatre-Bras, Napoleon attacked them boldly in front, at Ligny and Safford, ordering Ney to seize Quatre-Bras, as possible and then send one of his divisions to attack the Prussian rear. Half of the army would have been made prize of this order being executed; but Ney, all our generals, had begun to fear the enemy, but fortune, and disturbed by advice, spent the day in doubts, hesitating during which he could have taken Quatre-Bras from the few thousand men that it, attacked the position vigorously propitious time was past, that is, adverse forces were quadrupled, wishing to repair his error, he sent D'Erlon, whom Napoleon had already by which this general was rendered aid either, and, without conquering it, prevented Napoleon from completing the throw of the Prussians. Napoleon deprived of the corps with which he had to attack the enemy's rear, was not disconcerted, but, devising a new plan, he cut the ground itself, he cut the Prussians which he had not been able to attack in rear, with his Guard, above Ligny, a brilliant and important victory. Prussians, thanks to D'Erlon's manœuvres, were only defeated of being utterly destroyed, still the discomfited that a strong detachment have kept them in check while the engagement was being fought with them. Though it was through Ney's fault opportunity of repulsing the English he nevertheless displayed a heroic opposition to their efforts to communicate Prussians, and prevented them from their position on the high-road between Brussels and Namur: he arrested their progress, compelled them to retreat on the Sambre. Napoleon's plan, notwithstanding the incidental to war, the more frequent time because of the general execution been as successful on the 16th as on the 15th since the Prussians had been beaten in battle, and the English, checked in engagement, were obliged to retreat in different directions, leaving the entire French still between them, and were on the being compelled to accept battle, as their allies, on the morrow or next day.

It would not be possible to advance on the morning of the 17th which he had been engaged with the enemy on the previous evening, and who, supping, had bivouacked until the 17th.

bodies. Napoleon certainly lost as little time as possible; he sent forward Lobau, whose men had not been engaged, the Guard, of which only a part had fought, and the cuirassiers, who had not drawn a sword; he left Vandamme and Gérard, the fatigued victors of the Prussians, to watch the conquered enemy, and advanced himself, with his centre, toward Marshal Ney, that they might together combat the British army. But in order that these troops should defile, it was indispensable that Ney, who now formed the head of the column, should have defiled at Quatre-Bras; but Ney, as apprehensive on the 17th as he had been on the 16th, had not stirred, thinking he had the whole English army before him. His anxiety did not cease until he was joined by Napoleon and Lobau, with the Guards and cuirassiers, and it was only then, at half-past eleven, that he set out. Thus the morning was lost, partly because of the weariness of the troops, and partly because of Ney's tardiness, and in the afternoon because of a fearful storm that paralyzed both armies; for when Nature puts forth her power she annihilates that of man, however great it may be. But was time the most important consideration on this day? Certainly not. Having beaten the Prussians, it was necessary to beat the English, and that as quickly as possible. But they could not be beaten without being met, which depended on the Duke of Wellington, and not on Napoleon. We were only separated by half a day's march from the English, but we could not expect to outstrip them in speed. If they wished to fight, we should find them, without hurrying ourselves, in advance of the forest of Soignes; and if they did not, they would place the forest between them and us, which would render a battle impossible. Would they fight? Napoleon most ardently desired it, as it would be impossible for him to follow them to Brussels, when his presence would be so necessary in Champagne, and to leave them unconquered would overturn all his plans. But, whatever might be his wishes, he could not anticipate the arrival of the English at the entrance of the forest of Soignes, and thus compel them to fight. His hopes, consequently, rested solely on Blücher's impetuosity and the Duke of Wellington's ambition, and not on a rapid march, rendered more laborious by the weariness of his troops, by Ney's hesitation, and by the violence of the storm, whilst the proximity of the forest of Soignes would have rendered it fruitless.

Time, consequently, was not the most important consideration on the 17th. But if no fault had been committed in the employment of time, had none been made in the disposition of the troops? The reader can judge from what has been stated. What could be more natural than that Napoleon, having conquered the Prussians, should send after them a detachment sufficiently strong to watch them, keep them in check, and prevent their joining the English, whilst he should be engaged with the latter? Would any man of common sense say that the Prussians ought to have been allowed to follow what course they pleased, pursued only by a few cavalry, who would have been merely spectators of what they might please to do, without being able to offer any

opposition? Ah! indeed, if we could suppose in the commander of our right wing a blindness unequalled in the annals of history, a blindness so great as to allow 80,000 Prussians to do just as they chose before his eyes, and not even interfere to prevent their overpowering Napoleon, the man who had before conquered them, we would be justified in condemning the use made of the right wing. But in giving Grouchy credit for no more than the instinct manifested by the private soldiers, the service on which the right wing was despatched was not only in accordance with the rules of military warfare, but a matter of necessity, and by no means calculated to deprive Napoleon of the aid of these troops, for all the contending parties being enclosed within a space of four or five leagues, within which each could hear the cannon of the other, it was not reasonable to suppose that Grouchy's 34,000 men would have strayed uselessly about, and not made their appearance on the scene of action until after a great catastrophe had occurred.

Thus, the ordinary rules of warfare, the circumstances of the case, and the simplest common sense, show that it was necessary to detach Grouchy's corps from the main body. There may be some disputes as to the significance of the instructions he received, but there is one order that cannot be contested, one that even the soldiers would have given, that the Prussians should not be lost sight of, and that he should manoeuvre in such a way as to prevent their joining the English, for everybody knew that the arranged plan was that each army should be fought separately. No matter what hypotheses may be adopted, it is evident that it was not Napoleon's will, but the state of things itself, that dictated this order, and we know that whether clearly or obscurely expressed,—and it was not Napoleon's custom to express his orders obscurely,—it was comprehended by Grouchy, since when writing to Napoleon, on the evening of the 17th, he said, "I am in pursuit of the Prussians, and shall endeavour to keep them at a distance from the English." There could, therefore, be no doubt that the commander of the right wing understood his instructions.

But from the very commencement Marshal Grouchy mistook the direction the Prussians had taken, and thought they were advancing to Wavre. This error was excusable, and would not have had any serious consequence had he acted as he ought, and sent his light cavalry to explore in the three possible directions, that is, the routes leading to Mont Saint-Guibert, Gembloux, and Namur, and his infantry along the Gembloux road which lay between. The corn-fields, trampled by the Prussians, would soon have enlightened him, and shown him that they had not advanced toward the Rhine but toward Wavre, that is, toward the English army. Though he perceived this at last, he still had a suspicion that they had gone to Namur, and it was not until very late on the first day that he directed his infantry toward Gembloux. The 17th had been passed by Napoleon on the Mont Saint-Jean road, in the manner that circumstances rendered necessary, but it had been altogether lost by Marshal Grouchy on the road to Wavre.

But all might have been repaired had Grouchy set out at four o'clock on the morning of the 18th, when he would have had seventeen hours at his disposal, to advance whither he pleased, and he was not more than four or five leagues distant from the main army. But, unfortunately, he did not issue his orders until between six and seven in the morning, and, not having made previous arrangements for the distribution of provisions, the troops did not leave until eight, nine, and ten. Still all was not lost, as five hours would have sufficed to advance to the most distant point of this theatre of action, had he followed the sound of the cannon.

Whilst the right wing was thus conducted with so little activity and decision, Napoleon was preparing to fight, with the centre and left wing, that second battle which was to decide his fate and ours. Blücher's burning patriotism and Wellington's ambition were about to give him the opportunity he so much desired, and desired so justly, since it was necessary that he should beat the English after having beaten the Prussians, that he might then hasten to meet the Austrians and Russians. The result has certainly justified the two opposing commanders, but posterity, as Napoleon said, with his wonted grandeur of expression, posterity will be less indulgent, for if fortune had not wrought in their favour that real miracle of blindness on the part of Grouchy, they would have been overwhelmed on the borders of the closely-wooded forest of Soignes, so difficult to traverse for a retreating army; whilst, had they placed that forest between them and Napoleon, they would have frustrated all his calculations and compelled him to retreat in confusion and meet the great column coming from the east. They would thus have played a sure instead of a rash and perilous game.

Be this as it may, the battle that Napoleon so much desired was certain,—a proof that genius itself often errs in the prayers it addresses to Providence. Was it necessary to fight in the early part of the day? At Waterloo as at Ligny should he have endeavoured to give battle in the morning rather than in the afternoon? Ah! yes; undoubtedly he would have done so had he known that, not Grouchy, who was so near, but 60,000 Prussians would thus have had time to arrive, and to arrive without being seen by Grouchy, though all advanced openly in the face of nature,—men, horses, and

artillery! But nobody could have anticipated such an event, and, besides, the ground being impracticable for the artillery on account of the heavy rains, Napoleon was obliged to wait for five hours to allow it to become somewhat firm. Drouot, the best and wisest of us, could never forgive himself for having advised that the battle should be deferred for six hours;* but he blamed himself without cause, for at such a season the battle of Waterloo might have commenced at eleven, when a battle of Ligny had been gained though it did not commence until three in the afternoon. It was undoubtedly of vast importance to Napoleon to prevent his cavalry and artillery—his two best arms—from being imbedded in mud. It was true that the result—that idol adored of men—has condemned the vanquished; but Drouot's advice was decisive, and posterity will not blame Napoleon for being influenced by it.

The hour being decided on, there was all the plan to be considered. It certainly was most excellent ideas, that of rushing on the weakly posted left wing of the English, and it on their centre, and thus deprive them of the Brussels road, the only practicable one through the forest of Soignes, whilst this operation, besides all its other advantages, would effectually separate the Prussians from the English. There were errors, unfortunately, committed in the execution. The Château de Goumont, on the left ought to have been attacked certainly, but it ought to have been beaten down by cannon, not attacked by men, an attempt which weakened the left wing of our army. Two details were concealed from Napoleon by the wood of Goumont, and it was greatly to be regretted that General Reille did not long sufficiently near the scene of action to prevent this useless expenditure of human life. It is probable that after the conquest of the wood the attack ought to have ceased, and Jomini's, Foy's, Ney's, and Bachelu's brave divisions moved for the attack on the plateau of Mont Saint-Jean, the principal scene of operation.

Another error in tactics was the attack of La Haye Sainte at the centre, and on the English left along the Ohain road, an attack executed by masses too unwieldy to manoeuvre before the cavalry. It seems almost incomprehensible that so skilful a tactician as he could have fallen into such an error; but it must have been too much impressed with the idea of the English stolidity, and Napoleon

* I have found the following passage in some very curious and interesting notes, written a long while since by Colonel Combes-Brassard, head of the staff of the 6th corps, (Lobau's,) and I quote it here, as an evidence of the exalted feeling of one of the most virtuous men of modern times. "General Drouot," writes General Combes-Brassard, "remained but a few days in Paris after his trial. I saw him frequently. We often spoke of the battle of Mont Saint-Jean. One day he said to me, with the air of one who wished to relieve an oppressed mind, 'The more I think of that battle, the more I consider myself as one of the causes of its being lost.' 'You, general! When did the generous devotion of a noble friendship for one's master go further than yours?' 'I shall explain, colonel. I do not mean to accuse myself of faults I have not committed, but I shall avow what I have done at my own risk and peril.

"The Emperor," he continued, "was aware of the disposition of the enemy's forces at the break of day; his plan was decided on; he intended to commence the battle at eight or nine in the morning at the latest. I observed to him that the ground was so broken up by the rain that the movements of the artillery would be very slow, an inconvenience that would be done away with by a delay of

two or three hours. The Emperor consented to make this fatal delay. Had he disregarded my advice, Waterloo would have been attacked at seven, before it was too late; the victory would have been completed at noon, and the English arriving until five, would have fallen into the hands of a victorious army. We did not commence the attack till noon, and left all the chance of success to the evening."

I thought this passage deserved to be recorded. Whilst those who had committed the most serious error rejected the responsibility attached to their errors, those who had not committed any error during the first half of Waterloo,—for it was but an error, as the whole hours long, to wait two or three hours until the ground should become firm,—accused himself of having contributed to the loss of the battle, because he had advised that it should be deferred. The event proved that this delay was a great loss, but it was not an error in judgment, for the nature of the ground was an important condition, and it effected on the offensive. It is only a brief part of the military operations a grand deal to be done, and it shows how careful one should be in giving counsel where counsel of the greatest wisdom often produces the most deplorable results.

not time to alter the disposition of the troops, for they were already in motion when we perceived what was going on, and it was too late to change the plan of attack. It was an error much to be regretted; for it ended an attempt fruitless that might have been decisive, and from the very commencement created in the minds of the combatants an impression favourable to the English and unfavourable to us.

Nothing was compromised, and Napoleon saw his cavalry charge amply avenged us on the Scotch Greys. But that fearful spectacle, that Prussian army, had already appeared on the funeral plain. Napoleon saw all the danger that this apparition threatened, and immediately made Lobau advance to the right. Could he have done any thing else or better to neutralize this new attack? Certainly not. He abandoned an engagement that was now far advanced, he should renounce those means which could alone compensate for the inferiority of his forces, and would declare himself vanquished at a time that he hoped to conquer, for the road was as free for Grouchy for Bulow, and if one traversed it why did not the other? Napoleon continued the battle, but at the same time relaxed his efforts somewhat. He ordered Ney to seize La Haye Sainte, the English *point d'appui* in the centre, and which would secure us the approach to the plateau of Mont Saint-Jean, and we should be prepared to strike the decisive blow, and at the same time he desired not to attempt any thing further until we should be able to appreciate the importance of the Prussians' attack on our right. The only thing that was to be done under the circumstances was to seize La Haye Sainte and then retreat a little.

But Ney, yielding to his impetuosity, instead of his regret for the hesitation of the previous day, rushed on the English with unrelenting vigour and seized La Haye Sainte, and, having encountered the enemy's cavalry several times during this combat, and become so closely engaged with them, he followed them on the plateau, where, seeing a numerous cavalry abandoned, he thought the decisive moment was come, brought all his cavalry to engage on this plateau, where he maintained a gigantic struggle, but inopportune, since he did not infantry to support the attack. He had uselessly expended our cavalry, who, had they been employed at a later hour, might have contributed to gain the battle.

Ney's prodigies of valour were therefore followed by a misfortune, which Napoleon, whose position, as well as his infantry, was engaged, he right, was not able to prevent. What was to be done? The only possible plan, and which Napoleon determined to adopt, was to order Ney to maintain his position on the plateau as long as he could, whilst he himself at the head of the Guard made a furious charge on the Prussians. Having dispersed these, he ordered to rally the Guard and lead them to complete the destruction of the English army.

The Prussians were met and repelled with a courage of which the Old Guards under Morand were alone capable. When Bulow was driven back and beaten between Planchenois and Ansart, Napoleon did not lose an instant,

but rallied the Guards, and, keeping his word to Ney, hastened with them to the plateau, there by one desperate effort to decide his own fate, that of the Empire, and of France. Four of his battalions, braving a fearful fire, had already mounted the plateau, and the others would in all probability have ended the struggle, when the Prussian corps commanded by Ziethen, arriving unexpectedly, turned into defeat what might have been a victory, though a sanguinary and dearly purchased one! From the then existing state of things nothing could follow but an unparalleled dispersion of the troops, for there was not a single reserve to serve as a rallying-point, though Napoleon in his own person might have served as such, standing as he did amidst a torrent of fire, but that the increasing darkness hid him from the soldiers' view, and they, thinking him dead, fell into a dejection as great as their previous enthusiasm; and, to complete the disaster, the flying troops were pressed by the enemy in front, flank, and rear. Every thing tended to turn the lost battle into an unexampled defeat. Now fell that Empire which, bowed to the earth in 1814, had again risen in 1815, only to sink again like some gigantic edifice that descends suddenly on the head of him who persists in standing beneath it to the last moment!

It cannot be denied that it was a fearful overthrow; but the assertion that it was caused by Napoleon's tactics during the day cannot be supported, since it was a material obstacle that compelled him to defer the battle, besides he had endeavoured to repair the mistakes committed by Reille and D'Erlon, nor, occupied as he was at the right, was it possible for him to prevent Ney's premature attack on the left, which, however, he ordered to be suspended until he had driven back the Prussians, when he at once hastened to assist Ney, but was overpowered by the fresh arrival of Prussian troops. He, consequently, was blameless as a general, and, since we must be as just to the conquerors as to the conquered, we must add that both the Duke of Wellington and Blücher deserved their victory, the first by his unconquerable firmness, the second by a patriotism that nothing could quell.

But now it must be admitted, though with sincere regret for attacking the memory of an honest man and a brave soldier, struck on this occasion with an unparalleled want of comprehension,—it must, we repeat, be admitted that Marshal Grouchy was the real cause of our defeat,—the material cause; for the moral one was to be sought elsewhere. We have been scrupulously exact in our detail of the events of that day, and there cannot be found a single valid excuse for his conduct, though during the last forty years many have sought to exculpate him. Having lost the afternoon of the 17th and the morning of the 18th, there still remained the full half of that fatal 18th, during which he might have repaired his faults and converted a terrible disaster into a signal triumph. At half-past eleven the report of the cannon was heard at Sart-à-Valbain. General Gérard, with the sagacity of a true soldier and the ardour of a Frenchman that loved his country, proposed to advance to the scene of action, asserting that, ignorant as they were of

the enemy's intentions, they ought to hasten to Napoleon; since, if the Prussians were advancing toward him, they would be only obeying their instructions by following them, and, if they were gone to Brussels, the best thing to be done was to hasten to assist in completing the overthrow of the English. This was the advice of Gérard, Vandamme, Valazé, and even of the private soldiers. But Grouchy, closing his eyes to what was so evident, rejected the good advice poured on him by all. A neglect of etiquette in Gérard, and an excess of susceptibility in Grouchy, caused this most excellent advice to be rejected, advice that would have saved the empire, and, what was of a thousand times more importance, France.

Two excuses have been adduced in Marshal Grouchy's favour: first, that there would not have been sufficient time to advance from Sart-à-Vallain to Maransart, and, secondly, that he would have found on his route 40,000 Prussians ready to dispute the passage of the Dyle, whilst 50,000 more would be advancing to crush Napoleon. We believe both assertions to be unfounded, and, even if they were not, they would not exculpate him. If the time were insufficient, whose fault was it but Grouchy's, who had lost five or six hours on the afternoon of the 17th and four on the morning of the 18th? If the Prussians were defending the Dyle, who was to blame but Grouchy, who had not seized the bridges on this river neglected by the enemy, and who had not crossed when he might have done so without difficulty? It was, evidently, Grouchy's fault; and these inefficient excuses are in reality groundless.

Here is the absolute truth as to what concerns the distance. From Nil-Saint-Vincent, where Vandamme arrived at half-past eleven, to Maransart, the distance is only five leagues. The inhabitants say it can be traversed in four hours at the utmost. There is no doubt but that a league may be passed over in much less than an hour. Taking bad roads into account, which, however, were better than the cross-roads beaten down by the Prussians, we may allow five hours, fully sufficient for the soldiers, animated as they would be by the report of the cannon. If we even allow the unnecessarily superabundant time of six hours, the troops would have arrived sufficiently early. Let us give seven, and they would have arrived still more opportunely, at the moment when they would have surprised the Prussians in frightful disorder, beaten back from Planchenois by the Old Guard. Did we wish to adduce examples of the time in which marches could be effected on the same ground and under similar circumstances, we could quote several. Vandamme's corps left Gembloux at eight, and was at Baraque at two, though an hour had been lost on the way and the march had been very slow. The distance from Gembloux to Baraque is about the same as from Nil-Saint-Vincent to Maransart. Five hours would, consequently, have been sufficient for the march. Is a still more conclusive example needed? The distance from Wavre to Gembloux is more than five leagues, and on the following day, the 19th, when the desire of escaping from a victorious enemy hastened the pace of all, Vandamme's corps, which left

at sunset, that is to say, at eight o'clock, arrived at Gembloux at eleven.* Therefore, leagues might be accomplished in five hours on the 18th, since they were traversed last on the 19th.

As to the Prussians preventing the passage of the Dyle, this could not have occurred, not Grouchy neglected to cross by the guarded bridges of Moustier or Ottignies, advanced to Wavre to attack a position would be impossible to force. Indeed by posing the enemy to possess a superior power of divination, a quality in which right wing was unfortunately most deficient we may imagine Blücher foreseeing our plan and stationing 40,000 men at the Moustier-Ottignies bridges, by which Gérard would cross, and, whilst these troops were stationed, sending on 45,000 (it would have been impossible for him to send more) to overtake Napoleon. This might, indeed, be possible, but, as we are but mortals ourselves, it is not necessary to suppose that our adversaries are gods.

In reality, there was nothing of the kind. Blücher, seeing that he was pursued in the direction of Wavre, stationed Thielmann with 28,000 men in that place, in order to draw the attention of the French, whilst he sent Bulow with 30,000 in the direction of Châtelet-Saint-Lambert. Pirch I. followed Bulow, and Ziethen skirted the forest of Salgues, and commanded 15,000 men. Had Grouchy followed General Gérard's advice, he would have arrived at the Moustier and Ottignies bridges at one or two o'clock, have crossed them without opposition, and found the road to Maransart quite undefended. Had he ordered Pajol and Teffe, who had been sent to Tournai in the morning, to advance to Wavre, where they could have occupied Thielmann for some hours, he himself could have marched with his remaining 30,000 men toward Maransart, where he would have found Bulow too much engaged in the valley of Lasne to attend to any thing else, whilst Pirch I. and Ziethen would be probably too much advanced to check his approach. Had he only drawn off the main body, the essential object would have been effected, since it was their arrival that ruined all, and he even attracted their attention, he might have advanced before they could prevent him, and achieved the double advantage of routing Napoleon and overwhelming Bulow.

Marshal Grouchy's fault can only be traced by taking into consideration the great success he had formerly performed, and his many talents and devotedly good intentions. As Napoleon said, Grouchy was as useless in the army on that fatal day as though an earthquake had engulfed him and removed him from all participation in human affairs. His neglect of the duty imposed on him, that of preventing the Prussians from joining the English, was the real cause of our overthrow,—we must find the physical cause, for the moral one must be sought at a higher source, where Napoleon will appear as the true criminal!

If this campaign of four days' duration be considered from a higher point of view, we

* Asserted in General Berthod's Memoirs, tom. i. page 208.

It not find the fault to lie with the general, who had never been more profound, more brave, or more fertile in resources, but with the head of the State, who had created a false position both for himself and France, a position where the most powerful genius could yield in presence of insurmountable moral difficulties. Nothing, indeed, could be finer or more skilful than the plans by which, without knowledge of the enemy, he assembled 200,000 men on the frontier, plans which gave Clusson to Napoleon within a few hours, and placed him in such a position between the English and Prussians that he could fight them separately, and, when they would have been conquered, would leave him time to meet the Russians and Austrians with the forces which would be organized whilst he fought. The hesitation of Ney and Reille on the 16th, by which our victory was rendered incomplete, can only be attributed to Napoleon, since it was he who impressed on their minds those memories by which they were so much influenced. It was he who had inscribed the names of Arona and Vittoria on the memory of the Emperor, Dennewitz, Leipsic, and Laon on Ney's, and Kulm on Vandamme's. If the 17th, the day following the battle of Ligny, was lost, which, indeed, was not of any great consequence, it was caused by Ney's hesitation for half the day, and by a storm for the remainder. Of course, neither Napoleon nor his lieutenants could be blamed for the tempest; it was he who had placed himself in a position where the least accident might become a serious danger, a position in which, to avoid defeat, it would be necessary that every circumstance, without exception, should be favorable, a combination which nature never affords to any general.

It was the delay on the morning of the 18th, the result of error, as it was absolutely necessary that the ground should be allowed to dry for the passage of the horses and not could it be supposed that the time allowed the ground to dry was only to give the Prussians an opportunity of attacking. If Reille faltered before Goumont, if D'Erlon's hesitation of the 16th was caused by the rashness of the 18th, when his valuable troops were prematurely engaged, we repeat that the fault was Napoleon's who had placed them in such a position; to him was attributable the real cause of their moral condition, as well as of their physical but reckless heroism. Lastly, Napoleon's attention and presence, together with the reserve, were drawn off to the right, and could not prevent the serious errors which occurred in the centre, the catastrophe of the arrival of the Prussians; and the fault was attributable not to Napoleon but to his right wing to occupy them, and could not leave them unwatched or unopposed, or without some obstacle to prevent

their return, but to Grouchy, to Grouchy alone, whatever may be said. But the error of employing Grouchy; ah! that great error was Napoleon's, who to recompense a political service had selected a man brave and honest indeed, but one that was not competent to command an army under such circumstances. With 20,000 or 30,000 additional soldiers Napoleon might have provided against all these accidents, and these 20,000 or 30,000 soldiers were in Vendée, which formed a part of the extraordinary position he had created. It was the very extreme of rashness to lead 120,000 men against 220,000 of the best troops in Europe, commanded by exasperated generals, who were determined to conquer or die. And yet the excessive rashness was almost wisdom in Napoleon's position, as it was the only means by which he could win that desperate wager of conquering irritated Europe with the exhausted forces of France, forces which he had had but two months to reorganize. And, that we may omit nothing, the feverish excitement of the army, that fell from the very height of heroism to unheard-of dejection, was to be attributed to the head of the State, who, during a reign of fifteen years, had made an ill use of every thing,—of France, of his own genius, of all that God had placed under his control! To attribute to Napoleon's military incapacity the reverses which originated in a position it had taken fifteen years to create, is not only to substitute the false for the true, but the little for the great. At Waterloo he was not a superannuated general who had lost his activity or his presence of mind, but an extraordinary man, an incomparable warrior, whose mighty genius could not redeem his political errors; he was a giant struggling against the force of events, which he was trying to bend to his will, but who was carried along by the violence of that moral torrent and vanquished like the feeblest of mortals. Genius become powerless in presence of a reason it has ignored, or recognised too late, presents a very different moral spectacle to a degenerated commander guilty of technical errors. Instead of being a lesson worthy of the human race for whom it is delivered, or of the God who gave it, it would be only a theme to be discussed for the instruction of the pupils of a military school.

This extraordinary man is now about to appear confronting the moral causes he had himself created, and in the following book we shall find him undergoing a final catastrophe produced almost solely by moral causes, and little, if at all, by material; for, though minor events may depend on the latter, it is only the former that can produce really great results. It is they that create, and even force, events despite of material causes. Mind rules, matter is ruled; nor can aught else be seen by him who observes the world and sees it as it really is.

ts that resistance is impossible—The question is referred to a special military commission—M. Fouché puts the question in such a way as to get the answer he wishes—The answer being received from this council, it is admitted they must capitulate—General Exelmans' brilliant cavalry engagement with the Prussians—Notwithstanding success, all see that they must come to terms—Commissioners are sent to Marshal Blücher at Saint Cloud—These commissioners pass through Marshal Davout's quarters—Scenes at which they are present—Convention for the capitulation of Paris—The different articles—The French army is to retire beyond the Loire and leave the service of the Emperor to the National Guard—Scenes between the *fédérés* and the French army as the latter pass through Paris—Fouché has an interview with the Duke of Wellington and M. de Talleyrand at Neuilly—Not being able to obtain satisfactory conditions, he resigns, and accepts the portfolio of Police—His colleagues consider that he has betrayed—He returns to Neuilly and obtains an audience of Louis XVIII.—He makes arrangements for that monarch's escape, and causes the chambers to be closed—The general opinion is, that he has betrayed all parties—Review and date of the period called the Hundred Days.

Events that occurred on the eastern and northern frontiers had been less important as unfortunate than those that took place in the north. General Rapp had retired from Strasbourg, and General Lecourbe from Belfort, and the latter succeeded in saving the enemy by combats worthy of the time when he defended the Alps against the English and Russians. On the Swiss frontier, Marshal Suchet, ever skilful and ever successful, made his position good with 18,000 men against an army of 60,000. As he had but about 8000 or 9000 troops in line, and about as many of the mobilized National Guards, he had succeeded in defending the Jura and the Alps from Rousses to Lyon, he had put Lyons in a state of defence, and with his active troops disputed the approaches to Chambéry. Profiting by the flight of the Austrians, he repelled them, and proposed an armistice when he heard of the disaster of Waterloo. The enemy having lost possession of Lyons and Grenoble, the indignant marshal attacked them most bravely and killed or took prisoners 3000 Frenchmen. The Austrian General Frimont, disconcerted, accepted the armistice proposed by the marshal, and consented to retire to the frontier of 1814 as the line of separation between the belligerent armies. In Vendée, affairs were equally successful. We have seen how the Vendean chiefs after the surprise of Aizenay, being discontented with the English and M. de La Rochejaquelein, dispersed and were again likely to break up their old divisions. M. Louis de La Rochejaquelein, having become commander-in-chief of the insurrection, had confided the command of his staff to General Canuel, an old republican officer, who had quarrelled with the Empire. Although MM. de Sapinaud, de Suzannet, and d'Autichamp were disinclined to acknowledge a single commander, they submitted through deference to the royal authority through respect for the illustrious M. de La Rochejaquelein. Soon after, General Canuel urged M. Louis de La Rochejaquelein to centralize the authority, somewhat in the manner of a regular army; but the commanders were offended by an argument so different to Vendean customs, still more when it was proposed to lead them into the *Marais*, where they would receive orders from the English fleet, a promise in which they felt little confidence. They objected, asserting how little assistance could be expected from England, and how great the danger would be of accumulating men in the interval between the troops of General Travot, who was at Bourbon-Vendée, and those of General Lamarque, who was at Nantes, where they would be exposed to die of hunger in an

open country where they had always been beaten. At this time MM. de La Béraudière, de Malartic, and de Flavigny arrived in Vendée as envoys from M. Fouché to propose a suspension of arms, on the grounds that as the great question was to be solved in Flanders, it would be useless to shed blood in Vendée, where nothing decisive could ever be effected. When M. Louis de La Rochejaquelein heard of these conferences, he looked on them as criminal on the part of MM. de Sapinaud, de Suzannet, and d'Autichamp, and deprived them of their command as faithless to their cause. In Vendée the command being given by the people and not by the king, MM. de Sapinaud, de Suzannet, and d'Autichamp remained at the head of their troops, and allowed M. Louis de La Rochejaquelein to attack the enemy in the *Marais*, where, endeavouring to extricate himself from a perilous position by efforts of extraordinary bravery, he was killed at the head of a column of 1500 men, which was quickly dispersed.

He was succeeded in command by M. de Sapinaud, when the leaders again taking arms marched to Roche-Servien, where they met General Lamarque and were defeated with the loss of 3000 men. In this engagement M. de Suzannet fell pierced with bullets. The Vendean leaders, seeing that they could not withstand their opponents, and that it was not they who were destined to restore the Bourbons, yielded at last to M. Fouché's proposal, and signed the treaty of pacification of their province after they had uselessly shed their own blood and that of the brave soldiers who might have been better employed in Flanders than in Vendée.

Thus, neither on the frontiers nor in the interior had any thing been definitively lost, if the Parisians had known how to bear the disaster of Waterloo.

When Napoleon left Charleroy, he advanced with a small party of horsemen of all arms to Philippeville, where he arrived on the morning of the 17th, and it was with great difficulty that he could get the gates opened, the Governor not being able to recognise the Emperor of the French in such a plight. With grief and deference Napoleon was admitted into the fortress, where he found M. de Basano and some of his officers in the greatest consternation and without baggage, nothing having been saved, not even the Imperial carriages. Some moments being accorded to mutual condolences, Napoleon sent off several orders; he wrote to his brother Joseph to inform him of his last reverse and to desire him to summon the ministers, and in conjunction with them to make such arrangements as the circumstances required, and then, escorted by what attendants he could collect, he, with

them, got into such carriages as could be procured, and set off for Laon, where he had ordered the army to rally.

When Napoleon arrived at Laon, whither the news of our misfortune had preceded him, he was received by the municipal authorities and the commanders of the garrison with expressions of sympathy that touched him most sensibly, and he immediately began to meditate on the line of conduct he was to pursue. At a glance he saw the fate that was before him, saw too clearly, perhaps, that, however he might act, the result would be the same. He had trusted his destiny to a cast of the die, he had failed, and all was lost. This mode of regarding events inspired him with wonderful resignation, but perhaps diminished his energy, and even his care in estimating his future plans. He was alternately calm and resigned, bitter and contemptuous, at a time when less penetration and a greater desire for safety might have enabled him, at least for a time, to command destiny herself. Indeed, it seemed to him that any advantage he could gain would be but for a short while, and it is not probable that he would stoop to make a great effort for such a reward.

What was most urgent was to give France an exact account of the battle of the 18th of June. Napoleon had with him his aides-de-camp M. de Bassano, the Grand Marshal Bertrand, M. de Flahault and M. de La Bédoyère. He himself drew up the bulletin of the battle with the intention of stating the truth, but without blaming any person. Having rapidly dictated this bulletin, he read it to those who were present, and said he could attribute part of the day's misfortunes to Marshal Ney, but would not do so, as all had done their best and all perhaps had erred. Indeed, it would have been cruel to throw the responsibility of his defeat on a man who had endeavoured to avert it by performing prodigies of heroism. He did not think of Marshal Grouchy, of whose conduct he was ignorant, and whose absence he attributed to some extraordinary cause. The entire blame was attributed to circumstances, and the *feverish impetuosity of the cavalry*. Having first consulted the just and truthful Drouot, Napoleon confirmed the bulletin and sent it to Paris by an express courier. He then discussed with those about him what was to be done.

What was he to do at Laon? Would he patiently wait there until the wreck of his army had rallied? And what would the amount of that remnant be? Would it suffice to check the enemy, or delay their march for some days, so as to allow time to have the gates of Paris closed, the redoubts armed, and the troops assembled in the garrison? Would it not be better to leave the major-general and Prince Jerome at Laon to rally the army, and for Napoleon to hasten to Paris, appear before the chambers, tell them the truth, and ask them for the means of repairing the late disaster? The means were there, if the chambers would stand by the Government. Napoleon himself had made considerable preparations beforehand, that in case he should suffer a great defeat he might have some chance of making a successful resistance. The chambers

might aid him by their devotion to the common cause, so that now all depended on the firmness and unanimity of the public body. Would not Napoleon be more likely to obtain a manifestation of this firmness and unanimity if he were present than if he were absent?

This was a serious question, and now proposed for the third time during Napoleon's career. As in his own person he united the twofold character of general and head of the State, he had on many solemn occasions to ask himself which was better, to restore his sovereign to the Government or leave it to command to the army. On all these occasions he sacrificed the military to the civil interest, and his plan had succeeded, though at the expense of his personal reputation, for he thus gave his enemies an opportunity of saying that after endangering the army by his default he had only thought of his personal safety. These were the comments of enemies, for at each of these junctures he had attained some great aim. When he abandoned the army in Egypt and went to found a government at Paris, he became Consul and Emperor. When at the end of the campaign of 1812 he left his army at Smorgoni and crossed Germany before it could rise against him, he collected sufficient resources to conquer the rope at Lutten and Bautzen, and without saving his crown could he have indulged in pride to make some sacrifices. He had, consequently, acted wisely, since on the first occasion he had won power, and preserved it on the second. Would it be so on this time?

This was a question not so easily answered. When Napoleon returned from Egypt, covered with glory, he had only to show himself to throw the despised Directory into the shade. When he returned so abruptly from Russia, he was still believed invincible, and the forces of nature alone were blamed for a misfortune that was looked upon as temporary; besides, at that time, no other government than his had been thought of, and the patriotism of France soon supplied him with materials for a new campaign. But now every thing was changed. The world had become accustomed to an invincible conqueror; his genius was still believed in, but the faith in his good fortune had declined; his despotism and ambition were blamed for the reverses of France, and the present disaster was ascribed to his fatal return to Elba. The errors of the Bourbons had prepared the way for his return, and France allowed his army to impose Napoleon on her in the hope that he might still be able to conquer; but when besides his other attempts he had lost the prestige of victory, would it be possible for him to retain any ascendancy over the chambers, already ill disposed toward him on the eve of his defeat, and probably still more so on the morrow? Would they not, as men often do, despise the unsuccessful hero? Would it not be better for him to remain with the army, that still adored him and attributed his defeat to treachery? Would he not, though conquered, produce a more inspiring effect whilst surrounded by that army, than alone, unarmed and unguarded, at the head of an unpitied assembly?

Napoleon's private feeling was, that

would be wiser for him to remain at Laon to collect the remains of the army, than to go to Paris to place himself in the power of a hostile body of men. He was inclined to remain; but the opinions of those around were divided. Some only thought of what his enemies had so often said, that he always fled from the army when it was in difficulties, and they feared that this would be repeated on the present occasion. Others, taking a more extensive view, considered that by going to Paris he could revive the public courage, restrain party spirit, silence opposition, and unite all good citizens in the sole thought of opposing the enemy. Those with whom this last consideration had most weight, being accustomed to yield to the personal ascendancy of their master, did not perceive that though this sentiment was still intact for them, it had lost more than three-fourths of its importance for others, and they wished to oppose him to the influence of party spirit, in the chimerical confidence that he could produce the same influence as formerly. It was certainly desirable that some strong will should be present to ride the agitation that might easily be foreseen in Paris at such a time. But would not his will be more effective at a distance than near, more imposing in the midst of an army devoted to its commander than in the deserted palace of the Elysée? Supposing that an excited assembly should pass decrees subversive of the Imperial prerogative, what could it do against Napoleon whilst surrounded by his officers? whilst were he alone at Paris, with no other escort than the reputation of being conquered, could it not insult and even deprive him of his sceptre? He could foresee a humiliating future, though he did not ask of it to those around him. Almost all those saw only the necessity for a strong hand at the head of the Government, one that could restrain the ill-disposed, and, believing in the efficacy of a power under whose influence they themselves still bent, they counselled him to set off at once for Paris. He resisted in a kind of silent resistance, but at length two circumstances led him to form a resolution contrary to his secret inclinations. The first was the receipt of a letter from the Count de Lanjuinais, President of the Chamber of Representatives, written, indeed, after the battle of Ligny and before that of Waterloo, but imbued with such strong expressions of affection that it argued well for the feelings of the assembly. The other was, that considering the state of things at Laon, there was but little probability to remain there. Had Napoleon 25,000 or 30,000 men between Paris and the frontier, nothing could have induced him to leave them, for with his skill in manœuvring he had been able to check the conquering generals, given time to the public mind to restore its balance, and to the National Guards to turn to his assistance, and by their boldness to restrain the enemy both at home and abroad. But only about 3000 fugitives had been found between Philippeville and Laon, and it would take eight or ten days to collect the men with even the semblance of organized troops. "Ah," said somebody to him, "Grouchy were indeed a good general, if there were any hope that he had saved the

25,000 devoted men under his command, 25,000 more could soon be added to them, and with these 60,000 resolute soldiers the enemy could be attacked, a battle gained, the march of our opponents arrested, and the tottering fortunes of France restored." But it must be that Grouchy was taken either by the English or Prussians, and not a single corps now remains entire. It would take ten or twelve days to collect 15,000 or 20,000 men at Laon. And this time would be spent in collecting them one by one. It would, therefore, be much better for Napoleon to proceed to Paris and employ this time in assembling the public authorities, and then return after a few days, to assume the command of the army which, meantime, the major-general would have collected and organized. These specious reasons determined Napoleon, for he could not content himself to spend his time seeking fugitives at Laon, whilst he might be at Paris to restrain party spirit, encourage the administration, and create fresh resources. Had he known that Grouchy was safe, he would have remained, but, having every reason to believe him lost, he went to Paris. We may thus say that Grouchy twice caused his ruin, the first time by acting ill and the second time by exciting an apprehension that he might have acted ill, which, indeed, was not the case, as he had succeeded in saving his *corps d'armée* as though by a miracle.

Having taken his resolution, Napoleon gave orders that the entire National Guard should seek the fugitives in the country round and bring them to Laon. He left the command of the army to the major-general, Marshal Soult, and took with him his brother Jerome, who had been wounded in the hand and arm. He desired the marshal to reorganize the troops as quickly as possible, and said that when he should have arranged the most urgent affairs he would return to take the command. This was on the 20th of June. He got into his carriage and set out for Paris.

Whilst Napoleon was forming this important resolution, the Parisians, surprised by the news from Waterloo, first became stupefied, and then gave way to the most violent agitation. The successive accounts of a decisive success at Vendée, of another in the Alps, together with the brilliant victory at Ligny, had inspired a certain confidence; and it was hoped, with the aid of good fortune and some moderation, that an honourable peace might be concluded. The public mind was occupied by these satisfactory accounts up to the 18th. On the 19th nothing was heard. On the 20th it was said that the ministers had been summoned by Prince Joseph, and the most alarming rumours began to circulate through the capital. It was soon known that Prince Joseph had informed the Government that a great disaster had taken place, and that he had advised them to wait patiently for Napoleon's orders. It was more easy to counsel than to preserve composure. The excitement was great, and all felt that Waterloo would only be the signal for a new revolution. Since Napoleon's return from Elba it was generally felt that though the hatred entertained toward him by all Europe rendered him dangerous to France, still his valour would be her safeguard.

But, now that he had been conquered at Waterloo, it was universally acknowledged that to descend from the throne was the only compensation he could offer for the danger in which he had placed the country. Those who see no merit but in success said simply that he had played his last game, lost it, and ought now to give place to another. Those who formed their opinions on higher principles said that, having compromised France with Europe during its former reign, he ought not to have returned—that, having returned, he could excuse so daring an attempt only by adopting a wiser policy and by achieving a victory; but that, since instead of conquering he had suffered a defeat, he ought by sacrificing himself to put a termination to the dangers he had created but could not remedy.

This was the general opinion, expressed by each after his own fashion. The royalists, in great joy, proclaimed loudly that the immediate downfall of Napoleon was due to France, and would be only the just punishment of his crimes. The honest revolutionists, the young liberals, who, without having chosen Napoleon, had yet accepted him from the army as the only man that could defend the Revolution and France, seeing now that he made too large demands on his good fortune if not on his genius, fell into anxiety and despair, and did not hesitate to say that France alone ought to be thought of, and that it must be saved without Napoleon if it could not be saved with him. Those who were attached to the Bonaparte dynasty through affection or interest, and those revolutionists who were totally compromised, were the only persons who dared to assert that the country ought to stand by Napoleon and sink with him beneath the ruins of the Empire.

There were, however, some clear intellects—very few, indeed—who held the same opinion but for better reasons. They said that, as the error of recalling Napoleon or allowing him to return had been committed, it could only be repaired by persevering in the course adopted, and supporting him resolutely; that there were still resources for carrying on the war which in his hands would not fail to be efficacious; that with him it would be possible to resist the enemy, without him, impossible; that it was not only dishonourable but chimerical to think of sacrificing Napoleon in order to treat with Europe; that there was no doubt but that Europe was irritated against him, but it was as much so against France; that the finest promises would be made, but if France were weak enough to listen, God alone could tell what would become of her, her possessions, and her liberty!

This opinion was held by two eminent men, Carnot and Siéyès; by Carnot because during the three months he had passed in Napoleon's service he had become attached to him, seeing he was simple-minded, candid, ready to admit his errors when not accused of them, and fully devoted to his country. Siéyès, though he did not like Napoleon a whit better than formerly, estimated the actual position with his wonted superiority of intellect, and decided that it would be better to join Napoleon and resist the enemy, or submit at once to the Bourbons. But, as he could never adopt the latter alternative, he declared energetically and frankly

that Napoleon ought to be supported, at whatever resources the country possessed placed at his command.

He expressed this opinion very warmly M. Lanjuinais, whom he found terribly depressed by the news from Waterloo. M. Lanjuinais was one of those who had joined Napoleon to the sake of the public welfare, but that on being severed there was no bond to attach him to the Emperor. "Consider well," said Siéyès to him, "consider well what you are about to do; for it is only this man that can save you. It is not a tribune you need, but a general. He has the army, and can command it. If you crush him, after having made use of him, it is not I that will mourn over him. But do make use of him first, put all the resources of the nation at his command, and you may escape the danger that threatens you. Otherwise you will sacrifice the revolution and perhaps France with it."

To a certain degree Siéyès was right. If there were intended that liberty should triumph the aid of the new liberals and the old revolutionists—those, be it understood, who had not committed any criminal excess—all of whom were attached to this noble cause, and of worthy of taking part in its vindication if there were any desire to save France from the humiliation of accepting a government imposed by foreigners, of preserving her soul and glory from the insults of a victorious enemy, there was but one resource, national unity, Frenchmen and union with Napoleon. If he alone who could urge on the army and the more energetic portion of the nation to make those last efforts of patriotism, he alone who could render their efforts efficacious, he was only in the imagination of incorrigible men, such as are to be found at all times, and of whom there were many at that time in the revolutionary party, that there could be found place for the belief that a revolutionary constituted assembly could renew the prodigious energy wrought by the National Convention.

But it must be admitted that there was another mode of defending the cause of liberty and the inviolability of the French soil that by the hand of Napoleon. Liberty was not necessarily lost by the return of the Bourbons; it might triumph over them, as it had over Napoleon when he was compelled to grant the Additional Act, and as to the integrity of the French soil, it would be as doubtful in a separate struggle with the adverse coalition as it was in frankly accepting the Bourbons, and making conditions either with them or with Europe that supported them, and this latter arrangement would be the least dangerous, and the most likely to succeed, were it conducted with skill and sincerity. This might be the project of a good citizen, provided he did not think of his own interests but of those of his country, that he proposed conditions for the security of liberty and the integrity of the soil, and not for his personal advancement; in a word, that he should propose to himself a patriotic enterprise and not a base and interested intrigue. But though the members of the two chambers were quite willing to sacrifice Napoleon, they were not—either from repugnance or interest—willing to restore the Bourbons, so that to induce them to do so

ould require the most perfect sincerity, the most profound skill and immense influence, in fact, a gifted individual that did not exist.

There were two men at this time who could have done a great deal toward saving the country, M. Fouché and Marshal Davout. Marshal Davout exercised a well-deserved influence over the army. He alone, after Napoleon, had sufficient authority to rally the troops, and if he acted at Paris as he had done at Hamburg he would be able, for a long time, to arrest the progress of victorious Europe. His honesty was above all suspicion, and, though he was not deficient in political acuteness, he was totally devoid of tact. He was fully capable of one line of action; he could admonish the members of the Government, propose whatever measure he considered the best, even though it were to recall the Bourbons, and then break his sword if his advice were not adopted. But he was quite unequal to dividing parties through the difficulties of a complicated discussion, and inducing them to adopt a determination which, however just, could be dissembled for some days. M. Fouché was very different; though he was morally destitute of sincerity and disinterestedness and had no influence with the army, he possessed in the highest degree the power of receiving, and of leading men's minds to the effect he desired, at the same time that he fully denied his aim. He had too much of the qualities of which Marshal Davout had little, and in such a crisis as the present, the country alone should be thought of, and not the incapability of thinking of any thing but himself. The account of the disaster at Waterloo was a fresh spur to his activity, his vanity, and his ambition. To be rid of Napoleon was sufficient compensation for him, and that this event gave the Bourbons the certainty of returning, now that Napoleon was overthrown he saw none likely to above himself from the present chaos. He threw himself in imagination the sole director of the events, playing in 1815 the same part that M. de Talleyrand had played in 1814, that even with an increase of power, as the different parties in Paris at the same time that he was treating with the enemy at Waterloo, he flattered himself that he would be an arbitrator not only of France but of Europe; and his ridiculous blindness prevented him from seeing that if M. de Talleyrand had influence and decision in advising the young sovereigns had obtained the Charter of 1814, he, by trying to deceive all parties and by deceiving himself, would only have succeeded in delivering France and her most virtuous citizens to the rage of the emigrants of Europe. In 1814 a reconciliation had been effected, which it only depended on the Bourbons to render durable; 1815 would only have effected a detestable revenge. It was an ignominy on which to lavish so much labour. At the moment the fatal intelligence arrived that at Waterloo, M. Fouché commenced to weave a web of every kind. The Bourbons would not be his choice: his being a regicide placed an insuperable barrier between him and them. He would prefer the regency of Maria Louisa, which would suit both the Bonapartists and the army, or even the Duke of Orleans, to

whom many friends of liberty and many superior officers of the army began to direct their wishes. But, if conquered or half-victorious Europe might have consented either to Maria Louisa or the Duke of Orleans, there was nothing to be hoped for after such a disaster as the battle of Waterloo but the unconditional return of the Bourbons.

The prudent M. Fouché was quite resigned to such a result, provided it was his own work and tended to his personal advantage. He commenced by a decided step which he hoped would be certain to secure his interests. M. de Vitrolles, of whose conduct we have already spoken, since the time he had been arrested at Toulouse had remained a prisoner in Vincennes, where Napoleon detained him as a kind of hostage through whom some future advantage might be gained, and not to have him shot, as M. Fouché asserted when he wanted to have the merit of having saved him. Napoleon had thus unconsciously furnished an excellent instrument for intrigue to M. Fouché, who ordered that M. de Vitrolles should be released from confinement and brought before him, when he told him he was free, advised him not to appear in public, but to hold himself in readiness for the mission on which he intended to employ him. As M. Fouché knew well that there was but one species of mission in which M. de Vitrolles would consent to be employed, there was no occasion that the latter should make any remark on that point. But, as the crisis was only at its commencement, it was not possible to do more at that moment in favour of royalty. By releasing M. de Vitrolles from Vincennes and holding him in readiness to act as ambassador, M. Fouché did what placed him in a favourable light with the Bourbons, at the same time that it gave him an opportunity of opening communications with them.

M. Fouché, of course, did not mention to any person the step he had taken, but, on the contrary, showed himself in a very different character to those by whose aid he hoped to effect a fresh revolution. The first thing to be done was to get rid of Napoleon, whom he still feared, especially in the convulsions of that last agony which would probably be violent, and, though every thing indicated the fall of him who had been vanquished at Waterloo, it would be necessary to act with precaution with those whom he wished to lead on to pronounce the sentence of his downfall. Immediately after leaving the council of ministers at Prince Joseph's, M. Fouché summoned the different members of the two chambers and passed the entire of the 20th and the night of the 20-21st in these different interviews. "Well," he said to them, "did I not tell you that this man's foolish obstinacy would ruin us? If he had not returned from Elba, we should have got rid of the Bourbons; we had almost arranged with the Powers about accepting Maria Louisa or the Duke of Orleans, and, instead of violent revolution and sanguinary war with all Europe, we should have had a change effected with tranquillity and almost unanimous consent. There was an excellent opportunity for effecting it even at the Champ de Mai. We knew by a secret mission from Vienna (he alluded to M. Werner's mission to Basle) that

the allies were willing to come to an arrangement provided that Napoleon were removed, and if they were conceded they were willing to accept Maria Louisa, the Duke of Orleans, in fact, any arrangement that would suit us. At the Champ de Mai I proposed to Napoleon to abdicate in favour of his son, and thus compel the Powers to prove their sincerity. By this sacrifice he would have secured an honourable retreat and crowned himself with glory. But he would not listen to any thing, and you yourself see that this reckless gambler has lost the art of winning; and what can be done with a gambler that can do nothing but lose?"

M. Fouché did not speak so freely to all. With some he was more reserved; to his intimate acquaintances he spoke more fully; but to all he declared his terror of what Napoleon might do on his return from Paris. "He will come back like a madman," he said, "he will propose the most extraordinary measures, ask you to place the resources of the nation at his command that he may risk them in a desperate chance. Last year he thought to destroy Paris, you may imagine what he will be inclined to do this year, when his only choice will be between death and a dungeon, and you may rest assured that if you do not vote as he wishes he will dissolve the chambers that he may get the entire power into his own hands." M. Fouché, having repeatedly and successfully uttered this threat of the dissolution of the chambers, ever since their opening, was well aware of the effect it would now produce. The representatives, not more than three weeks in possession of their office, and who felt their influence increase as Napoleon's declined, trembled at the idea of being dismissed, sent back to their homes, and leave France, as M. Fouché said, in the hands of a madman, who the year before was thinking of setting fire to the powder-magazine at Grenelle, and who certainly would not attempt less this year. M. Fouché assured them that Napoleon was determined on a dissolution of the chambers, a suggestion which he well knew would deprive them of all coolness of judgment. They were inclined to believe him, as nobody had a better opportunity than he of knowing the Imperial plans. But it was not sufficient to be warned, they should devise some means of protecting themselves; no easy task, as the Additional Act gave the monarch the power of dissolving or adjourning the chambers.

M. Fouché professed the most profound contempt for the Additional Act, and did not seem to think that it could be an obstacle in any way. He declared that it would be the most egregious folly to be impeded by a valueless charter, which Napoleon held so lightly that he would not hesitate to violate it whenever it would suit his interests. There was but one thing to be done, and that was to pass a decree by which the chambers should declare that they would not submit to be prorogued or dissolved whilst France was in so critical a position. M. Fouché asserted that this decree was not an attack on the crown, though it restrained one of its prerogatives. The sceptre would still remain to Napoleon, though he would be restricted in its use. To these reasonings M. Fouché added some hints, by which he in-

sinuated that he was in private communication with the different European courts, especially with the Austrian, and he declared that resolution had been adopted inimical to France but only to Napoleon, and that if he were removed there was no doubt but that the liberty, and possessions of France would be secured. He need not be dethroned, he was prevented from committing any rash act which he might be tempted; for the destiny of France should not, he said, be left in the power of a madman, who would rather involve his country in his own ruin than sacrifice himself to save it.

All adopted M. Fouché's views on this measure, and he promised the different modes he met that he would give them immediate information of all that he could learn concerning Napoleon's plans. There was one representative, M. de Lafayette, whose discourse was most successful in awakening. We have already seen the part played by this important personage during the Hundred Days. By assenting or denying his approbation to M. Bonaparte Constant or to Prince Joseph, according as they yielded or refused to do as he desired, he had secured himself so much influence that he had succeeded in obtaining the convocation of the chambers against Napoleon's decided wish. M. de Lafayette attached more importance to this convocation than to the most important clauses of the Additional Act, for he said that once the chambers were assembled it would be very easy to restrain Napoleon should he think of resuming his old despotism. There was, consequently, no man then existing who would more certainly become excited on hearing of the certainty or even of the possibility of the chambers being dissolved. M. Fouché took care that he should be informed that Napoleon had lost his army and was returning to assemble a second, and that he doubtedly his first care would be to reassemble the chambers, that the representatives should therefore, be on their guard that they might in defiance of him, preserve an influence salutary to the welfare of the country. More than this would have sufficed to excite distrust, the real and unbounded jealousy of M. de Lafayette.

There were two young deputies, M. Jay and Manuel, both very honest men and much beneath M. de Lafayette in position, but of whom, M. Manuel, was about to play a very important part, and both these gentlemen had been greatly deceived by M. Fouché's pretended to use them constantly as instruments during the present crisis. M. Jay, who had formerly been tutor to M. Fouché's son, and was now representative for Bordeaux, had devoted himself to literature, and was distinguished by his academic success. He was cultivated, gentle, and refined, but somewhat timid but independent. He wrote little but he spoke, but he could, when necessary, express his opinions in a few bold, well-chosen words. M. Manuel, the representative of the Vendée, was a man who possessed no talent for literary composition but who spoke extremely well, and was distinguished with great presence of mind, and a sincere patriotism. He had become intimate with M. Fouché when the latter was

id of exile at Provence. Both had up to this time taken no and both felt great confidence he took care to present him- best possible light to them.

ected to belong to no party, interest for Bonaparte than for be more attached to measures h no desire to dethrone Napo- do so if the safety of France

He could not have assumed a for he only expressed the opi- young and sincere politicians, aracter it was not difficult for ous men unattached to any thinking of the interests of le said to them, as he had said te, that Napoleon would arrive hat it would only be right to t that they should not allow ng the chambers, to deprive re in the Government. Such calculated to gain not only the mentioned, but every member s.

chambers did not open until number of representatives *Palais de l'Assemblée* on the 1st, and, with the excitement time, demanded the details of h had happened on the 18th, ey had learned, all sincerely ch suggested a remedy after

but they were unanimous in France should no longer be e man, and that the country without his aid if it could not

To minds so disposed, the poleon was returning, deter- e the chambers, and to carry e against all Europe, regard- ch France, was calculated to of revolt. Any suggestion, t Napoleon's being the only of opposing the enemy, was e greatest disfavour. There st, sensible men among the re- os, on the 20th of March, had he fate of France should be to Napoleon, but who, at the y, had warmly espoused his elined to believe that he alone ly encounter Europe in arms. who dreaded the return of the nded by the triumphant emi-

now knew not what to say, e told that Napoleon was re- adman, determined to risk the perate strife, whilst it was as- e would abdicate, the enemy ented, and leave France the i government. To these asser- only reply by an embarrassed promoters of the ruling idea, ould be sacrificed to the safety n they had adopted in conse- uché's assertions, and on his inication with Vienna, these, at most but a timid and silent e idea that the chambers would prorogued, which would del- power of restraining Napo- rn to Paris, was most repug-

nant to the feelings of the representatives, and what they were determined not to brook. Such was the state of public excitement on the morning of the 21st, an excitement partly natural and partly fomented by the reports M. Fouché had so invidiously circulated.

He had done more than this, for he actually brought over some members of the Government to his views. He had not sought to influence Carnot, whom he considered a maniac, underserving his notice, and who, together with Sièyes, considered that France and the Revolution could be saved by Napoleon alone; but he had produced some effect upon M. de Caulaincourt, who was always inclined to take a gloomy view of things, and confirmed him in the opinion that all was lost, and that nothing now was to be thought of but to save Napoleon from being treated with personal ignominy or cruelty. He expressed the same opinion to Cambacérès, who had always held these views, and to Marshal Davout, who began to fear that he was right. All who disagreed with him he treated as imbeciles; but the witty and talented M. Regnaud de Saint-Jean d'Angély, though most devoted to the Emperor, being very impressionable, was completely won over by Fouché's assurance that by his own eloquence, and the assistance that would be afforded him, he would be able to guide the chamber. To all he said that the present crisis was desperate, that the only imaginable means of escape was in Napoleon's abdication, by which the anger of Europe might be mollified and possibly Maria Louisa's regency established. Of this latter result he seemed quite certain, and supported his belief by allusions to mysterious communications which he did not define clearly, but of whose existence he contrived to convince his hearers, at the same time that he impressed them with an idea of their vast importance.

Such was the result produced by M. Fouché during the twenty-four hours which had elapsed between the receipt of the fatal news and Napoleon's arrival at the Elysée palace. The first person he met, as he ascended the steps, was M. de Caulaincourt, whose hand he took and pressed warmly. As Drouot alighted from the carriage after him, he could not prevent himself from saying to those around that all was lost: "Except honour," added Napoleon, warmly. These were the only words he had uttered since he left Laon. He was paler than usual, but his countenance was firm; his eyes were dry, but his chest was oppressed; he took M. de Caulaincourt's arm, and ordered a bath and some refreshments, for he was exhausted from fatigue, having been almost constantly on horseback for the past six days. Throwing himself on a bed, he told M. de Caulaincourt that the victory of the 16th had offered a good prognostic for that of the 18th; that the second battle seemed to promise a decided victory, but had been changed to a defeat by two circumstances—Grouchy's absence and Ney's precipitation—the latter being more heroic than ever, but in a state of excitement that blinded his judgment; but he added that the question to be considered was not who was in fault, but rather how the evil that had been committed might be repaired. He then asked M. de Caulaincourt what was to be

hoped for from the two chambers, from their leaders, and from the chief men of the State in general. M. de Caulaincourt, whose fault was rather to exaggerate than conceal the truth, did not hesitate to say that the chambers were inclined to seek the public safety in his removal from the throne, and that he would find the greater number ill disposed toward him. "I divined it," said Napoleon; "I was certain that they would disagree, and thus lose the last chance we had. Our disaster is certainly great, but it might be repaired; disunited, we shall soon fall a prey to the enemy. They only think of removing me now. But when I am gone, they will rid themselves of all connected with the Revolution, and will send you back the Bourbons and the emigrants. The Bourbons—be it so! . . . but they must know what they are doing." Napoleon had expected this, and was neither surprised nor disturbed. He desired that the ministers and the principal men of the Government should be summoned, and then fell sound asleep; for he was worn out from fatigue, and his mind, prepared for every reverse, was no longer capable of that excitement that repels repose.

The Elysée palace was soon thronged by those who had the curiosity or the right to enter there. Their first occupation was to ask for information concerning the late military events from the officers composing Napoleon's escort. The appearance of these was in itself sufficient. Their clothes, which they had not had time to change, torn by bullets and stained with blood and dust, their countenances inflamed and their eyes red from weeping, told but too plainly what they had suffered. Their grief, as is usual with those who suffer, found vent in painful narrations, and even in exaggerations, if it were possible that imagination could add any thing to what they had already gone through. They could not, indeed, say too much of that fatal battle, or of the great losses that had been sustained; but from the accounts they gave it would seem that the army no longer existed, that it would not be possible to assemble 1000 men; whilst in reality, as we shall soon show, it would have been possible to form an army equal in numbers and superior in discipline to that of 1814. These sad recitals only increased the belief that there was now no choice but to capitulate to the enemy, a belief that had been but too general before, and it now spread from mouth to mouth until it reached the assembly of representatives, who were only too willing to give it full credit. There was no possibility of calming the public mind, rousing the courage of the people, or inspiring them with vigour. Alas! when Providence is about preparing any great event, no accessory circumstance is neglected that may contribute to the general result.

After a short sleep, Napoleon took a bath. It was announced that the ministers were assembled and waited for him. It was Marshal Davout that came to seek him. Napoleon had not seen him before. He let his arms fall back into the water as he saw the marshal enter, and cried, "What a disaster!" The marshal, whose rugged nature did not easily give way to emotion, advised resistance to the

storm, and begged Napoleon not to delay following him. Napoleon, who had torn and resigned himself to every thing, had for no good result from the council that he was about being held, told the marshal that the ministers might commence their deliberations without him, and that he would join them in a few minutes. He delayed some time, and the marshal again implored him to hasten when he proceeded to the council, where he was received with respect and listened to with the most eager curiosity, whilst he briefly but expressively related what had passed, and told of the great hopes of victory which had been succeeded by the disastrous reality of a fearful defeat. Having finished these details, he told the ministers that the country had still great resources, which he would undertake to develop and employ, that there still remained much to be done by a skilful general, that himself was neither discouraged nor dejected, but that he would need the aid, and not the opposition, of the chambers,—that the most essential, since by unanimity it was most likely that all would still be saved, he certainly could not be without it. He then reduced all discussion to the question, how they were to act toward the chambers in order to obtain this unanimity, on which the safety of the State depended. Nobody opposed this; it was the view entertained by all present. Napoleon now gave an opportunity to any one that chose to speak; but no one was inclined to do so, except those devoted men who thought more of their country than of themselves. Among these M. de Caulaincourt might have spoken first; but despair had seized him, and he had fallen into a state of passiveness, from which he did not emerge during the time these painful scenes lasted.

Carnot, that excellent man, was moved even to tears, and, fancying that everybody did as he did, asserted that a revolutionary dictatorship should be created as in 1793, and be trusted not to a committee but to Napoleon, who had become in his eyes the personification of the Revolution. In his zeal for the public welfare he fancied that the chambers would think, judge, and act like him, and therefore advised that they should be asked to appoint Napoleon dictator.

This opinion was not shared by Marshal Davout. Feeling no admiration for assemblies, which he only knew through the Convention and the *Congrès*, he said that they would be opposed and paralyzed by the chambers, which should be got rid of by being dissolved or prorogued as the *Assemblée* had given the sovereign the right to do,—a right which should now be used in order to give an opportunity for collecting the necessary means for opposing and conquering the enemy. His opinion was warmly supported by Fouché, (all the princes were members of the council,) who, as we have seen, had been with his brother since the 20th of March, and who seemed desirous that his present and distant atone for his former opposition. The influence he had shown in past times was a disadvantage, increased by the fact of his now having been a sovereign. Influenced by the memories of the 18th Brumaire, he joined Marshal Davout in advising to get rid of the chambers.

bers, but he found very few to support him. In all assemblies, great or small, the majority are always inclined to a middle course; and here, though the majority admitted that a sort of dictatorship was necessary, they were of opinion that it should be asked for from the chambers that might agree to it, but that in any case the attempt ought to be made.

Admiral Decrès, clear-sighted whenever an error was to be detected, said that this was all mere imagination, for that, though the chambers might submit to Napoleon had he conquered, they would reject him now that he was vanquished,—that, consequently, nothing would be gained by such an appointment from them, at the same time that it would be most dangerous to undertake it without their consent. It was evident that this minister's distrust in the present state of things was in exact proportion to his profound sagacity. M. Fouché had said nothing; but, as his silence seemed to imply disapprobation, he—merely for the sake of saying something—uttered a few phrases expressive of his regret for Napoleon's reverses, a regret he did not feel, and of his confidence in the chambers, a confidence that he would be very sorry was not unfounded. Still, to preserve some consistence between the different parts he was acting in public and private, he said that they should take care not to offend the chambers, and especially not let it be seen that they had an idea of getting rid of them, but that it would be much better by conciliating them to seek to get the resources necessary for saving the dynasty and the country.

M. Regnaud de Saint-Jean d'Angély, who had become the dupe of M. Fouché, thought in all sincerity that he ought to express himself more distinctly than the rest. He said that it was not necessary that he should give any additional proof of his attachment to the Imperial dynasty. He then spoke of the chambers, especially of the opinions entertained by the Chamber of Representatives, who, he asserted, were all imbued with the fatal conviction that the allied Powers were only inimical to Napoleon, and that if he withdrew they would be satisfied and would accept the King of Rome with Maria Louisa as regent. He added that this opinion had taken possession of all minds, even those most disinclined to the Bourbons, and that any other measure would have but very little chance of success. It could not be more plainly stated that the only remedy was that Napoleon should abdicate, and, by sacrificing himself, secure the throne to his son, and save those who had attached themselves to him. Up to this time Napoleon had preserved a gloomy silence, but now, seeing that M. Fouché's plan was influencing even those who were most devoted to him, he suddenly roused himself, and, fixing a penetrating glance on M. Regnaud, he said, "Explain; speak; conceal nothing. My personal safety is not the point in question: that I am ready to sacrifice, and it is but three days since that I did what I could to rid you of me: it is the safety of the State that is to be thought of. Who is it that can save the country now? Is it the Chamber of Representatives? Is it I? What does France know of the members of this chamber of yesterday,

not one of whom is a statesman or a soldier? Is there among them a hand strong enough to hold the reins of government? France knows only me, esteems only me. Do you suppose that the army, which will be sufficiently imposing when rallied, do you suppose that that will obey any voice but mine? And if, as at Saint-Cloud, I should throw all these talkers out of the window, the army would applaud, and France would take no heed. But I do not think of doing so; I can see the difference of times and circumstances. But false ideas must not destroy our unanimity, our only resource at present. Certainly, the safety of the country depending on me alone, I am the apparent object of foreign hate, and it may be believed that if I retire our enemies will be satisfied. You are told that they will accept the King of Rome with his mother as regent. It is a perfidious falsehood, invented at Vienna and propagated at Paris for our destruction. I know what goes on at Vienna, and they would not accept my wife and son at any price. They want the Bourbons, the Bourbons alone, and that is very natural. When I am out of the way, they will march to Paris and proclaim the Bourbons. Do you wish for them? For my part, I do not see but that they may be better than the present state of things. But the army, the peasantry, the holders of national property, all those that hailed my return with joy, do these wish for them? And all of you, upholders of the Imperial family, would it suit you to have the triumphant emigrants return? Personally I have no interest in all this; my career is finished; whatever may happen, the most successful dictatorship would scarcely prolong it a few days. There is no question, I repeat, of me personally, but of France, of the Revolution, and of the interests to which it has given rise, and which may still be saved by unanimity and perseverance. The blow we have received is great, but it is not mortal. None but fugitives remain of the army that fought on the 18th; but if Grouchy, who in all probability was forgotten by the enemy in the ardour of their pursuit of the beaten army, if he have escaped, the fugitives will rally round him. He had 35,000 men, and it is not unlikely but that we can rally as many more, who, though they may be discouraged now, will at the sound of my voice resume their natural heroism. I shall thus have 70,000 soldiers. Rapp and Lecourbe can bring 40,000 more troops of the line, or mobilized National Guards, whilst the Alps will be still guarded by Suchet and Brune. This will place more than 100,000 men under my command. I shall have 10,000 more from Vendée. I had not as many in 1814, when I had at least as many enemies to meet as now. Blücher and Wellington have not actually more than 120,000; and I could make them expiate their victory before the Russians and Austrians could arrive. The Federalists, the depots, the National Guard, and the marines would protect Paris from any sudden attack, and when the works on the left bank are completed the city will be impregnable. Do you not suppose that there would be a great chance with 120,000 men manœuvring between the Seine and the Marne, and in front of an impregnable capital? And in all probability France will not let us fight alone. I raised

180,000 picked National Guards in two months: could I not get 100,000 more? Could I not get 100,000 conscripts? We are backed by hearty patriots who would come to fill our ranks, and a few months of obstinate strife would weary the patience of the allies, who, if we observe the treaties of Paris and Vienna, could have no other motive than self-love for continuing the struggle. What then do we need to save us from ruin? Unanimity, perseverance, and good will!"

We only give the substance of an address, which, bearing the impress of Napoleon's peculiar vigour of thought and expression, made a decided impression on all present, and would have had a still wider influence could it have penetrated beyond the walls of the Elysée palace. But Napoleon could neither appear nor speak in the chambers, nor was there any one to represent him there during the present extraordinary agitation. As we have already seen, the Chamber of Representatives had assembled at an early hour in the morning, and was now anxiously seeking fresh information, when a sinister rumour was suddenly propagated among the members. It was said that a discussion was going on in the Elysée palace as to whether the chambers should be dissolved or prorogued, in fact, that a decision was already come to and would be officially announced in a few moments. It was M. Fouché, who, profiting by the lengthened discussion at the palace, had circulated this perfidious piece of information. It was to M. de Lafayette in particular that he sent the communication, to him who was most convinced that France could only be saved apart from Napoleon. M. de Lafayette, without consulting his colleagues, and calculating on the general feeling, asked permission to speak. His personal consideration, the importance of the present crisis, and the nature of the proposition it was supposed he was about to make, secured him the most serious attention. "Gentlemen," he said, "when now for the first time during so many years I raise a voice which the old friends of liberty will certainly recognise, I feel myself called on to speak to you of the dangers that threaten the country, and which you alone can avert. Alarming rumours have been circulated; they are now unfortunately confirmed. This is the time to rally round the old tricoloured flag, the flag of '89, the flag of liberty, of equality, and of public order. It is that we must defend from the attacks of enemies abroad or at home. Gentlemen, you will allow a veteran in this sacred cause, one who never adopted any party, to submit to you some preliminary resolutions, whose necessity I hope you will appreciate." Having spoken these words with his wonted simplicity, M. de Lafayette proposed a resolution drawn up in five clauses, which declared the country in danger, the two chambers permanently assembled, and that whoever should seek to dissolve or prorogue them should be declared a traitor. To this was added an order for the Ministers of War, of Home and Foreign Affairs, to come at once and inform the Assembly of the present state of their different departments. He then proposed that the National Guards should be called out throughout the whole empire.

M. de Lafayette resumed his seat amid a

general excitement, caused by the unanimity and not by the disagreement of opinion. Adopting this resolution was a violation in many ways of the Additional Act, which conferred on the Emperor the power of dissolving the chambers, and which, though it gave the chamber the right of questioning ministers on any particular fact, did not authorize summoning them to the bar or issuing orders to them. This was, in reality, declaring themselves in a state of revolution; but as they felt that they had entered on this path a step more in advance could not make any great difference. Not one, not even a Bonaparte, remarked that the chamber was thus violating the Additional Act. None spoke but some of these troublesome persons who wish to announce their presence on great occasions when nobody is thinking of them, and only delay the resolutions that all are anxious to adopt. M. de Lafayette's proposal was warmly supported by Lacoste, a deputy from the Gironde, one of those won over by M. Fouché. Another wished that the four ministers should be summoned by a formal order. A third made some observations relative to the organization of the National Guards throughout the empire, and seemed to imply that M. de Lafayette should be appointed commander-in-chief of the army. This last proposal was rejected without discussion; but the rest of the proposition was adopted by an immense majority. It was decided that this resolution should be sent to the Chamber of Peers to be passed there, should the members approve of it. This important measure, the commencement and almost the termination of a revolution already accomplished in men's minds, was passed without dissentient voice, for though the members did not wish for the Bourbons, but would prefer the Imperial dynasty represented by the King of Rome, they were all impressed with the idea that Napoleon's interests should be separated from those of France, and they considered that they were justified in acting thus toward a man whose ambition, in their belief, had ruined the country. They certainly were justified in doing so, especially at a time when legality was a matter of very little consequence, but they showed a want of discernment in supposing that after throwing Napoleon overboard the vessel could still float on the waters of the State. The dynasty itself should be rejected, and with it the principles of the Revolution, though these happily being immortal could not perish.

Whilst the Chamber of Representatives was coming so abruptly to a resolution, was waiting in the greatest anxiety for the answer to its *plébiscite*, copies of the resolution had been taken both to the Chamber of Peers and to the Elysée palace. The members of the Upper Chamber were embarrassed, but offered no opposition. This chamber being accustomed to the performance of its functions, and better skilled in its restraining power, it would in some measure have modified the precipitancy of the Chamber of Representatives. But it was not in the Imperial Senate, from which the greater number had been taken, that the members could have learned to play the part of an English House of Lords. They were chiefly men weary of revolution, disposed

with governments of every kind, who had seen both Napoleon and Louis XVIII. pass away, had flattered both, though estimating them at their just value, knowing that both deserved to fall, and who, notwithstanding the regrets that some might feel in secret, were determined to offer no obstacle to whatever Providence should please to decree. There was, consequently, no opposition offered by them to the resolution proposed in the other chamber. It was not so, nor could it be so, at the Elysée palace. The dart privately prepared by M. Fouché, and publicly flung by M. de Lafayette, struck the wounded lion as he lay motionless but not dead, and roused him again into life. Shaking off the species of lethargy into which he had fallen, and from which he had roused himself but for a moment to reply to M. Regnaud, Napoleon began to pace the chamber rapidly, as was his wont when greatly excited. With contempt and anger he again repeated that, opposed to the 500,000 enemies marching at that moment against France, he was every thing and all others naught, that what had happened in Flanders was only an accident incidental to warfare and might be repaired, that he and the army were alone of any importance, that he would send a few companies of the Guards to dissolve this insolent Assembly, an act that would be admired by the army and not noticed by the people, and that if he assumed the dictatorship it would be for the general welfare. Nobody contradicted him, but after a little while those present sought to calm him, and had scarcely succeeded when a second blow was struck by the announcement that the decree of the Lower Chamber had been passed by the Upper. This immediate and silent consent of a hundred and more peers whom he had appointed but a fortnight before, without offering him a new phase in his knowledge of human nature, still pained him deeply, and awakened the thought that had presented itself to his mind on the very evening of the 18th,—that his sceptre fell from him with his sword. He looked at M. Regnaud with less severity than before, and uttered these strange words:—"Perhaps Regnaud is right in wishing me to abdicate." M. Regnaud had not uttered the word "abdicate," but Napoleon with his usual readiness gave his proposal its right name. "Well, be it so: if it is necessary I will abdicate. I do not think of myself, but of France; I do not resist for myself, but for the country. If that needs me no longer, I will abdicate." These words startled all present, three or four grieved to hear them spoken, seven or eight were pleased, to M. Fouché they caused a secret pleasure, and set M. Regnaud's heart at ease, for though he had abandoned his master he did not mean to betray him. The news of this passed rapidly from one to another, and only facilitated the desertion to which all were but too well inclined.

Though Napoleon was ready to give way to those who though rejecting the Bourbons were doing exactly what would bring them back, he was still deeply wounded by the arrogant terms in which he had been spoken of, and forbade his ministers to obey the summons of the Assembly. "Let them do what they please," he said, "and if they drive me to ex-

tremities by any factious act, (there had been some mention of a dethronement,) at the head of a few companies of veterans I will fling them into the Seine." Lucien gave it as his opinion that there was no time to be lost, he asserted that the longer they delayed the bolder and more daring the Assembly would become, and that the best thing that could be done would be to employ the constitutional powers of the crown and dissolve the chambers at once. Resolute as Marshal Davout had been a little while before, his courage had sunk since the announcement of the resolution passed by both chambers. "The Chamber of Representatives," he said, "should have been dissolved before it had time to pass the resolution, but now that the resolution was passed, and the chamber strengthened by the adhesion of public opinion, it would be nothing less than an 18th Brumaire to attempt a dissolution, when things were by no means suited to such a *coup d'état*." Napoleon hesitated amidst these contradictory opinions, and seemed to lose his distinctive characteristics. Still the man was not changed, as was sufficiently proved by his return from Elba and by his last campaign. But it was his clearness of perception that constituted his weakness at that moment. He saw that all was lost in a political though not in a military point of view, and his resistance was but a last effort of nature. This last struggle between his judgment and his natural inclinations made him seem to hesitate, and that for the first time in his life. "Venture," said Lucien to him. "Alas!" he replied, "I have ventured but too much!" Memorable words, which did honour to his judgment, by condemning his past conduct. During this conversation Napoleon and Lucien had passed into the garden of the palace. In an animated and lively dialogue the former showed his brother how little chance of success there was in the *coup d'état* proposed to him. "In such enterprises," he said, "the state of the public mind at the time must be taken into consideration before acting. On the 18th Brumaire which you are constantly quoting, public feeling was against the assemblies and the ten years of calamity they had caused, and was entirely in favour of men of action, of whom I was looked upon as the very best. The entire public was opposed to the Cinq-Cents, and inclined to me. To-day the public mind has taken the contrary direction. The dominant idea at present is that I am the sole cause of warfare, and the Assembly is looked upon as the check to my ambition and despotism. My ambition has passed away, and over what shall I be despot? But such is the prejudice of men's minds. I think I might throw these representatives into the Seine, though I might meet more opposition from the National Guard than you think. These representatives would hurry through the provinces, excite them against me, saying that I had violated the national representation merely for my own interest and that I may be able to maintain a desperate struggle against Europe, which only asked that I should be removed, to put an end to its enmity and give peace to France. I know that they would not deprive me of the confidence of the entire country, but they would cause a division, and I should

retain what is called the violent party, and should assume the character of a Jacobin Emperor fighting for his crown in opposition not only to all Europe but to all honest men. That would be to undertake a dishonourable and unsuccessful task, for though the country, united under my command, might be able to defend itself, disunited it would be incapable of resistance."

At this moment the Marigny avenue became thronged by numbers attracted by the disastrous news of the defeat of Waterloo. Among these, of course, were many excitable men, some of those who had inscribed their names as federalists, and who, though not anarchists, had all the appearance of such. These were of the lower classes, or old soldiers, who, though they had no idea of overturning the framework of society, were still inflamed with rage at the idea of the enemy's again entering Paris. The wall which then separated the Marigny avenue from the grounds of the Elysée palace was much lower than at present. Some works that had been carried on there had lowered it still more, so that there was scarcely any partition between Napoleon and the crowd. When they saw him, they uttered frantic cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* Numbers of them crowding to the low wall stretched out their hands and implored him to lead them against the enemy. Napoleon bowed, looked at them kindly but mournfully, motioned them to be calm, and then continued his walk with Lucien, who found in this scene an argument in support of his opinion. "If all Frenchmen were as unanimous as these few," said Napoleon to his brother, "you would be right; but they are not. Those members of the chambers who have just rebelled against my authority, and who in a few hours, perhaps, will demand my deposition, these must certainly represent the opinions of a certain number of men in France. They represent those who consider me the cause of this quarrel with Europe, a sufficiently large number to make our disunion most significant. Without unanimity nothing can be done." This was all very true, but how clear must have been that intellect that could see this through the dense cloud of self-interest! But who was to blame if in this fearful conflict France persisted in seeing nothing but Napoleon's ambition opposed by Europe, and that it refused to be any longer compromised by one individual? But France was wrong; as she had allowed herself to be compromised by him, she should have stood by him until the struggle was ended, and then cast him aside, as Sieyès advised. But in this world error begets error, and men are not less injured by those they actually commit than by those they occasion.

Whilst time was thus lost in inevitable discussions, and, as is usual, the intervals of events were filled by useless words, the Assembly was waiting impatiently for a reply to its message; the members, inflated by the pride of compelling obedience, and at the same time fearing that violence might be used against them, gave vent to their feelings in useless and offensive speeches. They even thought of appointing immediately a commander-in-chief of the National Guards of Paris, which would have been perfectly illegal, as the Emperor

alone had the right to do so, and that he was then commanded by General Durosnel, Lieutenant to Napoleon. This proposition was rejected. It would not be so very easy to seize the executive power so suddenly, with the monarch, the legal depositary of this power, was at the Elysée palace, conquered, it is true, but still one of the most awe-inspiring of men. Apart from the consideration in which General Durosnel was generally held, the little indication that was felt either by revolutionary Bonapartists, or even by many of the moderate party for M. de Lafayette, the candidate whose appointment was most strongly intimated, prevented this proposal from being adopted. They confined themselves to demanding that an actual titular should be appointed to watch over the safety of the Assembly. Meanwhile the members, anxious for a reply, threatened to send a formal order and not a request to the ministers, and some supporters of the Imperial dynasty hastened to the palace to say that Napoleon's dethronement would be immediately decreed if the ministers did not once comply with the invitation that had been sent them. M. Regnaud and M. de Bassano requested Napoleon to come to a decision, as he seemed inclined to adopt their advice, yielding in some measure to the wishes of the Chamber of Representatives. But before allowing the ministers to appear at the bar of the Assembly, it should be decided what he should say, for up to this time the Emperor had been confined to the possibility or impossibility of dissolving the chambers. This would require a little time, and as persons were arriving constantly at the palace in fulfilment of the impatience of the representatives, Napoleon, with disgust and almost with contempt, and without hope of any important result, consented that M. Regnaud should leave to the Assembly, ask for a short delay, and announce that an Imperial message would be sent in a few minutes.

The Assembly listened to M. Regnaud with the ardent and childish curiosity of revolutionary times, quite satisfied to hear that the resolution that had been passed was not based upon a crime, and that the delay had not been occasioned by deference to its wisdom, and not through a determination to resist. The members became somewhat calmer, but it was still evident that their patience would not last long. M. Fouché's followers, now the outcasts of M. Regnaud, who had no idea that he was only the instrument of an intriguer, told him that it was amazing what an abuse had been made by the public mind, that all were unanimous in desiring an abdication, that they were willing to allow Napoleon the honour of laying down the sceptre, but that if he did not do so at once that it would be wrong to let him. It was in vain that M. Regnaud sought to calm them; he, ever devoted to the Empire, would sacrifice the father only that he might save the son, and had the greatest horror of a deposition that would overthrow the very dynasty itself. The members told him they would wait, but on condition that the abdication should be assured and quick. M. Fouché's pretended private communication with Vienna, which had been announced from bench to bench, and looked upon by all

as perfectly true, had convinced them that the allied Powers would consent to the regency of Maria Louisa.

M. Regnaud returned to the Elysée palace, where it had been, meantime, resolved that a message should be carried to the chambers by those ministers who had been summoned to attend. The message was to inform the Assembly of the disaster that had befallen the army, and that without exaggeration, to assure the members that the country still possessed abundant resources, and to propose to them that a commission should be appointed, which, in conjunction with the Government, would seek, select, and determine how these should be employed. Carnot, Minister of the Interior, was to present this message to the Chamber of Peers, and Prince Lucien, accompanied by the other ministers, to the Chamber of Representatives. The Additional Act gave Napoleon the right to be represented in the chambers by commissioners of his own choosing, and it was for this purpose he had now sent Prince Lucien, still the most popular of the princes of the family, from the firmness he had shown on the 18th Brumaire. Napoleon had put aside all hope or even desire of success, but he wished that a man, at once eloquent and true to his cause, should be present to repel the insults he expected, nor was he sorry to have an opportunity of showing his ministers that he was not satisfied with the zeal they had shown on this occasion. From these he excepted Carnot, whom M. Fouché had called Napoleon's dupe, and thus deprived him of public confidence, as also M. de Caulaincourt, who could only be useful at a congress or on a battle-field.

The deputation first proceeded to the Chamber of Peers, where the message was received without a remark; the members deferred coming to a resolution until the other chamber should have spoken. Little time was spent in going to the Lower Chamber, but it was more than sufficient for the impatience of the members. It was six o'clock when the ministers arrived, and at a moment when no words would suffice to appease the excitement of the members. The Imperial message was announced, and so great was the consequent commotion, that it was some time before the members could be induced to be calm, to keep silence, or to listen. It was decided that the meeting should be private, as this communication, which had been so ardently desired, might be the subject of discussion, and, perhaps, of important revelations. The public was, therefore, excluded, and it was nearly seven o'clock when Prince Lucien mounted the rostrum. The prince, having announced that he appeared there as Imperial commissioner, proceeded to declare the contents of the message. "France," he said, "had experienced a great but not irreparable misfortune. With unanimity and firmness among those in authority, the country, being possessed of vast resources, could still meet the enemy face to face. As the Emperor was anxious that the representatives of the country should assist him in collecting and employing these resources, he asked that five members from each chamber would assist him in determining on the best mode of saving the country, and that

the supplies should be immediately voted, and applied as required."

The prince was not received badly. He knew how to comport himself in such a position: besides, as we have already remarked, having never worn a crown, his appearance was not suggestive of that ambition that had ruined France. For these reasons he was listened to with attention. However, he told the representatives nothing new: they had already heard that the army had been brave but unfortunate at Mont Saint-Jean, that it had fought well and successfully at Ligny; they knew that the country still possessed resources, and that the Government wished for the assistance of the chambers in collecting, selecting, and applying them. But all this had no connection with what was now the dominant thought of all—the abdication of the man who was looked on as the sole cause of the war, after whose retirement from power the allies would consent to accept his son. Were the great captain still victorious, the country would be compensated for the hatred he inspired throughout Europe; but he was no longer a guarantee for victory, and that hatred still existed which had raised all Europe in arms against France. Besides, as it was his own despotism that had provoked this hatred, they need feel no scruple as to how they acted toward him, even without taking into account that they were securing the crown to his son. This was the reasoning which had naturally and invincibly taken possession of all minds. They did not see that it was with Napoleon alone they had any chance of resisting, that when he should be gone they would be obliged to yield and accept the Bourbons—to whom we can see no objection, but who were hateful to that very assembly—but they hurried on, believing that by getting rid of Napoleon they would free themselves from the most imminent danger, and adopt the means most certain to secure peace.

M. Jay, urged on by the Duke of Otranto, and worthy, indeed, of a better guide, vehemently demanded permission to speak. His appearance commanded universal silence, for all knew what he was about to propose, and were anxious to know what would be the result.

He commenced by making some unnecessary remarks as to the danger he ran by speaking on this occasion, as if any thing was to be dreaded from him who had been defeated at Waterloo! Still this commencement was listened to with an intense interest and attention, whose very excess gave additional encouragement to the speaker. Then, turning to the ministers, M. Jay proposed two formal questions to them, equally direct and embarrassing. He told them to lay their hands on their hearts and declare whether they believed that France, by the greatest efforts of daring, could oppose the armies of Europe, and whether peace was not absolutely indispensable; and secondly, whether that was not impossible so long as Napoleon remained at the head of the Government. Having said this, M. Jay looked at the ministers and waited some time for their reply. All eyes were turned on them and seemed to demand an immediate answer. They did not speak, but there was one among them who

dared not to remain longer silent, he whose perfidious whisperings had made men believe that if Napoleon were removed Europe would be satisfied and accept his son. So interrogative did the looks of the Assembly become, that M. Fouché felt himself compelled to speak. He advanced to the rostrum with his pale, sinister, and untruthful face, and merely said that the ministers, having delivered the opinion of the Government in the Imperial message, had nothing further to say. This ridiculously evasive reply was unsatisfactory to all. It showed that though M. Jay was M. Fouché's dupe, he was not his accomplice. Little satisfied with the ambiguous reply he had elicited, M. Jay continued his discourse, and gave an alarming, but unfortunately a faithful, description of the existing state of things. He first spoke of the internal state of the country, and endeavoured to prove that Napoleon had turned all parties against him,—the royalists his original opponents, and the liberals who had become estranged by his intolerable despotism. He then spoke of the 20th of March, of the hopes that had been entertained of it at the commencement, but which had been destroyed by the Additional Act; then, speaking with all the prejudice of the period, he declared that Napoleon, having lost the confidence of the liberals, and never having possessed that of the royalists, could no longer rally Frenchmen round him, or direct their energy against the enemy. M. Jay described the passions Napoleon had excited in Europe, quoted the manifestoes of the allies, which declared that they did not war against France but against Napoleon, and undertook to show that though he might make another effort more successful than that of the 18th of June, still that implacable Europe would unceasingly renew its efforts; that the army might indeed reap fresh laurels, but must yield at last; and then he asked whether, considering this twofold danger, of France disunited by Napoleon, and all Europe allied against them, it was not his duty to offer to resign his authority, and the duty of the chambers to accept that resignation, or even demand it. Encouraged by the general approbation, M. Jay, who did not possess either the energy or action of a true orator, warmed by degrees into real eloquence. He said that he appealed to Napoleon's genius and patriotism to deliver France from the danger into which he had plunged it. Then turning to Lucien, as though to make him in some sort the interpreter of ruined France, "It is you, prince," he said, "you whose disinterestedness and independence are well known, you who have never been misled by the charms of a throne, it is you who must advise and counsel your illustrious brother, show him that of his thousand victories, whose immortal glory cannot be dulled by the late defeat, not one could be so great as that he would now gain over himself by surrendering his sceptre to this Assembly, that is unwilling to wrest it from him, and willing to confer it on his son, and thus avert the dangers of a second invasion, a hundredfold more to be dreaded than the first." The speaker's powers were exalted by the circumstances in which he was placed, and for the time he obtained an influence which he never possessed before or after, though he always inspired a well-merited esteem. Prince Lucien im-

mediately replied. He spoke eloquently, inspired as he was by circumstances, fraternal affection, and his own talents. All crises are improved by being placed in some great or critical position, which, compelling them to neglect all accessory ornament, forces them to confine themselves to true and fundamental arguments. Indeed, there was much to be said in favour of Napoleon. Lucien would surely have been embarrassed in presence of a calm, clear-sighted, and courageous royalist, who would say, "Once the Bonapartes are conquered they lose their merit; they being put aside, the Bourbons must be accepted. Under the Bourbons, liberty may be achieved by perseverance, much more easily than under Napoleon, who is the representative of physical force. Revolution effected by foreigners is certainly a great misfortune, but this occurring now for the second time within fifteen months is your fault, is the consequence of your faults; refuse now let us negotiate with Europe, since you have reduced us to this extremity, and that our hopes of victory are too weak to tempt us to try again to conquer fortune by arms." Had this assembly there was no intelligent and bold royalist to hold such language. There were there only revolutionists and liberals who would not accept the Bourbons on any terms, and who were weak enough to believe that they could defend themselves and treat with the enemy without Napoleon's aid. Many would be given to such men as these. Lucien knew it, and acted on that knowledge. He commenced by showing that the state of things at home and abroad had been exaggerated, and that neither was as bad as M. Jay had described. Making use of the details furnished by the Emperor, he said that though the army in the north had been beaten it was not badly destroyed, that 30,000 of the men that had fought at Mont Saint-Jean could still be collected, who joined to Grouchy's corps, still, in all probability, entire, would amount to 60,000, superior to any soldiers of the enemy; that the Generals Rapp, Lecourbe, and Lamourgue (no longer needed in Vendée) would bring 30,000, and that with this army in front, and protected by fortifications, Paris, with 600 cannon and 60,000 men supplied by the depots, the marines, the Federalists and National Guard, would be safe from every attack; that they would thus have time for reflection, time to collect fresh resources; that the conscription of 1815, the application to all France of the mobilization of the picked National Guard would furnish 200,000 or 300,000 men, all of whom in the hands of a commander like Napoleon would leave no room for despair, or the prospect of submitting to conditions imposed by a insolent conqueror; that if those external evils were not as bad as they had been represented, he would show that the internal state of the country had been still more exaggerated. France was unanimous in rejecting the denunciation of the emigrants, there was but a small minority in favour of them, a minority more arrogant than dangerous, which had thrown off the mask in La Vendée, but had been conquered in a few days by General Lamourgue; that, with the exception of these few parties of the emigrants, all had but one desire, the national independence and constitutional li-

berty under that prince whom France had received with so much joy on the 20th of March; that indeed errors of judgment might produce discord, but that it depended on the Assembly to terminate these by standing by the man who had assembled them, and who alone was capable of meeting the enemy; the representatives had only to speak and the whole nation would join them; that it was the most fatal and ridiculous illusion to think of appeasing foreign hate by abandoning Napoleon; that these foreigners had said the very same things in 1814, by which, the Senate being deceived, Napoleon was put aside, the Bourbons were brought back, and France was deprived of her fortresses, her war matériel, and her frontiers; that the promise to be satisfied by the withdrawal of Napoleon was only a *ruse de guerre* to separate the nation from its head; the enemy, indeed, might use such devices, but Frenchmen would render themselves the laughing-stocks of contemporaries and posterity by giving them credence. Then, approaching a more delicate part of his subject, Lucien added, "Think also, my dear fellow-citizens, of the honour and dignity of France. What will the civilized world, what will posterity, say, when, after having received Napoleon with transport on the 20th of March, having declared that he was a hero come to deliver the country, and having taken a fresh oath of fidelity to him at the *Champ de Mai*, twenty-five days later, now, because a battle has been lost, because foreigners threaten, you have declared that he is the sole cause of your misfortunes, and will drive him from that throne to which you so lately called him? Will you not expose France to the reproach of inconsistency and fickleness if you abandon Napoleon now?" This accusation, though true, but for which circumstances were alone to blame, offended the Assembly, and immediately provoked a terrible reply; for when, in large assemblies, certain truths are rather felt than expressed, it needs but a word to loose them from their source. M. de Lafayette rose opposite to Lucien, and interrupted him with an irresistible reply, as he said, in a tone cold and trenchant as steel, "Prince, you calumniate the nation. Posterity will not blame France for abandoning Napoleon, but, alas! for having obeyed him too long. Frenchmen have followed him to the plains of Italy, through the burning sands of Egypt, through the heats of Spain, across the plains of Germany and the frozen deserts of Russia. 600,000 Frenchmen lie on the banks of the Ebro and the Tagus. Can you tell how many fell on the banks of the Danube, the Elbe, the Niemen, and the Moskowa? Alas! had the country been less faithful to him, two millions of her children might have been saved. Your brother, your family, —we all should have been saved from the precipice down which we have fallen, and from which we know not whether there is any escape." Though Prince Lucien was guiltless of any share in the errors of his brother, these words fell on his ear as the voice of posterity pronouncing judgment on his brother, and deprived his speech of its effect. He had, however, succeeded in calming the Assembly somewhat, less by his reasoning, though eloquently enunciated, than by his great resemblance to

the great conquered man whom they were about to cast into the chasm, though they could not tell whether even by sacrificing him it could be closed. M. Jay and Prince Lucien were succeeded by some other speakers. M. Henri Lacoste and M. Manuel prolonged the discussion and involuntarily lessened its violence a little. The desire of a voluntary abdication on Napoleon's part was all that was yet intimated. To pronounce his deposition was an act of which no one could at that time be found capable. The Government demanded that two committees should be appointed by the chambers to assist in considering what was to be done for the safety of the country. These two committees might by negotiation obtain what the direct intervention of the Assembly would make appear a degradation both for the chamber and Napoleon. The truth of this was felt, and the proposed measure adopted almost unanimously. The Chamber of Representatives resolved its own bureau into a committee. It consisted of the president, M. Lanjuinais, and the four vice-presidents, MM. de Flaugergues, de Lafayette, Dupont de l'Eure, and Grenier. The committee of the Chamber of Peers consisted of the president, the High-Chancellor Cambacérès, and of MM. Boissy d'Anglas, Thibaudeau, Drouot, Andréossy, and Dejean. These two committees were to meet the ministers with portfolios and the ministers of state in the hall in which the Conseil d'Etat held its sittings at the Tuilleries, to deliberate on the important subjects submitted to their consideration. They were summoned to meet that very evening, that a definite resolution might be presented to the chambers on the following day.

In the mean time, a constant communication had been kept up with the Elysée palace. The Duke de Rovigo, M. Lavalette, M. Benjamin Constant, and Prince Lucien had returned thither, and concealed from Napoleon nothing of what had passed. Lucien told him there was no longer time for deliberation, and that he must choose at once between a bold stroke or an immediate abdication, so as to prevent some offensive resolution being passed by the chamber. This was the truth, nor did Napoleon deny it. He sometimes became excited when he considered with how little generosity he was treated, and that it was still in his power to seize on the dictatorship, by summoning those Federalists who crowded beneath his windows, uttering cries of despairing patriotism. Giving way to such feelings for a few moments, he then fell back into a state of apathy, of disgust, and showed some inclination to abdicate, at the same time that he uttered bitter sarcasms against those who thought of saving themselves by such a sacrifice. "Take no heed of these men," said the Duke de Rovigo, with his wonted truthful familiarity. "Some of them are bewildered, and others are misled by Fouché. As they cannot see that nobody can save them but you, leave them to their fate. In a week these foreigners will be here, will shoot a few of them, exile others, give them back the Bourbons they deserve, and put an end to this miserable farce. Come, sire, with a few faithful followers to America, and enjoy the repose that both you and we need." The same advice was given

in grave, gentle, and mournful tones by M. Lavalette. Napoleon took what was said in very good part, and let them see that in reality he agreed with them and would act as they advised. He had a long conversation with M. Benjamin Constant, but one of a very different nature. With him, he considered the abdication from the most elevated point of view, and as though it had no personal interest for him. It was quite evident that his most painful feeling was the idea of having been beaten by Europe, and that he had no desire to reign when men's minds were so unsettled, that his ambition had sunk beneath his contempt of men and things, and that the only happiness he could ask in future was the society of a few friends in some peaceful and safe retreat. But it was the risk of abandoning a cause not entirely lost that compelled him, despite his inclinations, to deliberate on his accepting or refusing to make the sacrifice required of him. It seemed to him that there still a chance of conquering the European Powers, or at least of obliging them to negotiate, and so setting the Bourbons aside, that it would be on his part, at once, fraud, folly, and weakness to surrender, and that he would be one day condemned at the tribunal of sound policy for having yielded too easily. As a father, he would willingly sacrifice himself to secure the crown to his son, but, now that he knew what sort of person his wife was, he foresaw that his son was already doomed to be sacrificed to European distrust, a child destined to die a prisoner among foreigners. He smiled with disdain when told that if he abdicated Europe would consent to accept the King of Rome and Maria Louisa. With the clear vision of genius, he saw that the Bourbons would be re-established within a week after his departure, that the greater number of those who had wrested his sword from him would be dispersed or punished, and M. Fouché himself reserved for a late but certain chastisement. Thus looking into the future he could see himself avenged of all his domestic enemies. But what chiefly occupied his attention was the consideration whether, whilst there were still so many chances against foreign enemies, he ought to yield to Blücher or Wellington, and he asked himself if it were not folly or cowardice not to do all that was possible to avoid so dire an extremity. He had a long conversation on this subject with M. Benjamin Constant, a conversation in which he displayed both penetration and calmness. To him he repeated that the army recognised but himself, that he needed but utter one word to disperse these representatives whom he himself had admitted to the arena, but that to do that he should place himself at the head of the party then shouting beneath his windows, lead it against honest men, and become a kind of revolutionary Emperor dragging pinioned France behind him as he went to encounter all Europe allied against him. To this, he said, he felt the greatest repugnance, and that though it would be his greatest pleasure to lead willing France against the enemy, he could never think of undertaking a desperate strife whilst Frenchmen were disunited, but would rather settle as a planter in the virgin forests of America.

Whilst this discussion was going on at the Elysée palace, the committees from both chambers had arrived at the Tuilleries. They, with the ministers, assembled in the hall of the Council of State, deserted now and badly lighted, presenting a mournful contrast to what it had formerly been when Napoleon, at the summit of his glory, presided over the assembled sections and ruled them as much by the vigour of his intellect as by the prestige of his then all-potent authority. Prince Cambacérès opened the proceedings by enumerating the objects of discussion. All imposed some restraint on themselves, but some zealous men belonging to each committee were anxious to enter on the true, the only, question of the day, that of the abdication. They commenced by making protestations of devotion to the public welfare, and wished to lay down as principle that they were prepared to make any sacrifice but that of the liberty of the country and the integrity of its possessions. It was most ridiculous to draw up and put to the vote such resolutions, by which they implicitly pronounced that dethronement that they dared not declare explicitly. The propositions and the reply made to it were accepted, but considered only as a general declaration of devotion to the public welfare. The resources of the country in its actual disastrous condition were next taken into consideration. They spoke of the army, the finances, and lastly of how order was to be preserved by the repression of all hostile parties in the Empire. The army was to be recruited immediately by means of the conscription of 1815, as to the legality of which there was some discussion. None objected to this measure, by which 100,000 men would be raised, some of whom had served before. The state of the finances was next considered, and an issue of underquer bills was spoken of by which 30,000,000 or 40,000,000 might be immediately procured. Lastly, a preventive law was discussed, which would arm the executive against hostile parties, to which not an objection was made by any one present, though nearly all were sworn friends of liberty. They agreed to every thing, anxious to arrive at the most important question,—the abdication.

Having decided on the resources for carrying on the war, it was next considered necessary to see how a peace might be concluded, a most important point, warfare being so uncertain not to render it desirable that it should be terminated as quickly as possible. This was the question whose solution all were impatiently awaiting, and M. de Lafayette was not determined than the others, asked if it was not evident that peace, or even negotiation, was impossible as long as Napoleon was at the head of the Government.

This question, proposed in presence of Napoleon's ministers, and some members of the committee who were devoted to the imperial dynasty, was received with loud murmurs. The ministers replied that had they held the same opinion as M. de Lafayette, they would have said so to the Emperor, and made it the subject of a separate proposition in the present conference. M. de Lafayette said he would accept the proposition as it was put, and as they would have made it their

had they considered it necessary, he did so now, as he considered it indispensable. He then demanded that all those present should declare whether, as he himself convinced, Napoleon's being at the head of government did not render peace impossible, the continuation of war inevitable, and consequently the safety of the country as problematic as the success of the war. To do this would be to pronounce a deposition, which no one was willing to do, though desired an abdication. Prince Cambacérès, who presided, declared that he would not put such a question to the vote. M. de Lavalette's proposition was thus put aside, but it was admitted that whilst they prepared for it would be also necessary to negotiate, that to do so some form should be adopted which would allow them to open diplomatic negotiations with the European Powers who had only refused to reply to, but even to receive, Napoleon's communications. It was frequently suggested, as a middle course, to go to the coalesced camp a commission of negotiators, who would present themselves not as Napoleon's name but in that of the chambers. There would be very exacting indeed who would be content with this proposition, which was implicit abdication of Napoleon, since the important function of the executive authority, that of negotiating with foreign Powers, thus exercised independently of and apart from him. It was certainly monstrously illegal, equality had been so little thought of in the resolutions of the chambers, that that was out of little consequence. The proposition passed, and it was decided that the differences adopted in this conference should be presented to the Emperor by his ministers, and to the chambers by persons chosen from a committee. General Grenier, a distinguished officer of the republic, a sensible and interested man, was appointed to make the report to the Lower Chamber. But as the resolutions that had been passed fell short of what was desired by that assembly, the ministers, M. Regnaud in particular, requested General Grenier and his colleagues to delay some days, promising that they should then have sooner delivered their report, than an imperial message should come to satisfy the desire number of the members of both chambers, who considered that the safety of the State depended on Napoleon's abdication. The whole night had been occupied by this conference. At an early hour on the morning of the 22d many persons hastened to the Élysée palace to offer Napoleon advice, a proceeding which none would have ventured to formerly, especially in such grave circumstances. His sacrifice was already made; for, at the conference of the preceding night, it would be impossible for things to come as they were. How could he consent to negotiations, in which he was to have no part, being carried on with the enemy? Would it be to allow himself to be excluded from Government? It would have been a real disgrace, and he had no choice, if he would submit to it, but to crush that Assembly appealing to the people, and attempting, supported by disunited France, to carry on war against united Europe. Napoleon, as

we have seen, had already decided this point. Still two feelings within him rebelled, his natural instinct and his objection to abandon a cause not entirely lost. It was painful to him to descend from a throne; for it was to exchange it for a narrow prison: it was painful to him to renounce a struggle which, as his military knowledge showed him, still offered many chances. But convinced that disunion, though it might be appeased by his absence, would certainly not cease to exist whilst he remained, he resolved to yield. But he felt hurt when, with indecent haste, he was pressed to decide. It was sad and painful to see the agony of his strong will, in which his genius and reverses lost something of that dignity with which they should ever be invested, more especially in moments of such vital importance. Napoleon was alternately calm, gentle, and at the utmost ironical, but only irritated when urged too much. He had no objection to the advice of those who, like the Duke de Rovigo, Count Lavalette, and the Duke de Bassano, told him to abandon men who were not worthy that he should save them, to bear his imperishable glory with him to the free, unbounded wilds of America, and there end his life in profound repose, gazed on with admiration by a world that would do him justice after he should have retired from its precincts. But such advice was taken ill when given by those who seemed to expect some advantage from the sacrifice, either for themselves or for the public. He considered these as misled either by M. Fouché or by their own interests. For this reason he gave a very unfriendly reception to M. Regnaud and such as he, when they came to speak on a subject of which everybody was speaking at that sad time.

Part of the morning was passed in the palace and grounds of the Élysée in these painful perplexities. Better news came now from the army than what Napoleon and his officers had brought from Laon. Grouchy, who was thought to be lost, had got safe and sound to Rocroy, and with him more than 30,000 zealous men, around whom would rally the fugitives from Waterloo. Those already arrived at Laon amounted to 20,000, and these would soon increase to 30,000 or 40,000, armed and provided with artillery. In a few days an army of 60,000 men could be assembled, who, with the depôts, the federalists, and the troops from the west, would amount to 100,000, an army sufficient to cover Paris. This was infinitely better than what had been expected, when it was thought that Paris would be entirely unprotected and compelled to surrender unconditionally. The Minister of War was immediately sent to the Chamber of Representatives, to see if this intelligence had led to any useful reflections, or to the desire of preserving for these troops that leader who, in 1814, with much inferior forces, had held the balance of fate in his hand.

The Assembly had met at nine in the morning, and had shown stronger symptoms of impatience than on the preceding days. An effort was made to defer General Grenier's report for some time; but the members could not take an interest in any other subject than that which occupied their thoughts. There was no

choice but to yield. At about ten o'clock General Grenier rose to address the Assembly, and to him was granted the silence refused to the other speakers. He briefly enumerated the different measures which had been adopted that night at the Tuileries, and concluded with a detailed account of the principal resolution, that which decided that negotiators should be sent in the name of the chambers to the camp of the allies. This was a half consent to the abdication, and the other half was certain to come in a few moments. But, notwithstanding this disappointment, impatience and even anger were expressed by every countenance, and murmured by many voices. This speaker, unaccustomed to such scenes, stammered out some words, asking them to wait a little; for he said that the ministers had promised him that the present communication would soon be completed by an Imperial message. But this was not sufficient, and several speakers hastened to the rostrum to propose resolutions that would only tend to hasten the event so much desired. But, as none of these was of sufficient importance or dignity, the Assembly paid no attention to them, as they unnecessarily succeeded one another in the midst of this indescribable confusion. Suddenly those who had been influenced by the Duke of Otranto came to announce that the victim was about to defend himself, and that he must be restrained if they did not wish to be sacrificed by him, for the army, having heard what was going on, was prepared to go to any lengths to prolong Napoleon's reign; that intelligence had been received of Grouchy, who had escaped, and was advancing to Laon with 60,000 men. The prospect of such resources might restore Napoleon the firmness that seemed to have forsaken him, so that there was no time to lose. This was soon confirmed by the account of military affairs brought by the Minister of War. The impatience with which he was listened to was in proportion to the importance of his communication. What he said, far from changing the opinion of the listeners, only confirmed them in the resolution they had taken. Once the human mind becomes passionately desirous of any object, every thing urges it forward, even what seemed calculated to act as a restraint. Some said that these 60,000 men would furnish Napoleon with a pretext for retaining power, and he would perhaps even employ them against the Assembly; others said that they should profit by them to negotiate a peace, and that independent of the man who rendered peace impossible. The excitement increased so far, that it was at length proposed that the act of deposition should be put to the vote. This idea soon became general; but one of the representatives, General Solignac, who had long since fallen into disfavour with Napoleon, and who was a man of ill-regulated but generous feelings, now stopped the Assembly, saying that they would thus insult a man who had reigned for fifteen years, to whom Frenchmen had so lately sworn allegiance, and who had commanded their armies with incomparable glory; a man who deserved their respect, and for whom it was not too much to ask one hour to give him time to lay down the sceptre they wished to

wrest from him. "An hour! let it be an hour!" cried hundreds of voices; and a species of shame took possession of this assembly that really wished to preserve the Imperial dynasty, and the fatal delay was passed. One hour allowed for abdication to the man who had ruled the world, and who, ten months before, had been received by this people with such rapture! What a sad and fearful lesson to unbounded ambition!

Although a long time had elapsed since General Solignac had presented himself before Napoleon, he now hurried of his own accord to the Elysée palace. He was deeply moved when he saw this mighty Emperor, once so powerful, but now sunk in an abyss of misery. Napoleon, whose reception of one of his most favoured servants when they came to urge his abdication had been any thing but gracious, was most affectionate to a man who had been so long in disfavour, but who he sought and obtained for him an hour's reprieve. He told him that there was no need of intimation, that the act of abdication was proposed, and that he was about to sign it. He then led him into the garden, where his presence immediately elicited loud cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* from the crowd, and let him see how much power was still at his command. He asked the general whether he believed that the tumultuous assembly he had left, and would return to, was capable of originating a government, a government that could offer serious opposition to the enemy, and whether the abdication would not lead to the immediate return of the Bourbons escorted by 100,000 foreigners. This could scarcely be denied. General Solignac, seizing his hands, which were bedewed with tears, fully agreed with him, and Napoleon, touched by the emotion of this honest soldier, and satisfied since he had convinced him of the inconsistency of those who desired his abdication, clasped his hands and dismissed him, promising him that the Imperial message should be immediately sent to the hall of representatives. He then took a pen and commenced drawing up the document, wishing that it should be entirely his own deed; and he was right, for none but he could find words sufficiently dignified for such an occasion.

Having written a few sentences, Napoleon returned to his cabinet, where Joseph, Louis, and M. Regnaud said he ought to stipulate that the crown should be secured to his son. He turned on M. Regnaud a glance expressive of the bitterest contempt for M. Fouché's triumphant policy. "My son!" he repeated twice or thrice, "my son! what a chimera! No, it is not in favour of my son, but of the Bourbons, that I abdicate. They, at least, are not prisoners at Vienna!" Having spoken these words worthy of his genius, he drew up the following declaration:—

"Frenchmen,—

"When I commenced the war in defence of the national independence, I calculated on being assisted by the exertions and wisdom of all, and on obtaining the aid of the national authorities. I was justified in expecting to succeed, and I dared the declaration issued against me by the maligned French.

"Circumstances seem to have changed. I offer myself as a sacrifice to the hatred of the enemies of France. May they be sincere in their protestations, and feel no enmity but against me alone! My political life is ended, and I proclaim my son Emperor of France, under the title of Napoleon II.

"The present ministry will form a provisional council of government. I am impelled by interest for my son to request the chambers to appoint a legal regency without delay.

"Be united for the sake of the public safety, and that you may continue to be an independent nation."
 NAPOLEON."

This act was signed at half-past twelve, and taken to the Upper Chamber by the Minister Carnot, and to the Lower by the Duke of Otranto. The latter scarcely concealed the joy he felt at receiving what he considered the bulletin of his victory. It was near one o'clock when he arrived at the Chamber of Representatives, whither he had been preceded by several officials. The hour granted to General Solignac was long past, and but for the appearance of the triumphant conspirator come to appease the general impatience, it is probable that all respect toward him who had been vanquished at Waterloo would have been forgotten. When it was announced that the Duke of Otranto had arrived with the Imperial message, the representatives hastened pell-mell to take possession of every disengaged spot, where they stood silently listening whilst the president with much emotion read the declaration we have already quoted. Who would believe it? Those men who had shown so much impatience and anger, either affected by the dignity of the style, the greatness of the man's character and misfortunes, or by the mere success of their own attempt, remained silent for a while, and then gave way to a deep and universal emotion. A few moments were passed in exchanging expressions of pity, gratitude, and regret, and some began to see that if it would have been a difficult task to save the country with Napoleon, it would be utterly impossible to do so without him. They had been urged, as one may say, against their wills to act as they had done, and they began to feel an indistinct consciousness that they had thus secured the triumph, not of the Revolution and the Imperial dynasty, but of the Bourbons. This was no injury either to France or liberty, but it was strange to see it effected by these representatives, who were all accomplices or partisans of the Revolution of the 20th of March.

The Duke of Otranto then presented his pallid countenance at the rostrum, to demand, like a hypocrite as he was, that when France stipulated for her own safety, she should also stipulate that Napoleon's life, liberty, and the security of his retreat should be sacred; in a word, he proposed that a commission should be immediately appointed to treat with the camp of the allies. This almost unnecessary proposal he made solely to have an opportunity of showing that pitiful assembly—whose turn to abdicate was so soon to come—the ridiculous dictator that was to rule over France for one fortnight. M. Fouché was listened to without any particular atten-

tion, for, after the ample satisfaction that had been given, nobody thought of failing in respect to fallen genius, or of deferring a single hour the negotiation of a peace apparently so important, but in reality so useless, as we shall soon see. But a more important question remained to be discussed, one likely to occasion more dissension, that of replacing the executive authority rendered vacant by the Emperor's abdication. A field was now opened for party intrigue, and the declamations of those restless spirits who always bestir themselves on great occasions, either from inherent vanity that makes them desirous of attracting public attention, or from the mere necessity of action. The members of the present Assembly were all revolutionists or Bonapartists, that is, they wished for revolutionary principles put into operation by a Bonaparte, but not by him who alone was capable of doing what they desired. They asked for nothing but peace with the Additional Act which had been so much decried, and Napoleon II. whose father had been dethroned. But though the Duke of Otranto had promised that they should have Napoleon II., he began to doubt himself of the fulfilment of that promise, and did not hesitate to express his doubts, now that the positive assertions which he had used in order to dethrone Napoleon were no longer necessary. Fouché's emissaries went about saying that though it would be desirable to put Napoleon II. on the throne, still that should not be made an absolute condition, lest it might offend the allied sovereigns and prevent the commencement of negotiations. "Besides," added these men, "though feeling a preference for Napoleon II., the safety of France should not be compromised for a child who is a prisoner in Austria, and probably condemned to remain there; but if, for example, we could get an enlightened, liberal prince, one who has already adopted the Revolution and broken forever with the emigrants, and with him a constitutional monarchy, it would not be wise to refuse for the sake of a child, who is almost a foreigner, for nothing is of so much importance as to secure the liberty and safety of France." These insinuations referred to the Duke of Orleans, to whom the attention of many persons was turned, although he had not given any person the right to do so. Though neither himself nor anybody else had thought of proposing him, still his liberality, his prudent but evident opposition to the policy which ended by leading Louis XVIII. to Ghent, his military services during the Republic, and even the memory of his father, made him a desirable sovereign for the Revolutionists, the new liberals, and the army. Though the Assembly had pronounced in favour of Napoleon II., the members would have consoled themselves could they have got in exchange the head of the younger Bourbon branch. The army would not consider itself so completely sacrificed if placed under a prince of military reputation, and, as we have seen, the Emperor Alexander, discontented with the emigrants, had himself, at Vienna, proposed the Duke of Orleans, and had only yielded to the decided opposition of England and Austria. M. Fouché would be satisfied with this prince, but he had no hope that the allied sovereigns would consent, and,

if he encouraged others to hope, it was only to use him as a mode of transition from Napoleon II., whom he had promised though he had no certainty that the promise could be fulfilled, to the elder branch of the Bourbons, whose return he foresaw without desiring it. His tactics consisted in encouraging the expression of as many propositions as possible at once, with the mental reservation that none but that which would suit himself should triumph in the end; but he took very good care not to let this be seen by M. Regnaud, who was a sincere Bonapartist, nor by MM. Manuel, Jay, or Lacoste, who, being decided liberals, naturally dreaded the return of the elder Bourbon branch. He contented himself with saying that extreme prudence was needed, and that they should take good care not to impose any absolute conditions on the allies, for example, such as naming any prince in particular or acting in any way that might impede the opening of negotiations.

Napoleon's abdication had scarcely been read to the Assembly, when numerous proposals were at once made. Those who did not desire the Imperial dynasty, some from royalist principles—the number of these indeed was very small—and others from love of liberty and peace, proposed that the abdication should be made certain by being accepted,—a contract not being definitive until agreed to by both parties,—that Napoleon should be thanked for the sacrifice he had made, that they should then declare themselves a national assembly, seize the supreme authority, send negotiators to the camp of the allies, and, lastly, appoint a commission to undertake the executive functions. These resolutions were supported by many members, by M. Mourgues in particular, who indeed went further than all the rest. He proposed that, in addition to these measures, M. de Lafayette should be appointed head of the National Guards throughout France, and Marshal Macdonald generalissimo of the army. It must be borne in mind that this marshal, having accompanied Louis XVIII. to the frontier, had refused to serve under Napoleon. The meaning of these last propositions being very evident, one member, M. Garreau, demanded that the 67th article of the Additional Act should be read. The president, Lanjuinais, observed that it would be quite unnecessary to do so, as everybody was supposed to know it. Cries of "Read," "Do not read," were heard from every side. But, as the number of those who desired that the article should be read had the majority, M. Garreau read as follows:—

"The French nation declares that in the delegation it has made and is now making of its authority, it neither meant nor means now to give the right of proposing the return of the Bourbons or of any prince of that family to the throne, even in case of the extinction of the Imperial dynasty, nor the right of re-establishing either the ancient feudal nobility, or seigniorial or feudal claims, tithes, or any privileged or dominant form of worship, nor the power of invalidating the sale of national property, and it formally forbids the Government, the chambers, or any citizen to bring forward such a proposition." "I think," said the reader of this article, "that my meaning will be un-

derstood." "Yes, yes," cried a number of voices, and a return to the order of the day was demanded. M. Regnaud de Saint-Jean d'Angely rose to support and defend the order of the day. In the first place, he asked if the Chamber of Representatives should constitute itself a national assembly, what would become of the Chamber of Peers, and if the chambers should be fused into one, what would become of the Constitution. He showed to advantage of preserving a Constitution he was already established, which only needed a little modification to be most excellent; a Constitution which irrevocably appointed the sovereign, which put an end to all competition, which to be maintained in vigor only needed a temporary measure to supply for a short time the place of the absent monarch. Not daring to propose a council of regency, which would have immediately decided the question of dynasty, he chose from among the rejected propositions the idea of an executive commission of five members,—one to be chosen by the Chamber of Representatives and two by the Chamber of Peers. He then appealed to their generosity, their dignity, and the gratitude they owed Napoleon. "He is a man," he said, "whom you yourselves have called great, but whom posterity will judge better than we. Lately you saw him, for the second time, to be your emperor, and it is not yet four weeks since you swore allegiance to him! He has been unsuccessful, what indeed but rarely happened in his military career; you demanded his abdication, and he immediately gave it with a magnanimity of which I myself was witness.—For I was the first that dared propose it to him yesterday. He has abdicated, but in favour of his son. Will you repay his magnanimity by refusing to accept his son? Will you annul the act of abdication which you have so much desired, by refusing the essential condition of it? I, therefore, propose the order of the day: the propositions that you have heard, be the neither the Constitution nor the rights of Napoleon II. be annulled; and I also propose that a deputation be sent to him who was your emperor but a few hours since, to thank him for the generous sacrifice he has made for the benefit of the country."

The Assembly, still under the influence of the impression made by the great sacrifice obtained from Napoleon, and influenced by what M. Regnaud had said, unanimously adopted what he proposed. M. Regnaud flattered himself that he had thus secured the return of Napoleon II.; but M. Fouché did not think so: for the question which would have been decided by the nomination of a council of regency had been eluded by the appointment of a simple executive commission. This sagacity suited M. Fouché very well: he would be satisfied with any thing except Napoleon's return. The next step was to appoint the three members that the Chamber of Representatives was to furnish to the executive commission. M. Fouché, considering his own appointment certain, did not think of himself, but turned all his attention to getting colleagues who would not impede his plans. He could not avoid having Canning, whose sincerity he hoped to be able to take

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advantage, but he made every effort to prevent the appointment of M. de Lafayette, representing him to some as fanatically attached to the principles of 1791, whilst to others he represented him as indispensable to the commission that was to be sent to negotiate a treaty with the king. He early recommended General Grenier, who was esteemed by all parties, and as incapable of detecting an intrigue as of concocting one. M. Fouché, who remained behind the scenes, succeeded in obtaining the following results:—Carnot, elected by universal consent, had 324 votes; M. Fouché, elected because of the opinion entertained of his influence at home and abroad, had only 223. M. Grenier, 204; and M. de Lafayette, 142. A second scrutiny was made for the election of a third member, and General Grenier was chosen by a large majority. The names of the elected commissioners were immediately sent to the Chamber of Peers to obtain the approbation of that assembly.

The Chamber of Peers was very much excited at that very moment. The War Minister had just communicated the same military intelligence that he had before given to the Chamber of Representatives, the same external observances being observed toward both chambers, though the effect produced was very different. This communication gave rise to a scene at once sad and violent. Marshal Ney rose to speak. He was still under the influence of the excitement of Waterloo, where he had given such instances of bravery, an excitement that was increased by rumours circulated to his disadvantage, and by the suggestions of M. Fouché, to whom he had confided his chagrins. Every eye was turned on the speaker, attracted as much by the strong expression of passion depicted on his countenance as by a sense of the importance of what he was about to say. He contradicted the assertions of the Minister of War, and asserted that there were no longer any resources in the country; that all was lost; that the army, indeed, had done its duty, but that serious faults had been committed, and he unmistakably indicated, though he did not name, the Emperor, by which an irreparable misfortune had been occasioned, and that nothing now remained but to negotiate, on any terms, provided their lives were spared. This glorious victim did not know that he was thus rendering a capitulation inevitable, and one, unfortunately, by which all lives would not be spared. It would be impossible to describe the excitement that followed this scene. Some ill-disposed men were secretly rejoiced at this confusion; but the greater number of the peers, sincere but weak men, were saddened at seeing the depression of the public mind still further increased by a man of such extraordinary courage. Drouot entered as the marshal concluded, and, being informed of the statements he had made, began in his usual calm and gentle terms to reproach him for the assertions he had advanced, and which, he said, he would show to be incorrect. Ney defended himself badly, and only proved that his mind was a prey to despair, that he no longer possessed any self-control, and that, in fact, so far as he was

concerned, nothing should be taken into account but his incomparable services.

The members of the Upper Chamber were still under the influence of this saddening scene when the message from the Chamber of Representatives arrived. There was no hesitations; but the more zealous members of the Imperial party, Prince Lucien, and Generals La Bédoyère and De Flahault, both felt and showed displeasure at seeing the sovereignty of Napoleon II. evaded by the equivocal nomination of an executive commission. Count Thibaudeau, a morose revolutionist, who hated the Bourbons, to whom he preferred the Bonapartes without feeling any particular regard for the latter,—indeed he did not feel regard for any one,—and who despised Fouché, though he allowed himself to be led by him,—Count Thibaudeau, we say, adopted the general idea that safety should be sought in the immediate abdication of the Emperor. He proposed that the decision of the Chamber of Representatives should be adopted, which indeed was inevitable in the existing state of things. This proposition excited violent indignation among the partisans of the Imperial dynasty. Prince Lucien reminded the Chamber of Peers that they had been appointed by Napoleon, spoke of the gratitude and fidelity they owed him, asserted that if respect for the laws had been forgotten everywhere else it ought to be remembered in that chamber, appealed to the Constitution, which conferred the succession of the crown on Napoleon II., and, lastly, quoting the act of abdication, of which the succession of Napoleon II. was an essential condition, he demanded that the young prince should be immediately proclaimed, in order to save them from the chaos of civil war. "Let us rally round Napoleon II.," cried Prince Lucien, "and I give the example by being the first to swear fidelity to him." Many of the peers, alarmed by the tumult, and approving of the evasive form adopted for replacing the executive, showed their displeasure at the haste with which it was sought to decide so important a question. M. de Pontécoulant, a peer under Napoleon and Louis XVIII., and equally indebted to both, was one of those who did not wish that any additional difficulty should be put in the way of a transmission from a falling dynasty to the one that was now inevitable. He admitted all that he owed to Napoleon, but said that he owed still more to his country, and that he considered Prince Lucien's proposal extremely imprudent. He reproached him with being a Roman prince, and not a Frenchman, and that he was consequently incapable of forming a correct opinion on such a subject. "If you do not consider me a Frenchman, the nation does," replied Prince Lucien; and he then asserted that Napoleon's abdication would be void unless the right of Napoleon II. to the throne should be immediately recognised. The generous and imprudent La Bédoyère, who had as little command of his temper as Ney, commenced to speak with incredible violence. "There are men here," he said, "who fell at Napoleon's feet when he was successful, but who now desert him in his hour of need."

Let them act as they will, but let us do our duty. Napoleon has abdicated in favour of his son; if his son is not proclaimed, that abdication is void, and he must recall it. Let him draw his sword, and we will die fighting for him, and who probably will persist in their desertion, will form intrigues with foreigners as they did before. I see some of them on these benches." At these words, which proved that this brave young man had lost all self-control, he was interrupted by a fearful tumult. He was compelled to be silent; many of his friends hastened round him, but could not succeed in calming him. The discussion continued, but in a disorderly manner, and without any advantage being gained by those who wished for the immediate proclamation of Napoleon II., for the prudent Assembly, adopting the evasive policy of the Lower Chamber, merely confirmed the decision that had been made there. M. de Caulaincourt being considered the man best suited to represent the interests of France, without neglecting those of Napoleon, together with M. Quinette, a member of the old Convention and a sincere representative of the Revolution, were appointed to complete the executive commission.

The account of these proceedings caused no additional surprise or pain to Napoleon; for he had indulged no delusive hopes as to his son's fate, and never had believed that the crown, fallen from his puissant brow, would rest on that of a weak child, who was both absent and a prisoner. During the afternoon, a deputation of the representatives came to present him the respects and gratitude of that Assembly. He received them standing, with the same bearing as when he was at the summit of his power, and addressed them in a tone of mournful gravity, but with the haughtiness which freedom from all personal interest inspires. Having made a suitable reply to the professions of the deputation, he told them that he had not made the sacrifice for which they thanked him from any hope of advantage to himself, but for France. He had made it that there might be no disunion between himself and his representatives; for success could only be obtained by unanimity. He counselled them, above all things, to preserve union among themselves, and to be active in their preparations for defence; for peace could be obtained on the best terms only by those who were well prepared for war. "The time that has been lost in overturning the Imperial throne would have been better employed in preparing the means of resistance. But there is time still left; hasten your preparations; for your enemies are approaching, and only deceive you when they say that they will be satisfied by my removal. It is the Bourbons, and the consequence of the Bourbons' coming, that they want to impose on you. I recommend my son to you; it was in his favour alone that I abdicated, and it is only by rallying round him that you will avoid the conflict of contending pretensions, that you can rally the army, or have any chance of saving the national independence. My political career is now at an end, and, perhaps, with it, my life.

Wherever I may be, the happiness and unity of France shall be my only wish. I would serve France as a private soldier, since I may not lead her to battle; but you have decided that I must not think of any question of me, only of my son and France. Believe me, that there is no hope but in unity among yourselves." Having said these words, he bowed with dignity to the deputation, and retired, leaving them much moved.

Here we must again repeat that Napoleon was not deceived; he did not think that there was any greater hope for his son than in himself, and still less did he believe that the Assembly, disturbed and betrayed by Fouché, would be able to defend him. But he would, for the last time, fulfil his duty of a father, by recommending Napoleon II.; besides that, he was convinced that asserting this child's rights would be the only means of uniting the different parties, and arousing the zeal of the army. He therefore wished to make a last effort in his favour. He considered the care that had been taken to avoid mentioning his son's name as a breach of the promise made to himself. He spoke very warmly on this subject to M. Regnaud, reproached him with having induced him to abdicate by promising to secure the succession of Napoleon II., and complained that the failure of this was to be attributed to his want of energy. M. Regnaud did not deserve these reproaches; far, desired by his own wishes and by M. Fouché, he was convinced that the father's abdication would be immediately followed by the proclamation of the son. He said all that was possible in his own defence, and promised Napoleon that he would make every exertion to secure the fulfilment of that promise on the following day. Napoleon summoned to the palace the ministers of state, M. Defermon and M. Boulay de la Meurthe, two men on whom he could depend, and requested them to employ all their influence with the Lower Chamber to induce the members to proclaim Napoleon II. in a formal and unequivocal manner. They both declared their readiness to do so, and M. Boulay de la Meurthe, accustomed to assemblies in which he had formerly played a honourable part, an honest revolutionary, sharing the opinions of his friend Regnaud, promised not to spare his exertions in this attempt.

M. Regnaud went to M. Fouché, and represented the false position they were placed in with regard to Napoleon, the danger of not keeping the promise that had been made to him, since it might lead to his recalling the sacrifice he had made, and the absolute necessity there was that something should be done to content him. M. Fouché assented to agree with him, and represented to the young deputies, MM. Jay and Manuel, whom he influenced by deceiving, that something ought to be done to satisfy Napoleon, without however making any imprudent engagements to the Imperial dynasty. He did not mention the real motives for this advice, which we will soon see, were very different to those he alleged, but said that it would not be wise

exasperate Napoleon by destroying his last hopes, and that they ought to make every effort to assert the sovereignty of the Imperial child, under whom liberty would run no risk and the interests of the revolutionary party would be fully secured. They promised to do as he wished, and agreed to depart from the equivocal policy of the day, without, however, entering into any irrevocable engagement.

On the following day, the 23d, M. Berenger opened the question by seeking to define the nature of the powers intrusted to the executive commission. Should it assume the nature of a responsible ministry, or possess the inviolability of the sovereign? The mere proposal of such a question was sufficient to rouse the energies of all. Several speakers hastened to the rostrum: some would have the executive commission a responsible body, others asserted that it should be a real regency, occupying the place of the absent minor monarch, and enjoying all his prerogatives. M. Defermon rose, and said that if some fixed and decided principles were not resolved on, things would be thrown into a kind of chaos. Nothing would be easier than to determine the authority of the executive commission, provided regard was had to the bounds of the existing constitution. That its principles being those of constitutional monarchy, they had still a sovereign, Napoleon II., the necessary and legitimate heir of Napoleon I., and who succeeded his father by the same right as the living king formerly succeeded to him who had died. "Do you believe," added M. Defermon, "that Napoleon II. is your sovereign?" "We do! we do!" replied several of the members; "*Vive Napoleon II.!*" "Well, then, if such is your opinion," replied M. Defermon, "the executive commission will simply have the powers of a regency acting with the authority and in the name of Napoleon I., first taking an oath of allegiance to him. You must proclaim him formally, by which you will rally the army devoted to the dynasty, you will guide the conduct of the National guards, who have been told that you expect Louis XVIII., and you will let the enemy see that your conditions are irrevocably fixed." "Let us wait," said a member, "until we know the result of the negotiations." "No, no," cried many others; "let us obey the constitution, and proclaim Napoleon II." Almost the whole Assembly rose, exclaiming, "*Vive l'Empereur!*" and were about yielding to the general excitement, when some members sought to calm them by showing the necessity of acting with a little more reflection. M. Loulay de la Meurthe, anxious to sustain the present enthusiasm, asserted that the act of abdication was indivisible, that it would become void if they refused to pay the price of the sacrifice; and then he alluded, with great vehemence, to the intrigue on foot to bring back the Bourbons, an intrigue, he said, by which the Assembly would be divided, the country weakened, and the gates flung open to the enemy. He denounced two parties, one trying to bring back Louis XVIII., the other wishing for the Duke of Orleans; and he attacked the latter as if it had a real existence, instead of being a mere desire in the minds of some, describing it in the false hues lent by

fear, and then, having exhaled the last rage of expiring Bonapartism, he ceased, leaving the Assembly in a fearful state of excitement. Then commenced many unnecessary repetitions by various speakers, until, at length, M. Manuel got an opportunity of speaking. His young and handsome face, his simple but decided air, his easy flow of words, and the false reputation of being M. Fouché's principal agent, whose acknowledged opinions he shared, but of whose secret plans he was totally ignorant, won him immediate attention. So well-chosen and so firm was the tone he assumed, that, notwithstanding the excitement that prevailed in the Assembly, he influenced the minds of his auditors from the very moment he began to speak. He blamed those who, by proposing that Napoleon II. should be proclaimed, had raised a most serious and inopportune question, the immediate solution of which, he did not hesitate to say, would be the very extreme of imprudence. He admitted that as the question had been raised, it would be difficult to evade it, and that the only way in which it could now be decided was by declaring that they intended to abide by the existing Constitution, which necessarily implied the sovereignty of Napoleon II. Having made this concession to the feelings of the Assembly, he sketched a bold and true picture of the different parties by which France was divided, describing their expectations, their pretensions, and their plots; he indicated clearly that his personal preference was not for the Bourbons, and showed, with a great deal of power and dexterity, that the only way to avoid declaring for any party was to support the existing Constitution literally, without adding any new declaration that might increase the difficulties of the negotiation with Europe. This discourse, the most artistic and effective that this justly celebrated orator ever pronounced, had immense success, for it satisfied the twofold desire of the Assembly for Napoleon II. and for peace, by proposing a middle course, by which it seemed possible to secure both.

The Assembly authorized M. Manuel to record the following motion: That the chamber passed to the order of the day, recognising that, in accordance with the Additional Act, Napoleon II. was the real Emperor of the French, and that by the decision of the previous day an executive commission had been appointed, which, in the existing serious state of things, might secure the defence of the country, and assert its rights, liberty, and independence. The entire Assembly rose, voted that M. Manuel's speech be printed, and separated, amidst cries of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" M. Manuel had done the Assembly a signal service, by saving it from making a new declaration that might increase the difficulties of a negotiation for peace, without at the same time doing any further injury to the claim of Napoleon II., already sufficiently in danger. He was the object of universal admiration for a short time. M. Fouché, as far as he could, assumed to himself the honour of having discovered the orator, of having inspired his eloquence, and of having developed his talents for the benefit of France. This successful speech was the commencement of

the political career of an orator who was to distinguish himself at a later period by the firmness of his opinions.

The Assembly fondly believed that both Napoleon II. and peace were secured. France in her abandoned position had need of hope. She tried to console herself with illusions, realities being denied her.

The executive commission entered immediately on the exercise of its functions, and its first care was to complete its own organization. It needed a president. M. Quinette and M. Grenier, both devoted to the Revolution, voted for M. Carnot. He was too simple-minded a man to vote for himself, so gave his voice for the Duke of Otranto. M. de Caulaincourt considered Carnot honest but unskilful, and voted for M. Fouché, hoping that the latter being satisfied he would assist him in securing Napoleon's personal interests. Fouché voted also for himself, and having the three votes he became president of the executive commission and virtual head of the Provisional Government.

It was absolutely necessary to make some appointments. Prince Cambacérès had sent in his resignation as Minister of Justice; M. de Caulaincourt and M. Carnot could not be, at the same time, ministers and members of the executive commission. M. Boulay de la Meurthe was provisionally appointed to the Ministry of Justice, M. Bignon to that of Foreign Affairs, and M. Carnot's brother to the Home Department. The appointment of the commander of the National Guard of Paris was of more importance than any of these. M. Fouché did not mean to leave this office to General Durosnel without giving him a superior whose devotion to the fallen Emperor could not be suspected. Neither did he desire M. de Lafayette, whom he put aside, after having made use of him, under the old pretence that he would be needed for the negotiations with the enemy, but took care that Marshal Massena should be chosen, whose great reputation threw all competitors into the shade, and who, being disgusted with men and things, without hope for the country, and devoid of personal ambition, was quite willing to let things take their own course without offering any obstacle.

A commander having been appointed to the National Guard at Paris, there was one still needed for the troops that were to defend the capital. Napoleon had intended to appoint Marshal Davout to this office, and, as no better could be found, that choice was confirmed. This was making Marshal Davout commander-in-chief, as all the disposable troops would necessarily fall back toward Paris, both those that had fought in Flanders and at the Alps, and those that were unemployed in Vendée. It was decided that the marshal should defend the city on the outside with the troops of the line, and any volunteers that wished to join in the external defence, whilst the National Guards should keep order within the walls. General Drouot, whose virtues were an infallible guarantee for patriotism and the love of order, was appointed to command what remained of the Imperial Guard. Nobody doubted but that these heroic men under such a commander would again devote themselves

for their country, though they had been leon. Next came the measures which the concurrence of the chambers.

The members of the commission, on the day of entering on the discharge of functions, proposed three resolutions: brought forward in the nocturnal session held at the Tuilleries; the raising of a subscription of 1816, the authorizing of aquisition made according to certain rules a suspension of personal liberty. The of these resolutions passed without difficulty but the act for the suspension of personal liberty met with more opposition. The Assembly consisted of honest men, who abhorred arbitrary acts, which from the time of a revolution were called revolutionary would not employ them on any account royalists, (as the partisans of the Emperor were called,) who though a very numerous in the country had not more than five of their number in the Assembly, from this measure was directed against the indeed it was. This act required that it might be arrested arbitrarily who should any other than the national colours, and cries, take part in the civil war soldiers to desert, or open communication the enemy outside. These were all and crimes, but all honest men, all those who sired that unswerving justice should be France, preferred that punishment should be inflicted on mere suspicion, nor on crime had been proved before the tribunals. Unfortunately, things as that the little suited to legal rules; besides the suspension of the *habeas corpus* act in land was a very forcible example, the principle of the act was admitted, the Assembly would not consent that it should remain in force more than two months and made its application subject to that of a commission chosen from both chambers. Notwithstanding these precautions, 359 votes were given against it. This decided, the Assembly determined to attract attention at once to the framing of a constitution, as if a better could be drawn from the Additional Act, and as though the forgotten how ridiculous such a device would be at a time when the allies were threatening the walls of the capital.

Whilst the commissioners were passing these measures, negotiators were pointed to go to the camp of the allies. Lafayette could not be excluded from the number, as he had been excluded from every office under pretence of his capabilities negotiator. He was consequently appointed General Sebastiani was chosen in virtue of a twofold recommendation of soldier and diplomatist; M. d'Argenson was selected by of his reputation and the independence shown in the celebrated lawsuit of his M. de Pontécoulant because he had been under Napoleon and Louis XVIII. and cially because he had refused to consider Lucien a Frenchman, and M. de Laforest because of his experience in diplomacy. M. Jamin Constant was added to these as an of legation, both because of his talents and the connection he had formed with the princes during the time of his exile.

negotiators were desired to stipulate for the integrity of the kingdom, the independence of the nation, (that is, its right to choose its own government,) the sovereignty of Napoleon II., the oblivion of all recent and anterior acts, and, finally, respect for persons and property. It was decided that the legation was to make the best conditions it could, and yield those points that might endanger the signing of peace. The condition concerning Napoleon II. was merely nominal, and only mentioned to please the Assembly. It was decided that the legation should first go to Laon, not to meet the sovereigns, who were with the invading column that was advancing from the east, but to arrange an armistice with the Duke of Wellington and Blücher, who commanded the northern column then marching toward Paris. They were afterward to negotiate with the sovereigns in person.

Laon was at this time the rendezvous both of our army and of the pursuing foe. Our soldiers, having retired in confusion for two days, were ordered to assemble at Laon, whither they had hurried in crowds. Marshal Soult had fused several regiments into one, whenever their reduced numbers rendered it necessary. The carriages of the artillery having been saved, he had collected the cannon at La Fère, and had succeeded in regularly organizing the 30,000 men who had escaped from Waterloo, and who asked nothing more than an opportunity of avenging their defeat by some fresh efforts of devotion.

Meanwhile Marshal Grouchy, who was believed to be lost, had escaped the enemy by the most fortunate and unexpected chances. Having received the fatal intelligence on the morning of the 19th, intelligence that he could scarcely credit, he immediately began retreating toward Namur, according to Napoleon's directions. He had taken the most direct route, that through Mont Saint-Guibert and Tilly, and had ordered Vandamme to advance by Wavre to Gembloux. He ran the greatest risk of being surrounded and overpowered on this route, but fortunately the English were so exhausted that they needed rest, and Blücher, hurrying like a madman after those who had escaped from Waterloo, did not even think of Grouchy. Grouchy's divisions passed through Namur on the 20th, the Belgians everywhere testifying the most lively interest for them. Teste's division brought up the rear and took part in a brilliant combat at Namur, and afterward in perfect safety joined the *corps d'armée* by the route of Dinant, Rocroy, and Rethel.

A part of Grouchy's corps had thus arrived at Laon in addition to the troops escaped from Waterloo; and, within one or two days, more than 60,000 men would be assembled there, all ready, under Napoleon's command, to fight with the courage inspired by despair. All these became depressed or indignant when told of the abdication. As usual, they considered that this had been effected by treachery, and declared that it was useless to be soldiers when the only man capable of leading them against the enemy had been so unjustly dethroned by traitors. When the executive commission learned the state of feeling that prevailed in the army, two deputies were sent to represent

to the men that, though Napoleon had retired, their country—something far more sacred—still remained to be defended. One of these deputies was the valiant Mouton-Duvernet, doomed, like Ney and La Bédoyère, to fall a victim to the fierce passions of the time.

Meantime the excitement at Paris was daily increasing, everybody being in an agony of expectation awaiting the termination of this extraordinary crisis. Napoleon was still at the Elysée palace, where his solitude daily increased, as formerly at Fontainebleau. His sole consolation was in the visits of a few faithful friends, such as M. de Bassano, M. de Rovigo, and M. Lavalette, and in the homage of the federalists and of the soldiers who had escaped from the army, and who crowded the Marigny road and filled the air with loud cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* whenever he appeared. M. Fouché came to pay a last visit, during which he sought to conceal his embarrassment beneath his colourless face. Napoleon received him coldly and politely, and merely said, "Prepare to fight, for the enemy's plans and yours do not agree; they will have nothing but the Bourbons, and if you refuse them, you will have a fierce battle under the walls of Paris itself." M. Fouché accorded a kind of respectful assent to what Napoleon said, and then retired from a spot where every object seemed to reproach him, and where Napoleon's haughtiness, though free from all reproach, made him feel ill at ease. He preferred going to the Tuileries, where he was master, and where Quinette's inertia, Carnot's simplicity, Grenier's inexperience, and the dejection of the Duke of Vicenza allowed him to rule absolutely. His colleagues, knowing him to be a regicide, and that he had been arrested immediately before the 20th of March, thought that he could never be reconciled to the Bourbons, and having perfect confidence in his activity, knowledge, and capacity, allowed him to act as he thought fit. But whilst the army was falling back on Paris, and that commissioners had been sent to attempt an impossible negotiation with the allied sovereigns, and whilst the chamber considered it both honourable and useful to commence the discussion of a new Constitution, M. Fouché was only seeking to turn to his own profit the *dénouement* of this painful but burlesque comedy. Although, to please the chambers, he himself spoke and allowed others to speak of Napoleon II., he had no faith in that prince's cause. He was convinced that the allied sovereigns had as little desire for the son as for the father, and that Louis XVIII. would be the inevitable consequence of Napoleon's defeat. He did not wish for the Bourbons, but he foresaw that they would return. As they were inevitable, he determined to assist their return for his personal advantage. It was not a crime to foresee or even to assist in their establishment on the throne, it was only a foreknowledge of what was to come, a knowledge that none could blame. But if he had the sagacity to foresee the coming restoration, his aid ought to have been given as an honest man, as a good citizen; that is, he ought to have frankly explained his views to such of his colleagues as M. Caulaincourt and Marshal Davout, who were capable of understanding them, at the

same time that he guided the others without betraying them, and he should have made conditions not for himself, but for France, her territories, her liberty, and should especially have secured the safety of all such as had been compromised. Such ought to have been M. Fouché's conduct, but such it was not. The project suggested by his head and heart was, to help in the restoration of the Bourbons since no other choice was left, and even at the risk of betraying everybody, to let none into his confidence, that he himself might have all the merit and all the profit, to save as many of the compromised as possible, (for, when his personal interests were not concerned, M. Fouché was not malicious,) but abandon the others; in a word, to turn into an intrigue what ought to have been a skilfully and sincerely conducted negotiation.

It will not be forgotten that M. Fouché had, upon his own authority, set M. de Vitrolles at liberty. On the morning of the 23d, the day following the abdication, he sent for him, that he might at once commence his intrigue with the royalist party. M. de Vitrolles wished to go first to the court at Ghent to make arrangements for the return of the Bourbons and assume there himself the part he desired to play. M. Fouché made him abandon this idea, telling him that this work was to be accomplished with him at Paris, and not at Ghent with emigrant princes, who had nothing else to do than accept the services that would be rendered them. He described this as a most difficult task, and his own position as most delicate, placed as he was between Carnot, whom he called an imbecile fanatic, Quinette and Grenier, filled, as he said, with silly revolutionary prejudices, and M. de Caulaincourt, whom he described as entirely devoted to the interests of his old master. He did not feel any great fear of M. de Caulaincourt, who, seeing there was no hope for the Imperial dynasty, would be easily satisfied, provided that Napoleon's person was safe. M. Fouché assured M. de Vitrolles that all his efforts would be for Louis XVIII.; to aid his interests would all his exertions tend, even when seemingly taking a contrary direction; that he had already got rid of Napoleon I., and had his path still obstructed by Napoleon II., and perhaps the Duke of Orleans, but that neither should arrest his progress unless that very great difficulties indeed were put in his way. M. de Vitrolles, having received these assurances and explanations, promised M. Fouché that he would remain at Paris instead of going to Ghent. But, though he consented to remain, he requested the head of the executive commission to protect his life, to allow him frequent interviews, and give him passports for the agents that he would send to Ghent. M. Fouché replied, cynically, "Your head will be hung on the same hook as mine; as for communicating with me, you can see me three or four times every day if you choose; and as to passports, I will give you a hundred if you wish." This being arranged, he advised M. de Vitrolles to appear abroad as little as possible until the day when such precautions should be no longer needed.

Having thus opened a communication with Louis XVIII. through the most confidential

agent of royalism, M. Fouché continued to speak to Carnot, Quinette, and Grenier, though he were the irreconcilable enemy of the Bourbons and the emigration, while still M. de Caulaincourt he affected to wish, though he could scarcely hope, for the accession of Napoleon II., and to show himself desirous to procure Napoleon the treatment that in former dignity and glory deserved. To so many representatives through whom M. Fouché sought to keep up his communication and influence with the Lower Chamber, he insinuated that there would be many obstacles to the accession of Napoleon II.; spoke now, for the first time, of the impossibility of getting him out of the hands of the allies, mentioned the little interest that Maria Louisa felt for her son's advancement, and said that it would at be any very great loss if he were abandoned for a Bourbon prince devoted to the cause of the Revolution, the Duke of Orleans, for instance, whose intelligence, opinions, and conduct were known to everybody. All except the decided Bonapartists agreed with this, as both revolutionists and liberals would be quite satisfied with the sovereignty of the younger branch of the Bourbons, preferring an enlightened liberal man to a child a prisoner among strangers from whose hands it would be difficult to free him. But, whilst he spoke thus M. Fouché was only thinking of getting rid of Napoleon II., as he had said to M. de Vitrolles, and only introduced the Duke of Orleans to get rid of him in his turn, that he might at length come to the Bourbons, who ultimately treated him as he had treated others.

The public excitement still continued, as was it lessened by Napoleon's abdication, which was far from being the termination of the crisis. As long as this object had been the term to which men's minds were directed, they did not look beyond; but now that this had been attained and passed, attention was turned to a fresh object. The Bonapartists and revolutionists asked, in the greatest anxiety, whether the country were really in a position to negotiate with the enemy and get Napoleon II. in exchange for his father, and whether, if negotiation failed, they would be able to fight; of the latter, indeed, they had little hope, for they felt that the soldiers, deprived of Napoleon, would lose their self-confidence in losing their leader. Whilst the Bonapartists and revolutionists, henceforth to be ranked as one, were beginning to feel all the terrors of despair, the royalists were beginning to grow impatient. Seeing that things were assuming a favourable turn for them, they could not make up their minds to wait. Having a great number of troops at their disposal, some of whom had returned from Venice since peace was restored there, others of whom had belonged to the household troops and wished to serve again, the royalists were ready to undertake the rashest enterprises. M. Debouchage, an old royalist round whom all the others had rallied, only asked for a signal from the heads of their party to make a sudden attack on the Chamber of Representatives. General Dessoles commenced to form secret understandings with the National Guard, among whom he had formerly held a considerable command, and sought to recruit

their zeal, which the three past months had not destroyed. These were joined by Marshals Macdonald, Saint-Cyr, and Oudinot, all three devoted to the cause of the Bourbons. They were requested to put themselves at the head of the royalists and make some effort, but they were not men likely to act rashly through excess of royalist feelings; besides that, M. de Vitrolles, instructed by M. Fouché, told them that any attempt would at that time be premature, and that they must wait for a better opportunity. The royalists, whilst awaiting better times, gathered round the Elysée palace, to observe what was going on there, and were greatly offended at what they saw.

The Marigny road, which runs beside the palace, was incessantly crowded with succeeding swarms of idlers with anxious and threatening countenances. The greater number, as we have already said, consisted of federalists, men of the lower ranks, and old soldiers, to whom Napoleon did not intend to give arms until the enemy should be under the walls of Paris, and whom M. Fouché did not mean to arm at all.

Some of them, in whom more confidence was felt, had been placed under the command of General Darricau, and, under the denomination of sharpshooters of the National Guard, had been employed with troops of the line in the external defence of Paris. But these only formed a very small portion; the others, together with some thousands of every rank, who had left the army from some motive of pique, crowded the neighbourhood of the Elysée palace in the hope of seeing Napoleon for a moment, and of saluting him with acclamations. The dominant thought in the minds of all these men was that a great treason existed somewhere, either in the executive or in the chambers, and that the object of this treason was to abandon France to the power of foreigners, but that if Napoleon would only place himself at their head he would be able to repel the enemy and disperse the royalists. This subject was discussed by numerous and noisy groups, who were constantly threatening to commence operations, and who, whenever Napoleon appeared in the garden, hailed him with mingled cries of rage and enthusiasm. Though Napoleon did nothing to increase their excitement, he could not resist the desire of appearing sometimes and receiving these last homages of the people and the army, whom he was soon to leave forever.

But, although he knew that in this crowd he possessed the means of overpowering the Provisional Government and the chambers, and resuming the command of the army for a few days, perhaps even meet Wellington and Blücher in a final struggle, still, when he looked beyond what would only be a momentary success, he saw that the chances of such an attempt were too few, and he only thought of whither he should retire, feeling that the day was fast approaching when he should be obliged to seek shelter from home perfidy or foreign violence. But those who dreaded his very presence suspected him of projects of which he was not dreaming, and caused M. Fouché the greatest alarm, by asserting that Napoleon was laying plans for the recovery of power. The royalists, in particular, told

him that, if he neglected their warning, the federalists, with Napoleon at their head, would soon convince him of the truth by some unexpected attack. This alarm had been also spread through the members of the Lower Chamber.

M. Fouché was too deceitful himself not to suspect others of being so too. He communicated his suspicions on this subject to his colleagues, and sought to alarm them by describing all that Napoleon was capable of, now that he was reduced to despair, at the same time that he was determined, whether authorized or not, to get him to quit the Elysée palace. As it would not be safe to use violence, it would be necessary to see Napoleon, and endeavour to persuade him to retire. Fearing that he would not be well received, and little inclined to appear in the presence of the man he had betrayed, he intrusted the task to Marshal Davout, a man whose roughness of manner was well known, and whose attachment to Napoleon had been considerably cooled down by certain slights that he had received during the latter part of his ministry.

Marshal Davout repaired to the palace, in whose courts he found a number of officers who had left the army without leave, and who, like all the rest, declared that treason was abroad and that Napoleon ought to put himself at their head to crush it. The marshal had several animated altercations with some of these officers, many of them as unpolished as himself, and whom he reproached in vain for their conduct as he left them to wait on Napoleon. He told him the object of his coming, and commenced proving to him that for his own sake, his son's, and the country's, he ought to retire, and thus dissipate the anxiety he caused and leave the Government that freedom of action so necessary in serious and critical times. Napoleon received him coolly, did not hesitate to say that he would have expected anybody rather than Marshal Davout to have undertaken such a mission, assured him, though without designing to enter into his own justification, that he was not forming any of the plans attributed to him, and that he was quite ready to leave Paris, if he were provided with the means of making a safe retreat. The marshal retired, mortified by the reception he had met, though he had succeeded in his mission. This honest, sensible, but rugged soldier, whose powers of perception were not very refined, was quite unconscious of the effect he had produced on a man who had been his master but a few days before. He left the Elysée palace under the influence of the most painful feelings.

Napoleon determined to pass the few remaining days that he was to spend in France at Malmaison. This charming retreat, in which his career had commenced, and where it was about to terminate, was to him an abode filled with memories at once pleasing and painful, and he was not unwilling to imbibe the long draughts of his sorrows amidst its shades. He requested Queen Hortense to accompany him, and this devoted daughter hastened to lavish her last cares upon him. Napoleon deliberated for a long time on the spot where he would spend the remainder of his life. M. de Caulaincourt advised him to choose Russia,

but he was inclined for England. "Russia," he said, "is but one man, England is a nation, and a free nation. Englishmen are generous, and will be flattered by my asking for an asylum among them, where I shall enjoy the only pleasure left a man who has governed the world—the conversation of enlightened men." But M. de Caulaincourt representing to him that the passions of the English people were still too much excited to allow them to be generous, he decided on renouncing England and choosing America. "As I am refused the society of men," he said, "I will betake myself to the bosom of nature, and enjoy the solitude that suits my last thoughts." Having come to this decision, he asked that two armed frigates, then lying at Rhodes, should be placed at his disposal, to transport himself and his effects to America. He asked for books and horses, and began to make preparations for his departure.

He had abdicated on the 22d, and at noon on the 25th he left the Elysée palace, stepping into his carriage within the garden that he might not be seen by the crowd. He was recognised, however, and accompanied by cries of "Vive l'Empereur!" from the crowd, who had no idea of what was being done with him. Napoleon bowed in acknowledgment of these salutations with an expression of sadness, and left that Paris that he was never to see again, with his heart as much depressed as though he were assisting at his own funeral solemnities. He found Queen Hortense at Malmaison, and, the weather being fine, he walked about until weary through the scenes of the most brilliant portions of his life. He spoke continually of Josephine, and again expressed his wish for a faithful portrait of that regretted wife.

M. Fouché was delighted that he was gone, and felt almost as though he were emperor himself, since he who had so long borne the title had been expelled from Paris. Napoleon appearing inclined to leave not only Paris, but France, M. Fouché was inclined to comply with his wishes. But he was assailed by two motives of fear, with which he easily imbued his colleagues. He thought that Napoleon, in the solitude of Malmaison, would be exposed to two dangers: on the one hand, from the royalists, who might seek to rid themselves of him forever; on the other, from the Bonapartists, who might endeavour to place him at the head of the army that was actually approaching Paris, and tempt fortune for the last time. M. Fouché had no intention of abandoning Napoleon either to assassins or the desperate partisans of the Imperial cause. He intended to place him under the charge of General Beker, a man as much distinguished by his moral as his military qualities,—a man of well-known honour, who would be incapable of bearing in mind, under existing circumstances, that he had been disgraced in 1809. No other man would have suited such a position, for all honest men would have been revolted at the idea of placing a jailer over Napoleon. On the morning of the 26th, Marshal Davout sent for General Beker and told him of the mission that was to be confided to him, assigning two reasons: the first, to protect Napoleon; and the second, to prevent public agitations from exciting troubles under shelter of a glorious

name. He ordered him to set out immediately for Malmaison. General Beker obeyed with regret, but he did not refuse the charge imposed on him, as he considered it an honorable employment to watch over the safety of a great man fallen from his high position, and patriotic to prevent the disorders that might occur in his name. He was told that the two frigates demanded by the Emperor should be placed at his disposal, but that in order to obtain a safe sea-voyage it would be necessary to procure passports from the Duke of Wellington, which Napoleon might send to Rochefort.

M. Fouché has been accused of having sought to deliver Napoleon to the English by giving them notice of his departure by this means of a safe-conduct. This suggestion, though supported by M. Fouché's cynical conduct during the entire period, is completely erroneous. He sent General Frouin, a Bonapartist and a sincere royalist, to the English camp to ask for passports which would enable Napoleon to go in safety to America, and at the same time to learn the views of the English commander-in-chief with regard to the government of France. M. Fouché had this under the false impression that the English, glad to be rid of Napoleon, would give safe-conduct willingly. He made a great mistake, as we shall soon see; for the promise he took to secure Napoleon from captivity and himself from the suspicion of the greatest perfidy was doubly unsuccessful, as it made Napoleon's intended departure known, and exposed M. Fouché to the suspicion of having betrayed him whom he sought to save. Admiral Beker, who felt no confidence in M. Fouché's propositions, considered that Napoleon would be safe unacknowledged in a trading-vessel that on board a man-of-war avowedly bearing the illustrious captive. He opened communications with the American trading-vessels at Havre, and made arrangements with two for carrying Napoleon safely to New York. He informed Napoleon of these propositions, and of those of the Provisional Government at the same time.

A most painful excitement was caused at Malmaison by the announcement of General Beker's arrival. It was at first thought that M. Fouché had sent him as a jailer. Napoleon had been accompanied by some staunch civil and military, the greater number of whom were young and ready for the most daring acts. Had Napoleon but spoken the word they would immediately have refused to submit to General Beker. But he calmed them and desired to have an explanation with the general. He received him with polite reserve, but, seeing his emotion, he soon discovered that he was the most honourable of men, treated him as a friend, and conversed freely with him. Napoleon consented and was wished to go; but he did not approve of passports being asked for, fearing that he would be arrested in the harbour and given up to the English by the perfidy of the Duke of Otranto. He might have accepted the offer of the Americans at Havre; but it seemed beneath his dignity to escape clandestinely on board a trading-vessel. He desired General Beker to return to Paris and inform the Pro-

visional Government that he was ready to leave on condition of having the frigates placed at his disposal immediately; but that if he were to wait for an order to depart, he would prefer remaining at Malmaison to staying at Rochefort. General Beker hastened to Paris to fulfil his mission; but M. Fouché was positive, saying that he would not expose himself to the accusation of delivering Napoleon to the English, as he should do if he allowed him to leave without passports, which, indeed, had been already sent for and must arrive soon. The answer must necessarily be waited for, and Napoleon remained in the mean time at Malmaison.

It was a great relief to the royalists to have Napoleon removed from Paris, and no less so to M. Fouché, who was in constant fear of some attempt by the inhabitants of the faubourg and the soldiers, who, taking Napoleon as their head, might have set aside the chambers and the Provisional Government, and attempted a last struggle with the allied armies. Napoleon being gone, M. Fouché was no longer anxious to hasten events; for though he knew that the Bourbons were inevitable, he would not regret to see other candidates for the sovereignty appear on the stage. This was one reason why he should not hurry; but there was another, more rational and more decided, which was that, being himself resigned to the Bourbons, he was desirous to bring round the executive commission and the chambers to the same views by showing them the necessity of such a result; and, meanwhile, he hoped to make the change still more profitable to himself. Three of the five members of the executive commission—Carnot, Quinette, and Grenier—believed in all simplicity that it would be possible, partly by an armed resistance and partly by negotiation, to avoid the hard necessity of again accepting the Bourbons. M. de Caulaincourt alone saw this necessity in its unshadowed clearness, and allowed M. Fouché to act as he felt inclined: for he sought no other advantage from the deplorable confusion of those times than better treatment for Napoleon. Had three of the five votes been against him whilst the chambers were so prejudiced against the Bourbons, M. Fouché would have been compelled to temporize. But temporizing would not suit the impatience of the royalists, who now amounted to perhaps 3000 or 4000, though they themselves asserted that since the return of some from Vendée, and of others belonging to the household troops, they did not number less than 15,000. These urged old M. Dubouchage to act, and he, in his turn, pressed M. de Vitrolles and Marshals Oudinot, MacDonald, and Saint-Cyr to give the signal. M. de Vitrolles implored them not to do anything rashly, which might only excite the federalists against them, reveal their plans to the chambers, possibly cause a reaction in favour of Napoleon, and by precipitancy compromise their cause. M. de Vitrolles very naturally assumed another tone when speaking to M. Fouché, whom he urged to proclaim Louis XVIII., by which he would deprive foreigners of the merit of this second restoration, and spare the Bourbons the disadvantage of being replaced on the throne by the hands of the enemies of France. These were very good ar-

guments; but, though they furnished excellent motives for action, they did not supply the means of execution. So important a proposition, M. Fouché said, could not be made to the commission unless it could be proved that it would be impossible to resist the allied armies. There was but one man, Marshal Davout, the Minister of War, who would have sufficient authority to make such a declaration. His office, his great military renown, the firmness he had so lately shown at Hamburg, and his being proscribed by the Bourbons, gave him advantages possessed by no other man at the time, and constituted him sole judge of the possibility or impossibility of defence. He was an honest, straightforward man, who would not hesitate to proclaim any thing of the truth of which he was convinced. The very responsibility he would assume in the eyes of the world by declaring resistance possible when it was not so would be a sufficient reason to induce him to declare his real conviction. M. Fouché asserted that it was absolutely necessary that this man should be won over. But it was not so easy to gain access to the simple-minded marshal. Chance, however, so generally favourable in cases of great necessity, furnished the desired opportunity on the very day after Napoleon's departure. The police had given information of Marshal Oudinot's being about to head a royalist movement. This marshal had not taken service since the 20th of March, but had not broken off all connection with Napoleon. He had waited on him, and also on the Minister of War. The latter sent for him now, reproached him for holding back, and to test his sentiments offered him an appointment. Marshal Oudinot declined, and when closely pressed by the minister he said that the cause was hopeless; that the Bonapartes were henceforth impossible, whilst the Bourbons were inevitable and desirable; and that if they were not immediately proclaimed, we should be compelled to accept them from the hands of foreigners, and even on worse conditions for them and for the country. He added that the wisest and most patriotic course would be a courageous initiative. He then reduced the whole question to a point of military tactics by asking Marshal Davout whether he could hope to be able to make a successful resistance to Europe when Napoleon had not been able to do so. He then added, that if Louis XVIII. had not been prevented, he would have acted with justice toward the marshal; for he could appreciate the great qualities of the conqueror of Auerstadt, and would not forget the great services he had rendered to France on that occasion.

Marshal Davout replied that in his present onerous position, occupying Napoleon's military command, he did not think of his personal interests, but of the responsibility that rested on him, and must admit that he did not believe it possible to resist Europe. Having made this admission, there could be no great difficulty in accepting the Bourbons—the only dynasty that Europe would recognise in France. Marshal Davout, being a man of clear good sense, admitted the necessity, and added that he could easily overcome his own repugnance to them if he believed them capable of acting wisely. Marshal Oudinot asked him

what proof of their good sense he would require, and he replied that the king should return to Paris unaccompanied by foreign troops, who were to be left at a distance of thirty leagues from the capital; that he should adopt the tricoloured flag, pass an act of oblivion for all the acts of military men as well as civilians since the 20th of March, support the existing chambers, and maintain the army in its existing state, &c. &c. Marshal Oudinot retired to communicate the purport of this conversation to those in higher authority than himself. He hastened to M. de Vitrolles, who saw nothing objectionable in these conditions, and wished for a conference with Marshal Davout. The marshal consented, and made an appointment for the same evening. M. de Vitrolles said that he was not authorized to accept the proposed conditions, but was certain that the king would not object to them, especially if he were proclaimed before the allies entered Paris. Marshal Davout considered that it would be an immense advantage if by the immediate proclamation of the Bourbons the allies would be prevented from appearing a second time in the capital, and determined to make a formal proposition to that effect, on the following day, to the executive commission. The marshal was a straightforward man, without a ray of diplomatic tact, and who could not understand why a rational proposition should not be immediately adopted.

On the following day, the 27th, the executive commission, the presidents of the two chambers, and the greater number of the ministry being assembled at the Tuileries, the Duke of Otranto, aware of the interview that had taken place between M. de Vitrolles and the marshal, turned the conversation on the existing state of things, especially with regard to military affairs. Marshal Davout communicated the intelligence he had received, which was far from being satisfactory. During the past two days the Prussians and English had been advancing with redoubled speed, and there was every reason to fear that they would reach Paris sooner than the army that was beginning to rally at Laon. Marshal Davout, with characteristic absence of circumlocution, declared formally that he considered resistance impossible; that, even though a temporary advantage might be gained over the Prussians and English advancing from the north, there would still be the Austrians, Russians, and Bavarians coming from the east, to whom they must finally succumb; that it was better to understand and declare how things stood, and act accordingly; that, the Bourbons being inevitable, by proclaiming them unthemselves they would get them to enter Paris unaccompanied by foreigners, and on the conditions he had mentioned to Marshal Oudinot. Unlike M. Fouché, who would have made a thousand windings and calculations, Marshal Davout frankly repeated the conversation he had had with Marshal Oudinot, stated the conditions he required, the hope he had received of their being accepted, and finally declared that his advice would be to have a frank explanation with the chambers, making them a formal proposition on this important ground, that it would be better to accept the Bourbons willingly on conditions they should themselves propose,

than accept them unconditionally from the hands of foreigners.

This proposal, made in a tone of sincere conviction, did not meet with any opposition from MM. Grenier and Quinette, nor even from Carnot, who had perfect confidence in Marshal Davout's honour, and who, despite his prejudices, was not insensible to the advantages of the Bourbons' returning without foreign aid. M. de Caulaincourt was silent, as was his custom at that time. Had M. Fouché acted as frankly as the marshal, great advantage might have been derived from an immediate and patriotic determination. But, since because he was displeased at being anticipated, or that he feared Marshal Davout would be too precipitate, he was rather cool in his approach, and in pursuance of a habit he had adopted of almost constantly deciding without consulting his colleagues, he told the two presidents, M. Cambacérès and M. Lanjuinais, that they must prepare the chambers for a result that was inevitable. No person seemed inclined to object when M. Bignon, the temporary Minister of Foreign Affairs, arrived unexpectedly with an important document. It was the first report from the negotiators sent to the allied camp and contained the following information.

MM. de Lafayette, de Pontécoulant, Sebastiani, d'Argenson, de Laforest, and Benjamin Constant had first proceeded to Laon, where they expected to find the English and Prussian armies. Their object in taking this direction was to obtain an armistice with the troops nearest the capital, and then proceed to treat of the essential conditions with the sovereigns themselves. Having obtained more secret information as they advanced, they had repaired to St. Quentin, where they found the Prussian outposts, and demanded an interview with the commanders of the allied forces. Blücher, who was two days' march in advance of the English, referred them to the Duke of Wellington; but he, supposing that Napoleon's abdication was only a feint to gain time, was of opinion that an armistice should not be granted. Blücher, needing but little inducement to become quite impracticable, refused all suspension of arms unless he got possession of the frontier fortresses and of Napoleon's person. Such conditions could not be accepted. But the officers who represented the allied generals declared that they were not sent to France for the sake of the Bourbons, who were of very little importance to them, and that when Napoleon and his family should be removed, the allied sovereigns would be willing to agree to whatever conditions would be most advantageous to France. The negotiations were then authorized to proceed to Aachen, where they would find the allied sovereigns. They had now set out for this destination, being first, as was their duty, sent off this report to the executive commission. They repeated that the allies were not absolutely determined to bring back the Bourbons, but that their unchangeable resolution was that Napoleon and his family should be excluded from the throne of France; that, once this was agreed to, they would be more yielding on other points, but that they would be seriously offended should Napoleon be assisted to escape.—A proceeding that would remove all probability of peace.

The legation, in conclusion, advised that other negotiators should be sent to Blücher and Wellington, with authority to make such concessions as would be necessary for obtaining an armistice.

The negotiators had evidently allowed themselves to be misled by the heedless remarks of some Russian officers, all imbued with revolutionary principles, but who would have assumed a very different tone with regard to the Bourbons had they had to discuss the future government of France officially. Still this report caused an unfortunate revulsion in the executive commission. Three members, who were before willing to submit to the alleged necessity of accepting the Bourbons, now that this necessity seemed no longer to exist, thought it better not to act precipitately, nor seem so ready to make a sacrifice that might be avoided. Had M. Fouché had more sagacity, he would have seen that the negotiators had been deceived in accepting the remarks of a few Prussian officers as the decided opinion of the allies, and would not have allowed the fruit of Marshal Davout's bold proposition to be lost; but, either through error or the fear of compromising himself, he agreed that it would be better not to be too hasty in coming to a resolution. He revoked the order he had given to M. Cambacérès and M. Lanjuinais to prepare the chambers for the return of the Bourbons, and, still acting on his own authority, he chose, from among the persons present, fresh negotiators to treat concerning an armistice with the allied generals, now almost at the gates of Paris. For this purpose he selected MM. Flaugergues, Andréossy, Boissy d'Anglas, De Valence, and De la Besnardière, almost all of whom were present in their official capacity as members of the *bureaux* of the two chambers. He gave them no further instructions than that they were to be guided by the report they had heard read, and to save the capital, at any cost, from the presence of foreigners. He also gave them a letter to the Duke of Wellington, showing that they were duly authorized to act. In this undignified epistle, filled with flattery of our enemies, M. Fouché repeated all the commonplaces of the day, saying that, now that the man who had been the cause of the war had been removed, the European armies would certainly not advance farther, but would leave France the choice of her own government, and that the Duke of Wellington, the illustrious representative of a free people, would not wish that France, which was as civilized as England, should be less free. M. Fouché, by this letter, placed France, as it were, at the feet of the English general; and though, unfortunately, it was but too true that such was her position, it need not have been acknowledged so openly. But so great was his vanity that he would prefer appearing at a disadvantage on the political stage, than not appearing there at all. Although M. de Caulaincourt rarely made an objection to any thing that was done, he could not avoid opposing the choice of M. de la Besnardière, whom he knew and esteemed in private, but who had only just returned from the Congress of Vienna, was completely under the guidance of M. de Talleyrand, and who was looked on as a decided royalist. "Royalist," said M. Fouché: "well,

perhaps he is; but he is a good diplomatist, which is what we need." Nobody replied, and the selection was confirmed by the silence of those present.

Although the truth of Marshal Davout's conclusions had been recognised, things were still left in the same state of uncertainty, the care of arranging them being left to the enemy. On leaving the meeting, M. Fouché came to a very serious resolution. He had been quite sincere when he asked for passports for Napoleon for the United States, and had, at General Beker's suggestion, even given permission for the frigates to leave without waiting for these passports, so that Napoleon could have no further motive for delaying his departure. But the report of the negotiators caused a total change, for, fearing to impede the negotiations, he gave orders to the Minister of Marine that though the frigates should be permitted to prepare, and even receive Napoleon on board, they should not be allowed to weigh anchor until the arrival of the passports. It was now for the first time that he sacrificed Napoleon's safety to the interest of the negotiations. These negotiations were certainly of great importance, but the honour of France was still greater, and that would be compromised by delivering Napoleon to the enemy,—a risk that was incurred by detaining him at Rochefort.*

As M. Fouché had not adopted Marshal Davout's energetic proposition, both he and the Government were for some days tossed about, the sport of passing events. The hapless Chamber of Representatives, having a confused idea of its own weakness, and beginning to perceive that there was no choice between fighting under Napoleon's command or yielding to the Bourbons on honourable conditions, sought to forget its fears and its regrets in discussing the plan of a new constitution. "What is the use," asked some sensible men, "what is the use of plunging ourselves into the labyrinth of such a discussion? Have we not a constitution that needs only that some of its articles be changed, and which, by deciding the form of government and the choice of a sovereign, protects us from vain theories and party competition? Have we not, beside this constitution and the monarch it proclaims, the great advantage of concentrating the army?" This was the opinion held by the majority. But once that a path had been opened to empty theories it was not so easy to close it; and some proposed the adoption of the constitution of 1791, and others something that touched very closely on a republic. These childish

* A want of care in weighing the different circumstances of this affair of the passports has led to M. Fouché's being accused of a design to give up Napoleon to the English; but he has been calumniated in this instance,—a circumstance that has seldom occurred when his conduct has been the subject of comment. It is not true that M. Fouché wished to betray Napoleon, and he exposed himself, at a later period, to the displeasure both of the Bourbons and the allies for having anteriorly given permission to Napoleon to leave Rochefort. But it is equally true that, fearing at this time that the negotiations might be impeded, he gave orders to await the arrival of the passports,—a most chimerical expectation, which might lead to a great danger. It was this badly-understood and ill-explained circumstance that led to an unjust imputation, which a spirit of impartiality alone compels us to refute here. M. Fouché himself revoked the order of detention in perfect sincerity, and without the least thought of treachery

discussions, however, did not arrest the attention of the members, nor divert their thoughts from the existing danger; for, having listened for a moment to any novelty that was proposed, they left their seats and hastened into the lobbies to gather any news that might have arrived. As the bureau of the two chambers had been present at the late meeting of the executive commission, the members necessarily got some idea of the discussions that had arisen there. They knew that the re-establishment of the Bourbons had been proposed, and it was to M. Fouché that this intention of recalling the princes was generally attributed. As is always the case among partisans, there were various grades of zeal among the Bonapartists. The greater number was satisfied to get Napoleon II. instead of Napoleon I.; but there were a faithful few who considered that abandoning Napoleon was an act of treachery,—a crime they laid to M. Fouché's charge. One of this minority, M. Félix Desportes, repaired on the following morning, the 28th, to the executive commission, accompanied by M. Durbach, who was less anxious to retain the Bonapartes than desirous to avoid receiving the Bourbons from the hands of foreigners. Both pressed the Duke of Otranto with questions, and told him in the harshest terms that, having sought and won the confidence of the chambers, he had now betrayed them by proffering his aid to the Bourbons. M. Fouché was embarrassed at first, but soon recovered himself and replied, "It is not I that have betrayed our common cause, but the battle of Waterloo. The Prussian and English armies are advancing rapidly on us, and we are unprovided with all means of resistance. They will not have Napoleon or any of his family on any terms! What part have I in this? If you wish to know how and why I treat with their generals, here is my letter to the Duke of Wellington, which you can read." The Duke of Otranto here gave it to them to read. These gentlemen being simple enough to believe that the whole subject of negotiation was contained in this letter were satisfied, and asked and obtained permission to communicate this piece of information to the Assembly. They immediately hastened to the Chamber of Representatives, where they read M. Fouché's letter aloud; but though it was neither approved nor blamed, it produced a temporary calm:—for the imagination is a faculty which is easily excited or calmed in times of great danger. Besides, it dissipated for some moments the generally-received suspicion of an act of dark treachery.

Meanwhile, the members who had been sent to the French army, on its way to Laon, had fulfilled their mission and were now come to make their report. This duty devolving on General Mouton-Duvernet, he first described the disorder that had spread through the army; told how it had soon joined Marshal Grouchy's corps; how the men had believed that they had been betrayed; how their zeal had revived when told they were to fight for Napoleon II.,—a name, he said, that had given them fresh vigour; that they were quite ready to do their duty, but that they would require, besides the much-needed material assistance, some encouragement from the nation to raise both their

moral and physical courage. When he had spoken thus, a unanimous cry was heard, saying, that if Napoleon I. were gone, France remained,—France, that was a thousand times more important than any man whatever; that a proclamation should be drawn up to thank the soldiers for what they had done; to exhort them to continue their efforts for their country, which ought to hold the first place in their affections; and to beg them to hasten to fight once more for their independence and liberty under the walls of Paris, where they would find the representatives ready to die with them in defence of these sacred rights. An address breathing these sentiments was drawn up by M. Jay. It was voted during the course of that day, and then intrusted to five members to be presented to the army. The Assembly did what it could; but that was very little. With the best intentions it could not replace the name nor supply the want it had created by substituting Napoleon II. for his father,—a child for a great man.

The members intrusted with this proclamation had not far to go to meet the army, which arrived under the walls of Paris on the 28th and 29th of June, having been harassed by the Prussian and English armies, and ever in danger of being intercepted. At first the Duke of Wellington and Blücher had advanced but slowly, and had conceived the idea of seizing some fortresses before entering France, so as to protect their rear, and allow the column on the east time to advance in force. But when they heard of Napoleon's abdication and the consequent confusion they made no further delay. Though they feared that this abdication was but a feint, they foresaw what confusion it would cause in the administration, and determined to advance at once to Paris. They agreed to follow the right bank of the Seine, and, if possible, advance beyond the French army on the left bank, so as to arrive first at Paris. Marshal Blücher, being in advance, was to take the lead and proceed along the Oise, and endeavour to seize the bridge, whilst the English army would follow, and hasten as quickly as possible to his assistance. The Duke of Wellington, who, in his thrifty character of Englishman, of victorious general, and of profound politician, had great influence at the court of Ghent, recommended that the court should leave Belgium for Cambrai, while he would endeavour to open the gate by a *coup de main*. He was detained by the difficulty of moving his *mâtériel*, and especially his portable bridges, so that he was far in the rear of Blücher, whose impatience would not allow him to wait for anybody.

Whilst Blücher reached Saint-Quentin on the 25th, the Duke of Wellington left Ghent, giving directions to a detachment to seize Cambrai and Peronne. On the 26th the French army, continuing to advance, reached Chantilly, Compiègne, and Creil. One of his divisions crossing the Oise at Compiègne tried to intercept the French army on its way from Laon to Paris.

The French army rallied at Laon and fell back on Soissons under the command of Marshal Grouchy, Marshal Suchet having returned to Paris. General Vandamme repulsed Marshal Grouchy in command of the right

wing, which had been detained so much against its inclinations from taking part in the battle of Waterloo, and now advanced through Namur, Rocroy, and Rethel to Laon in the best possible dispositions. When Marshal Grouchy reached Laon in person he was informed that his line of retreat to Paris was threatened by the Prussians; he therefore hastened to reach Compiègne, whither he had ordered Count d'Erlon to precede with what was left of the 1st corps, and Count Valmy with the wreck of the cuirassiers. When Count d'Erlon arrived at Compiègne he found the Prussians in front, whom he checked as far as he could, fell back on Senlis, and sent word to his superior in command that the Prussians were on the left bank of the Oise, so that he must choose another route to avoid any disagreeable rencontre on his way to Paris. Grouchy, acting with a vigour that, had it been displayed ten days earlier, would have saved the French army, sent Vandamme to Ferté-Milon so that he might reach Paris by following the course of the Marne, and went himself to Villers-Cotterets, where he had arrested the progress of the Prussians by a vigorous attack, and then retreated quickly by the Dammartin road. On the following day, the 28th, the troops were advancing by all the eastern roads toward Paris, and on the 29th had taken up their position at Villette, having, by the skill and energy of their leaders, avoided the enemy. Blücher in the mean time had reached Gonesse. The Duke of Wellington having sent a detachment to seize Cambray had opened that town to Louis XVIII., and was himself between Saint-Just and Gournay,—his rear-guard being at Roye and his head-quarters at Orvillers, and consequently two days' march in Blücher's rear. The impatience of the one and the dilatoriness of the other had placed this great distance between them, and which might have been a great disadvantage to them had we been wise enough to profit by the opportunity.

Now, for the second time within fifteen months, was the roar of the enemy's cannon heard upon the plain of St. Denis, and increased the agitation that had reigned in Paris during the preceding days. Our troops presented a very unsatisfactory appearance, exhausted as they were by a march of a hundred or a hundred and twenty leagues, accomplished in ten days. The despatches sent by Marshal Grouchy on his route, inspired as they were by fear of the pursuing enemy and the terror of being intercepted before reaching Paris, did not help to reassure the public mind. Under such influences Marshal Davout lost all hope of making a successful resistance,—an opinion which he was too straightforward to conceal from the Duke of Otranto. He had removed his quarters to Villette, that he might be in a better position to provide for the defence of the capital, and sent word to the Duke of Otranto that the only chance of safety he saw was in following the advice he had given the day before,—to proclaim the Bourbons immediately, and thus cause the allied armies to retire,—an advice, he admitted, to which he himself had felt the greatest repugnance, but had conquered his feelings from the conviction that it would be far wiser to re-establish the

Bourbons spontaneously than receive them by force through the intervention of foreigners.

M. Fouché agreed with him fully, but M. de Vitrolles, with whom he was in constant communication, but who was not authorized to accept conditions, could only give him vague promises as to what regarded men or measures, and merely repeated that the great services he had rendered on this occasion would never be forgotten. M. Fouché, knowing the value of such promises, endeavoured to obtain some better security for himself and the revolutionary party. M. de Tromelin was now returned from his mission to the English head-quarters, and had only brought back similar vague replies, saying that the Duke of Wellington had no authority to give passports to Napoleon, that the Bourbons must be accepted, and that, instead of imposing conditions on them, implicit trust should be placed in the good sense of Louis XVIII., who would do every thing that could be reasonably desired. M. de Tromelin also informed M. Fouché that the Duke of Wellington had spoken in the most flattering terms of him, and would be glad to have an interview with him. M. Fouché became greatly alarmed at the prospect of the dangers announced by the military commanders, and by the vague declarations of the royalist agents, and acting, as usual, on his own responsibility, he told Marshal Davout, in reply, that every effort should be made to conclude an armistice, without, however, making any conditions concerning the Bourbons, as, by accepting them too hastily, they would incur the risk of receiving them unconditionally, without at the same time receiving any guarantee against the entrance of the enemy into the capital. But, if the Bourbons were not immediately proclaimed, some other sacrifice must be made to secure an armistice. The first negotiators had been told, in their interview with the Prussian generals, that the allies would not cease to advance but on condition that Napoleon and the frontier fortresses should be given up to them. M. Fouché considered that it would be better to sacrifice the fortresses for the sake of Paris; for Paris in itself represented both France and the seat of government. This was a very questionable policy; for surrendering Paris was nothing more than receiving back the Bourbons, whilst delivering up such fortresses as Strasbourg, Metz, and Lisle was surrendering the keys of the country to the enemy, and which, perhaps, they would not restore even to the Bourbons themselves. But, as M. Fouché was at that time more occupied by the dynastic question than by the safety of the territories, he authorized Marshal Davout to give up the frontier fortresses in exchange for an armistice that would arrest the English and the Prussians at the gates of the capital. He was to transmit this authorization to Marshal Grouchy, who commanded our retreating army, and from him it was to pass to the negotiators of the armistice, wherever they could be found.

No mention was made of Napoleon in this correspondence. What M. Fouché proposed was to allow him to leave for Rochefort immediately, conceding the condition that he most desired, that of setting sail without waiting for passports. This was the most honourable de-

termination that could be come to, as the enemy could not demand Napoleon from the Provisional Government when he was no longer in their power. This mode of proceeding would be prudent as well as honourable. Many military men spoke of bringing Napoleon from Malmaison, placing him at the head of the army, and, with him as their leader, fighting a last battle under the walls of Paris. By allowing him to leave he would be saved both from the violence of his enemies and the imprudence of his friends. Admiral Decrès and M. Merlin were sent to urge his departure, and to give him full authority to set sail the moment he should get on board the frigates at Rochefort, telling him at the same time that the enemy had demanded that he should be given up to them, and how impossible it would be to answer for his safety at Malmaison, where a troop of horse might surprise him at any moment. This done, the Government informed the Chamber of Representatives how much worse affairs had become, proposed that Paris should be placed in a state of siege, the civil authorities still preserving their power, except over the fortresses, where military rule alone should prevail, after the proclamation of a state of siege. The chamber, already greatly alarmed by the roar of the cannon, acquired no fresh information by these communications, and almost unanimously voted Paris in a state of siege.

The noise of the cannon on the plain of St. Denis caused as much consternation at Malmaison as at Paris, except, indeed, to Napoleon, who was better able than anybody else to estimate the danger at its full value. Marshal Davout, either to protect Malmaison, or to prevent the enemy from passing to the left bank of the Seine, had barricaded the Neuilly, Saint-Cloud, and Sèvres bridges, and destroyed those of Saint-Denis, Besons, Chatou, and Pecq. But, as these precautions would not guarantee Malmaison from a surprise, Colonel Brack, of the Horse-Guards, had hastened thither to say that the Prussian squadrons were scouring the plain, and that the place might be surprised if the inhabitants were not on their guard. Greater alarm would have been felt had information been received of Blücher's plans, of which we shall soon have occasion to speak. General Beker had three or four hundred men under his command, and was determined to defend Napoleon to the last extremity. About twenty young men, among whom were MM. Flahault, de La Bédoyère, Gourgaud, and Fleury de Chaboulon, were ready to die in defence of the illustrious victim confided to their zeal. Napoleon smiled at all these demonstrations, assured them that the enemy had scarcely reached the plain of Saint-Denis, that though the Seine was shallow it could not be easily forded, and that things were not so alarming as his faithful servants depicted them. Malmaison was nearly deserted. With the exception of MM. de Bassano, de Rovigo, Lavalette, and Bertrand, who seldom left the house, and Napoleon's brothers and mother, with Queen Hortense, none visited there but some officers in tattered garments, and covered with dust, who had escaped from the field of battle, and were come to tell Napoleon of the enemy's march, and beg him to

place himself at their head. Napoleon listened to them calmly, pacified and thanked them, and drew his own conclusions from what he heard. Without knowing precisely the position of the allies, he deduced from the different accounts he had received, that, as usual, the impetuous Blücher had got too far in advance of the cool Wellington. With his usual promptitude in military affairs he saw that the allies could be surprised thus at a distance from each other, and this happy chance might give him at Paris what he had sought in vain at Waterloo—an opportunity of fighting them one after the other—and so more restore the success of the French arm. Sixty thousand men must have returned from Soissons; there were at least 10,000 near Paris; and these 70,000 were more than sufficient to overpower Blücher, who could not have more than 60,000 under his command. The Prussian general defeated, there was little hope for the Duke of Wellington. If such a triumph were gained, who could calculate what courage it might infuse into the nation? and Napoleon, yielding to a vision of happiness, thought his glorious would be to render so great a service to France without seeking any personal advantage, and then betake himself to exile, when he should have paved the way for a profitable way of peace. The greatest result he hoped for, in all probability, from this last fact, would be to secure the crown to his son!

He pondered over this vast project during the night of the 28th-29th; it was on the evening of the 28th he got the information which suggested this plan, when he was suddenly interrupted by the arrival of MM. Denis and Boulay de la Meurthe, (M. Martin could not be met with,) who came in the middle of the night to inform him of the intention of the executive commission with regard to his departure. He admitted them at once, and when he received the order commanding the capture of the frigates to weigh anchor at once, without waiting for the passports, he said he was ready to leave, but had first a message to send to the executive commission. He took a sad leave of these two faithful servants, whom he was never to see again.

At dawn on the 29th he ordered his horse to be got ready, put on his uniform, and sent General Beker, to whom he explained his plan with an energy he had not shown since the 10th of June. "The enemy," he said, "have committed a great fault, but one that might have been foreseen from the different disposition of their generals. They have advanced in two masses of 60,000 men each, leaving a great space between them that one might overpower before the other could come to his assistance. This is an opportunity that Providence offers us, and which it would be a crime not to profit by. I, therefore, desire to resume the command of the army, so that my presence will restore all its courage, surprise the enemy, and, having punished them for their temerity, restore the command to the Provisional Government. I pledge my word," he added, "as a general, as a soldier, and as a citizen, that I will not retain the command an hour after having gained the victory, and engage to win not for myself, but for France."

er was struck by the noble expression of Napoleon's countenance as he pronounced the words. It sprang from the consciousness of awakening amidst misfortunes it for a moment dissipated Napoleon, the general immediately for the Tuileries, the unwilling proposal that he did not hope to. It was with great difficulty Neuilly bridge, which was commended. He found the executive committee: the members had been in the. M. Fouché presided, and as to concentrate all the authority

General Beker entered, M. Fouché asked with great eagerness Beker had left. The general was prepared for his departure, leaving he thought it right to communicate to the Provisional Council. M. Fouché listened with icy calm. The general explained Napoleon's plans, all were silent, until Fouché replied. He took a few moments to prepare his speech, which he wished that France should be by Napoleon. To do him justice, little confidence in the success of his military plans, whose value he appreciated, looking on the further proof of his rashness, that their failure would only distrust of the allied generals, looked on the abdication as a relief, when they would find their ally, would avenge this last misfortune. "Why," he harshly demanded Beker, "why did you have a mission? Are you not in a position? Read the reports of the general, he flung a bundle of letters on the table, and you will see that he returned in disorder; that it is impossible for us to defend ourselves and that our only hope is in an armistice at any cost. Napoleon will change in our position. His head of the army would only misfortune, and the destruction of him go; we do not wish to detain him longer." Not one of his colleagues said a word to what M. Fouché said. The general who were at Malmaison, that M. de Bassano was there, that he knew now with whom he originated, and immediately addressed M. de Bassano, assuring him he was the most dangerous to detain him a single hour longer.

He returned immediately to Malmaison, found Napoleon still in uniform, de-camp prepared, and only replied to his message before mounting.

Although Napoleon was not the reply he received, he was not irritated for a moment; but he reconciled to seeing that this could not be accepted from him, or certain might be its results, he overruled the opposition he had met from the marshals, when he could have

destroyed the allies dispersed through Paris. This was the second time within fifteen months that doubt, distrust, or ill feeling toward himself, had prevented his profiting by the opportunity that fortune offered of destroying the enemy! For the second time he culled the bitter fruit of having wearied, or—may we say?—disgusted, the world by his genius!

He now only thought of his departure. General Bertrand, the Duke de Rovigo, and General Gourgaud were the chosen companions of his exile. Drouot would have been of the number, but, as he alone was considered competent to command the Imperial Guard after Napoleon's departure, he had accepted the command. Napoleon himself had desired him to do so. He regretted Drouot, who, he said, possessed the noblest mind and heart he had ever known; but he did not despair of seeing him, Lavalette, and some others, in America; his mother, brother, and Queen Hortense were also to join him there. All his preparations being completed, he determined to leave in the evening. He had not thought of money, but four millions in gold which had been found in one of the military wagons were confided to M. Lafitte. Queen Hortense offered him a diamond necklace, that he might not be without a resource always at hand, which was at the same time easy of concealment and easily convertible into money. At first he refused, but, when she pressed him with tears to accept it, he allowed her to conceal it in his dress, then embracing his mother, brothers, Queen Hortense, and his generals, he stepped into his carriage at five o'clock, (29th of June, 1815,) whilst all present, even the soldiers of the Guard, melted into tears. He drove toward Rambouillet, avoiding Paris, that Paris he was not to enter until twenty-five years later, when he was brought back on a funeral car, brought back a corpse to the Invalides by a King of the House of Orleans, who is himself, at the moment that I write these lines, no longer at the Tuileries; so quickly do the inhabitants of that dreaded palace succeed each other in this stormy century of ours!

Whilst he was thus quitting France, in which his stay had been so short and sad, his departure was announced to the executive commission and to the two chambers. When this message was read in the Lower Chamber, a deep sadness fell on all the members, for they now saw how little advantage was to be derived from the abdication: they felt that Napoleon had gone forever, and foresaw that many of themselves would share a like fate, and many fall by the hand of the executioner!

Now that M. Fouché was rid of so formidable a neighbour, he turned with more eagerness than ever to those communications which he converted into intrigues, instead of making them a great and honest negotiation in the first instance for France, and in the second for those men who had been compromised during our different revolutions. He had a twofold object; he wished to obtain the best possible conditions from the allies and from Louis XVIII., and, as this would require time, he was anxious for an armistice that would afford him leisure to negotiate. Not satisfied with having M. de Vitrolles to communicate with the royalists and General Tromelin to treat with the

Duke of Wellington, he chose another agent to send to the English commander-in-chief. This was an intriguing Italian, named Macirone, who had first followed the Roman, then the Neapolitan, and lastly the English interests, and who had been Murat's envoy when he made terms with the allies. This man had remained at Paris since Murat's fall, and was well known to M. Fouché, who found him a most convenient emissary to send through the enemy's outposts to the English camp. He sent him there to learn what were the Duke of Wellington's views with respect to the armistice and the Government of France. At the same time he sent several messengers to the negotiators of the armistice to inform them of Napoleon's departure, in order to prove that the abdication was not a pretence, and to avoid the difficulty of making the success of the negotiations depend on Napoleon's being given up to the enemy.

We have already seen that the first negotiators, having conferred with some Prussian officers on the road to Laon, had then proceeded toward the Rhine in order to treat with the sovereigns themselves. The second negotiators had been sent to the head-quarters of the English and Prussian generals to arrange an armistice. The important mission of arresting the progress of the enemy had devolved on the latter. The solution of the whole question was consequently transferred to the Duke of Wellington's camp. Though Marshal Blücher was a sincere and zealous patriot and a heroic warrior, he was extremely violent, and consequently was not intrusted with the secret plans of the allies; for, though his unwearied devotion to the common cause had decided the battle of Waterloo, he did not possess that calm good sense which gains its possessor more influence than glory itself. It was not he, therefore, though nearest in position, but the Duke of Wellington, that was to negotiate the armistice. The commissioners intrusted with this negotiation, MM. Boissy d'Anglas, de Flaugergues, de la Besnardière, and Generals Androssy and Valence, proceeded first to the outposts, which were exclusively Prussian, as the English army was still in the rear, and were received very politely by M. de Nostitz, who conducted them from post to post; but they did not see Marshal Blücher, either because he did not wish to meet them, or because it was difficult to find him. After many useless passings backwards and forwards, M. de Nostitz himself advised them to go to the Duke of Wellington, who could be more useful to them than the Prussian general. The English commander was at Gonesse, whither the commissioners repaired. In this they did wisely, for his was the only mind capable of directing a revolution, the second, unfortunately for us, that was to be accomplished by foreigners.

Happily—if one may use the word in speaking of a time when our country lay at the mercy of an enemy—happily, the Duke of Wellington, if he had not genius, possessed good sense, calm, unyielding good sense, and to so great a degree that he need not fear comparison on that point with any name in history. He might be pronounced to be a man without a single weakness, were it not that he possessed a large share of vanity, pardonable, indeed, in

his position. Besides his military name which had greatly increased during the few days, he enjoyed the reputation of being a profound politician, capable of making any piece of state policy. During the time he had spent at Vienna he had gained the confidence of all, and during the six months he had been ambassador at Paris he had won over Louis XVIII. and the royalist party much influence as it was possible to acquire to exercise over men of narrow minds and violent passions. He entertained a favorable opinion of Louis XVIII., and considered the repose of Europe and of France would be secured by his being replaced on the throne, but with better advisers than he had had before. Regarding what had taken place in France in 1814 from an English point of view he believed and said that the charter given by Louis XVIII. could render a country so happy and prosperous, and had only failed because it had not been properly put into operation. The Duke of Wellington, enlightened by his experience of his own country, would have seen the operation of the charter is to create an establishment of a homogeneous minority independent of king and princes, under the influence of the chambers, and capable of directing them. He had seen nothing of this in the ministry of 1814, composed of great noblemen, an idle man of talent, and from his office, (M. de Talleyrand was then in Vienna,) of M. de Blacas, a royal formalist, cold, stiff-mannered man, who had no connection with any one but the king, and of a special men, unconnected by any bond, and ruled by a royal council, whereas the results of jealous princes banished all union of opinion. The Duke of Wellington said repeatedly in his communication to London and Vienna that what Louis XVIII. needed was a ministry possessing that unanimity necessary to support a Government. Being near Ghent during the months of April and May, he had constantly repeated the same thing to the royal court. There was but one objection made to this: that, however good the proposed remedy might be, it was necessary that the king, for whom it was meant should pay the price, and sent before it could be applied. Louis XVIII. might, perhaps, have agreed to accept a ministry, as it would rid him of the pressure of his family, and of the emigration; but neither the princes nor emigrants would have consented to such an arrangement. As the advice of such a man as the Duke of Wellington could not be altogether rejected, those who surrounded Louis XVIII. were wishing to defer at least in appearance to his advice, admitted that the ministry had been wanting in unanimity. Who ought to have been blamed for that? Everybody, and nothing had been done; but there must always be found some victim, who is rendered responsible for the faults of all, and often for the faults of others even more than for his own. On this occasion the circumstances of the case pointed out M. de Blacas as the victim. The gentleman, of whom we have had occasion to speak before, was not deficient either in intelligence or good sense, besides that he was perfectly upright. But he had the weakness to be considered the king's favorite, and

and unbending one. But it must be that, though tainted with all the sins of an emigrant, he had neither encouraged the errors of the emigration nor in all things obeyed the wishes of Louis XVIII., who was not inclined to adopt errors. He had often opposed the Count d'Artois in particular, and when measures were needed to expiate the faults of the emigrants, he certainly was not the one who would have been chosen. But as his frank manner and well-known opinions made him popular to the liberals, and his being the representative of Louis XVIII. made him popular to the princes, he was fixed upon as the expiatory victim, and became, on his departure from Paris, the chosen subject of general obloquy. The Duke of Angoulême's assertion of the necessity of a change in the ministry being adopted, it followed that such could not exist contemporaneously with a favourite who ruled both the king and the ministers, and this opinion was carried to Ghent by the excited friends of the Count d'Artois, as well as by the moderate liberals who wished for a more liberal form of government, so that M. de Blacas, from reasons which he opposed, became the object of universal hatred. So far had this gone, that even at Ghent, where all were in exile together, violent pamphlets were written against him. There are times when the mutual hatred against an individual with an equal hatred, which they would find it difficult to explain. Such was the position of M. de Blacas in the midst of the royalist party. Talleyrand, who deserved part of the blame, not only escaped all censure, but even gained more importance from the general hatred. At Ghent he assumed the entire responsibility of the prompt resolutions that had been taken against Napoleon at Vienna, and which occasioned his second and last fall. These resolutions originated rather in the passions than in reason at Vienna, than in M. de Talleyrand's policy; but the emigrants at Ghent, knowing of the internal machinery at work at Vienna, and judging but by the effect, that when they saw the thunderbolt fall it had been flung by the hands of M. de Talleyrand. Nobody disputed his deserts, though absent the entire year, the whole blame fell on M. de Blacas, who had been only beside the king, and M. de Talleyrand the merit of recovering what M. de Blacas had lost. M. de Talleyrand himself, greatly displeased that his intercourse with the king should be under the control of a party, joined in the denunciation of M. de Blacas, for which the emigrants repaid him by paying his services. All parties joined in a kind of unanimity against M. de Blacas, though he was the sole cause of their miseries, though he had not, in reality, done anything. Now arose a number of ideas to which he contributed his share. The Duke of Wellington, reasoning as an Englishman, was true, that there should be unanimity in the ministry, whilst the more sensible among the emigrants at Ghent, such as M. de La Fayette, de Jaucourt, &c., said that that was sufficient, that both the favourites and the errors should be removed, that the holders

of national property, who were so much alarmed, ought to be tranquillized, as well as the inhabitants of the country districts, who apprehended the re-introduction of tithes and feudal claims; that every effort ought to be made to separate the cause of the Bourbons from that of the foreign Powers. The emigrants made no objection to this, but added that some security should also be given to honest men by the exemplary punishment of those whose plots had caused the second overthrow of the monarchy; a protection necessary also to secure the dignity and safety of the crown. In fact, it was impossible to remove the impression that there had been a great conspiracy, in which, besides the chief men of the army, great numbers of civilians had taken part, and that these, keeping up a communication with Elba, had brought about the catastrophe of the 20th of March. The royalists never considered that this had been the consequence of their own errors, but attributed it to the criminality of those they hated, and to convince them of the contrary, that is to say, of the truth, would have been the more difficult, as it was shared not only by the most sensible men at Ghent, but even by the best diplomatists of the Coalition, such as Prince Metternich, Count Nesselrode, Count Pozzo di Borgo, and the Duke of Wellington. From this combination of ideas, some false, some true, arose a sort of programme, which consisted in saying that on their return into France a unanimous ministry should be formed, all interests should be secured, the Bourbons kept as distinct as possible from foreigners, and some of the more guilty conspirators punished. All these conditions seemed to be implicitly implied in the removal of M. de Blacas, and the installation of M. de Talleyrand in the office of Prime Minister.

We should not get a complete idea of the state of opinion in the exiled court if we neglected mentioning that a most favourable opinion was entertained there of the Duke of Otranto. If M. de Talleyrand got the merit of all that had been done at Vienna, M. Fouché was believed to be the originator of all that had been done at Paris. The Coalition that had vanquished Napoleon at Waterloo had been organized at Vienna, but his ruin had been consummated at Paris by the intrigue that had led to his second abdication. M. de Vitrolles' letters, and the reports of the different royalist agents, agreed in attributing the merit of this intrigue exclusively to M. Fouché, and those zealous royalists who had conceived so high an opinion of him before the 20th of March, justified the opinion they then expressed, of M. Fouché's capability of saving their cause, by appealing to the fact that he had saved it ultimately. The more moderate party agreed with these, and all joined in praising the regicide who betrayed Napoleon, whom he detested, for the advantage of the Bourbons, whom he did not love, but whom he did not fear, and whom, with his usual fatuity, he believed he could lead like grown-up children. The emigrants at Ghent would have been horrified at the proposal of adopting, as their recognised agent, an honest man, professing a wise and moderate love of liberty, whilst they considered it the very acmé of

skilful diplomacy to attach themselves to a skilful intriguer. For them the French Revolution was not the operation of sane and healthy ideas, confounded, certainly, in a chaos of the wildest theories, which an enlightened man might separate and utilize, but a letting loose of the powers of hell, which needed an infernal magician, stained though he may be with regal blood, to restrain and confine. Such a magician they considered they had found in M. Fouché. In truth he was nothing but a thoughtless, presumptuous, restless intriguer, but had he been the veriest scoundrel he would have suited them just as well. This was the reasoning of honest men, a reasoning that was the natural consequence of ignorance, which often leads to the brink of evil those who would shrink from it with horror were they sufficiently enlightened to see it in its native horrors.

But the tranquil-minded Louis XVIII. took no part in this excitement, these acts of injustice or prejudice. He did not believe that he had been ruined by M. de Blacas, nor saved by MM. de Talleyrand and Fouché. He did not consider that he owed his restoration to declarations proceeding from Vienna, nor to intrigues hatched at Paris, nor even to the battle of Waterloo, but solely to his being descended from Henri IV. and Louis XIV. ! His natural good sense, however, made him see some merit in the man who had conquered Napoleon at Waterloo ; him he esteemed, felt grateful for his good wishes, and would even yield to his opinion to a certain degree. The Duke of Wellington had advised him to choose a homogeneous ministry, a ministry that would be one, as was the saying of the time, to put an end to the influence of the princes and emigrants, to choose M. de Talleyrand as Prime Minister, and dismiss M. de Blacas, not because he had done any wrong, but because he was the object of universal dislike. Louis XVIII. thought this advice very good, except in what regarded M. de Blacas, and this displeased him in the highest degree. With Louis XVIII. favouritism was mere habit. He was accustomed to M. de Blacas, he valued his principles, his uprightness, and his talents ; he knew that he had done no wrong, and he had sufficient tact to perceive that the friends of the Count d'Artois did not persecute the favourite, but the devoted friend, of the king. This gave him a motive for upholding M. de Blacas, and feeling unwilling to be deprived of his services. He consequently showed a determination to stand by him.

M. de Talleyrand had left Vienna for Brussels at the same time that the sovereigns and their ministers left the Congress to assume the command of their armies. When M. de Talleyrand was about leaving Vienna, he expressed the greatest repugnance to holding office, and said that he would not any longer be the minister of Louis XVIII. unless the emigrants were removed, a resolution that was generally approved by the Coalition. The greater number had written to Ghent, saying that M. de Talleyrand's wishes ought to be consulted, and his advice followed in every thing. M. de Talleyrand stopped for some time at Brussels before joining the king, but specified the same conditions as were generally agreed on : a

unanimous ministry, a cessation of influence, security for the general in the punishment of those who had taken part in the fancied Bonapartist conspiracy, a separation of the royal cause from the foreigners. With regard to this last M. de Talleyrand had advised another combination. The king and his court were to leave Ghent for Switzerland, and enter France from the east, at the same time that the various monarchs should enter by the north. M. de Talleyrand, having sent on these conditions remained at Brussels, apparently waiting acceptance.

Such was the state of affairs when the Duke of Wellington, learning that Napoleon had abdicated, had hastened toward Paris in the rear of the Prussians. His good sense told him what was to be done. He considered the dispute between Louis XVIII. and M. de Talleyrand most inopportune, and advised the king to all that his minister proposed, except sending France from the east. He considered Louis XVIII. ought to go to Paris at once, so put an end to the uncertainty that was there, and that he ought to draw up a positive declaration, asserting that the war had been caused not by the Bourbons, but by Napoleon, that he himself was not sent for the second time, as mediator between him and France, that he promised him to send the holders of national property, that a unanimous and independent ministry should be appointed, the chambers assembled immediately, and, lastly, that those who were concerned in the conspiracy by which Napoleon was brought back to France should be punished. The Duke of Wellington showed to M. de Talleyrand, advising him to be content with these concessions, to join Louis XVIII. soon as possible, and enter France by the northern frontier, which was nearer than the eastern.

Having given this advice with all the details of the conqueror of Waterloo, the Duke of Wellington set out to take the command of the English army. When he came near France, he took as much pains to inspire France with little common sense as he had done with the Bourbons and the emigrants. He had told that Blücher wished to see Napoleon a person, and, as the saying went, not the son of him. The Duke of Wellington wrote him a letter which will be one of his best pieces of glory with posterity. "Napoleon," he said, "does not belong to you nor me, but to the sovereigns, who will decide his fate as the name of Europe. Should they require an executioner, I shall request them to send one other than me, and I advise yet, for the sake of your fame, to follow my example." The difficulty on this subject would be settling Napoleon's departure, of which he had heard. He next began to arrange with the plan of their military operations behind the walls of Paris. The English and Prussian did not now amount to more than 100,000 men, though the campaign had been one with 220,000 ; a proof that their resources had not been won without great loss. There was a long column extending from the north to Paris. As Napoleon was not there, a great this imprudent march, the danger was

specially as the English were making exertion to reach the Prussians. Still of 120,000 men was not very large to overpower the French army before the banks of Paris. The right bank of the Seine, the nearest the enemy, was very well defended; the left was not so well defended, but the river must be crossed before a difficult attack could be attempted. The defenders of Paris could not be estimated at less than 100,000, sixty and some odd thousands of men having returned from Flanders, and the assistance of troops that had been in the army, marines, federalists, and military. It was, consequently, the very extreme temerity to think of seizing Paris by negotiation would have been infinitely both in a political and military point of view. This mode of proceeding would have the double advantage of not compromising the success obtained at Waterloo, and increasing the irritation of the French. The Duke of Wellington was inclined to this opinion at first, but Blücher did not share the same view. He wished to have the first to enter Paris in 1815 had been in 1814, and to be able to levy contributions for his army, or, perhaps, worse if there were a battle. For the Prussian general had not equal power with the British.

It was the state of affairs at Ghent and the headquarters of the allied armies, when commissioners met the Duke of Wellington and the Legation from Paris on the morning of the 2nd of June. He received them very politely, and let them see that his plans were already decided on. He seemed to doubt at first the sincerity of Napoleon's abdication, and asked that he should be given up to be executed as Europe should think fit, which was that, as his fate was to be deliberated on, there was no danger that he would be treated with barbarity. The negotiators told him that Napoleon had left for England, he replied that his partisans still were violent men, who would not leave France or Europe in repose. He took pains to explain that Europe did not intend to interfere with the internal government of France, but gave as a friendly advice, and strongly expressed, that the Bourbons should be accepted again. The representatives of the executive commission, however, that Europe had promised not to use force over the choice of a government, showed no disinclination to the return, indeed, some seemed even to favour it, but, the principle once admitted, a long discussion as to the conditions. The Duke of Wellington said that the French should not be subjected to the humiliating conditions, that the French should trust to the Charter of 1814, which would secure them liberty if properly put into effect, that the want of the past year was a weak and independent ministry, which Napoleon III. now promised to give, and that it could be reasonably desired on this or that subject they would be sure to ob-

Flaugergues, an intelligent man of liberal opinions, replied that he

doubted whether the chambers would accept the Bourbons unconditionally, and he insisted on an alteration in the Charter relative to the chambers taking the initiative, an alteration that was very generally desired. The Charter of 1814 had surrounded the initiative with numerous precautions, and at those times it was believed that the influence of the chambers consisted in sharing the initiative legislation with the crown, for experience had not yet taught them that this influence can only be exercised by a ministry appointed by the majority, and that so long as the chambers can keep such a ministry in office they possess not only the power of taking the initiative in all legislative acts, but they actually have the entire government in their hands, as far, at least, as they can exercise it without danger. The ignorance of this truth led to the initiative being insisted on with a puerile but universal obstinacy. The Duke of Wellington promised to demand this concession from Louis XVIII., and then adjourned the discussion to the following day. Before leaving, they asked whether another Bourbon prince (they hinted at, but did not name, the Duke of Orleans) would be as acceptable to the allied sovereigns as Louis XVIII. The duke replied that he would think of it, and let them know at another interview.

The duke spent the remainder of the day in disposing his troops, in endeavouring to impress his own opinions on Blücher, and had several interviews both on that night and the following day with the envoys from the executive commission. In the mean time, these gentlemen had got certain intelligence of Napoleon's departure, and the Duke of Wellington had received very important information from Ghent. The English Guards having surprised the fortress of Cambrai, Louis XVIII. had entered the place accompanied by M. de Talleyrand, and published the declaration, called the declaration of Cambrai, dated June 28, which was the declaration of Saint-Ouen of the second Restoration. In this document Louis XVIII. said that *one gate of his kingdom being open to him*, he hastened to interpose himself for the second time between Europe and France, the only way in which he wished to take part in the war, for he had forbidden the princes of his family to appear in the ranks of foreigners; that on his first return to France he had found the public mind greatly excited, that he had sought to moderate that excitement by taking upon himself the office of mediator and arbitrator, that his government, surrounded as it was with difficulties, might have committed some errors, but that the experience then gained would not be lost; he had given the Charter, and meant to maintain it, and even add every guarantee that could assure its successful working; that a unanimous ministry was the very best that he could offer; that the re-establishment of tithes and feudal claims had been spoken of, and the invalidity of the sale of national property, but these were base calumnies invented for their own advantage by the common enemy, for it would be sufficient to read the Charter to see that nothing of the kind need ever be feared; and, lastly, that returning now to his subjects, from whom he had received so many proofs of affection and fidelity, he was de-

terminated to forget all that had occurred during the late revolution, but that an act of treason unexampled in the annals of history had been committed, treason that had caused the blood of Frenchmen to be shed, and had brought foreigners, for a second time, into the very heart of the country, and that the dignity of the crown, the interests of France, and the peace of Europe called for its punishment; that these conspirators should be arraigned, by the chambers, before the tribunals of the law, and that justice should pronounce their fate.

The declaration was signed by Louis XVIII. and M. de Talleyrand. It contained, as we see, all the current ideas of the time. The moderate party admitted in this the faults committed in the administration, spoke of the maintenance and development of the Charter, and of guarantees for the holders of national property. The sagacious Wellington had suggested the phrases touching the unanimity of the ministry, and the more violent emigrants what concerned the vengeance that was to fall on the fancied authors of the conspiracy of Elba, which was nothing else than the natural result of the errors committed by the royal Government, and Napoleon's skill in profiting by them.

The two facts of the departure of Napoleon, and the arrival of Louis XVIII. with his declaration, simplified very much the task allotted to the Duke of Wellington and the negotiators of the armistice. The latter announced Napoleon's departure, and, of course, there could no longer be a question of delivering him up a prisoner. The Duke of Wellington immediately proceeded to consider what dynasty should be substituted for the Bonapartist. The question of transmitting the crown to Napoleon II. he did not consider worthy of serious consideration, but only reflected whether, as had been suggested, another Bourbon prince might be substituted for Louis XVIII. Without mentioning any person in particular, he said that it would be infinitely better for the interests both of France and Europe to decide in favour of a sovereign whose claims could not be contested, than to choose one out of the regular line of succession, whose very position would compel him to undertake something novel, adventurous, and brilliant, which would not be very desirable for France at a time that her policy needed to be both calm and prudent. He added that, though he had not received any special instructions on that point, he was convinced that the suggestion would not be adopted. If France, he said, was determined on having Napoleon II., or some Bourbon prince besides Louis XVIII., Europe would be compelled to require stronger guarantees, such as the occupation of some fortresses. This was a positive though indirect mode of excluding every candidate except Louis XVIII. The Duke of Wellington then produced the declaration of Cambray, and pointed out the advantages it offered, with all the intelligence of an Englishman well acquainted with the working of a constitutional monarchy. To this the representatives of the Provisional Government made but two objections, one touching the restrictions attached to the act of oblivion of all political opinions and actions, and the other concerning the con-

vocation of the chambers. They, as well as everybody else, believed that Napoleon's return had been effected by a conspiracy, and had no objection that those who had taken part in it should be punished, but at the same time they feared that the same punishment might be tendered for the regicides. They had no slightest idea that, under pretence of punishing a conspiracy which had never existed but in the excited imaginations of the royalist party, the blood of the most heroic and illustrious men in France would be shed, and were quite satisfied when the Duke of Wellington assured them that Louis XVIII. had not the most distant idea of doing any thing of the kind, as might be seen by his intention of making Fouché one of his ministers. The English general was guilty here of a mental reservation unworthy of his wonted good sense and honesty. He had, in some measure, adopted the royalist plans of vengeance, not from any silly hatred, but because, in common with the leaders of the Coalition, he thought that a severity would be very expedient. There was a general feeling of dissatisfaction entertained against the French army, which was increased by having taken part in the late campaign and of being ready to join in another; and it was considered that a few striking examples of severity would produce a very salutary effect.

The second objection made by the commissioners referred to the convocation of the chambers. The declaration of Cambray, in saying that those criminals who were to be excepted from the operation of the act of oblivion should be named by the chambers, seemed to imply the convocation of new chambers, and the commissioners desired that the existing chambers should be continued as in 1814, which they considered would be likely to produce a favourable impression on them. The Duke of Wellington thought both objections worthy of consideration, and promised to send to M. de Talleyrand to request him to draw up another copy of the declaration, which would point out more definitely who were meant by the criminals, and which, in proposing the convocation of the chambers, should express in such a manner as not to exclude the possibility that the existing chambers might continue to sit.

These questions being discussed, the Duke of Wellington declared that an armistice would not be granted but on condition that the French army should be withdrawn from Paris, that the English and Prussian armies should be put in possession of at least the outposts, while the care of the city should be confided to the National Guard, under whose protection the desired arrangements should be afterwards made. The Duke of Wellington did not give any explanation as to how the change in the government was to be effected; but he wished that the foreign troops should appear to have a little part in it as possible, and the French army being sent beyond the Loire, so that but those of the Parisian National Guard should interfere. And effectively, with all the authority of his character and his position, he told the impetuous Blücher that the magnificent idea of entering the enemy's capital as conquerors should be abandoned; that the

better to seek a useful than a brilliant result; that it was very doubtful whether they would be able to take Paris by force of arms, and even did they succeed it would only humiliate France, and compromise the prospects of a government whose stability was of importance to all; and that it would be much better to take part outside the walls of Paris in a peaceful revolution effected by the National Guard than accomplish it themselves after a bombardment.

The Duke of Wellington considered that an armistice could be concluded on the following conditions: that Paris should be intrusted to the National Guard, whilst an absolute silence was to be preserved as to the future government of France, the re-establishment of the Bourbons being only implied. He desired the commissioners to inform the Provisional Government of these conditions, telling them that there was no possibility of their obtaining any others. He showed them a letter on this subject, from MM. de Metternich and de Nesselrode, dated the 26th of June, written when it was known that Napoleon had abdicated, and in which these ministers advised the allied generals not to recognise any authorities, feigned or otherwise, which might have succeeded the fallen Emperor, nor to suspend their military operations until within the walls of Paris, when they would be in a position to impose whatever government would suit the allied sovereigns. Nothing, therefore, was to be gained by waiting for the arrival of the sovereigns themselves. It is unnecessary to add that such declarations left no room for proposing the surrender of the frontier fortresses as a means of negotiation. Not a word was said on the subject; for the English general did not want either Metz or Strasbourg: he wanted Paris, that he might be able to re-establish the Bourbons there. He stated these same conditions to the envoy Macirone, and to all the other secret agents of the Duke of Otranto. He wished that the Bourbons should be reinstated with as little appearance of foreign aid as possible, and with a constitutional government such as he found to work well in England. As for M. Fouché himself, he declared that the Bourbons were much indebted to him, and desired nothing more than to have an opportunity of testifying their gratitude. M. de Talleyrand had worked abroad, M. Fouché at home; and both would be considered as the saviours of the monarchy.

Whilst these things were taking place at the English head-quarters, Marshal Blücher, dissatisfied with negotiations from which he was almost excluded, and which would prevent his entering Paris as a conqueror, threw so many obstacles in the way of our commissioners that it was with the greatest difficulty they were able to send an account of their interviews with the Duke of Wellington to M. Fouché, or get fresh instructions from him. The marshal did not confine himself to doing what he could to impede the negotiation, but sought to cut the knot with the sword of Prussia by crossing, to the left bank of the Seine. For this purpose he sent out a troop of cavalry to seize the bridges. The Sèvres, Saint-Cloud, and Neuilly bridges had been provided with defensive works, and those of Besons and

Chatou burned; but, unfortunately, the Peaq bridge, though Marshal Davout had given orders for its destruction, had been left standing in consequence of the opposition of the inhabitants of Saint-Germain, some actuated by mere motives of local interest, but others impelled by a criminal party spirit. The Prussian cavalry passed through Saint-Germain and advanced toward Versailles. These troops ran some risk, as we shall see; but the Seine had been crossed, and France threatened on the left bank,—that is to say, on her weakest side.

Meantime, the result of the negotiation was impatiently expected in Paris, and great displeasure felt at the delay. M. Fouché suspected the cause; for General Tromelin and Macirone had succeeded in passing the outposts, and had hastened to tell him all that the English general demanded. But, as the couriers of the negotiators had not arrived, he had not learned any thing officially, and he availed himself of this circumstance to keep the chambers in ignorance of what had occurred. He confined himself to saying to those about him that there was no chance of an accommodation but by accepting the Bourbons on good and safe conditions. This language excited the greatest distrust, not alone among the revolutionists, but among the liberals, though the latter would be satisfied if they could obtain liberty with any government. M. Fouché, seeing that he was suspected, became more undecided than ever; and, though he saw that the Bourbons were inevitable, he did not venture to act decisively, but sought to make use of Marshal Davout, who, as commander-in-chief, understood better than anybody else the difficulty of opposing the enemy, and, being a man whose frankness of disposition rendered him incapable of concealing any thing, he was capable, as he had done before, of declaring himself for the Bourbons. But instead of addressing the marshal openly and honestly, as he ought, he besieged him secretly, sending M. de Vitrolles to urge him underhand to make the desired declaration. This was not the way to succeed; and he even ran the risk of compromising every thing by such conduct. M. de Vitrolles' frequent visits to the marshal caused an event that might have had the most serious consequences.

The chamber, as we have seen, had sent some of its members with a proclamation to the army to console the men for Napoleon's departure and promise that every thing should be done to secure the succession of Napoleon II. When these deputies arrived at Marshal Davout's head-quarters they were greatly surprised to find there M. de Vitrolles, a well-known royalist, who was generally believed to be at Vincennes. The conversation that ensued soon degenerated into an altercation; the deputies expressed their astonishment to the marshal, and were badly received by him. They then visited the troops, who applauded them loudly as they spoke of Napoleon II. After this they returned to the chambers, where their report of what had occurred propagated the distrust they had themselves conceived. In the first burst of indignation, the chambers thought of denouncing the executive commission as guilty of high treason; but they

dreaded the effect of such a declaration, and confined themselves to asserting that some invisible hand was paralyzing the defence and threatening the safety of the capital and the established authorities. When told that the army, worn out with fatigue, could only be roused by the name of Napoleon II., several members exclaimed, *Let us join them and cry, Vive Napoléon II.* The entire Assembly rose and renewed its engagement to the Imperial dynasty in the person of the captive child. What had occurred at Villette produced an animated scene in the executive commission. Carnot was greatly agitated, and in his excitement seemed sometimes inclined to submit to the Bourbons, at others disposed to consider every attempt to bring them back as treason; he now called M. Fouché to account for what had occurred at Villette. He asked why M. de Vitrolles was there, what was his business, who had set him at liberty, and for what purpose it had been done. M. Fouché, who was not easily excited, became angry at last. "Whom do you blame?" he said to Carnot. "Why do you accuse each in turn of the difficulties that have arisen from circumstances? As you cannot keep quiet, but must needs have a quarrel with somebody, go and attack Marshal Davout at the head of his troops, and you will probably find him prepared to speak to you. If you wish to find fault with me, accuse me before the chambers, and I will answer." This warm reply did not satisfy, but almost annihilated, Carnot, who, like his colleagues, succumbed beneath the difficulty and falseness of the position. To refuse both Napoleon and the Bourbons was a twofold negation, that could lead to nothing. Carnot could not reproach himself with the first, but persisting in the second was unworthy of his intelligence and patriotism.

But it was necessary to come to some determination; and undecided as M. Fouché was, he saw clearer than anybody else the necessity of getting out of this perilous position, where on one side were the armies of the enemy ready to attack Paris, and on the other the Chamber of Representatives passing in a moment from the deepest dejection to the wildest resolutions: he determined to provoke a serious conference with the military commanders, and force them to declare their opinion on the most important question of the time:—Would it be possible or not to defend Paris? Were defence possible, they should fight; if not, they should surrender. This was well thought of, for it presented the sole means of getting out of the dilemma. But there was an absence of the frankness that ought to have characterized such a proceeding, and which, by abridging these moments of anguish, would have spared the dignity of all concerned, and which these protracted tergiversations had so much compromised.

Some slight amelioration of the state of things had prepared the way for M. Fouché's solution of the difficulty. Marshal Grouchy's exaggerated report had led to the belief that the army that was returning in disorder would be incapable of protecting the capital, but their appearance inspired a more hopeful feeling. Vandamme's corps, which had been Grouchy's, was uninjured in personnel and in matériel, and

the men, in despair at not having fought Waterloo, only asked to be allowed to shed their blood under the walls of the capital. The troops returned from Waterloo, though now well armed, had recovered their appearance and courage. The two masses amounted together to 58,000 men, some having been on the way from Laon to Paris, and many could not be excelled in valour or morale. The bare mention of Napoleon II. excited them; but, no matter who the enemy destined for them, the very sight of the English and Prussians made them furious. More than 12,000 men had been brought to Paris from the depots, which raised the number of disposable troops of the line to 70,000. Six thousand federalists had been armed, under the designation of *tirailleurs* of the National Guard, and, but for the unjust distrust of the Government, 15,000 more, at least, might have been under arms. For the artillery, some cannon-guns from the navy, the veterans, and the students might be reckoned on. It would have been impossible to assemble 90,000 men before the capital, of which 70,000 were perfectly mobilized and might be sent to either bank of the Seine. The fortifications on the right bank—that nearest to the enemy—were finished and completely armed, but those on the left were but just commenced. But the bank, if deficient in fortifications, presented means of defence in the necessity of crossing the Seine. To operate on the left bank, the enemy would be obliged to cross the river, and in order to effect this the troops would be compelled to separate into two masses, in a dangerous position, by which the French general would be sure to profit. Napoleon, manoeuvring at the head of these 70,000 men at the two banks of the Seine, would certainly have brought one, if not both, of the enemy's armies to a miserable end. But, even without Napoleon, a man of so much experience and firmness as Marshal Davout could have offered an effectual resistance, as long as he was only opposed by Blücher's and Wellington's armies.

Marshal Davout had left the troops that he returned from Waterloo on the right bank of the Seine, stationed Vandamme with Grouchy's former corps on the left, and established the Imperial Guard as a reserve in the Champ-de-Mars, with a bridge of boats close by the new bridge to facilitate the communication between the opposite banks. He had stationed some large guns on the heights of Anteuil, to sweep the plain of Grenelle in case the enemy should attack Vaugirard in force.

The Prussians, as we have seen, had seized the Saint-Germain bridge, and intended to operate with 60,000 men on the left bank while the English attacked the right with 30,000. Rapid marches, a few combats, and the occupation of some points in the rear, had reduced the invading armies to 110,000. Would it be possible to defend Paris successfully under such circumstances? Had the Government entertained more decided plans of action, and a few additional military precautions been added to those already taken, there is no doubt that the English and Prussian armies might have been arrested in their advance, and even severely punished for their temerity. In fact,

eights of Montmartre, Belleville, and one were in a complete state of defence, he approached to Villette, Chapelle, and especially to the canal of Saint-Denis, to be better defended. With a little more labour bestowed on this part of the works, it would have been impossible to force the right bank, which need cause no further anxiety if aided by the depôts, the tirailleurs, and the *chasseurs*. In that case the 58,000 that remained of the Flemish army might all have been sent to the left bank to oppose the Prussians.

As it was indispensable on this side to arrive in order to drive the enemy toward Paris, our forces should have withdrawn at a distance of two or three leagues from the left bank and Montrouge, and some works should have been thrown up to protect that city. It is therefore certain that with the Prussians on the right bank completed, those on the left commenced, and a large number of royalists under arms, 25,000 men could have been sent to the right bank, and 70,000 led to overpower the Prussians. The latter stated, the English could have little left to do.

Would this give a chance of a certain victory, one that would be truly advantageous to the country? Two hundred thousand enemies were approaching from the east, 50,000 men, under Marshal Wrede, were not at a distance than four or five days' march from Paris. Even did a desperate and despairing effort succeed, was there not a risk that Waterloo might be avenged, our troops meet with a more disastrous fate a few days later? Were Napoleon there to profit by his pulse attendant on such good fortune, is no doubt but that the allies might be fully opposed. But, Napoleon having left for Rochefort, any success we might expect beneath the walls of Paris would but be the Coalition, and perhaps render our situation worse.

we can easily understand that in the circumstances in which France then was, it was only natural that a disposition should exist to make a last desperate effort, and that Frenchmen should be willing to risk the greatest dangers for the chance of avenging Waterloo on the English and Prussians, though it now should entail a harsher fate.

These were the reflections that passed through the mind of the inflexible defender of Ham, to whom the defence of Paris was intrusted. It is only the madness of party spirit that could accuse such a man of weakness or timidity. He saw all the advantages and disadvantages of the position; he understood such it was in his favour to have to do with enemies whose forces were divided into two by the Seine, and whose line of communication was consequently interrupted, whilst he, by defending Paris, commanding all the approaches, could advance at any time *en masse* the troops of the enemy that might venture on the left bank, and do them serious injury. As a general, he was tempted by a battle offered so many chances; as a citizen, he felt that if he failed Paris would be exposed to the mercy of the Prussian soldiers; and that, if he conquered, his victory, however brilliant, would avail but little when 200,000 of

the enemy would arrive in fifteen or twenty days. He could not decide, the citizen and the soldier were at strife within him. M. Fouché inspired him both with distrust and anger, for he had proposed to him a simple and just means of terminating the difficulty by making a sincere declaration to the chamber, and proposing that the Bourbons should be accepted on honourable and satisfactory conditions. Though M. Fouché had approved of this plan, he had allowed the opportunity to pass under the weakest pretexts, and while he promised the royalists in private to do all that they desired, he sought in public to throw the entire responsibility on the military commander, by making him declare that resistance was impossible. The marshal knew not how to decide, at the same time that he felt extremely displeased with M. Fouché, who, instead of simply and honestly telling the truth to the chambers, had ensconced himself in a thousand tortuous windings, seeking to win a secret importance with the royalists; whilst in the eyes of the revolutionists and Bonapartists he threw all the responsibility of refusing to fight, and of submitting to the enemy, on the commander-in-chief of the army at Paris.

It was while in this disposition of mind that the marshal on the 1st of July received the Duke of Otranto's invitation to join the executive commission to deliberate on the expediency of resisting or yielding to the demands of the allied generals. Marshal Davout treated M. Fouché with the same haughty indifference as M. Fouché himself often showed to his colleagues in the commission, and was in no haste to take part in a discussion which he foresaw would be neither sincere nor decisive. Besides, having established his head-quarters at Montrouge, he was occupied in arranging his troops, in seeing that they were stationed at the posts where they were to fight, and his whole morning was passed in the discharge of his duties as commander-in-chief, and not in those of a member of the Government, which indeed were only an accessory to the first. When the executive commission saw that the marshal delayed in complying with M. Fouché's invitation, they all joined in a request for his immediate appearance. He came at once. It was in the afternoon. There were assembled, besides the executive commission, the ministers, the bureau of the two chambers, Marshal Massena, who had the command of the Parisian National Guard, Marshal Soult, Marshal Lefebvre, and Generals Evain, Decaux, and De Ponthon, the latter commanding the artillery and engineers. Marshal Ney had not been asked to attend, his influence having been greatly weakened by the manner in which he had spoken in the chamber.

When all were assembled, the Duke of Otranto announced the object of the meeting, and without telling the entire result of the negotiation commenced by MM. Boissy d'Anglas, Valence, Andréossy, de Flaugergues, and de la Besnardière at the head-quarters of the Duke of Wellington, he let them know that the allied generals were becoming every moment more stern, and showed no inclination to sign an armistice unless Paris, that is to say, the seat of government, was given up to them. It did not need much sagacity, nor much expla-

nation, to understand that they did not want to visit Paris with fire and sword, but merely to effect a revolution there.

M. Fouché, having briefly explained the question to be considered, became silent, expecting some one to reply, but no one seemed desirous of giving an opinion so serious a subject. But M. Fouché provoked a manifestation of opinion by addressing those present who belonged to the Chamber of Representatives, and who he was anxious should commit themselves to a declaration of opinion. He commenced by calling on M. Clément du Doubs,* a very honest man, and very much esteemed, who was a member of the bureau of the second chamber, and who replied that the question, being altogether military, should rather be referred to the commanders of the army, and seemed to imply that the illustrious Massena ought to give his opinion. The immortal defender of Genoa, who had disapproved of the Bourbons' return in 1814, and still more of Napoleon's in 1815, was perfectly aware of all the difficulties of the actual position, and were he inclined to exert any influence on the course of events, he would have advised the shortest path to what was inevitable,—the re-establishment of the Bourbons. In a weak voice, enfeebled more by dejection than ill health, he replied that of course he knew how long a large city could hold out against a powerful enemy, but, as he was ignorant of the resources of the capital, he could not give a decided opinion in the present instance.

This reply left Marshal Davout, Minister of War and commander-in-chief of the army defending Paris, no choice but to declare his opinion. This he did with harshness and ill humour, taking care to show that the displeasure he felt was excited by the tortuous policy which, instead of putting an immediate termination to our difficulties, had only seemed to take pleasure in complicating them. What information was required from him? Was he to say whether it would be possible to fight outside the walls of Paris? He said it was possible, that there was every chance of victory, and that for his part he was prepared to fight boldly and with every hope of success. He then explained the reasons of his opinion, not indeed with the eloquence of an orator, but with the clearness of a man who understood the science of his profession. What he said had great influence. "If," he added, "the question is merely whether a battle may be fought and won, I declare that I am prepared to fight, and have every hope of success. I here give a formal contradiction to those who assert that I refuse to fight because that I believe victory impossible. I now declare the contrary, and demand that this declaration be registered."

M. Fouché's face, which was not wont to change colour, became paler than usual, and,

embarrassed by words so evidently addressed to him, he replied, in a bitter tone, "You do to fight; but can you promise to conquer?" "I can," replied the intrepid marshal, "I engage to do so provided I am not killed within the first two hours."

This reply only increased M. Fouché's embarrassment; but had he been an honest man with a clear intellect, he would have raised the question from the point to which the marshal wished to lead him. A enemy however favourable, would not decide any thing, as 200,000 additional enemies would in a few days come and collect the wrecks of the French and Prussian armies. When Napoleon at Fontenoy, in 1744, desired to fight a desperate battle, all would have been decided at least for a time, since the enemy in the capital had scarce any resources to fall back on, and he would have held his ground, with his influence immensely increased by the victory. But now, were Blücher and Wellington's armies beaten, within eight days time the number of enemies would appear, and there would be no Napoleon to meet them. A battle, consequently, could not decide any thing. Discussed by soldiers beneath the walls of Paris, a heroic despair might lead them to attempt it, but discussed by civilians, by statesmen in council, it should be rejected, as an undoubtedly generous resolution, but one that might lead to the direst results.

The Duke of Otranto, either not being able or not daring to place the question in a proper light, found himself in a most embarrassing position, from which he was rescued by Carnot, the man who was prepared at any moment to accuse him of treason. This patriotic citizen had just alighted from his horse and entered the Assembly still covered with dust. He had been making a scientific inspection of the centre of Paris. He declared that it was his conviction that it would not be possible to give battle to the allied armies without risking the safety both of Paris and its inhabitants. The fortifications on the right bank of the Seine were not sufficiently strong to offer a permanent resistance, and justify the removal of the army to the opposite side. The works on the left bank were utterly insignificant, and there was every danger that if the army were sent to that distance, the city would fall into the hands of the enemy. The Prussians could only be driven from the heights of Montmartre by a fresh disposition of our troops, which would leave Montrouge and Vaugirard exposed, and risk the safety of the capital. It was absolutely impossible for the English and Prussian armies to come to each other's assistance. The tides being low at this season, the Seine would be fordable in some parts, and the allied armies seemed to be already occupied in establishing a mode of communication near Chatou and Argenteuil, so that it was very likely that if the battle took place on the left bank, we should have to meet not only 100,000 Prussians, but also 50,000 or 60,000 English in addition. The result was, consequently, very doubtful, more doubtful than the commander-in-chief seemed to think; nor could we Carnot—whose disinterestedness we can well doubt, as there would be but little reward for his life should the Bourbons return—

* The present generation has both known and respected M. Clément, who was a member of the chambers for forty years. It was the reminiscences of this scene which he was good enough to write out for me, that have enabled me to correct the reports of many of his contemporaries. His being present at the time, and his well-known voracity, besides that he could have no motive for giving a false colouring to what occurred, justify me in believing what I state to be correct, and as close as possible to the truth.

advise risking a battle beneath the walls of Paris.

This opinion, given by such a man as Carnot, who was at the same time a patriot and an officer of engineers, had, as was natural, a great influence on all present. Carnot was supported by Marshal Soult, who said that he had examined the works on the right bank and had not found them in a satisfactory state, the canal of Saint-Denis not presenting an insurmountable obstacle to the assailants, and there being no defences behind it, the enemy, after having forced the canal, could enter the faubourgs of Paris pell-mell with our soldiers, whilst the combat might still continue on the left bank.

This opinion was opposed by Marshal Lefebvre, an old revolutionist, who could not be easily intimidated, or induced to approve of the return of the Bourbons. He considered that the works on the right bank could be completed and made impregnable in a few days, and those on the left sufficiently advanced to allow the troops to leave them for a few hours, that there were men enough still in Paris to allow us to send 70,000 active troops to meet the enemy, when it was almost certain that a battle would be gained and the whole aspect of affairs changed.

This view, indeed, was quite tenable; but neither M. Fouché, nor anybody else, took a more enlarged view of the case, or saw that a victory gained beneath the walls of Paris could not be decisive, and would, at best, cause but a slight improvement, and might make matters worse. Viewing the question in a technical point of view, as to whether a battle might or might not be gained, left the decision entirely to the military commanders. The civilians, who composed the greater number of those present, finding that the discussion was altogether military, were glad of the opportunity of getting rid of the responsibility of a decision, and said that as the question was whether a battle would or would not be successful, it ought to be left to the decision of military men.

This opinion, being agreeable to the greater number, was immediately adopted, and it was decided that a council of war, entirely composed of generals, should be summoned for that evening, and the line of conduct to be pursued decided there. This was only avoiding, not solving, the difficulty; for even should the generals decide that it would be possible to defend Paris, it still remained to be considered whether, when the capital had been successfully defended, it would be possible to oppose all Europe.

Had M. Fouché stated this important question as he ought, it might have been decided at once, but he preferred gaining his object by throwing the responsibility on the generals. He drew up the questions to be decided by the council of war in such a way as that each should get a definite reply. These questions were as follows:—In what condition is Paris with respect to defensive works, arms, and provisions? Would it be possible to resist a simultaneous attack on both sides of the Seine? If the combat were unsuccessful, would the city and inhabitants be safe? And how long, in any case, could the city hold out?

Before the council of war had assembled in

the evening, news was brought of a brilliant victory gained by the French over the Prussian cavalry at Versailles that very morning. General Grenier, who had been inspecting our different positions, having sent intelligence that the Prussian cavalry were advancing toward Versailles, Marshal Davout sent General Exelmans to drive them back. General Exelmans, who was one of those who advised fighting to the last, hastened to meet the enemy. He stationed General Piré in ambuscade at Rocquencourt, with the 1st and 6th chasseurs and the 44th regiment of the line, and advanced himself, at the head of the dragoons, by the Vélizy road to Versailles. The enemy's cavalry, composed of the two hussar regiments of Brandenburg and Pomerania, under Colonel Sohr, did not amount to more than 1500 men. General Exelmans came in sight of them near Versailles, and attacked them furiously with the 5th and 15th dragoons, whilst the 6th hussars and 20th dragoons, under the valiant Colonel de Briquerville, charged them in flank. Briskly repulsed in the direction of Rocquencourt, where they were received by a fusillade from the 44th of the line and the charge of the 1st and 6th chasseurs, these two regiments were overthrown and completely destroyed. Only two or three escaped to carry the news of their defeat to the Prussian head-quarters. The Prussian infantry stationed at Saint-Germain then advanced to their assistance, but it was too late.

This brilliant achievement, the last of twenty-two sanguinary struggles, was but a slight consolation for what we had suffered, and made no essential change in the existing state of things. The council of war assembled in the evening at Villette. The members found their task greatly lightened by the manner in which the subject of discussion had been presented to them, being limited to a certain number of points, to which their observations were to be exclusively limited. There could be no doubt but that the decision would be conformable to the wishes of the Duke of Otranto.

With regard to the defence of Paris, the council declared that those on the right bank were sufficiently strong and well defended, but that those on the left were worthless. The supply of arms was declared to be sufficient. It was not thought probable that an attack would be made simultaneously on both sides of the Seine by the Prussian and English armies, but, if made, it was believed that it could not be resisted. There was a great deal to be said on this point, as it was most likely that the principal attack would be made on the left bank, to which that on the right would be but secondary. If a small part of the French troops were left on the right bank, 60,000 men might face the enemy on the left, and restrain if not totally overpower them. This reply left room for discussion. As to what the consequences of a defeat might be to the inhabitants of Paris, the council could not decide, as no general could tell what might be the result of a lost battle. And, lastly, it would be still more difficult to say how long it would be possible to resist the enemy, as that could not be known beforehand.

Still the important question was not solved. It was not said whether, if our troops should gain a complete victory over the Prussian and English armies, we would be placed in such a position with regard to the Russians, Austrians, and Germans that we should have no reason to regret our victory. But the council had been asked certain positive questions, and to these, with one exception, had given suitable and perfectly veracious replies. And these replies were all that the wily president of the Provisional Government wanted. Since men so competent to judge had declared that the left bank of the Seine was totally undefended, that it would be impossible to resist a simultaneous attack on both sides, that the consequences to the inhabitants of the capital could not be foreseen, and that resistance could only be for a time, the course to be taken was evident. There was no choice but to treat with the enemy. Carnot, M. Fouché's most formidable opponent in the Provisional Government, could make no objection to this decision, as he himself had, in opposition to Marshal Davout, asserted that resistance was impossible. Grenier supported the decision; Quinette was not a military man, and M. de Caulaincourt, the fifth member of the Government, considered that, Napoleon being removed, no alternative remained but to accept the Bourbons on the best obtainable terms. M. Fouché, having succeeded in throwing the responsibility on the generals, said that the only resource left was to resume the negotiations for an armistice. Besides sending fresh instructions to our commissioners, who had written for such from the British head-quarters, it would be very easy to open a communication with Blücher, with whose troops ours were already engaged on the left bank of the Seine. This could be done best, and in a manner most conformable to the rules of war, by sending an envoy to the outposts between Vaugirard and Issy. This would be sure to flatter Blücher, who was known to be jealous of the Duke of Wellington, and, as there was no doubt that the latter would agree to any reasonable proposition, perhaps the best thing that could be done was to flatter the Prussian general—the more unmanageable of the two—by a strictly military proceeding, and which under the circumstances was no additional humiliation. But before despatching an envoy to the Prussian outposts, M. Fouché, for whom clandestine communications always had a charm, determined to send Colonel Macirone again to the Duke of Wellington, and General Tromelin to Blücher, to learn in confidence on what conditions it would be possible to obtain an armistice. He also wished to learn if there would be no choice but the Bourbons, in which case it would be necessary to induce them to make such concessions as would render their return less difficult. He advised the Duke of Wellington (who alone of the two generals of the enemy could understand political considerations) not to hurry his entrance into Paris, to give the public excitement time to subside, to flatter the army, especially by leaving it the tricoloured flag, to make some concessions to the chambers, allow them to take the initiative in legislative acts, continue both in their functions, and finally to proclaim an act of complete oblivion

for all that had occurred since the 20th of March. "If all this be done," continued M. Fouché, "present difficulties will be removed, and those who are now most opposed to the Bourbons will become the very advocates of their recall." These communications were to be taken to the Duke of Wellington by General Macirone. M. Tromelin was not to enter into such minute details with Prince Blücher, but confine himself to learning on what conditions arrangements could be made with the implacable Prussian.

It was on the evening of the 1st of July, as we have seen, that the council of war had given its reply; and it was on the morning of the 2d that the Provisional Government came to this decision. The two envoys, M. Macirone and M. Tromelin, left in the afternoon, the one directing his course toward Genesee, the other toward Saint-Cloud. Colonel Macirone was stopped at the English outposts, and detained until the following morning. General Tromelin succeeded in passing the Prussian sentinels, and in being presented to Blücher, who was pleased at seeing that it had been thought of at last. Since the Prussian general had seen the difficulty of his position on the left bank, where the English could not come to his assistance, he had become anxious to negotiate, and so deprive the Bavarians, Austrians, and Russians, who were approaching, of all share in the glory of the campaign. He received General Tromelin politely, but let him see that he was determined that Paris should surrender. He would not require any political stipulation, though he allowed him to form some idea of what the allies would demand when they became masters of the capital of France. To remove all doubt from General Tromelin's mind as to the intention of the allies, he showed him, and even allowed him to read, the letter that had been written by M. de Neesschrode and M. de Metternich on the 26th of June, and of which the Duke of Wellington had made communication to the five French commissioners. The letter gave the two generals formal instructions not to cease operations until they had possession of Paris, not to recognise any authority established since the 20th of March, and to make every exertion to seize Napoleon. There was no mention made in this letter of the Bourbons, so that there was still room for the faltering delusion that the Austrians and Russians would not be as anxious for their coronation as the English. But of the determination on the part of the allies to get possession of Paris, and not to recognise the existing authorities, there could be no doubt. These preliminary communications being terminated, General Tromelin left Marshal Blücher and returned to M. Fouché, whom he informed of what he had learned. Nothing was known of Colonel Macirone, who had not yet succeeded in gaining admittance to the Duke of Wellington.

It was necessary to come to a decision, but the allied troops had already reached both banks of the Seine. The Prussians had succeeded in crossing the river, and were now stationed on the heights of Sevres and Meudon, their left toward Saint-Cloud, their right a little more in the rear along the little river Bièvre. The English were occupied in show-

bridge across the river at Argenteuil, were approaching Saint-Cloud by Courbeville and Suresnes, in order to bring a part of forces to Blücher's assistance. The main body of their army was on the plain of Saint-Denis.

Marshal Davout had taken up his position as an experienced general. Having commanded the armament of the works on the right bank, he had stationed there the sharpshooters of the National Guards, the men from the 10th, and part of the Waterloo troops; the rest of his troops, with the entire of Vandamme's corps, was to be stationed on the left. The Imperial Guard, as we have already said, was stationed as a reserve in the Champ de Mars, with the command of several bridges of the Seine, so that they could carry assistance to either bank as occasion required. A formidable artillery of heavy guns was stationed on the heights of Auteuil, ready to sweep the river of Grenelle on the opposite bank. About six o'clock on the morning of the 3d, Marshal Davout ordered a close reconnaissance of the island which was occupied by the Prussians, and having driven them back with some slaughter, he retired, not wishing to commence a serious engagement until he should receive orders to fight. But he was well prepared for every point, and determined, should the enemy's attacks become serious, to make the most obstinate resistance. The soldiers were highly excited, and loudly demanded to be allowed to attack the enemy. Their numbers amounted to 80,000, and there was every reason to think that they could conquer an enemy of 100,000, divided on the two banks of the river. Davout's old spirit responded to their ardour, and he sometimes felt tempted to attack and conquer or die before the walls of Paris. He waited for orders from the executive commission, and was not so rash as to take it upon himself to decide the fate of France without the consent of the Government.

When General Tromelin returned, the executive commission determined to send three plenipotentiaries to the Prussian outposts. These were M. Bignon, minister of foreign affairs for the time-being, General Guilleminot, chief of Marshal Davout's staff, and M. de La Fayette, prefect of the Seine. The political, military, and civil interests were all represented in this legation. M. de Caulaincourt was ordered to draw up three plans of convention, in which our negotiators were to propose successively in case the first should be rejected.

In each of these it was required that individuals, their acts and opinions, private and public property, the monuments of art, and museums, should be held sacred, and that existing authorities should be respected and maintained. The only point left open was the occupation of Paris, and the manner in which it should be accomplished. In the first plan Paris was declared to be neutral ground, and the French army should leave and retreat to a certain distance corresponding to the position of the enemy's forces. According to the second project,—every thing else being the same as in the first—Paris was not to be occupied until some account should arrive from the negotiators sent to the allied sove-

reigns. (Nothing had yet been heard from them, but it was hoped that they would obtain some concession from the Emperor Alexander.) And lastly, as a desperate alternative, Paris was to be given up, the French army was to retire beyond the Loire, and as much time obtained for the removal as possible, and the capital was to be intrusted to the National Guard, who alone were to do military duty there, maintain order, and support the existing authorities.

Carnot's and Grenier's hands trembled as they signed these conditions: despair had taken possession of their souls. Even M. Fouché was affected,—he who in the midst of the common ruin thought first of his own safety, and gave but the second place to that of his country. He signed, however, and desired the negotiators to go first to Marshal Davout's head-quarters to get his final instructions, and not to leave him until he should acknowledge definitively that there was no other course left to pursue.

MM. Bignon, Guilleminot, and de Bondy left and repaired to the head-quarters at Montreuil. The greatest commotion reigned there. All those who were with Marshal Davout became fearfully excited; they threatened, they declared that this was treason. Strange phenomenon! the inflexible marshal did not command the silence that he was wont to have observed in his presence. Sorrow was painted on his usually impassible countenance. Generals Flahault and Exelmans said it would be better to fall beneath the walls of the capital than capitulate to the enemy. So impressed were the three negotiators by this scene, that they hesitated to advance beyond the outposts. Drouot, the worthiest man of the time, said to M. Bignon, who asked him what was to be done, "that as a soldier he would rather die on the spot where they stood, but that as a citizen he recognised the prudence of negotiating." These words, uttered by so good a man, were some slight consolation to the three negotiators for having undertaken that sorrowful mission. Davout, yielding to an involuntary emotion, asked them to delay a few moments, and then galloped off with a few officers to take a last view of the enemy's position. Having made a short survey, he returned. That secret voice which speaks to the heart on great and solemn occasions had told him that the soldier should now give place to the citizen. "I have sent an envoy," he said to M. Bignon: "you may leave."

The three negotiators set out and advanced to the Prussian outposts. Here they met with some incivility from General Ziethen, but were soon conducted to the château of Saint-Cloud, where Marshal Blücher had taken up his quarters.

Rough as he was, Blücher was flattered by seeing the French plenipotentiaries at his quarters, and at not finding himself always considered as second to the Duke of Wellington. He received the three envoys politely, but gave them to understand that neither he nor his British colleague could be satisfied with less than the occupation of Paris and the withdrawal of the French army. All the other points were open to discussion, but these were incontestable. Only a few words had been

exchanged, when the Duke of Wellington, who had been informed by the Prussians of the commencement of the negotiation, arrived, and the conversation became serious, precise, and confined to the most essential points. As to the time for taking possession of Paris, the number of days to be allowed for the withdrawal of the French troops, and the place where they should stop,—these were left open questions. The allied generals made no objection to the stipulation that when they should have arrived in Paris they should not interfere in politics, and that the National Guard should alone do military duty in the capital. They had not hitherto concealed that their essential object was the restoration of the Bourbons, but it had not suited them to say, much less to write, that they were come for that very purpose, convinced as they were that it would follow as a matter of course, once Paris was surrendered, and they contented themselves with declaring that the National Guard should maintain the established order of things. Strange that the Duke of Wellington, who was most anxious for the restoration of the Bourbons and had done most to effect that object, was the one least inclined to acknowledge it, and that because of the British Parliament, to whom it had always been declared that no change was contemplated in the French Government. With regard to persons and property, the Prussians and the English, affecting not to take any part in politics, declared that they would respect them themselves and see that they were respected by their armies.

Having spoken in these general terms for some time, the Duke of Wellington said that in negotiations the manner in which they were drawn up was every thing, and asked the French envoys whether they had brought a written plan of the treaty. M. Bignon gave him the third of those drawn up by M. de Caulaincourt, the two first being no longer admissible. The Duke of Wellington then said that he would confer alone with Marshal Blücher; and at the end of half an hour he returned, having made some alterations, in pencil, on the margin of the document. A debate ensued on the contested points, and the following conditions were finally agreed to.

"The French army, whose immediate withdrawal had been demanded, was to be allowed three days to depart from Paris, and eight to retire beyond the Loire, the appointed limit of retreat.

"On the following day, the 4th of July, Saint-Denis, Saint-Ouen, Clichy, and Neuilly were to be surrendered; Montmartre the day following; and the different barriers on the third day."

The troops were allowed to remove all their property, arms, artillery, regimental chests, and baggage. The federalist officers, to whom the obligation of leaving ought not to have extended, as they belonged to the National Guard, were specially assimilated to the army by the allied generals, who had an extraordinary dread of their influence over the people of Paris.

These points being decided, it only remained to determine how the foreign armies were to behave in Paris. The French negotiators proposed inserting the following clause:—"The

commanders of the Prussian and English armies engage to respect, and to make also respect, the Government, the national authorities, the administrations dependent on us, and not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Government, nor in the administration of France."

Such a clause could not possibly be taken by the allied generals, inconsistent as it was with their avowed though unwritten intentions. They substituted the following:—"The commanders of the English and Prussian armies engage to respect and to make others respect existing authorities as long as they are in office." It was further stipulated that the care of Paris should be confided to the National Guard.

Two most important points were still undecided—the security of persons and property. The French commissioners understood not the title of property the public monuments and the museums. The allied generals employed more mental reservation in the negotiation than is usual in the treaty arranged by military men, absolutely refusing to adopt the proposed expression. They remembered that the year before their own reigns had intended to remove from Paris the works of art that made her the brilliant seat of European civilization, but, not daring to inflict so many wounds simultaneously on France, they had renounced the attempt. They therefore refused to make any promise, but declared in general terms that they would respect both public and private property, except such as was connected with war. The expression, being supposed to refer to the artillery, was allowed to pass unaltered. The hidden meaning of these seemingly insignificant words was revealed a few days later.

The twelfth clause, relating to persons, celebrated because of the illustrious blood that it caused to flow, was accepted as the French commissioners had worded it. It ran thus:—"Private individuals and property shall be respected. The inhabitants of Paris, and all persons actually in the capital, shall continue to enjoy their rights and liberties without being disturbed or questioned concerning the offices they hold or might have held, or concerning their political opinions or actions."

This clause apparently included everybody, civil and military, the old and new revolutionists, the regicides who had condemned Louis XVI., and the marshals who had abandoned Louis XVIII., nor could anyone have supposed that it would afford an opportunity for the most hateful revenge. The allied generals did not make the slightest objection to this stipulation, but seemed to regard it as most sacred and incontestable. Every one would wish to believe that two men like the Duke of Wellington and Blücher, so devoted to their patriotism, were also honest in their conduct and concealed no hidden meaning beneath their silence. Unfortunately, it appears that this silence sprang from a dissimulation to explain. They, as generals of the English and Prussian armies, themselves fully promised to respect individuals, but did not mean to impose the same restriction upon the Government of Louis XVIII., which, once re-established, would be sole dispenser of justice in

France. The slightest discussion on this point would have revealed the subterfuge, and perhaps rendered negotiation impossible. They therefore made no remark, and their silence cost France the lives of some of her noblest children.

The three negotiators, having done all for their country that its desperate state would allow, left Saint-Cloud and returned to the Provisional Government on the morning of the 4th of July. They were thanked for their exertions, having done all that was possible under the circumstances. To avoid the risk of a battle, it was evidently necessary to accept the proposed conditions.

The capitulation was accepted. It was only part of the farce that it suited the allied generals and even the Provisional Government itself to play. In reality it seemed to contain only purely military stipulations, dictated by the existing state of the armies, and left France at liberty to choose what government she pleased, the Parisian National Guard being the sole military force retained in the capital. The allied generals thus preserved a seeming fidelity to the solemn promises they had made not to impose a government on France, and the executive commission appeared to sustain the national independence whilst yielding to a physical necessity. It was in this light at least that the executive commission thought it right to view the affair and represent it to the chambers.

The representatives, who alone showed any symptoms of vitality,—the press was silent,—complained of the secrecy observed with regard to the negotiations. But secrecy is absolutely necessary on such occasions. This silence was broken on the morning of the 4th, when the two chambers were made acquainted with the articles that had been agreed on during the previous night at Saint-Cloud. The subterfuge concerning the Government of France suited the chambers as well as the allied generals and the Provisional Government. Why, indeed, desire more definite terms? To declare that the capitulation implied the return of the Bourbons would be only saying what everybody saw, except some imbecile persons who cannot understand any thing that is not formally enunciated to them. To withdraw this convenient veil after all the protestations that had been made against the Bourbons, would only have been to refuse the capitulation, overturn the Provisional Government, and commence a struggle that it was felt would be unsuccessful. Not daring to attempt a real opposition, whose chances of success had been rendered impossible by being deferred, it was more convenient to the representatives to allow the deception to continue until the day should arrive—and it was not far distant—when they should themselves be expelled by foreign bayonets. The Chamber of Representatives therefore accepted the capitulation of the 3d of July without an objection, and thanked the troops, that indeed deserved thanks, since it was to them that any consideration that had been shown to France was due.

However agreeable it might have been to the civil authorities to adopt this species of subterfuge, it was by no means so to the army. When the troops learned the terms of the con-

vention, they saw at once that the withdrawal of the army from Paris was equivalent to yielding it to the enemy, who would hand it over to the Bourbons. The irritation was extreme. The soldiers flung down their arms, left their ranks, and mingled with the federalists who traversed the streets, uttering loud cries. Some declared that they ought not to surrender, that they ought to refuse to obey, and depose those cowardly and perfidious generals. Some blamed one, some another, but all joined in execrating the Duke of Otranto, the traitor, as he was now universally called, as though he were the sole author of the existing state of things.

The stern Davout recalled the irritated soldiery to a sense of duty, and at length, aided by some generals, especially by the honest and ever-esteemed Drouot, succeeded in pacifying them. Having yielded to the first effusions of despair, the army marched through the streets of that capital that it was unwillingly about to surrender to the enemy. Some corps had not received their pay, and had to bear the twofold misery of the capitulation and poverty. M. Lafitte generously advanced some millions to the Treasury; the corps that were most in need were assisted, and all set out for the Loire. The army began to retreat in good order. Marshal Davout not wishing to remain in Paris, though the prudent proposal he had made of receiving the Bourbons unaided by foreigners would have secured him better treatment from them than he had met in 1814. But he wished to fulfil to the utmost the duty he owed the army and the country, and therefore sent in his resignation as Minister of War, that he might remain in command of what was now called the Loire army, whose soldiers, by their firmness and good order amidst all the insults hurled against them, secured some respect for France during several months, and were even a support to those Bourbons whom they did not love, and who did not love them, but who had become the rulers of France, and who had more than once to resist the intolerable demands of their pitiless conquerors. Marshal Davout commanded this army in a manner worthy of himself, and once that the Austrians attempted to pass the appointed limit on the Upper Loire, he threatened to advance on them, upon which they retired, though there were 600,000 of the allied soldiers at that time in France.

Whilst the convention of Paris was thus being put into execution, the shadow was obliged to retreat before the reality, and those Powers dating from the 20th of March prepared to yield to the approaching Bourbons. Colonel Macirone, who had been detained at the outposts, had not been able to see the Duke of Wellington until the morning of the 4th of July, at his return from Saint-Cloud to Gonesse, after signing the capitulation. The Duke of Wellington received him in presence of M. de Talleyrand, representative of Louis XVIII., Sir Charles Stuart, who represented England, Count Pozzo di Borgo, the Russian, and M. de Goltz, the Prussian representatives. The British generalissimo now spoke plainly, and told the Duke of Otranto's agent that it was time to put an end to a state of things that had become ridiculous, that the Provisional

Government and the Chambers had nothing more to do than to resign their authority, when Louis XVIII., who was at Roze, would proceed to Paris, which he would enter with such resolutions as might be expected from his own good disposition and the excellent advice he had received. This said, he gave place to M. de Talleyrand, who first announced verbally, and then gave in writing, the new promises made by Louis XVIII. Here is a summary of them as given by M. de Talleyrand himself. "The entire ancient Charter, comprising the abolition of confiscation; the non-renewal of the law passed the previous year restraining the liberty of the press; the immediate convocation of the electoral colleges for the formation of a new Chamber; the unity of the ministry; a reciprocal initiative in all legislative acts, by message on the part of the king, and by proposition on the part of the chambers; the hereditary succession of the Chamber of Peers."

M. de Talleyrand then gave the most solemn assurances that the Government would be wiser and altogether different from that of the preceding year. The Duke of Wellington then addressed the envoy, and said, "Let M. Fouché act openly with us, and we will do so with him. We can appreciate his services, and the king will not forget them. If he needs assistance, he shall have it from us in a few hours." It was arranged that the Duke of Wellington and M. de Talleyrand should meet the Duke of Otranto on the following day at Neuilly to decide with him concerning what still remained to be done to secure the peaceful return to Paris of Louis XVIII. M. Macirone left immediately to take this message to the Duke of Otranto. M. Fouché did not think of refusing the proffered interview, as it tended to the result he sought, which was to arrogate to himself the merit of the return of the Bourbons, which it was no longer in his power to prevent. He informed his colleagues, however, of what he was about to do, but with the air of a man who was making every exertion to save what remained from their common shipwreck, and about to make conditions for the return of Louis XVIII. to the throne. No objection could be made, for the impossibility of resistance naturally leading to the restoration of the Bourbons, there was no choice but to submit, endeavouring at the same time to obtain guarantees for the security of persons and property.

But the arrival of the first negotiators, MM. de Lafayette, de Sebastiani, de Pontécoulant, d'Argenson, de Laforest, and Benjamin Constant, threw unexpected difficulties in M. Fouché's path. When these plenipotentiaries left Laon, they, as we have seen, had repaired to the sovereigns at Haguenau, but had not been able to obtain an interview. They could only see the ministers, who pursued the pre-arranged system of dissimulation, and affected to have no desire to compel France to accept any particular government. The commissioners, being dismissed after a short interview, had returned to Paris with the same illusions, and persisted in believing that the Bourbons were not inevitable. M. Fouché was thus deprived of his principal argument, the necessity of submitting to the Bourbons, an argument that formed his excuse for an interview with

the Duke of Wellington. His emissaries prove that their return was unavoidable in supporting his argument by the many evils possessed; and he finally announced that he would have an explicit explanation in the evening at the camp of the allies. This was authorized to go there, but M. de Talleyrand observed to him that every private engagement not directly tending to the safety of the general interest would be treacherous, and such would merit and be certain to incur the meed of eternal infamy.

M. Fouché took little heed of this warning, but repaired on the evening of the 14th to Neuilly, to meet the Duke of Wellington. There, besides the British generalissimo, M. de Talleyrand, Sir C. Stuart, MM. de Guizot and Porzio di Borgo. The Duke of Wellington wished to know, in the first place, whether the French army had left; if the existing necessities were ready to resign; and whether it would be possible to get possession of Napoleon's person, that he might be delivered to the great Powers; this was a routine question which the allies were irrationally asking. The Duke of Otranto replied that the king was retiring gradually, though unwillingly; that the populace was in a state of excitation; that the Parisian National Guard, from which so much had been expected, was far from being willing to do what was required; that the greatest precaution must consequently be employed in demanding the desired negotiation, or in bringing back the king to France. As to Napoleon, it would be impossible to get him up, as he must have already escaped to the United States. This latter piece of information was very badly received, for the present were convinced that his escape had been effected by the connivance of M. Fouché, whom the Bonapartists accused of betraying Napoleon, and the royalists of aiding his escape. He was asked what he meant by his precautions, to which he seemed to attach much importance. M. Fouché, a more practical and sensible man than the negotiators who had been sent to the Duke of Wellington, who had confined themselves to demanding an initiative for the chambers, entered into an explanation and formally announced their essential conditions: a fresh declaration by the king, granting an entire amnesty to persons, without exception, who had not committed themselves before, during, and after the 20th of March, and the adoption of the tricoloured flag. Unless these conditions were agreed to, he said he did not think it possible for the king to return, unless by force, which all seemed disinclined. The discussion on this point continued until four in the morning, but without any result; M. de Talleyrand the principal speaker, trying to evade the question with all the ease of a fine gentleman, and M. Fouché persisting with the same vulgar and obstinate man. When the names of individuals was mentioned, the demand for clemency of the king was talked of, and demand for the tricolour cockade was made by adducing the ten or fifteen departments that had assumed the white. The Duke of Wellington insisted on some decision being come to, but could not succeed with either party, as this interview allowed no time for persua-

nothing was said of what was M. Fouché himself. He took both as to what concerned rests and the public welfare, representatives of Europe and of pleased with him as he was Duke of Wellington, however, for interview for the following negotiators parted without having consent, but also without having

re. Fouché returned to Paris, he re-occurred at Neuilly after his declared more positively than as no choice but the Bourbons, no possibility of avoiding the declared intentions of Europe, that a suspicion of him, an old reside, when he resigned himself able necessity, that the only he was to endeavour to obtain ditions, to do which he, in- sisted nothing. There was less ed him on this occasion than it was generally believed that ight of his own interests, and lered him a traitor. His col- to him in silence. Carnot sentiments and overwhelmed ches, to which M. Fouché re- him what he would have him fact, had believed defence im- subsequently the return of the he inevitable consequence of had himself announced. Be- was now indifferent as to the olleagues, treated them as of , and only thought of how he e return of Louis XVIII. with at of injury to his party and age to himself. His first care

Napoleon's departure from saw that as long as Napoleon that the allies distrusted the abdication, and would persist is person. M. Fouché wished cause of distrust, and at the be responsible for Napoleon's he fall into the hands of the gh he wished to deprive him e did not wish to deprive him life. We have seen that the ready received permission to asports. M. Fouché now went gain urged General Beker to ture of the illustrious fugitive, the necessary powers save one, eating with the English cruis- Napoleon in his strange con- English might give himself up e 6th, M. Fouché sent a fresh xecutive commission enjoining to compel Napoleon to leave, him the necessity of doing so personal safety, and offering, tes be too closely watched, to osal what lighter vessels were even consenting, contrary to that he should communicate a cruisers, but required a writ- Napoleon to that effect, so as lf from the responsibility of ss.

Having made these arrangements for Napo- leon's safety, M. Fouché considered what reason he should give for the approaching inter- view at Neuilly. No better need be sought than the attitude assumed by the Parisian National Guard. These Guards had been op- posed to Napoleon's return, and even wished for the Bourbons; but they wished for the Bourbons without the antiquated ideas, the passions, or the arrogance of the emigrants. Still, they continued to wear the tricoloured cockade, and to pull down the white flag wherever they saw it hoisted. M. Fouché, by means of his communications with the principal commanders of the National Guard, in- duced this body to make a declaration of their continued attachment to the tricoloured flag, which was to them emblematic of French glory and of many political advantages. This de- claration was signed by some of the most dis- tinguished names in the capital.

M. Fouché did not confine himself to this. Aided by M. Jay, M. Manuel, and many other representatives, he induced the Chamber of Representatives to make a declaration of another kind, but still more significant. The constitution they had undertaken to draw up was long, diffuse, and quite unlikely to be adopted by the Bourbons. But its principles were of far more value than its unmeaning form. At M. Fouché's instigation, the essen- tial principles of every constitution, and which should be required from every government whatsoever, were drawn up in a separate form, and it was declared that this should be signed by whatever monarch should ascend the throne. This monarch, whose name was not mentioned, was evidently Louis XVIII., provided that he signed these articles. These principles, which it would be unnecessary to introduce here, as they were enumerated in a very commonplace form, were those that France since 1789, with a constancy that does her honour, has not ceased to proclaim whenever, under pretence of restoring order, she has not been deprived of liberty.

Whilst M. Fouché was occupied with these cares, now unfortunately useless, the court of Louis XVIII. had successively advanced from Ghent to Cambray, from Cambray to the châ- teau d'Arnouville, and was now considering what was to be done on entering Paris. The principal persons of the court, the king, princes, courtiers, ministers, ambassadors, for- eign generals, and a crowd of sycophants who had appeared with returning fortune, were all discussing together what was to be done; for as revolutions give everyone a right to speak, courts are for the time-being transformed into a species of republic. The greater number of these debaters declared that to sacrifice the white flag to the tricoloured would be sacrificing legitimacy to revolt. To modify, to extend the Charter would be to increase the evil in- stead of diminishing it. It would be quite sufficient to declare that this Charter should be maintained without promising any exten- sion of its principles. They considered the principles known as those of '89 were a part of the revolutionary heresies which had been weakly encouraged; and as, in their opinion, the first revolution had been caused by the faults of individuals, and not by general causes,

so that of the 20th of March was the consequence of a conspiracy whose authors ought to be punished. They also believed it attributable to other errors, such as keeping M. de Blacas in office and refusing to employ M. Fouché. As we have already mentioned, M. de Blacas, the emigrant, was the object of universal blame, and M. Fouché, the regicide, of general favour. If these royalists were to be believed, M. de Blacas had been the cause of all their misfortunes, which M. Fouché would have prevented had his services been accepted, and which he might now terminate if his aid were not declined. He was indeed a regicide, but so much the better! He had emerged from the infernal cavern of the Revolution,—he knew it,—and could lay the demons that had escaped from it. With him there needed but one precaution: to require that he should betray his origin. They had no doubt but that he would unhesitatingly commit this treason, for they had the testimonies of M. de Vitrolles and others to that effect. They repeated with admiration his prophecies, which had the merit of after-wit. On the eve of the 20th of March, M. Fouché had said to M. Dambray, "It is too late. Napoleon will return to Paris, reign some time, but not long; and then we shall bring back the king." The man who had uttered such significant prophecies could alone bring about their accomplishment. He should therefore be accepted from the hands of that Napoleon he had dethroned, and be made minister to Louis XVIII., whose firmest support he would be.

Though M. de Talleyrand had no desire for a rival, he encouraged this strange idea. He felt his incapacity for administering the home department, and admitted M. Fouché's superiority in that particular. He considered the occupation of watching, paying, dispersing, imprisoning, exciting, and, if necessary, shooting the illustrious or obscure members of the different parties as far beneath that of treating with the European Powers, and therefore felt no jealousy of M. Fouché; and he thought that, regulating foreign relations—the most important at that time—whilst M. Fouché would purify the interior, he should rule like a sovereign over France. He therefore proposed M. Fouché as Minister of Police to the king. He was supported by the Duke of Wellington, who had another motive besides these we have mentioned for favouring M. Fouché. It was necessary to enter Paris and re-establish the Bourbons; but it was necessary to do this conformably to the deceitful programme of the sovereigns,—a programme that was all-important to Lord Castlereagh, and by which it was declared that France would not be compelled to adopt any particular form of government. But for this necessity they might have left the work to the brutal Blücher, who would have accomplished it in two hours. It was M. Fouché alone who could accomplish this task without any other aid than that of the National Guard. The repugnance of Louis XVIII. to M. Fouché had been at length overcome by the continual praises of his courtiers, whose admiration originated in a kind of superstitious feeling, by the recommendation of M. de Talleyrand, who felt the need of a skilful and cynical hand to rule the Interior, and by the Duke of

Wellington, who wished to have a man could effect the return of the Bourbons violence. The king had been driven to give up M. de Blacas, and was not to accept one of his brother's enemies. He did so unwillingly; for he was prone to dislike intriguers, especially those one with the Count d'Artois; and M. Fouché had been under all these disadvantages, when entreated long and importunately yielded. He consented to M. Fouché's Minister of Police, but refused to issue a declaration of principles or to accept a coloured flag.

Such was the state of things at court. M. Fouché repaired to Neuilly on the 6th of the 6th. He recommenced his duties of the state of Paris, which was becoming worse, he said, since the plenipotentiaries returned from Haguenau with the idea that the allied sovereigns were not desirous the return of the Bourbons, approved by the National Guard having retained the tricoloured flag, and by the declaration made by the Chamber of Representatives. This account did not seem to make much impression on his auditors. The Duke of Wellington told him that he would be supported by the English and Prussians, though it would be better to seek their aid as little as possible. He further said that the plenipotentiaries were either deceiving or had been deceived themselves; and he produced the letters of Lord Stewart, who had been present at the interview at Haguenau, and who spoke not decidedly as to the opinion of the sovereigns. A declaration made by Louis XVIII. would be quite sufficient, and there was no need of second, which would be a degradation of royalty. As to the amnesty, the Duke of Wellington and M. de Talleyrand now expressed the decisive opinion. "As to the amnesty," he said, "you, as Minister of Police, are answerable for that. Who that was concerned with the Revolution can fear when you will rule the police department?" It would seem very natural, indeed, that when a regicide was allowed to approach the king that no one could be uneasy. But though those who had insulted Louis XVI. might be pardoned, it would not be the same with the pretended authors of the 20th of March. M. Fouché had a vague idea of this; nor, indeed, were those criminals of the 20th of March protected by his hands in office; but he was addressed in so delicate a tone, and so large a reward was offered him that he could not resist. He was also told that it would be an offence to Louis XVIII. to make any further mention of the treason, and he yielded, having obtained nothing of his own appointment to a more important office.

Having sat together at table, they went to Arnouville, to prevent M. Fouché from leaving XVIII. This had been the object of Fouché's ambition,—unattainable for him during the first Restoration. He was now gratified; and in presence of the monarch he had made a great effort to render his seemed to him as though the crime of regicide had been effaced from his brow. Thus as was his wont on all important occasions had studied his part beforehand, rendered

h great politeness, and seemed conscious of any former passage in You have done me great service," and will do me still greater. I have to attach you to my government; opportunity of doing so now, and I you will be both useful and faithful. Fouché bowed with the humility these crimes were just forgiven, and he deserved the exaggerated eulogies of his enemies, when he allowed himself to be treated for treasons he had not committed to the implied extent. He retired after his interview, and passed words of courtiers, curious to see a man they looked on as a monster, but a man whom the king should employ to atone for fresh misfortunes. The wisest of them regretted that the assistance of Fouché had not been rendered unnecessary, and that the tricoloured flag should be in order to deprive the enemies of the popular standard, and now almost in anger, "What people! it induces them to receive a regicidal idea."

Duke of Otranto returned to Paris fully embarrassed as to the manner in which he should inform his colleagues of the result of his interview. He had told them that he had had an interview with the heads of the royalists, and that he had obtained nothing, not to agree to it, except on good terms. But it would not be so easy to tell them that there was no choice but to accept the Bourbons; that beyond the de Cambray he had obtained nothing, not a general amnesty, nor the tricolour, nor the continuance of the present constitution, and that the only guarantee granted to himself. However, he had been compelled to announce that the royalists sent to Hagenau had been that it had never been intended to give the choice of any other dynasty to the Bourbons; that the silence observed by the royalists had been only meant to deceive; that Louis XVIII. must be received; but that they should get all that they could from him; that is to say, the abolition of the law touching the modifications of the Charter, a new ministry, an act of oblivion for the past, of which he, M. Fouché, had been the Minister of Police. This was the acknowledgment to make to his colleagues.

M. Fouché declared that he had no other motive than for the advantage of those who had taken part in the Revolution of the Empire, and the 20th of March was more truth in what he had got credit for,—more truth at the result, if not in the intention; for all who were in danger was the only way to save those not actually in danger, and seek to retain power, there is no other way than to justify his doing as much wrong as possible.

This excuse, true though degrading—for no one is justified in doing ill that he may prevent another from doing worse—had but little weight with the executive commission. M. Quinette and M. Grenier, being men void of energy, and M. de Caulaincourt, having given up all hope, were silent. But the impetuous, generously inconsistent Carnot, who, though he hated the Bourbons, had done what was necessary for their return, became fearfully excited, and accused M. Fouché of treachery, but without disturbing the equanimity of a man whose countenance was never lighted by the indignation of wounded self-respect. The Duke of Otranto, as void of sincerity and dignity as he was of real wickedness, had been chosen by Providence as the connecting link between those who were willing to bring back the Bourbons, and those who were willing to receive them without acknowledging it. Mournful farce, where naught triumphed but the ever logical, unalterable nature of things!

After what had occurred, M. Fouché and his colleagues could no longer act for an hour in concert. They immediately sent in their resignation to the chamber. The Chamber of Peers separated in silence, never to meet again. The Chamber of Representatives also received the resignation of the executive commission in silence, but continued to discuss the most ephemeral of all constitutions, one that was not to last more than twenty-four hours. M. Fouché, in conjunction with General Dessoles, who was again commander of the National Guard, chose some assured royalists from that body to guard the approaches to the legislative palace and prevent all access to the representatives. It was officially announced in the *Moniteur* that the chambers were dissolved, and that Louis XVIII. would enter Paris on the afternoon of the 8th of July. M. Fouché went again that evening to the king to announce that every thing was prepared for his return. He was received as the man to whom, next to the conqueror of Napoleon, the Bourbons owed the greatest debt of gratitude.

Let us hasten to the end of this melancholy recital, and add, that if the Chamber of Representatives survived Napoleon but about a fortnight, M. de Talleyrand and M. Fouché survived that chamber but a few months, and both, the one intrusted with a high employment at court, the other virtually but not openly banished, shared in the inactivity of all those who had played an important part in the Revolution or the Empire. This was all that either party gained by the revolution of the 20th of March, which ended so deplorably on the 8th of July, and which is now generally known under the denomination of the Hundred Days. By it, Napoleon was subjected to a defeat such as he had never experienced, together with a cruel captivity; the chambers that had dethroned him lingered through a few days of humiliating existence; M. Fouché, who deceived and dismissed them, won for himself only banishment and a sullied name; Ney and La Bédoyère met a tragic death; France suffered a second invasion, the loss of Savoy, and several important fortresses; she was deprived of the *chefs-d'œuvres* of art, and compelled to pay a contribution of two thousand million francs; had to submit to a long

sojourn of foreign troops, and the fearful consequences of unbridled passions; whilst not one gained a single ray of true glory, not one, except the army, whose faults were wiped away by incomparable heroism. History must assume all its severity when pronouncing on that disastrous attempt, but to judge it correctly we must look upon it as a whole, that is, we must consider it both in its cause and effects, as we shall endeavour to do in concluding this book.

When the allied sovereigns, in 1814, deprived Napoleon of the French empire, they, by sending him to the island of Elba, left him the possibility of regaining his throne, and by their conduct soon inspired him with the desire to do so. It was not possible that he could remain so near the scenes of rapacity that were being enacted at Vienna, or the reaction of feeling that was being accomplished at Paris, without seeking to profit by so many errors. It could not be otherwise, unless that ambition that then swayed all hearts had become extinct in the most daring, the most ambitious heart that ever throbbed. Napoleon left Elba, landed in France, and at his appearance the army, the public authorities, the holders of national property, hastened to join him, and he made a skilful use of the advantages afforded him. His march from Cannes to Lyons was a prodigy; but if we make him answerable for an attempt so fatal to France, those whose mismanagement and ill-regulated passions inspired him with the idea, and furnished the means, must also bear their share of blame.

Napoleon stopped at Paris, instead of pursuing his triumphal march to the Rhine. He offered peace, in all sincerity, and with something of humility, not derogatory to his glory. He was answered only by an insulting silence. He still persisted, at the same time making extensive preparations for war. With unerring tact he selected all that still remained of good in our military resources, and with the soldiers returned from abroad, and the officers on half-pay, he formed a body of 300,000 men, and in order to render these completely disposable, he had the fortresses garrisoned with 200,000 of the mobilized National Guards, from the frontier provinces, and chosen from among men who had served before, and who, by their devotedness, their age and physical strength, were capable of rendering a last service to their country. At the same time, he protected Paris with 500 pieces of artillery, collected there the depots, sailors, and pensioners; and, leaving the capital thus fortified, he determined to meet the enemy at the head of 200,000 men. He arrived on the 20th of March, he arranged his plans and ordered their execution between the 25th and 27th, first in secret, assisted by the bureaux, afterward openly, when the manifestations of the European sovereigns left no longer any doubt as to their determination; nor did he leave France unconscious of her danger, but summoned all her sons to arms.

It would not be possible to act more judiciously or more promptly, or to accomplish more.

His arrangements for the Interior were as expeditious and as skilful, but not so successful. Abroad, he had offered peace instead of

the war that was expected, but his offer was not heeded, for none felt confidence in him. Nor was he believed at home when he offered liberty instead of the expected despotism. Had he not been sincere, he might have got out of his difficulties by summoning a Constituent Assembly, and abandoning it to the choice of systems. This he might have done, and remain sole master. But, on the contrary, he sent for the most celebrated men of the liberal party—his declared enemy Benjamin Constant—and, without giving any of the essential principles of constitutional monarchy, intrusted him with the task of embodying them in the Additional Act. This was not well chosen; it was less surprising the first Empire; but it needed only to read the Additional Act to see that it was not the offspring of the first Empire, but of a new constitutional monarchy, such as had secured the liberty and greatness of England for two centuries. But the distrust was so general, the very title caused it to be examined, but seemed to represent the despot of 1811 and the extent of his power. But as effect must be made to conquer the general imagination, as well as the armies of allied Europe. M. de Lafayette, one of the most esteemed friends of liberty, admitted the advantages of the Additional Act, and said he would have signed it in it provided it was put into immediate operation by summoning the chambers. Napoleon now objected, saying that newly assembled chambers, unaccustomed to political great danger, would be but little suited to act with firmness during the horrors of war, and instead of aiding Government would cause its ruin. His arguments were of no avail, and to prove his sincerity, Napoleon summoned the chambers, an error to which he was impelled by his false position. It has been said that this was all a feint, and that Napoleon only yielded that he might gain the moment he needed, determined to fling aside the instrument when it could be no longer useful. It would certainly be difficult to penetrate the depths of a mind like his, and everybody is at liberty to form what judgment he pleases on the subject. For our part, we have looked at Napoleon's genius, and that genius once he told him that modern societies must be taught to govern themselves according to their own views; that a man, a great man, might immediately after a great political convulsion save them for a moment, though but for a moment, but that moment was paid for him, and had been abbreviated by his own errors. Hence, his whole mind was fixed on conquering Europe, and having concentrated all his energies on that one point, he was indifferent to the amount of power he might possess after the war, saying that there would be always enough for his son. If some persons will trouble themselves by conjecturing what he would have done had he conquered, we answer that it is childish to endeavour to calculate what a man would have done under circumstances that never existed, that liberty must be accorded in the fullest extent, with the implied condition that it is not to be abused; that there is less danger with great than with little minds, because the dispute is reduced to essential points; and that if Napoleon's impetuous nature became cooled

the poignant spur of liberty, he would have done worse than all those sovereigns who have tried it in France, and who sunk beneath the attempt, because they did not resign themselves to all the consequences of their own

error. These are problems that cannot be solved. It is evident is this: that Napoleon gave a false constitutional monarchy, that he was mistaken—the just punishment of his past act—and that to prove his sincerity he was obliged to bring this monarchy into immediate operation by convoking the chambers.

The chambers were composed of men sincerely devoted to the Imperial dynasty and to the Emperor; but they were also influenced by the general feeling of distrust, and dreaded, in all things, to be looked on as the dupes of a despot who affected to have changed his

policy. They proved this by their strange instability on many occasions, and, far from exhibiting themselves before Europe in a united action with the head of the Government, they put obstacles in his path instead of helping him in his task. The ministers Carnot, Dumas, Caulaincourt, and Cambacérès, chosen among the highest and most estimable of the time, knew better how to fulfil the duties of an absolute master than to influence the assemblies, and were, consequently, as useful as the chambers were intractable. Napoleon, seeing that discord was taking the place of the unanimity so necessary to the Emperor of France, hastened to gain on the field that ascendancy that would enable him to rule men's minds. His choice lay between two plans: either to act on the defensive, by awaiting the enemy, with fortified positions in his rear, and to manœuvre with his own men, or to choose the offensive, by attacking the two invading columns, falling on them at nearest, beat it, and then attack the

enemy with all the advantages gained by victory. The first plan was the surest, but it would be both slow and distressing, for it would allow our fairest provinces to be invaded; the second was more hazardous, but it would be prompt and decisive if successful; the skilful gambler was impatient to throw the dice.

The result of this campaign of three days is now known. Having collected 124,000 men and 500 pieces of cannon, unnoticed by the enemy, who were within two leagues of him, he commenced operations on the morning of the 16th of June, surprised Charleroi, passed the Sambre, and found, as he expected, an unoccupied space between the English and the Prussians, took possession of it, and succeeded in separating the Prussians at Ligny, while he was preparing to oppose the English at Quatre-Bras.

Ney, uninfluenced by what he had done during the past year, possessed his own mind, and the English would have been driven back from Quatre-Bras, and the victory would have been completed. The destruction of the Prussians. Ney, though heroic as ever, was unfortunately too hesitating, and the Emperor was not as great as it should have been. Napoleon's plan had succeeded in all that was essential. The Prussians were separated from the English and beaten. Napoleon ordered them to pursue them, and advanced him-

self to meet the English. A fearful tempest prevented the battle of the 18th from commencing until noon. Every thing, the well-laid plan of the commander and the ardour of the men, promised victory; but from the very commencement there appeared on the right that spectre, the Prussian army, that Grouchy should have followed, but did not. Napoleon was therefore obliged to divide his attention and his army so as to be able to face two enemies. Whilst he, with consummate prudence and imperturbable firmness, was endeavouring to husband his strength so as to get rid first of the Prussians and then attack the English, Ney, no longer able to restrain himself, made a premature attack with the cavalry, our most important reserve, and just as Napoleon, having conquered two-thirds of the Prussian army, was hastening to aid Ney in destroying the English, he was unexpectedly attacked by the remainder of the Prussians whom Grouchy had allowed to pass, despite the exclamations of his soldiers, and at length, having accomplished prodigies of valour and firmness, he lost a real battle of Zama! His sword was now shattered forever.

Had any faults been committed? In a military point of view, none; in a political and moral sense, every act of Napoleon's reign had been an error. His generals discouraged, but valorous as ever, his soldiers so excited that they attacked the enemy unbidden, and, after performing prodigies of valour, fell into irremediable confusion, the enemy preferring utter destruction to submission, all this the effects of Napoleon's conduct,—not indeed during these three days, when he was all that a great commander should be, but of the policy he had pursued during fifteen years.

When Napoleon retreated to Laon he might have rallied the army, heedless of the chambers, whose noisy declamation could not unseat him from his war-horse. But there was no account of Grouchy. None knew that he was safe, and Napoleon thought that he could only collect the fugitives of his own army. He might have remained had he known that within three days he would have an army of 60,000 men, more exasperated against the enemy than ever. But, seeing himself without an army, he went to demand one from the chambers, with indeed but a faint hope of success, for by the boding light of the setting sun of Waterloo he had read his coming doom. His arrival at Paris gave birth to an idea that was most natural. This man had again seriously compromised France with Europe. So long as he could defend the country the danger was not so great, but now that he either could not or would not do so any longer, its safety was only imperilled by his presence. The general opinion was that the interests of France should be separated from those of Napoleon, and by the threat of a deposition he was compelled to abdicate.

Napoleon might have dissolved the Chamber of Representatives; he had the right to do so, and had he any hope of saving the country, he should have exercised that right. But it is doubtful whether, even supported by the nation, he would have been able to resist the enemy. Had he been reduced to attempt a kind of *coup d'état* against the chambers which contained his

own party—the liberals and revolutionists—and being then supported only by the energetic but violent portion of the population, and obliged to make use of these to keep the upper classes in check, he would have appeared as an exasperated soldier, defending his old tyranny with the expiring remains of Bonapartism and demagogy.

It was not so that France could be saved. He would not adopt a measure to which he felt so much repugnance, and of whose success he was doubtful. And now M. Fouché, a man void of sincerity, though not really wicked, disliking the Bourbons who despised him, and still more Napoleon who curbed him, and desirous of playing a prominent part on all occasions, even in the midst of chaos, hastened to profit by the opportunity that presented itself of getting rid of Napoleon, and excited M. de Lafayette's patriotism by telling him, what was quite false, that the Chamber of Representatives was about to be dissolved. This imaginary project was denounced by M. de Lafayette, and the chamber, impressed with the idea that bleeding France should be wrested from the hands of Napoleon, declared that any one who should attempt to dissolve that assembly should be considered a traitor. Napoleon was thus left no choice between abdication and deposition. He abdicated then for the second and last time.

Still the Chamber of Representatives was not to blame, with one exception, which was the necessity of realizing the real state of things, that is, of being convinced that if Napoleon were put aside resistance would be impossible, that a peace should be concluded as quickly as possible, and in order to do so that the Bourbons should be recalled—getting from them the best guarantees that could be obtained for the liberty of the nation and the lives of the illustrious men who had been compromised. The fearless Davout saw, with the plain good sense of a soldier, how difficult it would be to carry on a war without Napoleon, and proposed that the Bourbons should be recalled, not by an intrigue, but by the frank invitation of the chambers. But this would not suit M. Fouché. Whilst secretly treating with the royalists, he was seeking in every direction some other means of solving the political difficulty than by their aid; but, finding none, he ended by attaching himself to the Bourbons, at the same time stealthily extending his hand to receive the price of his very equivocal services.

But by thus prolonging the crisis he placed all connected with it in a humiliating light; for the chamber, not expecting to share in Napoleon's fall, was making itself ridiculous by seeking no other means of defence than proclaiming the rights of man; nor was there any greater indication of common sense in the conduct of Carnot and Lafayette, the one asserting that it would be impossible to defend Paris, and yet refusing to receive the Bourbons; the other believing that the allied

sovereigns would consent, if not to the establishment of a republic, at least to that of another dynasty; and then M. Fouché, the wildest of men, brought upon himself and the ridicule, but disgrace, for after denouncing Napoleon, the chambers, and his colleagues, he experienced the like treatment three months later, when he was dismissed and ended, thus disgracefully terminated his career, presenting at the tribunal of history only an excuse for his conduct: that he had employed the authority he had so handsomely received from the Bourbons in doing more harm to the country than he could possibly avoid. Miserable spirit! for what is more repugnant to the feelings of an honest man than to do wrong, great was merely that he may prevent others from doing worse? Such deplorable scenes as these are a cruel revenge on the part of the Bourbons and royalists for the 20th of March! Contemplating such things, one cannot but feel that it would have been a hundred times better if the Bourbons had not been expelled on the 20th of March, as then Napoleon would not have counted in his life the fatal day of Waterloo, the Chamber of Representatives would not have been surrounded by foreign legions, nor would France have been planted at the foot of the guillotine, nor would she have been trampled on by the foreigners as a conquered and expelled nation. To such sad results, Napoleon should have remained at Elba occupied in reviving his heroic actions, the revolutionists, instead of overthrowing the Bourbons, should have sought to win liberty by long and patient efforts, the Bourbons should not have been driven to desperation, the liberals, alarmed everybody, nor displaced the army; in a word, all should have acted with common sense! It may well be said that to expect that would be but a childish calculation only to dishearten those who might profit by experience. Still let us not be discouraged. We must indeed admit that a little, very little advantage has been derived from the teachings of experience, though much blood has been shed and much misery endured! But this little, accumulated from generation to generation, contains what is called the wisdom of ages, and though it does not make men dispassionate philosophers, which they never will be, it renders them gradually less prejudiced, less cruel, less embittered in their conduct toward each other. Let us, therefore, persevere, and endeavour to find in even the most painful events motives for inculcating a mode of conduct influenced by reason, moderation, and justice to all men, to all parties. The effort would be well repaid, though but one single error were prevented. Let not us, who in 1814 should have been a renewal of the scenes of 1793, but who are happily disappointed, let us not lose sight in the lessons taught by history, but continue to present them to the world, though only an occasional advantage may be derived from them.

BOOK LXII.

ST. HELENA.

ritation of the Bourbons and foreign generals against M. Fouché, whom they accuse of aiding Napoleon's escape—Napoleon proceeds to Rochefort—His reception there, and at different places on his way—He lingers on the coast, hoping for some unexpected event—At one moment he thinks of joining the army on the Loire—He gives up the idea—Different modes of embarking are proposed—Napoleon rejects them all, and sends a message to the English cruisers—Captain Maitland, commanding the *Bellerophon*, replies that he has not received any instructions, but supposes that the British people will accord to Napoleon a hospitality consistent with his dignity and their own—Napoleon determines to go on board the *Bellerophon*—His reception—He proceeds to the shores of England—Extraordinary curiosity of the English about Napoleon—The British Ministers' decision concerning him—The island of St. Helena is chosen as the place of his detention—He is to be treated there as a general, guarded, and allowed but three companions—Napoleon is taken from the *Bellerophon* to the *Northumberland*—His farewell to France and those friends that cannot accompany him—Voyage in the Atlantic—The English sailors' attention to Napoleon—His occupations during the voyage—He relates the different events of his life to his companions, who request him to allow them to write them from his dictation—Length of the voyage—Arrival at St. Helena after a voyage of seventy days—Appearance of the island—Its condition, soil, and climate—Napoleon lands—He is first stationed at *Brars*—Immediately after landing he is subjected to a close and continual surveillance—His displeasure at it—First news from Europe—Napoleon feels the deepest interest for Ney, La Bédoyère, Lavalette, and Drouot—Two months later Napoleon is transferred to Longwood—His apartments there—Precautions taken to guard him—His life and occupations at Longwood—Napoleon dislikes his residence, and does not properly appreciate Admiral Cockburn's attention to him—In the commencement of 1816, Sir Hudson Lowe is sent as Governor to St. Helena—His character, and his sentiments at his arrival—Disagreeable circumstances occur during his first interview with Napoleon—Sir Hudson Lowe is afraid of being accused, like Admiral Cockburn, of being influenced by his prisoner—He executes his orders with the utmost rigour—Many causes of dispute—Shabby quarrel about the expenses of Longwood—Napoleon orders his plate to be sold—Admiral Cockburn leaves, and the new admiral, Sir Pulteney Malcolm, arrives—Excellent disposition of this officer—His efforts to reconcile Napoleon and Sir Hudson Lowe useless—Final rupture—Annoyances experienced by Napoleon—His occupations—Explanation of his conduct during his reign—His historical labours—End of 1816—M. de Las Cases is expelled from St. Helena—Causes great dejection to Napoleon—The first year at St. Helena—Napoleon, not wishing to be guarded when he rides out, refuses to take exercise, by which his health is injured—His family offer to join him, and give him what they possess—He refuses—Some English persons visit Napoleon and converse with him—Sir Hudson Lowe becomes uneasy about Napoleon's health, and, instead of sending him to Plantation House, has a new residence built for him—The year 1818—Napoleon's conversations on religious and literary subjects—Departure of General Gouraud—Napoleon is successively deprived of Admiral Malcolm and Dr. O'Meara—The cause of the departure of the latter—Napoleon without a physician—Useless entreaties of Sir Hudson Lowe to induce him to see an English doctor—The year 1819—Napoleon's health is injured for want of exercise—His legs swell, he is attacked by frequent vomiting caused by a disease of the stomach—He is induced to exercise a little on horseback—His health improves somewhat—Napoleon puts aside his own history and occupies himself with those of other great commanders—He occupies himself with Cæsar, Turenne, and Frederick the Great—Napoleon's health soon declines again—Difficulty of seeing him and of proving that he is still on the island—Disgraceful attempt of Sir Hudson Lowe to force his door—The year 1820—A doctor and two priests, sent by Cardinal Fesch, arrive at St. Helena—Napoleon does not think this sufficient—He has the two priests to say mass every Sunday at Longwood—The good effects produced in a moral sense by this—As Napoleon would not ride because of being followed by a guard, Dr. Antomarchi prevails on him to occupy himself with gardening—He and his companions in exile work in the garden—Part of the year 1820 is spent in this employment—Napoleon's health improves—This improvement is only temporary—He suffers from violent pains in the stomach, his legs swell, he loses his strength, and declines rapidly—His satisfaction at the approach of death—His will, his agony, and death, on May 5, 1821—His funeral—Estimation of Napoleon's genius and character—His character in its normal state, and as it was influenced by events—His qualities in private life—His genius as legislator, administrator, and general—His place among great warriors—Progress of military tactics from the time of the ancients until the French Revolution—Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Charlemagne, the Nassaus, Gustavus Adolphus, Condé, Turenne, Vauban, Frederick, and Napoleon—In what Napoleon advanced military tactics—Napoleon's talents and destiny compared with those of other great men—Lessons to be deduced from his life—End of this history.

AMIDST all the joy felt by the Bourbons and the representatives of foreign courts at their entrance into Paris, they were deeply charmed on hearing of Napoleon's escape. They could not believe themselves safe so long as his great disturber of mankind was at liberty, and in their anxiety they could not decide whether his life ought not to be sacrificed to the general security. His escape was ascribed to M. Fouché, whose giving up Paris as forgotten in the displeasure felt at his not having given up Napoleon, and he was now generally accused of having played false to all parties. The approbation which the Bourbons and the allies had been for some days bestowing on their favourite was now changed into extreme disgust. The Duke of Wellington and Lord Talleyrand alone undertook his defence, saying that he had at least opened the gates of Paris, and that if Napoleon's escape was one of the conditions on which he did so, there was not such great cause of complaint. Notwithstanding these sage reflections, the greatest indignation was felt against M. Fouché at the Tuileries, and when he was summoned to

the king's presence, on the evening of the 8th of July, the day of the monarch's entry into Paris, he did not venture to defend the good deed of the 6th, when he renewed the order for Napoleon to leave Rochefort. He excused himself with the greatest humility, and, when asked by Louis XVIII., promised to do all in his power to seize the dreaded fugitive either on land or sea. But he did not keep his word, nor did he as Minister of Police issue any fresh orders when he left the king, so that his former directions remained still in full force. When a man has the courage to act uprightly, he ought to have the pride to avow it. Still it is well that good should be done, even though he who does it, either through weakness or interest, has not the courage to confess it.

Napoleon left Malmaison at five o'clock on the morning of the 29th of June. The heat was extreme, and Napoleon and his companions proceeded on their way in silence and dejection. When he arrived at Rambouillet, he said he would remain there for the night to rest himself, but in reality he wished to pro-

long as long as possible his retreat from the throne, from which he was about to descend into a frightful captivity. A regret, one simple reflection on the part of those men who had deprived themselves in the presence of a foreign army of the power wielded by his sword, might place him again at the head of his troops, a position preferred to the throne itself. Having passed the night and the following morning at Rambouillet, he left on the morning of the 30th, passed through Tours on the following day, (July 1,) where he spoke to the prefect for a few moments, then proceeded toward Poitiers, stopped outside the town during some hours, whilst the heat was at its height, ran some risk from the Vendean population as he passed through Saint-Maixent, and arrived at Niort in the evening, without having addressed a single word to his companions during all that long journey. Being recognised, he was received with the greatest enthusiasm, for the inhabitants, to use the language of that part of the country, were *blue* from opposition to the *whites*, by whom they were surrounded. Some Imperial troops, sent to restrain the insurgents, were still at Niort, so that Napoleon was in perfect security there. The small inn at which he stopped was soon surrounded by the populace, soldiers, and citizens, calling on him to appear, and shouting *Vive l'Empereur!* Though unwilling to appear in public, he came to a window, where his oppressed heart was for a moment relieved by the acclamations of the crowd. "Stay among us," was echoed from every side, with promises to defend him to the last. The prefect came to request him to stop at the prefecture, and he yielded to the evidently disinterested request. He passed July 2 at Niort, partaking in the inexpressible emotion excited by his presence, and from which he felt no desire to withdraw. But, on the morning of the 3d, General Beker respectfully reminded him of the danger of these delays, as the port of Rochefort might be blockaded, by which his passage to the United States would be prevented: he determined therefore to set out, though it was painful to him to leave such friendly and hospitable people. As he left he covered his agitated countenance with his hands, and the cavalry escorted him as far as the strength of the horses would permit. He entered Rochefort on the evening of July 3.

The naval prefect, M. de Bonnefoux, understood his duty as well as General Beker. He was determined to obey the Government, but at the same time to act with all the deference due to the great man whom fortune had confided to his custody for a few days. The inhabitants shared in the sentiments of those of Niort. They were under many obligations to Napoleon, who had caused some extensive works to be erected in the neighbourhood, and the town was crowded with sailors who had just returned from prison in England. Besides a naval regiment stationed in the Isle of Aix, there was a large garrison at Rochefort, 15,000 chosen National Guards, and a number of *gendarmes* collected for the suppression of the royalists, so that there were sufficient troops to defend the fallen Emperor, or even to aid him should he make any rash attempt. On the following morning the news of Napo-

leon's arrival spread through the town, as the inhabitants assembled under its walls, calling on him to appear, and uttering their cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* when he did so, Napoleon was deeply touched, waved his hand in reply to their salutations, and being moved by the spectacle before him, convinced that he could run no risk whilst surrounded by men so devoted, he determined to remain some days, in order to reflect maturely on the resolution he ought to take. To leave France and forever, he considered a great sacrifice. He could not see that, whilst all Europe was in arms, those who held power in France would not even accept him as a simple general. He said to himself that even at the last moment the army might change its opinion, and, if one condemned to die, he caught at even the most delusive hope. This naturally led to his wasting much time, as he considered that in lingering on the coast might originate an unexpected event, perhaps some desperate effort on the part of the army that would again summon him to take the command.

But if time thus passing by brought a change in his favour, a change, indeed, of which there was but very little probability, it deprived him of all hope of escaping the English and avoiding a cruel captivity. It would not be possible but that the many emissaries in communication with the English fleet should announce Napoleon's arrival at Rochefort, and render the blockade of the coast still stricter. Up to June 23, the cruisers had not been very numerous or near, but since that day they had approached the two locks, those of Breton and Antioche, by which Rochefort communicated with the sea. Two new frigates, the *Saale* and the *Medusa*, considered the best sailers in the French navy, and manned with excellent and devoted crews, were now in port and ready to leave at a moment's notice. The orders of the Provisional Government were that those who obeyed the Emperor Napoleon and transport him whithersoever he desired, provided it was not to any port in France. Captain Pallier, commanding the *Saale*, and under whose orders both frigates were, was an excellent sailor, faithful to his duty, but less daring than Captain Ponée, who commanded the *Medusa*, and who was prepared to make every effort to land Napoleon on a free soil. This valiant officer considered this a duty he owed both to the army and to the glory of France, personified in the person of Napoleon, who was not the less great in his eyes because he had been vanquished at Waterloo.

Immediately on his arrival, Napoleon desired that a naval council should deliberate upon what would be the best means of getting out to sea without coming in contact with the English cruisers. The naval prefect assembled for this purpose the best-informed men of the neighbourhood, and among them Admiral Martin, an old officer who had served in the American war, who had been overlooked under the Empire, but who behaved on this occasion as though he had always been an object of special favour. Although the English cruisers were so very near, our two frigates were not fast sailers that no doubt was felt but that once they had cleared the port they would be soon safe from pursuit. But to effect the

the wind should be favourable, which it was not. The captain of a Danish vessel, a Frenchman by birth, but whom want of employment in his own country had compelled to seek it in Denmark, offered to take Napoleon to America, and to conceal him so well that it would be impossible for the English to discover him. He only stipulated that his owners should be compensated for any loss that might be sustained. There could be no doubt of this man's sincerity; but Napoleon felt the greatest repugnance to burying himself in the hold of a neutral vessel, or to running the risk of being found in so undignified a position. Admiral Martin devised another plan. At the mouth of the Gironde was an armed corvette, commanded by a man of daring courage, Captain Baudin—afterward Admiral Baudin—who had already lost an arm in fight, and who was ready to attempt the most venturous deeds. It would not be difficult to pass from the Charente to the Seudre in a well-armed boat, and then make a circuit of some miles to Royan, where Napoleon could embark. As the attention of the English was much more directed to the Charente than the Gironde, there was every possibility of being able to put to sea and gain the coast of America in safety.

The plan was approved, and, though not definitely decided on, it was determined to try whether it would be practicable. In the mean time the wind might change, and it was not impossible but that passports might be sent by the Duke of Wellington. These were only specious excuses for deferring his departure, and were more agreeable to Napoleon than he would admit even to himself. At this very time, his brother Joseph, having passed through many dangers, arrived at Rochefort. He had seen the French army advancing toward the Loire, and had been told that many of the superior officers were vehemently demanding that Napoleon should place himself at their head, and, by prolonging the war, seek on a more successful battle-field some compensation for Waterloo.

This news agitated Napoleon not a little, and no wonder. It is true that the French army approaching the west had been joined by the troops that had been sent into these provinces, and that their numbers now amounted to 80,000 men, who stationed beyond the Loire could make a successful opposition to the enemy, who naturally became weaker the farther they advanced into France, and our troops might, by fighting with the same desperation as in 1814, gain a victory productive of the most important results. Beaten as they were, the commanding officers most deeply compromised could not do better than make a last effort under Napoleon, an effort that would seem both to themselves and the nation only an attempt to rescue the country from the hands of foreigners.

Napoleon began to estimate the possibility of success, ever recurring to the subject with an ardour that soon died away before reflection. Had he made such an attempt, it should have been whilst he was at Paris, with all the resources of France at his disposal. But now that he had abdicated, that he had resigned all legal authority, and with the Bourbons in the capital, he would be nothing but a rebel, and

on the Loire, with France not only morally but physically divided, he had no possible chance of success. He would certainly have prolonged the struggle, but it would be by covering the country with ruins, and extending the horrors of warfare from the northern provinces to the central and southern, which had not hitherto been subjected to any thing worse than conscription. Napoleon saw that it was too late, and that had he made a last desperate effort it should have been by dissolving the chambers the very day of his return to Paris. Still it was not for some time that Napoleon could entirely give up the idea of a last struggle. When he had convinced himself of the inability of such a project, and abandoned the very thought of it, it would return with renewed force after some hours, strengthened not a little by the dreary prospect before him. He passed the 5th, 6th, and 7th of July in apparently examining the plans for embarkation that were submitted to him, in waiting for winds that did not come, but really in alternately adopting and rejecting the idea of joining the army on the Loire, which would have been more fatal than his return from Elba, and would in all probability have but added a fresh disaster to that of Waterloo.

It was with great regret that the worthy General Beker saw this lengthened hesitation; nor could he venture to expel, as one may say, from the country a man who, whatever his faults, had so many claims on every enlightened and patriotic Frenchman. But his departure could no longer be deferred. Common sense showed that the delay of each hour would but compromise Napoleon's safety; besides that, the orders from Paris left no choice as to the line of conduct to be pursued. All the members of the Provisional Government, as well as the naval minister, Decrès, who was still faithful to his master, repeatedly desired General Beker to hasten Napoleon's departure, both for his own sake and that of the country, as his continued presence on the coast would only make the negotiations for peace more difficult, and give the English time to make the blockade closer. The Minister of Marine, at the same time that he desired General Beker to hasten Napoleon's departure, authorized him to employ not only the frigates, but every available ship at Rochefort, without any consideration as to what inconvenience might result to the vessels themselves. Though the minister did not say it, it was evident that the Provisional Government had but a few hours more to exist, and would in all probability be succeeded by one that would issue more rigorous orders concerning the person of the fallen Emperor.

On the morning of the 8th, General Beker informed Napoleon of the orders of the Provisional Government, orders issued in perfect sincerity and from the most honourable motives. He remarked to him how every day increased the difficulty of escaping the English cruisers, nor did he conceal his fear that very different orders would soon be issued, if, as was most probable, the Provisional Government should be overturned by the emigrants. Napoleon could make no objection to such cogent reasons, but ordered that every preparation should be made for setting out that very day for the island of Aix.

The same evening he stepped into his carriage, intending to proceed to Fouras, situate at the mouth of the Charente, in the harbour of the isle of Aix. The inhabitants, being informed of his departure, thronged the road, and accompanied him with cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* All were deeply moved, and tears flowed down many a withered cheek, embrowned by war and weather. Napoleon shared in the general feeling, and waved his hand in adieu to those who thus sympathized with his misfortunes. His companions followed in several carriages, and toward the close of the day the entire party reached the coast. Though the wind was not yet favourable, he preferred passing the night on board the Saale, that he might be able to profit by the first favourable breeze. He got into a boat belonging to the frigate, and was received with all due deference on board the Saale. The preparations for his reception were not completed, and he was obliged to accommodate himself as best he could on board the vessel that seemed destined to bear him to America.

As the wind continued unfavourable, Napoleon visited the island of Aix on the following day. He and his suite proceeded thither in the boats belonging to the frigates. The inhabitants hastened to the spot where he was to disembark, and received him with transports of delight. He reviewed the naval regiment, composed of fifteen hundred trustworthy men. They received Napoleon with shouts of *Vive l'Empereur!* and the still more significant cry of *à l'Armée de la Loire!* Napoleon thanked them for their devotion to him, and then visited the extensive works which had been executed during his reign for the security of this large port. He returned to the quay followed by the inhabitants and soldiers, and passed the night on board the frigate.

On the following day it became absolutely necessary to come to some decision. Fresh despatches were brought from Paris to General Beker by the naval prefect Bonnefoux. These were still more urgent than any of the preceding. They announced that there was no hope of obtaining passports, desired that the departure should take place at once, again authorized the frigates to leave at any risk, and should they be considered too large to escape the vigilance of the enemy, to employ a fast-sailing advice-boat to transport Napoleon to any place he chose, except it were some port in France. These despatches differed in one point from the preceding. Up to this time, the Provisional Government, foreseeing that Napoleon might be tempted to intrust himself to the English, had forbidden that any aid should be given to his doing so, fearing that it would be looked upon as treachery in them. But now, from the violence with which party spirit displayed itself before their eyes, they believed that Napoleon would be safer in the hands of the English than in the power of the victorious emigrants, and authorized a communication with the English frigates, but only on condition of a written order from Napoleon, so that he could not blame anybody but himself for the consequences.

Such instructions being received, there was no longer time for hesitation, and a resolution must be immediately come to. The French captain, Besson, commanding the neutral Dan-

ish vessel, repoleon so effect possibly discover consent to this still great difficulty though the wit and a small v and the positio Admiral Mart ceeding up the the tongue of from the Gir Captain Baudi under consider this captain t tion; and last of this disagree Napoleon deter by whom he v cruisers, to in passports that Paris, and es were inclined suitable to hi safety. Napo nate his caree British nation be unsuccessful former glory. hold of a neut mies the dou tured, and of dignified a pos a struggle wit that having sh own ambitious afresh to sect both cases h treated as a succeed in rea be certain of a popular in the tain whether t defend him a fail to deman even attempt filled the Old now to take th Although he e fettered life in he was too e Old World wou seek to tear therefore pref people, arousi great confiden them, and thu cord him a pe had received prince who h they refuse hi many illustrio deed, an inoffe but in pledgin disturb the pes not be believe exactly a pris precautions th to calm the a succeed, his d plished, that position woul though he coul

a life of freedom in the solitudes of America, a private life in one of the most civilized nations in the world, in the society of enlightened men, had infinitely more charms for him. He pictured to himself the happiness of renouncing the restless past, and terminating his career in the repose of private life, amid the charms of friendship, study, and the society of men of talent. Whatever might be the result, he considered that such a chance deserved a trial, and he sent M. de Las Cases, who spoke English, and the Duke de Rovigo, in whom he felt the most perfect confidence, on board the *Bellerophon*, from which the flag of the commander of the English station was floating, with directions to make the necessary inquiries.

During the night of the 9th-10th of July, M. de Las Cases and the Duke de Rovigo proceeded in a light vessel to the *Bellerophon*. Captain Maitland, who commanded the vessel, received them with the greatest politeness, but did not allow any expression to escape him that could enlighten them as to the intentions of the British Government. Captain Maitland knew of nothing that had occurred since the battle of Waterloo. He was quite unaware that Napoleon had left Paris and come to Rochefort. He had not received any passports, and would, consequently, stop any man-of-war that would attempt to force the blockade, and visit every neutral vessel that might try to elude it. As Napoleon's offering to give himself up had not been foreseen, he had neither been authorized nor forbidden to receive him. He would certainly receive him on board, as an enemy who surrenders is never rejected, and he was certain that the English nation would treat the Emperor of the French with all the consideration that was due to his glory and former greatness. But he could not enter into any engagement on the subject, as he had not received any instructions touching so extraordinary and unforeseen an occurrence. Captain Maitland offered to refer them to his superior in command, Admiral Hotham, who was then cruising in the port of Quiberon. Napoleon's two envoys agreed to this proposal, and retired, very well pleased with the politeness shown by the commander of the English station, but quite ignorant as to what might be expected from British generosity. Captain Maitland followed them with the *Bellerophon*, and anchored in the Basques Channel, that he might be, as he said, in a more favourable position for continuing the communications.

On the 11th Napoleon received the account brought by M. de Las Cases and the Duke de Rovigo; it was rather vague, as we have seen, and, though not very alarming, could not inspire much confidence in English generosity. The officer who had been sent to reconnoitre the port announced that the English had come nearer, and were more vigilant than ever, and that it would be almost impossible to pass them unobserved. The only alternative that remained was to force a passage, to which the greatest obstacle would be the *Bellerophon*, that had anchored in the Basques Channel. It was an old vessel, mounted with seventy-four guns, and, being a bad sailer, could not be an insurmountable obstacle to two new, well-armed, fast-sailing frigates, manned with most devoted crews. The other English vessels

were of so little importance that they need not be taken into account. There was a corvette with some smaller vessels in the port, and if these were employed immediately and boldly, there was every probability of forcing the blockade.

Napoleon asked the captains of the *Saale* and *Medusa* what they thought of such an attempt. The winds were shifting, and the weather did not present as many difficulties as before. This induced Captain Ponée, of the *Medusa*, to make a heroic proposal. He said that Napoleon's departure might be secured by an act of devotion which he was quite ready to perform, and of whose success he was certain. He would weigh anchor at sunset, an hour when there generally was a breeze favourable to leaving port. He would make a violent attack on the *Bellerophon*, and not abandon the contest until by sacrificing the *Medusa* he should have rendered the English vessel powerless. In the mean time, the *Saale* might sail out of port, either distancing or disabling the weak vessels that would attempt to prevent her passage.

This plan offered every chance of success, as Napoleon saw, but Captain Philibert, whose part in the affair would be the least dangerous, and who was, consequently, more at liberty to view things in a more prudent light, seemed to fear the responsibility that would devolve on him if he should agree to the almost certain loss of one of the frigates under his command. Unless both captains were equally generous, Napoleon could not decide on accepting the proposed sacrifice. He took Captain Ponée's hand, and said, as he affectionately pressed it, that he would not secure his own safety at the expense of a man so brave as he, but would rather that he would preserve himself for the good of France.

The frigates could be no longer thought of, but there was still the project of embarking on the *Gironde*. The officer who had been sent to Captain Baudin had returned with most favourable information. Captain Baudin declared that his corvette was in excellent condition, and would engage to take it out of port, and conduct Napoleon whithersoever he desired. But the land-journey in this case presented the difficulty: that part of the country through which Napoleon would be obliged to pass was almost entirely royalist. All were on the alert, and were Napoleon's party small, there was a risk of being captured; if numerous, there was the danger of attracting the observation of the English. This project was, therefore, almost impracticable, whilst that of the frigates was quite so.

On the following day, July 12, Napoleon received his brother's visit, and the despatches containing the latest accounts from Paris. The Provisional Government had been dissolved, M. Fouché was ruling Paris in the name of Louis XVIII., and there was every danger that hostile orders would be issued. There was now no choice but to leave the coast of France, no matter how, for Napoleon had less to fear from the English than from the victorious emigrants. He therefore left the *Saale*, as the frigates could no longer transport him to another hemisphere. The sailors bade him adieu with great affection, and he landed on

the island of Aix, where the inhabitants received him as warmly as before. But it was absolutely necessary to come to a decision, and that quickly. It would be impossible to ascend the Sèvre in a boat, and ride across the tongue of land that separates the Charente from the Gironde, as the late despatches from Paris informed him that the white flag was floating over all the country. The royalists had triumphed, and it would be impossible to escape them. But a fresh proposal, as plausible and heroic as Captain Ponée's, was now made. As it had become generally known that because of the extreme prudence of one of the captains the frigates would not have the honour of saving Napoleon, the younger officers felt irritated, and devised a new way of preserving him from the enemy. They offered to take two *chasses-marée*, (a large species of fishing-boat with deck,) and man them with forty or fifty resolute sailors, and take them out of port, either by the aid of oars or sails, and abandon themselves to the fortune of the waves, which might lead them to some trading-vessel, which they would compel to take them to America. There was no doubt but that, favoured by night, they might row out of port unperceived; but there was one serious objection. It was not likely that they would immediately meet a trading-vessel in these parts, and they might be driven to the coast of Spain, where the greatest danger was to be dreaded.

Still the plan was approved, and these brave officers were desired to make their preparations. They selected the strongest and boldest from among themselves, to whom they joined a chosen number of sailors, and on the following evening, the 13th, they brought their two small vessels to anchor near the Isle of Aix. Napoleon was determined to make the attempt, when an indescribable scene of confusion arose around him. He was accompanied by a number of persons, among whom were the families of those who were about to accompany him into exile. Those who were to remain behind felt all the anguish of parting, and the others trembled at the dangers they were about to encounter in frail boats on the fearful waters of the Bay of Biscay. The women sobbed; Napoleon's habitual firmness gave way. Different obstacles were now started that had not been thought of before, such as the possibility of perishing miserably on the Spanish coast in case they did not immediately meet a trading-vessel, or the danger of being seen by the English, who would not fail to follow and seize the boats. "Well," said Napoleon, as he saw the tears of those around him, "let us put an end to it, and since there is so little chance of escape let us deliver ourselves up to the English." He thanked the brave young men who had offered to save his life at the peril of their own, and he determined to give himself up on the following day to the British navy.

On the next day, the 14th, he again sent to the *Bellerophon* to know what reply Captain Maitland had received from Admiral Hotham, who, as we have said, was cruising in the Quiberon Channel. This commission was intrusted to M. Las Cases and General Lallemand. Captain Maitland repeated that he

was ready to receive Napoleon on board, as could not enter into any formal engagement, as there had not been time to communicate with London. He again gave it as his private opinion that Napoleon would meet the same reception in England that English fugitives always had met. When Captain Maitland spoke thus, he had no idea of the fate that was awaiting Napoleon in England, but it was evident that the desire of saving the former master of the world to come on board his ship, and the honour of bringing such a prize to his wondering countrymen, induced him to promise somewhat more than he believed would be accorded, for he could suppose that the English Government would leave Napoleon as much at liberty in their country as Louis XVIII. had had. By thus promising more than he himself expected to be done, and that to men whose position induced them to hope for even more than was promised, he contributed to produce an illusion by some not very far removed from falsehood. In sentence of death had been passed on General Lallemand, he asked whether there was any probability that England would surrender, and some of his companions who were similarly circumstanced to the French Government. Captain Maitland declared that there was not the least danger of any thing of the kind, and almost resented the doubt as an insult, which proves that he understood how different Napoleon's position was from General Lallemand's, and that he was not altogether ignorant of the risk the former ran in going on board the *Bellerophon*. He repeated that he could not make any engagement as to the person of the fallen Emperor, and that he only asserted what, as an English citizen, he was justified in respecting from the magnanimity of his nation.

M. de Las Cases and General Lallemand felt more reassured by these assertions than they ought to have been, and returned to the Isle of Aix to inform Napoleon of the result of their mission. He listened attentively to what they said, and, compelled as he now was to intrust his safety to the English, he believed what he heard justified him in expecting to be treated with severity, which was as well as his present position could allow him to hope for. Before deciding, however, he determined to consult the few friends who were with him as to what he should do. Every possible means of escape had been proposed, examined, and rejected. The only choice that now remained was between intrusting himself to the English, or taking the desperate resolution to join the army beyond the Loire. The sentiments of this army were well known, its excitement and profound regret, and there could be no doubt but that with Napoleon at the head of these troops they might still perform great things. It would not be difficult for him to join the army. He had the naval regiment of the Isle of Aix, consisting of 1500 men who had uttered the significant cry of "To the Loire army." He also had the equally well-disposed garrison of Rochefort, besides two battalions of federalists who offered to stand by him in any attempt he might make. These would altogether amount to 5000 or 6000 men, with whom he could safely pass through Vendée to join the army on the Loire, which

would thus obtain a large contingent and the still more important addition of Napoleon himself. But, however easily this might be accomplished, the misfortunes such an enterprise would entail on France could not be overlooked. No greater result could be expected than uselessly to prolong the calamities of war, and end finally with a fresh misfortune, greater slaughter, and a harsher fate for the vanquished. This was so evident, that though Napoleon had erred by returning to France before, he would not now complete her ruin by another attempt of the same kind. He determined, at every risk, to intrust himself to the English. This he resolved to do with becoming dignity, and wrote the following letter to the Prince Regent, which General Gourgaud was to take to England and present to the Regent himself.

"Your Royal Highness," he wrote, "pursued by the parties that divide my country, and become an object of hatred to the European Powers, my political career is at an end. Like Themistocles, I come to seat myself beside the hearth of the British nation. I place myself under the protection of its laws, a protection I demand from your Royal Highness as the most powerful, the most constant, and the most generous of my enemies."

At any other time, this letter would certainly have touched the honour of the English. Amidst the hatred and terror inspired by Napoleon, it was but a useless appeal to a magnanimity that was extinct for the time. Napoleon desired M. de Las Cases and General Gourgaud to return to the Bellerophon and announce his intention of going on board next day, and to ask a passage for the general who was bearer of a letter to the Prince Regent. When these gentlemen arrived on board the Bellerophon, they were received with many demonstrations of pleasure, excited by the agreeable news they brought. They were promised that the Emperor—that was the title used—should be received with all the honour that was due to him, and would be immediately taken to England accompanied by such persons as he chose. A light vessel was given to General Gourgaud, in which to accomplish his mission to the Prince Regent.

The moment was now come when Napoleon was to leave France forever. On the morning of the 15th he prepared to leave the Isle of Aix, and addressed the most touching adieux to General Beker. "General," he said, "I thank you for the dignified and delicate manner in which you have behaved to me. Why have I not known your worth until now? You should never have left me. May you be happy! I beg you to make known in France the prayers I offer for her welfare." He ceased to speak, and with the deepest emotion he clasped the general in his arms. The latter wished to accompany him on board the Bellerophon, but Napoleon would not allow him. "I do not know," he said, "how the English may behave to me. Should they treat me worse than my confidence in them deserves, you would be accused of having delivered me up to them." These words, which proved that Napoleon was not yielding to any great delusion when he surrendered to the English, were followed by fresh expressions of affection

for General Beker, who found it impossible to restrain his tears. Napoleon then descended to the shore amidst the cries and mournful adieux of the crowd, and with the companions of his exile got into the boats that were to take them on board the brig *Epervier*. Captain Maitland awaited him, ready to set sail, and in the greatest anxiety, fearing to the last moment that the trophy he wished to present his countrymen might escape him. When he saw the *Epervier* sailing toward the Bellerophon, he could not conceal his joy; he ordered his crew under arms to receive the illustrious victim who approached, bearing the weight of his glory and his misfortunes. He descended to the end of the ladder to give his hand to Napoleon, whom he addressed as "Emperor." When they reached the deck, he introduced his staff as he would have done to the sovereign of France himself. Napoleon replied with dignified calmness to the politeness of Captain Maitland, and said he felt perfect confidence when intrusting himself to the protection of British laws. The captain replied that nobody would ever have reason to repent confiding in English generosity. He made the best arrangements he could for Napoleon on board, and informed him that he would be very soon visited by Admiral Hotham. The admiral soon arrived in the *Superb*, and presented himself before Napoleon with the greatest deference. He requested him to visit the *Superb* and dine on board. Napoleon consented, and was treated with all the etiquette due to a sovereign prince. Having spent some hours on board the *Superb*, he returned to the Bellerophon, though the admiral wished him to remain with him. Napoleon would have had better accommodation on board the *Superb*, but he did not wish to pain Captain Maitland, who was most attentive, and seemed so anxious to retain him. He therefore remained on board the Bellerophon, and they set sail for England.

There being but very little wind, the vessel advanced but slowly along the French coast into the English Channel. Napoleon was calm and tranquil; he walked incessantly on the quarter-deck, observing the working of the ship, and asking many questions of the sailors, who always replied with the greatest deference, addressing him by his proper title. So calm was he, and so respectful was the manner in which he was treated, that none would think that he had fallen from one of the greatest of thrones into the depths of an abyss.

The passage was long. On the 23d of July the coast of France was distinctly visible, and on the morning of the 24th they anchored in Torbay, to receive orders from Admiral Keith, who commanded the different cruising squadrons. The orders soon came, and the Bellerophon was directed to anchor in Plymouth harbour. Two well-armed frigates approached immediately, and stationed themselves one on each side, so that the Bellerophon was within range of their guns. Several English officials came to communicate with Captain Maitland, but the subject of these conversations did not transpire. Admiral Keith paid a visit of ceremony to Napoleon; he did not remain long, nor was any thing said relative to the intentions of the British Government. Whilst this

ill-boding silence reigned around the illustrious prisoner, the countenances of all on board, Captain Maitland's especially, were expressive of the embarrassment of men who wished to conceal some disagreeable intelligence, or who were about to retract a promise; and a still more alarming symptom was, that these men, desirous as they were of acting as respectfully as before, dared not do so. General Gourgaud came to say that he had not been able to present the letter to the Prince Regent, but had been compelled to give it to Admiral Keith. All this did not augur well.

When Napoleon went on board the *Bellerophon*, he had but half deceived himself, because, having no choice but to be taken as prisoner of war by the English or surrendered voluntarily to their honour, he preferred the latter, and now waited calmly to know his fate. The scenes that took place in the harbour of Torbay showed him how he was still thought of in the world. He might have been content had he been nothing more than an Erostrates on a large scale, who placed his glory in being talked of. Intelligence of his arrival soon reached the shore, and gradually spread to London, when a wild curiosity seized all England to see the celebrated man whose fame had filled the world for the last twenty years. The English had always represented Napoleon as a hateful monster, who had ruled men by fear; but curiosity is not over-nice, and, notwithstanding their abhorrence, they were still anxious to see him. The British journals celebrated his captivity with ferocious joy, but blamed the curiosity their countrymen felt to see him, and which these writers did all they could to repress.

This only increased the feeling they blamed, and there was not a horse between Plymouth and London that was not employed in gratifying the curiosity of the anxious multitude. The *Bellerophon* was constantly surrounded with thousands of boats, which lingered there for hours, and many dangerous collisions occurred from the efforts made by the rowers to obtain a good view of the Emperor. Nothing abated their eagerness, though a day did not pass without some persons falling overboard. It was known that Napoleon walked for a short while every morning on the quarter-deck of the ship that had brought him to England; this moment was anxiously awaited, and when he appeared, silence reigned around, and an involuntary feeling of respect caused all to uncover, though not a word was spoken either unfriendly or otherwise. The English ministry, finding that pity for misfortune and sympathy for glory were lessening the national hatred, ordered that visitors should not be allowed near enough to the *Bellerophon* to gratify their curiosity. They wished to put an end to all this, and were determined that Napoleon's doom should not remain longer unpronounced.

The English ministers were as much astonished as Captain Maitland at Napoleon's surrendering to England. When an account was brought of his having left Paris, they felt as displeased with M. Fouché as were the European diplomatists, and believed that the great disturber had escaped, and was at liberty to overturn Europe on some future occasion. Their surprise was equal to their joy when

they learned that the fallen Emperor was on board a vessel of the royal navy in Plymouth harbour. The confidence Napoleon placed in the nation did not touch them in the least, and some even entertained the barbarous idea of giving him up to Louis XVIII. who might have the responsibility in the eyes of history of ridding the world of him. But such a resolution could not be carried out in a case where all important measures are publicly discussed. Still, though this idea was abandoned, the position of the illustrious captive presented very serious difficulties. Had he been taken at sea attempting to escape, he would have been a legal prisoner, when there would be nothing more to decide than whether, war being ended, they would be justified in detaining him who had caused it. But when this question could be discussed, a more delicate one was to be decided, which was whether an enemy who had surrendered voluntarily could be looked on as a prisoner of war.

The most learned lawyers in England felt very much embarrassed when this question was proposed to them. But this embarrassment could not continue long, when combined with the consideration that the tranquillity of the world would be always in danger from Napoleon. As Frenchmen, we naturally feel a sympathy for the old companion of our glory, but that should not prevent us from admitting the evident truth that Europe kept in confusion during twenty years, and so lately again disturbed, and compelled to shed such torrents of blood, could not neglect the opportunity of protecting herself from the possible attempts of a man of such daring genius. Had he been an ordinarily dethroned sovereign like Louis XVIII. the laws of hospitality would have commanded that he should be allowed to choose some spot in free England, where he might terminate his career in peace. But it would be impossible to allow to wander through the streets of London the man who had escaped from the island of Elba and summoned the armies of Europe to the battle-plain of Ligny and Waterloo. Though nations are bound to respect the safety of others, they must also protect their own, and the English lawyers appealed with justice to the principle of legitimate defence, which authorizes every nation to defend itself when threatened. All would restrain such persons as are considered dangerous, and all Europe, France included, having had abundant proof of how dangerous Napoleon was, was justified in depriving him of the means of doing harm. Europe had deposed him of his throne in 1814, and had given him the island of Elba; but when in 1815 he escaped from Elba it was perfectly just to deprive him of his liberty. To deny this would be but wilful blindness. But the rights of legitimate defence can only be directed against the existing danger, and terminate when the danger that called them into operation is at an end. In making Napoleon a prisoner, who would thus expiate his factious activity, the English would not be justified in tormenting him, shortening his life, or more especially in subjecting him to humiliation. They were as much bound to respect his person as to restrain his power. Any greater severity

than was absolutely necessary to prevent a fresh escape would be a gratuitous cruelty, that would involve its authors in eternal disgrace. On the latter point the resolutions adopted by the English were not as justifiable as on the former, and the mournful conclusion of our history will show that England compromised her own glory when she forgot the respect due to Napoleon's.

Napoleon's future residence was the first question brought under discussion. The trial that had been made of the Mediterranean showed that that locality would not suit. Some more distant sea must be chosen. The Indian Ocean was too remote, as it was necessary to the general security to have frequent intelligence of the formidable captive. Between the Isle of France, the only place that could be chosen in that ocean, was too populous too much visited to be safe. In such a place Napoleon should be closely confined, an equity which nobody even at that time thought of committing. There was in the Southern Atlantic Ocean, equally distant from Africa and America, a volcanic island, very difficult of access, too sterile to invite agriculturalists, and so solitary that no prisoner detained there, however important, need be shut in a fortress. This was Saint-Helena, which because of the advantages it offered as a place of security had already attracted the attention of those statesmen who wished to have Napoleon removed from the neighbourhood of the European seas. It was unanimously chosen as the most suitable spot for his detention, and the East India Company gave it up to the State for such time as it should be needed. The climate was not considered unhealthy; it was much the same as that of all islands within the tropics, and could not be particularly dangerous to an inhabitant of the temperate zone, except, perhaps, to him for whom the entire of the Old World was scarcely sufficiently large for the exercise of his boundless activity. We must be just, and admit that if a prison proportionate to his energy were to be selected, the whole world should have been placed at his disposal, a world he had sufficiently tormented to justify its forbidding him all access to it forever.

Saint-Helena was therefore decided on. It was arranged that some spot in the centre of the island should be chosen at a distance from that portion that was inhabited, and sufficiently spacious to allow Napoleon to move about freely, walk or even ride without being forced to feel that he was a prisoner. All these arrangements were consistent with what was absolutely necessary, and there was no need for the addition of useless restrictions or humiliations which must be as painful to the illustrious captive as imprisonment itself. The British Government, which had always styled Napoleon Emperor, even while at the island of Elba, now yielded to the evil passions of the time, and decided that henceforward he should be called General Bonaparte. It was indeed a glorious title, one of which the greatest potentates of the earth might have been proud. Refusing to recognise Napoleon by the title he had borne for twelve years, a title acknowledged by the whole world, given him by England herself in 1806, through her envoy Lord Lauderdale, and

again when treating with him through Lord Castlereagh in 1814, was not only undignified, but imprudent, as we shall soon see. In the present century, that has seen so many sovereigns descend from the throne to go into exile, and again emerge from exile to ascend a throne, whoever in speaking to Louis XVIII. or Charles X. should have refused him the title of king would have been accused of insulting illustrious misfortunes. It is true that these princes were the undisputed heirs of a long line of kings, the representatives of an authority that had existed for centuries, circumstances that have ever been a strong claim to the admiration of mankind. But genius (at least when possessed in so high a degree as by Napoleon) is an equally good claim, and those sovereigns who had made it their excuse for humbling themselves to the Emperor of the French, for their eagerness in seeking his alliance and mingling his blood with theirs, were very inconsistent in denying its moral value now, for, recognising in Napoleon only brute force that had triumphed for a moment, they justified the world in saying that they themselves had yielded to that influence. So far from giving greater legality or stability to the throne of Louis XVIII. by refusing the title of Emperor to him who had been beaten at Waterloo, they rather diminished the prestige attached to sovereignty by showing that it was only an accidental distinction, dependent on the caprice of fortune. It may be said that depriving Napoleon of the title of sovereign was but a wound to his self-love, which it would have been more consistent with his dignity to have left unnoticed, and which has no claim on the attention of posterity. Certainly, if it were not evident that the intention was to humiliate him, he might be content to be recognised as General Bonaparte by his contemporaries; but it becomes a duty in the vanquished to resist attempted humiliations, and refusing Napoleon his customary titles was but giving birth to fresh subjects of dispute, which necessarily added to the rigours of his captivity and subjected the British ministers to the charge of persecution, a charge that has caused no small pain to their descendants, as once that the passions of the moment are allayed, no one wishes to be designated as the persecutor of genius.

It was decided that Napoleon should receive no other title than that of general and be treated as a prisoner of war; that he and the officers of his suite should be disarmed; that he should be allowed only three companions, but that as General Lallemand and the Duke de Rovigo were considered dangerous, they should not be of the number; that every thing belonging to him and his companions should be searched, and their money, plate, and jewels taken away, lest they might serve as means to facilitate an escape; that they were to be immediately conducted to Saint-Helena, where Napoleon would be allowed a space sufficiently large to ride in, but that whenever he exceeded these bounds he should be escorted by an officer. We repeat that it was only just to take every precaution to prevent the escape of the illustrious captive who had caused such universal anxiety; but it was a needless indignity to deny him the title by which he would be known to posterity, to remove his

sword, and limit the number of his companions. What could be effected by three, four, or six persons? What could their swords and the few thousand louis hidden in their luggage accomplish? Ah! it was not of his sword, which he had never drawn, but of his genius that Napoleon should have been deprived. But as he could only be deprived of his genius by taking his life,—as Blücher wished to do, but which the ministers of free England dared not attempt, and which no sovereign in Europe would have advised,—he ought to have been enchained for the sake of public tranquillity; but these chains ought not to have been increased by any unnecessary additions, or sullied by uncalled-for insults.

It was also arranged that as the *Bellerophon* was too old for so long a voyage, Napoleon should be removed to the *Northumberland*,—an excellent first-class vessel, which was to be escorted by a squadron composed of vessels of different classes under the command of Admiral Cockburn, who was to direct the arrangements for the reception of the prisoner at Saint-Helena. Admiral Cockburn was desired to be as expeditious as possible in getting the *Northumberland* out to sea, as it was inconvenient to have at Plymouth an object of such general curiosity, and of which both England and Europe were anxious to be rid.

When these resolutions were decided on, they were immediately transmitted to Lord Keith at Plymouth, with directions to communicate them to those by whom they were to be put into execution. The decision that had been come to had been already announced by the public journals, nor did it cause much surprise to Napoleon, who had had no expectation of being treated as an inoffensive prince. But great was the grief of his companions, who saw themselves condemned either to leave him or consent to be buried alive in Saint-Helena. Lord Keith, accompanied by Bunbury, the under Secretary of State, came on board the *Bellerophon*, and read to Napoleon the resolutions that had been adopted concerning him. Napoleon listened with frigid dignity, and when Lord Keith had concluded, he calmly and firmly stated his reasons for protesting against the resolutions adopted by the British Government. He said he was not a prisoner of war, as he had come on board the *Bellerophon* of his own free choice,—to which he was not compelled by necessity, as he could easily have joined the army on the Loire and prolonged the war to an indefinite period; that even in not wishing to continue the war he could have surrendered to some other country than England; that had he given himself up to the Emperor Alexander, formerly his personal friend, or to his father-in-law, the Emperor Francis, neither of them would have treated him so; that he had surrendered in order to end the sufferings caused by war, and that it was esteem for England that had led him to choose that country as a place of refuge; but that that country had proved herself unworthy of the honour he had done her, by the manner in which she had behaved to an unarmed enemy, conduct which would not add to her glory in the eyes of posterity; that he protested against the outrage offered to the law of nations in his person, and

that he appealed against the acts of the British Government to the English people themselves, and to history, which would pass a severe censure upon such conduct. Napoleon did not designate the arrangements made for his future residence; the treatment he was to receive, but treated Lord Keith with a haughtiness worthy of greatness,—a greatness independent of the prices of fortune or the violence of blows.

He was not the less sensible of the ignominious details attached to his sentence of perpetual imprisonment. He was too clear-sighted to see that his detention was both just and necessary, but he was deeply wounded by gratuitous humiliations as depriving him of his sword, his rank as a sovereign, and some of what had been saved from the wreck of his fortunes. He said nothing, but was determined to resist such unworthy treatment to the last extremity. He had, at first, determined to adopt some such title as prince, went to assume when desirous of avoiding restraints of etiquette. He had thought of calling himself Colonel Muir, in memory of a valiant officer who had been killed in a defence at the bridge of Areola. But as the title accorded by France and recognised in Europe was disputed, he would not owe his enemies in their attempts to humiliate him by his consent to weaken the right France possessed to choose him as her chief. He persisted in designating himself the Emperor Napoleon. His sword he was determined to retain through whoever should attempt to deprive him of it.

When he returned to his companions in his fortune, he spoke to them calmly, and imposed on them, above all things, that they should consult their domestic interests and feelings; the choice they were to make. They all declared themselves ready to follow him whithersoever he went and under whatever conditions the hatred of the conquerors of France should subject him to. He regretted extremely that Generals Lallemand and Savary were not permitted to accompany him, but he had no choice. He selected as his companions Marshal Bertrand, Count Montholon, and General Gourgaud. His right to choose did not extend beyond three. It had been wished that their wives and children would be permitted to accompany them, and indeed a small number that was to accompany Napoleon into exile. But there was one person who had come with him to England and whom he esteemed highly, though he knew him but a short time, the Count de Las Cases, a well-informed man, of agreeable conversational powers, who having been an officer in the navy was well acquainted with English, and might be very useful in his new residence. Napoleon was most anxious that he should accompany him to Saint-Helena, and he was ready to follow Napoleon anywhere. As the British Government in limiting the number of his companions had only restricted the number of military men, M. de Las Cases was appointed in a civil capacity. He was also allowed a doctor and twelve servants. All this being arranged, every thing was prepared for an immediate departure.

When the *Northumberland*, which was fitted

with the greatest expedition, was ready to be joined the *Bellerophon*, that was lying at Start Point, exposed to very bad weather. Lord Keith, always desirous of temper as far as possible the rigour of the military orders, had deferred until the last moment the accomplishment of such painful measures as demanding his prisoners' swords and their luggage. Their swords had been demanded from such as wore them, a custom-house officer searched their luggage and took possession of their money and valuables they possessed. The faithful valet, Napoleon's valet, whose superior loyalty and simple and modest fidelity were a mark of such service to his master, had taken the most judicious precautions to preserve some of the former master of the world. He had no more than the four million francs he had confided to M. Lafitte, about 350,000 in gold, and the diamond necklace he had been compelled to accept by Queen Hortense.

The necklace was given to M. de Las Cases, who concealed it in a belt. The 350,000 francs were concealed in the clothes of the valet, with the exception of 80,000 which he exposed and were taken in charge by the custom-house officer. As this undignified proceeding did not go so far as to search their persons, such things as were concealed remained undiscovered. An inventory was made of what was taken, that it might be given up as the prisoners should need it. These painful formalities were ended, the prisoners were put into boats belonging to the fleet, and Captain Maitland respectfully bade adieu to Napoleon in the most touching manner. Although Captain Keith, in his desire to get Napoleon on the *Bellerophon*, had promised perhaps more than he hoped could be accomplished, neither the author nor the abettor of this perfidious treatment the illustrious prisoner had met, treatment that he most sincerely regretted. Napoleon uttered no reproaches; he even desired him to bear his thanks to the crew of the *Bellerophon*. As he was to pass from one vessel to the other, Lord Keith, with evident unwillingness on the most respectful tone, said, "General, England orders me to demand your sword." Napoleon replied by a glance that told on what terms it could be obtained. Keith did not insist, and Napoleon retained his honoured sword. The moment was come when he was to part from those who were not to have the honour of accompanying him. Savary and Lallemand flung themselves at his arms, and could scarcely tear themselves away. Having embraced them, Napoleon said, "May you be happy, my dear friends. We shall not meet again, but I shall cease to think of you, nor of those who have served me. Tell France that my heart's wishes are for her." Then, escorted by Lord Keith, he got into the admiral's boat, and as to take him to the *Northumberland*. Lord Cockburn, surrounded by his staff, with his crew under arms, received him with all the honours due to a commander-in-chief.

Stripped of all but his glory, Napoleon here, as everywhere else, enjoyed the *éclat* of his own great achievements. The sailors

and soldiers, heedless of the distinguished Englishmen before them, could see only Napoleon, and seemed as though they would devour him with their eyes. They presented arms as he passed, which he acknowledged with calm and gentle dignity. Once his prisoners were on board, the admiral did not lose a moment in weighing anchor, for the harbour was not safe, and he had orders to leave at once. The *Northumberland* set sail on the 8th of August, followed by the frigate *Havana*, together with several corvettes and brigs carrying troops. This squadron advanced toward the Bay of Biscay in order to double Cape Finisterre, and then sailed southward along the coast of Africa. As Napoleon left the English Channel, it was with deep emotion that he saluted the shores of France visible through the fog, convinced that he looked upon them for the last time.

The moment of parting is one of excitement, which occupying both the heart and the head does not allow us to feel all the bitterness of even the most painful separation. It is only when the tumult of feeling is subdued and we are alone, that sorrow becomes poignant, that we can estimate what we have lost, what we have left, never perhaps to see again. A profound and silent sadness reigned now in that small circle of emigrants, whom the will of Europe was impelling toward another hemisphere. Without affecting an indifference he did not feel, Napoleon was calm and polite in his acceptance of the attentions of Admiral Cockburn, who felt desirous of alleviating the position of his illustrious prisoner as far as his orders would permit. Admiral George Cockburn was a tall old sailor, despotic, irritable, and excessively jealous of his authority, but bearing an excellent heart under this unprepossessing exterior, and quite incapable of increasing the severity of the orders he had received from his Government. He had done what he could to make Napoleon's sojourn in his vessel as tolerable as the circumstances would admit, and endeavoured to reconcile him to the customs of the English. Being forbidden to treat him as an emperor, he addressed him as "Excellency," but his manner compensated for any seeming want of respect implied in the change of title. Napoleon took his place at the admiral's table as commander-in-chief, and his companions according to their rank. The officers of the squadron being invited successively were presented to him in turn. Napoleon received them politely, and using M. de Las Cases as interpreter, asked them various questions connected with their profession, but without expressing either admiration or disdain for what he saw, praising what was deserving of commendation in the arrangement of the English vessels, but always calmly, unaffectedly, and sincerely. There was one thing he did not like, nor did he hesitate to say so,—the length of time passed by the English at their repasts. He, whose restless activity would not allow him when alone to spend more than a few minutes at table, could not consent to remain there for hours with the English. The admiral soon perceived that his national customs must yield to such a guest, and when dinner was finished rose and, with his staff, stood until Napoleon had left the

room, offering him his hand if the motion of the vessel were unsteady, and then returned to indulge his English habits with his officers.

Napoleon then paced the deck of the Northumberland alone or accompanied by Bertrand, Montholon, Gourgaud, and Las Cases, sometimes in silence and sometimes in giving expression to the emotions that filled his soul. If he were not inclined for conversation, having discontinued his walk he seated himself on a cannon, which the men soon called "the Emperor's cannon." There, as he sat, he contemplated the blue sea of the tropics, and advancing toward the tomb that was to terminate his wondrous career, he thought of himself as of a star that was about to set. He saw the future that was before him, and felt that in those southern climes to which the ship was tending, he would find, not a temporary repose, but an agony, more or less protracted, to be succeeded by death. Become as it were the spectator of his own career, he contemplated its different phases with somewhat of surprise, alternately blaming, excusing, and pitying himself as though exercising his judgment on another, but with the abiding conviction of the greatness of his glory, to which he felt the boundless fields of history could offer no parallel. These reveries never left him sad or irritable, but rather inclined to relate the most striking events of his life. Then, joining his companions, he would address him whose countenance seemed to sympathize most with the feelings that influenced him for the time, and relate some part of his career to which all listened with rapt attention. It is very strange and unaccountable how it was the two extremes of his career that always recurred to him at this period! He either spoke of Waterloo, whose influence still shook his soul like the continued vibrations produced by some mighty concussion of the air, or he reverted to his glorious début in Italy, which had delighted his youth and shadowed forth so great a future. When he thought of the recent events of Waterloo, he asked himself what it was that could have so misled his lieutenants on that fatal day, what could have caused their inexplicable conduct! Ney, D'Erlon, Grouchy, he would cry, of what were you thinking? Then without blaming any one for faults that originated with himself, he would consider why it was that Ney without waiting for his orders had attempted a final stroke, charging with his cavalry two hours too soon, nor could he find any cause but in the excitement that had seized on his heroic mind. Though he did not doubt either the courage, fidelity, or talents of D'Erlon, he could not understand how that excellent infantry officer had disposed of his troops on that day. He regretted these errors without blaming them, for at the worst they were not irreparable, but he became severe when speaking of the mortal blow inflicted by Grouchy. He did not deny that he was unquestionably faithful and courageous, but, ignorant of what we have learned since, he wearied himself ineffectually in divining what could have been his motives. He blamed fate, that silent deity whom men accuse because he cannot contradict them, but reflection showed him that fatality was naught but the reaction resulting from his own overstrained efforts.

He was apparently convinced that Englishmen had been beaten at Waterloo, and had great influence in Europe, and useful reflections; but that in any case, even if the preparations for the campaign had been successful the preparations would have been sufficient to repulse the Austrians and Prussians. He was of the gravity of the position, of the position of France, and the hatred of the English still declared in anguish that, but for one man, the national cause would have triumphed!

He unwillingly reverted to this only when his feelings became too repressed, like one who having to step into a precipice cannot avoid considering step it was that led to his ruin. He spoke far more willingly of his first campaign at Brienne, of the first proofs he gave of his genius at the siege of Toulon, and of the sure he had felt in his first campaign. He became animated, and related with a glowing brilliancy that charmed him how his family dated from the old times of the republic, and how he felt an indebtedness for France when Corsica was many masters. He spoke of his first campaign at Brienne, of his first campaign, of his reasoning powers so wonderful of the age he then was, his towering pride that had made the single error had been inflicted on him at such a durable, how some of his mistakes had dictated his future career, of his first campaign, his connections of Valmy, affection for a young lady whom he had the pleasure of rescuing from a position, his arrival at Toulon, where he experienced the pleasures of glory surrounded by the most violent passions of the Convention and ignorant of the past, had seen that Fort d'Emile was a point to be taken, and, having gone to attack, seized it, and by this compelled the English to retreat! What presage! what intoxicating vision passed, far surpassed by the reality occupied his mornings in reading, spent the afternoon on the quarter of the Northumberland, sometimes for long lengths of time, charming his own misfortune by his recitals, or with his favourite cannon contemplating it made by the vessel that was bearing him to his last resting-place.

As time thus passed away, the Northumberland crossed the Bay of Biscay, and Finisterre and Saint Vincent, and by a faint but favourable wind reached the African Isles. The passage was the least excessive. Napoleon suffered no complaint. On the 22d of August he reached the island of Madeira, and was able to take in fresh provisions, but the rising suddenly compelled them to leave their voyage. So great was the storm that the frigate Havana and the brig separated from the squadron. Four hours later the Northumberland was anchored at Madeira and procured provisions. The inhabitants, of Portuguese, attributed their escape to the late storm to Napoleon. He

a man of tempests, who could not appear without causing desolation. On the 29th of July they passed the tropic, and on the 29th of August the line, when, as may be supposed, Napoleon was the only one that escaped the perils practised by sailors on those who cross the equator for the first time. But the emperor's delight knew no bounds when he ordered the medals to be distributed among the sailors.

The sailors of the Northumberland, sent to Napoleon but from the description in English journals, in which during fifteen years he had been represented as a monster, every day more surprised to find him gentle, and kind, and divining his unexpressed but evident chagrin, gave him the touching proofs of sympathy. They most carefully polished the gun on which he was accustomed to sit, and showed respect for his solitary reflections by remaining silent when he approached.

Napoleon continued his account of his youth, his description after the 9th Thermidor, his connection with the heads of the Directory, his explanation he gave them each day when sitting in the despatches from the army, the means they entertained of his military education, the impulse that had impelled them all to point him to the command of Paris on the 10th of Vendémiaire, and some months after the command of the army in Italy; his appointment at Nice in the midst of the old generals, anxious of his promotion, but who were satisfied when they saw him, by a prodigy of military skill, throw his troops between the French and Austrians, driving the one on the left to the other on Genoa, whilst he himself occupied the Po and took up his position on the right, whence he defied the armies of Austria year after year! As he related these exciting deeds his youthful vigour seemed to revive, and he again six-and-twenty. It was strange whilst it gave him such pleasure to relate his adventurous achievements, creating for him a kind of mirage in which he beheld the vision of the deeds of his youth, that he did not feel inclined to give an account of his writing, as he did when about to set out for Elba. When leaving Fontainebleau, it was said to him that, following the example of the great men, writing his autobiography might not be an occupation unworthy of him. Now he did not seem to feel any interest for his own glory or that of his companions.

He was very much changed since he came to Elba; he had sunk much deeper into the abyss in whose depths his great career seemed to terminate. At Elba his reverse fortune was still a novelty, which excited him not to deject him, for deep in his soul a hope still abided. But after the 20th of July, after Waterloo, where could hope find a resting-place? Did he even burst the chain with which England had bound him, and safely cross the mighty ocean, where could he go alone, without even the aid of his faithful soldiers? Would France receive him? would she be willing to aid him in a third attempt when the second had been so disastrous? The human heart struggling before it completely gives up hope, and we find in history the record of a single mind in which hope ever became wholly

extinct. Marius amid the ruins of Carthage, Pompey after the battle of Pharsalia, and Hannibal after the battle of Zama, still hoped, and not without reason. But after Waterloo what could Napoleon expect from fortune? Never was soul so dejected as his, and though he hid from his faithful companions the void that life had become for him, he did not feel it less deeply. This degradation rendered him incapable of the labour which a great literary composition involves. When roused by recollections of the past, it was not difficult for him to speak of his former deeds with all the vigour of his native eloquence, but he did not feel either the energy or the inclination to give a detailed account in writing. Having retired forever from the active scenes of life, it seemed a matter of indifference to him in what light posterity should view him. Often did his companions, when delighted with what they heard, request him to write what he had related with so much force and vivacity. Gourgaud, Las Cases, Montholon, and Bertrand begged him to take his pen, or allow them to be his amanuenses, and write under his brilliant dictation even as rapidly as he could speak, and thus afford a dignified occupation to the closing period of his career; but he refused, as though even his glory was unworthy of the effort. "Let future generations," he said, "act as they will. Let them seek the truth if they wish to know it. It may be found in the archives of the state." Then the benumbed heart would suddenly warm with a glow of pride. "I trust to history," cried Napoleon. "I have had many flatterers, and now detractors occupy the scene. But the fame of great men, like their lives, is exposed to a diversity of fortune. A day will come when impartial writers will be animated exclusively by the love of truth. They will doubtless see many faults in my career, but Arcola, Rivoli, the Pyramids, Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland, stand on a foundation of granite, which envy herself cannot gnaw away." Napoleon expressed the greatest confidence in history, even in his actual state of calm despair. It was represented to him that history needed information which he alone could give; that if he did not record them many of his noblest thoughts would be lost; that recording the events of his own life would be a dignified and useful means of employing his great energy; and his companions added that their aid should not be wanting in erecting this great monument to his fame. These repeated exhortations, and his own dejection, ended in inspiring him with an inclination for some occupation; for man, while on earth, will ever find some attraction, were it even in watering plants, or constructing watches, like Diocletian and Charles V. Napoleon finally consented to commence the task he had projected when leaving for Elba. His excitement was too great to allow him to follow the movement of his hand, and even when he did make the attempt the characters were almost illegible. Employing the pen of M. Las Cases, he commenced his dictation with his campaigns in Italy. His plan was to portion out the different parts of his history between the companions of his exile, that all might share in the honourable occupa-

tion and have time to review their work or make a fair copy. But to relieve his heart from the oppressive recollections of Waterloo, he immediately commenced an account of the campaign of 1815 to General Gourgaud. He had sufficient time, for the voyage was lengthened by the very efforts the admiral made to shorten it. At that period it was usual in naval science, once the equator was passed, to allow the vessel to be borne by the trade-winds toward the coast of Brazil, and then, turning southward, endeavour to catch the varying west winds, which would take the vessel to St. Helena. Admiral Cockburn, anxious to shorten the voyage more for his guest's sake than his own, determined to try another route. By keeping near the African coast, bending a little toward the coast of Guinea, west winds are often met with, which, having taken the vessel toward Africa, are succeeded by an easterly wind blowing in the direction of St. Helena. This was the route chosen by the admiral. It was but too successful at first, as it not only took him into the Gulf of Guinea but almost to Congo. He was exposed to tempests, oppressive heats, and delays, which caused the very sailors to murmur. Napoleon, who felt no great desire for the termination of the voyage, as it would only enable him to exchange one prison for another, passed his time in dictation. His mornings were spent in dictating an account of the Italian campaigns to M. de Las Cases, or that of 1815 to General Gourgaud. These gentlemen would not venture to interrupt him, but followed him as rapidly as they could, and then retired to make a fair copy of the thoughts they had caught, as one may say, on the wing. These copies were submitted on the following day to Napoleon, who read them attentively, abridging what had been too diffusely related, elaborating what was too cursorily told, and that with excessive particularity as to style, which became of more importance to him as he advanced in years. As he progressed in his task, he was annoyed by the want of documents to which he could refer for dates or details. Like all men of active lives, who have numerous events to remember, his memory often failed as to dates, but never with respect to any thing else. His memory was infallible as regarded facts, their importance, the places where they occurred, or the men concerned in them, and he recounted them in a style that left no doubt as to their truth. He also regretted not having possession of his orders, and still more his letters, which would have explained his plans, his motives, and which are as clear evidence of what he meant, now that he is dead, as if he still lived. He was sometimes irritated by the want of these documents, but not so much as to be diverted from an occupation which had become his sole resource. His only recreation was reading, and that was confined to the noblest productions of the human mind. Marchand had brought the books he had with him in the country, which unfortunately were very few. One day, whilst he was regretting the smallness of his library, a trading-vessel was seen approaching the Northumberland. M. de Las Cases then remembered that he had taken the precaution of sending a case of books to the Cape.

"Perhaps," he said to Napoleon, "a vessel with my books." It was, and being brought on board and immediately opened, afforded the illustrious prisoner restricted to intellectual pleasures, some trifling satisfactions that were his only constitution the sum of his happiness.

It was now seventy days since they had left England, when they at length met an easterly wind blowing from the Cape, and soon bore them toward St. Helena. Early the morning of the 15th of October, at a distance of twelve leagues, they could discern peak wrapped in clouds; this was the peak of Diana, the highest point of the island of St. Helena. Napoleon had now reached the goal of his prison. About noon the vessel anchored in the little harbour of James Fort before a dark, gloomy coast, bristling with rocks surmounted with canons. To the right Havana and the brig *Fury*, which had been separated from the squadron at Madeira, arrived seventeen days earlier than the admiral's vessel. These had announced the approaching arrival of the prisoner, and the orders sent from London, to land the troops, and the usually tranquil island assumed a warlike aspect at the approach of the man of warfare, who was destined to his career beneath that burning sky.

The island of St. Helena, situated in the southern Atlantic Ocean, a little south of the Tropic of Capricorn, owes its origin to a volcanic eruption. The island, of about twenty miles in circumference, is irregular in every side, is distinguishable from the rocks, which, surrounding the peak of Diana, rear their blackened summits to the sky. St. Helena is constantly enveloped in being the only stationary object in these parts to attract the vapours of the great crater of the parent volcano from the west, and this crater, situated at the foot of the peak of Diana, presents its roiling hot abyss to the gaze of the European vessels. Several long, narrow, parallel valleys run from it to the sea, looking as if they had been the channels through which the lava flowed, and one of these, more spacious than the others, forms the harbour of James Fort, the only one by which the island can be approached. Toward the south are plains separated by deep ravines, perpendicular to the sea, and frequently inaccessible and exposed to the east wind blowing from the Cape. The narrow valleys of the north are watered by few clouds attracted by the peak of Diana, and display some scanty verdure, the southern plains are constantly swept by a hot, dry wind, over these plains no limpid streams run, but their arid surface no green turf springs, and there are seen patches of a meagre vegetation parched by the winds and offering little shade in a climate that needs so much. St. Helena: its southern plains hot, windy, and its northern valleys less arid, but profoundly dreary; not unhealthy for those accustomed to live there, but fatal to one accustomed to the great scenes of the civilized world. There are but few agriculturalists there, for they find but trifling occupation on a sterile soil situated at such a distance from any market. But as the vessels returning from India

by the wind from the Cape, and weary from a long voyage, is a firm soil, breathe the land-air, a pleasant spot, or taste some fruit or wine, the East India Company's there as at a hotel placed for once in the midst of the Atlantic 4000 inhabitants of St. Helena, reside at James Town, have no notion than feeding a few cattle on the Cape, and cultivating some vegetables; and the greatest joy the soldiers is when the vessels return from the East exchange some of gold for a momentary repose and

that Napoleon was to end his days are always rejoiced when they land, but it was not so with the passengers on board the Northumberland felt like prisoners within view of gates that are about to close on

The entire population was assembled on the quay, but the numbers were not called a crowd. Napoleon stood on the quarter-deck, and gazed sadly at the black abode where he was about to live. He did not express a wish, the admiral to decide when he would land and where he was to take up his abode. The admiral immediately ordered to seek some place where Napoleon might reside until his own residence was prepared. He spent two days in the island, came, with many apologies, to Napoleon that he had at length found a commodious house, where he might enjoy the pleasure of being on the 17th of October Napoleon left the island, to the great regret of the people, who thanked for the attention they had shown him. When he reached the house ordered by the admiral, he found it so different from the public gaze that he did not remain there more than two or three days. The admiral promised to seek a more comfortable place the following day,—one where he could be protected from the observation of the

House, a pretty residence, situated in a shaded valley in the north of the island, built, and sufficiently large, suited Napoleon exactly, but was not the residence of the governor. In regard for the proprieties of life, the admiral indicated this as the proper place for Napoleon, but, from some idle shabbiness on the part of the company when lending the island, it was stipulated that this house be reserved for the governor, and that, with a strange want of consideration. There was, therefore, no prospect of Napoleon's getting Plantation. He could have had an immediate retreat. He was obliged to remain in the wood, one of the southern plains, belonging to the Company and in the residence of the deputy-governor. With some additions, could contain about twenty persons. The plain of the island is sufficiently extensive to allow of horseback, and was not wholly de-

ficient in shade, being planted in part with gum-trees; but, unfortunately, Longwood had a southeasterly aspect, and was exposed to the wind from the Cape. This was an inconvenience that could only be discovered with time; and at the first view the site presented nothing disagreeable. It afforded a healthful and convenient encampment to the troops destined to guard Napoleon's residence, and the site that looked on the sea was inaccessible. These were sufficient reasons to determine the admiral's choice, and he proposed to Napoleon to ride over and see whether it would suit him. Napoleon agreed, and on the following day he and the admiral rode to Longwood, where a grassy plot presented an agreeable change after months at sea, and in a solitude secure from curiosity. He was pleased with the site, and consented to the house being immediately put into habitable repair.

As Napoleon had passed the peak of Diana on his way to Longwood from James Town, he saw, in this tolerably verdant valley, a small residence that he liked. On his return from Longwood, he visited it and expressed a wish to reside there temporarily. The owner was a native merchant, who lived with his family in a neighbouring house. He immediately offered this little dwelling to Napoleon, who wished to take immediate possession of it. He would be obliged to sleep, eat, and write in the same room, but, as it looked on a pretty valley, he admired the confined dwelling, which the people about called Briars. As there was some difficulty in accommodating a few servants, a tent was erected beside the little pavilion. The greatest inconvenience was that Napoleon was separated from his companions, who had to come a distance every day to see him. Some kind of accommodation was found for M. de Las Cases, whom Napoleon wished to have with him, as he was then writing, under dictation, the account of his Italian campaigns. Napoleon had, in this little abode, only the bare necessities of life; but he took little heed of these physical privations, having suffered much more severe in his long and fearful wars. It is true that in those early days the sense of danger and the love of glory absorbed every other feeling, and the severe captivity to which he was now doomed would suffice to poison the greatest pleasure or abundance. It was now that he felt the first bitter fruit of this severity. Until now, as Emperor on board the Bellerophon, and commander-in-chief in the Northumberland, he might believe himself free, for the ship was a floating prison, in which his jailers were as much confined as he. There had been no surveillance on board the Northumberland; but, once on land, the admiral, from a sense of his own responsibility, could not venture to allow his captive the entire island as a prison. It was only nine or ten miles in circumference, its coasts were almost inaccessible, excepting by the little harbour of James Town, which was closely guarded, and surrounded, besides, by a number of cruising-vessels. Had Napoleon attempted to escape, he would have found it very difficult, particularly at first, when he had not yet had time to procure accomplices, or a vessel to take him to America. Notwithstanding all this, the admiral, wishing to have a constant certainty

of his presence, stationed sentinels all round Briars, with orders not to lose sight of its occupants for a moment. Napoleon's quick glance soon detected them, and the discovery caused one of the most painful annoyances of his imprisonment. The admiral, desirous of making every thing as agreeable to Napoleon as circumstances would admit, and knowing that he was accustomed to spend the greater part of his time on horseback, and, indeed, to compel his contemporaries to do the same, had procured three tolerably good saddle-horses from the Cape, whence all those on the island were brought. Napoleon was about to profit by this attention, when he perceived that an English officer was preparing to mount and follow him. He immediately gave up all idea of riding, and desired that the horses should be returned; but, considering that this would be a bad return for the admiral's politeness, he kept the horses, but was determined not to use them.

Certain persons have blamed Napoleon for being annoyed by such things, or for allowing the annoyance he experienced to be seen. It is very easy to speak of the sufferings of others, and explain how they should be borne. I am so deeply affected by the afflictions of my fellow-men, that I can scarcely blame the faults of those who suffer, and could never have the nerve to examine calmly whether the noble victims of sorrow had, at such a time or on such an occasion, behaved with the required impassibility. I know none whose sufferings touch me more than those of Pius VII., Louis XVI., or Marie Antoinette, and in considering them I feel a strong desire to abridge their agony.

The human frame presents a sad spectacle when suffering from convulsions of physical pain, and the human mind does not offer a more agreeable object of contemplation in certain phases of moral agony: over such let us, with respectful compassion, throw a veil. Were Napoleon a Christian anchorite, it might be said to him, "Bend meekly beneath the blows of your executioners." But he, whom neither fatigue, nor physical sufferings, nor the sense of present danger had ever subdued, he, fallen from so great an eminence, quivered beneath humiliation, and these first bursts of impatience may well be pardoned in a man who saw himself in the fetters of kings that during fifteen years had lain crouching at his feet. His companions were unwise enough to increase his irritation by telling him how they were treated at James Town. Their least movements were watched, a soldier followed them wherever they went, and they complained bitterly of these annoyances to their master, who felt more for their sufferings than his own. Napoleon could restrain himself no longer: he repeated what he had already said to Lord Keith, that the rights of nations and of humanity had been violated in his person; that he was not a prisoner of war, but had of his own free choice intrusted himself to the English, and made an appeal to their generosity, of which they had shown themselves unworthy; that he might have gone to the Loire, and continued a desperate war, or gone to his father-in-law, or to his old friend the Emperor Alexander, who would have been bound by the

bonds of affinity or honour to treat him with respect; that consequently the English had no right to treat him as a prisoner; and that would, in any case, end with the very self, and that even with prisoners there are certain considerations connected with rank and position, which should never be forgotten. Napoleon then recalled how he behaved formerly to the Emperor of Russia, to the King of Prussia, whom he might have dethroned, or to the Emperor of France, whom he could have made prisoner at Austerlitz; he had spared them the worst consequences of their reverses, and he now angrily censured their conduct to him, forgetting in his own reproaches the real cause of the difference, forgetting that when he treated Louis Frederick, William, and Francis II. as vassals they did not inspire him with fear, while he, conquered as he was, was still a terror to the world, and that it was to his great credit to the abuse of his genius, that he was indebted for this unusual form of captivity. Somewhat relieved by this burst of anger, he cried, "It is not for me to complain. My dignity commands me to be silent in the face of sufferings, but you who are under such restriction may complain. You have wives and children, whom it would be shameful to subject to such things, and for this reason you should protest against such treatment."

They did complain, and the admiral, whose countenance was harsher than his heart, did what he could to render their residence at James Town supportable. He did not relax his surveillance, for his sense of responsibility made him anxious; but he desired his officers to be more considerate, without, however, abating their watchfulness in keeping the principal prisoner constantly in view.

This state of things improved after a few days. Some of Napoleon's companions were accommodated at Briars. He could have done at table, resume his labours with them, and occupy that ardent mind that fed upon itself when it could find no other aliment. He resumed his conversations with them, and walked out a little without being followed, as it was considered that he could not go far on his own. He traversed the little valleys running northwards and parallel with that of James Town. These, being sheltered from the south wind and sun, were, as we have already said, cool, shaded, and afforded many picturesque views. One day that Napoleon had gone farther than usual, he entered the unassuming dwelling of Major Hudson, an English officer. He was received most respectfully, he conversed simply and unaffectedly, and retired pleased with the cordial reception he had met. Being at a distance from Briars, he was accommodated with horses for his return. He had a long ride, a pleasure he seemed to enjoy, and of which he had been deprived for some time. He became accustomed by degrees to his singular habitation, considering that he would have a better, and lived there as though it were one of the many bivouacs in which he had passed a part of his stormy career.

Napoleon's host, who was a merchant of inferior rank, but a man of excellent disposition, did what he could to make his guests and humble society agreeable to his guests. He

and two young daughters, who spoke a little French, very lively, innocent girls, able to sing a little, and endowed with all the gaiety of youth. They came to visit the fallen Emperor, questioned him with the ignorance incidental to their age and position, and played some Italian airs on a not very harmonious instrument. Napoleon replied to their naïve inquiries with the greatest kindness. One of them who had met with the name of Gaston de Moix in a historical romance, and fancied that he was the hero of Ravenna was a general of the Empire, asked if Gaston were very brave, and whether he were dead. "Yes," replied Napoleon with paternal kindness, "he was brave, but he is dead." He interested himself in these children as he did in the birds that flew about his garden. Such were henceforth to be his only recreations. It would be hopeless to seek to desire others.

Thus passed the months of October and November, peacefully and sadly, as were destined to pass the many years of this unexampled captivity. It was about this time that the first accounts arrived from Europe. The exiles and the pleasure of hearing from their families. Napoleon alone got no letter. His mother, his brothers, sisters, were fugitives, seeking concealment, and had not been able to write to him. Maria Louisa had not even thought of sending him an account of his son. The only interesting information he received was afforded by the public journals, which moved him greatly by the details they gave concerning France. The Bourbons who had entered France so mildly in 1814 had now returned in anger, and under the influence of a fatal delusion. They were firmly convinced that they had been expelled on the 20th of March by a vast conspiracy, which it would be both just and politic to punish. The journals announced that many of Napoleon's devoted friends had been arrested or banished, and all on his account. Ney, La Bédoyère, Drouot, and Lavalette were threatened with rigorous prosecutions and public death. Napoleon grieved deeply for the three latter, for whom he felt the most sincere affection, and pitied Ney, whom he did not esteem so much, but whose warlike energy he admired. He was not offended, but afflicted at the mode of defence adopted for the marshal. With that unerring logic with which he reasoned on every subject, he at once pointed out the line of defence that should have been adopted. "They are wrong," he said, "if they think to influence Ney's judges by representing him as my enemy by adducing his conduct at Fontainebleau. There is but one way of saving Ney, and that is by fully declaring the truth. Neither Ney nor anybody else is a conspirator. When he was about leaving Paris, he wished to arrest me, and again at Lons-le-Saulnier, and he would have done so but that he dreaded the people and the soldiers. But, as he approached the locality where I was, he yielded to the general and universal feeling that carried away so many others. I must say that he wrote to me, at that time, in terms most honourable to himself, declaring that he was influenced by the interests of the country, and not by mine, and offered to retire in case my policy was not in accordance with the general wish. When we

met at Auxerre, I anticipated what he had to say, by pressing his hand and assuring him that he might trust in me, that my policy, dictated by plain good sense, would be all that Frenchmen could desire. He kept somewhat in the background at that time, for he was disturbed by the consciousness of his false position. That feeling influenced him at Quatre-Bras, and more especially at Waterloo. He was never more heroic or daring than then, when in contributing to our destruction he assured his own. But neither the Bourbons nor I can reproach him with any thing but yielding to the force of circumstances. His plea with his judges should be this:—'I have not betrayed anybody: I have been carried away by circumstances, and in regard to that offence, so general and so excusable in a time of revolution, a law has been made—the capitulation of Paris—a capitulation which implicates the honour of the victorious generals and their sovereigns, and which protects all political crimes from further inquiry.' That is the only defence that Ney should make, for that is the entire truth. Either the capitulation of Paris is a nullity, or it must be a protection to Ney. By adopting this defence, which is the truth, he may influence his judges, and even if he should not, he will dishonour them in the eyes of history, and will fall surrounded by the undying sympathy of all honest men. Ney, poor Ney," cried Napoleon, "what a sad fate awaits you!" Continuing to speak on this subject, he repeated that neither Marshal Ney nor anybody else had been guilty of treason on the 20th of March, that all had done their duty, civilians as well as military men, but they as well as the rest were borne along by the army and the people. Napoleon then mentioned a remarkable fact worthy of being recorded in history. "Massena," he said, "has been accused of betraying the Bourbons, but he has done nothing of the kind, as I shall show. After I had returned to Paris and was re-established on the Imperial throne, everybody thought it his interest to appear of importance to me, all boasted of the risks they had incurred for me. Massena came to Paris: I asked him what he would have done had I gone to Marseilles instead of Grenoble. Massena is not a flatterer, but still he felt embarrassed, and when I pressed for an answer he said, 'You did well, sire, in going to Grenoble.' All my marshals would not have answered so frankly, though they would have been justified, except Davout, the only one at liberty to act as he pleased, for he was not in the service and had been badly treated. Nobody betrayed the Bourbons, and if they exercise vengeance now, it is only to please their party and to excuse the faults they have committed. But I can foresee the uncertainty of their future career. By yielding to the passions of the emigrants, they will only alienate France more and more. It is not my son that will first profit by their mistakes, the house of Orleans will take precedence, but the turn of the Bonapartes may come."

Having uttered these prophetic words, Napoleon again reverted to the injustice of the proposed prosecutions, and showed the greatest anxiety for Ney, La Bédoyère, Drouot, and Lavalette. He considered, however, that

Drouot's universally admitted honesty would serve him as an impenetrable buckler, but he trembled for La Bédoyère, Ney, and Lavelette, and impatiently awaited news of the victims sacrificed as much by himself as by the Bourbons.

Although Briars had been made as comfortable as possible, Napoleon was so restricted there as to space, and so annoyed by the ill treatment offered to his friends, that he was most impatient to get to Longwood. The admiral, whom he called *his shark*, though he appreciated the goodness of his heart, did all he could to hasten the preparations at his new residence. He had collected all the workmen of the town and fleet, and with wood, tarred cloth, and all kinds of materials had succeeded in forming a large *rez-de-chaussée* where Napoleon and his companions in exile could be lodged. When all was prepared, the admiral proposed to Napoleon to take up his residence there, to which he immediately agreed.

He left Briars on December 10, having first taken leave of the family who had received him so well, and repaid their hospitality with a munificence unrestricted by his actual position. He set out on horseback, accompanied by the admiral on one side and the Grand Marshal Bertrand on the other. He wore, as usual, the uniform of the Guards, and rode a lively, gentle, easily managed Cape horse. His ride was not disagreeable, and when he arrived at Longwood he found the 53d English regiment, which was encamped near, under arms. The admiral presented the officers of the regiment, and then conducted him to his new abode. The apartments were very slightly built, covered with tarred canvas, and very plainly furnished. Napoleon made no objection. He had a sufficient number of rooms to sleep, work, receive his friends, and lodge them near him. It was all that he desired. He thanked the admiral, and settled himself down in the dwelling which was destined to be his last. In one room he had his camp-bed arranged, his books in another, and had the portraits of his son and some other members of his family hung around. Behind these two rooms were a reception and dining room. M. de Las Cases, his son, M. and Madame Montholon, and General Gourgaud, occupied another wing of the building. The Grand-Marshal Bertrand, who wished to live alone, and his wife, who, though a most amiable woman, could not accommodate herself to living with the rest, had asked for a separate residence. They got one at the entrance to the plain of Longwood, so that they were not guests, but only neighbours, of the Emperor. Their house was called Hutt's Gate.

These arrangements being made, Napoleon endeavoured to reconcile himself to his new mode of life. Having acquired during his campaigns the habit of watching part of the night, his sleep was irregular and broken. He woke frequently, and rose to read or work, then went to bed again, and if he could not sleep, rode out at dawn, returned when the heat became too great, breakfasted alone, dictated or lay down, passed thus three or four hours of the day, then received his companions, drove out with them, their wives and children, dined toward evening, and spent the remainder of the day with his friends, sometimes

having some book read, or charming others by accounts of his past life. He lengthen their evening parties, and went to bed the better chance of sleeping. "What a victory over time!" cry when eleven or twelve struck.

Here, as at Briars, his principal complaint was the strictness with which he was treated. The 53d regiment being encamped near Longwood was no nuisance, nor were the sentinels during the day. Napoleon went unless he went to a greater distance could accomplish on foot. If he was miles from Longwood he was always an officer, but at such a distance conversation could not be overheard. Napoleon had expressed the greatest repugnance to ride out while thus followed, he wishing to deprive him of his solitude a space of about three or four miles around Longwood within which he was. Beyond that a mounted officer was to be seen in sight.

At nine in the evening the sentinels near the house, and were stationed that no one could pass. Lord Bathurst given directions that an officer of the interior service of Longwood was to see Napoleon once and sometimes twice in order to secure a physical seal being at St. Helena. The most important parts of the island were provided with telegraphs, to announce to the governor's residence, whenever of importance should occur at Longwood, especially any lengthened disappearance of the illustrious captive. A guard was posted at the peak of Diana to announce the approach of any vessel that might be seen when a war brig would go out to port, and prevent the landing of anything without previous inspection coming from any part wherever we were to hold any communication with the island, send letters or packets to the governor, Longwood, excepting through the governor. No vessel could take on board without permission from the governor, nor leave the harbour until it had gone a rigorous examination. It was forbidden all intercourse without permission from the governor, they were warned that any party attempt at escape should be considered treason and punished as such.

These regulations, the usual anxiety and of Lord Bathurst's were very disagreeable to Napoleon as much pained by every thing that reminded him of his captivity as by the strictness. Having grown more reserved since the precautions that had been taken at Briars, he was even more so now, and not speak to him on any subject but his own nearly, fearing that he should be restrained himself. Such subjects as Bertrand, Las Cases, Montholon, and Gourgaud, to discuss. These gentlemen, however, could advance but one that had no influence with the Emperor, namely, that the Emperor had

himself into the power of the English, that he could not be treated as a prisoner of war, nor could there be any such prisoners now that peace had been concluded; to which the admiral might have replied that the safety of Europe required that extraordinary precautions be employed when an extraordinary man was in question. But he was neither a lawyer nor a logician, he was a simple soldier, actuated by good feeling, but inflexible in the performance of his duty. He had received orders, and would execute them. These were, that the prisoner, whose safety was a matter of importance to the universe, should be well guarded, and he trembled at the very idea of his making his escape. Once and the guard sufficient, he did not of adding any other annoyance, and if it was not from a desire of showing authority, a weakness of which he was incapable. The entire island might, indeed, the precaution of ascertaining Napoleon's place at Longwood twice every day, have allowed Napoleon as a prison, as there was a certainty of his disappearance being immediately announced, and the island was so inaccessible except at James Town, the prisoner would certainly be detected he could escape. Still, as it was safer to lose sight of him, the admiral was determined to continue the practice, but with as much inconvenience as possible to Napoleon. An officer on duty did not appear, he lived at Longwood with the exiles themselves, and was satisfied if he saw Napoleon as he walked out or passed from one apartment to another. When Napoleon went out, this officer did not follow so long as he remained within the prescribed bounds, and only mounted his horse when these were passed. When that occurred he remained at a distance, and often lost sight of Napoleon when curiosity or hardihood led him to choose some difficult path. It often happened that he sunk into marshes, and was not able to follow his prisoner, but even then a murmur did not escape him. Though Napoleon's intercourse with the inhabitants was forbidden, it was tolerated, and the exiles were permitted all necessary communication with James Town. The admiral, knowing all who came or went, allowed visitors to be received at Longwood provided they addressed themselves to the Grand Marshal Bertrand, who at Longwood as at the Tuilleries took his master's orders as to who should be admitted to see him. Thus Napoleon had not the appearance of being in a prison, to which admission could only be gained by permission of his jailers.

Notwithstanding these annoyances, Napoleon had at first no objection to the residence in which he was destined to die. Up to this time his health had been good; the inconveniences resulting from the climate, and of Longwood in particular, had not affected his constitution, which was insensible to physical suffering whilst he led an active life, but delicate and susceptible when he remained in repose. It was now January, the summer of the southern hemisphere; and the place still possessed the charms of novelty, and prevented him or his companions from being tormented by ennui. He suffered from the greatness of

his fall, from the extinction of hope, but he had not yet acquired a horror of the place where he was condemned to reside. He walked or rode sometimes to a distance, questioning the few inhabitants he met, especially an old negro, that cultivated a field near him, and a poor widow, whose two daughters came to offer him flowers. He felt pleasure in assisting them. He sometimes visited the encampment of the 53d, where he was well received as a soldier by soldiers. He then, as we have mentioned, returned, and resumed his dictation of the Italian campaigns to M. de Las Cases, the Egyptian campaign to the Grand Marshal Bertrand, or that of 1815 to General Gourgaud, after which he would drive out at the close of the day with Madame Bertrand and Madame Montholon, return to dinner, and pass the remainder of the evening conversing on a variety of subjects, or having some interesting work read aloud. He admired our great writers extremely, and read them with the pleasure that a cultivated mind and refined taste enabled him to enjoy.

Still it was not long till he felt the inconveniences of his residence either for himself or his companions in misfortune. Having traversed the plain of Longwood twenty or thirty times, he found it dull and monotonous, and when he passed its bounds it was most painful to him to be followed by an officer. It would not be polite to leave this officer at a great distance, or get him into a difficult path, but still his presence was insupportable. He would sometimes, however, pass the barriers of his plain, and try to penetrate the valleys to the north, where Briars and Plantation House were situated. When he compared these verdant, shady valleys with the plain of Longwood exposed both to sun and wind, he could not avoid seeing that to render his person more secure he had been placed in a disagreeable and unhealthy situation. His companions declared that it was his death that was desired. He did not go to such extremes, but said that his life was endangered to prevent the chance of his escape.

The plain of Longwood being quite exposed, and defended by steep rocks on the side looking toward the sea, afforded every facility for surveillance, but made it insupportable as a place of residence. When not enveloped by the mists attracted from the Atlantic by the peak of Diana, it was so pitilessly swept by the wind from the Cape that, notwithstanding the moisture of the climate, it was perfectly barren. It afforded no other protection from the sun than the shade of a wood of stunted gum-trees of very scanty foliage. When the sun did not shine, a disagreeable damp pervaded every thing, penetrating even the garments of the inhabitants, and when the sun was visible, its burning rays pierced through the canvas roofs of Longwood. There was no water: what was needed had to be brought by the Chinese servants from the opposite side of the island, and was neither pure nor fresh when it arrived. In addition to these inconveniences, the island was poor and little frequented, food dear and of inferior quality, which was indeed but a slight inconvenience to so temperate a man as Napoleon, but a serious one to his companions in exile, who had

brought with them their wives and children, accustomed to all the delicacies of European luxury. "There is nothing very gay here," he remarked one evening to his friends, as he looked at the bare walls and ill-served table: "we have nothing here in excess but time."

His great acuteness soon made him see that his companions were beginning to be affected by the moral evils of exile, which revealed itself in a certain involuntary bitterness toward each other. They were almost as jealous of his favour at St. Helena as at Paris, and General Gourgaud, a sensitive, irritable, and jealous man, could scarcely conceal his displeasure at seeing M. de Las Cases admitted to the closest intimacy with Napoleon. Although the Bertrand and Montholon families lived apart, the one at Hutt's Gate, the other at Longwood, they also showed some symptoms of the same failing. The evils of a court did not end with the loss of a throne. But we must not alone pardon, we admire, a rivalry that struggles for the favour of oppressed genius. How many families exalted by Napoleon were occupied by the same rivalries, not at Longwood, but at the Tuilleries!

Napoleon knew that these feelings originated in misfortune, and dreaded the consequences to this little colony wrecked on a barren rock. He endeavoured to console them by his attentions, to calm them by the wisdom of his discourse; he concealed his own weariness, and sought to remove that of others by promising them a better future, which, however, he had no hope of seeing realized.

It was in the fourth month of 1816, the time when summer commences in Europe, and winter in St. Helena, when news arrived that a vessel from England was bringing out the new governor, Admiral Cockburn's appointment being but temporary.

The governor was Sir Hudson Lowe, who is indebted to his appointment at St. Helena for an unenviable notoriety. Sir Hudson Lowe was one of those men, half military, half diplomatic, employed by Government on occasions where the latter qualifications might be more useful than the former. He had acquitted himself well in many appointments, especially at the head-quarters of the allies, where he had acquired a prejudice against the French, and, though he was not so bad a man as his appearance seemed to indicate, he possessed neither a benevolent character nor an obliging temper. As the peace closed the road to military preferment, the expectation of a large compensation induced him to accept a painful mission, accompanied with serious responsibility, not only toward his own Government, but to history. The latter consideration, whose importance he did not understand, had very little weight with him, and he only thought of avoiding the reproach incurred by Admiral Cockburn, of having allowed himself to be influenced by his prisoner. Without intending to be a tyrant, Sir Hudson Lowe was resolved to show the world that he was capable of resisting any influence whatever. This determination necessarily obliged him to come frequently into disagreeable contact with the strong-willed and irritable man whom he had received orders to restrain but not to drive to despair.

He had scarce Admiral Cockburn, and prescriptive. The admiral, who intimated the custom of Napoleon to stand before at This the admiral, and tool to Longwood. could not see asked when he he was told on he returned acc He was receive trand, who int peror. A disag admiral, being moment the ne did not percei were closed by no person was governor, refus admiral, greatl and returned t camp.

Napoleon's it was cold and been piqued by governor had vious day, and flattered by ha the morrow. I to make their saw at a glan to deal with, party,—an opit nance only te ceived him with complained of to, but without ameliorated; h the new govern late himself or not. Sir Huds great warmth, he could to re fort of the exile short interview

Sir Hudson I when Napoleon that he had ne that of an Itali gret our shirk, told of the d caused the adm it at first, but f he recollected admiral was. incapable of te with the govern he had met, he an authority th On his return mined to carry gulations insti he pretended to structions. No sentinels statio evening set in, obliged to confis unless he conse lish officer. S

regulations were known to Lord Bathurst, and finally approved by him, and would be carried out to the very letter. He did at the same time the order to the governor not to allow a single day to pass without seeing his prisoner twice. He carried out the same rigour with regard to the proscriptions which the admiral had ordered, so to speak, to fall into disuse. For the admiral, according to the ministerial orders, was not to be allowed to communicate with the inhabitants of Longwood without the governor's permission; but the admiral had received no other authorization than that of the Grand Marshal Bertrand. The servants had no difficulty in passing to and fro on their ordinary domestic errands. Some Englishmen, returning from the Indies, who, being known to the admiral, could inspire no distrust, were received at Longwood merely by the permission of the Grand Marshal, and the conversation afforded a short relaxation to the prisoners. A continuance of this practice would not have been inconvenient; but Sir Hudson Lowe required that all communication should depend on his permission, and that every letter written at Longwood or addressed to the inhabitants should pass through his hands. That there might be less occasion for delay, he appointed a special purveyor for the colony at Longwood, and for this purpose chose the proprietor of Briars, where Napoleon had passed some weeks. When information of these severe restrictions was brought to the exiles, they felt greatly distressed, not having expected any thing of the kind. When Sir Hudson Lowe paid a second visit, Napoleon received him still more coldly than before, and referred him to the Grand Marshal concerning every thing connected with the execution of his orders. The Grand Marshal protested with great vehemence against the old and new restrictions, and, finding Sir Hudson Lowe inflexible, he declared that he persisted in his intention, Napoleon would quit his apartments, and that should his health suffer from want of exercise the new governor would be accountable for it in the eyes of the world. Such threats had but little effect upon Sir Hudson Lowe, who affected to consider his own conduct as quite natural, the necessary consequence of his instructions, and he ought to secure him as friendly a region at Longwood as had been accorded to Admiral Cockburn. This mode of viewing the matter soon increased that want of cordiality which caused so much suffering to his prisoner, and brought so many humiliating imputations upon himself. The fleet arrived from India. Lady Moira, the governor, was on board with his wife, Lady Moira, both most anxious to see Napoleon. But as the latter had declared he would not allow himself to be treated as a captive, whose prison could be opened or closed at the will of his jailer, and that he would not admit any person who had not asked permission through the Grand Marshal, the admiral and Lady Moira would not venture to make a demand that was at that time surrounded by so many difficulties. As their curiosity was very great, Sir Hudson Lowe, in order to satisfy it, sent an invitation to dinner to Marshal Bertrand, enclosing one for Napoleon, in

which he said that, if *General Bonaparte* had no objection, Lady Moira would be very happy to be presented to him. The only fault in all these proceedings was the want of tact on the part of Sir Hudson Lowe, who had not the least idea of giving offence to the noble prisoner. Marshal Bertrand was greatly offended at receiving such an invitation for his master and himself, nor was Napoleon less so; he felt indignant at the idea of becoming an object of curiosity which the governor could show at pleasure to his favoured guests. But a refusal from Marshal Bertrand was not the sole reproof administered to Sir Hudson Lowe. When he appeared at Longwood it was not with coolness alone that he was received. Napoleon addressed him with great severity. "I am astonished," he said, "that you could presume to send me the invitation that was returned to you by Marshal Bertrand. Do you forget who you are, and who I am? It does not become you nor your Government to deny me a title bestowed by France, recognised by Europe, and by which I shall be known to posterity. Whether you and England consent or not, I am, and shall be always, known to the world as the Emperor Napoleon. I attach very little importance as to what title you may give me. But I am insulted by your expecting that I would go to your house to gratify the curiosity of your guests. Fortune has abandoned me, but nobody shall make the Emperor Napoleon an object of derision." Having said this, Napoleon became calmer, and Sir Hudson Lowe made many apologies in explanation of his intentions, saying that Lord and Lady Moira had been desirous of offering their homage to his great fame, and he had merely wished to know whether a visit from such distinguished persons would give him pleasure. Napoleon neither approved nor disapproved of these explanations, and dismissed the governor more humiliated than on either of his former visits.

The comparison between Sir Hudson Lowe and Admiral Cockburn was entirely to the advantage of the latter, who soon left for England. Before leaving, he went to Longwood to take leave of the Grand Marshal, express his regret for the additional rigour with which Napoleon was treated, and for the misunderstanding between him and the new governor, whose intentions, he declared, were not as bad as they seemed. The Grand Marshal responded to the admiral's cordiality, and begged him to inform the British people of the state to which the great man, who had intrusted himself to them, was reduced; he requested him to visit Napoleon, and made fresh apologies for the accident that had occurred on the day that Sir Hudson Lowe had been presented. But the admiral, as sensitive as he was generous, would not see Napoleon again. He requested Marshal Bertrand to present his adieux, and assure him that at his return to England he would not prove himself his enemy. In fact, the admiral had conceived the greatest sympathy for Napoleon, and always said that he was the mildest and most reasonable of the prisoners at St. Helena, and more willing to listen to reason than any of the others.

Admiral Cockburn left, taking with him the regrets of this hapless little colony. He was

scarcely gone when fresh difficulties arose. The British ministry required that Napoleon's companions should make a formal act of submission to all the restrictions imposed on their liberty, and that those who refused should be sent back to Europe. The expenses of Longwood had also been objected to, expenses that may be explained by the high price of every kind of provision at St. Helena, and the number of persons to be supported, amounting altogether, masters and domestics, to about fifty persons. The whole expense was about £20,000 per annum. Admiral Cockburn had never thought of making a remark on the subject. Was it well to estimate the cost of the bitter bread of captivity that was flung to the former master of the world in his prison? In exchange for the liberty of which he was deprived for the public benefit, self-respect might have taught his captors to supply him all material necessities. But it was not so; and now that the passions actuating the men of 1815 have died away, we ask how it was possible that Lord Bathurst could make a formal demand that the expenses of Longwood should be reduced to £8000 a year. The sum is a matter of no consequence; the disgrace was in making such a calculation at all, and, for her own sake, England ought not to pardon those who cast such a stain upon her history.

We must admit that Sir Hudson Lowe was sensible of the indignity attached to this part of his instructions, and felt an embarrassment that does him honour, when obliged to execute these instructions. With regard to the declaration required from the members of the colony, he at first showed himself determined. He drew up, with his own hand, the document they were to sign, in which Napoleon was styled "General Bonaparte." This would place them in a very painful position. Those who had him in their power might refuse Napoleon his titles if they chose, but to require that his companions in misfortune should, by signing a formal act, deny his right to the title by which they were accustomed to address him, would be compelling them to become parties to his dethronement. They drew up a declaration resembling that of Sir Hudson Lowe, as to the formal engagement of submitting to the arrangements established at Saint-Helena, but differing as to the titles given to Napoleon. The governor declared, in a brutal manner, that if they did not sign his declaration he would send them all to Europe. "Do not sign," said Napoleon; "let him send you back. I will remain alone here, where I cannot have much time to live, and the world shall know through what a wretched motive I was deprived of my few remaining friends." The exiles persevered, and Sir Hudson Lowe, feeling, at last, how odious such conduct must appear, proposed an arrangement, by which the titles of emperor and general were to be suppressed, and the prisoner simply denominated "Napoleon Bonaparte." He said if they refused to accept these terms, a vessel, then under weigh, should take them to Europe. They submitted, without telling Napoleon, for they did not wish to abandon, without friends, without secretary, without servant, that hapless master whose misfortunes they desired to share.

Sir Hudson Lowe was more anxious in regard to the expenses. It is very true that Napoleon's servants and those of the three families, by whom he was accompanied, were not very economical in the expenditure of English money; but we repeat that it is incomprehensible how anyone in England could think of making a remark about it. Sir Hudson Lowe visited Napoleon the subject to Marshal Beresford, who sought to excuse his remarks by producing instructions which fixed General Beresford's expenses at £8000. Marshal Beresford simply replied that he was quite ignorant of a subject on which the governor was speaking; that the Emperor's household was very well supplied with provisions, but had no occasion of complaining, or inquiring who and where the accommodation might be; that he would not do so now, nor think of sending it to their master. Sir Hudson Lowe, declaring that he could not permit expenses, The Grand Marshal was greatly embarrassed, and having consulted with the principal members of the little colony, was obliged to tell Napoleon of what had occurred. The day he felt may easily be imagined. He immediately ordered that Sir Hudson Lowe should be told, that although all nations were bound to support their prisoners, the most painful circumstance attending his captivity was that he was obliged to eat the bread of England; that he had always been his wish that he and his friends should live at his own expense; that he still wished to do so, and if permitted to send sealed letters to Europe, he had a family and friends who would not leave him in abjectance, and that the British Government would be relieved even from the burden of the annual £8000 to which they wished to limit the expenses of Longwood. The reasons of his reply may be easily understood. Although Napoleon's family, especially his mother, uncle, and Prince Eugène, were both able and willing to supply his wants, he did not wish to apply to them, but to M. Laffitte, whose hands his money was deposited. But he was desirous of concealing the existence of this deposit, lest it should be confiscated with all the other Bonapartist possessions in France.

When Sir Hudson Lowe received this reply, he said that he was ready to transmit Napoleon's letters to his banker, but upon remembrance with Lord Bathurst's instructions, he insisted that the expenses should be reduced or supplied from Napoleon's own resources. Shocked at this new species of oppression, Napoleon ordered his steward, Marchal, to choose such articles of his plate as were absolutely needed, break them, that what belonged to him might not become an object of sale, and send the pieces to James Town to pay his purveyors. This was extremely embarrassing to the governor; for when the intendants discovered to what extremities the prisoner at Longwood was reduced, they became heartily ashamed of the manner in which their Government had acted. To lessen this feeling, Sir Hudson Lowe instructed his secretaries to say that Napoleon was wallowing in money, and might meet all demands without having recourse to this miserable expedient. What we have already narrated is sufficient to show how Sir

his was true. Napoleon had brought with him about 350,000 francs, and his friends about 50,000. He would not deprive himself of this sum, which he called his reserve fund, and which furnished him the means of making occasional alms or requiting a service. Not wishing to expend this money, which in fact could not long have sufficed for his expenses, the deposit left with M. Lafitte, he was compelled to sell his plate. He had a great deal, much more than he needed. The merchant, who kept a watchful eye on all domestic details, had had time to send this plate from the Elysée palace to Rochefort, and it could be sufficient to supply Napoleon's household wants until Sir Hudson Lowe or Lord Bathurst became conscious of the promptings of shame.

Embarrassed by this dispute, Sir Hudson Lowe announced that he would take on himself to increase to £12,000 the sum of £8000 appointed by Lord Bathurst, and would send to England for fresh instructions. The sale of plate then ceased, and there was an end to this disgraceful transaction. About this time another admiral came to succeed Admiral Cockburn, not as commander of the island, but of the naval station. This was Sir Pulteney Malcolm, a man of high principles, whose goodness of heart was reflected in the amiable expression of his countenance. Immediately on his arrival he waited on Napoleon, observing all the forms of respect due to the august captive. His gentle dignity, and respectful sympathy, produced an immediate effect on Napoleon's impressionable and sensitive nature, and completely won his good opinion. Napoleon from the first treated him as a friend, and conversed freely and kindly with him. Sir Pulteney frequently repeated his visits, and Napoleon desired that he should always be introduced without ceremony, as he attached no importance to etiquette, except to impress his guardians. As Sir Pulteney perceived that one of Napoleon's greatest inconveniences arose from want of protection from the sun, very little being afforded by the meagre gum-trees of the Longwood plantation, he sent to his ship for a large and handsome tent, which he caused to be erected by his sailors close to Napoleon's dwelling. Napoleon was greatly touched by this attention, and frequently dined or worked under Sir Pulteney's tent. This gentleman, in his desire to alleviate the fate of the exiles, thought nothing better could be done than to bring about an accommodation between Napoleon and Sir Hudson Lowe, and thus contribute to ameliorate the execution of Lord Bathurst's instructions, if not the instructions themselves. He spoke on this subject to Napoleon, admitting that Lord Bathurst's orders were most objectionable; but that Sir Hudson Lowe was bound to fulfil them, and could not avoid causing annoyance to the inhabitants of Longwood; that he was neither a bad nor ill-intentioned man, but shared in the terror felt not only by the British but by all other Governments, lest Napoleon should again escape as he had done from Elba; that the thought of this clouded his reason; that it would be better to forgive him, meet him, and impress him by a frank explanation, which would produce a better understanding, and ameliorate the position of the

inhabitants of Longwood. "You are mistaken," replied Napoleon to the amiable mediator. "I can read men's countenances, and Sir Hudson Lowe's bears the impress of a bad heart. I also understand the full value of an attempt to escape, but I have no idea of doing any thing of the kind, for two reasons: in the first place, because escape would be impossible, and in the next place, because it would lead to no result. There is no part for me to play in the world: I can expect nothing but to remain here during the remainder of my life, which cannot be long, and employ myself in inditing some notes for the edification of posterity. Though I may cause my enemies to lose their reason, I need not lose my own. I do not seek to escape from their iron grasp, but from their insults. I ask no more of your countrymen than to allow me to die un insulted. I expect nothing from another interview with Sir Hudson Lowe. Though I can restrain myself when necessary, I feel the greatest repugnance to that man's presence: his aspect offends my eye and embitters my words." Sir Pulteney was not discouraged, but still pressed Napoleon to receive Sir Hudson Lowe, who, on his side, desired the interview from a sincere desire of reconciliation.

Napoleon yielded to entreaties made in so friendly a spirit, but consented only on condition that Sir Pulteney should witness the interview. Sir Hudson Lowe came to Longwood with Sir Pulteney Malcolm, and felt somewhat embarrassed as he presented himself before his haughty prisoner. Napoleon received him politely, and allowed him to enter on a justification of the complaints made of him at Longwood. He replied calmly, and almost conciliatingly, until the governor, with great want of tact, introduced the subject of expenditure, which had been put aside but not decided, when Napoleon, casting off all restraint, broke forth into the harshest language. "I am surprised, sir," he said, "at your presumption in addressing me on such a subject. It is not my custom to meddle in the details of my kitchen. If it suits you to see after them, you must do so without speaking to me on the subject. If there were not women and children here, condemned with me to exile, I would take my place at the table of the officers of the 53d, and certainly those brave men would not refuse to share their meal with one of the oldest soldiers of Europe. But I have to support several families, who are as desirous as I of accepting nothing from the unworthy Government that oppresses us. Could I write to Europe without taking you into my confidence, neither my family, nor France herself, would allow me and the friends who have consented to share my misfortunes, to want what we need." Having said this, Napoleon became still more excited, and, scarcely allowing the governor to utter a word, addressed himself exclusively to the admiral, speaking of Sir Hudson Lowe only in the third person. He forgot himself so far as to use the most insulting language. The admiral, in excuse of the governor's conduct, said that he must obey his orders. Napoleon replied that there were appointments no man of honour would accept, that Sir Hudson Lowe was no soldier, having oftener wielded the pen of a staff officer than the sword of a

soldier. At these words, Sir Hudson Lowe, who had restrained himself and respected in his prisoner misfortunes to which the century offered no parallel, left the room in a rage, declaring that he would never again set foot in Longwood.

When he left, Napoleon, ashamed of his want of self-control, apologized to Sir Pulteney Malcolm, saying that he would not have been so excited but for the governor's want of tact in speaking of the contemptible affair of expenditure, that he had foreseen that the interview would lead to no good result, that Sir Hudson Lowe's countenance produced upon him an impression that he could not control, that he admitted he had done wrong, and he added what was a full apology for his error. "I have but one excuse to offer, admiral; I am no longer at the Tuileries. I could never forgive myself for the insults I have offered Sir Hudson Lowe, were I not his captive." These annoyances occupied a part of the year 1816, after which Napoleon's life subsided into the dull monotony which continued till his death, interrupted occasionally by the pangs of physical pain. His habits continued the same. Sleeping but at broken intervals, especially when the dulness of his evenings made him retire early, he frequently rose during the night and read or dictated if Marchand were near, then retired to another bed, seeking the repose that fled him, rose when the sun came to illumine the plain of Longwood, and commenced riding round what he called his "circle of hell." This constantly repeated round became daily more disagreeable, nor could he get beyond it, except accompanied by the hapless officer left to guard him. Even the pleasure he felt in conversing with the old negro who possessed a field in the neighbourhood, or with the widow whose daughters brought him flowers, was spoiled by the dread of compromising them, or exciting the governor's distrust. He dreaded even doing a service to any person, lest he should be suspected of endeavouring to procure accomplices for some fancied project of escape. These restraints, acting on an irritability of temperament which great dangers alone could subdue, became to him a real torture. "Ah!" he said to M. de Las Cases, "would that we were with our families and a few friends on the banks of the Ohio and Mississippi! Can you imagine the pleasure of riding unrestrained at full speed through the vast forests of America? On this rock one has scarcely room for a gallop." When the rays of a tropical sun darted fiercely on his brow, he retired to the unpicturesque shade of Sir Pulteney's tent. "An oak," he cried, "an oak," and in passionate tones expressed his longing to repose beneath the foliage of that fair tree of France. When Napoleon returned from his ride, he lay down, hoping that fatigue would bring slumber, then took a bath, in which he remained a long time, a habit that eventually became injurious from the debility it induced, but which he liked because it relieved a pain in his side, the first symptom of the disease of which he died. He then occupied himself in reading or dictating, resuming in fact the occupations we have already described, and finished the day in the society of his friends, when some book was

read aloud, or he continued the same life, which was ever listened to with eagerness. These were not the worst of that dreary period, dreary for any particularly so for him whose realm had once kept the world in submission were days, and these most numerous, Cape wind prevailed, that dry, insidious wind which painfully affects the nervous system, beats down plants and trees, and prevents grass from growing, so that one is surrounded by ocean mists, the only relief from an all-penetrating moisture was a continuous and oppressive wind. Napoleon remained within doors whilst this wind and, sunk in sadness, considered this fearful climate had not been chosen with a perfidious intention of shortening his life. This painful suspicion seemed to him he learned that there was near his abode a residence, Plantation House, on a verdant and sheltered valley. "If I die," he cried, "why did not they tell me as they did Nay? One bullet to the head would have sufficed. Europe considered me as the emigrants, but she had much courage. Europe dared not kill me, she dared condemn me to a lingering death. Napoleon was mistaken. Europe only of securing his person, and, solely, with that idea, never thought of whether the precautions taken to secure his person were compatible with the preservation of his health. Europe intrusted his safety to England, who allowed him to be on a minister, and he transferred the subaltern, who was continually alternated between anxiety for his own responsibility caused by the insults of his sons. Lord Bathurst had been, as he said, so culpably negligent as not to let the East India Company to give up the House, and Sir Hudson Lowe had no good taste to offer it, preferring to let his family." These motives were acceptable, but probably meaner than expected by Napoleon. His enemies wished to assassinate him, but regarding no other feeling than that of fear, they let him endure the agonies of a lingering death at the hand of subalterns.

Sir Hudson Lowe had brought with him with which to construct a new habit Napoleon; he also brought farm books. More solid materials than necessary as a protection against the heat and moisture of the climate. He refused every thing but the books, and took a few from the ill-sorted collection had been brought, read them with an often made them the subject of his conversations. Though the evenings were sad, they were, as one illumined by the brilliancy of his books. The tone of these conversations was a

* In saying this we do not calculate on the who says, in one of his despatches, that he was have resigned Plantation House to Napoleon have got a suitable residence in the island for his family. This is admitting that he thought it own convenience than of that of his prisoner, who was entitled to more consideration than Sir Hudson Lowe, however interesting they might be.

piquante, occasionally, though rarely, gay, and sometimes, when treating of history, war, science, and literature, rose to a sublimity that was, unfortunately, but too often beyond the capacity of his auditors. He frequently played with the children of Madame Bertrand and Madame Montholon, had Fontaine's fables read for their amusement, regretting that much of the author's depth of observation was beyond the capacity of the little listeners, but he was ever ready with the most appropriate argument to influence their minds. One of Madame Montholon's sons complained that he was obliged to study every day. Napoleon said to him, "Do you eat every day, my little friend?" "Yes, sire." "Then if you eat every day you must study every day." Quitting the children, he would turn to the loftiest themes in politics and philosophy.

Among the books brought to St. Helena were some pamphlets connected with the events of the day, which it was supposed would interest him. Some of these were written against himself, some against his enemies. Among these was "The Weathercock's Dictionary," which since 1815 had become very popular, because it stigmatized the mobility of public men, who in their eagerness to hold office had not hesitated to transfer their services from one Government to another. This book, being written by opponents of the Bourbons, was naturally enough very agreeable to the poor exiles, who felt a lively satisfaction in seeing punishment dealt out to those who, instead of being like them on the rock of St. Helena, were parading through the Tuileries, disavowing the usurpation under which they had served, and celebrating the legitimacy they had opposed. It won a smile from Napoleon when first he read it, but soon, getting weary, he flung it aside. "It is a detestable book," he cried, "degrading to France, degrading to humanity! Were it to be believed, the French Revolution, which originated such generous principles, has made us all, nobles, citizens, and people, only a set of degraded creatures. That is false and unjust. Look at the religious wars in France, England, and Germany, and you will find as many interested changes originating in motives as mean. Henry IV. saw as many of them as I, or Louis XVIII. The Fronde can offer as many, and certainly that France was not degraded which a few years later won the battles of Rocroy and the Dunes, and produced Polyeucte, Athalie, and the Oraisons Funèbres of Bossuet. Do not be so ready to rejoice at the punishment of your adversaries: you may be assured that the sword that smites them has a double edge, that may be turned against yourselves." Somebody observed that the men he excused had betrayed him. "No," he said, "they did not betray, they abandoned me, which is a very different thing. There are fewer traitors in the world than you think, but, on the other hand, there are numbers of weak men who yield to circumstances far more powerful than themselves." Napoleon saw, though he did not say, that these men, exhausted by the extraordinary demands he had made on their moral strength, had sunk under the trial, and sought under new masters the reward of the essential services they had rendered to France. "Fouché," said Napoleon,

"is the only real traitor I have met; Marmont, the wretched Marmont, who injured me more than Fouché, was not a traitor. He was misled by vanity and the hope of playing a great part, and he believed that by abandoning me, and depriving me of the means of overwhelming the Coalition in Paris, he was saving France from a great catastrophe. But he did not betray me as Fouché did." His auditors surprised at his forbearance asked why, knowing in 1815 that Fouché was a traitor, he did not restrain him. "The question," replied Napoleon, "did not depend on the conduct of an individual, however important he might be. It should be decided by the loss or gain of a battle, and had I, by accusing Fouché, anticipated that event, I should but have disturbed the stability of my Government. I was obliged to have patience and wait, but I let Fouché see that I was not deceived. He has avenged himself for my contemptuous forbearance, but after Waterloo, even without the presence of a man so dangerous as Fouché, I should have been lost. Traitors," he repeated, "are rarer than you think. Great vices and great virtues are the exceptions. Men, in general, are weak, and changeable because of their weakness, they seek their advantage wherever they can, advance their own interests without intending to injure others, and, on the whole, are more deserving of pity than blame. They must be taken and made use of as they are, and impelled to something higher when it is possible. Of this you may be sure, contempt will never elevate them. To induce them to exert their capabilities, you must lead them to believe themselves better than they are. In the army, cowards are made brave by telling them they are so. The only way to deal with men is to affect to believe that they possess the virtues with which you wish to inspire them."

This subject led Napoleon to another, in treating which he displayed the same practical philosophy and the same elevation of thought. "It is weakness," he said, "and not wisdom, to distrust men too much. It would but lead to want of confidence in all, to hesitation in one's choice, and to the frequent neglect of useful instruments. Besides, if it becomes known that you are of a suspicious disposition, everybody about you will seek to turn it to his own advantage. Had I listened," he added, "to all that I was told, I should have had none but cowards in my army and traitors in my household. There are but very few of you here, my friends, all bound to be complaisant to each other, and I do not yield credence to what you say ill of one among you, and I am right."—This was an allusion to certain divisions that were beginning to disturb him.—"No," he continued, "men must not be believed when they speak ill of each other. Lannes died for me like a hero, though he often used language that, had I taken it seriously, might have led to his being accused of high treason. This is the reason that, after long experience, I consider violating the secrecy of the post-office as both useless and dangerous. Nobody will conspire by post: all that can be got in letters are remarks originating in idleness, revenge, or ill feeling. Who would wish to hear all that is said of him even by his best friends? It would be very imprudent, very unwise, of any—

body to make such an attempt, even were it in his power. He would be compelled to hate even his best friends. We are all so thoughtless when speaking of each other! If one heard all the remarks that are made, one would often detest those who deserve to be esteemed. To read letters is but to listen to general conversation that will engender prejudice and injustice, which are more injurious to one's self than others. A Government in doing so deprives itself of valuable instruments; and when practised by a private individual, friends, thoughtless in language but sincere in their attachments, come to be looked upon as enemies. It is far better not to know all that is said, however high-minded we may be; for there are some remarks that we may find it difficult to pardon. We can only be certain of pardoning such, when we never hear them."

At another time, taking up some of the wretched pamphlets published against him in England, Napoleon ran through the tirade of serious calumnies of which he was the object. "If my enemies are to be believed, it was I," he said, "that assassinated Kleber in Egypt, blew out Desaix' brains at Marengo, strangled Pichegru in his dungeon! Kleber, Desaix, Pichegru! I esteemed Kleber highly despite his faults. He was too fond of pleasure, and was sometimes dangerously indifferent, but he was passionately fond of glory, and unsurpassed as a warrior on the field of battle. I assassinated the man by whose death I lost Egypt! Desaix was an angel. I loved him better than anybody else, and nobody loved me better than he. It was his arrival that won the battle of Marengo, and could I strike him down at the very time he was rendering me a service that promised so many others! Pichegru was, in all probability, the most intelligent general of the Republic. He had been one of my masters at Brienne, the remembrance of which made me always feel the greatest commiseration for him. While in command of his army, he was guilty of crimes for which he was denounced by Moreau. The wretched man injured himself sufficiently without my assistance, and it was this conviction that led him to destroy his life after ruining his fame. And I am now accused of having destroyed the three! The calumny is more remarkable for its folly than its wickedness. The violence of enmity is so great that it very quickly leads to absurdity. The accusations it invents are revolting whilst we are young, ardent, and proud. We become accustomed to them with time, and rather wish they should exceed all bounds, as their very excess is a justification." Napoleon then introduced and explained in succession the most exaggerated events of his life, especially the pretended poisoning of the men sick of the plague at Jaffa. As to what had occurred there, he said that, being obliged to retreat, he could not take with him twenty sick men of the plague without running the risk of infecting the whole army, and, as these were certain to be killed by the Arabs, he said to Desgenettes that perhaps it would be greater humanity to give them a little opium; but the latter, with great presence of mind, replied that his profession was to cure, not to kill. He added that almost all were dead before the army left, that the five or six who remained

had not taken opium, and that the accusation had been propagated in the infirmary, who had been adulterating the medicines.

Napoleon spoke with haughtiness of these atrocious calumnies. The subject of which he spoke as though not as calmly, the catastrophe of 1815. He spoke of it with reserve, and that he felt a repugnance to the subject. Unlike all those who had taken part in the sad event, he admitted it fully. "The bon princes," he said, "wished for my death and it is evident to any person that at Georges' trial, that several of them were of the plots laid for my assassination. But d'Enghien was waiting within a league of the frontier for the renewal of hostilities, in order to take up arms against France, only in right according to the laws of all times, deserved the punishment I inflicted on him. After all, my blood was not polluted. I had the right to defend it against those who sought to shed it, especially when in my own person I defended the repose, prosperity, and glory of France. I struck; I had the right to do so and would do it again."

The very violence with which Napoleon expressed himself showed that his enemies reproached him. His right to defend himself being admitted—and never was more placed on a head more worthy of being defended than his—he forgot that he should be so legally, that, by the Duke of Enghien's arrest on a foreign soil and forcible transportation into France, the laws were violated in the form of the commission and by the immediate execution of the sentence. But when an enemy becomes a lawful prisoner, policy must be consulted, and then comes self-indulgence, and such an article is equivalent to a command, as it requires the justification of necessity as well as legality in the effusion of human blood; he forgot that the death of the Duke of Enghien, far from being beneficial to the Consular Government, did incalculable injury in inducing Europe to take up arms, and that, under such circumstances, personal considerations should have great weight, and that the descendant of the conqueror of Rocroy ought to have been such to the conqueror of Rivoli.

Napoleon loved to contemplate his reign as a whole, and would say that, if the events of the world were consulted, no founder of a dynasty would be discovered more innocent than he. There is not one, indeed, in whom history makes fewer reproaches, as far as relates to getting rid of relatives or rivals, and there is no doubt that, except on the field of battle where the sacrifice of human life was common, nobody has shed less blood than he, which was partly due to his own disposition, and partly to the manners of the time. Comparing himself to Cromwell, he said, "I assumed a tyrant throne, but it was not I that rendered so. I was lifted to the throne by the enthusiasm and gratitude of my contemporaries. This assertion was quite true; but, when lifted to that throne amid the approving admiration of his countrymen, Napoleon had to fight it with equal delight. This fall could be accounted for by treason, which he had

did not exist: the cause was to be in his own errors, which he would admit with sincerity, sometimes with sophistry, according as the adroit his pride more or less. In accordance with a general law, where he had no offer he employed subtleties and ruses, and became so accustomed to these that it was impossible to say whether he believed what he said or not.

In recounting the fall of the Empire in 1804, he gave a summary of the errors which led to that result, and which, in our opinion, amount to six. These were:—first, instance, abandoning, in 1803, the moderate policy of the Consulate; breaking the Peace of Amiens, and warring with England, whose interests lay beyond our reach.

Secondly, having subdued the continent in the battles of Austerlitz, Jena, and Eylau, not returning in 1807 to a moderate policy, but, instead of seeking to humble the nations by uniting the continental Powers, rather to profit by the opportunity of creating a universal monarchy.

Thirdly, in allowing, at Tilsit, that this universal monarchy should rest on the interested Russia, an aid whose recompense was the possession of Constantinople.

Fourthly, in plunging into the Spanish war, which engulfed all our strength.

Fifthly, not trying to finish this war by a peace, but rather seeking a solution in the East, which could only be found in the Peninsula; a policy that led to the unparalleled disaster of Moscow.

Sixthly, and most fatal error was that, after again stooping conquerors at Lützen and Bautzen, we had rejected terms of peace which would have left us an empire, territory much larger than policy had given grounds either to hope or

It is necessary to say that, midst the end of his captivity, Napoleon reviewed the memories only as the incidents of his life suggested them. He did not dissect them methodically, as we have attempted to do; sometimes touched on one subject, then another, ever offering most excuses that was least excusable.

During his outbursts against the English, breaking the Peace of Amiens, he said that the celebrated scene with Lord Whitworth was greatly exaggerated, and that he had submitted to the refusal of the British to evacuate Malta. But he forgot that his own policy that had caused affairs to assume so threatening an aspect, of which he took advantage, and refused the evacuation of Malta. He admitted that it had been his intention to make a descent on England, but for the error committed by his admirals, he would have conquered it. It cannot be denied that vast preparations had been calculated, and that had Admiral Villeneuve been in the English Channel, 150,000 men would have crossed the Straits of Gibraltar. What would have been the result, had he gained such a battle as Austerlitz in 1805 and become master of London, as he

was, at a later period, of Vienna and Berlin? Would the haughty aristocracy of England have bowed before that terrific blow, or would they have prolonged the struggle against their conqueror, imprisoned to a certain extent, as he would be, within the limits of his conquest? We cannot say. Running such hazards was, certainly, staking on a desperate game his own and France's greatness.

Napoleon could offer no justifiable reason for his project of universal monarchy, devised when, having failed in his attempt on England, he turned to attack the continent. He had designed, he said, that this universal monarchy should be but temporary, an external dictatorship, such as France had bestowed on him at home, and which he would have resigned in time. In the first place, if France, in 1800, needed a powerful arm to save her from anarchy, this was not the case with Europe. What she had to dread was the ambition of the actual head of the French Government, and to be placed under his dictatorship would have been what she most feared; it would have been an attempt to cure a disease by increasing the malady. The necessity for an external dictatorship could in no way be deduced from the existence of a domestic one. To be enduring it should be of short duration; and it would have been incumbent on Napoleon to prove to the nations that he exercised the office of dictator for their benefit. He should have endeavoured to do them good, instead of inflicting on them the mass of evil which, in 1813, induced all Europe to rise and destroy this universal dictatorship.

Speaking of this chimera of universal monarchy, Napoleon added that, being compelled to defend himself incessantly, he had become master of Europe almost against his own will, a false assertion that has been frequently repeated by those who wish to flatter his memory and policy. There is no doubt but that the European states, in consequence of the oppressions they endured, were only watching for an opportunity to throw off the yoke, and that so overpowered were they after the affair of Tilsit, that, but for the Spanish war, Austria would not have ventured on the celebrated *levée de boucliers* in 1809; and that, after the victory of Wagram, if Napoleon had not undertaken the Russian campaign, nobody would have ventured to raise a hand against him.

He spoke with more sincerity of his third great error, the Spanish war. This war, he said, had compromised the moral character of his Government, divided and exhausted his forces. He alone could understand how much and how completely. The transaction at Bayonne was one of unpardonable perfidy; the war in Spain drew to the south the troops that were needed in the north, and exhausted their strength by the fierceness of the struggle. How could he have been so sincere in speaking of this point, when he was so little so in treating of others? Perhaps it was that the error was too evident, or it was perhaps attributable to the nature of the excuses he made. Having founded, he said, the fourth dynasty in France, he could not tolerate the Bourbons in Spain, as their very position made them the necessary accomplices of England. This reason should indeed have some weight, but had

Napoleon, instead of anticipating events by a crime, allowed the incapacity of the Bourbons and his own popularity in Spain to produce their effect, the Spaniards themselves might have asked him to place both thrones under the same ruler. This error originated in a natural impatience of character—the source of many he committed; nor was this excuse for the Spanish war, which he must have considered a good one, since it induced him to admit that he had done wrong, of greater value than many he adduced in palliation of the errors of his policy.

He was equally candid in admitting the mistake he made in not endeavouring to conquer the Spaniards by perseverance, and of seeking in Russia a solution he could not find in Spain. He made a singular admission on this subject. "Alexander," he said, "had no real desire for war, nor had I. When we arrived at the Niemen we were like two braggarts, who wished for nothing more than that somebody should interfere to separate them. At that time I had not a good minister of foreign affairs. Had I M. de Talleyrand, for example, the Russian war would never have taken place." This was true, and Napoleon's admission will afford subject of reflection to those ministers who shrink from arresting their masters when they see them approaching a dangerous descent.

He attributed the fatal result of the campaign to the burning of Moscow. "There was a sufficiency of provisions in Moscow," he said, "to support an entire army for more than six months. Had I passed the winter there, I should have resembled an ice-bound vessel, that recovers her liberty of action on the return of the sun. My army would have been intact in spring, and if the Russians had been reinforced, so should I too, and as in 1807, after the battle of Eylau, in February, I fought that of Friedland in June, I might have gained some brilliant victory with the return of summer, and ended the campaign of 1812 as successfully as that of 1807." There was some truth in this, but it may be said in reply that though his infantry could be supported in Moscow, the cavalry and artillery would have been without forage; and that if reinforcements had been brought to Osterode in 1807, the same facility did not exist for bringing supplies to Moscow, and that the army of 1812 was not in as good condition as that of 1807.

Napoleon could not offer a plausible nor even specious excuse for the last serious error of his reign, the refusal of peace at Prague. He repeated the worn-out commonplace policy, that Austria was not sincere, and whilst apparently treating at Prague, was secretly engaged to the allied Powers, an assertion completely falsified by the most authentic documents. If Austria were not sincere at Prague, there could be no better means of convicting her of insincerity than by accepting the conditions she proposed, namely, to leave us Westphalia, Holland, Piedmont, Florence, Rome, and Naples, that is, double what we could demand, refusing us only Hamburg and Lübeck, with which we had nothing to do, Sicily, which we had never had, and Spain, that we had lost. Had these conditions been accepted, and Austria broken faith, she would have been convicted of falsehood, and public opinion would have been in

our favour. But there is evidence that she would have accepted our admission into light, for it was with the greatest reluctance that she went to war, and had formerly refused to join the allied Powers until a term appointed for mediation had expired. Napoleon had no desire to spend so much blood, so painful to his self-love, to be so deeply deceived himself in supposing that he had inspired Austria with so much hostility, she would never dream of opposing him. Austria did fear him, and very much to his feeling was not so powerful as to prevent her judgment, or prevent her adopting so evidently conducive to her interests. He sought to avoid this reproach by saying that his marriage, by inspiring him with hostilities in Austria, had been the cause of it. An undignified and mendacious excuse. M. de Metternich had repeatedly said that his marriage would have a weight, but not unlimited, weight with the court of Vienna and would not prevent war being declared against him, should he refuse the mediation offered at Prague, which had not been that they were too favourable to it.

It was thus that Napoleon resented the events of his reign, sincerely with his love could find specious excuses, explained when it had none to offer; but it is all the conscious of his faults, without admitting them, and calculating that the promise of glory would justify him with posterity, as he had done with his contemporaries.

He spoke more readily and with more confidence of the internal government of his empire. In contemplating his conduct in 1793 he justly considered himself as a great regenerator, who, collecting the fragments scattered by the axe of the Revolution, had reconstructed the fabric of modern society. It was easy to him to show why he had sought to divide different classes which had been so widely asunder, why he had recalled the old nobles, and elevated the citizens to the same rank, by conferring on them the titles their ancestors had merited, and thus presented to Europe a vigorous and reinvigorated nation worthy of companionship. But while looking to France in a respectable light, and turning into pacific relations with Europe, a great necessity that the latter should be by constant fear. On all these points Napoleon appeared as a legislator, philosopher, and politician, when some of his companions blamed him recalling the old nobles who had betrayed him, he repelled what he looked on as a personal objection by the following peremptory reply: "The two men," he said, "who most contributed to my ruin, were Marmont and Fouché, who excited the Chamber of Representatives against me, in 1815. If I had been ruined by traitors, these are the men. Can be said that they belonged to the old nobles?"

It was with great pleasure that Napoleon spoke of his exertions to give France a more active, powerful, honest and enlightened administration. He enumerated the roads, canals, ports, and monuments he had built; the laws for the perfection of the civil code, of the

puted a large portion to Tronehet; his presidency of the Council of State, where there was the greatest liberty of discussion, where he had often met with obstinate men, for, he added, men's being courtiers deprive them of self-love, and I have councillors of State, simple masters of who, once a discussion had commenced would persist in upholding their own opinion in opposition to mine, so true is it that in subjects connected with administration, men are assembled with the seriousness of thorough investigation, a relatively occasionally fruitful liberty of discussion.

He admitted that he had not been a sovereign, but said that he had advanced civilization, adding that as a dictator had not been to bestow liberty, but to men for it. He did not deny the trial had been made of liberty in 1815, but the subject as though ashamed of an act from which he had derived no benefit. When alluding to this subject, he constituted assemblies with profound thought though he had employed them so little, attributed his misunderstandings in the Chamber of Representatives rather to the want of success in the use of liberty than to any defect. "Such assemblies," he said, "have leaders to guide them as well as to mislead; with this difference, that in assemblies appointed commanders, whilst in the Chamber of Representatives it selects its leaders. The Chamber of Representatives in 1815, summoned by peal of cannon, had not been able to find or seek its way."

He always said that he had not had time to lay his plans, but not to come to anything, that his reign had consisted of sketches, and then, giving play to his imagination, he would tell all that he had done had he obtained a frank and peace from Europe. (A peace he unhesitatingly refused when he could get it in 1815 when it was impossible attainment.) "I should have allowed myself," he said, "a large share in the government. I should not only have summoned them to meet in really free assemblies, but have gone to meet them myself. I have listened to them, and have allowed them all liberty to contradict me. I would have travelled with my own horses through the Empire, accompanied by the Empress and my own army, would have seen and heard for myself, redressed their wrongs, and the same hands that disseminated the evils of war should read the blessings of peace. I should have been as old as a paternal and pacific prince, the people having so long applauded as in the warrior would then bless as Napoleon the pacific, drawn like the Merovingians in a car yoked with oxen."

He related these dreams of the great man because they convey an important lesson, the opportunity of doing good should not be neglected, as once allowed to pass it can never be recalled. It was thus that the evenness of his captivity were spent, and when once again he beguiled the time until a later hour, Napoleon exclaimed, with delight, "What! midnight! what a victory over

time!" time of which he could never find sufficient in other days, but which now hung heavily on his hands.

The first half of the year 1816 was passed in disputes; the second was better employed in diligent historical occupations. Napoleon now devoted most of his time to M. de Las Cases, as his Italian campaigns interested him extremely and recalled his first and best-enjoyed successes. Although occasionally dictating the Egyptian expedition to Marshal Bertrand, and the campaign of 1815 to General Gourgaud, he showed a decided preference for Italy. He wished to have copies of the *Moniteur* in order to verify dates and various details, but, not being able to procure these, contented himself with the *Annual Register*. His memory was so very correct that he very rarely had to make an alteration. In order to write as rapidly as Napoleon dictated, M. de Las Cases made use of certain modes of abbreviation, which obliging him to re-write his notes, a great part of his nights were spent in that occupation. He brought the copy next day to Napoleon, who corrected it with his own hand. This occupation became very hurtful to M. de Las Cases' eyes, though often relieved by his son, who frequently assisted him in seizing the rapidly expressed thoughts of the powerful historian. To this labour Napoleon added another. Feeling the inconvenience of not knowing English, he determined to learn it with the assistance of M. de Las Cases. His mighty genius found great difficulty in learning languages, for though endowed with a most correct memory for events he had none for words. This did not prevent his making the attempt, and he soon began to read, but not to speak, English. These different occupations caused M. de Las Cases to be frequently alone with Napoleon, which excited no little jealousy in that small colony, where it would seem that unity of misfortune should have produced unity of feeling. General Gourgaud had given proofs of extraordinary devotedness to Napoleon, but all his good qualities were spoiled by an overweening pride and never-ending jealousy. Having been with Napoleon in his last campaigns, he considered he had an exclusive right to assist him in his military narrations, and was deeply hurt at seeing that M. de Las Cases was his master's habitual confidant. However, each was to have his turn, and when the concluding period of the Empire became the subject of dictation, General Gourgaud being better acquainted with that period, he enjoyed the privilege of long private interviews with his master. Being as impetuous as courageous, he was unable to control his feelings, and in that limited circle, where the slightest impulse was necessarily perceptible, he became the frequent cause of quarrels and annoyance. These disputes added greatly to the inconveniences suffered by Napoleon. He endeavoured to restrain this ill feeling, which he perceived even when efforts were made to conceal it from him, by employing his authority to repress the impetuosity of General Gourgaud, and by soothing the wounded sensibility of M. de Las Cases, a reserved and somewhat morose man. "What!" he said, addressing all, "have we not unhappiness enough? Must

we add to it by our own fault? If the consideration of what you owe each other does not suffice to restrain you, think of what you owe to me. Do you not see the pain that your dissensions cause me? When you return to Europe, which will be soon, for I have not long to live, your greatest glory will be that you have been my companions on this rock. You will not then acknowledge the disunion that exists among you; you will speak of your friendship and call yourselves *brothers in Saint-Helena*: if this must be done some time, why not begin now, as well for your own dignity as for my peace and happiness?"

Notwithstanding the constant guard kept over the poor exiles, they sometimes went into the town, under various pretences, but in reality to learn some account of the exterior world. They rode in, accompanied by a guard, to whom giving their horses in charge, they got a little more liberty, by which they profited to procure some communication with Europe. The proprietor of Briars, being appointed purveyor to Longwood, often aided their correspondence,—very harmless correspondence, indeed, as it was confined almost exclusively to communications on domestic subjects, and the most culpable not going further than denouncing the cruelty of the British Government to the European public. They should have confined themselves to such harmless correspondence, and not do any thing to arouse the suspicious spirit of Sir Hudson Lowe. M. de Las Cases wrote a detailed account of their sufferings at Saint-Helena on a piece of silk, as being most convenient to conceal, and intrusted it to a servant who was about returning to Europe. This was discovered, either through the treachery of the servant or the closeness of the search. M. de Las Cases, who had given particular offence to Sir Hudson Lowe, was condemned, in virtue of the established regulations, to leave Saint-Helena. An armed guard seized both him and his, and took them to James Town. Sir Hudson announced to M. de Las Cases that, having infringed the regulations forbidding clandestine communications, he should be conducted to the Cape and thence to Europe. There was no choice but to submit to this absolute master. M. de Las Cases' papers were examined, and among them were found the journal he had kept of his conversations with Napoleon, and the manuscript of the Italian campaigns. Both were detained provisionally.

Napoleon was greatly irritated by this violation of his privacy, and the loss of so respectable and so useful a man as M. de Las Cases. He demanded the manuscript of the Italian campaigns, which was given to him, and complained bitterly of M. de Las Cases' being removed for the commission of an act so natural and so innocent as the expression of pain at miseries he suffered, and when it was evident there was no idea of attempting an escape, as nothing of the kind was alluded to in the papers that had been seized. As there was not at that time a vessel ready to sail, M. de Las Cases was detained in the island, but forbidden all communication with Longwood. This delay gave Sir Hudson Lowe time to reflect that M. de Las Cases could do him and the English ministers more hurt in Europe than in Saint-Helena, as once free he could make

the voice of misfortune be heard, and he would command attention even in the French Parliament. He offered M. de Las Cases to allow him to return to Longwood to settle that he would profit by his month's seclusion, and make no attempt at correspondence in future. The same reflections had suggested themselves to M. de Las Cases. He considered that by denouncing the treatment which the exiles were subjected to, he might be more useful to Napoleon in Europe than at Saint-Helena. Feeling, also, somewhat anxious for the health of his son, who was suffering from the tropical climate, he declined Sir Hudson Lowe's offer. He could not get permission to see Napoleon except in presence of witnesses, to which he would not agree; but he let his son know the motives of his determination, and he sent him some things he had in his pocket, embarked toward the end of December 1817, having been eighteen months with Napoleon, twelve of which he passed in Saint-Helena.

Napoleon was very much affected by the departure of M. de Las Cases. Of all the companions of his exile he possessed the most varied information, and, besides being so useful from his knowledge of English laws, was of a gentle disposition, though somewhat sensitive. Although Napoleon was anxious that M. de Las Cases had been principally influenced in forming his resolution by the idea of denouncing to Europe the treatment adopted by the exiles, he also felt that anxiety for his own health and especially for his son's, had some part in his determination, and therefore the suspicions of the governor, the evils of the climate, or domestic duties would greatly reduce the number of those who had aided him and afforded him some society in his terrible solitude. Marchand, his valet, who read well and wrote rapidly, a sensible prudent man, most touchingly devoted to his master, and gradually becoming rather more than servant, was the most frequent witness of those exclamations that burst from a suffering soul and which seem addressed to his alone. "If this continues," said Napoleon, with a sigh, "Marchand and I will soon be left alone." Then, turning to his valet, he said, "You will read to me, and write and dictate, and, having closed my eyes, you will return to Europe to enjoy the company as I shall secure you."

The 1st of January, 1817, gave occasion to a little domestic fête. Napoleon's friends hastened to pay their respects as eagerly as when at the Tuileries, anxious to show him, though proscribed and in chains, he was still for them the Emperor Napoleon. There was no display of pride, as at Paris, but the outpourings of affection, of a repentant and humbled heart, became communicative in proportion to its sorrows. Madame Bernadotte and Madame Montholon, with their husbands and children, and General Gourgaud, came, followed by Marchand and the servants who had accompanied their master to St. Helena, to offer their wishes for his happiness on the first day of the year. Alas! what happiness could they wish him? That his life on that rock might not become insupportable; that his health might not decline too rapidly; that some symptoms then beginning to show them-

lives might not lead to too great an excess of suffering; for none would venture to hope, much less to speak of seeing him again on the throne of France, or even free in America. Napoleon was sadder than usual, both because of the memories awakened by the day, and the departure of M. de Las Cases. He received his companions with affability, and with what was for him unusual emotion, and thanked them, in the most expressive manner, for their devotion to him. It had always given him pleasure to make presents, and he now occasionally drew from the wreck of his fortune what Marchand had saved, some testimony of gratitude for those who had done him a service. From these he now selected some gifts to bestow on the children he loved, or on their parents,—gifts that became to them most precious memorials. When this affecting scene had ended, the day being fine, he breakfasted with his friends under the tent erected by Admiral Malcolm, and which afforded the only shade he could enjoy at Longwood. Here was passed the greater part of the day, when the beauty of the weather, the attentions and affectionate conversation of his friends, seemed gradually to disperse the cloud that hung upon Napoleon's brow. France was the theme, and the brilliant past; but none spoke of the Present, though some ventured to mention the Future, a subject that was usually avoided, for, however profoundly meditated on, it presented no prospect but a prison! Still, some hope was beginning to dawn, owing to the prospect of ministerial changes in England. It was evident from the tone of the journals that a reaction had taken place, and that the public mind was recovering from the excitement of 1815, that more liberal ideas had begun to prevail, and that the hatred against France diminished in proportion as these ideas gained ground. Lord Castlereagh's ministry had been violently attacked; the Opposition had called Lord Bathurst to account for his cruelty to the prisoner of Saint-Helena, and there was every probability of an immediate change in the English cabinet. Their expectations did not go so far as to hope that a new minister would allow Napoleon to assume any important part in the world, but his chains might be lightened, or he might be sent to some other island, or perhaps allowed to retire to America. This was not very likely, but so inclined is man to hope, that when probability fails he bases his expectations on chimeras! The day was, consequently, devoted to dreams of a better future, and the company separated at night with lighter hearts.

The year 1817 was even more mournful than the preceding, and the coming years seemed to offer no better prospect, for, in a captivity to which death alone seemed to promise a termination, despondency must naturally increase with time. Napoleon had altogether given up riding, which was so necessary to his health. The space of three or four leagues, in which he was allowed to ride unguarded, seemed, from custom, to be as confined as the enclosure within the walls of a prison. Having, in his rides to a greater distance, occasionally been altogether lost sight of by the officer on guard, the latter told him that he had received orders to keep closer to his person, which led to Napoleon's entire abandonment of that mode of exercise.

For two months he did not go out, except for a short walk. He had been in the habit of receiving English or Dutch travellers returning from India, and who had asked the Grand Marshal Bertrand to be allowed the honour of paying their respects. Sir Hudson Lowe attempted to change this mode of proceeding, and Napoleon, seeing that the object was to make Longwood a prison, whose doors should open only at the will of his jailer, refused to receive any more visitors. This total seclusion, especially since M. de Las Cases' departure, had deprived him of all relaxation, and induced a mental lassitude, which, joined to physical inertness, would be sure to produce an immediate and injurious influence.

About this time there arrived three commissioners, appointed by the allied Powers to combine with Sir Hudson Lowe in guarding the prisoner of Saint-Helena. The allies had signed a document in approval of the proceedings of England, and conferring on her the charge of guarding Napoleon, but on condition that commissioners appointed by them should reside at Saint-Helena, to ascertain not only the continual presence of the prisoner, but the manner in which he was treated. Prussia, certain that England would take good care to secure her old enemy, and feeling little interest in the manner in which he was treated, did not send anybody. Russia, Austria, and France had each sent a commissioner. These men, shut up in an almost uninhabited island, had no prospect of compensation but in occasionally seeing and conversing with their illustrious prisoner. The French envoy, M. de Montchenu, an old royalist, a violent partisan, but not a bad man, was accustomed to say that the abominable French Revolution had been effected by men of talent, and that their leader, Napoleon, more talented and more wicked than the rest, was a demon that ought to be kept in an iron cage. He had no desire to visit him, but wished to ascertain, as frequently as possible, a visual certainty of his physical presence at Saint-Helena. M. de Stürmer, the Austrian envoy, was desirous of sending some interesting details to Prince Metternich, the most inquisitive man in Europe. The Russian envoy, M. de Balmain, who had been desired by Alexander to see that Napoleon was strictly guarded, but without unnecessary cruelty, was less anxious to see him than his colleagues, and often laughed at the anxiety of the Frenchman and the curiosity of the Austrian.

These commissioners were greatly disappointed on their arrival at Saint-Helena. Sir Hudson Lowe having announced at Longwood that they came accredited by the treaty of the 2d of August, 1815, Napoleon peremptorily refused to receive them in virtue of that title. As obstinate in adverse as in good fortune, he would not depart from the principle he had once laid down, that, having voluntarily surrendered to the English, he could not be considered a prisoner. He, consequently, declared that he would receive these gentlemen if they came as private individuals, but not if they presented themselves in virtue of the treaty of the 2d of August. This persistence is very much to be regretted, as, besides the recreation that the society of these commissioners would have afforded him, some details of his cap-

tivity might have become known at Vienna and Petersburg, and might have awakened a sense of shame in the Emperor Francis and touched the generous heart of Alexander. This idea had suggested itself to Sir Hudson Lowe, who immediately profited by the difficulty raised by Napoleon, and declared that the commissioners should not enter Longwood except as authorized by the above-mentioned treaty. This opinion was not shared by the three envoys, who were desirous of seeing Napoleon, no matter by what right, that they might assure themselves of his presence, and enjoy a society that would have been sought by everybody. But Sir Hudson Lowe, fearing that they would interfere in the mode of guarding the prisoners, would not agree to any accommodation: so they were compelled to remain at Saint-Helena without being admitted to Longwood. They rode occasionally round the buildings occupied by Napoleon, or took up their station at some opening of the road where they might hope to see him, but were compelled to content themselves with a distant view, or details received from others. They also acquired some information from Napoleon's companions. One of them had known Marshal Bertrand, another General Montholon and General Gourgaud. They received these at their houses, or went to Hut's Gate to visit Madame Bertrand. They thus acquired the certainty of the presence of the illustrious prisoner at Longwood, and let fall some information which, though very insignificant in their eyes, was of great importance to poor captives in a desert island two hundred leagues from their country. M. de Montholon, the most adroit of the residents at Longwood, possessed the art of engaging the commissioners in conversation, and often succeeded in extracting some interesting details from them. In the expectation of pleasing his hapless master or arousing his expiring hopes, he endeavoured to persuade him that the Russian envoy would inform the Emperor Alexander of the treatment to which he was subjected, or that public opinion would force a change of the Castle-reign ministry in England, and that from a new cabinet he might obtain permission to live free in America, or at least be permitted a change of residence.

Chance had also procured Napoleon a means of communicating with Europe through Dr. O'Meara, who had taken up his abode in the neighbourhood. Napoleon had not brought a doctor with him from France, but had met one on board the Bellerophon, who had succeeded in winning his favour. This was Dr. O'Meara, an intelligent, skilful man, and not as obstinate in the English mode of practising medicine as the greater number of his professional confrères. Napoleon, who did not feel confidence in any medical man but the illustrious Corvisart, whom he characterized as *the embodiment of experience* in a man of high intellect, generally refused every remedy, and would have nothing to do with those prescribed by English physicians. He listened, however, to Dr. O'Meara, whom he had taken into his service, laughed at his prescriptions, but often conversed with him on various subjects in French or Italian, or sent him to James Town to learn the news of the day. Sir Hudson

Lowe had not subjected Dr. O'Meara, who was an Englishman, to the same restraints with Napoleon as the other inhabitants of Longwood, because that he believed him to be as he was, incapable of betraying his trust, and that the utmost he would ever do would be some harmless politeness to O'Meara by skilful management got through his delicate office without betraying any, obliging Napoleon by the harmless compliance of procuring him some news from Europe serving Sir Hudson Lowe by the assurance of the presence of his prisoner, and the officer at Longwood could not always be and winning favour in London by communicating to the Prince Regent some details concerning Napoleon which, without being any breach of confidence, were most interesting to the curiosity of the prince.

The sea was visible from some points of the plateau of Longwood, and once a sail came in sight all were anxious to know what vessel it was, whence it came, who were on board, and what cargo it bore. Dr. O'Meara was immediately despatched to James Town, and returned with papers and sometimes with letters which had escaped the vigilance of Sir Hudson Lowe. Napoleon's captivity was sometimes lightened for a moment by the information he thus obtained. At one time he learned the escape of Drouot and the escape of Lavalette, of both of which he rejoiced greatly, at another he heard of the celebrated ordonnance of the 16th of September, which confirmed the pleasing hope that the violent party would soon be ground in Europe. He also received news from his family which affected him deeply. Some told him that his son was in good health and growing tall, others that his mother, his sister Pauline, and his brothers were anxious to join him at Saint-Helena, and that they placed their fortunes at his disposal. Napoleon was touched by these offers, but persisted in refusing them. Considering himself at Saint-Helena as one condemned to death, he would no more consent to his mother or sister being there than to their ascending the scaffold with him. Knowing that, with the exception of his mother and Cardinal Fesch, his relatives had scarcely sufficient for themselves, and having four or five millions secretly deposited with M. Lafitte, he would not consent to be a burden to them. He had no longer any means to draw upon this private deposit, as Sir Hudson Lowe had ceased to torment him about his domestic expenses. He therefore assured his relatives that he felt much obliged by their offer, but could not accept it.

Notwithstanding his complete seclusion, Napoleon occasionally received some Englishmen, returning with the Indian fleet to Europe. This event, as we have mentioned, was always a source of festivity to the inhabitants of Saint-Helena, as these vessels, coming from so great a distance, took in fresh provisions at James Town, giving money or goods in exchange, and causing a momentary animation on this ocean-bound rock. Travellers of every grade—the better informed in particular—felt the greatest desire to see Napoleon. Men of high rank, magistrates, and men of learning, passengers on board the Indian fleet, took no notice of Sir Hudson Lowe's

can arrangements, but addressed themselves directly to Marshal Bertrand, to obtain the hour of an interview with Napoleon. Among these were Lord Amherst and several other distinguished persons. Napoleon received them, conversed with calmness, gentleness, and politeness, sometimes of India, sometimes of English affairs, but ever with a wonted superiority of intellect. The most distinguished of them asked could they take any passage for him to Europe, but he replied, with dignified resignation, "I give you no permission. Tell your ministers what you have seen: I am here on a rock, circumscribed even narrower limits than those prescribed by nature, and where I cannot ride,—I, who have spent my life on horseback. I dwell beneath a wooden roof, where I am sometimes oppressed by heat, sometimes seriously inconvenienced by a penetrating damp. If I leave the house, a pitiless jailer surrounds me with spies. I cannot write to my family or hear from them without taking this jailer into confidence. Two of my companions have been already removed, and God alone can tell whether the others will be left. If your ministry wished my death, it would have been more generous to give me a soldier's death, as they did to the illustrious Ney. If they do not desire my death, let them give me air and space for exercise. They need not fear my attempting to escape. I know there is no place for me in the world, and that I must die in your hands. But the question is, am I to be tortured whilst in them? I ask for nothing; let those who see my position make it known if their feelings bid them. I do not ask them to do so."

The despondency with which Napoleon spoke of himself was justified by the state he was in.

Those who saw him were struck by the great change in his countenance; and though not near death, it was evident that it could not be very remote. He had entirely given up riding, disgusted by the restrictions to which he was subjected. Although summer commenced about the end of 1817, he passed six months without mounting his horse. Dr. O'Meara told him that this giving up of his habitual exercise would be fatal. "So much the better," he said; "the end will come the sooner." He began to feel a dull pain in the right side, and O'Meara told him he required exercise. "Yes," he said, "a ride of ten or twelve leagues would do me good, but how is it to be had on this rock?" He had always liked a prolonged bath. He indulged in this practice now more than ever, as it relieved the pain from which he suffered. He would remain for hours in a warm bath, and then go to bed. The result was that he became visibly weaker. Though depressed, his mind neither lost its strength nor vivacity; but his body became daily weaker, and he said to those around him, "You see now that it was not my body but my mind that was of iron."

Sir Hudson Lowe, fearing that this rapid decline of Napoleon's health would be attributed to him, became very anxious. Many persons in England had complained of the manner in which the captive at St. Helena was treated, and he did not wish to furnish grounds for such accusations. Not daring to allow him to ride unguarded, he thought that a change

of residence would be a certain remedy, particularly as the buildings at Longwood, being formed of earth and wood, were falling into decay. Plantation House would have suited the prisoner in every way, but this the governor determined to keep for his family, and build another for Napoleon. Lord Bathurst had given him permission to do so, provided that the new residence should not be too expensive. Whether it was that the price of ground in the neighbourhood of Plantation House was too dear, or that the plateau of Longwood afforded greater facilities for observing the prisoner's movements, Sir Hudson Lowe determined to choose that locality for Napoleon's new residence, merely selecting some spot near the peak of Diana, where the southeast wind would have less influence. He informed Napoleon of his intention, and submitted various plans for his approval. Napoleon replied that any residence in that part of the island would be fatal to his health; that it would require three or four years to complete the building, at the end of which time he would have more need of a tomb than of a house; that he would have the inconvenience of being surrounded by workmen, without being able to profit by their labour, and that if it were his taste that was to be consulted, he declared he had no desire for a new house, the one he had being quite good enough to die in.

This reply did not deter Sir Hudson Lowe, who commenced building on the most sheltered part of the plateau of Longwood, taking care, however, that a high wall of turf should prevent the progress of the work from being offensive to the senses of the exiles.

The 1st of January, 1818, was sadder than the preceding anniversaries, particularly than the New Year's day of 1817, though that had been clouded by the departure of M. de Las Cases. Napoleon exerted himself less, and, ceasing to dictate to his companions, left the care of his glory to posterity. "What advantage can there be," he said, "in giving these memoirs to posterity that will sit in judgment on us all? We are only litigants who fatigue their judge. Posterity will appreciate these events better than we. The truth will be divined without any trouble on our part." Napoleon dictated less now, but read more. His lively perception of the beautiful, refined by time and suffering, afforded him a delicious enjoyment in the master-works of the human intellect. He spoke less now, of an evening, of the events of his own life than of the subjects of his studies; sometimes reading aloud to his companions passages from the great writers of all ages, which he enunciated with an accentuation that proved how fully he appreciated his authors.

He frequently read the Holy Scriptures, whose sublimity captivated him; but of all the authors of antiquity Homer was his favourite. He considered him sublime and true to nature, feeling a particular charm in the contrast between the refined and elevated sentiments, the frequently noble characters of the Iliad, and their manners, simple even to grossness, saying that the costume was of little consequence, provided the man was a reality, the type of every age, of every land. What particularly charmed him in Homer was the union of

grandeur of sentiment with perfect truthfulness. "Homer," he said, "saw and acted for himself. Virgil was but a college professor, who did neither the one nor the other." This harsh opinion of Virgil was the result of Napoleon's not possessing sufficient knowledge of Latin to appreciate the delicious language of the poet of Ausonia, and of his admiration for grand and striking descriptions, less frequent in Virgil than in Homer.

Among modern writers he preferred the dramatists. He did not admire vagueness, or a mingling of the tragic and comic. He despised what we call the drama, which he designated the *tragedy of waiting-maids*. He praised the dignity of Corneille, the eloquence of feeling in Racine, and the truly comic in Molière. He thought little of Voltaire as a dramatist, but esteemed him highly as a prose writer, both as to matter and style. Highly sensitive to the graces of style, but always desirous of solid information, he read Madame de Sévigné with great pleasure, but said that after having read her letters with delight he found that he had gained nothing. He considered that history, with the exception of memoirs, was badly written in France,—an inferiority he attributed to literary men being kept in ignorance of public affairs. He often spoke of the difficulty of historic composition, which he had often practised himself, and said, speaking of the history of France, "There is no medium: it should be written in two volumes or in a hundred."

In proportion as weariness and inaction injured Napoleon's health and brought death nearer, the more frequently did he speak of philosophy and religion. "God," he said, "is present everywhere in the universe, and blind and dull must be the eyes that cannot find him there. For me, he lives in all nature; I feel myself beneath his all-powerful hand; nor do I wish to deny his existence, for I do not regard him with dread. I believe him to be as merciful as he is powerful, and I am convinced that when we return to his paternal bosom, that we shall there find the presentiments of human conscience verified, and that what truly enlightened minds have here declared to be good or evil will find the same judgment there. I do not speak of the errors of nations, for the mistake of one is never that of another; but that what the great minds of all countries have declared to be good or ill will be found to be such with God. I feel no doubt on this subject, and, despite my faults, I feel confidence in approaching the throne of Sovereign Justice. I feel less confidence when I come to consider the different forms of religion. There I everywhere meet the hand of man, which often repels and shocks me. But one must not yield to such a feeling, which savours greatly of human pride. If, on putting aside those national traditions with which every people has encumbered religion, we still find the idea of God's providence fully expressed, and the difference between good and evil clearly recognised, we have all that is essential. I have visited mosques and seen men kneeling before the Eternal Power; and though the manner was repugnant to my national customs, I could see nothing ridiculous in the form. Calumny has misrepresented my actions, and said I pro-

fessed Islamism at Cairo, whilst at the same time in Paris I affected to be a Catholic. There is some truth in it; for even in moments that which awakened a feeling of respect in my mind, and, though not impressed on Catholic churches, midst which my faith was passed, I there saw man kneeling in humble acknowledgment of his weakness before the majesty of God. Every religion that not heathen has a claim on our respect, and as Christians we have the advantage of being members of a creed derived from the pure sources of morality. If all are desirous of respect, how much more ought we to respect our own, and each ought to live and die in the faith which his mother taught him to acknowledge."

"Religion forms a part of our duty. Together with the soil, laws, and customs, it constitutes the sacred whole which we call France, and whose interests we should never desert. When, at the time of the Convention, some old Revolutionists spoke to me of making France Protestant, I felt as much revolted as though they had asked me to abdicate myself of Frenchman and declare myself English or German."

These elevated subjects leading to the consideration of certain moral questions, Napoleon spoke of what was called his *fatalism*. "Calumny," he said, "has caricatured that word as my other opinions. I have been represented as a kind of stupid Mussulman, and said that every thing was decreed on high, and that we would neither turn aside from a precipice nor avoid a horse at full gallop, because of the conviction that life or death was not in our own hands, but depended on an inflexible and unyielding destiny. If that were the case, we might lie in bed all his life, expecting that Providence would put food into his mouth. Such opinions would be very inconsistent with the great efforts I have made—often, indeed, with little success—during my long war to establish the pre-eminence of human intelligence over chance. I, in common with every rational man, believe that we are destined with our own fate on earth; that it is better to right and duty to improve it as far as we can, nor relax our efforts until we find them availing. It is then only that we must not act, and resign ourselves to a fate that could be averted. Precaution is quite useless on a battle-field: every spot is equally dangerous. I have seen men leave what they considered a dangerous position, and seen them struck down just as they arrived at what they hoped to be a place of safety. A soldier's anxiety about his safety during battle leads only to the loss of presence of mind and courage, which in any way lessening the danger. It is better to resign himself to the chances of the position, and think no more of the projectiles flying through the air than of the wind that blows his hair. It is then that a man is most courageous, cool, intelligent, and, being calm, his perception is unclouded. Such is the theory of my fatalism, and what I sought to impress on my soldiers in language suited to their capacity, when I assured them that their fate was decided on high, that, since cowardice could bring no advantage, they might as well secure themselves the reputation of bravery, precepts which I strengthened by wearing an

on brow, to which every eye was directed, of indifference, which ultimately became fatal. This was the fatalism of the soldier as a general I certainly adopted a system; and I think that I may say with vanity that no commander has ever used his intelligence and exerted his will than I in my campaigns. You perceive can justify the opinions I hold, since they are based on true and practical knowledge."

Napoleon was subjected to very great annoyances during 1818. We have already mentioned General Gourgaud was a very irritable man. M. de Las Cases being gone, his jealousy was now entirely directed against General Montholon, whom at this period Napoleon loved more frequently than the others in the garrison under his dictation. This misunderstanding was increased by other causes. Both Montholon and Bertrand families contributed in a great degree to alleviate the captivity of the august prisoner. But they differed much in disposition, and held opposite views on many subjects interesting to the colony. The Montholons were intelligent, reformed, gentle, and accustomed to society, and considered that instead of irritating Sir Hudson Lowe by always suspecting him of intentions, it would be of more advantage to do for whom they had sacrificed themselves, to endeavour to mollify Sir Hudson by making his proceedings more gently. The Bertrands, who lived apart at Hutt's Gate, were more irritable, and considered it a point of honour to profess an abiding opposition to the tyranny of the jailer of St. Helena. It did not only to difference of opinion, but to conduct, in the two families, which would have been of very little consequence but for the interference of General Gourgaud. Things went so far that the consequences might have been serious between Generals Gourgaud and Montholon, had not Napoleon interfered and averted an outbreak that would have led to most deplorable results in the land of exile. He was greatly displeased, and, interposing his authority, obliged the two soldiers to abandon quarrel. His greatest displeasure was directed against General Gourgaud, who was in fault, and who expressed a wish to leave St. Helena. Napoleon gave him his choice. "I prefer being alone," he said, "to being tormented in my misery by such insensibility." He saw General Gourgaud very rarely during the remainder of his stay at Longwood, but remembering his former devotion, he gave him invaluable proofs of his regard when he came to take leave. General Gourgaud took with him from St. Helena the narrative of the campaign of 1815, and shed it as his own on his return to Europe. The same work, revised and acknowledged by Napoleon, has been published in a collection of writings. It is fortunate that both have been preserved, for, though they agree perfectly in all essential points, each contains details wanting in the other, and which explain many events of this memorable campaign.

At this same time Napoleon was deprived of his friends, whose loss affected him still more. Admiral Malcolm, whose conduct had been such that a man might do a great deal to avert the fate of the illustrious prisoner

without infringement of duty, was removed from the command of the seas around the Cape. His intimacy with Napoleon had been disagreeable to Sir Hudson Lowe, who feared that the admiral's conduct might be regarded as a condemnation of his own.

His place was supplied by Admiral Plampin, a man of frigid temperament, with very little desire to visit Longwood. Napoleon parted from Admiral Malcolm as from a friend.

This loss was succeeded by another, which, though not so painful to Napoleon's feelings, caused a disagreeable change in his habits. He had become accustomed, not only to English medicines, but to Dr. O'Meara, who brought him news, and gave him a correct account of the contents of the English journals, in which he felt the greatest interest, as his last ray of hope lay in the prospect of a change in the English ministry. Sir Hudson Lowe, having discovered that Dr. O'Meara was in the habit of taking news to Longwood, required that he should inform him of the subject of his conversations with Napoleon. Dr. O'Meara refused, saying that, as a true and loyal Englishman, he would tell any thing he should hear connected with an attempt to escape, but that as a physician he could not betray what his patient had confided to him. This irritated Sir Hudson Lowe, who ordered that Dr. O'Meara should be subjected to the same restrictions as the Frenchmen attached to Napoleon's service, that especially of being followed by a guard whenever he left the precincts of Longwood. Napoleon asserted that his doctor ought to be attached to him personally, and that, if the physician could conserve his liberty only as the dependant of the governor, he would resign him altogether. This led to a long dispute, during which many little incidents occurred. Dr. O'Meara was alternately removed, restored, again removed from Napoleon, and finally, with a great deal of rough treatment, sent back to Europe.

Napoleon was now without a physician, which in itself he did not esteem a great privation. "The human frame," he said, "is a watch which the watchmaker cannot open and repair. Doctors introduce curiously formed instruments, but they cannot see what they do, and it is only by a miracle that they serve the poor machine." This prejudice was strengthened by the unsuccessful attempts that had been made to remove his own disease. He found no relief but from exercise, and some draughts suggested by himself. He thought at first that the tropical climate had given him a disease of the liver. His usual sagacity soon led him to conclude that his malady was in the stomach, which was confirmed by remembering that his father had died of a disease of that organ. This was further confirmed by several fits of vomiting with which he was seized at this time, and he considered himself a better physician than any of those at St. Helena. He had too much good sense, however, not to feel a certain confidence in a science that had been practised for ages, and, having indulged in some invectives against mediocre physicians, admitted that it would do him good if he could consult some intelligent man of great experience. He often said, "I have no faith in medicine, but I have in Corvisart. As I cannot have him, I desire to be left in peace."

As it was generally known on the island that Napoleon's health was declining, Sir Hudson Lowe became alarmed at the responsibility he had assumed in removing Dr. O'Meara, which induced him to offer the services of Dr. Baxter, of the English Navy, a man very generally esteemed. But this doctor was refused by Napoleon, who felt a distrust of the man esteemed by Sir Hudson Lowe. Besides having incurred the responsibility of having deprived Napoleon of a physician at a time that his health was declining, he had lost the testimony of a person whom he could trust to assure him of the presence of the prisoner. This had become more difficult since Napoleon had adopted the habit of sometimes remaining for eight days without leaving the house, which often compelled the officer on guard to remain waiting for hours for an opportunity to see him. Sir Hudson Lowe had thus caused great inconvenience to himself by removing Dr. O'Meara. He had several conversations on this subject with M. de Montholon. "What can I do?" he said. "If I yield, I shall be accused in Europe of having succumbed to an ascendancy that none has been able to resist; and if I do not, you will accuse me of barbarity."

"The precautions you have taken to prevent an escape," replied M. de Montholon, "of which he is not dreaming, are most irksome to Napoleon, and are the cause of the seclusion in which he persists in living. The more precautions you take, the more retired he will live, which, by injuring his health still more, will but subject you to a moral responsibility both at present and before the tribunal of posterity. You wish to obtain, at any cost, the daily proof of his presence at Longwood. Dr. O'Meara should not have been removed. Since you have deprived yourself of his services, you must trust to me and my desire to facilitate the accomplishment of your duty and our own. If you attempt force, you will find us in front of Napoleon's door, and your blood and ours will expiate the intended insult. It is therefore that I request you to count on me for procuring your officer the means of seeing his prisoner without giving offence." The result was that the officer, being informed by M. de Montholon of when Napoleon was about to pass from one room to another, hastened to see him, and thus the thoughtfulness of an intelligent and faithful servant prevented the most deplorable disputes.

Napoleon, persisting in remaining within-doors, and taking very long baths to relieve the pain in his right side, became rapidly weaker. His legs swelled, and his extremities became subject to a continuous chill, which could only be removed by long-continued external warm applications. His pulse had always been very slow, (scarcely amounting to fifty-five beats in his ordinary health,) which showed that there must be some difficulty in the circulation. The celebrated Corvisart had, with his rare medical perspicacity, foretold to Napoleon that should he ever abandon an active life he would suffer severely, for his circulation would become still lower, and cause such results as swelling of the legs, cold feet, &c. Napoleon did not regret this fulfilment of the great physician's prophecy, but looked on the symptoms as the announcement of approaching lib-

erty. But, the instincts of nature still living, he yielded to the entreaties of M. Montholon and Bertrand, and rode occasionally. He was offered a small horse, which he accepted and rode on several occasions. It was near the close of 1818, and the commencement of summer in the southern islands, which procured Napoleon an unusual pleasure in his rides. This pleasure succeeded by some improvement in his health. In the January of 1819, he seemed thus recovered, his complexion became less pallid, his eyes less dull, and his legs no longer so much swollen. Marriat, who he had as a father, did not conceal this joy. "My son," said Napoleon, (he began to call him so about this time,) "your affection gives me pleasure, but do not deceive yourself; it but a last gleam of health. My great constitution is making a final effort, but it will succeed by a reaction. I shall be so, and you too. You will return to Europe, as far as depends on me you shall be long there."

There was also a moral cause for this momentary improvement. While in the state of weakness from which he was now recovered, he had almost entirely abandoned all occupation. He no longer thought of fighting campaigns. One might almost say that he was weary of life, and that he left to posterity the task of vindicating his fame. Some hundreds of volumes were spread around him in confusion: he sometimes took up one, sometimes another, but flung down each in turn, as he expressed to feel an interest in any. He expectedly met with some historic works pointing to the great captains of all ages, and read them with avidity. Though his education had been most excellent, he had but a very general idea of the history of Frederick, Louis Condé, Gustavus Adolphus, Caesar, Hannibal, Alexander. The lives of these men, written in detail, had the greatest charm for him. His physical strength was now almost recovered, and with it his intellectual powers. He felt himself equal to continuous attention, and was seized with a burning curiosity to learn the deeds of those celebrated commanders. His study had, of course, a charm for him that would not have for others. He found in it what others did not seek, and wished to see what progress his predecessors had made in the military art, and thence judge what advance he had made himself. He soon adopted wider views, and resolved to write the lives of illustrious commanders. He would present upon their actions—and where could a more competent judge be found?—he would write a history of the military art, at once brilliant and profound, that art which had been his passion and his glory, and which with the science of politics is the greatest that can engage the intelligence of man. It is strange, but most creditable to Napoleon's genius, that from this moment, charmed by the deeds of others, he abandoned the narrative of his own actions, of which he had recounted but a few, and devoted himself to the contemplation of the lives of the great commanders of ancient and modern times. He first turned his attention to Catinat, but, as he said, found him overrated by the philosophers. Then passing to Turven and

"We must," he said, "bow to merit." He felt the greatest admiration for Turenne. It came to him that he had read of these great men in books that treated of these subjects, and Sir Hudson Lowe, being informed of his new occupation, was very well pleased to find that he was not thinking of attempting an escape: he sought in the library, at Plantation House, every book connected with the history of the military art. He found some sent them to Longwood. Napoleon set to work with his wonted activity, and soon learned that was to be known of the lives of Frederick, Turenne, and Caesar. He also wished to study and write those of Condé, Prince Eugene, Marlborough, Gustavus Adolphus, and Alexander the Great among the ancients. Having finished these, he intended to turn to the life of minor note, if he lived long enough to accomplish the task. He still wanted books, especially a Polybius, which he was greatly annoyed at not possessing, as he wished to go to the fountain-head for his information concerning Hannibal, for whom he felt the greatest admiration. He had Caesar's Commentaries, which he thought that may be had everywhere, even the most deserted rock in the ocean. This he thought him to form a judgment of the great captain, and dictate to Marchand pages which will be immortal, both because of the greatness of the man and the greatness of the work he composed them.

Improvement apparent in his health at the beginning of 1819 did not continue. He was attacked with violent pains in the stomach, the greatest repugnance to food, and great difficulty in digesting it. He often threw up matter, and had once a long fainting-fit. There was a distinguished physician, Dr. Stokoe, on board the Conqueror, and he was brought to the illustrious patient, whose permission had not been asked, but who made no objection to him, as he was not an emissary of Sir Hudson Lowe. Napoleon received him very well, displayed his usual want of confidence in all medicine, more especially in the English. "It is my end," he said, "that is approaching, and my own soothing draughts are better than any thing you can order me." Dr. Stokoe repeated his visits several times, but the qualities that won him Napoleon's confidence lost him that of Sir Hudson Lowe, who soon forbade his visiting Longwood. A doctor had been sent for to Europe, as well as some servants, and a priest or two, as there was not one at Saint-Helena; so great was the want in this respect, that when one of Napoleon's servants died, the burial-rites were performed by a Protestant minister. Cardinal Fesch was requested to make a suitable selection. His connection with the different courts of Europe afforded him facilities for this purpose denied to the rest of his family.

Whilst awaiting these arrivals, Napoleon had to bear another parting, which pained him more than all the rest. Madame de Montholon, whose amiable disposition had largely contributed to soften the rigour of his captivity, found her health injured by the climate, and the English physicians declared that she had had disease of the liver for some time. She was anxious also about her children, and

it became absolutely necessary that she should leave. Napoleon wished M. de Montholon to accompany his wife, but he, seeing the state of his master's health, refused to leave him. Madame Montholon left with her children, but Napoleon felt that he must soon send the husband after the wife, and that Madame Bertrand would soon follow, as her children would also need a European education; she would probably be followed by her husband. He knew that however great the devotedness of his followers might be, it should yield to domestic duties; but he did not complain, only saying that he ought to die, if it were only to avoid being left alone. He saw death approach, but he felt neither fear nor regret.

Toward the end of the year 1819 Napoleon's disease resumed its slow but progressive course, and he returned to his solitary mode of life. It was with great difficulty that the officer on duty could see him, and Lord Bathurst's orders that his presence should be reported every day were no longer observed. He was often several days without seeing the captive, but considering that the constant visits of the servants to the sick-room, their eagerness and evident anxiety, could not be a plan to conceal an escape, he contented himself without getting further proof of his prisoner's presence. There was no need of fear, for had the doors of his prison been thrown open at this time, the utmost that his strength would have permitted would be to go outside the door for a little air. But Sir Hudson Lowe became embarrassed by the repeated orders of Lord Bathurst. He had recourse to an ingenious but rather undignified means of communicating with his prisoner. Letters for Napoleon had always been delivered through Marshal Bertrand; but Lord Bathurst, considering that this was treating him too much like a sovereign, ordered that all communications should be given to him personally. This affording a sure means of seeing Napoleon, Sir Hudson Lowe determined to profit by it. He sent to Longwood an officer on horseback, who behaved politely enough in other respects, but said he had a packet to deliver to Napoleon Bonaparte. He was sent to Marchand, who, aware of the customary forms, and fearing that there was some intention of violating them, told him that all communications intended for the Emperor Napoleon should be transmitted through the Grand Marshal Bertrand. The officer was dismissed in this fashion, and Marchand immediately told his master of what had occurred. Napoleon at once desired his servants to refuse admittance to all that should present themselves, and, fearing that force would be used, he took a resolution after the fashion of Charles XII.

"It is as good," he said, "to make a tragic end here in defence of our dignity as to die on a bed of sickness." He ordered his pistols to be loaded, and desired his servants to do the same, and it was resolved that whoever should force the Emperor's door should receive a bullet in his head.

Sir Hudson came himself, accompanied by his staff, sent for MM. Marchand and Montholon, spoke of his orders not being executed, and declared that whoever would resist should be sent to the Cape. He was told, in reply,

that no alteration could be made in the etiquette observed around the Emperor, and that it was not under existing circumstances that any want of respect should be shown him. Sir Hudson Lowe left in anger, declaring that the orders of the British Government should be executed by force. On the following day an officer with a strong escort presented himself, told the domestics that he had a message to deliver to *Napoleon Bonaparte*, and must be admitted. He was referred to Marchand, who told him to go to the Grand Marshal. Thus repulsed, he commenced to walk through the house, knocking at the doors, and at last approached that of the Emperor. Napoleon was quietly reading in his apartment, his pistols loaded near him, his entire household standing behind the door, ready, like him, to make a tragic end of their captivity in defending their master from this last humiliation. The officer passed from door to door, knocked at all, but, finding that none was opened, mounted his horse and returned to Plantation House without having accomplished his mission.

This was a fruitless and pitiful attempt directed against such a man as the prisoner of St. Helena, and a very heartless one, considering the state of his health. Napoleon was as revived by this scene as though he had again heard the roar of cannon, which had so often resounded in his ears. Sir Hudson Lowe did not venture to persevere, but confined himself to threats, which did not produce much impression after his late mishap.

About the same time, the end of the year 1819, the personages sent by Cardinal Fesch arrived at Saint-Helena. These were a young Italian doctor named Antomarchi, a man of great intelligence, little experience, and extreme presumption; a good old priest, the Abbé Buonavita, an old Mexican missionary, and a young priest, the Abbé Vignale, both very good men, but deficient in information and intelligence. With these came three or four servants to fill the vacancies in the Emperor's household. These new-comers spent some days in the town before coming to Longwood, and by accepting some attentions from Sir Hudson Lowe produced a rather unfavourable impression on their master, whose antipathy to the governor had become a real passion. But Napoleon soon forgave them, as he listened to the accounts they brought of his family, especially of his mother, his sister Pauline, and his brothers Lucien and Joseph. His mother and sister pressingly renewed their request to be allowed to come to St. Helena; Joseph and Lucien made a more agreeable proposition, that they should spend three years with him alternately. Napoleon was greatly touched by this offer, though his anticipation of an approaching death made it perfectly useless.

He had a conversation concerning his health with the young doctor, Antomarchi, and submitted to a minute inspection at his hands, but only smiled at his opinion, and told him, as he did all his doctors, that he would rather die of disease than of medicine. He desired him to visit the garrison hospital and observe what effect the climate produced on Europeans, saying that he might thus acquire some information that would be useful in his case. He then

had an interview with the two priests, whom he found to be both unpretending and sensible. "It is exactly such a selection," he said, "as I should expect from my Uncle Fesch, the same intelligence, the same docility. This doctor knows nothing, though he knows a great deal; my uncle gives unnecessary trouble when he consults a physician to me, who would not touch but Corvisart! I have had a long conversation with these two priests on religious matters, of what else is one to speak when one is near?—and that single interview has increased their powers. I wanted a man with whom I could speak of the duties of Christianity. He certainly could not compare me with more faith in God than I already, but he might have strengthened belief in some important points of Christian faith. It would be so agreeable to approach the tomb with full confidence in Catholic religion! But I cannot expect anything of this kind from my two priests. I can, however, celebrate mass for me."

There was a large dining-room at Longwood, which Napoleon did not use, as it was disputed between his friends he had dined alone, that he might now and then meet at table. But since Madame de Lon's departure he dined with Napoleon in one of the two rooms to which he was now confined. He had the large room converted into a chapel, where mass was celebrated every Sunday. He did not allow any person to attend, though he allowed those who did,—and these were a small number; and this mass, celebrated in the midst of the ocean, had for him an indescribable charm, awakening the memories of childhood. He would not reprove any person for neglecting religious duty, but would not suffer a word to be spoken on the subject. Antomarchi having made some remarks which displeased him, he reproved him, and said that for himself he did not know whether he had faith or not, that he feared of anybody, but that he would not want of respect toward the most sacred religion of the human race, and of the national faith both of the French and the English. These words were spoken with an intensity that forbade reply, especially as he was not accustomed to be contradicted at St. Helena. Napoleon added, to those present, "Do you know who will not go to mass? I do not. Mademoiselle Lenormand. It is better that mass is better than that."

The vessel that had brought the two priests had also brought several cases. Weak as Napoleon was, he wished to see the cases opened in his presence. He examined several volumes, he examined several cases, that he thought should be sent to a father. One of the cases was found to contain a portrait of the Duke de Reichstadt, and which had been painted by Eugene Delacroix. Napoleon seized it and gazed at it for a long time, and then he went to a part of his room where he could stand before his eyes. He then

the books, but complained much of not being able to read, as being the principal historian of the empire. He found several works on history. He read these eagerly, sometimes with pleasure, sometimes with anger, but never with them all with notes.

The state of his health became more alarming every day. Of all that Dr. Antomarchi had said, only one opinion impressed him, and that was, it agreed with Dr. O'Meara's, Dr. Antomarchi's, and his own, namely, that in his case exercise was absolutely indispensable, and the only remedy that could be used with any hope of success. It was the only remedy, indeed, which he had any confidence; but he still had the same repugnance to go out followed by an officer. Dr. Antomarchi said that riding was a good exercise, but not the only one, and that gardening would be quite as healthful. This was a real ray of light for Napoleon, and he secured him some moments of enjoyment, the first of his life.

He immediately adopted this new mode of exercise, compelling the entire colony to do the same. It was the commencement of the year 1820, and the weather was delightful. Napoleon desired that every body at Longwood should follow his example, rise at four, and finish with spades, set to work in the garden. Nobody was exempted from this service, not even the MM. Bertrand, Montholon, and Archambault, the Chinese, worked under his orders. His occupation gave universal pleasure, it relieved the weariness of the exiles, but even if it had been otherwise they would not have shunned the labour, since it was not only an amusement but an advantage to their master. A few days of this exercise made an evident improvement in his health, and again as at the end of the preceding year his decreasing pallor, the abated swelling of his legs, his slight increase of appetite and less frequent vomitings, gave hopes of an abiding improvement. For a long time past, Napoleon had laid aside his uniform, retaining only the white culotte and silk stockings. With these he wore a civilian's coat. This he now changed for the costume of a planter. Clad in a dress of some light white Indian material, a straw hat, and a stick in his hand, he directed the labours of his household with the air of an officer of engineers.

His first undertaking was to erect a turf embankment as a protection against the south-east wind, and this was soon sufficiently high to shelter the house and garden from this hateful wind. He then transplanted trees, —among others, some lemon-trees, and, above all, an oak, the tree he had so much longed to see again, and which is all that has survived of the garden cultivated by his glorious hands. As there was a deficiency of water, he had it brought from a reservoir that Sir Hudson Lowe had constructed at the foot of the peak of Diana. This water, being turned with great skill on the garden at Longwood, soon covered it with verdure, for in these burning climates, if heat and moisture combine, vegetation progresses rapidly. Napoleon's garden soon yielded vegetables, which it gave him great pleasure to see on his table. When Sir Hudson Lowe was informed of the new occupation of his

illustrious captive, he sent to offer him plants, instruments, and workmen. Napoleon accepted part of what the governor offered, and at the expiration of two months his garden, thanks to the exertions of his household, began to assume a new aspect, and his health and temper improved. He worked, and made the others work, from four in the morning until ten, when the heat became oppressive. They then breakfasted under a tent, he and his friends at one table, the servants at another. He afterward retired to rest for a while, bid the others do the same, and closed the day with reading and dictation.

These occupations were resumed with equal ardour next morning, and for the short time this improvement continued, he was gay, amiable, sometimes witty, sometimes learned. When some plant or insect attracted his attention, he would, occasionally, burst forth in the most lofty and eloquent reflections on God and creation. At other times he would give the most picturesque and piquante descriptions of physical truths derived from the observation of particular facts. A servant, digging in one of the canals cut for the purpose of irrigation, had injured the root of a yew, and when Marchand pointed out the injury, Napoleon said, "If you were hungry, and an agreeable repast were placed behind you, you would turn to gratify your appetite. This tree will do the same. Its roots, which have been uncovered on this side, will turn to the other, and the tree, after a momentary decline, will resume its former vigour."

This physical labour enabled him to resume his intellectual occupations, and his returning health was accompanied by a remarkable awakening of intelligence. He dictated the life of Cæsar about this period, or wrote numerous notes on contemporary works sent to him from Europe. He had already made some annotations on the works of M. de Pradt, and now at the commencement of 1820 he commenced his notes on a work on the Hundred Days, written by M. Fleury de Chaboulon, a well-intentioned young man, but who often spoke on subjects of which he was ignorant or did not understand. Napoleon had covered the pages of this work with notes most indulgent to the author, but replete with revelations most interesting to history. He was also engaged, but in a different spirit, by a work, possessing a different kind of importance, and written by General Rogniat, on the principles of war. General Rogniat had been a distinguished officer of engineers, but his military qualities were spoiled by an ill-judging and malevolent mind. His work, chimerical for the most part, showed but little good feeling toward the captive of St. Helena, whom he had once most submissively obeyed, but now calumniated without reserve. This book excited Napoleon's anger, though it caused him no anxiety as to his fame. "It would be something serious," he said, "if Frederick the Great were living, and criticized my campaigns; however, I should be able to answer him; but such persons," meaning Rogniat and some others, "cannot cause me any alarm." Although this was his estimation of General Rogniat, he did him the honour of replying to him by annotating his work, and thus secured

for the author an immortality he could not otherwise have obtained. Napoleon in these notes has traced, in a style of unprecedented clearness, precision, and strength, the principles of his art, even to their least details, together with some pages dedicated to the campaigns of the most celebrated commanders, a subject that had the greatest interest for him at the time. Never was a loftier or simpler style chosen to treat a great subject, for it was of Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Napoleon, and of their actions viewed on general principles of policy and war, that he treated. We may add that calumniating mediocrity was never punished more severely or by a nobler hand.

This was the last gleam of his genius, and, we may say, of his life. Having shown extraordinary activity during some months, he rapidly declined with the disappearance of the fine weather, and his health became worse than ever during the latter half of the year 1820. He again became sedentary, sad, indolent in body and mind, and had only time to finish the lives of Cæsar, Turenne, and Frederick. The fine weather returned with the last months of 1820, but made no improvement in his health. He no longer took exercise, his legs began to swell, his feet became cold, and the very sight of food was offensive to his stomach. From this time he no longer doubted of his approaching end, and, except that he regretted not having completed all that he had intended to write, he beheld the approach of death with pleasure.

He had never seriously thought of attempting an escape. The island was too closely guarded to allow the smallest boat to approach unperceived, and so constant was the watch kept over his person, that it would have been impossible for him to disappear for more than a few hours without being discovered, even though concealed in the most secret part of the island. It is not unlikely that his great dislike to the officer on guard arose from the consciousness of its being impossible for him to escape from his jailers. There is no doubt but that he considered escape next to impossible. A still stronger motive prevented him from thinking of it. Contemplating the existing state of things with the discrimination of a profound observer, he saw that though the world was not forgetful of his glory, it could very well do without him. This convinced him that he was forever excluded from active life. His only hope was to obtain another residence. Though he saw that public opinion in England was undergoing a change, he did not expect that the Whigs would soon come into office, nor did he suppose that they would restore him to liberty. Lord and Lady Holland had testified the liveliest interest in his welfare, and felt that the great captive might be kept in safety without causing him unnecessary torture. They had sent him presents of books, fruits, and wines, accompanied with sincere expressions of sympathy, which gave him the greater pleasure as they assured him that he was not the object of universal hatred. But there was a great difference between private sympathy and an important decision of Government. He had, therefore, no hope but from death, the sole comfort of the hopeless. Though the prospect of com-

pleting the writings he had commenced to make a prolongation of life endurable, furnish no motive for desiring extension, besides, what could a few additional pages to his fame? They would have been read to the few who could have appeared, but would not have added to the lustre of glory. Death had not for him the same has for others, and if there was more when a physical instinct awakened which some faint desire for life, still his soul viewed death as a friend that came to open the way of the hideous prison of Saint-Helena. His feeling was strengthened by other circumstances.

Although M. de Montholon had remained at Saint-Helena since the departure of the children, without showing the least wish to follow them, this self-sacrifice cost him forever, as the general would surely be obliged at length to consider the interest his family living without him in Europe. The Bertrands, too, who resided at one time from Longwood, and who, though depressed in spirits, were most assiduous in their duties, had several children, whose education could not be much longer neglected. M. Bertrand had respectfully informed Napoleon that this duty would soon oblige him to leave Saint-Helena. Though Napoleon could not blame this resolution, it pained him deeply. He saw that the Grand Marshal would not allow his wife to set out alone on a long voyage, and he requested him to accept of a *congé* for such time as circumstances would require. Although the Bertrands, from his temperament, and living at a distance from Longwood, had not afforded him so much consolation in his captivity as the Montholons, he still appreciated the noble position of the Grand Marshal and the high principles of his wife, and felt depressed at seeing that the little colony would soon be reduced to the chand alone. "You have no children to educate," he said to him: "you will remain close my eyes. You will read to me, you will write a few more pages, and then you will leave. But I see it is time that I should go."

The year 1821 came at last, that year that was to terminate the wondrous career of Napoleon. At the commencement of January his health improved, but only for a few days. "It is a respite," he said, "of a week or two, and then the disease will resume its course." He then dictated a few pages touching Cæsar to Marchand; they were the last he wrote. About the same time he saw the death of his sister Eliza announced in the papers. It pained him deeply. She was the first person of his family that had died since he had obtained the use of reason. "She has shown me the way," he said: "I must follow." The symptoms of his disease returned now with greater violence than ever. Napoleon's complexion became livid, his glance was expressive of as much power as ever, but his eyes were sunken, his legs swelled, his extremities became cold, and his stomach rejected every species of food, and these ejections were accompanied by a discharge of blackish matter. February brought no other change than an increased intensity of the symptoms. Not being able to digest any food, the sugar be-

did became weaker every day. He was tormented by intense thirst, and his pulse, once slow, beat with feverish rapidity. He wished for air, though he could not endure it when admitted. The light pained him, and he now never left the rooms in which were his two camp-beds, being removed occasionally from one to the other. He did not dictate any more, but had Homer read to him, and the account of Hannibal's war in Livy, not having been able to procure Polybius.

His health became still worse in March, and on the 17th, thinking that during a short drive he could breathe more freely, he was put into a carriage, but, when brought into the air, he very nearly fainted, and was borne back to the bed in which he was to die. "I am no longer," he said, "that proud Napoleon whom the world has so often seen on horseback. The Antonarchs who persecute me may set their minds at rest: I shall soon remove every cause of fear." Napoleon's faithful servants never left him. Montholon and Marchand remained day and night by his bedside, an attention for which he showed himself profoundly grateful. The Grand Marshal told him that neither he nor his wife would leave, and Napoleon thanked them warmly. The Grand Marshal asked permission for his wife to visit him. "I am not fit to be seen," he said. "I shall receive Madame Bertrand when I am better. Tell her that I thank her for the devotion that has kept her for six years in this desert."

In this desperate condition, no longer able to go out, seeing only his dearest friends, and unable to bear light or heat, he was become totally invisible to his jailer. The unfortunate Sir Hudson Lowe was seized with terror, as though so serious an illness, and the sadness depicted on every face at Longwood, were only a feint got up to conceal an attempt at escape. The officer on guard, who behaved most considerately, had no such suspicions, and endeavoured to reassure the governor by declaring that the illness was real, and that there was no necessity for tormenting the illustrious captive by an attempt to see him. This did not satisfy Sir Hudson Lowe, who found the commissioners as doubtful as himself. M. de Sturmer had been recalled by Austria, for it was evident that England would never allow her prey to escape, and the presence of an Austrian envoy would only render his country responsible to public opinion for the treatment inflicted on the son-in-law of Francis II. M. de Balmain had married a daughter of Sir Hudson Lowe, and, in general, adopted his opinions. M. de Montcheun, the French envoy, was most anxious to be assured of the presence of the prisoner, and wished for some means of solving the doubts he entertained. Impressed by these suspicions, Sir Hudson Lowe finally gave orders to an officer to force the door of the invalid's chamber if necessary, as fifteen days had elapsed since he had been seen. The officer on duty behaved with great delicacy, and told MM. Marchand and de Montholon of his embarrassment, assured them that he would not force Napoleon's door, but requested them to afford him an opportunity of seeing him. M. de Montholon, who did not consider, like the Grand Marshal, that these disputes compromised Napoleon's honour, came to an under-

standing with the officer. He placed him outside one of the windows, which he partially opened as the invalid was removed from one bed to another. The officer could distinguish his noble countenance, become pale and meagre under the influence of approaching death, and immediately wrote to the governor that it was not a fearful comedy that was being enacted at Longwood.

The unfortunate governor was no sooner delivered from one cause of fear than he was assailed by another. Having first apprehended an escape, he now reproached himself for allowing his prisoner to die without proper assistance. He insisted that a doctor of the island should attend with Dr. Antonmarchi, by which means he would have a daily witness of Napoleon's presence, an exact account of his illness, and a reply for those in Europe who would say that he had allowed the glorious invalid to die without medical aid. Dr. Antonmarchi, alarmed for his own responsibility, also desired that he should be assisted by one or two physicians. But Napoleon refused, not wishing to be tormented by remedies in whose success he had no confidence. There was, however, a doctor at St. Helena, belonging to the 20th regiment, who was universally esteemed. Napoleon yielded to the entreaties of his friends and consented to receive him, which he did with great politeness, but repeating what he had so often said when he spoke of his health, that it was a *lost battle*, affected to approve his advice, but did not follow it, wishing, as he said, to die in peace.

Having now reached the last days of April without any renewal of hope, or wishing for it, and considering his end as very near, he determined to make his will. He had still four millions, with the interest, in the hands of M. Lafitte, and some part of a sum of money confided to Prince Eugène. He had drawn two or three hundred thousand francs of the latter sum through the assistance of M. de Las Cases when he had returned to Europe. He still retained his reserve of 350,000 francs in gold which he had brought with him to St. Helena. This he distributed between M. de Montholon, the Grand Marshal, Marchand, and his other attendants, to enable them to return to Europe and supply their first expenses on arriving there. Of the four millions remaining in France, he left two to M. de Montholon to secure him a competency, 700 or 800,000 francs to the Bertrands, and about 500,000 to Marchand. He also gave the latter the diamond necklace of Queen Hortense, and appointed him executor in conjunction with MM. de Montholon and Bertrand, in acknowledgment of his undeviating fidelity. He left legacies to his other servants suited to their condition, endeavouring to secure a competency to all after his death. Though not very well pleased with Dr. Antonmarchi, but grateful for his attention, he left him 100,000 francs; nor did he forget the Abbé Vignale, the sole remaining priest at St. Helena. He even remembered the Chinese servants, who had served him faithfully. Having provided, as far as he could, for all, he collected any objects of value he possessed and left them by will as souvenirs to his son, his mother, his sisters and brothers. He did not forget the generous Lady Holland,

to whom he left one of his snuff-boxes. To these legacies he added some expressions of affection for Maria Louisa. He had learned to estimate this princess at her just value, but he wished to honour in her the mother of his son.

Napoleon devoted several days to making these arrangements and committing them to writing. His labour suffered frequent interruptions from pain and weariness. All was arranged at length, and with his usual love of order he had a legal document drawn up of the transfer of his will, and all that he possessed, to his testamentary executors, that there might be no cause of dispute after his death. He desired that the rites of the Catholic faith should be observed at his burial, and that the dining-room in which he was accustomed to hear mass should be converted into a *chapelle ardente*. Dr. Automarchi could not help smiling as he heard these orders given to the Abbé Vignale. Napoleon considered this as a want of respect to his authority, his genius, and his death. "Young man," he said, in a severe tone, "perhaps you are too clever to believe in God; I am not in that position: a man cannot become an atheist merely by wishing it." This severe lesson, spoken in terms worthy of a great man at the point of death, overwhelmed the young doctor with confusion; he made a thousand excuses, and made profession of the most satisfactory moral principles.

These preparations for death weakened Napoleon and, perhaps hastened his end. Still it was both a moral and physical relief to him to have arranged his affairs, and secured, as far as he could, the fate of his companions. Meeting death with a smile as dignified as it was grateful, he said to Montholon and Marchand, who never left him, "It would be a great pity not to die, now that I have arranged my affairs so well."

The end of April had arrived, and every moment increased his danger and suffering. He had no relief from the spasms, vomitings, fever, and burning thirst. Napoleon was relieved by occasionally drinking some drops of fresh water brought from the foot of the peak of Diana, the spot where he had wished to have a dwelling erected. "I wish," he said, "if it is possible, that I should be buried on the banks of the Seine, or at Ajaccio in my family domain, or, should my body be fated to continue a prisoner, at the foot of the fountain whose waters have afforded me some relief." This his friends promised with tears, for they no longer concealed from him a state he so well understood himself. "You will return to Europe," he said to those that surrounded him. "You will return bearing with you the reflection of my glory, with the honour of your own fidelity. You will be esteemed and happy. I go to meet Kleber, Desaix, Lannes, Massena, Bessières, Duroc, Ney! They will come to meet me. They will experience once more the intoxication of human glory. We shall speak of what we have done. We shall talk of our profession with Frederick, Turenne, Condé, Cæsar, and Hannibal." Then, pausing, Napoleon added, with a peculiar smile, "Unless there should be as great an objection in the upper spheres as there is here below to see a number of soldiers together." This bad-

nage, alternating with the moon, course, produced a profound sleep. On the 1st of May he awoke to commence, and he was in bed. On the 2d and 3d Napoleon had fever, and suffered from convulsions. Whenever his sufferings abated, he was as radiant as ever, and he spoke with calmness and serenity. During one of these intervals he dictated, under the title of *Reveries*, two notes on the defence of the case of an invasion. On the 4th he was delirious, and amid his ravings were distinguishable:—"My son, Desaix." It would seem as if he had a last vision of the battle of Marengo. The agony continued the entire of the 4th, and the advance of the hero was terribly slow. The weather was terrible: it was the 1st of Saint-Helena. Sudden gusts of wind, some of the planted trees. But there was no doubt but that the extraordinary life had dawned. All kneeling round his bed watched the flickerings of the vital flame. Fortunately attended with blither English officers, assembled with respectful interest to the servants gave of his agony. Toward the close of day, his life and suffering together; the cold extending from his limbs became general, and death seized his glorious victim. The countenance became calm and serene. About five, when the sun was low, waves of light, and the English, the signal for retiring, there perceived that the patient did not stir. They cried out that he was dead. They pressed his hands with kisses, and Marchand brought to Saint-Helena the Consul had worn at Marengo, his body, leaving only his noble head.

The convulsions of the death were so painful to witness, were so majestic tranquillity of expression so wondrously beautiful, now the slenderness of youth, and the firm mantle of Marengo, seemed to give to the witnesses of that touching mortal Bonaparte in the meridian of his life.

The governor and the French to feed their eyes on this spectacle all due respect in presence of a man was as extraordinary as the life he led.

During the six years that he had lived, Napoleon had expiated the fear of the world,—a fear that he who surrounded him with more or less of fear is cruel—in proportion more or less distant from the officers on guard, coming in contact with him, could not be interested in his welfare, and he fetters whenever they could. Sir not meeting him directly, was sometimes persecuting him through resentment, and sometimes a movement of pity when told of the prisoner. Lord Bathurst, and leagues' distance, not being the sufferings of his victim, was

of Europe, and acted most unmercifully. He left a sad legacy to his country; for, he compels us to admit that England ought to restrain Napoleon, it must also decide that she had no right either to glorify or humiliate him.

Obedience to Napoleon's instructions, his wounds opened, and from the examination it appears that cancer in the stomach was the principal cause of his death. The liver was fatally diseased, which shows that the Emperor had some, though not a determining, influence on his general health. There is no doubt of grief and suppressed despair, joined with a want of exercise, had accelerated the progress of the disease and shortened his life, but it would be impossible to say by how many years.

An inspection of his body revealed several things, some very slight and three very disfiguring. Of these three, one was in his head, the ring-finger of the left hand, and a swelling of the left thigh, the last a very deep wound resulting from a bayonet-thrust received at the siege of Toulon. Of these wounds the last alone can be historically interesting. From the measures taken and the description made of the body, it appears that Napoleon was five feet two inches (in measure), the body well proportioned, and hands remarkable for the regularity of form, the shoulders wide, the chest well developed, the neck a little short, but firmly and erect the largest and best head ever submitted to the investigation of science, and a countenance whose even death respected, of which his contemporaries have preserved an ineffaceable remembrance, and of which posterity will say, comparing it with busts from the antique, was one of the most beautiful that God ever made to manifest the workings of His life, so pregnant in action that it was to comprise centuries, did not last more than fifty-two years. MM. de Montholon and M. de La Harpe dressed him in the uniform he wore, that of the chasseurs of the Guard, and upon his puissant head the little hat he was accustomed to wear. A single priest, one of his few friends, prayed for some days beside the animate body. What a wonderful lesson to be derived from the termination of his career! It is presented by the profound solitude that attended the death-bed of the man that the Emperor had looked up to and flattered! To the honour of soldiers it must be recorded, as long as his coffin remained open the British troops defiled around. When, at last, the Emperor was to receive him was completed, which was situated near the fountain of St. Helena, the waters had afforded him some relief, and he was followed by the governor, the staff of the island, the soldiers of the garrison, and the crews of the naval squadron, bore him to the spot where he was to repose until, in accordance with his wishes, he was transported to the banks of the Seine. The English soldiers fired a salute of cannon over his inanimate body, and his companions in exile, having for a while beside the tomb that had just received the remains of the greatest man the world had seen since Cæsar and Charlemagne, decided to return to Europe. As a conclusion

to the many that may be derived from this tomb, we must add that the exiles from St. Helena were received with general interest even in England, whilst the unfortunate Hudson Lowe, who was merely the instrument of his Government, was met with coldness by his countrymen, with ingratitude by the ministers he had obeyed, and with embarrassment by his very friends. Eternal justice of Providence revealing itself here below! At Saint-Helena Napoleon expiated the misery he had caused the world, and those to whom it was allotted to punish him had to expiate the disrespect they had shown to glory and genius!

Before concluding this history, whose length will, we hope, be pardoned in consideration of the great events of which it treats, we must pronounce on him who is the subject of it the judgment of posterity, at least as far as it can be interpreted by a man, were he as just and enlightened as we do not pretend, but wish, to be.

Napoleon was endowed by nature with a clear, penetrating, vast, comprehensive, and peculiarly active mind; nor had he less decision of character than clearness of intellect. He always went directly and undeviatingly to his object. In reasoning he seized at once the decisive argument, in battle the most effective movement. To conceive, resolve, and perform were with him but one indivisible act. So wonderful was his rapidity that not a moment was spent in reflection between perception and action. Any obstacle presented to such a mind by a trifling objection, by indolence, weakness, or disaffection, served but to cause his anger to spring forth and cover you with its foam. Had he chosen some civil profession where success can only be attained by persuading men and winning them over, he might have endeavoured to subdue or moderate his fiery temperament, but flung into the career of arms, and endowed with the sovereign faculty of seeing the surest means of conquest at a glance, he became at once the ruler of Italy, at a second the master of the French Republic, at a third the sovereign of Europe. What wonder that a nature formed so impetuous by God, should become more so from success? what wonder if he were abrupt, violent, domineering, and unbending in his resolutions? If apart from the battle-field he exercised that tact so necessary in civil business, it was in the Council of State, though even there he decided questions with a sagacity and clearness of judgment that astonished and subdued his hearers, except on some few occasions when he was misled for a moment by passion, or want of sufficient knowledge of the subject under discussion. Both nature and circumstances combined to make him the most despotic and impetuous of men.

In contemplating his career, it does not appear that this fiery despotic nature revealed itself at once or altogether. In his youth he was lean, taciturn, and even sad, sad from concentrated ambition that feeds upon itself until it finds an outlet and attains the object of its desires. As a young man he was sometimes rude, morose, until, becoming the object of universal admiration, he became more open, calm, and communicative, lost the meagreness that made his countenance so expressive, and, as one may say, unfolded himself. Consul for

life, Emperor, conqueror at Marengo and Austerlitz, still exercising some little restraint on himself, he seemed to have reached the apogee of his moral existence, and his figure, then moderately stout, was radiant with regular and manly beauty. But soon, when nations submitted and sovereigns bowed before him, he was no longer restrained by respect for man, or even for nature. He dared, attempted, all things, spoke without restraint, was gay, familiar, and often intemperate in language, his moral and physical nature became more developed, nor did his extreme stoutness diminish his olympian beauty; his fuller countenance still preserved the eagle glance, and when descending from his accustomed height, from which he excited admiration, fear, and hatred, he became merry, familiar, and almost vulgar, he could resume his dignity in a moment, for he was able to descend without demeaning himself; and when at length, in advancing life, he is supposed to be less active or less daring, because of his increasing *embonpoint*, or because that fortune had ceased to smile on him, he bounds more impetuously than ever on his charger, and shows that for his ardent mind matter is no burden, misfortune no restraint.

Such were the successive developments of this extraordinary nature. It is not so easy to estimate Napoleon's moral qualities; for it is rather difficult to discover goodness in a soldier who was continually strewing the earth with dead, or friendship in a man who never knew an equal, or probity in a potentate in whose power were the riches of the universe. Still, though an exception to all ordinary rules, we may occasionally catch some traits of the moral physiognomy of this extraordinary man.

In all things, promptness was his distinctive characteristic. He would become angry, but would recover his calmness with wonderful facility, almost ashamed of his excitement, laughing at it if he could do so without compromising his dignity, and would again address, with affectionate words or gestures, the officer he had overpowered by his burst of passion. His anger was sometimes affected for the purpose of intimidating subalterns who neglected their duty. When real, his displeasure passed like a flash of lightning; when affected, it lasted as long as it was needed. When he was no longer obliged to command, restrain, or impel men, he became gentle, simple, and just, just as is every man of great mind that understands human nature, appreciates and pardons its weaknesses, because he knows they are inevitable. At Saint-Helena, deprived of all external prestige, his power departed, without any other ascendant over his companions than that derived from his intellect and disposition, Napoleon ruled them with absolute sway, won them by his unchanging amiability, and that to such a degree that, having feared him for the greater part of their lives, they ended by loving him for the remainder. On the battle-field he had acquired an insensibility that was almost fearful; he could behold, unmoved, the ground covered with a hundred thousand lifeless bodies, for none had ever caused so much human blood to flow as he. This insensibility was, so to speak, a consequence of his profession. Often would he in the evening ride over the battle-field which in the morning he

had strewn with all the banners that the wounded were removed, that might be the result of a not,—and frequently sprang to assure himself whether in a less body the vital spark did. At Wagram he saw a fine young uniform of the cuirassiers, lying with his face covered with dust, sprang at once from his horse, head of the wounded youth onto him by the aid of some spiritus said, smiling, "He will recover saved!" These are no proofs of

In every thing connected with almost avaricious, disputing at time, whilst he would give to friends, servants, or the poor. Ivered that a distinguished savant accompanied him to Egypt was in circumstances, he sent him a being him at the same time for him of his position. In 1813, he all his ready money, and heard of high birth, who had once he was in want of the very necess immediately appointed her a per francs, as much as 50,000 at the and being told that she was old of age, "Poor woman," he had paid four years in advance." I repeat, are no indications of wa of disposition.

Having but little time to de friendships, removed from the riority to other men, but still a ence of time and habit, he did be to some, so strongly attached a gent even to weakness to those it was the case with regard to his pretensions often provoked hi seeing them annoyed, he rel gratify them often did what I unwise. Although the admiral for the Empress Josephine past time, and though she had, by m acts, lowered herself in his ent entertained for her, even after most profound affection. He w but in secret, as though it were

As to his probity, we kno standard to estimate such a q who from the very commencement career had immense riches at When he became commander army in Italy, and was master of the country, he first exp abundantly, and then sent a army on the Rhine, reserving self, or at most only a sum chase a small house, Rue de la chase for which one year's sufficed; and had he died in I would have been left destitut result of pride, disdain of val or honesty? Perhaps there w in this forbearance, which w among our generals, though t then as it has ever been. B honesty with extreme severity, attributed to his love of order still better and seemed to indi cessed the quality himself, a

showed for honest people, carried take pleasure in their society and concealment of his feelings.

man, whom God had made so great, was not a virtuous man, for virtue in a fixed idea of duty, to which nations, all our desires, moral and just be subjected, and which could ease with one who, of all that ever east restraint upon his passions. lly deficient in what is abstractly as virtue, he possessed certain ies, particularly those of a warrior an. He was temperate, not prone gratifications, and if not exactly as not a libertine, never, except on ceremony, remained more than a at table, slept on a hard bed though tion was rather weak than strong, it even perceiving it, an amount of would have exhausted the most ldiers, and was capable of prodions when mentally occupied with undertaking. He did more than er, he seemed unconscious of its nd was ever to be found wherever ed to see, direct, or command. s character as a soldier; as a geneot inferior. Never had the cares ilitary command been borne with ss, vigour, or presence of mind. occasionally excited or angry, the knew him best said that all *was ell*. When the danger became was calm, mild, encouraging, not dd the excitement attendant on his to that which naturally arose from ances; he remained perfectly calm, uired by the habit of restraining s in great emergencies and calculatent of the danger, turning it aside umping over fortune. Formed ergencies and familiarized by habit cies of peril, he stood by in 1814, ator of the suicidal destruction of ver, a destruction achieved by his nd still he hoped, when all around ecause he perceived resources unanybody else, and under all vicising on the wings of genius above f circumstances, and with the re a self-judged mind, he accepted punishment of his faults.

our opinion, was this man, so self-contradicting, so many-sided. e principal traits of his character more prominent than the rest, it of moral intemperance. A prodigy ad passion, flung into the chaos of n, his nature unfolds, develops n; he masters that wild confusion, y his own presence, and displays audacity, and fickleness of that placed. Succeeding to men who othing, either in virtue or crime, r cruelly, surrounded by men who ant on their passions, he laid none y wished to convert the world into a republic, he would have it an endless monarchy; they turned into chaos, he formed an almost unity; they disorganized every re-established order; they defied

sovereigns, he dethroned them; they slaughtered men on the scaffold, he on the battle-field, where blood was shrouded in glory. He immolated more human beings than did any Asiatic conqueror, and within the narrow precincts of Europe, peopled with opposing nations, he conquered a greater space of territory than Tamerlane or Genghis Khan midst the deserts of Asia.

Absence of restraint is the essential feature of his career. Had not Alexander lived, we might say with justice that this great captain, this sage legislator and consummate ruler, was the most insensate of politicians. Did skill in politics depend solely on the amount of intelligence possessed by the individual, Napoleon would have surpassed the greatest statesmen that ever lived. But the skill of the politician is more the result of moral character than intellect, and that was the point in which Napoleon failed. While young, before he had subdued the world, he was compelled and resigned to encounter obstacles, and displayed as much tact, finesse, and patience as anybody could. When, in 1796, he went into Italy with a small army, finding it to his interest, he protected the priests, and conciliated the princes, despite all that the Parisian republicans might say. When he went to the East, when he had reason to dread the antipathy of the Mussulmans, he, heedless of the remarks of devotees at Paris, sought and succeeded completely in winning the Arab sheiks, by allowing them to hope he would become a convert to their faith. When, at a later period, he had to accomplish a very different task—the Concordat—he, by wonderful address and energy, succeeded in overcoming the prejudices of Rome, and, what was equally difficult, those of the philosophers. All that such a task needed of finesse, skill, constancy, and energy, he, as we have shown elsewhere, employed in such a manner as proves that he was deficient in no quality necessary to constitute a political genius. But at that time he was not master, and consequently checked the impetuosity of his disposition. When his power became supreme, he restrained himself no longer, and of the qualities of a political genius he only retained the smaller portion—intelligence—whilst the moral qualities had altogether disappeared.

We must, however, say, in his justification, that if politics are ever inopportune, it is in a time of revolution. When we speak of politics, we mean a slow development based on the past, combined with respect for what has gone before; when we mention revolution, we understand a sudden disruption from all that has existed. A true system of politics is the work of many generations, through which the design of attaining a certain end is transmitted, and which proceeds to its object with consistency, patience, and, if necessary, modesty, making perhaps a step or two in a century, but never seeking to reach the goal at a bound. This is such a work as Henry IV. undertook when he had suppressed the different parties at home, and sought to lessen the power of the houses of Spain and Austria, united as they were by blood and ambition, a scheme he transmitted to Richelieu, which Richelieu bequeathed to Mazarin, and Mazarin to Louis XIV., who pur-

sued it until he placed his grandson on the Spanish throne, and separated Spain forever from Austria; such a scheme as when in Prussia the great Elector laid the foundations of the military importance of his nation, carried on in the first instance by the Elector Frederick III., when he placed the crown on his head; then continued by Frederick William, who created an army and treasury to support his new title; and finally by Frederick the Great, who, when the crisis came, combining a determined daring with the slowness of political progress, struggled for twenty years against Europe, and eventually secured the greatness of Prussia, and changed a small electorate into one of the greatest monarchies on the continent.

It was no wonder, therefore, that Napoleon, who was both a despot and a revolutionist, could not be a diplomatist; for though he did prove himself one for a moment when he reconciled France with the Church, with Europe, and with herself, still his attempts against England, undertaken soon after the breaking of the Peace of Amiens, his project of universal monarchy after Austerlitz, the war in Spain, which he endeavoured to terminate in Moscow, and his refusal of peace at Prague, proved him worse than a bad politician, for it gave the world the sad spectacle of genius degenerated into folly. But we must admit that it was not he alone, but the principles of the French Revolution, that, raging within him, induced him to throw off the restraints of reason.

And yet this bad politician was a wise legislator, an excellent ruler, and one of the greatest captains the world ever saw. The turmoil of a revolution, so far from being an obstacle to the development of his character under these aspects, rather afforded aid and a field for display. To complete our task, we must estimate him in his different characters of legislator, administrator, and captain.

The real school in which Napoleon cultivated his talents for organization was war, than which there is none better, sterner, or more practical. To calculate the general movements of his army, and, having arrived on the battlefield, to fight successfully, is only half the duty of a great captain. To prepare his resources, that is, to recruit, drill, clothe, and arm his men, amid the incessant and violent movements of war, is the other half, both of which are so important that it would be difficult to say which is most so. In a word, to organize and fight are the two principal phases of their art for all true warriors. Inferior generals, such as the greater number unfortunately are, get their armies from their Governments, employ them in whatever state they find them, and can do no more than complain of their condition, without ever seeking to improve it. This was not the case with the young Bonaparte.

When he crossed the Alps with brave but famishing soldiers, his first care was to lay a discreet, just, and economical hand on the riches of Italy, to prevent rapine, and, having abundantly supplied his own army, to send assistance to that on the Rhine, which was to aid him in his designs. When he arrived in Egypt, where neglected resources were as plentiful as in Italy, he procured abundant provisions for his own army, while relieving

the country from the exactions of the Mamelukes and the incursions of the Bedouins. It was not possible to get supplies from the country in a few months had manufactured goods, own orders, powder, muskets, cannon, and all that was needed in that desert. One of the greatest inconveniences in Egypt was exposed was the laziness of the Bedouins, who would suddenly desert their cultivated lands, pillage them, and then suddenly disappear. One day that a caravan passing he stopped it a moment, ordered one, two, or three feet-soldiers to take their provisions and cartridges to market. "Now we are in the desert," he cried. "On the following day, a regiment of dromedaries, which could not with the swiftness of the Bedouins themselves, are some hundred tired foot-soldiers to guard them; and he thus cured the Arabs of their taste for pillage, at least for such time as the French remained in Egypt. A diplomatist and with his talent for organization comprehended what was needed, and he executed promptly and efficiently.

Placed at the head of the Government of France, he found every thing in confusion, and felt, even more than he had in Italy and Egypt, the necessity of restoring order, peace, and prosperity.

He did not feel any great anxiety about giving a political constitution to the country. The friends of liberty (and we are of the number) blame Napoleon for not having done so. Though holding the same general principle as these gentlemen, we believe that to be an error in this particular. It was well that Napoleon could establish a definite political organization, as the form of our government was destined still to vary many times during the tempest of revolutions, and France, sometimes inclined to adopt a despotic form, suffering from the excitement of liberty, sometimes turning to liberty when oppressed by excess of power, has been fluctuating for two quarters of a century between despotism and anarchy, like a much-disturbed pendulum; we can we yet say what form of government it will ultimately choose, though every thing seems to indicate that it will not be despotic. Napoleon, therefore, could not be the legislator of France in a political sense, though he might be, and in reality was, so in every other.

The policy that succeeded the disruption of the Revolution could not be that of *therapies* of reparation. The general desire was, bankruptcy, requisitions, confiscations, imprisonments, and sanguinary executions, to be succeeded by order in the finances, respect for persons and property, by victories and not compelled to support themselves by pillage; in a word, by peace and security. Napoleon, animated by a spirit of revenge, was quite equal to his part, and to the job wants. His wonderful activity permitting him to undertake many things at once, he, in the first instance, undertook to remodel the civil and military legislation, and the entire machinery of the administration. When we pretend to assert, for example, that he knew the Civil Code. To claim the right of intervention in such a sense would be the same

rit of having invented human
not a thing of yesterday, but
man's first appearance on our
had, before Napoleon's time,
aws, some borrowed from the
h as those that regulated con-
individuals, and which do not
or country, others dependent
oms, varying as these customs
ws relating to domestic con-
riage, inheritance, &c. The
r to be reproduced in a clear,
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lified according to the princi-
ality, which do not demand
ch men may differ in talents
r should possess an equality
es, or social rank, but rather
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eduties, corrected by the same
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at the children of the same
ve equal claims to his inheri-
t-owever, to the parent the
ing the most worthy, but with-
him to disinherit those whom
rtune not to love. On these
ery other, the French Revo-
o various impulses, oscillated
emeand the other. It became
a medium between the retro-
nwisely innovating tendencies
marriages, inheritance, wills,
possessed no more extensive
hat is acquired in a good mili-
he was born amid the great
ruths that may be misunder-
re fully explained, but which,
serve to throw light on every
day, MM. Portalis and Cam-
ove all, M. Tronchet, came to
that was to be discussed next
il of State; he reflected on it
hours, attended at the discus-
with his supreme good sense,
oint to be chosen between the
ler of things, and, what was
t the industry of all by his
ntributed in two ways to the
codes, by deciding where in-
stop, and by accelerating the
of the task. This work had
attempted before, but those
it, yielding to the prejudices
adopted exaggerated views,
erward regretted or were
finally gave up the task alto-
n took charge of the stranded
oat, and carried it into port.
the Civil Code, nor can any
is is the code of the modern

It was certainly a great and
for a young soldier to be able
ae to the civil organization of
nor was it less honourable to
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merit of originating the best
tion of modern States, France
ise of having framed, in the
best form of the social state.
ble partition of glory between
ilized nations of the world!

Whilst Napoleon was thus occupied with the
civil legislation, his expeditious and creative
hand was also applied to the administrative.
Finding the administration of the provinces in
the same state as that of the other parts of the
Government, he there, as in the amendment of
the civil legislation, selecting from the past
and the present what was excellent in both,
created the modern system of administration.
In former times, the provinces legislated for
themselves, and enjoyed, as far as local inter-
ests were concerned, almost unrestricted
power. The sovereign, either from respect to
the old terms of union, or from some confused
idea that, as the centre was denied all liberty,
the extremities should be allowed a great deal,
permitted these to do as they pleased, provided
they did not fail in paying their subsidies to
the State. The sovereign assumed the entire
direction of general affairs, but left the care
of such as were local to the country. This
tacit contract had to yield to the great pheno-
menon of the French Revolution. It was not
just that the sovereign should have entire con-
trol over the general interests of the country,
nor that the provinces should have the unre-
stricted charge of local affairs, for the general
interests of the nation ought to be regulated by
the nation itself, to whose inspection the inter-
ests of the provinces ought also to be subject.
The money employed by the provinces, to de-
fray their expenses, is a part of the general
wealth, which they should not be allowed to
squander; the local regulations established by
the communes concerning manufactures, mar-
kets, and dues are a part of the social legisla-
tion, which ought not to be regulated by par-
ticular interests.

The great phenomenon of modern unity should
consist in the sovereign's renouncing all claim
to the sole administration of general affairs,
the provinces renouncing on the other hand all
pretensions to the exclusive regulation of local
affairs: both should amalgamate, so to speak,
and become a powerful whole, guided by the
general intelligence of the nation. This would
require, in the central seat of government, a head
of the executive, assisted by the principal citi-
zens of France, for the regulation of general af-
fairs; and in the provinces, the heads of the local
administration, assisted by respectable citizens
of the place, for the regulation of local affairs,
and responsible to Government for every thing
connected with that department, and to the de-
partment itself in all things relating to the lo-
cality. From the recognition of these princi-
ples arose the prefect and council of depart-
ments. Had circumstances permitted the First
Consul to act consistently with the principles
he had laid down, he would have made the
councils of the departments elective. But im-
mediately after the fearful convulsions that had
just subsided, between the frantic politicians of
1793, men most hateful to the country, and the
great proprietors returned from emigration,
such elections would have been impossible, or at
least attended with serious inconveniences.
He reserved the selection to himself, and chose
sensible moderate men, who could administer the
provinces in a respectable manner. This was
a consequence of his dictatorship, which was
not intended to be permanent, but to pass
away with that office. The principle itself

was fixed, that a prefect was to administer the affairs of the department subject to the control of a council, and that this office was to become elective as soon as our terrible divisions should be sufficiently allayed.

The surveillance of the State as to all that concerned expenditure, taxation, the character of the local legislation, was to be provided for, and could not be unconditionally intrusted to the Executive, the representative of the State. For the attainment of this object, Napoleon adopted an institution suggested by Sieyès and borrowed from the ancient monarchy. The Royal Council, besides the other affairs in which it was formerly employed, gave its advice on such as resulted from the relations of the State with the provinces. These relations, being closer under the new régime, should naturally be submitted to the Council of State. Napoleon, without carrying out any particular theory, but adopting whatever presented itself as suitable to his purpose, confided to the Council of State this general surveillance, which essentially constituted what is called centralization. Desirous that the budgets of the communes and departments should be under the control of the State, that their ordinances should be in accordance with the principles of 1793, that one commune should not be able to re-establish the *jurandes*, another impose taxes inconsistent with modern principles, and that there might be an arbitrator for such cases of dispute, he desired that all such questions should be referred to the Council of State, at which he himself presided constantly and with indefatigable application. Without such a regulator, our system of centralization would have been the most intolerable of despotisms. Prudent in all that relates to the expenditure of the departments, moderate when they plead their different interests before it, and legislative when municipal arrangements are to be decided on, the Council of State is an enlightened, firm regulator, independent, though appointed by the Executive, because that its functions originate an administrative spirit, which subdues that of servility, and which, under every régime, though it may succumb for a moment to a new government, rises again as it were involuntarily, and, like the branches of some healthy plant, resumes its original direction after having bent beneath a momentary restraint.

It was by assiduously presiding in this council whenever he was not engaged in some campaign, and presiding there for seven or eight hours consecutively with the closest application, the rectitude of extraordinary good sense, and a respect for the opinion of others, such as he ever displayed on special subjects, deciding sometimes on facts, sometimes inventing or modifying as our administrative laws required, that Napoleon created at the same time a system of legislation and jurisprudence. It was thus that he became the true author of this firm, effective, and upright system, which makes our administration the most luminous that exists, renders our political strength more manageable than that of any other country in Europe,—an administration which, when revolutions distract our Governments, alone preserves its calmness, conducts the current affairs of the country wisely and steadily, collects the

taxes, lays them up with care, supplies on occasion needs, levies soldiers, drills and disciplines them, provides for the common towns and provinces, without permitting anything to be lost, keeps France even with a head totters, and seems like a ship steered by modern mechanism, which keeps her steadily though her crew be negligent or wildered.

War, by rendering Napoleon irresistible, made him a bad diplomatist, but on his return, one of the greatest organizers he has produced, and in that, as in every thing else, he was indebted for his superiority to nature, partly to the force of circumstance.

In order to estimate correctly his place among great captains, we must first draw the history of that powerful art which conquers, raises, defends empires, and which the science of legislation, must have for its basis a rare union of intellectual and moral qualities. Unfortunately, this history is little written. Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Tacitus, and Napoleon have given some scattered sketches, but, considered as a whole, compared with the progress of science, the annals of empires, and the advance of the human mind, this history does not yet exist, and for this reason it is most difficult to assign it its proper place to great military operations. Still the history of military art presents some prominent features which immediately attract attention, and by whose assistance we may trace the general progress of things, and to some few points whose permanency has stood the test of ages.

What is generally called a great war has not often occurred in the world, because to produce such would need the joint operation of great nations, great events, and great men. It does not depend alone on the importance of the changes effected, for, were that the case, we might say that the conquests of Asia had carried on great wars. To make a war "great," there should be a display of wisdom and of the genius of combination, which implies skilful and energetic resistance to a conqueror. Though Alexander changed the whole aspect of the then civilized universe, so great was the stupidity of that Asia over which he triumphed, that one could scarcely say that he carried on a great war. His not advancing into Asia until he had secured the possession of Syria, a combination so much admired by Montesquieu, was so necessary from his want of a navy, that it was evident to the simplest officers of the Macedonian army, and was suggested to Alexander rather by instinct than genius. The three battles that secured him the conquest of Asia were the consequences of heroic rashness,—battles decided by the courage commanded by Alexander in person, which, attacking the confused ranks of Persian horsemen, as cowardly as they were ignorant, was to them the signal of flight, in which they were immediately followed by the foe. It was the Macedonian discipline, led, indeed, by the daring of Alexander to immense distances, that was the true conqueror of Persia.

It was not thus that Cæsar and Hannibal fought. With them heroism was opposed to heroism, science to science, great men to great men. Cæsar, despite the vigour of his thence-

and the mingled daring and prudence of enterprises, betrays a certain restraint in movements, resulting from the military atoms of the time, and from which Hannibal seems to have been free. The Romans, accustomed to carry on warfare in savage countries, and constantly on their guard against the wild impetuosity of barbarians, days encamped with great skill, and when arrived in the evening on a spot chosen by a practised eye, in a few hours they were reached within a real fortress, formed of ditches, surrounded by a ditch and almost impregnable. Their mode of encampment has never been surpassed nor even equalled; as Napoleon with wonderful sagacity remarked, it would be useless to attempt any of the kind now, as such a camp as could not hold out against modern artillery for two hours. This precaution of encamping every evening engendered a certain regularity in their movements, made great military results of rare occurrence, nor could those battles which, though they bedew the earth with human gore, lessen the horrors of war by abbreviating them, take place, unless with the consent of the adverse parties. One refused to fight, the war might be continued to an indefinite period, or should end in a siege or a regular or unexpected attack on the enemy's camp. Thus, we see Cæsar, the boldest of Roman generals, act with unrestrained freedom in the country of the Gauls, whom he fought when it suited him, for their needless daring was easily excited; but in pain and Epirus, where he had to encounter Romans, he changed his plan, and employed endless devices on the Segre in attempts to induce Afranius to come out of his camp, and only succeeded by starving him out after having obliged him to change his position. At Dyrrachium, in Epirus, his mode of encampment rendered him invulnerable to Pompey, who by a similar process had rendered himself equally so to him. Then, not knowing how to terminate this lengthy campaign, he advanced into Macedonia, hoping to induce Pompey to follow: his tactics succeeded, but in his new position, being again made to experience the impregnability of the Roman camp, he would have found it impossible to reach his adversary, if the impetuosity of the Roman nobility had not forced Pompey to descend into the plain of Pharsalia, where the superiority of the Gallic legions won Cæsar the sovereignty of the world.

This mode of warfare undoubtedly involves very skilful and often very daring combinations to oblige an unwilling adversary to fight, but that cannot be called "great war," in all the freedom, precision, and importance of its movements,—such wars as we, in our time, have seen decide in a few days struggles that would formerly have continued for years. There is but one general in ancient times—Hannibal—in whose movements we discover this freedom of action and scientific correctness of procedure, and who has no equal in antiquity for the boldness, daring, fertility of resource, or success of his plans. This was the opinion of Napoleon, a supreme judge in such matters, and one that we may safely adopt on his authority.

During the Middle Ages military art neither attracts nor merits the attention of posterity. There we see terrible conflicts where blood flowed in torrents, where humanity displayed its usual passions; we see cowards and heroes, crimes and virtues, but neither a Cæsar nor a Hannibal. We here mark the absence, not alone of great wars, but even of the military art. Barbarism with its heedless daring flung itself on the effete Roman civilization, where military science still existed, but whence the warrior virtues had departed, and when innumerable herds of barbarians rushed down with the impetuosity of mountain-torrents, destroying the Roman empire, and overwhelming the civilized world, we occasionally see such men as Clovis and Pepin commanding their armies battle-axe in hand, or we find a matchless ruler like Charlemagne, but nowhere do we find a great captain. In that age of individual prowess poetry itself, the sole historian of the period, assumed the conventional form of the time, and celebrated the paladin mounted on his proud warhorse, who did battle for Christ against the Saracen, who charged no less vigorously in defence of Mohammedanism. This was the age of chivalry, a name that reveals its nature, that is, a mounted knight clad in mail, fighting with his own sword as far as his address and physical powers will allow. But this state of things was soon changed by the progress of European society. Commerce and industry, in collecting a numerous and wealthy population in the towns, whom the necessity of self-defence rendered courageous, gave birth to the foot-soldier, our modern infantry. The Swiss defending their mountains, the inhabitants of the Italian and German towns guarding their walls, and the Dutch their dikes, originated the infantry, and won that arm an importance that has only increased with time. A great discovery, for which we are equally indebted to the progress of human society and the knowledge of explosive materials, contributed powerfully to this phenomenon. The cuirass was not only useless but dangerous when opposed to projectiles impelled by powder. Henceforward men were freed from the weight of useless armour, and physical force was replaced by intelligence and thoughtful bravery. The towns surrounded by salient and threatening walls suddenly assumed another form and appearance. The walls were lowered to protect them from the cannon, and, instead of high, round towers, were defended with bastions of moderate height, sharp and angular, so that the cannon could protect the entire profile. This was the origin of our modern scientific fortification.

This change began in Italy, was propagated and perfected in Holland, in the wars against Philip II., and produced those three great men, the Nassaus. Genuine military art again appeared, though still timid and restrained in its movements, and possessing none of the qualities that distinguished it under Hannibal and Cæsar. War took up a position, and remained as it were enchained in the fortresses of Holland, and protected by dikes and scientifically-constructed bastions. The entire science of the generals of that time consisted in attacking a fortress, investing it, protecting themselves by lines of contravallation against relieving

armies, and in procuring provisions; whilst the enemy, on the other hand, endeavoured to secure the place by cutting off the besiegers' supplies, or in seeking to divert them from their undertaking. There were displayed neither great science nor decisive battles, but rather skirmishes to cut off supplies or to draw off the besiegers from the attack; and so far was this system pursued, that during the career of the Nassaus, from 1579 to 1648, that is, from the proclamation to the recognition of the independence of Holland, there were not more than five or six engagements that deserved the name of battles, whilst there were a hundred sieges of greater or less importance. The Dutch, to whom the sea was open, endured this war of sieges for two-thirds of a century with the greatest patience, because that they felt themselves safe, and that their commerce secured them the means of paying their troops; and it was this patience that aided or rather originated the justly admired perseverance of the Nassaus.

At this period, the institution of infantry,—at once the cause and effect of the independence of nations,—commenced by the efforts of the Swiss against Austria and Burgundy, and continued by the Dutch towns against Spain, received a new impulse from the struggle between Protestantism and Catholicism. It was that justly popular hero, Gustavus Adolphus, who next to the Nassaus, and in the Thirty Years' War, made the greatest advance in modern military art. Sovereign of a poor but valiant nation, called on to defend himself against a pretender, his cousin, King of Poland, who commanded a nation of horsemen, he placed his confidence in the infantry, and devoted all his efforts and intelligence to the better organization of that arm. This infantry was a species of Macedonian phalanx, closely serried, armed with pikes of enormous length and having in front and on the flanks a few musketeers. These phalanxes were very unwieldy, but Gustavus Adolphus, like a true reformer of infantry, exerted himself to mingle the pikemen and fusileers with it, to get rid of the armour that offered no protection against firearms, to render his army more manageable, and to increase his artillery and render it lighter. Although he did not make his artillery perfect, he advanced it sufficiently to enable him to conquer the King of Poland, whose strength lay in his horse, and compel him to renounce his pretensions to the Swedish crown. He then obeyed the call of the Protestants beaten by Wallenstein and Tilly, and advanced into Germany, impelled by sincere religious feeling as well as a desire for glory. One thing must be noticed, which proves how slow is the progress of what is called scientific warfare. This hero, one of the bravest men that God ever created, was extremely timid in all his movements. Faithful disciple of the Nassaus, he manoeuvred around fortresses, would not leave the shores of the Baltic until he had conquered the fortresses on the Oder; and because the Elector of Saxony would not confide Wittenberg to him, and so allow him to pass the Elbe in safety, he suffered Tilly to take Magdeburg before his eyes and wreak his vengeance on that devoted city. The report of this event circulated throughout Europe,

and cast a momentary doubt as to the ability of the Swedish hero. Still, and notwithstanding the cries and entreaties of his friends, and knowing by experience that his fate depended on his infantry, he met Tilly on the plain of Leipzig, was brought Austria to his feet, and Oxeustern, more daring than he, led him to advance on Vienna and crush him; he first went to enjoy his triumph, then lost a year in desultory wars in Bavaria, spent some months in passing the Rhine against Wallenstein, then Lutzen, and then, almost in spite of himself, on that celebrated plain fought a second great battle of his career; then, like Epaminondas, he died in victory. We must undoubtedly, in estimating Gustavus Adolphus as one of the human beings, whether we consider his courage, the dignity of his sentiments, and the extent and grandeur of his views; and it would be a great tribute to the timidity and uncertainty of his sentiments to want of personal courage not he, but the military science of that was timid. But this science was soon to change; a new revolution was to be effected in three acts,—the first in France by Condé, Turenne, and second in Prussia by Frederick the Great, and again in France by Napoleon. The glory of our country began with the revolution that commenced and ended with the revolution.

As we have just shown, military art was to gyrate round some fortification, the purpose of capturing or occupying a place, resembled a bird attached to the earth and unable to walk or fly; that is to say, to the defence of the war. Gustavus was the dispenser of this science, and the French for a while were his disciples. Many of our illustrious Gassions especially, had been that school, and brought it to France, when, the general engaging us in the Thirty Years' War, called upon to play the chief part, vacant by the death of Gustavus, in course, on the banks of the Rhine, the frontier of the Low Countries, then encountered those of Austria and the allies recently disunited by Vauban, adopting the science of the Dutch, carried it to a degree that has not been surpassed in the century. But military art was not to the defence and besieging of a place when suddenly a young prince, with extraordinary sagacity, impetuous glory, whom God had made a hero, and whom his position as a prince of blood made superior to the ordinary attendant on a sense of responsibility, the lists, and, weary of the restraints of the Nassaus, which would not allow him to battle but at the last extremity, from the restraints by which our generals seemed bound. The first he assumed the command, he was by councillors appointed by the emperor to strain him; but he took heed of his

who was as daring as himself; he led the infantry to the plain of Rocroy, and boldly in face of a brave and experienced enemy, attacked the adversary's army composed of cavalry according to the tactics of the age, put them to rout, then reformed the infantry, that had maintained its position in the centre like a *citadel* that *sustained its losses*, scattered its ranks with bayonets on that day which terminated the career of the Spanish infantry. On that day, Condé made no change in the tactics of fighting, which was still the same as at Pharsalia and Arbela; but he was himself an innovator, by giving battle immediately advancing to the termination of the war, a method which is even the most humane, though it may be for the most bloody.

By such conduct that Condé won for himself the reputation of dauntless daring. A little later, by despising the nature of the ground, at Nordlingen by losing himself to be disheartened when one of his wings beaten and his centre routed, by persisting in a daring design, a battle that had almost been lost. By a combination of boldness and foresight he became the greatest general that France had produced until then. Before him, a little later, afterward under his command, and soon independent of him, was a general who was to become his rival, fighting as he on the field of battle, but on the march and in the general conduct of his campaigns. Need we say that Turenne? Condé as prince of the not intrusted with tasks easy of accomplishment, for there are none such in war: contrary, to him were confided vast undertakings, for which abundant resources were at Turenne's disposal, who eventually became the champion of the royalty, was at first, especially on the Rhine, appointed to the most difficult undertakings, where he had to encounter an enemy superior in numbers. He distinguished himself by the most daring marches.

In 1646 he descended the Rhine, which he did at Wesel to join the Swiss and coming to Bavaria to accept terms of peace when in 1674, affecting to be op-timistic at the termination of a campaign, suddenly emerged from his cantonment unexpectedly on the enemy's flanks, put them to flight and drove them to the frontiers. We may say that he produced a spirit of daring into battle into marches. After the death of two great captains, military science stood still, doing little more than wait, until the middle of the eighteenth century, when a great struggle enabled it to take a second step and advance that may be truly called scientific

to form a correct idea of what had been accomplished and what still remained to be done must consider how armies were constituted, the proportion and employment of different arms, and the manner of their use. All this will be found described with perfect correctness in the memoirs of Louis Montecuculi, one of the most

scientific generals of the time. Notwithstanding the improvement that had been made in the infantry, it did not yet form more than half the strength of an army, the other half being entirely composed of cavalry. The artillery was very unwieldy and scanty, not affording more than one cannon to every 1000 men. The order of battle was such as we find described by the historians of Cæsar and Hannibal, (the only masters studied at that period,) that is, the infantry was always in the centre, the cavalry stationed on the wings, and the artillery (replacing the war-engines of the ancients) in front, no account being made of the nature of the ground, except that the cavalry closed their ranks, fell back, or in a word did what they could, whenever the ground occupied by the wings did not allow them to deploy. The artillery commenced by firing on the enemy in order to break their ranks, then the cavalry from the wings attacked whatever force was opposed to them, and if successful, turned to the centre, where the foot was engaged, and completed the defeat of the enemy by attacking them in flank or rear. There were but few battles in the time of Gustavus Adolphus, Condé, or Turenne, that were conducted in any other way. It was thus that the celebrated battles of Lutzen, Dunes, and Rocroy were managed. This plan is not pursued in the present day. The cavalry is not uniformly stationed on the wings, the infantry in the centre, nor the artillery in front. Each arm is stationed according to the nature of the ground, the infantry in the more difficult positions, the cavalry on the plain, and the artillery wherever it may be employed to most advantage. The infantry, amounting to four-fifths of the troops, constitutes the strength of the army. A portion of the cavalry is attached to the infantry to examine the nature of the ground, and a larger or smaller portion of artillery, according to the nature of the ground, is appointed to support the efforts of the foot, and if, as during the Empire, there is a large reserve of cavalry and artillery, these are under the commander-in-chief, to be employed in striking a decisive blow, if he is capable of using his resources with the promptitude of genius.

Both ancients and moderns were induced to station the cavalry on the wings, in order to protect the flanks of the infantry, that in those days had not learned to manœuvre as in modern times, and present a front to every side by forming into square. The infantry, until toward the termination of the seventeenth century, was a true Macedonian phalanx, a species of long square, with its longer side to the enemy, and this side was composed of pikemen, mingled with musketeers. The latter were generally placed in front, where they fired, protected by the length of the pikes, then when the enemy approached they ran along the battalion, where they took up their station on the wings, leaving the pikemen to charge or repulse with the cold iron. It is easy to understand that had artillery been as effective in those days as at present, such a battalion would soon be destroyed. The balls, falling on a mass of men sixteen or sometimes twenty-four deep, would occasion fearful destruction. This battalion, protected with pikes

only in front, would not be able to defend its flanks from an attack of cavalry.

To avoid the inconveniences of this arrangement, it was not unusual to see the Austrian and Spanish infantry, as in the battles of Lutzen and Rocroy, form into four large masses turned toward each side, thus resolving the entire mass of the infantry into a single great square.

This difficulty has been overcome by fixing the bayonet to the musket, an invention that has made our excellent Vauban the true author of modern tactics. By thus attaching the bayonet to the musket, he effaced the distinction between pikemen and musketeers. Nothing henceforward was needed but a foot-soldier who could first fire and then meet the approaching cavalry at the point of the bayonet. This important change led to the modern mode of organizing the infantry. But all the consequences deducible from a principle are not immediately drawn. We do not, during war, profit by the lessons it gives; it is during the silence and meditation of peace that they produce fruit.

During the latter wars of Louis XIV. the bayoneted musket did not produce all the results of which it was capable. Experiments were made at first: the ranks of the infantry were thinned that the enemy's fire might do less injury, and, being more fully deployed, were able to do more execution.

But it was in the middle of the eighteenth century, so fruitful in revolutions of every kind, that the great revolution in military art was effected. In that age, when doubt and inquiry invaded every profession, military men also began to seek after improvement in their art. There was one German monarchy almost as powerful as Bavaria, but, being better situated, could offer more effective resistance to imperial power; for, being placed in the north, it could not be so easily attacked. This kingdom possessed a vigorous and valiant population, who, from the distinction they had gained in the wars of the seventeenth century, had become ambitious, and being animated by a Protestant spirit, were prepared to make fearful opposition to Catholic Austria; this monarchy was Prussia. The great Elector had been a military sovereign. His successor, a vain prince, was fascinated by the title of king, which he purchased from the Emperor, at the expense of his military strength. This title, useless as it seemed, was but a fresh stimulus to ambition, and, Prussia having become a kingdom, her increasing dignity added to her desire for glory. He who had been made king was succeeded by a sickly, morose prince, irritable almost to madness, but who possessed some really good qualities. Careful of the lives and money of his subjects, and feeling that Prussia should support her rank as a kingdom, he amassed riches, and trained soldiers, though he disliked war, and would not undertake it himself. His passion for tall grenadiers is well known, and those who wished to flatter him presented him with tall soldiers, as other monarchs have been flattered by gifts of horses or pictures. This prince, whose gloomy imagination rendered him unequal to the continual burden of a crown, endeavoured to lessen the weight by sharing his responsibilities with two favourites. The civil department he con-

sided to M. de Seckendorf, the old Prince of Anhalt-Dessau; the military to the Prince of Anhalt-Bernburg. The Prince of Anhalt-Bernburg, in the latter campaigns of Louis XIV. distinguished himself at the battle of Malplaquet, and it was he who decided that the fate of battles would be decided by the infantry. By exercising the Prussian into the square of Potsdam, he came to the extent of the advantage of the square; he armed these troops with muskets, and almost completed the organization of the modern battalion. He confined himself to this, but instilled into his infantry, whom he reviewed with his own spirit; a most serious and however important the mechanism, its moral tone is no less so, of this the best-organized army, constructed machine void of all.

His king approved and aided him, determined not to go to war himself, that, at least, his people should be able to do so. He was unconsciously in deep, confused, and indefinable, out, indeed, suspecting the importance of which he was labouring, that his son would employ the same had so well prepared.

This son, brought up by French from whose hands he passed into the hands of philosophers, was full of genius and independence. He regarded the authority from antiquity as a tyrannical religion as a ridiculous prejudice, and nised no other authority than his own. He felt the greatest aversion to military pedantry that prevailed at Berlin, which caused him to be so much to the king, that, in a fit of passion with his cane him who was the great Frederick. The great Frederick and shut up in a fortress became to a military life, is one of those tactics that history sometimes presents.

This extraordinary father died, and the son immediately claimed the throne. Achilles, that he had not before his own. The Emperor Charles died, and left his daughter, the sole heiress of his possessions, not believed she would be a queen. Everybody wished to get a partitioned the imperial crown; France to conquer the Austrian possessions of the Rhine; Spain even had Italy; and the young Frederick, enlarging his dominions, and making worthy of the rank of kingdom. Every one of these wished for Maria Theresa's inheritance, and touch it. Frederick acted like a fire to a house that he intended to attack Silesia, an example followed by all Europe, and thus a flagration from which he derived advantages. Having inherited a well-supplied treasury, and as a for battle, he entered Silesia, in six months after he came to the throne, he conquered the entire province in

no army to oppose him, and proved worthy of an inferior prince who holds prepared for war, to a more powerful one not.

He exclaimed that the King of Prussia, who would expiate his crime following January. The Austrians, emboldened by their success, advanced from Silesia, while Frederick, deficient in resources, allowed them to take up their rear and cut him off from Prussia. He turned round, marched toward them with the audacity that marked all his actions, and offered them battle, although he had only a single battalion, and that was in his rear, whilst the Austrians were between him and Prussia. Had he known he would never have seen Berlin, it is strange to say, his first battle was conducted according to the tactics of the ancients.

His fine infantry was in the centre, supported by the brave Marshal Schwerin, on the wings, and the artillery in the same as in the battles of Rocroy, Lutzel, and Lutten. The Austrian cavalry was posted on the wings, and being greatly inferior both in discipline and numbers, they were repulsed and bore along the Prussian *rocchetta equestris*, together with the Emperor, who had never before been in such a scene. But while the two armies were pursuing, the other pursued, and to the rear, the solid Prussian remained firm in their ranks. Had it not been the same as those of Condé, the Austrian cavalry would, at least, have attacked the Prussian on both flanks and utterly destroyed it. But not so: the old Marshal Schwerin, with his ground with immovable resolute, got possession of the stream of Mollwitz, and when the victorious Prussian cavalry returned, they found their position and the battle lost. Frederick, by means of his infantry, which he kept whilst he was borne to the rear, said himself, the lesson was a good one soon became a general. Europe at this victory was miraculous, prostrated Frederick a great warrior, and no man; but, what was of more importance, the Prussian infantry gained an experience it retained until brought into combat in the infantry of the French Revolution.

In the succeeding years Frederick gained a third, and fourth victory, and after vicissitudes of fortune, whilst Bavaria and Prussia wearied themselves in vain efforts to obtain the imperial crown, the other side of the Rhine, Frederick alone at object he had in view and won Silesia, a reward of a profound policy and conducted on excellent and modern

province as Silesia is not to be won by a single blow. The pious Maria had two motives to render her implacable: for her dismembered patrimony, and seeing the pride of Austria humiliated, an innovator who despised both her Empire. She waited an opportunity, and she soon found it.

Frederick, though perfect master of himself in every thing connected with policy and war, could not restrain his taste for raillery, and Europe offered him subjects for amusement. At Paris a fascinating and intellectual woman, the representative of refined society, governed the reckless indifference of Louis XV. A beautiful and licentious woman, the Empress Elizabeth, presided over the ignorance of the Russian court. Having offended both of these by his remarks, Frederick had made them the allies of Maria Theresa, and brought on himself that terrible Seven Years' War, in which English gold could scarcely sustain him against the entire continent. It was this war that gave the great impulse to military science.

At Mollwitz, as we have seen, Frederick arranged his troops after the fashion employed at the battles of Rocroy, Pharsalia, and Arbela, stationing his infantry in the centre and the cavalry on the wings. Struck by the superiority of the Austrian cavalry, he endeavoured to improve his own, of which he had great need on the plains of Silesia, and did succeed in imbuing it with a solidity in which the Austrian horse was deficient. But it was on the Prussian infantry that he principally relied for success. Two motives induced him to this, the excellence of the infantry itself, to which he principally owed his first success, and the nature of the ground on which he was to fight. Silesia is a plain, but it was not on this plain that the possession of Silesia was to be decided, but in Bohemia, and especially among the mountains lying between the two provinces. He saw the special necessity of the infantry, and that both cavalry and artillery were only to be used as auxiliaries more or less necessary according to the spot in which they were to be employed. In a word, he there learned the art of proportioning his resources to the nature of the ground.

At Mollwitz he had placed his infantry in the centre, his cavalry on the wings, but he arranged these arms very differently at Leuthen and Rossbach. At Leuthen, a battle that Napoleon declared to be the master-piece of Frederick the Great, he perceived that the Austrians were supporting their left on the wooded height of Leuthen and extending their right into the plain. He profited by a curtain of hillocks that lay between him and the enemy, to advance the greater part of his infantry to the left of the Austrians and deprive them of the heights of Leuthen, and, having dislodged them, he charged them on the plains with his cavalry, and thus, on the verge of destruction, he in one day re-established his affairs by destroying or capturing half the forces opposed to him.

At Rossbach he was encamped on a height difficult of access, with marshes on his right and woods on his left. The Prince of Soubise, adopting tactics different from those of the seventeenth century, thought to surround the Prussians, but he only succeeded in getting the French army entangled in the woods on the enemy's left. Frederick allowed the French to advance into this dangerous spot, then met them with a few battalions of excellent infantry, attacked them in flank with Seidlitz's cavalry, and routed them so effectually that, but for the triumphs of the Revolution and the

Empire, we could not revert to that combat without a feeling of shame.

Frederick, by employing the different arms according to the nature of the ground, effected a complete change in the art of combating. He had, however, adopted a favourite mode of attack,—for in war, as in every thing else, each individual acquires a peculiar mode of operation,—and this was to attack one of the enemy's wings, and by the conquest of the wing to decide the victory. This mode of operation gave rise to the celebrated discussions on the *oblique order of attack*, which occupied the attention of military men in the eighteenth century.

Frederick did not alone effect a change in the employment of the different arms, but also in their relative proportions,—reducing the cavalry to a third instead of a half, and in developing the artillery, which he rendered more numerous and less unwieldy.

He accomplished still more important alterations in that department which requires the greatest intelligence,—the general direction of operations. During the preceding century military art consisted in hovering round some fortress, either to effect its capture or prevent its seizure by the enemy. Frederick, having to oppose the armies of all Europe, one perhaps advancing from Bohemia, another from Poland, a third from Franconia, and to meet all these perhaps at the same time, was compelled to neglect the less imminent for the greater danger, to sacrifice the ancillary to the principal, to engage his enemies in succession, one after the other, and save himself by the skilful husbanding of his forces. Although, thanks to the progress made in each department of military art and to Frederick's unusual position, warfare had become more animated, active, and daring, it was still far from the degree of perfection it has attained in our century. Frederick, confined to Silesia and Saxony,—that is, to the narrow space between the Oder and the Elbe,—had never thought of embracing the entire extent of an empire in one vast view, and selecting some particular point by attacking which unexpectedly he might terminate the war. He had indeed thought of entering Dresden, which was not remote, but had never dreamed of marching to Vienna. If he hastened to Erfurt from Glogau or Breslau, it was because that, having completed the conquest of one enemy, he was told of the approach of another, toward whom he hastened as some fierce animal pursued by dogs rushes sometimes on one, sometimes on another, when after being bitten by one he is attacked by another. In short, he had commenced a great revolution, but had not terminated it. For example, he still followed the practice of encamping, and not knowing, like Napoleon in 1814, how to profit by the opportunity afforded by some false movement of the enemy to effect a decisive blow, he shut himself up in the camp at Buntzelwitz, where he passed several months awaiting some favourable turn of fortune,—which did indeed occur, and saved him from utter ruin, by substituting Peter III. for Elizabeth on the Russian throne. Encamping was not the only ancient practice that he retained; he also protected his frontier with what was then called the *départ* of the army. When

seeking to prevent the Austrians from Silesia, he, within a space of three leagues in breadth by thirty or forty miles in length, burned down the crops and felled down the trees, and, instead of opposing the enemy with skilful operations, he left him with famine. Warfare, from a debased or science, degenerated into cruelty. Frederick had changed the order of the subjecting it to the nature of the ground by being compelled to meet them on once, had given general movements of war hitherto unknown, still he did not bring military art to its ultimate perfection, he left to the French Revolution, and to an extraordinary man who bore its initial confines of the civilized world.

He accomplished enough; and then who, in the great march of civilization, made such strides. By the abrupt individual character and by his opposition to France, Austria, and Russia, which, even after the acquisition of Silesia, did not contain more than six millions of inhabitants. We must briefly review some circumstances in explanation of this seeming miracle. In the first place, he was assisted by England with money, not very liberally, but still he did not require aid from her. With this he procured soldiers, and, as Germany was fighting against Germans, as he did not convert his prisoners into slaves, so he supplied the deficiency of his population. His central position between Russia, Austria, and France enabled him to meet all his enemies by land. From Breslau to Frankfort-on-the-Oder, from Frankfort to Dresden, from Dresden to Leipzig, he was also favoured by another important circumstance, that though his position to him was serious, that of the French, guided by court caprice, was not so. Every year Elizabeth withdrew him an army, which, whether he retired into Poland after fighting the French, opposed to the English, Low Countries, and badly governed civil and military sense, presented an army which, discomfited as it had not again make its appearance, had, consequently, no real enemy, which does not render his vanishing, nor would it have dared not possess what in our days is the right of legitimacy. His enemies were twice; but, instead of despatching they would have done had they been tender to set up in opposition to him, tired after levying a contribution of a hundred thousand crowns. These circumstances do not diminish what ordinary in his success, they help to a petty prince was able, unassisted during seven years, the three great powers in Europe, disconcert them by his attacks, weary them by his tenacity, able to wait until fortune brought sovereign to Russia, and how his strategy disarmed three women who had exasperated. His empire, this account the less wonderful, to be classed with those of Alexander

Cæsar, Gustavus Adolphus, and Napo-

the French Revolution that gave the decisive impulse to military art. The improvement made by substituting infantry for cavalry, that is to say, that had created a mounted nobility by the strength of a nation, was destined to receive its final impulse from the French Revolution, which was nothing else than an outburst of feeling on the part of the middle classes. The French, in 1789, were under the influence of two feelings: regret at seeing France declining since the time of Louis XIV., which they attributed to the frivolity of the court, and indignation against the European Powers, that wished to prevent the French from reforming their institutions on the principle of civil equality. By these causes the whole nation took up arms. The old royalist army, though deprived by emigration of the greater number of its officers, was reorganised in the commencement, and won several battles under Dumouriez, whose genius had not yet frittered away until his fiftieth year in court intrigues. But that army melted, so to speak, in the terrible fire of the conflict, and the Revolution replaced these forces by countless thousands of the middle classes, who retrained themselves into infantry. Cavalry, artillery, and engineers cannot be raised at a moment's notice, but there is no such difficulty with the infantry, especially in a country essentially military and filled with the pride and traditions of war. These foot-soldiers, incorporated into the semi-brigades that remained of the old army, inspired the old soldiers with Jewish courage, adopted their discipline, and attacked the enemy first as skilful sharpshooters, and then charged them *en masse* at the point of the bayonet. With time their discipline equalled that of the best-drilled armies of Europe, those formed in the schools of Frederick and of Daun; with time they formed infantry, artillery, and engineers, and, whilst requiring the discipline they needed, they preserved their original daring and activity, and thus became the finest army in the world.

It would be impossible that whilst the powerful impulse of '89, combined with our ancient military traditions, furnished us with armies, should not at the same time give us generals, that our infantry, as well drilled as the German armies, but more active, more daring, and more daring, should not exercise some influence upon their officers; nor did this incongruity exist: for there arose Pichegru, Holland, and Moreau, Kleber, Hoche, and Jourdain in the midst of Germany. Whilst generals capable of commanding a great army sprung up, it followed, as a matter of course, that there ought to appear not two, but one who could guide all the armies of a vast empire, for moral influences resemble physical when acting on several bodies at the same time: they impel each to a distance proportionate to its weight and volume. Whilst Pichegru, Hoche, Kleber, Desaix, and Masséna were the offspring of this national impulse, he who was superior to them all first revealed his genius at Toulon. This master, whose name has been echoed throughout the universe, was young Bonaparte. Brought up in the schools of the old régime, in the study of the most scientific

branch of the military service,—the artillery,—deeply imbued with the modern spirit, ho united with his personal hardihood—the greatest perhaps with which mortal was ever endowed—the daring temper of the French Revolution. Gifted with that universal genius which fits men for every employment, he possessed, moreover, a taste peculiar to himself, that of studying the character of the country on the map, and an inclination to seek in physical geography the solution, not alone of military, but of political problems. Ever poring over his maps, a practice too much neglected by military men, and which was still less practised before his time, he was constantly meditating the configuration of the ground where war happened to be raging at the time, mingling with these reflections the dreamings of a young man, saying within himself that were he master he would do so and so, send the armies of the Republic in such and such a direction, little suspecting that he would be master one day, but conscious of some undefinable impulse within, as we sometimes feel the motion of the water beneath our feet, before it forces through the ground and bursts forth in an unceasing spring. His meditations showed him that since Austria had resigned the Low Countries her only vulnerable point was Italy, whither the war to be decisive should be carried. Almost wearying the Directory, in whose service he was, with the repetition of these views, he was appointed commandant of Paris, and, when Schérer allowed himself to be beaten, general of the army in Italy. Immediately on his arrival at Nice, the young general saw at a glance that it was not necessary to force the Alps, but to turn them, as he most profoundly remarked. The Piedmontese and Austrians were guarding the pass of Montenotte, the spot where the Alps decline, to rise at some distance as the Apennines. Making a feigned attack on Genoa, in order to call off the Austrians, he forced at night the pass of Montenotte, where the Piedmontese were alone on guard, drove these back on Turin, after overpowering them in two battles, compelled the King of Piedmont to accept peace, and then descended to the Po in pursuit of the Austrians, who, seeing that they had been deceived at Genoa, were hastening to protect Milan. He crossed the Po at Piacenza, entered Milan, hastened to Lodi, forced the passage of the Adda, and stopped at the Adige, which his great intellect saw should be the true frontier between Italy and Germany. A less profound genius would have hastened southward to seize Florence, Rome, and Naples. He did not even think of doing so. "It is with the Germans," he said to the Directory, "that we must dispute Italy—it is they we are to oppose. Going to the south, we should meet at our return a Forno, like Charles VIII., or a Trebbia,* like Macdonald." He decided, therefore, to

* Although Charles VIII. was victorious at Forno, he ran great risk, and would have perished there with all his army but that the troops in his rear were inferior to his own. At Trebbia, Macdonald met troops as valiant as those he commanded, and was very near being destroyed, not through his own fault, but through that of the Directory, that had sent him to Naples. General Bonaparte's reasoning was correct in reference to both, and proves that it is in the north, and not in the south, that the possession of Italy is to be disputed.

remain in the north, and, with his usual penetration, he saw that the Po was too lengthy to be easily defended, that the Isonzo, from its advanced position, might be turned through the Tyrol, and that the Adige alone could be successfully defended, because that immediately on leaving the Alps its waters fall into the marshes of Legnago, and, being situated beyond the Tyrol, could not be turned. The young Bonaparte alleged the following reasons for taking up his position on the Adige:—"If the Austrians seek to force the Adige in the mountains, they must pass by the plateau of Rivoli; if they prefer the plain, they will appear in front of Verona, or in the direction of the marshes in the neighbourhood of Legnago." This condition of things obliged him to station the greater part of his troops in the centre, that is, at Verona, placing two detachments of the guard, one at Rivoli, the other in the direction of Legnago, to be reinforced according to the direction taken by the enemy; he remained immovable in this position, besieging Mantua as an amusement between the different apparitions of the Austrians. It was this correctness of appreciation that enabled the young Bonaparte, with thirty-six thousand men, scarcely increased by fifteen thousand during the course of the war, to oppose all the Austrian armies, and within eighteen months fight twelve pitched battles, more than sixty lesser engagements, take more than one hundred thousand prisoners, overwhelm Austria, compel her to yield the line of the Rhine to France, and obtain a general peace.

Most certainly one may peruse all the pages of history without finding a parallel to this. It presents a degree of perfection in general conception of plan, and an acquaintance with military science, that has never been equalled. His clearness of conception was demonstrated in passing the mountains of Montenotte, whilst drawing off the Austrians by a feigned attack upon Genoa, and, when master of Milan, advancing to Verona instead of hastening to Rome or Naples, seeing that as Italy was to be disputed with northern soldiers it was in the north that victory should be obtained, whilst the south was to be left like a fruit that would fall from the tree when ripe. And then choosing the Adige from amidst so many lines of defence, because that it was not as lengthy as the Po, nor exposed to be so easily turned as the Isonzo, and remaining immovable in that position until he had attracted thither and destroyed all the Austrian forces. His military science was shown by awaiting the enemy at Verona, where if they should appear his excellent position at Caldiero would enable him to repel them, and should they turn toward the plains he would meet them in the marshes of Arcola, where valour would be more potent than numbers. Should they descend on our left by the Tyrol, he was ready to receive them on the plateau of Rivoli, and then, master of both routes, that of the valley through which the artillery and cavalry were advancing, that through the mountains by which the infantry was marching, he first drove back the artillery and cavalry into the river, then captured the infantry that had lost the aid of the other arms, and with fifteen thousand men took eigh-

teen thousand prisoners. And so all this at the age of twenty-six, the daring of youth with the judgment of mature age. Such feats, as great, are unparalleled in the annals both for greatness of conception and of execution.

The entire career of General Bonaparte presents the same distinctive features, wonderful perspicacity in discovering the object to which all the efforts ought to tend, and profound knowledge by the configuration of the ground the battle was to be fought; an exhibited equal superiority in determining the movements of an army, and in giving battle.

In 1800 we had possession of the far as the Tyrol, with the plains on our left and those of Piedmont on the right. The Austrians, not anticipating the movements of their young advance toward Huningue on the Rhine, Genoa on the left. The First Consul the design of rushing from both Alpine chain on their rear, and Moreau to descend by Cassin, whilst he would advance on the Great Saint Bernard. Moreau throw himself into the centre amidst masses of the enemy. Bonaparte allowed Moreau to carry on, whilst he crossed the Saint Bernard track, rolled his cannon down precipices, fell on the Austrians' rear, and near Marengo to give him up in one of that Italy which two years before him twelve battles and sixty thousand men, pursuing his own mad plan, took six months to reach.

In this case, too, the point chosen so correctly, that when struck the enemy was completely defeated. The decisive battle, indeed, had been as skillfully conducted at Rivoli. The ground was level, any favourable position, and, having executed reconnaissance, the First Consul was surprised, and of being beaten. But his lieutenants, Grouchy, but Desaix, who by his arrival secured the victory. All ran the risk of being lost if, indeed, Bonaparte's unexpected enemy's rear was not the daring, comparable only to his over the Alps, accomplished years before.

When, in 1805, the young Emperor, was obliged to tack on England, and turn his back on the continent, he in fifteen days from Flanders to Swabia. We gained the defiles of the Black Forest, sources of the Danube, and the Austrians advanced in great haste their progress by the apparent columns in the principal defiles disappearing, he advanced at the Swabian Alps, debauched the Austrians' rear, shut them

impelled an entire army of 60,000 men to lay down their arms before him, a feat unprecedented in the annals of history. Freed from the largest portion of the Austrian forces, and learning that the Prussians were assuming a threatening aspect, he, without hesitation, advanced to Vienna, bringing in his train the from Italy under Masséna. These he in the Austrian capital, then hastened to Austerlitz, where he found the Russians united to the remnant of the Austrian forces. Here, by affected hesitation and feigned retreats, he tempted the temerity of Alexander, who, listening to the advice of young men, to cut off the French army from Vienna. By this movement Alexander exposed the plan of Pratzen, where his centre was stationed. Napoleon descended with the rapidity of an eagle, cut the enemy's army in two, drove one portion into the lakes, the other into a ravine. He then turned to the Prussians, who, instead of joining the Coalition, were compelled to beg pardon on their knees for having gone to war with him.

Here again Napoleon's general movements unparalleled in correctness and daring; battle itself was a prodigy of skill and presence of mind, and it was not strange that empires should fall before such miracles of science.

Instead of the certain and durable peace he might have concluded with Europe, the conqueror of Austerlitz, intoxicated with his success, brought on himself a war with Prussia and Russia. The Prussian army advanced behind the mountainous forest of Thuringia, in order to protect the central plains of Germany. Napoleon left them in that position, turned back to the right until he came to the neighbourhood of Coburg, then debouched on the extreme left of the enemy's line, approached the Prussians in such a manner as to cut them off from the north where the Russians were expecting them; overpowered them at Jena, at Auerstadt, and by constantly attacking them while retreating, he captured them to the last man at Prenzlau, near Lübeck. On that day the Prussian monarchy ceased to exist, and the work of the great Frederick was annihilated.

He was now compelled to go to the north in search of the Russians, to correct them of the habit they had acquired of incessantly urging against us the German Powers, whom they abandoned after they had compromised them.

Napoleon advanced to the Vistula, and encountered the two great dangers of climate and distance, which were to be so fatal to him at a later period. His army at first preserved its moral and physical vigour, but the distance compelled some of the men to desert, and cold and hunger soon disgusted others. Napoleon displayed extraordinary strength of will and powers of organization in preserving his army undiminished. With unconquerable energy he struggled on the frozen plains of Eylau against the barbaric energy of Russia, spent the winter in strengthening his position by the taking of Dantzic, and, spring being come, and his army recruited, he descended along the Ale to the Niemen. He calculated that the Russians would be compelled to approach the shore in search of provisions, and cross the Ale before him; and he advanced in expectation of

this event, from which he expected a decisive result. On June 14, the anniversary of Marengo, he found the Russians crossing the Ale at Friedland. With the exception of Oudinot's grenadiers, all his troops were far behind. Hastening to the spot with those under his immediate command, he ordered Oudinot to *tirailleur*, and brought up the remainder of his army in haste. Instead of attacking the Russians when all his forces were collected, he waited until they had crossed the Ale. To induce them to fight, he drew back his left a little, gradually advanced his right toward Friedland, where the Russian bridges were, destroyed these, and, when he had thus deprived the enemy of all means of retreat, he again advanced his left, with which the Russians had refused to engage, drove his opponents into the Ale, and drowned or captured almost their entire army, the last that Europe had to oppose to him.

We again repeat that all these feats were accomplished with an equal degree of perfection. His foreseeing that the Russians would attempt to reach the shore, in order to join their magazines, and should necessarily cross the Ale in face of the French army, his following and surprising them, and waiting until they had almost crossed the river, his seizing the bridges, and, when these were seized, driving the enemy back on the Ale, were all real prodigies, in which the profound foresight of the general operations was only equalled by his presence of mind in the definite operation of the battle.

In Italy, Napoleon had been but a general acting under orders, and with limited resources; in Austria, Prussia, and Poland, he was general, but head of the State, with the resources of a great empire at his disposal, capable of effecting operations equal in magnitude to his conceptions. In one day he destroyed Austria, in another Prussia, and Russia on the third; and this at distances from home to which war had never before been carried. He was, at first, the model of all subordinate generals, afterward, that of the all-powerful and successful commander. Warfare was no longer confined to the circumference of a fortress, those classic battles with the infantry in the centre and the cavalry on the wings were at an end, the general movements were proportioned to the empire to be conquered, and the general features of the battle conformable to the ground on which they were fought. His battles surpassed, though they had some resemblance to, that of Leuthen, and his movements were very different from those of Frederick, who hastening breathless from Breslau to Frankfort-on-the-Oder, from Frankfort to Erfurt, never struck a decisive blow which could terminate the war. Not but that the activity, the constancy and firmness of Frederick, deservedly called the Great, are worthy of all admiration! It is also true that the French general, animated by prodigious personal daring, and deeply imbued with the spirit of the Revolution, and studying the nature of the ground, as none had ever done before, attained to such magnitude and correctness of plan, that his blows were, at once, sure and decisive, and to a certain degree without appeal! With him, we may say, that military science attained the summit of perfection.

These wonderful successes, unfortunately, corrupted, not the general, who was improving daily in his art, but the politician, by persuading him that every thing was possible, by leading him sometimes to Spain, sometimes to Russia, with armies declining in quality, because incessantly recruited and through ever-increasing difficulties, across such distances as from Cadiz to Moscow, through such varieties of climate as from Africa to Siberia, driving men from forty degrees of heat to thirty of cold,—variations that animal life cannot support. The greatest, the most consummate of commanders necessarily succumbed beneath such rash attempts.

Many of those who have constituted themselves Napoleon's judges have shown too little severity to his policy, too much to his military operations. They have reproached him with being the general of success, but not of defeat, one who could invade, but not defend, who was foremost in offensive, the most inferior in defensive warfare, all which they sum up in these words, *Napoleon never knew how to retreat!* This we hold to be an incorrect opinion.

When the intoxication of success led Napoleon to such a distance from Paris as Moscow, and to a climate of thirty degrees of cold, there was no possibility of retreat, nor could Moreau, who had effected that admirable retreat from Bavaria in 1800, have possibly brought the French army uninjured from Moscow to Warsaw. Such disasters as that of 1812 are not the chances of war, which allow alternate advance and retreat; they rather resemble some lofty edifice that crumbles on the head of the daring mortal who had ventured to raise it to such a presumptuous height. The soldiers, elevated to the highest degree of excitement when setting out for Russia, were suddenly surprised by a destructive climate; conscious of the immense distance from their home, and knowing that the nations in their rear were hostilely inclined, they sank into a dejection great as their previous excitement had been, nor was there any authority that could any longer keep them in order. The question was not in this case that of a practical retreat which the commander was not capable of effecting, it was the edifice of universal monarchy falling on its daring projector!

But he is not a true general who cannot act in adversity as well as in prosperity; for warfare is such a succession of favourable and unfavourable chances, that he who is not as equal to the one as to the other is not fit to command an army for a fortnight. When General Bonaparte, amidst the fevers of Mantua, was attacked by the Austrians in the November of 1796, when with no more than 10,000 available troops he entered the marshes of Arcola to destroy the advantages of number, he displayed a firmness of mind and fertility of invention under difficulties which, most certainly, have not often been equalled. When at Essling, on the Danube, in 1809, the period when his great political errors were commencing, he was deprived of his bridges by an unusual swell of the river, he showed no want of firmness in adversity, when he fell back on the island of Lobau with imperturbable coolness. The resistance at Essling itself was a

prodigy effected by Lannes, who lost the effort, and of Masséna, who lost his life there, had God not made him fortunate as he was persevering; but it is Napoleon's firmness, which with the evacuation of Vienna and the demoralization of his generals, that discovered resources nearly others, adopted that firm and patient plan which restored victory to our standards at Wagram, and that firmness so much valued in Masséna in reality belonged to Napoleon. This moment presented one of those crises in warfare, the greatest and most glorious endured of all those whose remembrance has been preserved in history.

The most decisive of all proofs is the campaign of 1814, when Napoleon, with a handful of men, some exhausted, some raw recruits, opposed all Europe, not by heaving a stone, but by profiting by the false movements of the enemy, by retarding their progress by weak blows; and it furnishes another example of the fertility of resource, his presence of mind, and indomitable firmness in a desperate position. Napoleon certainly did not carry on a defensive war, like the greater number of generals, by retiring methodically from one line to another, defending the first well, then the second, then the third, and thus gain time, which is to be despised, though it is not sufficient for the successful termination of a crisis: he carried on defensive war as he did offensive; he fortified the ground, endeavoured to anticipate the enemy's movements, to surprise and overtake them, as he did Blücher and Schwarzenberg in 1814, and which would have secured his safety, but that all around him, men and things, were completely exhausted.

If he were not, correctly speaking, a general of retreats, because that, like Frederick, is considered attack the best mode of defence, he was as great in his unsuccessful as in his successful wars. In both he preserved the same vigour, daring, and promptitude in seizing the proper point of attack, and if he failed we must repeat that it was not as a soldier, but as a politician who had undertaken what was impossible of accomplishment.

Napoleon was no less great in the organization of his armies than in battle, and in the general direction of operations.

Before him, the generals of the Republic divided their armies into divisions composed of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and at the very utmost, reserved one division unengaged, composed like the others, and intended for any unexpected event. Each lieutenant-general fought a separate battle, the part of the commander-in-chief being confined to aid whenever should be in greatest need. By this plan defeats could be avoided, and even losses gained, but not one of those decisive battles which compel a nation to lay down its arms. Napoleon changed the organization of armies, and in such a way that the power of deciding a victory was in the hands of him who held the supreme command.

His army was divided into corps, of which the principal was composed of infantry, with a portion of artillery as a support, and some cavalry to clear the ground. Besides the Guard,—his usual reserve,—he formed masses of cavalry and artillery, to be employed like a

underbolt when the decisive moment should

When the Russian infantry appeared invincible at Eylau, he charged them with squadrons of cavalry and artillery, and made a breach that could not afterward be re-

When Bernadotte had allowed our

to be broken at Wagram, Napoleon, with

hundred pieces of ordnance, stopped the

glorious centre of the Archduke Charles, and

ended the battle, which Davout ended by

the plateau of Wagram. This was the

that he formed two reserves besides the

one composed of heavy cavalry, the

of artillery, à grande portée, which, in

and, resembled the club of Hercules. But

club of Hercules must be wielded by the

of Hercules, and with a general inferior

Napoleon this arrangement would often

had the inconvenience of depriving skil-

lieutenants of a special arm, of which they

might make successful use, and placing them

the hands of a commander who could not

employ them. Thus, all the generals of the

Republican army on the Rhine, being accus-

ed to act almost independently, having a

certain portion of each arm under his com-

mand, regretted the old arrangement; that is,

they regretted a state of things which, though

diminished the general result, gave each a

certain degree of importance.

The organization of an army does not alone

consist in the disposal of its different parts, but

also in recruiting and supporting it. Napo-

leon's skill in leading recruits from their vil-

lages to the banks of the Rhine, thence to

those of the Elbe, Vistula, or Niemen, in col-

lecting them in depots, watching over them

with extreme care, scarcely ever allowing one

to escape, and leading them as it were by the

hand to battle, was something extraordinary.

It consisted in an infallible memory of all de-

tails, in profound discernment of the neglect

or disobedience of subalterns, in a constant

endeavour to correct such faults, in an indefat-

igable strength of will, and in incessant labour,

which often consumed his nights, even when

the day had been passed on horseback. Notwith-

standing all these efforts, the roads were often

covered with deserters, which only showed how

the nature of things had been outraged when

men were transported from the banks of the

Tagus to those of the Volga.

To these different duties of a commander-in-

chief, there is another still to be added, that

of conquering the elements when snow-clad

mountains are to be traversed, broad and

rapid streams, and sometimes even the sea

itself, to be crossed. Antiquity has bequeathed

Hannibal's passage of the Pyrenees and Alps

to the admiration of mankind, and there is no

doubt but that nothing greater, or perhaps

even so great, has ever been accomplished.

The crossing of St. Bernard, the passage of

the Egyptian army through the English fleet,

the preparations for the expedition from Bou-

logne, and the crossing of the Danube at

Wagram, are great operations which will be

no less admired by posterity. The last, espe-

cially, will be an eternal subject of admiration.

The difficulty, on this occasion, consisted in

having to seek and fight the Austrians beyond

the Danube, in leading 150,000 men across

that broad stream, whilst 200,000 of the enemy

were waiting to force us back into the waves; nor was there any possibility of avoiding this danger by seeking a passage either above or below Vienna, as the first would bring the troops too much in advance, the second lead them too much to the rear. This difficulty was got over in a most wonderful manner. In three hours, 150,000 men and 500 pieces of cannon crossed the river in presence of a stupefied enemy, who did not think of attacking us until we had landed on the left bank and were in a position to oppose them. The passage of the St. Bernard, extraordinary as it was, could not be compared to Hannibal's crossing the Alps; but the passage of the Danube in 1809 equals any effort ever made to overcome the combined powers of nature and of man, and will be forever looked on as a prodigy of profound calculation executed with the calmest daring.

Full justice would not be done to Napoleon's military genius, if we did not add that to his various intellectual endowments he joined the power of ruling men's minds, of inspiring them with his passions, of subduing them as some great orator subdues his auditors, sometimes restraining, sometimes urging them forward, inspiring them with fresh courage when they falter, and ever holding them in check, as a skilful rider curbs a restive horse. He was not deficient in any intellectual or moral quality necessary to a great commander, and we may safely say that, had not Hannibal existed, he would have been without an equal.

To sum up what we have said of the progress of scientific warfare, we repeat that two men, Hannibal and Cæsar, carried that art to the highest degree in ancient times, but that Cæsar, impeded by his mode of encamping, showed less daring in his movements, less fertility of invention, and less perseverance in all phases of fortune than Hannibal; that in the Middle Ages, Charlemagne, though an excellent sovereign, does not fulfil the idea of a true general, because that military art was in too rude a state in his time, when almost all soldiers were horsemen, and had but a few archers to assist them; that it was with the development of the middle classes in towns that the infantry first sprung into existence, an event that took place first among the mountains of Switzerland, then in the German, Italian, and Dutch towns; that powder in destroying salient walls compelled the towns to lessen the height of their walls, and the subtle art of modern fortification arose; that it was then in attacking or defending towns that scientific warfare again appeared, in which art the Nassaus were the first teachers, and in which they displayed an intelligence and firmness admired even now, but that the art itself, being confined to the capture of fortresses, was still very timid; that in the sanguinary strife which sprung up in the north of Europe between Catholics and Protestants, and lasted thirty years, Gustavus Adolphus, opposing a brave and steady people to the Polish cavalry, gave a fresh impulse to the infantry; that when he came into Germany he made military art more daring, and less restricted to fortress-warfare, than in the time of the Nassaus; that in France, Condé, with a happy union of intelligence and daring, first displayed the real genius of battle-fields,

and Torenne that of great movements; but still the infantry was not sufficiently effective, because of being divided into musketeers and pikemen, till Vauban, in attaching the bayonet to the musket, enabled the infantry to be ranged in three ranks; the Prince of Anhalt-Dessau, being intrusted with the organization of the Prussian army, formed the modern battalion, which could discharge an extensive fire without presenting a dense body to the enemy; that Frederick adopted this plan, and, having to fight on the frontiers of Silesia and Bohemia, changed the classic order of battle, and was the first that adapted his troops to the nature of the ground; that, being alternately opposed to Austrians, Russians, and French, he enlarged the circle of operation, and was, consequently, the originator of two great improvements. He was succeeded by the French Revolution, which, having only popular masses to oppose to coalesced Europe, resisted by means of the number and impulse of the old armies; that the infantry, which is the expression of the development of nations, took a definite position in modern tactics, without depriving the scientific arms of theirs; that, finally, one extraordinary man, with a vast and profound, intellect and daring as the Revolution that gave him birth, carried military art to its ultimate perfection by profound meditation of the physical geography of the countries where war was being carried on, by always selecting the right position from which to strike an effective blow, by joining the science of general movements to the art of fighting according to the nature of the ground, by always seeking in the configuration of the ground or the enemy's position the opportunity for a great battle, by never hesitating to fight one, since it was the natural consequence of his general plan, by arranging these battles so well that each caused the overthrow of a great empire, which produced in him the most dangerous of all intoxications, that of conquest, which inspired the desire of universal monarchy, and occasioned his fall; so that this wise legislator, this skilful administrator and great captain, was, by reason of his very superiority, a bad politician, since, losing his reason in the midst of victory, he passed from triumph to triumph until he fell into an abyss.

If we now compare him to those great men his rivals, not in the special light of a general, but under the more general relation of talents and destiny, the subject assumes a wider, more moral, and more instructive aspect. If we wish to estimate him by his fame, by the importance of what he effected, the excitement he caused mankind, and the influence he exerted in the world, we must again seek his compeers in Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Charlemagne, and Frederick, and by close comparison between him and them our conception of his character will become fuller and more correct.

Alexander, inheriting his army from his father, and instructed in all the learning of the Greeks, whose applause he ardently desired, invaded Asia, where there were none but the feeble Persians to oppose him, and advanced to the limits of the then known world. Had not his soldiers prevented him, he would have proceeded to the Indian Ocean. Compelled to return, his sole desire was to recommence

his adventurous expeditions in his country, which had no need of conquests, that he thought, but having overrun the world as it was then known, his desire was to be celebrated at Athens. Although generous and hearted, he killed his friend Clitus, one of his best lieutenants, Philotas, and because in a thoughtless moment seemed to cast a doubt upon his fame was his object, the valued by a great man, and when, having time for his army to rest, he spent the pursuit of this sole aim of his charmed by the delights of Asia, fell into intoxication and to fever. He been captivated by his heroic life could be more tumultuously his, for he did not carry Greece beyond Ionia and Syria, where already planted, and he left Greece of anarchy, which only prepared conquest of the Romans. In a one would prefer being the wise Philopæmen, who did not seek attention, but who prolonged the of Greece, though it was but for

With Alexander's career, at a and so profitless, compare that the most extensive, the most the most energetic ever pursued mortal on whom God bestowed gifts of intellect and character, suited for the accomplishment was descended from a long line of whom had died in defence. His soul was of a metal tempering furnace of hatred which he around her. At nine years Carthage with his father, in gators, to live and die fighting a mans. War was the amusement. As a child he slept a battle, acquired for his body to pain, his soul became incarnate his mind acquired the power calmly amid the tumults of whilst in perfect repose. When brother-in-law had died Sigh country, though he was but two of age, the Carthaginian army as general, and almost forced to the senate, who were jealous of family of Barca. He assumed of this army, which he imbued sentiments of daring, firmness, the Romans, led it into Europe, then as the interior of Africa to cross the Pyrenees and Alps, men, of whom he lost two-thirds extraordinary passage, and, in profound conviction that it was Rome should be conquered, he her all the Italian towns that he submitted to her sway. He all man generals, inducing them camps by piquing the courage vanity of others, overcame every have triumphed over all, but opponent worthy of him in fact that it was not in battle, where cible, that this Titan was to be by perseverance, the essential

seeing that he had erred in calculating the Gauls, excitable and fickle like all the nations, advanced into the centre of Italy, rich and civilized towns governed by a senate, of which the people were jealous. Although an aristocrat himself, he destroyed the aristocratic party, bestowed the democracy, made Capua the centre of the empire, where he did not, as was his habit, sink into pleasures for which he had no time, but stopped to recover from fatigue and to collect the riches of the country; then, abandoned by his cowardly nation, he called the whole world to his aid, carried the war into Greece and Asia, destroyed all the forces against him, and maintained himself so long in his conquest for twelve years, that the Romans began to consider his presence in Italy as an incurable evil. But the time came when the Romans in their turn besieged the city of Carthage, and he was recalled to oppose his weakened army to the renovated forces of the Romans, and then, according to the course of human affairs, his matured judgment yielded to the rising fortune of Scipio. When he returned to his country, he attempted to reform it and render it equal to a renewal of the struggle with Rome. Denounced by the whole of the maladministration he attacked, he fled into the east, attempted to rouse the weakness of Antiochus, but he was pursued by the Romans; and when he found the struggle vain, he swallowed poison, and died the last of his family, all of whom had laid down their lives in the same sacred cause, resistance to foreign rule. In contemplating the career of this great man, endowed with talents so varied and courage so heroic, we look on every side to detect a fault, but in vain. We seek for some personal motive of pleasure, luxury, or ambition, but no other can be found than hatred to the enemies of his country. The Roman Livy accuses him of avarice and cruelty. Hannibal had amassed great riches, not for his own enjoyment, but to pay his army, composed of mercenaries, and the only mercenary army that never revolted, restrained as it was by his genius and by his wise distribution of the spoils of victory. It is true that he sent to Carthage several bushels of rings taken from the Roman knights who had fallen beneath the sword of the Carthaginians, but we do not hear of a single act of cruelty committed off the field of battle. The reproaches of the Roman historian become an eulogium, and posterity has said, what will be repeated to the latest times, that Hannibal has presented the world with the noblest spectacle that man can offer,—genius unsullied by egotism, and actuated alone by patriotism, to which Hannibal fell a glorious martyr.

History presents us with another martyr, not of patriotism but of ambition, a man of rare genius, possessing most seductive qualities, but laden with vices and guilty of the most fearful attempts against the constitution of his country. This was Caesar, the third great man of ancient times. Endowed with wonderful talents, brave, haughty, eloquent, refined, lavish and still simple in his greatness, but making little distinction between right and wrong, his only thought was to succeed where

Sylla and Marius had failed, to become, in a word, the master of his own country. Alexander sought to conquer the world; Hannibal to prevent the conquest of his country; Cæsar, a Roman, only thought of gaining the mastery of that Rome which had conquered almost the entire world. For this he employed the vilest arts; still he was not cruel, but his forbearance arose not from goodness of heart, but from policy, for he did not wish to recall the proscriptions of Marius and Sylla to the terrified imaginations of his countrymen. When seeking to become edile, prætor, and high-priest, he contracted immense debts in order to purchase the votes of his fellow-citizens. He corrupted wives and husbands, as he had endeavoured to corrupt the people. To all his other modes of corruption he studied to add the noblest of intellectual gifts, and became one of the most perfect of human orators. Become the delight and scandal of Rome, it was not possible for him to remain there longer. He joined with the avaricious Crassus and vain Pompey, whose weakness he ruled, and had himself appointed to the command of the army in Gaul, the only country that was left to be conquered within the limits assigned by nature to the Roman world. He conquered Gaul, not for the benefit of his country, which did not need such an addition, but that he might form for himself devoted soldiers, and acquire riches to pay his own debts and those of his needy partisans. Fighting during summer and intriguing during winter, he, from his quarters in Milan, swayed the vanity of Pompey and the avarice of Crassus, ruled the Roman world for ten years, and when Crassus died in Asia, and there was none to prevent the collision of his ambition with Pompey's, he first artfully tried to avoid a struggle of whose danger he was aware, but, when he found that impossible, he crossed the Rubicon, marched against Pompey, whose legions were in Spain, drove him from Italy into Epirus, where he turned, as he himself has well expressed it, *from a general without an army to encounter an army without a general*. He destroyed Pompey's legions, which were under the command of Afranius in Spain, returned then to Epirus, fought Pompey himself, and terminated at Pharsalia this struggle for the supreme command. The remnants of Pompey's party were still in Africa and Spain; these he conquered, and returned to Rome to triumph over all his enemies and found that great system called the Roman Empire, but was assassinated by the republicans because he prematurely sought to assume the name as well as the reality of supreme power. In this life, when a man's name is vicious so are the means by which he tries to attain it; but we must allow Cæsar the merit of having endeavoured to substitute the empire for the republic, not by blood, as Sylla and Marius had done, but by bribery and corruption suited to the Roman customs, and by intellectual powers corresponding to their taste. The distinctive characteristic of this wonderful man, of this great politician, great orator, great warrior, and especially this great profligate, clement without goodness, was that, regarded under every aspect, he was the most highly endowed being that ever appeared on this earth.

How many a page of the mighty tomes of

that it is they that render human society so fair, so attractive, so gentle, and so safe! What eyes that have once enjoyed the light would not love it? But when in the midst of profound darkness an eye that has never possessed this advantage anticipates, loves, seeks, and obtains illumination, and endeavours to reflect its rays around, we behold a prodigy worthy of the admiration and respect of mankind. Such is the spectacle presented by Charlemagne to the universe.

Born a barbarian in the midst of barbarians, who possessed, indeed, some rays of ancient science transmitted by the clergy, he was seized with the most glowing desire for what we call civilization, to which he gave another name, but loved as much and for the same reasons as we. At that time civilization was Christianity. To be a Christian in those days was equivalent to being a true philosopher, the friend of what was right, of justice, and of social liberty. Charlemagne was induced by all these motives to become a fervent Christian, and to endeavour to propagate Christianity throughout the barbarian world abandoned to brute force and the grossest sensuality. Austrasia, or the northeastern part of the uncultivated and ill-defined France of those days, was at war with the southeast, or Neustria, and both were opposed to the south, Aquitaine. France was threatened with fresh invasions from the barbarian Saxons on the north, and by the Arabs on the south, both very nearly, if not altogether, pagan nations. If a strong hand did not arrest their progress on the north or south, the rising kingdom of the Franks would be destroyed, the different nations which composed it would be again brought into contact with each other, and fresh invasions bear away the seeds of civilization which had been only just planted. Charlemagne resumed and completed the work of consolidation which his

ferent rulers. During that he sustained this great defatigable perseverance, to establish order, justice, at least, as they were the which purpose he sometimes assemblies which he year, sometimes the clergy ment of civilization, and representatives, his delegated agents of his and Convinced of the necessity knowing that among an laws cannot be enforced, whence flowed not the times, but that of his supply to these receptacles dance than he possessed, laborious virtues some which perhaps originated in the ge He established himself i were rich farms, and, sur dren, he lived there as a amiable as he was wise more good than a conquest was the model of a per his people, deserving the his undeviating exertion plishing more, perhaps, ever lived. After having terrible Alexanders and turned the whole world i fame than to serve may sure it is to turn to this benevolent figure, ever as in some work for the better whom we see subjected to that of beholding, towards the skirts of those terrible devastations he foresaw, time to repress them? no career on earth is

ruler of the English Revolution, nor V., with his dignity and good sense, equal the grandeur of those glorious men who have attempted to depict. We now compare two men, Frederick and Napoleon, whose twofold brilliancy of intellectual and military genius has placed, one near, the other on an equality with, the great men of antiquity. Frederick, the jesting skeptic, the leader of the philosophers of the eighteenth century, the despiser of all that is false in mankind, who turned his very greatness into ridicule, who was in some sort ashamed to defy, insult, and humble the Austrians and of the old system it represented—who dared, in the midst of that firmly-established Europe, in whose position it was so difficult to effect a change,—dared, we repeat, to effect the creation of a new Power, and the honour of succeeding, though opposed by the entire continent. His success is true, to the frivolity of the courts of France and Russia, and to the narrowness of the Austrian court; and, after having won a war of twenty years' duration, he found policy kept Europe in peace, succeeded in dividing Poland without a single shot. This Frederick is an original, striking character, who, though not deficient in great deeds, is deficient in greatness because he only changed the relation of power in the interior of the European Confederation, or because his mock-heroism is deficient in that dignity which impresses mankind. There is no lack of that in him which exceeded Frederick, and surpassed him in admiration he excited and the destruction he caused. It was reserved for the French Revolution, destined to change the aspect of European society, to produce a man who would attract the attention of the world as powerfully as Alexander, Cæsar, Hannibal, and Alexander possessed every qualification that attracts, excites, and fix the attention of the world, whether we consider the greatness of his career, the power he was destined to perform, the effect of the political convulsions he caused, the splendour, extent, and profundity of his career, or his majestic gravity of thought. Alexander, a Corsican gentleman, who received his gratuitous military education that the emperor bestowed on the sons of the nobility, had scarcely left school, when, in the first military tumult, he obtained the rank of lieutenant-in-chief, then left the Parisian army, that in Italy, conquered that country, then, successively destroyed all the efforts of the European Coalition, wrested from the Coalition the Peace of Campo-Formio, and then, going to fight, stood beside the Government of the Republic, he went to seek a new world in the East, passed through the English Channel, with five hundred ships, conquered Egypt, then thought of following Alexander's footsteps in the conquest of India; but when he recalled to the West by the renewal of the European war, after having attempted to imitate Alexander, he imitated and equalled him in crossing the Alps, again overpowered the Coalition, and compelled it to accept the Peace of Lunéville, and at thirty years of age, the son of a poor Corsican nobleman had

already run through a most extraordinary career. Become pacific for a while, he by his laws laid the basis of modern society, but again yielding to the impulses of his restless genius, he once more attacked Europe, vanquished her in three battles, Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland, set up and threw down kingdoms, placed the crown of Charlemagne on his head, and, when kings came to offer him their daughters, chose the descendant of the Cæsars, who presented him with a son that seemed destined to wear the most brilliant crown in the universe. He advanced from Cadiz to Moscow, where he was subjected to the greatest catastrophe on record, rose again, but was again defeated, and confined in a small island, from which he emerged with a few hundred faithful soldiers, recovered the crown of France in twenty days, struggled again against exasperated Europe, sank for the last time at Waterloo, and, having sustained greater wars than those of the Roman Empire, went—he, the child of a Mediterranean isle—to die in an island of the ocean, bound like Prometheus by the fear and hatred of kings to a rock. This son of a poor Corsican nobleman has indeed played in the world the parts of Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, and Charlemagne. He possessed as much genius as the greatest among them, acquired as much fame as the most celebrated, and, unfortunately, shed more blood than any of them. In a moral point of view, he is inferior to the best of these great men, but superior to the worst. His ambition was not as futile as that of Alexander nor as depraved as that of Cæsar, but it was not as respectable as Hannibal's, who sacrificed himself to save his country the misfortune of being conquered. His ambition was that usual with conquerors who seek to rule after having aggrandized their native land. Still he loved France, and cherished her glory as dearly as his own. As a ruler, he sought what was right, but sought it as a despot; nor did he pursue it with the consistency or religious perseverance of Charlemagne. In variety of talents he was inferior to Cæsar, who, being compelled to win over his fellow-citizens before ruling them, had to learn how to persuade as well as how to fight, and could speak, write, and act with a certain simple majesty. Napoleon, on the other hand, having acquired power by warfare, had no need of oratory, nor possibly, though endowed with natural eloquence, could he ever have acquired it, since he never would have taken the trouble of patiently analyzing his thoughts in presence of a deliberative assembly; but he could write as he thought,—with force and dignity, and even carefully, but he was sometimes a little declamatory like his mother the French Revolution; he argued with more force than Cæsar, but could not narrate with his extreme simplicity or exquisite taste. He was inferior to the Roman dictator in the variety of his talents, but superior as a general, both by his peculiar military genius, and by the daring profundity and inexhaustible fertility of his plans, in which he had but one equal or superior, (which, we cannot decide,) Hannibal; for he was as daring, as prudent, as subtle, as inventive, as terrible, and as obstinate as the Carthaginian general, with one advantage of living at a later period.

Succeeding to Hannibal, Cæsar, the Nassaus, Gustavus Adolphus, Condé, Turenne, and Frederick, he brought military art to its ultimate perfection. God alone can estimate the respective merits of such men; all we can do is to sketch some prominent traits of their wonderful characters.

Napoleon has claims on us Frenchmen, claims which we can neither disavow nor forget, to whatever party we may be attached by birth, conviction, or interest. Certainly, in organizing our social state by the Civil Code, and regulating our administration according to its conditions, he did not give us the political form in which French society was to repose definitely, and live peacefully, prosperously, and free; he did not give us liberty, which is still due to us from his heirs; but on the morrow of the French Revolution he could do no more than restore order, and we must thank him for having given us, with that, our civil position and administrative organization. Unfortunately for him and us, he diminished our greatness, but he left us glory, which constitutes moral power, and which in time will restore material greatness. He was by his genius fitted for France, and France for him. What they have done together could not have been accomplished by the French army without him, nor by him without the French army. Author of our reverses, but companion of our exploits, we must judge him with severity, but at the same time we must entertain for him the sentiments of soldiers for the general who has long conducted them to victory. Let us study his great deeds which are our own, let us learn from him, if we are soldiers, the art of guiding armies, if we are statesmen, how to govern empires; let us learn above all from his faults; let us avoid his example, and learn to love moderate greatness, that which is attainable, and is durable because not insupportable to others; in a word, let us learn moderation from this most ambitious of men. Let us, as citizens, draw this last and memorable lesson from his life, that, however great, wise, or boundless the genius of any man may be, the destiny of a country should never be entirely intrusted to his power. We most assuredly are not of the number of those who blame Napoleon for wresting France on the 18th Brumaire from the hands of the Directory, in which she might have perished; but it does not follow because it was well to wrest the country from weak and corrupt hands, that it should be delivered over unconditionally into the daring and powerful grasp of the conqueror of Rivoli and Marengo. If any nation ever had an excuse for placing itself in the power of one man, it was France


when in 1800 she adopted Napoleon as chief. It was no pretended aim raised as a bugbear to terrify the chains. Alas, no! thousands of men had been sacrificed on the scaffold, sons of the Abbey, or in the waters. The horrors of barbarism had appeared in the midst of a terrified and even when these horrors had subsided, the French Revolution oscillate between the axe of the guillotine from whom it had been wrung, and the emigrants who wished to effect movement over a blood-stained and an unattainable Past, and all the threatening swords of foreigners and the chaos.

At this very time there returned East a young hero, full of gall, conquered nature and men who appeared, and who, wise, modest, seemed formed to captivate. There never, certainly, was a hero for intrusting power to a single man, was terror more real than that which French society, never was genius, that to which Frenchmen turned. After a few years, this great wise man, mad with a different but not less frenzied than that of '83, a million lives on the field, excited all Europe against him, was left vanquished on the field, blood and stripped of the fruits of victory, and with no hope of life but in the few seeds of modern democracy deposited in her bosom. Who can see that the sage of 1800 would be a madman of 1812 and 1815? We have been foreseen by any man, remembered that the possession of power is ever accompanied by an insatiable ambition that aims at grasping because every thing is within its grasp, that this frenzy often leads to the triumph of evil, him who had before wished power to do good. The life of Napoleon is so instructive for soldiers, rulers, statesmen, contains a lesson also for us, teaches them that they ought never to intrust their country to the power of one man, matter who he may be, no matter the circumstances! This is the cry from my heart, the sincere wish to conclude this long history of our reverses, and which I hope will be the heart of every Frenchman, is him never to sacrifice his liberty, at the risk of doing so, by abusing it.

THE END.









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